FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1961–1963, VOLUME XXI, AFRICA Foreign Relations of the United States Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State Title page Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963 Volume XXI Africa United States Government Printing Office Washington U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian Bureau of Public Affairs Please visit the Office of the Historian ebooks web page to access updates. Africa (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXI) Contents Preface List of Unpublished Sources List of Abbreviations List of Persons Africa North Africa Region (Documents 1-34) Algeria (Documents 35-90) Libya (Documents 91-107) Morocco (Documents 108-157) Tunisia (Documents 158-186) Africa Region (Documents 187-222) Ghana (Documents 223-253) Guinea (Documents 254-269) Horn of Africa (Documents 270-310) Southern Africa Region (Documents 311-319) Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Documents 320-346) Portuguese Africa (Documents 347-373) South Africa (Documents 374-426) Index List of Unpublished Sources List of Unpublished Sources Department of State Indexed Central Files . Through January 1963, the Department of State continued to use the decimal central file system. In February 1963, the Department changed to a subject-numeric central file system. For the period January 1961-January 1963, documents in classes 200 (protection of interests), 300 (international organizations and conferences), 400 (trade relations), 500 (cultural relations), 600 (international relations), 700 (internal political and national defense affairs), 800 (internal economic and social affairs), and 900 (communications, transportation, science) were searched for decimal combinations involving U.S. relations with North Africa (country nos. 51S and 70 through 73) and Sub-Saharan Africa (nos. 45A through 45X, 70A through 70X, 75 through 79). Files covering the African relationships of the United States (no. 11), the United Kingdom (no. 41), and France (no. 51) were also examined. Other files and related subfiles searched for relevant materials for this period include 033 (official visits); 110.11 through 110.15 (Department of State senior officials' files); and 123 (Department of State personnel files). Other documents were located through pursuing cross-references and referenced telegrams. In the February-December 1963 central files, the major files searched included AID (aid), DEF (defense affairs), ORG (organization and administration), POL (political affairs and relations), REF (refugees and migration), SOC (social conditions), and SP (space vehicle tracking) for Africa (AFR), Algeria (ALG), Angola (ANG), Libya (LIBYA), Ethiopia (ETH), Ghana (GHANA), Guinea (GUIN), Morocco (MOR) Mozambique (MOZ), Portugal (PORT), the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (RHOD & NYAS), Somalia (SOMALI), South Africa (S AFR), South West Africa (SW AFR), and Tunisia (TUN). A list of the most important central files cited in this volume follows: 033.7711: Somali Prime Minister Abdirashid Ali Shermarche's visit to Washington 110.15-WI: Assistant Secretary Williams' visits to the region 330.00: U.N. Security Council 601.70X11: South African diplomatic representation in the United States 611.3722: U.S. blockade of Cuba 611.41, 611.45A, 611.45C, 611.45J, 611.45X, 611.51, 611.70X, 611.71, and 611.72: U.S. relations with the United Kingdom, the Union of South Africa, Rhodesia, Ghana, South West Africa, France, the Republic of South Africa (after May 31, 1961, the Republic of South Africa), Morocco, and Tunisia, respectively. 637.51S: Cuban relations with Algeria 641.70: United Kingdom relations with Africa 651.51S: French relations with Algeria 675.77: Ethiopian relations with Somalia 745A.00, 745C.00, 745J.00, 745X.00, 751S.00, 753N.00, 770.00, 770B.00, 771.00, 772.00, 773.00, and 775.00: General political conditions in South Africa, Rhodesia, Ghana, South West Africa, Algeria, Angola, Africa, Guinea, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, and Ethiopia, respectively. 745J.11: Ghana President Kwame Nkrumah 770.5, 770.5-MSP, 770.5245J, 770.54, 770.5411, 770.56: African national defense, military assistance for Africa, troop movements in Africa, and U.S. bases in Africa 770B.11: Guinea President Sekou Toure 770B.5-MSP: Military assistance for Guinea 771.11: King Hassan II of Morocco 771.5; 771.5-MSP; 771.56; 771.5622; 771.56311: Moroccan national defense, military assistance for Morocco, U.S. bases in Morocco 772.11: Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba 772.5; 772.56; 772.56351: Tunisian national defense, military assistance for Tunisia, French base (Bizerte) in Tunisia 773.5; 773.5-MSP; 773.56; 773.56311: Libyan national defense, military assistance for Libya, U.S. bases in Libya 775.5; 775.56311; 775A.56311: Ethiopian national defense, military assistance for Ethiopia, U.S. bases in Ethiopia 777.5; 777.5-MSP: Somali national defense, military assistance for Somalia 845J.26, 845J.2610: 845J.2614; 845J.2624: Ghana/Volta Dam project 845J.394: Ghana/VALCO project AID (US) GUIN, AID (US) LIBYA, AID (US) TUN: U.S. economic assistance to Guinea, Libya, and Tunisia, respectively AID 6 SOMALI: Communist bloc aid to Somalia DEF 12 SOMALI, DEF 12-5 S AFR: Arms supplies to Somalia and South Africa, respectively DEF 15-4 ETH-US, DEF 15 LIBYA-US, DEF 15 MOR-US, DEF 15-10 MOR-US: U.S. bases in Ethiopia, Libya, and Morocco, respectively DEF 19-3 US-ETH, DEF 19-3 US-MOR, DEF 19 SOMALI, DEF 19 US-SOMALI, DEF 19-3 US-SOMALI: U.S. military assistance to Ethiopia, Morocco, and Somalia, respectively DEF 19-6 SOMALI: Communist bloc military assistance to Somalia ORG 7 AF: Visits of U.S. officials to the region POL AFR-PORT: General Portuguese-African relations POL AFR-US, POL ALG-US, POL GHANA-US, POL GUIN-US, POL LIBYA-US, POL MOR-US: General U.S. relations with Africa, Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, Libya, and Morocco, respectively POL ALG-CUBA: General Algerian-Cuban relations POL 1 AFR, POL 1 ALG, POL ETH, POL RHOD & NYAS, and POL S AFR: General policy for Africa, Algeria, Ethiopia, Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and South Africa, respectively POL 1 FR-TUN: General Franco-Tunisian relations POL 7 ALG, POL 7 ETH, POL 7 LIBYA, POL 7 MOR, POL 7 RHOD & NYAS, POL 7 SOMALI: Meetings with Algerian officials, meetings with Ethiopian officials, meetings with Libyan officials, meetings with Moroccan officials, meetings with Rhodesian officials, and meetings with Somali officials, respectively POL 10 PORT-AFRICA, POL 10 PORT-UN: Portuguese colonial policy in Africa, U.N. consideration of Portuguese colonial policy POL 15-1 LIBYA: Libyan head of state/executive branch POL 15-1 MOR: Moroccan head of state/executive branch POL 15-1 S AFR: South African head of state/executive branch POL 15-5 S AFR: South African constitution POL 16 RHOD & NYAS: Independence of the territories of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland POL 17 US-AFR: U.S. diplomatic representation in Africa POL 17-1 GHANA: Diplomatic representation, Ghana POL 17-4 ALG: Algerian ceremonial and social affairs POL 17-4 US-S AFR: U.S. Independence Day celebrations in South Africa POL 19 BAS: Administration of the dependent territory of Basutoland POL 19 RHOD & NYAS, POL 19 RHOD & NYAS-UN: Administration of the dependent territories of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, U.N. consideration of the administration of the dependent territories of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland POL 19 SW AFR-UN: U.N. consideration of the administration of the dependent territory of South West Africa POL 26 ALG: Rebellion in Algeria POL 32-1 ALG-MOR: Algerian-Moroccan border conflict POL 32-1 ETH-SOM: Ethiopian-Somali border conflict Lot Files . Documents from the central files have been supplemented by lot files of the Department, which are decentralized files created by operating areas. A list of the principal lot files cited in this volume follows: AF/AFC Files: Lot 65 D 189 Subject files on Mozambique for 1962, as maintained by the Office of Cental African Affairs. AF/AFI Files: Lot 64 D 467 Files of the U.N. Adviser for African Affairs pertaining to the 17th United Nations General Assembly, as maintained by the Office of Inter-African Affairs. AF/AFN Files: Lot 63 D 250 Subject files on Morocco for the years 1956-1962, as maintained by the Office of Northern African Affairs. AF/AFN Files: Lot 65 D 182 Algerian Desk and Algerian regional files for the years 1959-1962, as maintained by the Office of Northern African Affairs. AF/AFW Files: Lot 66 D 53 Ghana Desk files for the years 1960-1962, as maintained by the Office of West African Affairs. AF/S Files: 66 D 344 Subject files on South West Africa, the High Commission Territories, and Southern Africa refugees for the years 1944-1964, as maintained by the Office of Southern African Affairs. Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366 Records of official visits by heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States, and international conferences attended by the President or Secretary of State, 1961, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat. Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533 Records of official visits by heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States, and international conferences attended by the President or Secretary of State, 1962, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat. Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110 Records of official visits by heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States, and international conferences attended by the President or Secretary of State, 1961-1964, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat. INR-NIE Files Files retained by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research containing copies of National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates. Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204 Exchanges of correspondence between the President and Secretary of State and heads of foreign governments, 1953-1964, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat. President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149 Cleared memoranda of Presidential conversations with foreign visitors, 1956-1964, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat. Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192 Files of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, 1961-1969, including texts of speeches, miscellaneous correspondence files, White House correspondence, chronological files, and memoranda of telephone conversations. Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330 Chronological collections of the memoranda of conversations of the Secretaries of State and Under Secretaries of State for the years 1961-1964, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat. Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 66 D 147 Records of the Secretary of State's Staff Meetings, 1961-1963, and additional ad hoc meetings, reports, papers, and memoranda of Chester Bowles' telephone conversations. S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199 Files of the Policy Planning Council for the years 1963-1964. S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351 Serial master file of National Security Council documents and correspondence, and related Department of State memoranda for the years 1947-1961, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat. S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265 Master set of papers pertaining to National Security Council meetings, including policy papers, position papers, and administrative documents for the years 1961-1966, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat. S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316 Master file of National Security Action Memoranda (NSAMs) for the years 1961-1968, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat. S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95 Administrative and miscellaneous National Security Council files, including NSC Records of Action, 1947-1963, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat. S/S Policy Guidelines: Lot 67 D 396 Master file of Guidelines for Policy and Operations Papers, 1961-1966. State-JCS Meetings: Lot 70 D 328 Top Secret records of meetings between representatives of the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the years 1959-1963, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat. Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas Papers of President Lyndon B. Johnson, National Security File South Africa Country File Vice Presidential Security File John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts Ball Papers Papers of George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, 1961, and Under Secretary of State, 1961-1963, consisting of records of telephone conversations during his tenure as Under Secretary. Cleveland Papers Papers of Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, 1961-1965. National Security Files Brubeck Series Countries Series: Africa, Algeria, Angola, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Morocco, Portugal, Rhodesia, Somalia, South Africa Meetings and Memoranda Series President's Appointment Books President's Office Files Countries Series: Algeria, Ethiopia Security, Ghana Security, Guinea Security, Morocco Security, Somali Republic, South Africa Staff Memoranda: Dungan, Ralph A.; Komer, Robert W. Schlesinger Papers Papers of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Special Assistant to President Kennedy, 1961-1963. National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. Taylor Papers Papers of General Maxwell D. Taylor, the President's Military Representative, 1961-1962; and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1962-1964 Princeton University, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton, New Jersey Stevenson Papers Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, 1961-1963 Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland Record Group 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense OASD/ISA Files:FRC 64 A 2382 General and country files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs for 1961. OASD/ISA Files:FRC 65 A 3501 General and country files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs for 1962. OASD/ISA Files:FRC 67 A 4564 General and country files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs for 1963. OASD/ISA Files:FRC 73 A 2226 Africa regional files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1963-1971. OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464 Records of the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary, and their Special Assistants, 1961. OSD Files: FRC 65 B 3463 Records of the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and their Special Assistants, 1961. OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542 Records of the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and their Special Assistants, 1962. OSD Files: FRC 69 A 3131 Records of the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and their Special Assistants, 1963. Central Intelligence Agency, Langley, Virginia Director of Central Intelligence Files: Job 80 B 01285A Files of John A. McCone, 1962-1965 Central Intelligence Agency Files: Job 79 R 1012 Central Intelligence Agency Files: Job 79 R 01012A List of Abbreviations List of Abbreviations AF/AFN, Office of Northern African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State AF/AFW, Office of West Coast and Malian Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State AFB, Air Force Base AFN, Office of Northern African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State AFP, Agence France Presse AID, Agency for International Development ALN, Armee de la Liberation Nationale; National Army of Liberation (Algeria) AMR, Atlantic Missile Range ANC, African National Congress ARMA, Army Attache BB, initials of Ben Bella BNA, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State CAB, Civil Aeronautics Board CAC, United Nations Advisory Committee on the Congo CARE-MEDICO, Cooperative for American Remittances to Everywhere—Medical International Cooperation CCC, Commodity Credit Corporation CENTO, Central Treaty Organization CG, Consulate General CIA, Central Intelligence Agency CINCLANT, Commander in Chief, Armed Forces, Atlantic CINCSAC, Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command ColOff, Colonial Office COMAFELM, Commander, Air Force, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean COMNAVACTS, Commander of Naval Activities ConGen, Consulate General CONUS, Continental United States CPP, Convention People's Party (Ghana) Cte, Committee CU, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State CY, calendar year DAC, Development Assistance Committee (OECD) DCI, Director of Central Intelligence Depcirtel, Department of State circular telegram Dept, Department of State Deptel, Department of State telegram DG, Director General DL, Development Loan DLF, Development Loan Fund DOD, Department of Defense ECA, Economic Commission for Africa ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council of the United Nations EEC, European Economic Community (Common Market) Embtel, Embassy telegram EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State EUR/WE, Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State Exim, Export-Import Bank FAA, Federal Aviation Agency FBO, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Buildings FLN, Front de Liberation Nationale (Algeria) FonOff, Foreign Office FRC, Federal Records Center FRG, Federal Republic of Germany FRIA, international consortium operating a bauxite aluminum plant at Kimbo, Guinea FY, fiscal year FYI, for your information GA, United Nations General Assembly GDR, German Democratic Republic GMT, Greenwich Mean Time GOA, Government of Algeria GOF, Government of France GOG, Government of Ghana; Government of Guinea GOL, Government of Libya GOM, Government of Morocco GOP, Government of Portugal GOT, Government of Tunisia GPRA, Gouvernement Provisoire de la Republique Algerienne (Provisional Government of the Government of Algeria) GRAE, Government of the Republic of Angola in Exile GRN, Government of Rhodesia and Nyasaland GSA, Government of South Africa GSR, Government of the Somali Republic HIM, His Imperial Majesty HMG, Her Majesty's Government IATA, International Air Transport Association IATSG, International Air Transport Study Group IBRD, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) ICA, International Cooperation Administration ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization ICFTU, International Confederation of Free Trade Unions ICJ, International Court of Justice IEG, Imperial Ethiopian Government ILO, International Labor Organization IMF, International Monetary Fund INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff JCSM, Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum JFK, initials of John F. Kennedy JTF, Joint Task Force LA, Latin America MAAG, Military Assistance Advisory Group MAP, Military Assistance/Aid Program MATS, Military Air Transport Service Memcon, Memorandum of Conversation MIG, A.I. MIkoyan i M.I. Gurevich (Soviet fighter aircraft maned for designers Mikoyan and Gurevich MNA, Mouvement Nationaliste Algerienne MOD, Ministry of Defense MPLA, Mouvement Populaire pour la Liberation d'Angola (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola NAC, North Atlantic Council NASA, National Aeronautics and Space Administration NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization NBC, National Broadcasting Company NFD, Northern Frontier District (Kenya) NIE, National Intelligence Estimate Noforn, no foreign dissemination NR, Northern Rhodesia NSAM, National Security Action Memorandum NSC, National Security Council NYT, New York Times OAS, Organization Armee Secrete (Algeria) OASD/ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs OAU, Organization of African Unity OCAM, Afro-Malagasy Common Organization (francophone grouping) OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development OPLAN, operation plan OSD/ISA, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Bureau of International Security Affairs PAC, Pan-Africanist Congress (South Africa) PAFMECA, Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa PAG, Provisional Algerian Government PC, Patrol Vessel, Submarine Chaser PGAR, Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic PL, Public Law PM, Prime Minister POLAD, Political Adviser Polto, series indicator for telegrams from the United States Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council to the Department of State PROVEX, Provisional Executive (Algeria) RCA, Radio Corporation of America RG, Record Group RMA, Royal Moroccan Army RMAF, Royal Moroccan Air Force RSAF, Republic of South Africa SA, South Africa SAA, Special Assignment Aircraft SAAF, South African Air Force SAC, Strategic Air Command SAG, South African Government SC, United Nations Security Council SCP, Security Classification Procedure Secto, series indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State when he is away from Washington Sov, Soviet SR, Southern Rhodesia S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State SWA, South West Africa SWAPO, South West Africa Peoples Organization SYG, Secretary-General of the United Nations TIAS, Treaties and Other International Acts Series Topol, series indicator for telegrams from the Department of State to the United States Permanent Representative at the North Atlantic Council Tosec, series indicator for telegrams to the Secretary of State when he is away from Washington TVA, Tennessee Valley Authority UAM, Union Africaine et Malagache (African and Malagasy Union) UAR, United Arab Republic UGTA, Union Generale des Travailleurs Algeriens (General Union of Algerian Workers) UK, United Kingdom UN, United Nations UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization UNIP, United National Independence Party in Northern Rhodesia UNSYG, United Nations Secretary-General UPA, Union des Populations d'Angola (Union of Angolan Populations) UPI, United Press International USAF, United States Air Force USCINCEUR, United States Commander in Chief, Europe USG, United States Government USIA, United States Information Agency USN, United States Navy USNAVEUR, United States Naval Forces, Europe USOM, United States Operations Mission USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics USSTRICOM, United States Strike Command USUN, United States Mission at the United Nations VALCO, Volta Aluminum Company, Ltd. WE, Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State ZAPU, Zimbabwe African Peoples Union List of Persons List of Persons Abdirashid Ali Shermarche, Prime Minister of Somalia Adoula, Cyrille, Congolese Minister of the Interior until July 1961; Prime Minister of the Congo from August 1961 Alphand, Herve, French Ambassador to the United States Attwood, William H., Ambassador to Guinea until May 1963 Balafrej, Ahmed, Moroccan Foreign Minister Balewa, Sir Abubakar Tafawa, Prime Minister of Nigeria Ball, George W., Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs from February until December 1961; thereafter Under Secretary of State Banda, Hastings, Prime Minister of Malawi from 1963 Bell, David E., Director of the Bureau of the Budget from January 1961 until December 1962; thereafter Administrator of the Agency for International Development Ben Bella, Ahmed, President and Prime Minister of Algeria Bonsal, Phillip W., Ambassador to Morocco from May 1961 until August 1962 Bourguiba, Habib, President of Tunisia Bowles, Chester B., Under Secretary of State until December 3, 1961; President's Special Representative and Adviser on African, Asian, and Latin American Affairs and Ambassador at Large until July 19, 1963; thereafter Ambassador to India Brown, L. Dean, Deputy Director, Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, from July until December 1961 Brubeck, William H., Deputy Executive Secretary, Department of State, from August 1961 until May 1962; Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Executive Secretary from May 1962 until July 1963; thereafter Member of National Security Council Staff Bruce, David K.E., Ambassador to the United Kingdom from March 1961 Buffum, William B., Deputy Director, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, until November 1963; thereafter Director of that office Bundy, McGeorge, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from January 1961 Burdett, William C., Jr., Director, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, until September 1962; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Caccia, Sir Harold, British Ambassador to the United States until October 1961 Cleveland, J. Harlan, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs from February 1961 Coote, Wendell B., Deputy Director, Office of Western African and Malagasy Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, from June 1961 until January 1962; Couve de Murville, Maurice, French Foreign Minister De Gaulle, Charles, President of France Dean, Sir Patrick, United Kingdom Permanent Representative at the United Nations Deming, Olcott H., Director, Office of Eastern and Southern African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, until August 1962; Ambassador to Uganda from January 1963 Dillon, C. Douglas, Secretary of the Treasury from January 1961 Dulles, Allen W., Director of Central Intelligence until November 1961 Dumont, Donald A., Deputy Director, Office of Western African and Malagasy Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, from September 1961 until October 1962; thereafter Ambassador to Burundi Dungan, Ralph A., Special Assistant to the President Eisenhower, Dwight D., President of the United States until January 20, 1961 Elbrick, C. Burke, Ambassador to Portugal until August 1963 Ferguson, C. Vaughan, Jr., Director, Office of Western African and Malagasy Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, from June 1961 until December 1962; Ambassador to the Malagasy Republic from January 1963 Ferguson, John H., Ambassador to Morocco from October 1962 Field, Winston, Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia from 1962 Franco, Generalissimo Francisco, Chief of State and Prime Minister of Spain Fredericks, J. Wayne, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from May 1961 Gilpatric, Roswell L., Deputy Secretary of Defense from January 1961 Godley, G. McMurtrie, Director, Office of Central African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, from September 1962 Greenhill, Denis, Counselor at the British Embassy Haile Selassie I, Emperor of Ethiopia Hamilton, Fowler, Administrator of the Agency for International Development from September 1961 until December 1962 Harriman W. Averell, Ambassador at Large from February until December 1961; Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs from December 1961 until April 1963; thereafter Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Hassan II, King of Morocco Herter, Christian A., Secretary of State until January 20, 1961 Hilsman, Roger, Jr., Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, from February 1961 until April 1963; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Home, Lord (Alexander Frederick Douglas-Home), British Foreign Secretary until October 1963 Hooper, Peter, Jr., Officer in Charge of Algerian Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State Houphouet-Boigny, Felix, President of Ivory Coast and Minister of Defense, the Interior, and Agriculture Johnson, Lyndon B., President of the United States from November 22, 1963 Johnson, U. Alexis, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from April 1961 Jones, John Wesley, Ambassador to Libya until December 1962 Kaiser, Philip M., Ambassador to Senegal from July 1961 Kayibanda, Gregoire, President and Prime Minister of Rwanda from October 1961 Kaysen, Carl, Member of the National Security Council Staff from June until December 1961; thereafter Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Keita, Modibo, President of Mali Kennedy, John F., President of the United States from January 20, 1961 until November 22, 1963 Kohler, Foy D., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until August 1962 Komer, Robert W., Member of the National Security Council Staff Korry, Edward M., Ambassador to Ethiopia from April 1963 Khrushchev, Nikita S., Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers LeMay, General Curtis E., USAF, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, Joint Chiefs of Staff, from June 1961 Lemnitzer, General Lyman L., USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until September 1962 Lightner, E. Allan, Ambassador to Libya from May 1963 Lumumba, Patrice, leader of the Congo National Movement (MNC); first Prime Minister of independent Congo Republic; murdered in February 1961 Luthuli, Albert John, South African nationalist leader; President of the African Nationalist Congress (ANC) Lynch, Andrew G., Ambassador to Somalia until May 1962 MacKnight, Jesse M., Director, Office of Eastern and Southern African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, from August 1963 Macmillan, Harold, British Prime Minister until October 1963 Mahoney, William P., Ambassador to Ghana from June 1962 McClintic, Stephen H., Officer in Charge of Moroccan Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State McCone, John A., Director of Central Intelligence from November 1961 McGhee, George C., Counselor of the Department of State and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council from February until December 1961; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from December 1961 until March 1963 McNamara, Robert S., Secretary of Defense from January 1961 Newsom, David D., Director, Office of Northern African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, from September 1963 Nkomo, Joshua, Rhodesian nationalist leader; President of the banned Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) Nkrumah, Kwame, President of Ghana Nyerere, Julius, President of Tanganyika from December 1962 Obote, A. Milton, Prime Minister of Uganda Ormsby Gore, Sir David, British Ambassador to the United States from November 1961 Palmer, Joseph, II, Ambassador to Nigeria Porter, William J., Ambassador to Algeria from December 1962 Post, Richard St. F., Officer in Charge of Libya Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, until April 1962; Officer in Charge of Ethiopian Affairs from March 1963 Poullada, Leon B., Ambassador to Togo from July 1961 Read, Benjamin H., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Executive Secretary of the Department from August 1963 Richards, Arthur L., Ambassador to Ethiopia until November 1962 Roberto, Holden, leader of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) Root, John F., Deputy Director, Office of Northern African Affairs, Department of State, until August 1962 Rostow, Walt W., Counselor of the Department of State and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council from December 1961 Rusk, Dean, Secretary of State from January 1961 Russell, Francis H., Ambassador to Ghana from January 1961 until March 1962; Ambassador to Tunisia from October 1962 Salazar, Antonio de Oliveira, Prime Minister of Portugal Satterthwaite, Joseph C., Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs until February 1961; thereafter Ambassador to the Republic of South Africa Savimbi, Jonas, leader of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) Senghor, Leopold Sedar, President of Senegal Sisco, Joseph J., Director, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, from July 1961 until November 1963; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Smith, Bromley K., Executive Secretary of the National Security Council Stevenson, Adlai E., U.S. Representative to the United Nations Tasca, Henry J., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs until May 1965 Taylor, General Maxwell D., USA, President's Military Representative until October 1962; thereafter Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Thant, U, Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations from November 1961 until November 1962; thereafter Secretary-General Thompson, Llewellyn E., Ambassador at Large from October 1962 Torbert, Horace G., Jr., Ambassador to Somalia from January 1963 Toure, Sekou, President of Guinea Trimble, William C., Director, Office of West Coast and Malian Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, from September 1962 Tyler, William R., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from May 1961 until September 1962; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Vance, Sheldon B., Director, Office of Central African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, from June 1961 until August 1962 Verwoerd, Hendrik F., Prime Minister of South Africa Villard, Henry S., Ambassador to Senegal until April 1961 Walmsley, Walter N., Ambassador to Tunisia until July 1962 Welensky, Sir Roy, Prime Minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland until 1963 Whitehead, Edgar, Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia until 1962 Williams, G. Mennen, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from January 1961 Wine, James, Ambassador to the Ivory Coast from November 1962 Witman, William, II, Director, Office of Northern African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, until April 1962 Wright, Thomas K., Ambassador to Mali from January until December 1961 Yost, Charles W., Ambassador to Morocco until March 1961; thereafter Deputy Representative at the U.N. Security Council and Representative at the U.N. General North Africa Region North Africa Region 1. Briefing Paper Prepared in the Department of State Washington, undated. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110. Confidential. Drafted by Root; cleared by Valdes, McBride, and Witman; and approved by Collopy. This paper was part of the Briefing Book prepared for the President's visit to France May 31-June 2, 1961. 2. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Fredericks) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, August 11, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1480A/8-1161. Secret. Drafted by Root and sent through the Executive Secretariat. Copies were sent to Bowles, Ball, and Johnson. 3. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic Washington, January 29, 1963, 4:30 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770.00/1-2963. Secret. Drafted by Newsom, cleared by Davies, and approved by Williams. Repeated to Benghazi, Tripoli, Tunis, and London and pouched to Algiers and Rabat. 4. Paper by the Officer in Charge of Tunisian Affairs (Stackhouse) Washington, July 26, 1963. Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, AF-1963. Confidential. A handwritten marginal notation on the source text indicates that the paper was discussed at the Secretary's Policy Planning meeting on July 30. 5. Report Prepared by the Policy Planning Council Washington, September 23, 1963. Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, Basic National Security Policy 1963. Confidential. 6. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Washington, October 14, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria, Proposed Ben Bella Visit. Confidential. 7. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria Washington, October 14, 1963, 7:17 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ALG-MOR. Confidential. Drafted by McClintic and approved by Newsom. Also sent to Rabat, Paris, and Tunis. 8. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria Washington, October 15, 1963, 6:52 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ALG-MOR. Confidential. Drafted by Hooper and approved by Williams. Also sent to Rabat and repeated to Paris and Tunis. 9. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France Washington, October 18, 1963, 7:18 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ALG-MOR. Secret. Drafted by Hooper, cleared by Sisco and Davis, and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Tunis, Algiers, Rabat, Addis Ababa, Bern, and USUN. 10. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Military Aide (Clifton) for President Kennedy Washington, October 19, 1963, 2:30 p.m. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria, 10/63. Secret. A handwritten note on the source text reads: “President saw.” 11. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco Washington, October 19, 1963, 7:31 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ALG-MOR. Confidential. Drafted by McClintic, cleared by Marvin, and approved by Hooper. Repeated to Algiers, Tunis, Paris, and Madrid. 12. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, October 21, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria, 10/63. Secret. 13. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Washington, October 21, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria, 10/63. Secret. A handwritten notation by Komer to Bundy in the margin of the source text reads: “MAC—this is way of informing JFK that we're being solicited, and that we propose to stall.” 14. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria Washington, October 22, 1963, 7:40 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ALG-MOR. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Newsom, cleared by Newsom and Hilliker, and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Rabat, Cairo, and Paris. 15. Memorandum for the Record Washington, October 23, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria, 10/63. Secret. Drafted by Robert W. Komer. Copies were sent to Bundy, Williams, and Newsom. 16. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco Washington, October 23, 1963, 6:18 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-3 US-MOR. Secret. Drafted by Haynes and Newsom, cleared by Heffner (DOD), and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Paris, Algiers, and USUN. 17. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts Washington, October 23, 1963, 6:58 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ALG-MOR. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Newsom and Stackhouse; cleared by Sisco, Davies, Imhof, Ortiz, Meade, and Heffner (DOD); and approved by Tasca. Sent to Nouakchott, Dakar, Accra, Conakry, Bamako, Niamey, Lagos, Dar-es-Salaam, Addis Ababa, Tunis, Tripoli, Cairo, Amman, Damascus, Baghdad, Kuwait, Jidda, Khartoum, Taiz, and USUN. Repeated to Rabat and Algiers and pouched to Madrid, Paris, and London. 18. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Washington, October 24, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria, 10/63. Secret. 19. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, October 24, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria, 10/63. Secret. 20. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Washington, October 25, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Morocco, 10/63. Secret. 21. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco Washington, October 25, 1963, 6:37 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ALG-MOR. Secret. Drafted by Hooper, cleared by Newsom, and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Algiers, Cairo, Tunis, Paris, Madrid, and USUN, and by pouch to London, Rome, and Tripoli. 22. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco Washington, October 27, 1963, 7:40 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 MOR. Secret; Immediate; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Newsom, cleared by Getsinger and Tasca, Bundy (White House), and approved by Ball as Acting Secretary of State. 23. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria Washington, October 27, 1963, 7:41 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ALG-MOR. Secret; Immediate; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Newsom; cleared by McGeorge Bundy, Tasca, and Getsinger; and approved by Ball. 24. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Washington, October 28, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Morocco, 10/63. Secret. 25. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Mali Washington, October 29, 1963, 8:48 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ALG-MOR. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Hooper; cleared by Newsom, Connett, and Komer; and approved by Secretary Rusk. Fredericks is also indicated as an approving officer. Repeated to Rabat, Algiers, and Paris. 26. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, October 30, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Morocco, 10/63. Confidential; No Foreign Dissem. 27. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, November 1, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Morocco, 11/63. Secret. 28. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts Washington, November 1, 1963, 7:13 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ALG-MOR. Secret. Drafted by Hooper, cleared by Newsom, and approved by Tasca. Sent to Addis Ababa, Khartoum, Tripoli, Tunis, Mogadiscio, Kampala, Dar-es-Salaam, Cotonou, Accra, Conakry, Abidjan, Monrovia, Bamako, Usumbura, Yaounde, Bangui, Fort Lamy, Brazzaville, Leopoldville, Libreville, Nouakchott, Niamey, Lagos, Dakar, Freetown, Lome, Ouagadougou, Tananarive, and Kigali. Repeated to Paris, Madrid, Cairo, Rabat, and Algiers. 29. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, November 4, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Morocco, 11/63. Secret. 30. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Read) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, November 4, 1963. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ALG-MOR. Secret. Drafted by Stoltzfus and approved by Tasca. 31. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco Washington, November 4, 1963, 6:11 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ALG-MOR. Confidential. Drafted by McClintic, cleared by Buffum and Jones, and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Algiers, Paris, Madrid, Cairo, Tunis, and USUN. 32. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia Washington, November 12, 1963, 7:31 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ALG-MOR. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Newsom and McClintic and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Rabat, Algiers, Paris, and Madrid. 33. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain African Posts Washington, November 19, 1963, 6:35 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ALG-MOR. Secret. Drafted by Newsom and Stackhouse, cleared by Dorros and Allen, and approved by Tasca. Also sent to Khartoum, Dakar, Lagos, Abidjan, Bamako, and Dar-es-Salaam. 34. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco Washington, December 24, 1963, 5:36 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ALG-MOR. Secret. Drafted by Newsom; cleared by Symmes, Long, Ortiz, Hadsel, Adams, and Heffner (DOD); and approved by Williams. Repeated to Paris, London, Madrid, Addis Ababa, Bamako, Tunis, and Algiers. 1. Briefing Paper Prepared in the Department of State 1. Briefing Paper Prepared in the Department of State Source Washington, undated. MOROCCO AND TUNISIA In giving Morocco and Tunisia their independence in 1956, France expected to remain in very close association with them. “Independence within interdependence” was the phrase coined to describe the hoped-for relationship. France, it was thought, would continue to support the two North African nations financially and in return would keep its military bases and obtain special guarantees for its citizens and investments. In recognition of France's paramount role, the U.S. at the time said that any aid we might give Morocco or Tunisia was intended to supplement (not supplant) French efforts. Events soon belied these hopes. The nationalistic prejudices aroused in Morocco and Tunisia clashed with French short-sightedness (and short temper)—over bases, over French privileges, over disputed territory and over the other sequels of French colonization in North Africa. The Algerian war made it certain that a stable relationship was for the time impossible. Morocco and Tunisia were bound to support the FLN and the French were bound to resent such support. The FLN depended heavily on the sanctuary of Tunisian and Moroccan territory. Border transgressions by both the French Army and the FLN exacerbated the tensions between France and its former protectorates to the point of rupture. The remarkable fact is that French influence still counts for so much in Morocco and Tunisia. This testifies to the underlying importance of the French-North African interrelationship. Some 200,000 French nationals (of 350-400,000 before independence) still live in Morocco and some 50-60,000 (of 150-200,000 before independence) still live in Tunisia. Morocco continues to rely on some 15,000 French advisers, technicians and teachers and Tunisia, while it is much less dependent on such help than Morocco, still employs several thousand French teachers and other experts. France continues to provide a protected market for Moroccan and Tunisian exports and French investments, particularly in Morocco, still account for most of the modern sector of the North African economies. In both countries French is the second language of all educated persons and the French liberal press and French culture exert a powerful influence. On the governmental level, nevertheless, France, because of the obduracy of Morocco and Tunisia in post-independence negotiations, suspended virtually all direct financial aid to these two countries. This left a void which we have felt it necessary to fill both for the sake of our own national interests and to preserve some position for the West. In both countries the U.S. has become the principal source of direct foreign economic aid. In Morocco, U.S. aid has reached an annual level of $40 to $50 million, in Tunisia $20 to $25 million—two of our largest aid programs in Africa. We also entered into modest military supply programs when it appeared that Morocco and Tunisia, in desperation, would seek arms from the Soviet bloc. France has not been happy about the expansion of U.S. military and economic aid, but has acquiesced in it while trying to insure that we consult France in advance of any new steps and showing great sensitivity over an indication that we might permanently undermine the French position. As elsewhere in Africa, the French have been especially pained by our English-language teaching programs which they see as a permanent danger to the predominance of French culture. We have taken great pains to persuade France that we are not seeking a predominant role in North Africa and that we hope France will play a greater role there when the Algerian war is over. We have argued, at the same time, that so long as we have important interests in the area, such as our bases in Morocco, and that so long as the controversies separating France and North Africa endanger the Western position generally in the area, the U.S. does not feel it can abandon Morocco and Tunisia. One of the most hopeful auguries for the future of the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia) lies in the interrelationships between the economies of France and that area. France is an important labor market for North African workers and provides outlets for North African grain, wine, phosphates, edible oil and petroleum. The great reservoirs of natural gas developed by French enterprise in Algeria can no doubt provide all of North Africa with a cheap source of power on which to base an expanding industry, and with cheap power it may even become possible to desalinize water profitably and thus to bring vast new desert areas under cultivation. * Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110. Confidential. Drafted by Root; cleared by Valdes, McBride, and Witman; and approved by Collopy. This paper was part of the Briefing Book prepared for the President's visit to France May 31-June 2, 1961. 2. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Fredericks) to Secretary of State Rusk 2. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Fredericks) to Secretary of State Rusk Source Washington, August 11, 1961. SUBJECT Regional Conference—Nicosia 1 Although Governor Williams on his return will no doubt wish to report personally on the views of our ambassadors to Northern African countries expressed during the Nicosia conference, I believe that meanwhile you will find of great interest the records of that conference here attached. One is in the form of a signed memorandum from the ambassadors to Governor Williams highlighting the main points which they wished to have emphasized for the Department's benefit. The other is a summary of the discussions during the conference. 2 I would like to call your attention to the following points in particular: 1. The consensus of the conference was that the AFN countries are not irrevocably committed to the Soviet bloc nor are they safely aligned with the Free World. 2. The two major motivations in the area are nationalism and the demand of the people for a better life. When a choice has to be made between what is economically rational and politically expedient, we must expect that nationalism will cause political expediency to win out every time. 3. Although all of the ambassadors applauded the criteria for economic development assistance in the new AID program, it was the general view that in this area as a whole the outlook is bleak for the states concerned to meet the self-help criteria. At the same time, AID remains vital for political reasons, and, where we have military bases, for that reason as well. 4. The maintenance of U.S. military bases in the AFN area is contrary to the tide of nationalism sweeping through those countries. Nevertheless, so far as the existing bases in the area have been given renewed strategic importance, we must presumably face the political and economic disadvantages of holding on to them. This may require our giving further economic and military assistance, or in due course altering our agreements to make them less offensive to the nationalistic sensibilities. 5. The Bizerte crisis 3 was a major misfortune for our relations with Tunisia and may necessitate a profound revision of our policies in North Africa. The Bizerte crisis has made King Hassan II of Morocco apprehensive of our reaction in the event that Morocco has trouble with Spain. 6. While the countries concerned, many with authoritarian regimes and most with low standards of living, were admittedly highly vulnerable to Communist penetration, the consensus of the ambassadors was that the bloc had not registered significant success. The danger was an increasing one, however. The ambassadors from the countries surrounding the UAR (Sudan, Libya, and Somalia in particular) felt that Egyptian propaganda at the present time was more effective and therefore more dangerous to the West than that from the Communists. 7. There was a unanimous and strong feeling that the ambassadors were asked to make too many demarches to local foreign ministries on behalf of international issues in which the U.S. has an interest for such demarches to be effective. It was suggested that the principal effort should be made in the U.N. (for U.N. issues) rather than in foreign capitals, that fewer approaches would be more effective than the numerous approaches which have hitherto been made, that arguments should be made shorter and simpler, and that more time should be allowed between the approach to the foreign government and the crucial vote. * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1480A/8-1161. Secret. Drafted by Root and sent through the Executive Secretariat. Copies were sent to Bowles, Ball, and Johnson. 1 The Regional Operations Conference held at Nicosia, Cyprus, July 31-August 4, 1961, was chaired by Under Secretary Chester Bowles and attended by the U.S. Chiefs of Mission from Aden, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Greece, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Turkey, Tunisia, the United Arab Republic, and Yemen. 2 Attached to the source text but not printed. 3 See Documents 158 ff. 3. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic 3. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic Source Washington, January 29, 1963, 4:30 p.m. 1680. Dept believes it desirable, as occasions permit, remind President Nasser and other senior UAR officials, of strong U.S. interest in stability and independence North African states, including particularly Libya. Dept aware Nasser's recent statement to U.K. Ambassador to effect he had no designs on Libyan oil fields and had cordial relations present Libyan Government. Nevertheless reports persist of UAR sympathy for elements opposed present regime Libya (as well as Tunisia and Morocco) and UAR should be under no illusions re importance we attach stability this area and particularly to security US installations and present regime Libya. As suitable opportunities arise, and perhaps, on occasion Governor Williams visit Cairo, hope Embassy may be able reiterate U.S. interest this matter. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770.00/1-2963. Secret. Drafted by Newsom, cleared by Davies, and approved by Williams. Repeated to Benghazi, Tripoli, Tunis, and London and pouched to Algiers and Rabat. 4. Paper by the Officer in Charge of Tunisian Affairs (Stackhouse) 4. Paper by the Officer in Charge of Tunisian Affairs (Stackhouse) Source Washington, July 26, 1963. SUMMARY OF BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY PAPER “NORTH AFRICA IN THE MEDITERRANEAN LITTORAL” I. —Despite many present uncertainties in the North African picture, the West's position now is substantially better than could have been foreseen only a little over a year ago during the final throes of the Algerian War. That war left its scars on the West's relations with the area as the increased Bloc presence there attests. But the War's end has permitted the end of what was for many of North Africa's governing elite a painful estrangement. They have actively sought to resume close ties with Western Europe. France has risen to its opportunities and has actively pursued policies of rapprochement with each of the North African countries (though traces of vindictiveness are discernible in the manner in which they are going about their Bizerte military installation shutdown). The United States and other Western European countries have similarly contributed to a reinforcement of the North African swing toward the West. For the United States the problem has become less one of finding means to build North African-European relationships than to discern ways to encourage and perpetuate ties now in existence, while at the same time defining and carrying out a supplemental role consistent with US interests and objectives. II. —The Bloc, too, has found a different situation in the area than it probably anticipated a year ago. Morocco and Tunisia are less hospitable to Bloc overtures than they were under the stresses of the Algerian War. Algeria remains a relatively soft target for the Bloc but has not become, as was conceivable a year ago, a beachhead for Bloc domination of North Africa. In all three countries an intense pride in independence has been a barrier to the Bloc. Faced with stickier going than expected, the Bloc has not made a major resource commitment to subvert the area. Its interest remains high, however, and we may expect the Bloc to continue to be attracted by the opportunities this important strategic area offers. At the moment Algeria is particularly vulnerable; the Bloc has not been remiss and recent months have seen a substantially increased Bloc presence there. III. —In quantitative terms, the American presence in the area tends to decline. The Algerian War's end has sharply reduced the danger of a sudden North African spin into the Bloc orbit. Western Europe, again politically acceptable in the area, is helping to take up the assistance slack in Morocco and Algeria. Our assistance to Tunisia represents a major contribution to a soundly conceived development plan, but Western European aid is increasing. Our strategic presence likewise is declining as our SAC operation is pulled out of Morocco. All of this adumbrates a smaller US material involvement in the area and lessens the possibility that we will face assuming the major share in foreign assistance to North Africa. There is nothing here, however, to lull the US into a false sense of security. Deep-seated economic and political forces bid fair to keep the area disturbed. Morocco's King seems to be in control but his efforts to set his rule in a democratic, constitutional frame, in which he would remain pre-eminent, are encountering disruptive opposition. The political foundations of newly independent Algeria are still settling as Ben Bella goes about eliminating rivals, consolidating his power and attempting to cope with Algeria's massive economic problems. Tunisia appears relatively serene, but only last December it was shaken by a plot aiming at Bourguiba's assassination, and opposition voices continue to be heard. Bloc interest persists and a flexible US policy, alert to the special and not always predictable demands of the troubled period through which North Africa is passing, is essential to protect US interests in the area. IV. —Talk of North African unity has been more abundant since the end of the Algerian War, but objective analysis discloses little basis for anticipating such a development in any comprehensive form, embracing spheres of major economic and political interest. Political differences, often tied to personal rivalries among leaders, cut deeply. The parallel nature of North African economies gives little real incentive to broad scale, intimate economic cooperation, though the desirability of offering a common front to the challenge of the Common Market may provide a spur to cooperation in limited areas. North African nations clearly intend to pursue their destinies in the near future through national channels; it behooves the United States to continue to address itself to the nations of the area as individual entities and to appraise any proposed US involvement in regional undertakings first from the standpoint of our relations with the individual nations involved. V. —The skeptical view we take of chances for comprehensive North African unity should not imply hostility for the concept. We look with favor on North African efforts to promote greater regional cooperation and greater cooperation with Western Europe. Such efforts—under leadership not substantially less well disposed toward the West than that presently in control—will tend strongly to damp intra-regional tensions and strengthen the region in all respects against external threats. We can conceive of instances in which US assistance could be helpful. But, given the lack of forceful momentum behind North African unity at present, we would be badly miscast in a leading role in a halting process whose final issue is so uncertain. North African unity, though desirable, is not the key to the achievement of US aims in the area; we are wise to leave unity initiatives to the North Africans themselves. * Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, AF-1963. Confidential. A handwritten marginal notation on the source text indicates that the paper was discussed at the Secretary's Policy Planning meeting on July 30. 5. Report Prepared by the Policy Planning Council 5. Report Prepared by the Policy Planning Council Source Washington, September 23, 1963. NORTH AFRICA IN THE MEDITERRANEAN LITTORAL Preface This report was prepared in response to the Basic National Security Policy Planning Task No. III (I), “North Africa in the Mediterranean Littoral”. The task as defined in the initial terms of reference was: “To recommend U.S. policies and courses of action which would tend to bring the states of the North African littoral into constructive association with each other, with Southern Europe, and the Atlantic Community while minimizing ties to nations of the Communist bloc and with Cairo, to the extent that the latter are likely to prove disruptive.” This paper is a revised version of the original draft which was discussed at the Secretary's Policy Planning Meeting on July 30, 1963. 1 This version takes into account the discussion and views expressed by various officers in the Department of State and outside. The principal conclusion of the paper is that while certain trends, now in progress, point to a growth of some degree of regional unity, they are balanced by other trends which point in exactly the opposite direction. The result of the study indicates, therefore, that significant movement toward unity in Northwest Africa is unlikely irrespective of US or other attempts to foster or delay this process. Similarly, the challenge of the common market will be felt by the different countries in different ways and will probably not be a significant spur to unification. Activities of the Soviet Union, likewise, will be differently felt in the three countries of Northwest Africa. The governments of the three are in actual or potential conflict on territorial and ideological issues, and their leaders are rivals. Thus, while some degree of regional integration would be beneficial, particularly in areas of economic planning and modernization, and while an important legacy of the French period is an East to West communications infrastructure, significant cooperation is judged to be unlikely. It is suggested that the present paper be considered as completing the Policy Planning task until such time as significant developments within North Africa make useful a revision. W.W. Rostow 2 [Here follow Sections I-VI of the paper.] VII. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations Although there are acknowledged advantages to the United States in a closer form of association among the countries of the North African Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya), there appears to be little current basis on which to anticipate such a development. Further, there would appear to be little basis for U.S. policy to promote actively any formal association in the political, military or economic realms, although discreet help toward closer cooperation may be possible in the economic field. U.S. policy must continue to address itself to the individual national entities of the North African littoral, taking full account of the heightened consciousness of national identity which has characterized North African nations since they achieved independence. This does not mean that the U.S. should view the possibilities of association or union negatively. As a matter of policy, we should remain open-minded and alert for opportunities to further Maghreb cooperation and Maghreb ties with Western Europe. U.S. and Western aid programs are particularly important in the latter case. In Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia lip service is paid to the notion of eventual Maghreb unity, but currently and for the foreseeable future, nothing more concrete is likely to be attempted. The possibility of Maghrebian incorporation into a larger Arab union seems even more distant though a loose confederative link between Algeria and the UAR cannot be ruled out. The underlying political differences and frictions, the incompatibility of the royalist and republican regimes, the fact that there is no economic basis for unity (they produce in a parallel rather than complementary pattern) and the fact that each is intensely national in aspect, all militate against organized economic, political or military agreements leading toward unity in any sector. This is not to indicate that advantages would not accrue should a form of unity develop. Advantages of customs union, specialization of industry (one steel mill complex for several nations instead of competing mills), and the resultant economy in labor forces, finance and materials are obvious. But it is difficult to see any basis to hope for it today or to estimate foreseeable times when it could develop into actuality. In the same less than optimistic view, no political or military or economic pact can be presently anticipated between the North African countries and the countries of Southern Europe other than those which now exist. All of the North African countries are now eager for increased economic assistance from their former colonial lords. France seems prepared to play a major role in Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria, while Italy appears ready to broaden its relations with Libya. But to cement the relationships with a political pact would clash with the Arab-African ideals of independence and non-alignment. North African abhorrence of formal political or military pacts with the West does not foreordain deterioration of the Western position in the area. On the contrary, the events of recent months give the West cause for tempered optimism: Maghrebian communist parties have been proscribed; the area's historical and cultural ties with the West have been an important underlying counterforce to Bloc bids in the area; and the intense pride in independence manifested by newly independent Maghrebian countries has been a barrier to Bloc efforts to gain influence. The area nevertheless remains vulnerable to Bloc subversion. All of the countries, but particularly Algeria with its enormous economic problems, offer opportunities to the Bloc. If North Africa does not seem at the moment to be exposed to a major Bloc drive for power (on the order of Soviet efforts in the Middle East in the mid-50's), it is, assuredly, because of its economic weakness and political uncertainties, a continuing target of opportunity for the Bloc. Apart from aspects of cooperation in the official realms, cooperation within the Maghreb and between the Maghreb and Europe takes place in a number of unofficial and quasi-official fields: labor, education, the professions, and commerce. To the extent these can be encouraged they represent an effective aid to the ultimate objective of closer ties. The U.S. diplomatic establishment must be alert to any change in the present political, military, or economic scenes in North Africa which would augment North African ties per se or ties with the West, or on the other hand a lessening of Western influence. U.S. objectives are to preserve the North African ties which presently exist with the West, to try to strengthen them when and where they need strengthening and to rebuild them where they have been damaged; to utilize our influence wherever feasible to provide a strong economic base for this cooperation through strengthened North African-EEC ties; to present the image of the U.S.A. as responsively enthusiastic toward helping the new independent nations so that the alternative of turning toward the Soviet Bloc will become less and less attractive. All of this is consistent with the creation of a formal Maghreb association and tangentially should promote it. * Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, Basic National Security Policy 1963. Confidential. 1 See Document 4 . 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 6. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy 6. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Source Washington, October 14, 1963. Best reading on the Moroccan-Algerian affair 1 is that, while both sides are building up strength in the disputed desert area and another minor clash or two may occur, neither Hassan nor Ben Bella really wants a fight just now. Both our embassies feel this way. There seems to me little security risk in any case, except on the really off-chance that the few planes on each side get involved in deep strikes. But there might be a political reaction in Algiers to what these over-sensitive people may interpret as a pro-Moroccan gesture. They are pretty unhappy with us at the moment anyway, because of what they regard as biased US press treatment. However, a remedy is to hand, if we could tell Algerians now you're happy to see Ben Bella if he comes (we never got to point of telling them, because he postponed visit again just after you OKed seeing him). He's due in NY the 18th (though another delay is always possible). 2 As attached 3 indicates we can arrange minimum protocol—we'll bring him down from NY, chopper to the lawn (one platoon honor guard, no speeches), and then back again same way. Latest reports also say Castro is not going to Algiers in November. Bob Komer * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria, Proposed Ben Bella Visit. Confidential. 1 Serious fighting between Algerian and Moroccan forces in the disputed border region broke out on October 8. 2 On October 17, Komer sent the President a memorandum stating that Algerian Ambassador Cherif Guellal had just informed U.S. officials that Ben Bella had definitely cancelled his U.N. trip. Guellal had also said that Ben Bella had much appreciated the word he had received indicating that Kennedy wanted to see him and that he wanted them to understand that the cancellation was caused solely by his problems at home. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria, 6/63-9/63) 3 The source text indicates a memorandum from Read to Bundy, October 12, was attached. Reference may be to an October 14 memorandum from Read to Bundy attached to Komer's October 14 memorandum to Bundy, which provided an assessment of the Algerian situation. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 26 ALG) See footnote 2, Document 87 . 7. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria 7. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria Source Washington, October 14, 1963, 7:17 p.m. 601. Department anxious that fighting which has broken out on Moroccan southeastern border be quickly brought to an end. On October 12 Balafrej in Washington briefly for Moroccan Embassy social function expressed only general uneasiness over Algerian response to what he claimed were Moroccan attempts to settle border disputes by negotiations. His attitude indicated he clearly did not expect fighting on any significant scale. Dept reps expressed belief future solution to border problems would be undermined by pressing question at time when Algerian internal situation unsettled and any effort force settlement could push Algeria further to left. Addressee posts are requested to make every effort provide full information this situation as viewed locally as well as report initiatives likely to halt fighting. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ALG-MOR. Confidential. Drafted by McClintic and approved by Newsom. Also sent to Rabat, Paris, and Tunis. 8. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria 8. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria Source Washington, October 15, 1963, 6:52 p.m. 609. French Ambassador advised Secretary today 1 that GOF does not intend get involved in Moroccan-Algerian dispute. Possible solutions were direct negotiations between two countries possibly with assist from Tunisia, OAU or UN. He stated Moroccans had advanced to points within Algerian territory as last administered by French, while admitting international border in this region had never been defined. Secretary indicated USG would also not wish become involved and would certainly refrain from any initiatives this direction. In view boundary history resort to ICJ would not seem be feasible means for resolution of problem. Therefore Algerian-Moroccan negotiations would appear be only course open. Alphand listed as possible Moroccan aims: (1) seizure of limited number of advanced points in preparation for border negotiations, (2) obtaining control of Tindouf and its mineral deposits and possibly (3) positioning for greater pressures on Mauritania. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ALG-MOR. Confidential. Drafted by Hooper and approved by Williams. Also sent to Rabat and repeated to Paris and Tunis. 1 A memorandum of this conversation is ibid. 9. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France 9. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France Source Washington, October 18, 1963, 7:18 p.m. 1974. With breakdown Algerian-Moroccan negotiations Marrakech yesterday and apparent determination both sides continue fighting apparently on wider front, Department concerned that limited border conflict might be expanded to war in which other powers might become involved to detriment interests US and West in area. We do not want become involved, but now actively considering possible courses action to which we could lend stimulus in effort bring about early cease fire and resumption peaceful efforts reach understanding or moratorium. Algerians have sought assistance OAU and French Embassy here has informed Department today that Zentar Political Director of Moroccan FonOff has informed French that help from either SYG or OAU would be acceptable to GOM as means getting talks started with GOA again. Request Embassy Paris seek contact Haile Selassie through Ethiopian Embassy during Emperor's unofficial visit Paris Oct. 20 to 23 for purpose obtaining his views on how OAU might assist in bringing about cease fire and resumption of talks. 1 We think this would be good opportunity help OAU move in direction establishing conciliation machinery envisioned in charter and that Emperor's support of possible initial role for OAU in influencing GOM and GOA to return to conference table would be helpful. Discussion with Emperor should be purely exploratory this stage and it should be made clear USG not intending become actively involved in any way. FYI. As will be noted separate tels today, we also exploring possibilities that SYG himself 2 or Swiss 3 might serve as catalyst for resumption GOM-GOA talks and cease fire. Possibility of combining all three elements to some extent might be GOM-GOA meeting in Geneva with SYG or his representative assisted by selected number OAU Foreign Ministers. No objection your sounding out Emperor this sort of possibility, if conversation develops in such way as avoid implication we trying arrange it. End FYI. Any information you able obtain incidentally re Emperor's overall assessment of conflict and his understanding of Moroccan position resulting from talks during his Marrakech visit also of interest. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ALG-MOR. Secret. Drafted by Hooper, cleared by Sisco and Davis, and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Tunis, Algiers, Rabat, Addis Ababa, Bern, and USUN. 1 On October 20, the Embassy in Rabat, where Haile Selassie had decided to prolong his stay, was given similar instructions. (Telegram 1032 to Rabat; ibid.) 2 In telegram 1094 to USUN, October 18, the Department of State instructed the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations to make discreet inquiries of the Secretary-General, asking whether he was thinking in terms of any U.N. mediatory role. (Ibid.) 3 In telegram 245 to Bern, October 18, the Department of State requested that the Embassy discreetly sound out the Swiss Government and inquire whether it was giving any consideration to the possibility of assisting a cease-fire and resumption of talks between the two sides. (Ibid.) 10. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Military Aide (Clifton) for President Kennedy 10. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Military Aide (Clifton) for President Kennedy Source Washington, October 19, 1963, 2:30 p.m. On allegations US planes helping Moroccans against Algeria, 1 we've been raising hell on this all week here and in Algiers. After repeated protests we've gotten BB regime to accept our denials and clamp down on radio and press, insofar as this gimcrack regime can control them. We're pressing now to get them to publish our denial. Unfortunately our Air Attache Rabat just flew down to Ouarzazate (100 miles or so behind front) to pick up intelligence, and was seen by press. We've already clamped down hard on any more such nonsense. * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria, 10/63. Secret. A handwritten note on the source text reads: “President saw.” 1 On October 12, the Christian Science Monitor published a story alleging that USAF training pilots had been ferrying Moroccan troops to staging areas near the Algerian border at the request of the Moroccan Government because of the lack of Moroccan pilots. The U.S. Government subsequently denied this allegation in public and private statements in both Washington and Algiers. On October 22, the newspaper published a correction, stating that the information on which the October 12 report was based had been inaccurate. Documentation on this subject is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ALG-MOR. 11. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco 11. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco Source Washington, October 19, 1963, 7:31 p.m. 1031. Following based on uncleared Memcon and Noforn. Amb. Bengelloun in call on Secretary today 1 presented GOM case: (1) Moroccan efforts to negotiate border problem long rebuffed, (2) posts unquestionably Moroccan were wrested from it Oct. 8, (3) re-taken by RMA Oct. 14, and (4) Iche attacked by Algerians Oct. 17 thus gravely risking turning frontier war into a generalized ideological military conflict. Dangerous for Algeria's neighbors and since it involves another “Castro-like experience“ in a sensitive part of world, dangerous for US as well. OAU of limited appeal to GOM since likely to be used by UAR and in any event not yet organized for conciliation work. U Thant's offer to help personally was of interest and GOM UN representative indicated willingness accept with “certain conditions” but GOA had not yet responded. GOM most anxious avoid extension of conflict, attributes Ben Bella's performance to internal stresses. Also transformation from border to ideological conflict highlighted by Boumedienne's recent statement to press that Algerian revolution should not be limited to Algeria. Secretary, emphasizing U.S. concern, over present situation and prospects urged we be kept fully informed. Secretary advised Bengelloun he did not wish make any formal proclamation now but we wished see fighting stopped. We would follow situation closely and hoped talks could be started again possibly through encouragement of Haile Selassie or SYG. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ALG-MOR. Confidential. Drafted by McClintic, cleared by Marvin, and approved by Hooper. Repeated to Algiers, Tunis, Paris, and Madrid. 1 A memorandum of this conversation is ibid. 12. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 12. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Source Washington, October 21, 1963. McGB: JFK might be interested in Algiers 802 attached, 1 which shows invite to BB served its purpose. Also 680 to Algiers 2 which is one evidence of drumfire we've kept up on allegations US helping Moroccans. More important what began as a minor border fracas is now well on the way to becoming a major Algerian effort to overthrow Hassan. We've got to get this damped down before it reaches point where Soviets, Chinese, and UAR are actively backing BB, while Spanish are screaming for us to join them in backing Hassan (French have same problem we do—desire to stay on good terms with both). Best way to avoid having to choose is to get a cease-fire pronto. But Hassan's price is that BB agree to arbitrate border. Since Hassan is the likely loser if this affair escalates, I'm arguing we ought to urge prudence on him. We can't mediate, however; our best bet is to get UN, OAU, Arab League or some other impartial third party in the act. We're trying. RWK * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria, 10/63. Secret. 1 Telegram 802 from Algiers, October 18, reported that the President's invitation to Ben Bella had apparently mollified Algerian feelings. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ALG-MOR) 2 Telegram 680 to Algiers, October 19, asked Ambassador Porter to seek the earliest opportunity at a high level to urge the Algerian Government to issue a statement accepting U.S. denials that the United States had been assisting Moroccan troop movements. (Ibid.) 13. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy 13. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Source Washington, October 21, 1963. As Moroccan/Algerian fracas becomes less a border dispute and more a struggle between BB and Hassan, we've gotten the latter's inevitable request for military aid (Rabat 693 and 694 attached). 1 Hassan alleges Soviet and UAR aid to Algeria, which is true, though it is not clear how much this is mostly new aid or material UAR gave Algerians earlier. In either case we feel that for us to aid Hassan just now would simply cause BB to lean even farther east. Result would be a new East/West confrontation with UAR and Soviets backing Algeria, while French and ourselves are pressed (especially by Spain) to back Hassan. Our best bet is to stay loose while discreetly backing every effort to find a cease-fire and negotiation formula. Meanwhile we propose to stall on Moroccan arms request. 2 R.W. Komer 3 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria, 10/63. Secret. A handwritten notation by Komer to Bundy in the margin of the source text reads: “MAC—this is way of informing JFK that we're being solicited, and that we propose to stall.” 1 Attached to the source text are telegrams 693 and 694 from Rabat, October 20, which transmitted reports from Ambassador John H. Ferguson on his separate conversations that day with King Hassan and General Oufkir at Marrakech, focusing on Morocco's request for U.S. military assistance. The King and the General had insisted that Morocco needed arms because Algeria was receiving substantial aid from the United Arab Republic and had made an arms deal with the Soviet Union. The King said that Morocco had no aggressive intentions and remained ready to discuss the frontier problem before any international body. Ferguson said he had explained the U.S. difficulty in taking sides in the present dispute, but noted that he must be in a position to make some response within a few days. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ALG-MOR) 2 On October 22, the Department instructed Ferguson to tell King Hassan that the United States was seriously concerned that provision of extensive additional U.S. military assistance to one side could gravely threaten current efforts to limit and halt the conflict, which were in the best interest of the future of Morocco. It would also provide justification for increased UAR and Soviet involvement on the side of Algeria. (Telegram 1049 to Rabat; ibid.) 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 14. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria 14. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria Source Washington, October 22, 1963, 7:40 p.m. 709. Ref: Embtel 831. 1 Dept in agreement courses of action proposed para. 6 reftel. Desire you see Ben Bella at first opportunity and state: 1. USG neutral in current conflict. We consider ourselves friends both parties and believe any prolongation current conflict will only result in serious setback for development and progress Maghreb states. 2. While not judging issues involved, we warmly welcome efforts Ethiopian Emperor's and other members OAU and hope solution can be found through African mediation. 3. USG has made clear to GOA fact its forces not involved in helping Moroccans. While we appreciate both sides obtain defense needs from outside we would consider military involvement of outside powers serious threat to efforts resolve question peacefully. Should foreign powers intervene directly or indirectly in manner which seems likely enlarge scale of hostilities, it will be apparent that changed and dangerous situation may result. Similar statement being made Hassan. 4. USG will take occasion visit Yazid stress its continued interest in Algeria. President did same to Tito in response Tito's conveying message from Ben Bella and in extending invitation Ben Bella come to Washington. We would deplore and shall continue to work against any propaganda or circumstances threatening polarization present conflict or placing U.S. on either side. 5. In light these considerations, we are expressing strongly to both sides our hope that both Morocco and Algeria can find way accept such mediation as may be offered by outside powers with minimum conditions and can contribute peaceful effort by refraining from further military moves and limiting propaganda exchanges. 2 Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ALG-MOR. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Newsom, cleared by Newsom and Hilliker, and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Rabat, Cairo, and Paris. 1 In telegram 831 from Algiers, October 22, Ambassador Porter proposed that, while waiting for the results of Haile Selassie's efforts to bring about a meeting between Ben Bella and Hassan, he tell Ben Bella that the United States deplored intervention by certain foreign powers that was not aimed at negotiations and a peaceful solution to the conflict. (Ibid.) 2 On October 22, Porter reported that he had carefully gone over the points in telegram 709 with Ben Bella that evening. Ben Bella had told him that he and Haile Selassie agreed that the conflict should be handled by the “Addis Ababa group.” He also had indicated that he was willing to withdraw Algerian troops from the frontier zones if Morocco would do the same. (Telegram 851 from Algiers; ibid.) 15. Memorandum for the Record 15. Memorandum for the Record Source Washington, October 23, 1963. At Ambassador Guellal's request I had luncheon with him and Ben Bella's special emissary Yazid. It was quickly apparent that I was being given a preview of the Algerian case to be presented to Secretary Rusk that afternoon. 1 After a long wind-up about peace-loving Algeria which simply wanted to develop in its own way on its own socialistic model, he pinned the rose on the Moroccans for trying to upset the Ben Bella regime as well as seize the valuable iron deposits at Tindouf. His case was that Algeria did not want a war with Morocco and had repeatedly offered to negotiate “without any agenda” but that the Moroccans had consistently rejected this. He said the Algerians were standing on an issue of principle. All the African states at the OAU Conference in Addis Ababa had agreed that the borders established during the colonial period should be accepted and that no borders should be changed by force. He understood that the US favored the OAU and accepted the decisions of the Addis conference. Therefore, where did the US stand on this question of principle? Would we condone a Moroccan attempt to change by force an existing frontier? I evaded the issue, saying that we were neutral in this dispute and had taken no position on the merits; however, we understood the question to be what was the “border” between Morocco and Algeria in this area? The Moroccans seemed to claim it was simply an administrative line which had been frequently changed, and that the places in dispute were in fact on their side of the “border.” In any case, I was sure we would not want to get dragged into the middle of a dispute between two friends of ours unless we were forced to do so. Our great concern was that a minor border issue seemed to be blowing up into a major confrontation between Algeria and Morocco, in which each side was claiming that the future of its own regime was at stake. It seemed to us in the best interests of both countries that this trend be reversed before other powers were drawn into the situation and a choosing-up of sides resulted which would make it very difficult for the US to stand aloof. The President had amply demonstrated our friendly interest in Algeria, but we were on good terms with the Moroccans too. They had provided us SAC bases at a time when we needed them, although we were getting out by agreement now. Both Algeria and Morocco were young countries with major internal problems which we were trying to help them surmount. A major fight between them could only interfere with their domestic development; this was worth every effort to avoid. We hoped a situation would not develop in which the UAR and others came so openly to the assist-ance of Algeria as to put great pressure on us, the French, and the Spanish to give countervailing assistance to Morocco and thus convert the issue into an East-West confrontation which would help nobody. Were the issues involved in the border dispute of sufficient seriousness to run this risk? Yazid said he fully understood our position. Yazid said they did not want to take the issue to the UN precisely because it might prove embarrassing to the US and France. What would we do, however, if the UN became involved? I responded that all one could say at this point was that we would call the shots as we saw them. However, if the issue blew up to the point where UN intervention seemed essential, I was sure we would come down in favor of peacekeeping regardless of whether it made one side or the other sore at us. At the outset I told Yazid and Guellal that the President had very much wanted to see Ben Bella if he came and regretted it wasn't possible at this point. After expressing appreciation, Yazid said that since he was a special emissary from Ben Bella, they had thought of asking for an appointment but had concluded it would not be proper. However, he hoped to present their case informally to certain key Congressmen; it had been suggested he talk with Senator Kennedy. What did I think about their using a family connection in this way? My own personal view was that it was probably wiser not to try and exploit a family connection. I stressed to Yazid the importance of not letting rumor, tendentious press stories, and incipient misunderstandings get in the way of US-Algerian relations. There had been too much of this recently. I hit him hard on Algerian press allegations that US pilots were transporting Moroccan troops. He was most apologetic, mentioning that he hoped to help set the record straight at a press conference after his talk with Secretary Rusk. They hoped to exert more effective influence on the press, which he admitted was often quite irresponsible. But the American press had its flaws too. I countered that we hadn't yet nationalized our newspapers but if the antics of their press were any guide, this didn't seem to do much good. Yazid said he expected to tell Ben Bella not to be so sensitive to US press stories, but that we must realize we were dealing with a young and fairly inexperienced regime. I asked Yazid what had happened to his mission to Marrakech, which at one point seemed to be succeeding. He answered that he had sought a cease-fire and return to positions as of 1 October but the Moroccans insisted on holding Algerian territory. As for negotiations, they insisted that these were possible only if border questions were specifically on the agenda. So it was impossible to reach agreement. When Guellal began talking about Moroccan aggression, I asked about the Hassan-Ferhat Abbas agreement of 1961 just published by the Moroccans, which seemed to indicate that the two parties had agreed to negotiate the border issue. Yazid said that the agreement had been in French but the Moroccans had made their own slanted Arabic translation. As everybody knew, Ferhat Abbas couldn't even read Arabic so he had been “had.” As we parted I again mentioned our neutrality on the issue in dispute but our strong feeling that this issue should not be permitted to lead to a major to-do which would encourage outside intervention. We understood Algeria's desire to develop in its own distinctively Algerian way; we also recognized its right to accept assistance from any quarter and fully expected that it would seek help from East and West. But we hoped the Algerians would recognize that becoming too beholden to any single outside power or group of powers would compromise their own freedom of action over time. We ended by my mentioning to Yazid that he and I were the same age but the reason why I had so much more grey hair than he did was because of the frustrations of trying to keep up with such volatile people as Sukarno, Nehru, Nasser, and Ben Bella. He laughingly responded by telling me that he tried to call Ben Bella in Algiers last night and the American operator had asked him “do you mean Algiers, Morocco?” However, he would not take this as an indication of US policy. RWK * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria, 10/63. Secret. Drafted by Robert W. Komer. Copies were sent to Bundy, Williams, and Newsom. 1 Yazid's conversation with the Secretary on October 23 is recorded in a memorandum of conversation in Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ALG-MOR. 16. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco 16. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco Source Washington, October 23, 1963, 6:18 p.m. 1053. In connection current Algerian-Moroccan problem, we presume Embassy aware substantial amounts U.S. ammunition and equipment are in the pipeline due to arrive in Morocco over the next several weeks. This includes jeeps, two helicopters and assorted ammunition. These shipments represent GOM purchases under the MAP military assistance agreement with the GOM. While we do not believe we should raise issue, we assume GOM will continue to unload these military supplies without any conspicuous display. We understand GOM has followed practice unloading such supplies at night and in cordoned areas. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-3 US-MOR. Secret. Drafted by Haynes and Newsom, cleared by Heffner (DOD), and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Paris, Algiers, and USUN. 17. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts 17. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts Source Washington, October 23, 1963, 6:58 p.m. 765. Following may be drawn on with FonOff or other officials who broach subject Moroccan-Algerian conflict: We keenly regret emergence conflict which threatens disrupt stability and development of Maghreb. Years of struggle leading to independ-ence have left nations in area in desperate need period of tranquility to build better life for its citizens. US, in sympathy aspirations area's peoples, has contributed substantially to its economic development. These contributions significant both in Morocco and in Algeria. In latter our surplus food supplies of crucial importance in countering effects post-independence food shortages. In view our close and friendly relations with both countries we are and intend to remain impartial in the present conflict. We have no intention of becoming involved in substance of dispute over borders never formally delimited to satisfaction of parties concerned. Instructions have been given to US military personnel present in area to avoid any action tending involve them directly or indirectly in this dispute. US efforts will be bent toward encouraging early peaceful resolution conflict either through direct negotiations or through good offices other friendly countries. We welcome efforts of Haile Selassie and other African and Arab statesmen to bring an early end to hostilities and hope they will have full support other African states. We are also in consultation UNSYG who having continuing discussions with Moroccan and Algerian representatives. We believe any extension of this conflict or its polarization along lines of East-West struggle would be extremely regrettable and we will exert all our efforts to avoid this. In our view increasingly sharp invective employed by press and radio in each country against the other will hinder an early solution and is to be deplored. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ALG-MOR. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Newsom and Stackhouse; cleared by Sisco, Davies, Imhof, Ortiz, Meade, and Heffner (DOD); and approved by Tasca. Sent to Nouakchott, Dakar, Accra, Conakry, Bamako, Niamey, Lagos, Dar-es-Salaam, Addis Ababa, Tunis, Tripoli, Cairo, Amman, Damascus, Baghdad, Kuwait, Jidda, Khartoum, Taiz, and USUN. Repeated to Rabat and Algiers and pouched to Madrid, Paris, and London. 18. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy 18. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Source Washington, October 24, 1963. Algeria-Morocco . Both sides have cooled down a bit, but military buildup continues and both stick to their basic positions. This is why none of the many mediation efforts have yet succeeded. Algerians say they want a cease-fire but on basis of Moroccan withdrawal from two disputed Sahara posts they apparently occupied, were kicked out of, and then retook. Algerians also refuse to negotiate border claims. Moroccans want cease-fire on present positions (they may have lost one post yesterday) and insist Algiers agree to negotiate borders. As to venue, Ben Bella wants OAU to mediate, since he stands on Addis Conference principle that borders inherited from colonial powers should not be changed. Algerians have an impressive case, and even Rusk was impressed by Yazid's presentation of it yesterday. Nasser has also offered summit meeting, and has stimulated Arab League to propose cease-fire, but Hassan sees both as stacked against him. Hassan prefers mediation by Selassie or Bourguiba. Meanwhile, we're trying to condition U Thant to intervene personally if other efforts fail. We fear renewed fighting which could spread all along frontier, which would give Soviets, Nasser, and Cubans their chance to make a big pro-Algerian splash and make it hard for us not to back Moroccans. We seem to have re-established our bona fides with Algiers (see Porter's talk with Ben Bella, Algiers 851 attached). 1 In fact our problem now is how to field Moroccan pleas for arms, etc. Hassan has gotten himself out on a limb, [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. As time passes his position becomes weaker [ 1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified ]. Our best bet is still to keep loose, while working behind scenes to get a cease-fire. While Hassan may be unhappy with us (and French), [ 1 line of source text not declassified ]. R.W. Komer 2 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria, 10/63. Secret. 1 See footnote 2, Document 14 . 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 19. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 19. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Source Washington, October 24, 1963. McGB: We have a quite disturbing report from a fairly reliable source that Nasser has decided to go in big with help to BB, including substantial Egyptian troops. His reported reason is that he wants to help BB in order to freeze the Soviets out since the Soviet embrace would be the end of BB. Source says the real reason, however, is that Gallal wants a dramatic “victory” to enhance his prestige in the eyes of the Syrians and show them how powerful he is. We also have two ships with arms cargoes reported en route from Cuba. If Algerians get all this help, it will be hard for us to keep turning down Moroccan arms requests. Also Moroccans may just publicize fact we are continuing to ship ammo, trucks, recoilless rifles, etc. under existing MAP program. This would justify other side's intervention. So our best bet is maximum effort to get a cease-fire and mediation going. SYG is probably our best recourse here since only he will have prestige and leverage. So I am pressing along these lines. We'll also consider going to Nasser and telling him that if he gives massive aid to BB we will have to counter with the Moroccans. I am not sure this would be a good bet, however, (incidentally, if Nasser does intervene on big scale, Faysal will be encouraged to smack his rear in Yemen). RWK * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria, 10/63. Secret. 20. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy 20. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Source Washington, October 25, 1963. Morocco-Algeria . We're going to do all we can to warn off Nasser, 1 calm down BB and Hassan, and get a cease-fire before this affair escalates. But once again we find ourselves in the middle [2 lines of source text not declassified]. I've already heard working level worry from State that Castro's and Nasser's potential involvement is tending to convert State's seventh floor to a pro-Moroccan stance which would ill-serve our long-term interests. To avoid getting in this box we're trying to get the fighting stopped. We're (1) pressing U Thant to issue a cease-fire appeal, but he's reluctant so long as Haile Selassie and other Africans are in the act; (2) warning Algerians that if they get substantial outside help at a time when we've been holding off Moroccans, it may force our hand; (3) conveying same point to UAR, adding that an apparent UAR power play westward at a time when UAR being criticized here on Yemen may critically affect US/UAR relations; (4) trying to get Paris in the act—it has same problem we do of being interested in both sides; (4) urging Rabat to move toward cease-fire in a hurry, [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. Apparently Hassan and BB agreed to meet with Selassie at Tripoli, but one report says Hassan insists Bourguiba be present. There's not much we can do about Cuban or UAR arms. Castro may be sending help without even asking Algerians. In any case, we're in a spot about protesting UAR (or even Cuban) response to BB's arms appeal, when we and French are continuing regular arms shipments to Morocco (we have 31 jeep trailers landing now and 22 75-mm recoilless rifles, 143 jeeps, 100,000 rounds carbine ammo and 7000 rounds grenades and other artillery ammo due within the next two weeks). Ouch! Bob Komer * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Morocco, 10/63. Secret. 1 Telegram 1740 to Cairo, October 25, instructed Ambassador John S. Badeau to immediately request an appointment with Nasser and stress the serious consequences of large-scale military involvement on Algeria's side. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ALG-MOR) 21. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco 21. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco Source Washington, October 25, 1963, 6:37 p.m. 1068. You should inform Balafrej that we take most seriously the threat of outside intervention in Algerian-Moroccan conflict. Evidence is increasing that UAR may be preparing intervene with considerable force in support of Algeria. We now actively engaged diplomatic efforts discourage any such massive UAR intervention. Depending on his intentions and relative impact of these and other efforts on Nasser,UAR intervention may or may not be stalled or limited. In this situation accomplishment of cease-fire with minimum delay is most urgent in order to check any further intervention or escalation of conflict. You may assure Balafrej that we also using our influence to persuade both disputants, as well as those seeking directly to assist in bringing about resumption of talks, to avoid taking positions with regard to cease-fire which would put either GOM or GOA in politically untenable position. We would strongly urge that GOM in own best interests respond with early acceptance to any genuine cease-fire proposals that UNSYG, OAU, or other conciliators may put forward. Cease-fire, even if temporary, now paramount consideration so long as other claims or concerns can be dealt with peacefully. Ball * Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ALG-MOR. Secret. Drafted by Hooper, cleared by Newsom, and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Algiers, Cairo, Tunis, Paris, Madrid, and USUN, and by pouch to London, Rome, and Tripoli. 22. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco 22. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco Source Washington, October 27, 1963, 7:40 p.m. A memorandum from Komer to the President, October 27, warned that King Hassan was very unhappy with U.S. stalling on his appeal for military aid, but noted that U.S. officials were going to urge the Moroccans toward negotiations, lest what they feared—a real contest between regimes—actually came to pass. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Morocco, 10/63) 1078. Please deliver following message soonest to King Hassan: “Your Majesty: I have watched with deep concern the growing split between Morocco and Algeria. Ambassador Ferguson and Col. Canton have relayed to me Your Majesty's apprehensions over the meaning and direction of this conflict. 1 The crucial fact is that this conflict has not yet come irrevocably to the point of a contest between competing systems, though this might well eventuate, with all its grave consequences, if present moves toward reconciliation fail. So it seems most important that you forestall the development of such a contest by seeking quickly a solution through negotiation rather than war. I welcome Your Majesty's decision to attend the meeting at Bamako. 2 I am expressing to the principals at this meeting my hope that agreement can be reached on an honorable basis for ending the fighting and on some means for resolving the issues involved. By doing everything possible toward bringing about a settlement, it seems to me Your Majesty's position before the world will be made clear and the risk of grave threats to your Kingdom will be reduced. John F. Kennedy” 3 Ball * Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 MOR. Secret; Immediate; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Newsom, cleared by Getsinger and Tasca, Bundy (White House), and approved by Ball as Acting Secretary of State. 1 On October 27, the Department received a message from King Hassan through Colonel Canton. The King told Canton that it was now clear that his fears regarding the threat of foreign intervention had been correct and that the present border strife had been created by Ben Bella, aided and guided by Nasser, to serve as an excuse for his real objective, the destruction of the Moroccan monarchy. He repeated his plea for U.S. military aid, saying it could be channeled secretly through Spain, which had offered to help. The King said he desired a peaceful solution to this crisis, but felt that Nasser and Ben Bella would not honor any such solutions. (Telegram P 262315Z from COMNAVACTS Port Lyautey to the Secretary of State; Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 71 D 370, Morocco) 2 Through the mediation efforts of Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia and President Modibo Keita of Mali, President Ben Bella and King Hassan II had agreed to meet at Bamako, Mali. 3 On October 28, Ferguson delivered the President's letter to the King and expressed U.S. satisfaction that the Bamako meeting was being held. At the end of the audience, the King asked him to tell President Kennedy that Morocco was now asking only for economic aid and for U.S. non-interference with military assistance from other Western countries, which was needed to restore equilibrium. (Telegram 747 from Rabat, October 28; Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ALG-MOR) 23. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria 23. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria Source Washington, October 27, 1963, 7:41 p.m. 821. Please deliver following message soonest to President Ben Bella: “Mr. President: I have watched with deep concern the growing split between Morocco and Algeria. I am pleased to learn of your decision to meet with King Hassan in Bamako. I am expressing to the principals at the meeting my hope that agreement can be reached on an honorable basis for ending the fighting and on some means of resolving the issue involved. I am particularly concerned that what started as a frontier dispute not become on either side a far graver conflict between philosophies or systems. Should this happen, it would be most difficult to prevent outside powers from becoming far more heavily involved on both sides. I cannot believe this could serve either your interests or those of Morocco in the long run. I would hope, therefore, that you would agree, Mr. President, that, given the grave threats posed by continued fighting to peace in the area, the failure to explore every reasonable means to find a common basis for a solution would be tragic. John F. Kennedy.” 1 Ball * Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ALG-MOR. Secret; Immediate; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Newsom; cleared by McGeorge Bundy, Tasca, and Getsinger; and approved by Ball. 1 On October 28, Porter delivered the President's letter to Ben Bella, who asked him to request President Kennedy not to judge Algeria “on this or that development,” and to express his profound appreciation for the President's interest in the problem. (Telegram 903 from Algiers, October 28; ibid.) 24. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy 24. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Source Washington, October 28, 1963. 4:30 meeting 1 will cover Algeria-Morocco crisis and Yemen because of Nasser's interest in both. Attached are some of the more recent cables. 2 Core of Moroccan/Algerian problem is to get a cease-fire and negotiation going before Algerian buildup (with UAR/Cuban/USSR support) leads BB to enlarge the war. Moroccans hold both disputed cases, and one press report has them heading for ultimate objective of Tindouf. Of course the farther they go, the wilder BB will get. Our hopes are pinned on Bamako meeting Tuesday and mediation of Selassie and Keita. We seem to be softening up Moroccans a bit; your message to Hassan, plus our stall on his appeals for aid, should carry this further. We must get Hassan to compromise before he gets in over his head. Meanwhile Badeau did a good job of beating up Ali Sabri and then Nasser, but we're not on too good a wicket here. If we and French are still supplying Moroccans, how can we tell Nasser not to equip Algerians? We also don't want to get too far out of step with DeGaulle; latest suggests French are switching hands-off policy to extent of sending Hassan ammo and food, plus continuing regular military aid. This may be a reaction to reports about UAR involvement. We hear Chicom delegation due in Algiers tonight to sign agreement covering 25 billion old franc loan announced earlier. Soviet Foreign Trade Minister Potolichev is also arriving to discuss aid. In this light, should we still hold up announcing $10 million Moroccan SA loan, which we've already stalled a week? [Here follows discussion of Yemen.] R.W. Komer 3 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Morocco, 10/63. Secret. 1 At the White House meeting on October 28, the President agreed to the following courses of action: 1) the signing of the $10 million Supporting Assistance Loan for Morocco; 2) expediting shipments of small arms ammunition to Morocco already programmed under MAP; and 3) raising with Ambassador Porter the particular concern and interest of the United States in the shipment of Cuban arms to Algeria. (Memorandum from Newsom to Williams, October 29; Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ALG-MOR) 2 The source text indicates the following cables as attachments: 1079 to Rabat; 742, 744, 745 from Rabat; 276 from Tunis; 882 from Algiers; 1645 from USUN; 969 from Cairo; 2041 and 2042 from Paris. 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 25. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Mali 25. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Mali Source Washington, October 29, 1963, 8:48 p.m. 58. Following message from President should be delivered earliest to Emperor Haile Selassie: “Your Majesty: I welcome the key role you are currently playing in the Algerian-Moroccan conflict and wish every success to the Bamako meeting. In the spirit of our conversations in Washington and with full appreciation of the desire for an African solution, I have asked Ambassador Handley to present informally to your Foreign Minister some ideas relating to the problems faced at the Bamako Conference. From what we hear a crucial need is for some give on both sides. Their initial declared positions would appear to thwart progress towards an end to the fighting. Our thoughts are of course in confidence. If they should in any way prove useful to your estimation, please advance them as your own, rather than as official views of the United States, adapted to the circumstances as you see fit. I believe, as I feel certain you do, that the results of the present conference will have an important bearing on the welfare of the peoples of Algeria and Morocco, as well as on the future peace and stability of that key region of Africa. John F. Kennedy“ For Ambassador Handley Request you seek earliest opportunity deliver foregoing message to FonMin Yifru for Emperor and simultaneously pass following ideas orally to Yifru, making it clear these have no standing other than private suggestions from a long distance for whatever use they may be to Emperor: 1. Possibility of compromise cease-fire agreement based on full or partial (e.g. from Tindouf region and either Hassi Beida or Tinjoub) withdrawal Moroccan forces in return for firm Algerian commitment discuss both geographic and economic approaches to solution of border problem. 2. Possibility of temporary cease-fire pending arbitration by international commission acceptable both sides. Consideration of stationing neutral observers in disputed areas during arbitration. 3. Possibility joint withdrawal by both sides from disputed areas accompanied by agreed moratorium on all claims and establishment of neutral zone embracing areas agreed by both sides to be parts of Morocco and Algeria. Another feature might be agreement to review prospects joint economic exploitation with advice of economic experts of appropriate international financial organization. FYI. We realize difficulty of delivering message to Emperor in Bamako and possible problem of misunderstanding by Keita and parties to dispute should U.S. role become known. Strongly hope matter can be handled in way which will minimize risk disclosing U.S. hand. To this end, emphasize to Emperor or his representative this be entirely confidential with him. Knowledge of overt U.S. role could be counterproductive. End FYI. Ball * Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ALG-MOR. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Hooper; cleared by Newsom, Connett, and Komer; and approved by Secretary Rusk. Fredericks is also indicated as an approving officer. Repeated to Rabat, Algiers, and Paris. 26. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk 26. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk Source Washington, October 30, 1963. INTELLIGENCE NOTE The Moroccan-Algerian Cease-Fire Terms of the Agreement —Under prodding from Mali's President Modibo Keita and Ethiopia's Haile Selassie, Morocco and Algeria reportedly have agreed to: (1) a cease-fire commencing November 2; (2) withdrawal of combatants from a Saharan demilitarized zone to be established by a quadri-partite commission composed of Morocco, Algeria, Mali, and Ethiopia; (3) establishment of Malian and Ethiopian observers inside this zone; and (4) an arbitral commission to be formed as a result of an OAU foreign minister's meeting. Likely Difficulties in Implementation —While the cease-fire represents a concrete and unexpected achievement, both King Hassan and President Ben Bella are likely to place roadblocks in the way of full settlement. The agreement to establish a demilitarized zone does not solve the critical question—whether or not Hassan will withdraw from Tinjoub and Hassi Beida. It is this issue which has stalled all previous efforts to commence negotiations. The cease-fire thus may be short-lived and the threat of renewed hostilities intensified. Arms Buildup Likely to Continue —Given the tenuous nature of the Bamako agreement, Hassan and Ben Bella are almost certain to continue efforts to bolster their military forces. We believe that the UAR and Cuba will maintain their flow of arms to Algeria, thus increasing Hassan's apprehensions. As a result, the King is likely to persist in attempts to secure broader Western, particularly US, economic and military aid. * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Morocco, 10/63. Confidential; No Foreign Dissem. 27. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 27. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Source Washington, November 1, 1963. MAC— Wayne Fredericks just told me worriedly that Rusk was getting pretty itchy about Algeria; “if those people take arms from Cuba, we'll just have to back Morocco.” But there are a few fundamentals which should guide our approach toward this affair, and override any tactical considerations: (1) Our basic interest is in a friendly Maghreb (free of undue Soviet or for that matter Nasserite influence). We do not want a pro-West Morocco at the expense of a pro-East Algeria if it can be avoided. (2) In the long run, as Algeria goes so goes the Maghreb. Algeria is the largest, best located, and certainly most dynamic of the Maghreb states. We and the French must keep sufficient “in” with whatever regime holds power to compete effectively with Nasser and Khrushchev, and in a real sense to protect our Tunisian and Moroccan friends. (3) Hassan's border claims on Algeria, though he has a good case, must be seen in the context of his many other claims, which have practically isolated him in Africa. He claims all of Mauritania and didn't attend Addis Conference on this ground. He naturally also claims all the Spanish enclaves, which will in time create real frictions with Madrid (especially Ceuta and Melilla). We've got to turn him off this nationalistic kick before he gets everybody sore at him. (4) We and the French have been actively supplying arms to Morocco. This makes it hard to argue against Ben Bella's right to get UAR, Soviet, or even Cuban arms (in fact Hassan got a lot of Soviet arms too). One reason why I favor lying low on US arms to Morocco just now is that, when this becomes public, it will seem to justify Algerian arms requests to others. We're also in a poor position to influence BB against such requests if we're simultaneously continuing to equip Moroccans. (5) We can always reverse our policy well before it's too late, if it becomes clear that BB with UAR/Soviet/Cuban support is really out to get Hassan. In the meantime, we ought not to get out ahead of the French. A shrewd calculation of our interests suggests that we have to stay loose in these bloody disputes between third parties—precisely so they won't become East-West issues in which we somehow tend to end up stuck with the weaker side against the stronger. In my part of the world, moreover, things are seldom what they seem at first glance. For example, NYT this morning had Indians, not Paks, starting trouble in Kashmir; Hassan blew up this morning about Algerian capture of Figuig and this afternoon we hear Figuig is still in Moroccan hands; UK tells us it's staying strictly out of Yemen war, yet its own people say that puppet Sharif of Beihan sent 35 camel loads of arms to royalists, and is actively conniving with Faysal; four months ago Hussein was accusing us of being in bed with Nasser—now he's cosying up to Nasser and accusing us of being pro-Baath. We are presently evacuating Morocco except for a residual commo facility at Kenitra. Yet we're still investing tens of millions a year. The more arms aid we give Morocco now, the more BB will seek elsewhere. So we risk a nice little Maghreb arms race in which our costs go up and BB leans further in the wrong direction to satisfy his suppliers. Where is our interest here? Ben Bella is a pain and will remain so, but he's more likely to be around for a while than Hassan. He seems to have done a good job so far of out-maneuvering his opposition. I think most specialists would agree that Hassan has even less life expectancy than BB. So we also want to be careful lest we end up backing the losing horse. Ferguson, who seems to his managers back here to be pleading his client's case rather more than ours, doesn't seem to be taking these longer range factors much into account. In sum, our interest is to avoid being drawn into disputes in a way which will plague us, and cost us a lot more than we reckon at the outset, until we see where more clearly we want to end up. RWK * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Morocco, 11/63. Secret. 28. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts 28. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts Source Washington, November 1, 1963, 7:13 p.m. 826. Whatever may be success Algerian-Moroccan cease-fire Dept remains seriously concerned over possibility continued military build-up both sides. 1 Request Ambassadors addressee posts therefore seek earliest opportunity elicit views FonOffs on Algerian-Moroccan problem and concept OAU role suggesting where possible they consider sending messages to both Algeria and Morocco urging observance of cease-fire and avoidance any further significant arms build-up from other countries. Suggest point be made strongly that continued outside military aid to either country would seriously threaten nullify agreement reached at Bamako and chances any ultimate solution dispute within African (OAU) framework. During such discussion you may summarize US position as follows: 1. Strictly impartial. 2. Welcome Bamako and favor solution within African framework. 3. Most important obtain and maintain cease-fire along lines Bamako agreement. 4. Against further significant arms build-up either side as most serious threat to success of Bamako agreement. Have so informed both Algeria and Morocco and we refraining from contribution any such build-up. 5. Believe Bamako demonstrated that firm and persistent presentation African concern over detrimental impact on African interests of fruitless conflict and outside intervention can have telling effect on both Algerian and Moroccan governments. 6. Consider it crucial in terms longer range effectiveness of OAU in promoting all principles its charter that OAU discussion and mediation begin soon and emphasize objective solution rather than politically charged point of attempting fix responsibility for outbreak hostilities which probably shared by both parties dispute. Telegraphic reports conversations requested. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ALG-MOR. Secret. Drafted by Hooper, cleared by Newsom, and approved by Tasca. Sent to Addis Ababa, Khartoum, Tripoli, Tunis, Mogadiscio, Kampala, Dar-es-Salaam, Cotonou, Accra, Conakry, Abidjan, Monrovia, Bamako, Usumbura, Yaounde, Bangui, Fort Lamy, Brazzaville, Leopoldville, Libreville, Nouakchott, Niamey, Lagos, Dakar, Freetown, Lome, Ouagadougou, Tananarive, and Kigali. Repeated to Paris, Madrid, Cairo, Rabat, and Algiers. 1 On November 1, the Department of State instructed Porter to express strong U.S. support for the cease-fire and successful completion of the negotiating course established at Bamako in conversations with Ben Bella and his Foreign Minister. The Ambassador was also asked to express concern over Cuban arms shipments to Algeria and the conviction that any continuation of an extensive arms build-up on either side would thwart the encouraging progress made at Bamako toward a peaceful resolution of the dispute. (Telegram 911 to Algiers; ibid.) Ferguson received similar instructions for his conversations with the King and his Ministers. (Telegram 1100 to Rabat, November 1; ibid.) 29. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 29. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Source Washington, November 4, 1963. McGB: I may be all wet but I see Moroccan/Algerian truce being patched up again. Mali and Ethiop observers should be on scene shortly, and we know Selassie and Keita have been weighing in heavily. Their pressure, plus clarification as to who is shooting most, should operate to damp affair down. We continue low-key needling of all parties. We're going out to UAR again about Cubans and also cautioning UAR about over-commitment. Other than this, we're inclined to lie low. Yazid has been told to seek session with JFK. We're stalling till we find out if Moroccan coming; I think latter should get in first, if so. Hard to sort out who's firing at whom, but Figuig seems still in Moroccan hands. Most fascinating question is whether Boumedienne at the front is taking orders from Algiers. RWK * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Morocco, 11/63. Secret. 30. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Read) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 30. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Read) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Source Washington, November 4, 1963. SUBJECT Algerian-Moroccan Dispute: Request of Algerian Special Representative to Call on President Algerian Special Representative Muhammad Yazid arrived in Washington November 4 and has asked for an appointment with the President in order to deliver a special message from Ben Bella. 1 The Moroccans had previously informed us of their desire to send Prince Moulay Abdullah to Washington as the special representative of King Hassan with a message for the President. Prince Abdullah has been delayed but may arrive within the next two weeks. To help preserve the current delicate cease-fire by all means at our disposal and because Ambassador Porter has been able to see Ben Bella at will even during the recent fighting, the Department recommends that the President receive Yazid. It is also recommended that the Department inform the Moroccans of this and that the President be prepared to receive Moroccan Prince Abdullah if he comes to Washington as planned. 2 John A. McKesson 3 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ALG-MOR. Secret. Drafted by Stoltzfus and approved by Tasca. 1 Yazid met November 8 with the President. For a summary of their conversation, see Document 89 . 2 Ferguson warned on November 6 that untold damage had been done by agreeing to Yazid's appointment with the President before indicating U.S. willingness to receive Moulay Abdullah, the King's brother, whom Hassan had chosen as his emissary. He urged that the President send a personal message to the King indicating that he would be pleased to receive the Prince. (Telegram 795 from Rabat; Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ALG-MOR) The Department responded that, once Yazid's appointment was set, it had immediately informed the Moroccan Embassy that the Prince would be welcome. (Telegram 1121 to Rabat, November 6; ibid.) 3 Printed from a copy that indicates McKesson signed the original above Read's typed signature. 31. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco 31. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco Source Washington, November 4, 1963, 6:11 p.m. 113. Ambassador Bengelloun telephoned, having just talked to Rabat, to take sounding on U.S. attitude if, in his words, continued fighting by Algerians at instigation UAR at Figuig or elsewhere should oblige GOM to take matter to UN since, in GOM's opinion, understandings reached at Bamako would then clearly no longer be applicable to new situation, i.e., attempts by ANP with UAR help to capture Moroccan city across a frontier which has never been contested. He was told question premature; we remain convinced African forum is preferable and consider it should be tried in light of (1) new cease-fire as of 1030 GMT, this time with Malian observers, (2) Haile Selassie presence in UAR now where his views on foreign intervention expressed Belgrade likely be conveyed to Nasser, and (3) Balafrej's recent telegram urging haste in convoking Foreign Ministers on acting OAU President Doudou Thiam. In reply his complaint Dept fails to deplore UAR intervention publicly, we said we had been strong in our protest to Nasser 1 but believed strongly any public statement on our part likely create additional polemics and make it more difficult for him to back down. Bengelloun accepted our assertion that too early resort to Security Council would likely result in its referring matter to OAU but with GOM in role of having tried to avoid OAU consideration of conflict. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ALG-MOR. Confidential. Drafted by McClintic, cleared by Buffum and Jones, and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Algiers, Paris, Madrid, Cairo, Tunis, and USUN. 1 Reported in telegram 1901 to Cairo, November 4. (Ibid.) 32. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia 32. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia Source Washington, November 12, 1963, 7:31 p.m. 429. OAU Foreign Ministers' Conference. Following is your guidance re U.S role at OAU Foreign Ministers Conference 1 on Moroccan-Algerian conflict: (Appropriate background material pouched Nov. 8) A. General: U.S. desires continue its unobtrusive but active encouragement settlement in African context. As has been case during development conflict and at Bamako, we desire you keep us currently informed of progress conference and send urgently any recommendations for steps U.S. might appropriately take to facilitate solution. At same time, we are conscious conspicuous U.S. role could be misunderstood by Africans and particularly by one or other of parties to dispute. To meet this objective, suggest your primary effort follow conference be with IEG officials. You will wish to avoid any early initiatives in seeking out Moroccans and Algerians and be wary, if approached, of their seeking to involve U.S. in the details of their dispute. Such contacts once begun by one side or the other should be to the extent possible balanced. In exchanges of information you should confine yourself chiefly to European missions, particularly French. In order avoid too great attention our role, suggest circulation by U.S. Embassy representatives among other delegations be kept to minimum except at public and social events where contact expected. B. Presidential Message: To establish basis U.S. interest, you will receive separately message from President to Emperor. C. Oral Demarche: Suggest prior conference, you set forth U.S. position as set forth Depcirtel 826, 2 making following additional points: 1. U.S. concerned, as result its contacts with interested African states, that Morocco and Algeria may each be concentrating on seeking votes for its regime and basic position on frontier rather than for means of settlement. Concentration on choosing sides in present conflict could be serious for African unity as well as frustrating genuine efforts find means of solution. (FYI—We are also concerned by possibility Emperor may himself opt for Algerian position on frontiers with Somali problem in mind. While some similarities exist, many features are different. We trust Emperor can be encouraged exercise maximum influence by not himself choosing sides to determine success conference. End FYI.) 2. From our study of problem, we doubt solution can be found in brief span of meeting. We would hope impartial arbitrators could be appointed and time provided for cooling off of current tempers. During this period, cease-fire must be maintained. We remain concerned that in absence clear withdrawal by both sides more observers, equipped for rapid movement, may be needed. 3. We hope conference can focus, also, on problem limiting outside intervention in conflict through excessive shipments military material and introduction foreign troops and technicians. U.S. recognizes right both countries acquire needed equipment in present crisis, but is apprehensive some outside powers such as UAR, Cuba and USSR may seek occasion build up own positions without reference need for peaceful settlement. We strongly believe injection large numbers foreign advisers and troops likely to exacerbate situation and should be avoided. U.S. military program in Morocco was initiated in 1959, is of modest proportions and designed to permit GOM to ensure its internal security only. With exception small number USAF personnel in purely and temporary training function there are no U.S. personnel involved. There is no U.S. intention to increase program in present conflict. 4. Consequences failure reach agreement on means for solution could be resumption conflict with much greater threat escalation, general disappointment in African organization, and introduction problem in United Nations. Neither we nor Africans desire this. D. (FYI) Relations with Disputants: U.S. has sought follow impartial policy between Morocco and Algeria. King Hassan had hoped for more conspicuous and forthright support from U.S. We have not believed this in his interest or ours. Consequently, Moroccans sensitive over U.S. role. In view key U.S. interests Morocco and close association, it is important Moroccans be given no cause believe U.S. in any way favoring Algeria at conference. At same time we wish avoid any Moroccan efforts identify us with their viewpoint. Relations with Algeria currently on even keel after Yazid talk with President and general recognition impartial U.S. role. However, this subject rapid change in this disorganized country. (End FYI) Embs. Algiers and Rabat should provide make up and evaluation delegations sent. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ALG-MOR. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Newsom and McClintic and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Rabat, Algiers, Paris, and Madrid. 1 The Bamako agreement called for a special meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity. The conference took place in Addis Ababa November 15-18. 2 Document 28 . 33. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain African Posts 33. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain African Posts Source Washington, November 19, 1963, 6:35 p.m. 911. You may indicate as appropriate Department welcomes accord reached at Addis for settlement Algerian-Moroccan problem in African context and particularly welcomes selection seven countries on commission. 1 We desire also assure continued full appreciation by host government US interests and attitudes re Algerian-Moroccan dispute. Main lines US posture set forth in Depcirtel 826 2 continue valid. While we do not wish initiate approaches these subjects, Department also interested any info available on decisions reached and action contemplated by OAU foreign ministers on limiting Algerian-Moroccan arms buildup. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ALG-MOR. Secret. Drafted by Newsom and Stackhouse , cleared by Dorros and Allen, and approved by Tasca . Also sent to Khartoum, Dakar, Lagos, Abidjan, Bamako, and Dar-es-Salaam. 1 The OAU Council of Ministers meeting at Addis Ababa created a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration consisting of Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, and Tanganyika to inquire into the origins of the conflict and submit concrete proposals for its definitive settlement. 2 Document 28 . 34. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco 34. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco Source Washington, December 24, 1963, 5:36 p.m. 1246. Ref. Rabat's 947. 1 Following are suggested talking points your further discussions with British, French, and Spanish ambassadors Rabat relating King's latest approach. FYI. Department hopes replies governments to King can be as much in accord as possible, but at same time does not wish commit U.S. join others in any line of action which may be counter our broader objectives. End FYI. 1. King's approach has two elements: his immediate difficulties with Algerians and his desire for additional arms. 2. We believe conditions which King reports Algerians have attached resumption full diplomatic relations unwarranted. Reports from other sources, however, suggest conditions may be less onerous than those described by King. They would seem center about completion work mixed commission, with which we certainly would not take issue, and normalization treatment Algerians in Morocco, which seems logical request from Algerian point view. If we do determine Algerians have posed conditions as described by King, U.S. willing use such influence as it possesses in Algeria emphasize benefit resumption full relations and seek removal conditions. 3. We are guided primarily by desire preserve present momentum toward African solution. This objective directly conditions our attitude toward additional arms for Morocco. 4. We agree evidence indicates Algerians moving to position of materiel advantage and, with completion current training, may become tactically on par with Moroccans or superior to Moroccans. Due weight should be given, however, to fact UAR has not demonstrated great military prowess elsewhere. King's concern over their role, while understandable, may overemphasize real danger. Direct Soviet role has been limited and Cuban role minor, though symbolic. UAR desires keep Cubans out. 5. Morocco does, in our view, face threat from instability in Algeria and from continued risk break in cease-fire by stray shot or initiative individual commanders for political purposes. We also have evidence Algerians may still have substantial military stocks in Libya which Libyans may be prepared release to them. 6. Before considering alteration our present policy toward aid to Morocco, however, believe we must assure ourselves King is not seeking alternative to acceptance African solution. We know he has been reluctant accept withdrawal arrangements worked out on frontier and agreed to by Algerians. We know his military commanders reluctant accept any solution which may require Morocco give up areas now under their control. [ 1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] He may feel current circumstances give sufficient weight this picture to persuade us of need for additional aid and commitment to Moroccan side. U.S. continues believe King running major risk in isolating himself from remainder of Africa. This danger would be accentuated by accepting conspicuous new Western aid. 7. Prospect additional Soviet arms Morocco is naturally matter of concern. King can hardly sustain picture his pro-Western stance, however, and accept substantial Soviet aid. Believe we should make every effort dissuade him, but yet not indicate this so alarms us we are prepared go extraordinary lengths prevent it. 8. King's approach further concerns us since it represents continuation his [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] efforts acquire arms without any indication careful planning, either from financial or military standpoint. Evidence substantial purchases in Europe points to this. 9. Given these factors, believe our initial response to King should be designed: (a) assure him our continued support for independence Morocco; (b) assure him continued reasonable flow normal Western military assistance; (c) indicate our willingness make representations Algerians with respect diplomatic relations problem, if Algerians have set unreasonable conditions; (d) urge his continued cooperation with African solution including withdrawal agreement; and (e) consideration his raising problem with Haile Selassie and Keita and point out acceptance Soviet arms would weaken his case both with West and with Africans who have tended support Morocco because of arms buildup in Algeria. 10. U.S. would be prepared re-examine situation in light responses these demarches. FYI. Policy set forth in Deptel 1965 to Madrid 2 remains basis our approach. However, in view serious limitations on foreign aid, U.S. response in military aid terms would probably be minimal in event further aid deemed necessary. End FYI. Algiers' 1307 3 just received. Department has no objection your seeking reaction French, British, and Spanish ambassadors suggestion para 4. You may also explore privately with French Ambassador (without reference to Porter) ideas paras 5 and 6. Preparation actual reply to King must await your further discussions your three colleagues and receipt comments other interested posts. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ALG-MOR. Secret. Drafted by Newsom; cleared by Symmes, Long, Ortiz, Hadsel, Adams, and Heffner (DOD); and approved by Williams. Repeated to Paris, London, Madrid, Addis Ababa, Bamako, Tunis, and Algiers. 1 In telegram 947 from Rabat, December 21, Ferguson reported that King Hassan was gravely concerned over the danger from Algeria and worried that Moroccan military strength would soon be outmatched by Algeria's. He indicated that he was considering accepting deliveries of Soviet arms. Hassan complained that the Algerian Government had refused to accept the appointed Moroccan Ambassador or return their Ambassador to Rabat until the Bamako frontier commission had completed its work and Morocco normalized its relations with Egypt and Cuba, which Algeria did not wish to offend. (Ibid.) 2 Telegram 1965 to Madrid, December 2, outlined the U.S. position toward the Algerian-Moroccan conflict as presented to Spanish Deputy Prime Minister Munoz Grandes in conversations with Rusk and Williams in Washington November 25-26. The United States supported an African solution to the crisis; it agreed with Spain that Morocco should not be permitted to fall under anti-Western influence; if Algeria broke the cease-fire and continued its extraordinary military build-up, the situation would be out of control and would require reassessment. In such an event, the United States hoped Spain and France could provide aid to Morocco, which it would back up with some assistance of its own. (Ibid.) 3 In telegram 1307 from Algiers, December 24, Porter suggested trying to induce the French, British, and Spanish Ambassadors to emphasize to the Algerian Government that the situation was moving into a dangerous stage because of the continuing arrival of Soviet and UAR arms. Porter also recommended inducing the French Ambassador to take the lead. He reported that he had already discussed with the French Ambassador certain ideas, including expressions of concern over the influx of Soviet and Egyptian arms and the need for demilitarization of the frontier. (Ibid.) Algeria Algeria 35. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, January 3, 1961, 3:15 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.51/1-362. Secret. Drafted by Imhof (WE) and approved in S on January 9. Ambassador Herve Alphand had requested an appointment with Secretary of State Christian A. Herter to discuss the general situation. 36. Editorial Note 37. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Satterthwaite) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, January 30, 1961. Source: Department of State, AF/AFN Files: Lot 65 D 182, A20, U.S. Policy Towards Algeria. Confidential. Drafted by Chase. Sent through Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs Raymond A. Hare. 38. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France Washington, February 1, 1961, 9:30 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/2-161. Confidential. Drafted by Chase and Valdes; cleared by Kohler, McBride, Penfield, Hare, and Stoessel; and approved by Rusk. Also sent to Rabat, Tunis, Cairo, and Tripoli and repeated to London and USUN. 39. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia Washington, February 8, 1961, 6:23 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/2-861. Confidential. Drafted by Root on February 6, cleared by Seip and Goodpaster, and approved by Williams. Repeated to Paris. 40. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassyin France Washington, February 15, 1961, 9:52 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/2-1561. Secret. Drafted by Valdes; cleared by McBride, Mau, and Tasca; and approved by Kohler. Repeated to Tunis, Rabat, Algiers, and London. 41. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, February 27, 1961. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria. Secret. Also sent to Rostow. 42. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia Washington, March 31, 1961, 8:21 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/3-3161. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Root and Chase; cleared by Brown, Valdes, and Witman; and approved by McBride. Also sent to Paris and repeated to Rabat, London, and Algiers. 43. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Dulles to President Kennedy Washington, April 24, 1961. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria. No classification marking. Attached to the source text but not printed are three attachments entitled: “French Army Dispositions,” “Military Air Transport Available,” and “Excerpts as stated.” 44. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France Washington, April 24, 1961, 9:19 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/4-2426. Confidential. Drafted by Valdes; cleared by Collopy, and in substance with S; and approved by Kohler. 45. Special National Intelligence Estimate Washington, May 23, 1961. 46. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of European Affairs Washington, August 5, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/8-561. Confidential. Sent to the White House under cover of a brief memorandum from Battle (S/S) to Bundy (NSC) indicating that the paper had been written in response to an oral request from the National Security Council. A copy of this memorandum is in Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria. 47. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Paris, September 2, 1961, 4 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/9-261. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Algiers, USUN, and Tunis. 48. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts Washington, September 9, 1961, 4:10 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/9-961. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by MacDonald on September 8; cleared by Brown, Wallner, Buffum, Tyler, Fredericks, Witman, and Korn; and approved by Ball. Sent to Tunis, Paris, Algiers, Rabat, Cairo, Tripoli, Benghazi, London, and USUN. 49. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France Washington, October 18, 1961, 9:06 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.15-WI/10-1861. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Brown, cleared by Witman, and approved by Tyler. Repeated to Tunis, Algiers, and Tripoli for Williams, and pouched to Rabat. A memorandum of this conversation is ibid., 751S.00/10-1861. 50. Letter From the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball) Washington, October 20, 1961. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, Algeria 000. 1961. Secret. Drafted by Colonel Yount on October 19. Attached to a memorandum from Major General Frederic H. Miller, Director, European Region, to Bundy recommending that he sign the letter. A handwritten note indicates Bundy signed the letter on October 20. 51. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer and Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Washington, October 27, 1961. Source: Kennedy Library, Schlesinger Papers, French-Algerian Negotiations. Secret; Noforn. On October 27, Komer sent this memorandum to McGeorge Bundy under cover of a memorandum that reads: “FYI, here is a draft Memorandum to the President which I originally intended to propose you send forward with an NSC Action Memo attached. Since the talk which Arthur, Hal Saunders, and I had with the State people, however, I prefer holding up a few days until we can get a better idea as to what, if anything, State proposes to do. Hence, attached is merely to fill you in on the sense of urgency which we feel about this problem. Admittedly, our leverage with the PAG may be marginal and the costs of offending De Gaulle at this juncture high. But the cost of not doing whatever we can, however little, to forestall a frightful mess and push a negotiated solution might be higher still.” 52. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France Washington, October 28, 1961, 3:28 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/11-2861. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Brown, Tyler, and Imhof; cleared by Tasca, Witman, Tyler, and Johnson; and approved by Ball. Also sent to Tunis, Algiers, and Rabat, and pouched to USUN, Cairo and Geneva. 53. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the Director of the Office of Northern African Affairs (Witman) Washington, November 6, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/12-1961. Secret. 54. Editorial Note 55. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) Washington, December 15, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.51S11/12-1561. Secret. 56. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, January 6, 1962. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.51S11/1-662. Secret. Drafted by Hooper and concurred in by WE. Attached to a memorandum from Witman to Williams indicating that the memorandum to the Secretary followed the line that McGhee had instructed Witman to take on January 4. Witman added that he would prefer that they adhere to their decision “no longer to slam the Department's door in the faces of the PAG.” (Ibid.) 57. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, January 8, 1962. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Algeria 000.1-121 1962. Secret. Attached to a memorandum from W.B. Palmer, Director of Military Assistance (DOD/ISA), to Assistant Secretary of State Williams, noting that Defense concurred with the JCS recommendations as a basis for planning purposes and requested further Department of State participation in developing such plans. 58. Special National Intelligence Estimate Washington, January 24, 1962. 59. Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of Algerian Affairs (Hooper) Washington, February 8, 1962. Source: Department of State, S/S Policy Guidelines: Lot 67 D 396, Algeria. Secret. A cover sheet indicates that the memorandum was being submitted to an NSC Standing Group meeting on February 9 for purposes of discussion, and had been generally approved in the Department of State but had not yet received final approval from Secretary Rusk. (Ibid.) 60. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia Washington, February 23, 1962, 6:04 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/2-2362. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Witman on February 22; cleared by Imhof, Tyler, Fredericks, Rowan, Manfull, Davies, and Smith (White House); and approved by McGhee. Also sent to Paris and Algiers. 61. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (McGhee) Washington, March 13, 1962. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.51S11/3-1362. Confidential. Drafted by Hooper on March 12. 62. Memorandum for the Files Washington, March 19, 1962. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/3-1962. Confidential. Drafted by Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs William R. Tyler. 63. Editorial Note 64. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts Washington, March 23, 1962, 8:38 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/3-23-62. Secret. Drafted by Hooper; cleared by Imhof, Tyler, Tasca, Thacher, and Pezzullo; and approved by Ball. Sent to Accra, Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Belgrade, Benghazi, Cairo, Conakry, Djakarta, Frankfurt, Hong Kong, Jidda, Karachi, London, Madrid, Moscow, New Delhi, Oslo, Paris, Prague, Rabat, Stockholm, Tripoli, and Tunis; and pouched to all other African posts. 65. Editorial Note 66. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, June 22, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria, 4/62-6/62. Secret. A copy was sent to Dungan. 67. Editorial Note 68. Central Intelligence Agency Information Report Washington, July 10, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Algeria. Secret; Noforn; No Dissem Abroad; Limited; Background Use Only. 69. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, August 17, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria, 7/16/62-7/30/62. Secret. A copy was sent to Dungan. 70. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Sloan) to William R. Polk of the Policy Planning Council Washington, August 23, 1962. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330,OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Algeria 000.1-121, 1962. Secret. Drafted by Colonel Junkermann. 71. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Washington, October 13, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria, 9/1/62-10/15/62. Secret. A handwritten covering note from Komer to Bundy reads: “This is long, but State briefing book is lousy so I summed up their 30pp. in my three. I also wanted to clue JFK on State/AID hassle over aid to Algeria. Only he can decide it, in last analysis, and now is best time to educate him.” Department of State briefing material for Ben Bella's visit in October 1962 is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2176. 72. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria Washington, October 23, 1962, 6:03 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.51S11/10-2362. Confidential. Drafted by Hooper on October 22, cleared by Little and Bromley Smith, and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Paris. 73. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) Washington, October 25, 1962. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.51S/10-2562. Secret. Drafted by Newsom. 74. National Intelligence Estimate Washington, November 7, 1962. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79 R 01012A, Box 215. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet: “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: “The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force.” All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on November 7 except the Atomic Energy Commission Representative and the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction. 75. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Northern African Affairs (Witman) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) Washington, November 7, 1962. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/11-762. Confidential. Drafted by Gonzalez. 76. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Paris, December 6, 1962, 7 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/12-662. Confidential. Repeated to Algiers. 77. National Security Action Memorandum No. 211 Washington, December 14, 1962. Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAMs. Secret. A copy was sent to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. 78. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Washington, December 28, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria, 10/16/62-12/31/62. Secret. 79. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, January 3, 1963. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files:FRC 69 A 3131, Algeria, 1963. Secret. 80. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, February 1, 1963. 81. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy Washington, undated. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series,NSAMs, NSAM-21. Secret. Attached to the source text but not printed is a 14-page “Discussion of the Strategy and Action Plan for Algeria.” 82. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Washington, February 4, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer, Secret. 83. National Security Action Memorandum No. 221 Washington, February 20, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAMs, NSAM-21. Secret. A copy was sent to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. 84. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President Washington, July 15, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria, 6/63-9/63. Confidential. A marginal handwritten notation reads: “(Taken from Pres. weekend reading dtd 7/19/63—Tab 6)”. 85. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, July 24, 1963, 4:15 p.m. Source: Department of State, President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. Confidential. Drafted by Witman and approved by the White House on August 7. The conversation was held at the White House. Earlier on July 24, Komer sent a briefing memorandum to the President suggesting that he take the time for some serious talk with the new Algerian Ambassador, who was one of Ben Bella's closest confidants. Komer proposed that the President focus on the need for Algeria to put its economy, which was in near chaos, in order before anyone else could do much to help, and on U.S. problems with Castro and how Algeria's relations with Cuba raised difficulties for nations that wanted to help Algeria. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria, 6/63-9/63) 86. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, September 19, 1963, 9:30 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 ALG. Confidential. Drafted by Porter and approved by the White House on September 23. The conversation was held at the White House. 87. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, October 14, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria. Secret. The source text indicates two attachments: A memorandum from Read to Bundy, October 14, which discussed the revolt in the Kabylia region of Algeria, which had begun on September 29, and the Algerian-Moroccan border conflict, which had escalated since the first serious armed clash on October 8 (Department of State, Central Files, POL 26 ALG); and telegram 734 from Algiers, which advised against sending a high-level U.S. delegation to the Algerian ceremonies planned for November 1, the anniversary of the outbreak of Algeria's revolution in 1954, which Communist governments intended to attend at the ministerial level (Ibid., POL 17-4 ALG). 88. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Washington, November 7, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Morocco Security, 1960-1963. Secret. 89. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria Washington, November 8, 1963, 8:59 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ALG-MOR. Confidential. Drafted by Hooper, cleared by Baldwin and Komer, and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Paris, Rabat, Addis Ababa, USUN, and Moscow. 90. National Intelligence Estimate Washington, November 27, 1963 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79 R 01012A, Box 242. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was prepared by the CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and NSA. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on November 27 except the Atomic Energy Commission Representative and the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction. 35. Memorandum of Conversation 35. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, January 3, 1961, 3:15 p.m. SUBJECT Call by Ambassador Alphand—January 3, 1961 PARTICIPANTS The Secretary Mr. J.V. Imhof, WE Ambassador Alphand, French Embassy M. Claude Lebel , Minister, French Embassy [Here follows discussion of other matters.] Algeria . The Secretary asked whether Ambassador Alphand had any recent information as to how the Algerian problem was developing. Ambassador Alphand said that in his talks with Prime Minister Debre and Minister Joxe both had been much more optimistic than on past occasions and had expressed the view that they felt reasonably certain for the first time that the other side really wanted to reach an agreement. He said he understood that in preliminary negotiations agreement had been reached on a number of crucial problems such as the Sahara, the stationing of French troops, the maintenance of bases and of communications with Black Africa and the rights of the European minority although this latter point still presented certain difficulties. He said he considered it likely that formal negotiations would begin within the next few weeks. He warned however that difficulties could appear at the last moment. With Arabs, one could never be certain whether agreements that had been reached would not again become negotiable. Also, the Egyptians and the Soviets were exercising pressure on the GPRA against a negotiated settlement. Lastly, there was the threat from the OAS. In the Metropole, the OAS has been noisy but without any real influence. The vast majority of the people in metropolitan France would welcome a negotiated settlement of the Algerian conflict. In Algeria, however, the OAS was influential and could cause trouble. Ambassador Alphand was confident however that the Government would be able to deal with these troubles. Ambassador Alphand said that in view of the fact that the outlook was favorable and that a negotiated settlement appeared to be at hand it was important to do nothing that might disturb this situation. He referred to the understanding which he had had for several years that FLN leaders would not be received in the Department. 1 He said that a meeting with FLN leaders in the Department at this time (he cited as an illustration a meeting between Governor Williams and Chanderli) would have a disturbing influence on the negotiations. He said that General De Gaulle has also expressed concern about this. The Secretary said that we did not intend to do anything that might upset negotiations. Our vote in the UN on the Algerian issue had been determined by this consideration. 2 However, it was neither in the interest of France nor of the West that the Soviets would meanwhile strengthen their contacts and their influence with the GPRA. Ambassador Alphand said that the Soviets had not recognized the GPRA. He said he knew that we were concerned about Soviet influence on the GPRA but was convinced that a balancing act on our part would do no good. It would be far better to wait until negotiations had led to the establishment of a Provisional Algerian Government. For the moment it was of the utmost importance not to do anything that might hinder negotiations and premature official contacts between U.S. officials and GPRA leaders could have an unsettling influence. The Secretary said that he would discuss this matter with his colleagues. French-Arab relations . The Secretary said the constructive Algerian settlement would improve French relations with the Arab world. He also remarked on the current happy state of relations between France and Morocco. Ambassador Alphand said that there was a curious seesaw relationship in North Africa: when French-Tunisian relations were bad, French-Moroccan relations improved and vice versa. He agreed that an Algerian settlement would have a salutary effect on French-Arab relations but said that Egypt was an exception. He said the French had disturbing reports from Egypt on the treatment inflicted upon the arrested French officials who had been subjected to all kinds of torture. [Here follows discussion of another subject.] * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.51/1-362. Secret. Drafted by Imhof (WE) and approved in S on January 9. Ambassador Herve Alphand had requested an appointment with Secretary of State Christian A. Herter to discuss the general situation. 1 For previous documentation on this issue, see Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, vol. XIII, pp. 629 - 630 , 651 , 691 - 692 , and 718 - 719 . 2 Reference is to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1573 (XV), adopted December 19, 1960, with the United States abstaining. For text of the resolution, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960 , pp. 520-521. For a record of the U.N. proceedings, see U.N. Doc. A/PV.956. 36. Editorial Note 36. Editorial Note On January 13, 1961, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Livingston T. Merchant gave the following report during a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting: “Mr. Merchant said he would like to report to the Chiefs our assessment of the recent referendum on Algeria. In France itself De Gaulle won over 75% of the vote. Even when the non-voters are considered, 57% of the eligible voters supported De Gaulle. Sixteen million Frenchmen voted yes, five million no and five million abstained. In Algeria 70% of those voting supported De Gaulle. In France the negative vote did not reflect success on the part of the extreme right but was largely the communist electorate. The results of the referendum were not as good as was expected a month before the vote took place but were more favorable than was anticipated on the eve of the referendum. We do not know if the FLN will be willing to negotiate with De Gaulle but the lull occurring after the referendum gives us some feeling of optimism. We have no idea of how De Gaulle plans to play his hand, how he will negotiate. With respect to North Africa in general Mr. Merchant said in the future we will want to get JCS views on certain aspects of Sino-Soviet involvement in the area. He said he was considering the possibility of sending the Chiefs a letter containing certain military questions in this regard. Reverting to the referendum he said we felt the West had jumped over a hurdle, that a majority of Frenchmen have endorsed De Gaulle's program, that the ultras have been isolated and that the French Army will remain loyal to France. The Algerian situation now warrants modified optimism.” (Substance of discussion of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting, January 13; Department of State, State-JCS Meetings: Lot 70 D 328) De Gaulle had offered self-determination to Algeria in a speech on September 16, 1959. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959 , pages 1096-1099. On November 16, 1960, the French Government announced that President De Gaulle had decided to submit his Algerian policy to a nationwide referendum. The referendum was held January 6-8, 1961, in metropolitan France and Algeria. 37. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Satterthwaite) to Secretary of State Rusk 37. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Satterthwaite) to Secretary of State Rusk Source Washington, January 30, 1961. SUBJECT Forthcoming Algerian Developments and the Role of The United States Algerian problem enters new phase—How is “Algerian Algeria” to be created There is general agreement that the Algerian problem is entering a new phase. There is no longer any question that an “Algerian Algeria” will be created, but there remains the very considerable problem of how this will be done. The central point at issue is to define the Algerian elements to which political power can be transferred without risking unacceptable danger to French national interests. If Algerians could be found who (a) commanded local support and (b) evidenced a willingness to cooperate with France in the post-independence period the forms of transfer of power would assume reduced importance as appears to be the case in the current negotiations with the entente states. Unfortunately Algerian leaders who might have played such a role have either become compromised by non-participation in the rebellion or by siding with the French or, as in the case of Farhat Abbas, have made common cause with the rebellion. The critical issue—Transfer of Power France seems to recognize that the rebellion will come to an end only through political negotiations with the PAG in its capacity as spokesman for the ALN and FLN (the Military and Political arms of the rebellion). It is probable also that the French Government recognizes that negotiations with the PAG will inevitably lead to that group's assuming the principal role in determining the future policies of “Algerian Algeria”. There is no question that the PAG and its followers through their advanced degree of political organization, their cadres trained abroad and perhaps covertly in Algeria itself and their security forces, will inevitably outdistance any Algerian competitors. Their initial margin is likely to grow as the formation of trade union, youth and student groups add to PAG's nationalist image that of primary advocate of internal social and economic reforms which can be expected to have great appeal for the urban masses and landless rural elements. Of course the PAG is not a static body and the longer peace is delayed the more likely it is that its policies will become increasingly revolutionary. On the other hand a relatively quick settlement would maintain the leadership of the new Algeria in comparatively moderate hands. Thus the problem in essence is for France and the PAG to reach agreement on (1) transitional steps and (2) Franco-Algerian relations in the post-independence period. We may expect that the PAG will wish to make no concessions which would seriously restrict “Algeria's” future freedom of action. At the same time France would be reluctant to make uncompensated concessions in the pre-independence stage, quite apart from the very real problem of France's inability to make any moves at all towards legitimizing the followers of the PAG unless the French Army's acquiescence were assured. Under these circumstances it is to be feared that the parties if left to themselves will have great difficulty in reaching a settlement. The PAG is already showing the strains of a long war in that it is increasingly vulnerable to suggestions from its own militants and to outsiders that continued hostilities will bring about a French political collapse permitting a battle-hardened and truly revolutionary Algerian regime eventually to take over the country. The French Government has had some success in over-riding the objections of the Europeans of Algeria to self-determination and has also been able to maintain army acquiescence in the government's Algerian policies. However, the Army's hatred of the rebels probably continues to inhibit De Gaulle from taking any really decisive steps towards an early transfer of significant powers to the supporters of the PAG even if he wishes to do so (which is by no means certain). The balance of probability is that talks will be opened, that they will be exploratory in nature and that they will not reach any very meaningful agreements. At the present stage the primary obstacle will probably be the continuation of hostilities. The PAG will not renounce its principal instrument of pressure on France and undecided Moslems, and De Gaulle will not withdraw the French Army in any appreciable numbers without a prior political understanding between the parties. Should the talks become stalled, we would expect that the next phase of the problem would take place in the resumed General Assembly at which time the Algerians would seek a resolution building on that of December and calling for the UN to assume a direct role in the negotiations. Such a resolution would put the US directly on the spot. Our failure to endorse such a demand would be held against us for a very long time and should such a resolution fail, the influence of the extremist view regarding the Algerian problems might be impossible to overcome. In this case De Gaulle would be caught between pressure in France for a settlement on almost any terms and the French Army with serious consequences for his own authority. The moderate leaders of North and West Africa would also be forced to choose sides instead of working for a reconciliation and would bitterly resent what they would hold to be the failure of the US to exert its influence in favor of a UN assisted settlement. US Role to Prevent a Breakdown by Establishing Influence with PAG 1 It is our contention that the foregoing course of events might well be averted by expeditious US action. It is not safe for us to assume that De Gaulle has the problem well in hand but that we could always intervene to “influence” the parties if anything goes wrong. The facts are that De Gaulle's room for maneuver is very limited in the negotiations of such key problems as the future of French military installations in Algeria, the political and economic status of Europeans, the future of French holdings in the Sahara and army toleration of PAG political activity in the pre-independence period. It is also true that self-imposed restrictions in response to French pressures have not only prevented us from established meaningful relations with the PAG but, together with our sales of armament to aid the French military effort, have given the rebels the impression that for all practical purposes we support the French side politically, militarily and economically. Hence there is every likelihood that the PAG, faced with a US appeal following no real concessions on the part of De Gaulle, will feel that it has nothing to lose from maintaining a recalcitrant attitude. On the other hand an indication that the US recognizes that an era in history has ended and that in consequence the PAG is entitled to be dealt with much as we deal with the future rulers of British territories may cause the PAG to see some value in US suggestions. While the PAG is disillusioned with past US behavior, it nevertheless still greatly values the potentialities of our active interest and influence in bringing about a solution based on continuing cooperation between the new Algeria and the West. Indeed, the mere evidence of genuine US sympathy and objectivity would go a long way to give the Algerians the confidence to enter into negotiations with France. Already there are indications that the PAG moderates will be prepared to discuss fully with the French the key issues mentioned above. It should be our task to ensure that this willingness does not evaporate in the face of the rigid French proposals which are predictable at least in the initial stages of the talks. Not to be overlooked, also, is the added weight which such a US position would give to similar representations to the PAG by the African and Asian states. The latter have been handicapped by the obvious lack of any supporting evidence for their pleas to the PAG to place its trust in Western intentions. We may be thankful that it was only in the sixth year of the war that PAG leaders began to consider seriously the possibility that the West had no real interest in their goals and decided to explore vigorously the possibilities of bloc assistance. We should not conclude however that the turning away from the West is irreversible or on the other hand that it will not continue in the absence of positive Western moves. French reaction to a US initiative It may be argued that a US initiative to establish Western bona fides with the PAG will cause De Gaulle to draw back from his present policies. We do not agree. We think De Gaulle has adopted self-determination for French reasons as the only policy which can settle the Algerian problem in a way permitting France to emerge from the settlement with prestige and honor permitting it to assert a valid claim to great power status. His policies are also responsive to the fact of rebellion, to the fact that the rebellion is dominated by the PAG, and to the growing demand within France for an end to a most unpopular war. We do not believe he could or would draw back from a settlement on the grounds that the US shared his desire that the PAG should negotiate. Nor do we believe that at this stage expanded but discreet US contacts with the PAG would cause the French Army to do anything which it would not do if faced with the prospect, for example, of numbers of PAG approved Algerians assuming power during the transition period as the result of French contacts with the same persons. If the army will acquiesce in the transfer of power it will hardly revolt against the government of De Gaulle because of a US ambassador's contacts in Rabat or Tunis. If it will not acquiesce, such contacts are all the more important to head off the prospects of a bloc-backed Algeria-in-exile forming in Tunisia or Morocco with serious consequences for Western interests in these and other African states. It is also suggested that an approach to the PAG will be ineffective unless it is preceded by an approach to De Gaulle. While this may well be true as regards the discussion of specific issues such as the fate of the French naval installations at Mers al Kebir a demarche to De Gaulle is not a prerequisite to the kind of relationship which is in itself also a precondition to advice on specifics. We do not object of course to informing the French that we propose to expand our contacts with the PAG in the interest of facilitating negotiations and preventing a further deterioration in North Africa's relations with the West. To do so would in fact have the advantage of underscoring to the French the importance we and other friendly states attach to successful negotiations. De Gaulle himself has admitted that world opinion has a justifiable interest in a fair settlement; he could hardly object if we sought to assist by doing what we could to establish and maintain a similar point of view in rebel circles. Finally it is argued that expansion of US contact with the PAG serves no useful purpose at this time since “we have nothing to say” but should await a moment of difficulty at which we could intervene with a plea for the adoption of a “constructive” approach. This suggestion lacks merit on two counts. It assumes by implication that we will wish to endorse the French position on whatever issue is at stake. It also overlooks the fact that the PAG will be responsive to our advice only if we have made it worthwhile for them to do so by having reassured them over some time that we wish to treat with them as responsible political leaders not as guerrillas. We do not have to convey the impression that we consider the PAG as the government of Algeria. We do need to make clear that our interest is not to rescue French chestnuts but to deal on dignified terms with those who may be important leaders in a new Algeria. Support from North Africa's Moderates Should the US assume a more positive position towards the Algerian question using expansion of contacts with the PAG as a first step, it would also be very desirable to make sure that the North African governments understood and appreciated what we were doing. Our willingness to be more forthcoming on Algeria and to consult closely with the North Africans about developments there would do much to shore up our political and military position in Morocco and Libya and would greatly strengthen Bourguiba's Tunisia. It is quite possible that the favorable reaction we could expect to an indication that the US had finally decided to recognize the trend of events in Algeria would be of assistance to us in gaining greater acceptance for our own positions on other issues. It seems apparent that US “indifference” to Algeria has had a considerable effect on African “indifference” if not antagonism to the US position on cold war issues. This is not to say that differences between the US and the North Africans will not continue, especially as regards bases and certain other matters, but these conflicts can be reduced to manageable proportions once the North Africans are persuaded that the US is in fundamental agreement with them on major political issues. Specifics of our approach to the PAG It is possible to spell out in some detail the content of initial approaches to the PAG, to the French and to the North African states, 2 but the essential point to be decided at this time is that the US is now prepared to approach the Algerian problem from the assumption that it is desirable that an orderly transfer of power to the PAG and its supporters take place as rapidly as possible, and that the role of the US over the coming months will be to do what it can to ease this transition at the same time laying the groundwork for fruitful relations between the US and the new Algeria, between Algeria and France, and between Algeria and its African neighbors. While we would expect in our discussions with the PAG to counsel conciliatory attitudes towards such matters as the status of European and French economic holdings, it would be premature for us to adopt specific positions on these subjects at this time or to involve ourselves as guarantors in any way. If the general premises outlined above are accepted and implemented we have every reason to believe that North Africa's present orientation towards the West can be maintained. If not, the probability is that a settlement will not be reached, that the war will drag on with extremists taking over the rebellion and De Gaulle's authority gravely weakened and that the US will be lumped with France in African eyes as being responsible for the growth of bloc influence in the area in spite of the best efforts of North Africa's moderate leaders. * Source: Department of State, AF/AFN Files: Lot 65 D 182, A20, U.S. Policy Towards Algeria. Confidential. Drafted by Chase. Sent through Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs Raymond A. Hare. 1 On October 23, 1962, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs G. Mennen Williams sent a memorandum to Secretary Rusk recommending that the U.S. Government maintain effective and public contact with nationalist leaders in the remaining African dependent territories; see Document 360 . 2 Proposals in this respect are already under study in the Department. [Footnote in the source text. For examples of such proposals, see memoranda from Foy D. Kohler (EUR) to Secretary-Designate Dean Rusk , January 13, 1961 (Kennedy Library, Schlesinger Papers, French-Algerian Negotiations); James K. Penfield (AF) to Raymond G. Hare (G), January 19 (Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/1-1961); and Satterthwaite (AF) to Hare (G), January 27. (Ibid., 751S.00/1-2761)] 38. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France 38. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France Source Washington, February 1, 1961, 9:30 p.m. 3161. Department has carefully studied posts' recommendations for and against raising level our contacts with PAG. Department shares concerns cited Paris 3016. 1 However, Department also shares belief (Tunis 881) 2 FLN will inevitably play large role in Algerian future, and therefore sees merit in modifying present arrangements in manner which will permit us to improve our eventual capability to influence PAG in direction constructive approach to problems which bound to arise in conjunction anticipated negotiations. In any case Department believes present situation inconsistent with our traditional position of being willing see all groups and considers effort should be made bring contacts with PAG more into line our normal practices. At same time Department wishes avoid creating expectations or suspicions on either side which could make direct contact between them more difficult. It is important in particular that neither French nor PAG be given grounds to believe US intends to deal with PAG or its representatives in manner inconsistent with our non-recognition of PAG's claim to government status, or to become actively involved in any way in negotiations. Department accordingly authorizes addressee posts to take such steps as may be appropriate locally to deal discreetly but positively with Algerian overtures for exchanges of views at other than present levels. This should be done unostentatiously and without any advance statement to PAG or others we are prepared do so. In other words we would not envisage sudden campaign to cultivate PAG but only quiet return to more normal practices. Posts should make every reasonable effort to confine higher level contacts to those which would arise spontaneously in course of normal social and ceremonial functions. Department will welcome posts' suggestions as to best ways of handling French when they complain of higher level US-PAG contacts. 3 Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/2-161. Confidential. Drafted by Chase and Valdes; cleared by Kohler, McBride, Penfield, Hare, and Stoessel; and approved by Rusk. Also sent to Rabat, Tunis, Cairo, and Tripoli and repeated to London and USUN. 1 In telegram 3016 from Paris, January 30, Cecil Lyon, Minister of the Embassy, warned that any advantage gained by moving to higher level contacts with the PAG would not be “sufficient to counter-balance inevitable French feeling we were prejudicing negotiations and trying to upstage them at delicate moment.” (Ibid., 751S.00/1-3061) 2 Dated January 27. (Ibid., 751S.00/1-2761) 3 On February 2, Lyon recommended that the French Government be informed of any change in U.S. policy and made a “final plea for deferring any change in present policy at least until FLN-French negotiations under way.” (Telegram 3061 from Paris; ibid., 751S.00/2-261) The Department of State responded on February 4 that it did not believe it advisable to inform either the French or the FLN in advance of any change in policy “since this would lend too great significance to matter” and reiterated its position on contacts with the PAG as outlined in telegram 3161, noting that the date when Franco-Algerian talks were to begin remained unclear. (Telegram 3201 to Paris; ibid.) 39. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia 39. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia Source Washington, February 8, 1961, 6:23 a.m. 801. In extended and extremely cordial farewell call on President Feb 6, 1 Ambassador Slim reiterated his country's confidence in U.S., identity of views between two nations and Tunisia's earnest hope U.S. Government would take courageous anti-colonial stand despite difficulties this might cause us with certain of our European allies. Ambassador stressed Algerian problem as Tunisia's main preoccupation and said that present opportunity for negotiations must not be lost. He informed President that Bourguiba had been invited visit De Gaulle and that, while Bourguiba appreciated this gesture and was willing to take any step that would help cause of Algerian peace, he first wished to discuss invitation with Algerian friends and to make sure his visit would serve useful purpose and not merely be matter of protocol. In answer to President's question, Ambassador said Bourguiba's relationships with FLN leadership were excellent. Ambassador warned that if De Gaulle missed present opportunity for negotiations Tunisia could not long hold out against transshipment of Communist help to Algerian fighters. President recalled long interest he had in North African problems from time he was Senator and said his views had not changed though his responsibilities were of course now different. In difficulties that lay ahead we certainly counted on constructive and stabilizing role of President Bourguiba and Tunisia. It seemed to President that more progress had been made toward solution of Algerian problem in last three months than in last six years. He wondered whether events were not now moving toward kind of solution based on self-determination which he and President Bourguiba favored. Ambassador expressed doubt events were moving at sufficiently rapid pace. President indicated we looked to Tunisia for any suggestions as to how US could play effective part. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/2-861. Confidential. Drafted by Root on February 6, cleared by Seip and Goodpaster, and approved by Williams. Repeated to Paris. 1 A memorandum of this conversation is ibid., President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. 40. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassyin France 40. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassyin France Source Washington, February 15, 1961, 9:52 p.m. 3348. Following report of discussion on Algeria in February 14 Alphand-Secretary meeting based on uncleared memcon: 1 Alphand, who probably not speaking from instructions but from what he conceives to be the French position, said De Gaulle obtained mandate proceed with self-determination. Extreme rightists out, army completely disciplined, and question is to negotiate with FLN, first on cease-fire then on guarantees, though latter negotiation cannot be with FLN alone. Inside FLN there tendency influenced by Bourguiba which wants to negotiate, and other tendency influenced by Nasser and East which does not, finding war serves its purpose. French hope moderates will prevail. Negotiations will be very secret, and Alphand will probably not be informed. French ask our confidence. French do not think we can help. Last Administration had no official relations with rebellion, French hope this will remain case. French hope negotiations will commence soon, but once they do we must realize will be difficult process, and will take some time. Secretary asked, in view split in FLN if would be helpful to moderates to know friendly relations could be established with West. Alphand replied they already know if agreement with French reached they will be closely associated with France, hence with West in general. Alphand reiterated there no move US can make now. Secretary asked if French had any idea re time factor. Alphand could not say, even De Gaulle could not fix time. Secretary stated we feel we are in period of pregnant opportunity, that is French and Algerians are, and we do not want to interfere in any way that might jeopardize progress. We under pressure to make some statement on Algeria, and have resisted, though this difficult for us. After Secretary left meeting Alphand asked if could summarize our position as: US will let De Gaulle continue try seek solution, US will not make any statement, and US will continue not have any formal relations with FLN? Kohler replied this essentially our position. Stressed we always under pressure. We realize French problems, but would appreciate any information re progress. We hope there disposition on both sides to compromise issues, so as avoid repeat of Melun. For example, we hope there inclination to find way around problem of cease-fire. We do not wish change our relations with either side, if this would result in firming up that side's position against compromise. If French would at any time indicate this might be useful, we would be glad do what we could. We all confident De Gaulle seeking solution. Alphand referred to Bourguiba visit to Paris, saying this would not involve good offices, but could be useful. Tasca stressed importance Bourguiba returning with his status unimpaired. Trip is risk for him. 2 Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/2-1561. Secret. Drafted by Valdes; cleared by McBride, Mau, and Tasca; and approved by Kohler. Repeated to Tunis, Rabat, Algiers, and London. 1 A memorandum of this conversation is ibid., 770.00/2-1461. 2 De Gaulle and President Bourguiba met in Rambouillet, France, February 27-28. Following the meeting, Bourguiba flew to Morocco to confer with PAG leaders. On March 1, Ambassador at Large Averell Harriman reported from Rabat that he had met with Bourguiba who had told him that he was convinced of the genuineness of De Gaulle's intentions and that he was “risking his future on convincing Algeria leaders to respond to De Gaulle.” (Telegram 1637 from Rabat; ibid., 751S.00/3-161) 41. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 41. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Source Washington, February 27, 1961. SUBJECT Algeria at the Point of Decision—Is There Anything We can Do? With genuine Franco-FLN talks at last in the offing, 1 we are at a critical stage which may offer the last real chance of a relatively “peaceful” Algerian solution. It is arguable whether or not we would help or hinder this by US action at this point. But clearly here is an urgent policy issue which ought to be on our list . DeGaulle is obviously seeking to disengage from Algeria, but if the FLN pushes him too hard he may be unable to do so (a tragedy for him as well as us). Hence it is now up to the FLN to meet him halfway, and any influence we may have should be used for this purpose. At a minimum, shouldn't State explore post-haste whether to use all available means of direct and indirect influence to persuade the FLN to respond constructively when DeGaulle lays his cards on the table? [ 1 line of source text not declassified ] We could point out that now is the time when the FLN leaders must choose between the likelihood of expanded conflict in Algeria, which would inevitably convert it into an East-West issue, and a peaceful transition which in the long run will probably give them all they want. The big hitch is that such efforts might be counter-productive. DeGaulle might be upset by our meddling, regardless of whether it were in his interest. As for the FLN, they might respond to our overtures by seeking compensatory commitments from Washington which would, in turn, embroil us with the French. But before letting the opportunity pass by inaction, let's at least make it a conscious choice. Bob Komer * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria. Secret. Also sent to Rostow. 1 On February 21, the PAG announced that the two sides had agreed to talks. On March 30, the French Government and the PAG issued communiques announcing their decision to open talks in Evian, France, on April 7. 42. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia 42. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia Source Washington, March 31, 1961, 8:21 p.m. 994. Department is disturbed by Yazid statement reported in press that “under present conditions PAG will not go to Evian.” Embassy should therefore make immediate contact with PAG at level you consider appropriate to express perplexity over Yazid statement and to ask what explanation you can send to USG. Embassy can draw on following points as appropriate in light PAG reply: (1) While PAG may have felt compelled to underscore its position in light reported Joxe Oran statements and MNA communique, 1 fact remains that GOF in communique announcing talks and subsequently, especially in Algeria, has clearly differentiated between “official” negotiations to take place at Evian and exchanges with MNA and other Algerian elements many of which, as PAG well knows, have little political influence among Algerian masses. (2) It quite clear to us that French govt fully committed to begin formal negotiations with PAG on “conditions for self-determination of Algerian population as well as problems related thereto,” a formula which is clearly responsive to PAG's own wishes and status. US believes, as result its discussions with highest levels of French govt, that French intentions are firm and genuine and that decision has been made (not without some cost, e.g. assassination mayor of Evian) to proceed at Evian to begin creation of Algerian Algeria. PAG does not have to accept our estimate on faith but would seem to have everything to gain by exploring French intentions fully in official talks instead of through communiques. (3) There will no doubt be many extraneous attempts to block or compromise negotiated settlement but parties must rise above them for main issue is that negotiations must take place, and quickly, if peaceful and equitable solution for Algeria is to be found. (4) Embassy knows US is urging GOF with equal frankness to take every precaution to avoid inopportune statements or actions which might be misinterpreted. US also avoiding substantive statements at this time. If PAG reaction to foregoing is negative and intractable, Embassy may in its discretion tell PAG that instructions it has received from Washington make clear that US Government, whose interest in a mutually satisfactory agreement should be apparent, would find it very difficult to understand PAG's failure to seize opportunity which Evian seems to offer. Alternatively, you may report PAG reaction to Embassy inquiry together with your recommendations. In either case you should inform GOT of your conversation with PAG and its results. Paris may tell GOF in general terms that we are seeking emphasize to PAG vital importance of adhering to April 7 schedule Evian, but Embassy should emphasize to GOF, (presumably Joxe or Couve) importance we attach to GOF's doing nothing which would make more difficult task of bringing PAG negotiators to Evian and assuring that talks themselves will be productive. Embassy should indicate that in our opinion it would be most helpful if GOF were to see that a reaffirmation of special character Evian were speedily made clear. 2 Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/3-3161. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Root and Chase; cleared by Brown, Valdes, and Witman; and approved by McBride. Also sent to Paris and repeated to Rabat, London, and Algiers. 1 On March 27, rival Mouvement Nationaliste Algerienne leader Messali Hadj announced that the MNA planned to appoint a delegation to begin parallel negotiations with the French. On March 30, Louis Joxe, French Minister of State in Charge of Algerian Affairs, said in Oran that he was prepared to meet with the MNA. On March 31, PAG Minister of Information Mohammed Yazid declared that French negotiations with the “valets of colonialism” called into question the Evian talks. 2 On April 1, Ambassador James M. Gavin reported from Paris that the French Government was “still reasonably optimistic” that FLN maneuvers would not prevent the opening of talks in Evian on April 7. (Telegram 4164 from Paris; Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/4-161) On April 3, Ambassador Walter N. Walmsley met with PAG Ministers in Tunis and emphasized the danger that a delay in beginning negotiations would entail, to which they responded that Joxe's statement indicated a basic French unwillingness to negotiate sincerely and insisted that the Evian talks could not begin until this statement had been suitably clarified. (Telegram 1144 from Tunis, April 3; ibid., 751S.00/4-361) This was the first official meeting between PAG officials and a U.S. Ambassador. French protests were reported in telegram 4209 to Paris, April 7. (Ibid., 751S.00/4-761) 43. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Dulles to President Kennedy 43. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Dulles to President Kennedy Source Washington, April 24, 1961. SUBJECT The Situation in France and Algeria 1 Ever since the settlers revolt in Algiers in January 1960, the Agency has received, analyzed and published numerous reports of French military and rightist plotting against De Gaulle's government and his Algerian policies. For example, on 26 January the CIB carried reports and analyses of sagging morale and disaffection in the Army and Air Force—in the latter particularly with reference to General Challe's resignation from his NATO command in protest over De Gaulle's intention to negotiate with the Algerian rebels. It now appears that the military officers involved, who had initially decided to exclude political leaders from their plans, suddenly moved up their timetable when their plot leaked to the Algiers Delegate General's office last week. In Algeria, insurgent leaders remain in control of most of the territory though it seems clear that large elements of the military there, as in France itself, have not fully declared themselves. There is yet no indication, however, that more loyal or passive elements would challenge the Legion and paratroopers in battle. In France, the government actions on the night of 23-24 April 2 appear to have reduced the prospects of successful invasion of France by the insurgent leaders—if indeed they actually intended such an invasion. These measures also seem to have stirred up the French popular will to resist—particularly among younger groups. The call up of military reservists continues. Other emergency measures are being relaxed, however—tanks and armored cars are being withdrawn from the city, roadblocks and airport barricades removed and commercial flights resumed at Paris airports. De Gaulle is unlikely to give any ground to the demands of the revolutionary military junta. Over the next few days he will probably solicit acknowledgements of positive loyalty to him both by the general public and by prominent political leaders in an effort to discourage disaffections by now hesitant military officers. The junta leaders for their part will be probing for support in units of metropolitan France and Germany; in the face of strong backing De Gaulle is likely to receive, we do not believe they will gain many additional adhesions. If the military leaders in Algeria feel the success of their revolt threatened by isolation and by the blockade imposed by De Gaulle on April 22—which we believe will be effective—they may in the next day or so attempt an invasion of France proper, hoping to spark as yet uncommitted military elements on the continent to their cause. However, as time passes without decisive action in metropolitan France, the insurgent leaders are more likely to turn on the FLN rebel bases in Tunisia in a desperate attempt to commit France to an enlargement of the war. I attach excerpts from the most significant intelligence reports that have come in during the last 24 hours. Allen W. Dulles 3 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria. No classification marking. Attached to the source text but not printed are three attachments entitled: “French Army Dispositions,” “Military Air Transport Available,” and “Excerpts as stated.” 1 On April 22, French military officers in Algeria seized Algiers and began an armed revolt against De Gaulle's Algerian policy. The French Cabinet decreed a state of emergency. 2 On April 23, President De Gaulle announced that he had assumed special emergency powers under Article 16 of the French Constitution, and the French Government undertook intensive emergency preparations to block a possible invasion of metropolitan France by rebel parachute troops. 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 44. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France 44. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France Source Washington, April 24, 1961, 9:19 p.m. 4506. Under instructions Alphand called on Kohler 1 re French press reports that Algiers radio broadcast statement by NBC Algiers correspondent saying Challe told him he asked President to help his movement, in order block Mediterranean to Communists. Kohler replied no such communication received, directly or indirectly. Had there been, our reaction would have been totally negative, and we would have informed GOF. Kohler said he assumed it best not dignify statement by denial, but should French think denial desirable, we would issue immediately. Alphand referred to Secretary's assurance yesterday there no truth to rumors rebel generals had contacted us for support. Kohler said Secretary made thorough check be sure no truth whatsoever in this. He pointed out whole idea fantastic, since no matter what any American felt about Challe, even if he professed friendship to us and NATO, if he should succeed we would inevitably have to take violently opposite line to his Algerian policy, and by definition we would be opposed to him. Kohler said when President offered support to De Gaulle 2 he meant it in real sense, and we wondered if French had any ideas of what we might usefully do. Alphand replied he talked to Paris on this twice yesterday after his conversation with Secretary, and they saw no need for further gesture, thinking exchange of messages would suffice to dispel rumors. This is French affair, and French must settle it themselves as fast as can. Kohler, in reaffirming our readiness be helpful, referred to NATO article 4. Asked if NATO could usefully take any troop or air force dispositions, or if we could usefully move Sixth Fleet under NATO. Alphand thought not, on grounds this might be dangerous since involvement foreign military units, even of friendly nations, might give more prestige to Challe. Kohler said we most apprehensive about possible movement into Tunisia. Alphand agreed would be disastrous. Lebel suggested if UN reaction to such move were too strong, French reaction might be increased sympathy for Challe. Alphand noted there had been rumors at time of force de frappe debate [that] we contacted rightists and encouraged them by saying we would like to see a government more favorable to NATO cooperation. He thought these might have been people in our services who not responsible but speak too much. Hoped we would be careful about this. Kohler reiterated assurance we have not encouraged rightists in any way, saying this not in our interest, since if Challe won, we would have more serious trouble with him over Algeria than any difficulties we may have had with De Gaulle. Embassy should follow above line with Foreign Office and other French officials. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/4-2426. Confidential. Drafted by Valdes; cleared by Collopy, and in substance with S; and approved by Kohler. 1 A memorandum of this conversation is ibid. 2 On April 23, President Kennedy sent De Gaulle a message pledging his “continuing friendship and support as well as that of the American people.” (Telegram 4489 to Paris, April 23; ibid., 751S.00/4-2361) For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, p. 315. For text of Kennedy's April 26 message congratulating De Gaulle after the revolt collapsed, see vol. XIII, pp. 653 - 654 . 45. Special National Intelligence Estimate 45. Special National Intelligence Estimate Washington, May 23, 1961. SNIE 22-2-61 [Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79 R 01012A, Box 193. Secret. 3 pages of source text not declassified.] 46. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of European Affairs 46. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of European Affairs Source Washington, August 5, 1961. ALGERIAN PROBLEM The Lugrin talks between the Algerian rebels (PAG) and the French were broken off, at PAG request, on July 27. 1 The PAG announced that this was not a rupture but a suspension, that they hoped negotiations would be resumed, and that they were leaving contacts in Switzerland to facilitate resumption. They insist that the suspension resulted entirely from the French refusal to concede Algerian sovereignty over the two Saharan departments. They cannot, they maintain, negotiate a settlement on only one fifth of their territory. The French also have expressed a desire the talks be resumed. They have maintained that the Sahara was only a pretext on the part of the PAG. They have offered numerous other explanations for the breakoff—inability of the PAG to negotiate with the French during the Bizerte crisis, dissension within the PAG and loss of influence by the moderates, the technical inability of the PAG delegation to negotiate, etc. We believe that the PAG meant what they said, and that the question of sovereignty over the Sahara did in fact cause the suspension of the talks. They are simply not prepared to negotiate the future of Algeria until the Algeria under discussion is defined. The Bizerte crisis did provide an awkward accompaniment to the talks, but the PAG nevertheless felt itself able to begin the second series of talks in the midst of the fighting at Bizerte. There are clearly various tendencies within the PAG, and this might affect the bargaining position the PAG delegation might take on any given issue, but there is no indication that any group opposing negotiations per se has achieved a position of decisive influence within the PAG. As for the negotiating ability of the PAG delegation, this has not yet been tested, since the negotiations did not progress as far as a discussion of technical details. With the suspension of the talks, what happens now? De Gaulle has made clear his determination to liquidate the Algerian problem by the end of the year. He has conceived of two ways of doing this—by negotiation with the PAG to arrive at an agreed solution of an independent Algeria associated with France, or by regroupment of the Algerian populations. There is speculation that De Gaulle will now proceed with regroupment. This, as De Gaulle would seem to envisage, involves bringing all Europeans and those Moslems who wish to remain with France together in enclaves, which have not been delineated but will apparently consist of the areas around Oran and Algiers. The east of Algeria and at least some portions of the center and west would then be abandoned to the PAG. Once the enclaves were established, De Gaulle would propose to organize the emigration, to France, of those who wished, and would then attempt to negotiate some sort of arrangement between the two Algerias. The French have made clear that this solution would be undertaken only as a last resort. They realize that it would not end the war, in that the PAG would continue fighting until it obtained all of Algeria. They probably also realize that the French negotiating position in attempting to bring the two resulting Algerias together would almost inevitably be worse than their present negotiating position. Most importantly, to attempt regroupment would be extremely risky for De Gaulle. He has considered himself to be limited in the manner in which he could negotiate with the PAG by the danger of an army-led coup. This danger would increase enormously with an attempt at regroupment, for it is difficult to see how the army would view such an attempt as anything but sheer abandonment. We believe, therefore, that De Gaulle will make further attempts to negotiate an agreement. To be successful, this will involve a French concession on Saharan sovereignty (in return for which the PAG can be expected to make economic concessions concerning the Sahara, and it is here, rather than with sovereignty, that France's interests are really involved). This concession could best be made by indicating a change in position to the PAG through the Swiss intermediaries with whom the PAG is still in contact. This, however, would not correspond to De Gaulle's manner of operation. He would be more apt to make a unilateral concession on the Sahara, possibly as a passing reference in some speech delivered in a provincial town during one of his tours. This procedure has in the past resulted in a number of concessions that went beyond what would otherwise have been necessary, and it has led to a gradual erosion of the French position, but De Gaulle is not apt to change his style of operation. On August 1 Minister for Algerian Affairs Joxe stated in a radio address that, with regard to the Sahara, “in France's view the problem of sovereignty is not the essential thing.” This statement would seem to be a preliminary to a De Gaulle concession of Algerian sovereignty. * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/8-561. Confidential. Sent to the White House under cover of a brief memorandum from Battle (S/S) to Bundy (NSC) indicating that the paper had been written in response to an oral request from the National Security Council. A copy of this memorandum is in Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria. 1 Talks between French representatives and the PAG were held at Evian-les-Bains May 20-June 13, and at the Chateau of Lugrin July 20-27. 47. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 47. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Source Paris, September 2, 1961, 4 p.m. 1197. First subject raised in my tour d'horizon with De Gaulle this morning was Algerian situation. I told him that I had followed this situation closely and had discussed it with Joxe Tuesday. I explained that US is aware of France's point of view and sympathetic to her endeavors to deal with this very complex problem and that we are aware of his desire to see Algeria become independent although linked to France. De Gaulle then began familiar exposition of the necessity for France to rid itself of the heavy burden of Algeria. He added that it is no longer important to France whether the future Algeria is friendly toward her, and that France will let Algeria go regardless of the form and attitude of its Government. As in 1958 France had offered independence and the opportunity for continuing ties to her African colonies, she will now offer Algeria the same choice after forming a “national” Government and withdrawing the European population into enclaves such centers as Oran. Should chaos follow, that will be a problem for the Algerians with which GOF will not concern itself. I then asked whether he was not concerned about the Sahara in view of French investment and continued interest in its exploitation, since I could not see how a solution to the Sahara issue satisfactory to the GOF could be reconciled with his projected solution to the Algerian problem. De Gaulle replied that nobody had shown interest in the Sahara until the French developed its possibilities. Now he recognizes that it will in the nature of things ultimately be part of Algeria. He realizes, however, that Morocco and Tunisia want part of it—indeed principal motive of Tunisian precipitation of Bizerte crisis was to stake a claim in the Sahara that will later be expanded. Naturally he does not know the final outcome of the Saharan problem. Perhaps the riparian countries will solve it without fighting. As for France she will continue to hold on to the Sahara until the negative value of this position becomes overriding, that is when the cost of maintaining her position there surpasses the return she realizes from being there. There is an abundance of petroleum in the world, so it is not essential that France stay in the Sahara at great cost. I should add early in the discussion I said to De Gaulle that in the past we had been approached by representatives of the FLN, that France has always been informed of these contacts, and that they may occur in the future. If this were to happen it might be possible for us to fill a helpful role and I wondered if he had any thought in this matter. He ignored the question, intentionally I believe, and his answer in terms of what was going to happen Algeria was also the answer to what role we might play vis-à-vis the FLN. I don't think he cares particularly, perhaps he does not think that what we can do would be significant and, in any event, he is going to go ahead with his own solution. Gavin * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/9-261. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Algiers, USUN, and Tunis. 48. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts 48. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts Source Washington, September 9, 1961, 4:10 p.m. 436. Algeria . In September 5 press conference De Gaulle in our view made major concession on Sahara, 1 in effect renouncing French claims to sovereignty. Way appears be opened to PAG to resume negotiations. We have also noted Ben Khedda avoided any possible temptation during Belgrade meeting to take hard line. Despite turnover in PAG, effective power still seems be wielded by Krim and Boussouf and PAG consistently says its objectives obtainable through resumption negotiations. Both French and PAG seem envisage another round of negotiations; both also making alternate plans should negotiations prove fruitless. De Gaulle has announced plans proceed with creation provisional authority in Algeria to implement self-determination process (referendum and elections). He seems regard this as alternate means reaching agreement with PAG, that is, by secret understanding rather than open negotiations. If agreement with PAG impossible by any means, he then would proceed with plans for regroupment and total abandonment large segments of Algeria. PAG on other hand talks of stepped up diplomatic and military activity and probably expects more active intervention Afro-Asian and Bloc powers, should negotiation process fail. We believe time running out rapidly and that French share this view. Failure to reach agreement would result in complete cessation French economic assistance to partitioned section of Algeria and installation PAG regime therein under chaotic conditions. In such case we would undoubtedly see new regime turn to Bloc. In short, we believe resumption negotiations essential. Failure to reach agreement would possibly be disastrous to Western interests in North Africa and elsewhere. With above in mind, we believe moment propitious for approach new PAG team. PAG should be sounded out on intentions re negotiations, including any concessions they willing make to accommodate French interests as stated by De Gaulle. PAG should be assured our full support self-determination, and our conviction Algeria will soon be fully sovereign State. Should particularly stress our hope new Algeria will find it possible cooperate with France in economic and cultural fields, on basis full equality, since France already making tremendous efforts in Algeria which it willing continue after independence provided some accommodation made its own interests. Should assure PAG our willingness assist also in numerous problems new state will face. PAG should be informed we feel De Gaulle intent on full decolonization, and that concession on Sahara was major step forward which should facilitate agreement. We would hope PAG itself will be as forthcoming. Should stress our fear that failure to reach bilateral settlement could lead to introduction cold war in North Africa in particularly acute form, and could prevent for some time to come assumption by Algeria of important role in African and Arab worlds. In view previous contacts, Ambassador Tunis should seek early occasion make approach to Krim or Dahlab. 2 While French authorities would be aware approach to be made, contact should be discreet so as to avoid press attention. We are considering parallel approach to Chanderli in New York. For Paris: Ambassador or Charge should immediately inform Couve and Joxe our preoccupations and intentions, as outlined above. 3 We note that De Gaulle has no strong feeling on such an approach to PAG, but we would nevertheless hope any information received would be helpful to French in reaching agreement with FLN. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/9-961. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by MacDonald on September 8; cleared by Brown, Wallner, Buffum, Tyler, Fredericks, Witman, and Korn; and approved by Ball. Sent to Tunis, Paris, Algiers, Rabat, Cairo, Tripoli, Benghazi, London, and USUN. 1 De Gaulle had told the press conference that France might be willing to recognize Algerian sovereignty over the Sahara if French interests there were safeguarded. 2 On September 13, Walmsley expressed these points to PAG officials, Interior Minister Belkacem Krim, and Foreign Minister Saad Dahlab. (Telegram 438 from Tunis, September 14; Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/9-1461) Department of State officers made a parallel approach to the PAG Representative to the United Nations, Abdelkader Chanderli, in Washington on the same day. (Telegram 1514 to Paris, September 14; ibid.) 3 On September 11, Gavin informed French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville regarding U.S. intentions. (Telegram 1378 from Paris, September 11; 751S.00/9-1161) 49. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France 49. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France Source Washington, October 18, 1961, 9:06 p.m. 2224. French Charge Lebel, stating he not acting under direct instructions, lodged strong protest with Dept. October 18 on Governor Williams' conversations with PAG in Tunis. 1 Said he sure GOF would regard meeting and its attendant publicity as most unfortunate, particularly coming at time when Algerians rioting in France. Dept. noted protest and then asked Lebel to put matter into perspective in his report to his govt. Said trip to North Africa had been planned many weeks and that it natural for Asst. Sec. in charge of area to visit countries where he had responsibilities. US had taken no initiative to arrange meeting with PAG members. US had, in fact, resisted attempts by others to give special political significance to Williams' trip to Tunisia insofar as Algerians concerned. Tunisian FonMin had invited Williams to luncheon at which two members PAG present. This had not been “special meeting” but rather social occasion of Tunisian-hosted luncheon. It would have been counter-productive to refuse luncheon invitation. No statements were made to press about luncheon other than to acknowledge it took place. It was press rather than US which created story and attempted give it political significance. Finally, there is no change in US policy which remains one of strong support for De Gaulle in his efforts solve problem and is US hope that renewed French/Algerian talks will be success. Lebel suggested Dept. attempt put record straight through medium press statement in view fact reports from Tunis imply US policy under modification. Dept. replied Secretary would be holding press conference later in day and question might well be posed. Lebel then given summary Williams talk with PAG, omitting sections noted earlier cable. 2 Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.15-WI/10-1861. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Brown, cleared by Witman, and approved by Tyler. Repeated to Tunis, Algiers, and Tripoli for Williams, and pouched to Rabat. A memorandum of this conversation is ibid., 751S.00/10-1861. 1 On October 17, Tunisian Foreign Minister Sadok Mokaddem gave a luncheon in Tunis for Assistant Secretary of State G. Mennen Williams at which Dahlab and Yazid were guests. Williams was on his third official trip to Africa September 29-October 26. Documentation on the trip is ibid., 110.15-WI. 2 Williams sent a summary of his conversation with Dahlab and Yazid in telegram 566 from Tunis. (Ibid., 751S.00/10-1761) On November 28, Williams submitted a report on his trip to the President. He noted that the two PAG leaders had let him know “in no uncertain terms of their disappointment that the new United States administration had been unwilling to make any public statement not exclusively tied to support of De Gaulle.” They had wanted a U.S. statement expressing respect for the “respectability” of the Algerian nationalist cause. Williams argued that such a statement, phrased to make it clear that the United States believed that legitimate French interests must be protected, was necessary. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Africa) 50. Letter From the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball) 50. Letter From the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball) Source Washington, October 20, 1961. Dear Mr. Ball : You recently asked Deputy Secretary Gilpatric for an evaluation of the strategic value to the West of Mers-el-Khebir and other French military installations in Algeria. 1 We have asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to consider the value of the military installations in Algeria based on their importance to the West, if these facilities remain: a) under French control, b) in neutral hands, or c) in the hands of a government essentially hostile to NATO. The reply of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to our inquiry is attached. 2 Obviously, the situation under conditions b) and c) above is potentially a serious menace to the Western defense position in the North African, Mediterranean and Middle Eastern areas, particularly if it is the political evaluation that the new Algerian State will not be pro-Western in its orientation. In such a situation, we would want to watch developments most carefully and, in the event of a possible communist take-over, be prepared to take such steps as might be necessary. However, we see no need for the development of contingency plans to cope with this potentially dangerous situation at this time. Sincerely, William P. Bundy 3 * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, Algeria 000. 1961. Secret. Drafted by Colonel Yount on October 19. Attached to a memorandum from Major General Frederic H. Miller, Director, European Region, to Bundy recommending that he sign the letter. A handwritten note indicates Bundy signed the letter on October 20. 1 Ball's September 22 letter commented on the value of the recent Joint Chiefs of Staff appraisal of the strategic value of the French naval base at Bizerte and asked that they undertake a similar study of the military installations in Algeria. (Ibid.) 2 Attached to the source text but not printed. The memorandum of October 17 from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (JCSM-731-6) called French and NATO facilities in Algeria a valuable asset to the West and warned that Western forces would be seriously limited without these facilities and that neutral control would constitute a potentially dangerous opening in the southern flank of NATO, while hostile possession would threaten east-west lines of communication through the Mediterranean to the Middle East and U.S. air bases in Morocco, Spain, and other nearby countries. The memorandum was signed by U.S. Army Chief of Staff George R. Decker and included an attachment providing a synopsis of the military facilities in Algeria. 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Bundy signed the original. 51. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer and Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy 51. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer and Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Source Washington, October 27, 1961. SUBJECT Action Program to Spur French-Algerian Negotiations Can we afford any longer to pursue such a cautious policy on the Algerian question when we may well be heading for a major blowup? DeGaulle appears to be heading toward a showdown with the OAS, with a final desperate coup attempt possible. The PAG is preparing large-scale Moslem demonstrations in Algeria on 1 November, and European extremists probably hope to provoke fighting. French indignation at Moslem demonstrations in Paris has already made DeGaulle's task even harder. DeGaulle himself seems ready in default of a quick negotiated solution to abandon most of Algeria “to chaos”. If negotiations fail, DeGaulle seems determined to proceed with a shadow government and then, if the PAG won't join in this indirect solution, with regrouping the European population and cutting off aid to the rest. Such partition could lead to a bloodbath, diverting French attention and resources from Berlin, and driving the two sides even farther apart. The U.S. then would face the intolerable choice of flouting DeGaulle to help the Algerians or leaving a vacuum for the Communists to fill. In short, the next round of talks between the French and Algerians, expected soon, may be the last chance for a decent settlement. Hence from our viewpoint , a negotiated settlement and transitional Algerian cooperation with France are essential. But is there anything we can do in this situation where our interests are so vitally at stake? To date, we have played the role of “friendly bystander” largely because we saw no other recourse. There are strong arguments for continuing this role: DeGaulle would undoubtedly be offended by any “U.S. interference”, however motivated; powerful segments of French opinion would also be aroused. Nor do we have much leverage with the PAG because we can't offer recognition. However, in a situation containing the seeds of disaster, anything we could do, however marginal, is at least worth considering. In the basically new situation created by DeGaulle's desperate search for a settlement, the target of these initiatives must be the PAG. DeGaulle and Joxe have come a long way already, perhaps as far as they can go. But the PAG smells victory and shows little inclination to compromise. They do not appear to understand that DeGaulle's fall would ruin chances for a quick settlement. Nor do they appear to understand that DeGaulle needs a few basic concessions to sell decolonization in France and to the colons. Our objectives . First, if possible, we want to stave off the 1 November demonstrations in Algeria. Second, we must be willing to talk more specifically with the PAG about post-independence relations, particularly economic assistance. Third, we might seek help of friendly pro-PAG quarters in convincing the PAG to negotiate reasonably. Specifically, we want to get across the following points to the PAG: 1. Large-scale demonstrations now could destroy chances for a negotiated settlement. The best way for the PAG to win control over the Moslem population is to cooperate with DeGaulle and get in on the ground floor of the transitional government—not by mounting demonstrations that could lead to bloodshed. If negotiations begin by 1 November, the PAG would have reason to call off their demonstrations. The demonstrations in France have already weakened DeGaulle's case for a negotiated settlement and increased anti-Algerian feeling, which strengthens support for the OAS. 2. Failure to negotiate a settlement now could make Algeria one of the worst battlegrounds of the cold war and deprive it of real independence. Partition could cut off French assistance and, frankly, make U.S. aid all but impossible. Algeria's resultant dependence on Bloc aid would deprive it of freedom to pursue a policy of genuine neutrality. Algerian aspiration to control all of Algeria could become a cold war victim with France and the Soviet Union contesting control. On the other hand, the PAG can have everything essential now simply by negotiating reasonably. 3. The PAG must face the fact that DeGaulle's fall would disrupt French efforts at decolonization. They should take advantage of DeGaulle as the one man able to go through with it. They misjudge the situation if they think a rightist successor would not quickly scrap the whole idea. 4. The PAG must understand that DeGaulle, desperately as he wants a quick settlement, needs realistic guarantees for the European minority in order to sell decolonization in France. This is the gut issue. If the PAG will only give guarantees now, no one can stop it later from making gradually whatever reasonable adjustments may be more consistent with the status of the Europeans in the new nation. 5. The U.S. will naturally want to help independent Algeria economically. As mentioned, however, it will be almost impossible to do so if Algeria is partitioned. Moreover, a negotiated settlement will be very important to the U.S. government in selling a substantial aid program to the Congress. 6. If the PAG showed real movement toward an accommodation, we would be willing to begin exploratory planning of post-independence assistance, in order to be ready to move quickly after independence. Perhaps the PAG could prepare some of its UN delegates to begin such talks, which could be followed up regularly in Tunis. Many complex problems will demand solution; the sooner we establish contact, the better. 7. But far more important than any conceivable allocation of US aid would be what PAG might get from the French, if it were sufficiently forthcoming. PAG might even be able to get a French commitment to continue the Constantine Plan program. Moreover, PAG should not underestimate the economic value to them of the European minority. Reasonable guarantees for them would be farsighted and help to preserve them as a significant economic asset. 8. Bloc aid could not conceivably add up to what France, backed by US, could do. Moreover, it is folly for PAG not to look at the other side of the coin. The economic chaos created by partition or the political upheaval created by Algeria's direct embroilment in the cold war would inevitably delay Algeria's assuming its rightful responsible role in Arab and African councils. How can we get these points across? The first hurdle is to get reluctant French acquiescence if possible for the above approach to the PAG. One possibility would be a Presidential letter to DeGaulle. Or a quiet talk between Porter and Joxe, who appears more receptive than DeGaulle, might accomplish the same thing (in any case, the Porter-Joxe channel would be useful to inform the French of our new initiatives). We would have to decide in advance whether to seek French approval or merely clue them. They might even prefer the latter. Then we should instruct Walmsley to present our eight-point case to Krim or Dahlab in Tunis. 2. AID should draw together what we know about Algerian economic needs and should prepare an appropriate officer to talk knowledgeably with the PAG about U.S. assistance after independence. We should begin planning our economic assistance program and should arrange for working level contacts, to begin here and to continue in Tunis. 3. We should try to create a sense of urgency and reason in as many pro-PAG quarters as possible. If U.S. advice carries little weight with the PAG, let's start talking through other mouths as well. For instance, Bonsal might approach the Moroccans to urge use of such influence as they have with the PAG. (King Hassan's recent expressions of concern about Algeria provide an opening.) Stevenson could ask Lebanese Foreign Minister Takla, now at the UN, to explore the possibility of his pressing our line with the Iraqi (who have given the PAG financial help) and other Arab nations. Let's make our case to President Senghor of Senegal during his visit here on 3 November. Recommendation: We have already gotten some movement from State by a gentle nudging on Algeria. (Our meeting with State last Tuesday led to Outgoing ____ to Paris, etc. 1 But State may still be moving too slowly to meet the need. AF is toying with the idea of proposing a Task Force, but EUR will no doubt oppose. Perhaps a Presidential action memo is called for. We'll draft one if we don't see signs of movement in next few days. 2 Robert W. Komer Harold H. Saunders 3 * Source: Kennedy Library, Schlesinger Papers, French-Algerian Negotiations. Secret; Noforn. On October 27, Komer sent this memorandum to McGeorge Bundy under cover of a memorandum that reads: “FYI, here is a draft Memorandum to the President which I originally intended to propose you send forward with an NSC Action Memo attached. Since the talk which Arthur, Hal Saunders, and I had with the State people, however, I prefer holding up a few days until we can get a better idea as to what, if anything, State proposes to do. Hence, attached is merely to fill you in on the sense of urgency which we feel about this problem. Admittedly, our leverage with the PAG may be marginal and the costs of offending De Gaulle at this juncture high. But the cost of not doing whatever we can, however little, to forestall a frightful mess and push a negotiated solution might be higher still.” 1 On October 24, Komer, Schlesinger, and Saunders met with Tyler, Brown, and Imhof of EUR and Fredericks, Herz, and Witman of AF. EUR officials indicated that above all, they were concerned with not offending De Gaulle and argued that current channels were sufficient for all necessary contact with the PAG, while AF insisted that these channels were not adequate and that it was absolutely essential to begin practical preparations for Algerian independence. (Memorandum of conversation; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memos Series, Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer) Reference is presumably to telegram 2432 to Paris, Document 52 . 2 The memorandum was also sent to Arthur Schlesinger with a handwritten note in the margin of the transmittal memorandum from Komer to Bundy asking for Schlesinger's reaction. On October 30, Schlesinger responded that the PAG should not be the exclusive target of the initiative, to which Komer replied on November 1 that he doubted it was feasible to press the French at this point, noting that so far De Gaulle had done all the giving. (Kennedy Library, Schlesinger Papers, French-Algerian Negotiations) 3 Printed from a copy that bears these typed signatures. 52. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France 52. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France Source Washington, October 28, 1961, 3:28 p.m. 2432. As Algerian problem enters into crucial phase, consider it necessary that posts directly concerned with this problem understand fully principles and motivations of US policy in order prevent divergent approaches. 1. Algerian independence is inevitable. We believe (as does De Gaulle) that normalization of relations between France and North Africa possible only if Algerians conduct their own affairs. As far as US concerned, continuation of Algerian war constitutes a major obstacle to conduct effective US policy in North Africa, and also has adverse effects on our relations with France. Perspective of Algerian independence makes it desirable improve relationship with PAG and proceed with planning our relationship with new Algerian state, particularly in view of likelihood that independent Algeria will exercise predominant influence in North Africa and on newly independent states bordering on Sahara. 2. Manner in which Algeria will acquire independence not yet clear. If independence comes about without agreement with France, future of Algeria and future relationship between US and Algeria would be heavily mortgaged from outset. There would be danger of chaotic conditions in France and in Algeria which could render France useless as ally and Algeria highly susceptible to Soviet bloc influence. Even if chaotic conditions do not ensue there is further danger that US support for Algeria (or Algerian rump state after pro-French elements have been regrouped in certain enclaves) could alienate France from alliance. Principal objective of US policy must be to prevent such situation from arising. As long as there exists reasonable chance, negotiated agreement between France and future Algerian leadership is therefore of overriding importance. Any proposed inducements to FLN must therefore continuously be examined in light whether they help or hinder negotiated settlement. This examination can only be made by Department based on reports received from posts abroad. 3. As to tactics, Department considers following principles are in accord with above objectives: (1) Pure prestige gestures toward FLN are in general undesirable and should be discontinued except on instruction because they do not contribute to negotiated settlement and may actually strengthen elements opposing negotiations in France as well as among FLN. However, if we have something important to say to FLN (or they to us) we will decide to raise level of normal contacts with FLN. In any case, while it logical view PAG as likely future government, we should avoid appearing to have recognized it as such prematurely. (2) Regular non-publicized contacts with FLN should be maintained and intensified. Department planning at appropriate moment assign medium-level officer to Embassy Tunis with specific mission maintain contact with FLN. This move has been complicated by unfortunate leak on appointment “emissary” to FLN. Other means improve our intelligence of FLN and our ability make substantive points to it under study. Non-government institutions may, for instance, be helpful. (3) Meanwhile, in regular contacts with FLN we should bring home to them dangers we see in delaying negotiations on assumption De Gaulle successor regime would be willing or able pursue De Gaulle's policy of broad concessions. We should suggest to PAG in convincing terms that if relations between Algeria and France are normal we will be able to do more for Algeria than if relations are hostile. (4) In general, believe general character of discussions with FLN should look increasingly toward future of Algeria, Algeria's needs and our desire help meet these needs. We hope by this approach (a) obtain better knowledge of FLN post-independence plans, on which FLN leadership has been silent; (b) discreetly and tactfully make FLN aware of problems involved in running complex state in full process of modernization (problem of which at least part of FLN leadership appears to be unmindful); and (c) convince FLN that negotiated solution is in Algerian self-interest in terms future prospects economic aid and development. Department would welcome comments from addressee posts. 1 Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/11-2861. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Brown, Tyler, and Imhof; cleared by Tasca, Witman, Tyler, and Johnson; and approved by Ball. Also sent to Tunis, Algiers, and Rabat, and pouched to USUN, Cairo and Geneva. 1 In telegram 2360 from Paris, October 31, Gavin characterized the guidelines in telegram 2432 as most encouraging and constructive, but recommended that the Department temporarily defer assigning an officer to the Embassy in Tunis with the specific mission of maintaining contact with the PAG, pending efforts to renew negotiations. Gavin strongly supported the path described in numbered paragraph 3 of this telegram, but warned against nurturing FLN illusions about the degree of future U.S. economic assistance. (Ibid., 751S.00/10-3161) 53. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the Director of the Office of Northern African Affairs (Witman) 53. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the Director of the Office of Northern African Affairs (Witman) Source Washington, November 6, 1961. SUBJECT Algeria Bob Komer left before your note 1 arrived. However, I believe my comments reflect his views. We were pleased with the start made in Deptel 2432 to Paris. 2 We agree we must do everything we can to influence the PAG to stay with negotiations this time until they reach a settlement. Their outcome, of course, will shape our long range problem. The urgent question in our minds is whether we could provide any inducements for PAG reasonableness. We are “intensifying regular contacts,” but do we have anything to offer except advice? Is there any way we can increase the weight of our advice without upsetting the negotiating balance? We feel it's very important to study possible post-independence aid programs now in order (1) to be prepared for quick movement and (2) to discover areas for helpful pre-independence discussion. Admittedly, we can't make final decisions until the situation clarifies, but we can't afford not to move decisively when it does. More immediately, we might find some way of adding substance to our present contacts with the PAG. If independence emerges from partition, the need for imaginative U.S. action will be even greater than if a settlement is negotiated. We see two related but separate problems: (1) planning our long range approach to independent Algeria and (2) discovering ways to increase our leverage now for insuring successful negotiations. If you set up a study group, perhaps its work might be divided with these distinct problems in mind. Needless to say, we would welcome the chance to sit in on any such deliberations. Hal Saunders * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/12-1961. Secret. 1 Not found. 2 Document 52 . 54. Editorial Note 54. Editorial Note On December 14, 1961, Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson sent to the Department of State the text of a draft U.N. resolution on Algeria which had been given to the U.S. Delegation by Tunisian Ambassador to the United Nations Habib Bourguiba, Jr., and had the preliminary approval of the Afro-Asian bloc in the United Nations. The draft included an operative paragraph calling on “the two parties to resume negotiations with a view to implementing the right of the Algerian people to self-determination and independence respecting the unity and territorial integrity of Algeria” and a preambular paragraph expressing regret at the suspension of negotiations between the Government of France and the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic. In a separate telegram, Stevenson described the draft as “moderate,” and noted that the only significant objection he saw was the reference to the PGAR. (Telegrams 2141 and 2142 from USUN; Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/12-1461) On December 15, the Department authorized Stevenson to tell the French, Algerian, and Tunisian representatives that the United States could support the resolution if the reference to the PGAR and the phrase “and respecting the unity and territorial integrity of Algeria” was eliminated. (Telegram 1594 to USUN; ibid.) On December 15, 34 Afro-Asian countries submitted the draft resolution to the First (Political and Security) Committee with the text unchanged except for a reversal in the position of two of its paragraphs. On December 18, Assistant Secretary Williams sent a memorandum to Under Secretary Ball informing him that Chanderli had told Stevenson he thought the reference to the PGAR could be eliminated but not the phrase “and respecting the unity and territorial integrity of Algeria,” to which only the U.S. Delegation had objected. After noting that the French did not want the United States to vote for any resolution on Algeria, Williams argued that “the benefits to be gained from support of the resolution (with reference to PGAR eliminated) will outweigh possible disadvantages in both the short run and long run.” (Ibid., 751S.00/12-1861) That afternoon, the Department cabled to USUN that it was “authorized to make it known publicly (in any way and at any time you deem best) that US prepared to vote for this resolution if those two elements, which would make an already difficult negotiation more difficult, are corrected.” The telegram noted that the reference to the “unity and territorial integrity of Algeria” was a clear attempt to prejudice the outcome of the negotiations on the Sahara. (Telegram 1612 to USUN; ibid., 751S.00/12-1461) Despite U.S. efforts, the text of the resolution as submitted on December 15 remained unchanged. U.S. Representative Charles W. Yost explained the U.S. decision to abstain on the resolution to the First Committee on December 19. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961 , pages 725-726. The Committee subsequently adopted the resolution by a vote of 61 to 0, with 34 abstentions (including the United States). For a record of these proceedings, see U.N. Doc. A/C.1/L.308 and Add.1, 2. On December 20, Resolution 1724 (XVI) as recommended by the First Committee was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly without debate by a vote of 62 to 0, with 38 abstentions. For text of the resolution, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961 , pages 726-727. For a record of these proceedings, see U.N. Doc. A/5070. 55. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) 55. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) Source Washington, December 15, 1961. SUBJECT Reception of Algerian Representatives in the Department Discussion: On October 9th the Secretary approved EUR's memorandum of October 3 1 recommending that he call in the French Ambassador to inform him of the decision to receive representatives of the FLN in the Department up to the level of Under Secretary. Action was temporarily deferred, however. On November 21st the Secretary decided that EUR should inform the French Embassy we are now ready to receive Algerian representatives in the Department. According to your memorandum of December 11th to Mr. Tyler, 2 the Secretary agreed that EUR should defer action on informing the French Embassy until after the Paris meetings and that the reception of PAG representatives in the Department should, if necessary, be correspondingly deferred. This matter is of particular importance now because the Paris meetings will be over at the end of this week and the PAG Minister of Information, Yazid, who is now in New York for the Algerian debate, may well want to be received in the Department. He has already asked to be received by Ambassador Stevenson in New York. I think we should be prepared to receive him here as well, presumably some time early next week. As for the level at which PAG representatives may be received in the Department, it was the decision of the Acting Secretary on September 15, confirmed by the Secretary on October 9, that they could be received up to the level of Under Secretary. I think we should retain flexibility in this matter. As you know, I myself have already met socially with the PAG Information Minister in Tunis. I am afraid we would defeat our purpose if we tried to downgrade him, for example, should he come to Washington. Recommendation: That you authorize receiving the PAG Information Minister at Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary level some time next week, with the French Embassy to be informed beforehand by EUR. 3 On December 22, the Department of State cabled the Embassy in Paris that it had informed the French Embassy in Washington on December 20 of the decision in principle to receive PAG leaders in the Department, noting that it had emphasized that their reception would not in any sense mean departure from a policy of nonrecognition and full support De Gaulle's Algerian policy. (Telegram 3539 to Paris; Department of State, Central Files, 611.51S/12-2261) On December 28, Couve de Murville suggested personally to Gavin that the Department refrain from seeing PAG officials for at least a week. (Telegram 3250 from Paris; ibid., 751S.00/12-2861) * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.51S11/12-1561. Secret. 1 Not found. On November 13, Tyler sent a memorandum to Secretary Rusk reviewing the recommendation to receive PAG representatives in the Department. Rusk initialed his approval. (Ibid., 751S.00/11-1361) 2 Not found. 3 Johnson initialed his approval on December 20, crossed out the words “Under Secretary,” and added the following handwritten note: “On condition that the PAG takes the initiative in requesting an appointment. We are not to stimulate such a request. Should request for appointment materialize, suggest Asst. Secretaries for both AF and EUR.” 56. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk 56. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk Source Washington, January 6, 1962. SUBJECT Reception of Provisional Algerian Government Leaders in the Department I understand that Ambassador Alphand suggested during his talk with you on Wednesday that we should again postpone our decision to receive PAG leaders in the Department. If Mr. Alphand's request had specified a limited period for postponement justified by urgent considerations explained in some detail, I would not find it quite so objectionable. Mr. Couve de Murville's request to Ambassador Gavin on December 28 (Paris tel 3250 at Tab A) 1 was far more reasonable from our point of view. The week he asked for as a minimum has now passed. As far as we know the PAG has no knowledge of our decision to lift the restriction on their reception in the Department. It is quite possible that several weeks may go by before they seek talks here. But whether PAG leaders take the initiative next week or next month, it is at this stage, and under these circumstances, much more likely to be for substantive discussion than for show. I am most reluctant to be committed to a position of having to refuse them and thus, of doing damage to the reasonably good rapport we have painstakingly established. Recommendation I suggest that we inform the French that we are not prepared to defer indefinitely our readiness to receive PAG leaders at their request. We might suggest that we would consider a French request to extend the period proposed by M. Couve de Murville for a specified brief time if the purpose for doing so seemed clearly to justify it. Again we could reassure the French that we will neither initiate such talks in the immediate future nor treat them any differently than previous conversations with the PAG. 2 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.51S11/1-662. Secret. Drafted by Hooper and concurred in by WE. Attached to a memorandum from Witman to Williams indicating that the memorandum to the Secretary followed the line that McGhee had instructed Witman to take on January 4. Witman added that he would prefer that they adhere to their decision “no longer to slam the Department's door in the faces of the PAG.” (Ibid.) 1 Not attached to the source text. See footnote 3, Document 55 . 2 On January 6, the Department of State cabled the Embassy in Rabat in response to a January 4 Embassy request for permission to initiate contacts with the PAG. The Department instructed the Embassy not to initiate such meetings at this stage, although if a meeting with the Ambassador or Charge seemed advisable as the result of a PAG initiative, “this should not be ruled out.” (Telegram 1114 from Rabat and telegram 928 to Rabat; Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/1-462) 57. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 57. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Source Washington, January 8, 1962. SUBJECT Military Assistance for Post-Independence Algeria JCSM-10-62 1. Reference is made to the memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated 22 December 1961, subject as above, and its inclosure, a draft State Department study, subject: “Post-Independence Algeria”. 1 2. The State Department study discusses objectives and lines of action under two general headings. These are “Short Term (before Algerian independence),” and “Medium and Long Term (after Algerian independence)”. The latter group is further divided into two subgroups, the first on the assumption that a French-Algerian agreement is reached, the second on the assumption of regroupment and partition. The referenced memorandum asked for recommendations for a military assistance program under each condition. 3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are concerned that precipitous action in furnishing military assistance to Algeria will impair relations with France. An overriding strategic requirement is the maintenance of a strong NATO. France is a cornerstone of NATO. 4. No offer of military assistance should be made to the Provisional Algerian Government (PAG) prior to Algerian independence except at the specific request of the French Government (GOF). Any offer directly to the PAG, or any response in reply to a request from the PAG without consultation with the GOF, would endanger our relations with France. 5. In the event that through successful negotiations, ties between France and Algeria are severed completely, the United States should be in a position to offer Algeria a military assistance package without delay. The purpose of such an offer is two-fold. First, it would serve as an opening whereby the United States could assert positive influence designed to orient Algeria toward the West. Second, it may forestall Algerian acceptance of similar overtures from the Soviet Bloc. However, consultations with the GOF should precede an offer of military assistance. 6. If the settlement finds France retaining close ties with Algeria, or responsible for certain Algerian affairs, the United States should again be in a position to respond quickly. However, under these circumstances, the GOF, rather than the United States, should take the initiative for discussion of a military assistance program with Algeria. The possibility exists that the PAG might still approach the United States directly for military assistance. Such a request should be thoroughly discussed with the GOF prior to making a positive or negative determination. 7. Regroupment and partition present most formidable problems in developing a suitable military assistance program adequate to meet the varied and delicate conditions which may prevail under such a settlement. If portions of Algeria remain in French hands, the United States should not offer military assistance to the PAG. No action should be taken which would have a detrimental effect on our relations with France. On the other hand, depending on the situation existing between France and Algeria after partition, the GOF might welcome military assistance to the PAG if it assisted in maintaining order. In any case, no offer of assistance should be made except with the full knowledge and participation of the GOF. 8. The extent of military assistance to be furnished under any of the above conditions is dependent on many factors as yet unknown. These include that type and amount of military assistance the United States may provide to countries neighboring Algeria, the position France will occupy with regard to Algeria, and the assistance the GOF itself is prepared to furnish. In addition, information is almost nonexistent as to Algerian requirements and assets. If the determination is made to offer military assistance to Algeria, the most practical approach would be to send in a survey team immediately after settlement of the crisis to develop a program. However, the need for quick response through an “impact package” is also recognized and such a “package” is described in the Appendix hereto. 2 If for political reasons a “package” of this type is offered, the United States should simultaneously propose sending a survey team to Algeria for the purpose of ascertaining additional requirements and developing a basic program tailored to the need. Arrangements must also be made for US military representation in Algeria to supervise the issue of the materiel. 9. The National Army of Liberation (ALN) is known to have small arms and some light artillery. Therefore, the impact package is designed primarily to enhance the mobility of the ALN. However, with few exceptions the same items are in demand by US units and diversion to Algeria would be at the expense of US forces. For this reason, an overriding priority must be directed if equipment is to reach Algeria promptly. 10. The memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) refers to the sensitive political nature of this problem, and representatives of your office have advised against coordination with USCINCEUR at this time. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it important that they obtain the views of USCINCEUR prior to their furnishing final recommendations on the policy and nature of military assistance to Algeria. 3 For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: L.L. Lemnitzer 4 Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Algeria 000.1-121 1962. Secret. Attached to a memorandum from W.B. Palmer, Director of Military Assistance (DOD/ISA), to Assistant Secretary of State Williams, noting that Defense concurred with the JCS recommendations as a basis for planning purposes and requested further Department of State participation in developing such plans. 1 The undated Department of State draft paper provided background information relative to the development of a possible military assistance program for post-independence Algeria. In a covering memorandum of November 22 to the Joint Chiefs, William Bundy noted that the Department of State had indicated the strong likelihood that all or part of Algeria would become separated from France within a few months, and had requested the Department of Defense to provide recommendations regarding possible military assistance for post-independence Algeria. Bundy specifically asked that the Joint Chiefs provide recommendations regarding a military assistance program “which would be demonstrative of our desire to help meet Algerian requirements and preclude Soviet influence” no later than January 10, 1962. (Ibid., OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, Algeria 000.1-1961) 2 Not printed. 3 At a State-JCS meeting on January 19, Department of State and Defense representatives agreed that “the French should handle the bulk of any military assistance for an independent Algeria since present MAP demands from other recipients are already far beyond our resources.” (Department of State, State-JCS Meetings: Lot 70 D 328) 4 Printed from a copy that indicates Lemnitzer signed the original. 58. Special National Intelligence Estimate 58. Special National Intelligence Estimate Washington, January 24, 1962. SNIE 62-62 [Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79 R 01012A, Box 215. Secret. Extract—1 page of source text not declassified.] 59. Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of Algerian Affairs (Hooper) 59. Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of Algerian Affairs (Hooper) Source Washington, February 8, 1962. PROPOSED ACTION RE ALGERIA This paper is an outline of action which it is proposed should be taken during the next few months, given the continuing validity of the indicated assumptions for which current prospects appear favorable. Bracketed sections indicate action already taken or now in process. Assumptions: Franco-Algerian agreement will be achieved and announced simultaneously with cease-fire during the next two to four weeks. After a brief concerted insurrection the OAS will be checked. A provisional interim Franco-Algerian regime under continuing French sovereignty will be established by early March to secure internal order, conduct a referendum and prepare transfer of governing authority. The joint administration will face considerable economic stress in the form of shortages of food and basic supplies, and heavy unemployment as the flow of refugees and displaced persons from Morocco, Tunisia and internal detainment camps converges on Algerian villages and cities. Algeria will become independent on relatively amicable terms with France by next September. Recommended actions: After announcement of cease-fire and successfully concluded negotiations: (1) Congratulatory message from President to De Gaulle on successful conclusion of negotiations. [Already drafted and approved.] 1 (2) Press statement welcoming agreement. [Draft being reviewed.] (3) Short of official recognition of the PAG, pursue active contact with FLN leadership at all levels in order to prepare the way for future friendly relations and to obtain more precise knowledge of current and projected policies of Algerian leadership. [There has been considerable contact with FLN leaders at Tunis, Rabat, USUN and in Washington outside the Department over the past few months. However, this has not included Ben Khedda, it has excluded reception of PAG representatives in the Department, and interviews have been restrained by the hitherto over-riding policy of avoiding discussion which might be disruptive to delicate Franco-Algerian negotiations.] (4) In renewed approach to French, referring to our earlier exploratory inquiries, we should seek candid discussion of both short-run and longer range Algerian economic problems. French should be reassured we seek minimum involvement, but in anticipation of problems during transition and in future of nature which Communist Bloc might exploit, we wish to be helpful where we can. Explore with French possible emergency aid requirements (food and basic supplies) and also discuss ways and means of projecting long-term developmental assistance to Algeria with maximum feasible adherence to a multi-lateral Western arrangement in which France should play a major role. [We have suggested to the French, in three separate conversations since last November, the advisability of discussing post-independence Algerian aid problems. On January 26, Labouret informed Lyon that French might be ready to do so in a few weeks.] 2 (5) Through appropriate Chief of Mission in Tunis or Algiers deliver informally (in such a way as to preclude interpretation that diplomatic recognition is involved) a message from the President to Ben Khedda expressing: (a) appreciation for FLN statesmanship in concluding negotiated settlement; (b) looking forward to increasingly meaningful contacts on an informal basis now and to the day when these can be formalized by recognition of an independent Algerian Government; and (c) expressing willingness to discuss ways and means in which USG might help in solution of economic, educational, administrative and other problems which Algerians foresee in connection with coming independence. [Draft under consideration in Department. Policy difference to be resolved as to whether it should be written personal message, which Protocol and Legal experts agree can be done without any recognition problem, or oral. Former would have greater impact on Algerians.] (6) Inaugurate new programs and sharply increase those already under way for training Algerians in the United States in technical, administrative, labor and other skills essential to Algerian self-government. [With eight new arrivals this month there will be 46 Algerian students here under [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] private auspices and Department's (CU) exchange program. Latter have Tunisian or Moroccan passports. Plans under way to expand these programs and add AID technical training effort as soon as possible. FLN leaders have indicated strong interest.] (7) Proceed immediately with implementation of interim administrative plans (already prepared or now in process) to elevate CG Algiers to Embassy—building lease, staff and equipment. [Tentative staffing pattern approved in Department and Algiers. Gradual staff build-up in next few months is required, but present funding problem not yet resolved. FBO projected Embassy building would not be completed before 1964 or 1965. Funds for interim lease of large enough building to house Embassy, Attaches, AID and other agency officials will be required. Problem currently under active review. Plans for early opening two small consulates at Oran and Constantine are ready for implementation as soon as expected French approval received.] (8) Advance preparation of political and protocol arrangements for recognition, diplomatic relations, delegation to independence, gifts. (9) Timely selection of U.S. Ambassador. After OAS subdued and joint provisional administration is established and operating: (10) As follow-up to earlier conversations with GOF and FLN, consult Franco-Algerian Provisional Executive re USG offer to assist with food-relief, food-work and other emergency programs. An economic team of State and AID officers from Washington, Rabat and Tunis should be selected in advance to pursue this. [Economic paper prepared by study group with refinements now in process will serve as basic paper for short-range aid planning. Separate longer range paper now in process. Contact with PAG economic planners, interested in US AID program and methods, has just been established by Embassy Tunis. Department approved last month a Ford Foundation project to sponsor private economic adviser to PAG. Advance assignment of one or two US AID officers to Algiers is being prepared.] (11) Earmark an advance provisional amount of $50,000,000 in FY'62 and '63 funds for emergency assistance. [AID has noted and will take necessary action.] (12) Review with French the longer term internal security situation and suggest minimum US military aid and police training assistance as agreed Western alternative to what otherwise might be semi-reliance on Communist Bloc. [In response to Department's request JCS has prepared preliminary study of possible US military aid to post-independence Algeria accompanied with suggested “impact package” of items likely to be of immediate usefulness and subject to rapid delivery with appropriate priority. This included 64 cargo trucks, 2 L-19A aircraft, 2 C-47's, 3 picket boats, spare parts and auxiliary equipment at a cost of $1.4 million. Its contents could be adjusted to more immediate Algerian requirements when known and when and if it were decided to make any such offer.] (13) Notify FLN leadership at appropriate point before independence that USG is prepared to enter into diplomatic relations with new Algerian Government on independence day or as soon thereafter as is mutually convenient. On and after Independence Day (14) Ambassador-designate and designated US AID Director should participate as members of USG delegation to ceremonies. (15) Above two officials should remain in Algeria, and assisted by appropriate economic and military survey teams as needed, should make early appraisal of Algerian economic and security plans and requirements with view to early US assistance as counter to expected immediate Communist Bloc initiatives. [Other preparations under way to cover the above and less favorable contingencies include: (1) Labor and manpower requirement studies being prepared in the Department of State and Labor, the latter emphasizing possible expansion of US labor union liaison. (2) State Department intelligence studies re: (a) Consequences of a French decision to partition Algeria, (b) Prospective policies of an independent Algerian state, and (c) The probable effects on North African (Maghreb) relations of Algerian independence.] 3 * Source: Department of State, S/S Policy Guidelines: Lot 67 D 396, Algeria. Secret. A cover sheet indicates that the memorandum was being submitted to an NSC Standing Group meeting on February 9 for purposes of discussion, and had been generally approved in the Department of State but had not yet received final approval from Secretary Rusk. (Ibid.) 1 All brackets (except those in paragraph (6)) are in the source text. 2 Reported in telegram 3632, January 27. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.51S/1-2762) 3 On February 9, during a briefing session held prior to the NSC Standing Group meeting, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs George McGhee asked that two additional points be added to the Algeria paper. U.S. representatives should stress to the FLN “the importance of honoring in practice the agreed guarantees to the European community in Algeria,” and a few representatives of that community should be included in future expanded U.S. training programs. Later that day, McGhee presented the paper to the NSC Standing Group, which discussed it and approved it “in general.” (Ibid., S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Standing Group Meeting, February 9, 1962) 60. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia 60. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia Source Washington, February 23, 1962, 6:04 p.m. 515. Procedure re messages Deptel 4419 to Paris rptd Tunis 507 1 superseded by following: 1. President has approved following stand-by oral personal message to be delivered by Ambassador Walmsley to Ben Khedda 2 on occasion of cease-fire: President welcomes conclusion of cease-fire agreement for Algeria as a great and historic accomplishment. He expresses his sincere gratification for the wisdom and statesmanship which you and your colleagues brought to bear in helping to achieve it. He believes the opportunities it provides for a friendly and fruitful relationship between Algeria and France should prove to be of profound benefit to all concerned. He sincerely hopes that it will assure a future for Algeria toward which all residents will contribute constructively. President feels that Algeria now stands at the threshold of a bright new future. He says that we Americans can from our own heritage appreciate the great tasks and opportunities that lie ahead for the people of Algeria as they prepare to build a new nation and in this we wish them well. He wishes to assure you that we look forward to establishing friendly relations, of benefit to both of our nations and peoples. 2. Delivery of foregoing message should be effected by Ambassador Walmsley (personally if possible) at such place and in such manner as he deems most appropriate, but only upon the receipt of further specific instruction from Dept which will be sent as soon as cease-fire has been officially announced. 3 3. Ambassador should make following additional points as USG position separate from President's personal message: (a) USG looks forward to increasingly meaningful informal contacts now and to the day when these can be formalized by recognition of an independent Algerian government. (b) Appropriate USG officials will be willing explore with Algerian leaders during course such informal conversations ways and means in which USG might assist in solution economic, education, administrative and other problems which Algerians foresee in connection coming independence. (c) During transition period USG will of course have to conduct official actions vis-à-vis Algeria in accordance provisions Franco-Algerian agreement. (d) USG considers it important for all concerned despite possible obstacles that provisions of agreement concerning European minority be put effectively into practice. 4. Upon receipt above-mentioned action instructions and time permitting GOT may be informed just prior delivery that Amb intends deliver congratulatory message, but fact that it is presidential message should not be disclosed. 5. Avoid press attention of meeting to extent feasible. If queried suggest you merely say conversation informal and there is no change your status which solely that of Amb accredited GOT. 6. You should advise Ben Khedda that President's message personal and not intended for publication. You may say that if queried by press we will reply that President asked our Amb in Tunis express President's gratification to Ben Khedda about conclusion of cease-fire agreement. You may suggest to Ben Khedda he may wish handle similarly. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/2-2362. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Witman on February 22; cleared by Imhof, Tyler, Fredericks, Rowan, Manfull, Davies, and Smith (White House); and approved by McGhee. Also sent to Paris and Algiers. 1 Not printed. (Ibid., 751S.00/2-1562) 2 Benyoussef Ben Khedda was head of the PAG. 3 In telegram 555, March 18, the Department of State informed the Embassy in Tunis that it should carry out the instructions in telegram 515 and that the President asked the Ambassador to emphasize to Ben Khedda the friendly personal character of his message. (Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/3-1062) On March 19, Walmsley reported that he had delivered the President's message to Ben Khedda, who had asked him to express his deep appreciation for the personal message. Ben Khedda had also said that U.S. support and understanding would be invaluable to the Algerian people and noted that the present Algerian leadership intended to work out cooperative arrangements with the French Government. (Telegram 946 from Tunis; ibid., 751S.00/3-1962) 61. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (McGhee) 61. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (McGhee) Source Washington, March 13, 1962. SUBJECT Authority to Receive PAG Representative in the Department after Algerian Cease Fire Discussion It has been agreed, as you know, that following the Algerian cease fire, the Department should receive representatives of the PAG informally at an appropriate high level. The occasion of the official announcement of a cease fire agreement would in itself present an opportunity which I believe would be particularly useful for us to exploit in this connection. I should appreciate an early chance to talk to Mr. Chanderli, the PAG representative in New York, who up to now has been limited in Departmental contacts to occasional informal discussions with officers of AFN and WE outside the Department. Mr. Chanderli has been quite forthcoming in these discussions and informal talks he has had with Ambassador Stevenson and other USUN officers. On an informal basis I should like to arrange to have a discussion with him as promptly as possible after the cease fire announcement during which I would propose to inform him of the substance of the President's message and the additional points which Ambassador Walmsley will have been authorized to pass to Ben Khedda. This would serve two useful purposes. First, it would be very gratifying to Chanderli who has been sensitive about not being informed about past initiatives of the Department concerning the PAG. Secondly, it would provide a natural pretext for holding such an interview and changing our policy of banning reception of PAG representatives in the Department under circumstances and at a time which could hardly be seriously objectionable to the French. Mr. Chanderli is a likely choice for the post of first Algerian representative to the UN and possibly also Ambassador to the United States. Recent conversations he has had with USUN indicate that he is well informed about Algerian plans concerning inter-African cooperation and that he is destined to play a significant part in Algerian representation at future African conferences such as the Conference of Independent African States scheduled to take place at Tunis later this year. I feel that this move to establish a basis for informal discussions in the Department would help us considerably in obtaining a flow of useful information about prospective internal and external policies of the FLN. Recommended Action: That AF be authorized to arrange informally through USUN after the cease fire for Mr. Chanderli to visit the Department for purposes of holding discussions along the lines indicated above. 1 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.51S11/3-1362. Confidential. Drafted by Hooper on March 12. 1 McGhee initialed his approval on March 14. A cease-fire agreement was concluded at Evian-les-Bains on March 18. On March 26, Chanderli was received at the Department of State by Williams. The visit was preceded by a small informal luncheon outside the Department hosted by Deputy Assistant Secretary Tasca. The conversation was recorded in two memoranda of conversation (ibid., 751S.00/3-2662) and reported to the Embassy in Paris on March 26 in telegram 5251, which asked the Embassy not to emphasize the fact that this was the first time any PAG representative had been received in the Department of State. (Ibid.) 62. Memorandum for the Files 62. Memorandum for the Files Source Washington, March 19, 1962. SUBJECT Algerian Cease Fire I was called yesterday evening between 8 and 9 p.m. by Pierre Salinger. He said he had been called by Lebel of the French Embassy, on instructions from Ambassador Alphand, who said the Embassy was concerned at the omission from the statement which the White House had issued 1 of any specific reference to the role and achievement of General De Gaulle with regard to the cease fire. I told Salinger that this had been deliberately done in order not to appear to be giving credit only to one side. Salinger called me back sometime later to say he had talked with the President, who had requested that some way be found to convey to the press our admiration for De Gaulle's role. Salinger asked if it would be all right for him to leak to the correspondents the fact that Ambassador Gavin had been instructed to express to De Gaulle the President's feelings of admiration and gratification. 2 I pointed out that the Ambassador had not been instructed to see De Gaulle personally and that it would therefore be better to confine any background comments to the press to saying that the Ambassador had been instructed to convey to the French Government the appropriate sentiments of the United States Government with regard to De Gaulle's role. Salinger agreed, and said he would do so. * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/3-1962. Confidential. Drafted by Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs William R. Tyler. 1 For text of the Presidential statement welcoming the Algeria cease-fire agreement on March 18, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962 , p. 809. 2 On February 23, the Embassy in Paris had been instructed to call on De Gaulle as soon as a cease-fire agreement was officially announced in order to convey an oral message expressing the President's deep awareness of the immense difficulties that De Gaulle had overcome to reach the agreement, the painful decisions and sacrifices involved, and his admiration for the great qualities of character and statesmanship that made the agreement possible. (Telegram 4554 to Paris; ibid., 751S.00/2-2362) On March 18, the Ambassador was authorized to carry out these instructions. (Telegram 555 to Tunis, repeated as 4992 to Paris; ibid., 751S.00/3-1062) 63. Editorial Note 63. Editorial Note On March 19, 1962, Ambassador Bonsal informed the Department of State that King Hassan II of Morocco had asked that the United States transport FLN leader Ahmed Ben Bella and his associates from Geneva to Morocco as soon as possible in two separate U.S. Government planes. (Telegram 1571 from Rabat; Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/3-1962) Komer transmitted this information to McGeorge Bundy in a note, adding that providing planes “would help cement relations with Morocco and Algerians, while not unduly upsetting French.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer) In a subsequent telephone discussion about the King's request, Ball expressed concern to McGhee over “French sensitivity” and the danger of a crisis in France. McGhee said they would tell the French that the United States could not refuse the request because it came from the King of Morocco. McGhee agreed to check the possibility of chartering a commercial plane. (Memorandum of telephone conversation, March 19, 7:21 p.m.; Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Algeria) On March 20, the Department instructed the Embassy in Rabat to inform King Hassan that a Pan American Airlines Boeing 707, which was chartered to the U.S. Military Air Transport Service (MATS), could be made available to transport the Algerians from Geneva to Nouasseur in Morocco. The Embassy in Paris was told to explain to the French Government that the United States could not refuse this request because it came from King Hassan. (Telegram 1400 to Rabat, repeated to Paris as 5007; Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/3-1962) On March 21, the Consulate General in Geneva reported that the Algerians had departed at 12:06 a.m., March 21, Geneva time. (Telegram 955 from Geneva; ibid.) On March 22, Moroccan Ambassador Ali Bengelloun called on President Kennedy to convey King Hassan's appreciation. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., 751S.00/3-2262) 64. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts 64. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts Source Washington, March 23, 1962, 8:38 p.m. 1613. During transition period between Algerian cease fire (March 19) and establishment sovereign Algerian Government, addressee posts should be guided by following in relations with Algerian representatives their respective areas. 1. It has been made amply clear on occasion delivery President's personal oral message to Ben Khedda March 18 1 and by President in press conference March 21 2 that USG does not intend recognize PAG. Question of US recognition will not arise until transfer of sovereignty from France to independent Algeria after transition period of three to six months from date of cease fire. Ben Khedda and other PAG officials appear understand our position and are themselves now more concerned with successful implementation cease fire accords and achievement independence than with recognition of PAG. PAG and FLN leaders are now in effect partners with French in joint effort put agreements in practice. 2. Within formal limits posed by non-recognition policy during transition period Department desires intensify informal and friendly contacts with Algerian leaders. It intends pursue exploratory discussions re future planning and priorities for possible US assistance to Algeria with French in Paris and Algiers and with Algerian leaders in Algiers, Tunis and/or Rabat. These will be conducted in such manner as avoid weakening French-Algerian co-operation which we consider of prime importance future Algerian development. They will be subject separate instructions to posts concerned and should not be mentioned at other posts. 3. Other posts are requested limit their approach to more general terms friendly US interest Algerian problems, hope for early resolution remaining difficulties and importance future Franco-Algerian co-operation. Department will of course welcome any information developed through Algerian contacts all posts re Algerian plans or views in political, economic, social, cultural and international relations fields. Fullest possible biographic reporting also desired. 4. All addressee posts now authorized at their discretion utilize opportunities develop Algerian contacts at official and other functions at appropriate level, even though these specifically in honor PAG. No objection inviting or receiving PAG representatives informally in Embassy or official residence by Ambassador, DCM or such officer level deemed appropriate locally. Posts should however avoid giving impression of “rushing” Algerian leaders or representatives, should reiterate where necessary that PAG recognition not involved and should conduct discussions in manner avoiding any implication that we consider PAG now responsible for Algerian foreign relations. 3 5. Paris requested advise Foreign Office this general approach. Other addressee posts requested keep French locally informed. Ball * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/3-23-62. Secret. Drafted by Hooper; cleared by Imhof, Tyler, Tasca, Thacher, and Pezzullo; and approved by Ball. Sent to Accra, Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Belgrade, Benghazi, Cairo, Conakry, Djakarta, Frankfurt, Hong Kong, Jidda, Karachi, London, Madrid, Moscow, New Delhi, Oslo, Paris, Prague, Rabat, Stockholm, Tripoli, and Tunis; and pouched to all other African posts. 1 See footnote 3, Document 60 . 2 For text of the President's remarks, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, p. 258. 3 On March 30, the Department of State instructed the Embassies in Paris, Rabat, Tunis, Algiers, and London to treat the PAG as the leadership of the strongest party of a future Algeria and to consult them informally in that capacity on problems concerning Algeria's future. It suggested dealing primarily with the Provisional Executive when it was necessary to have interim formal dealings with the Algerians. (Telegram 5238 to Paris, repeated as 1486 to Rabat, 582 to Tunis, 341 to Algiers, and pouched to London; Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/3-3062) The Provisional Executive had been established under the Evian accords and was officially installed at Rocher-Noir in Algeria on April 7. 65. Editorial Note 65. Editorial Note The Organization Armee Secrete (OAS) renewed its campaign of terrorism in Algeria following the signature of the Evian accords. On May 24, 1962, the Department of State expressed the hope that Gavin would find the opportunity to tell De Gaulle that the United States was watching with sympathy the efforts of the French Government to bring the situation in Algeria under control and that it was concerned about the extent to which conditions there might endanger the Evian accords, which had its full support. (Telegram 6320 to Paris; Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/5-2462) A temporary truce was agreed upon in Algiers between the OAS and the Algerian authorities on June 1. On June 4, after the OAS announced that it intended to resume terrorist attacks at midnight on June 5, the Department of State issued a statement supporting the Evian accords as “the charter of the new Algeria” and condemning the OAS threat of renewed violence. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962 , page 810. The Department of State had previously informed the Consulate in Algiers that it felt that the OAS threat required strong and specific denunciation. (Telegram 526 to Algiers, June 4; Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/6-462) 66. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 66. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Source Washington, June 22, 1962. McGB: Aid Planning for Algeria Rusk's talk with Couve was just the latest in the series of unsuccessful efforts to win French cooperation in planning post-independence aid for Algeria. Tyler raised this subject with Joxe last November. Ever since the French have been stalling. Couve told Rusk (Secto 9) that “it would be best not to discuss aid for many months.” 1 So we're caught between this French position and the certainty that the Algerians will want to begin talking aid soon after independence. In fact, Information Minister Yazid has already suggested that we put some statement of willingness to aid Algeria into our Independence Day message. So far, EUR's position has prevailed in State—we must wait for a French green light (except for relief projects) to avoid offending DeGaulle. On the assumption that substantial planning is impossible without French coordination, AID has done little. Although they've picked a Mission Director, they still do not have a senior desk officer to back him up. With independence expected July 5, I don't think we can wait any longer for the French lead. The Soviets certainly won't. After trying for seven months to play ball with Paris, we too simply have to put ourselves in a position to respond to the Algerian requests almost certainly in the offing. Admittedly, it is unlikely that we can launch major development projects until the new government settles down, but numerous rehabilitation and public works projects will be urgent in the near future. If we are prepared to move, for instance, we can combine PL-480 food relief with a Title II program to support such labor intensive projects. We have made a pretty decent showing so far with a number of relief projects (about $4-1/2 million in FY '62) and the Algerians have been appreciative. Most have been administered through Red Cross or UN High Commissioner for Refugees—financial support for repatriation, food, 10,000 tents for temporary shelter, etc. State also hopes to get a medical team of six University of Chicago surgeons under CARE-MEDICO sponsorship with equipment and drugs to Algeria by 1 July. AID has approved $100,000 to support the Red Crescent, which the PAG says it will rely on after independence for relief projects. But the problem now is to free our hand to be responsive to much larger Algerian requests in the crucial post-independence months. This will require a policy decision to act without a French go-ahead (although of course notifying the French). To stimulate State to take this step, we could send them an NSAM like the attached. 2 Alternatively, you could just call George Ball or McGhee. Bob K * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria, 4/62-6/62. Secret. A copy was sent to Dungan. 1 Rusk reported this conversation in Secto 9 from Paris, June 20. (Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/6-2062) The conversation was also recorded in a memorandum of conversation. (Ibid., Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330) 2 Attached to the source text is a draft National Security Action Memorandum that reads as follows: “Having read the report of your talk with Couve, the President is disturbed at the impasse we seem to have reached in our persistent efforts to coordinate with the French our planning for aid to independent Algeria. At the same time as Couve comments that ‘it would be best not to discuss aid for many months,' we have indications that the Algerians will want to begin talking aid very soon after independence. While recognizing the sensitivity of this matter, I am concerned lest our policy of waiting for the French lead may cost us too much politically with the Algerians, who will certainly be asking shortly for help. Would you therefore review this policy and let the President know how far you think we can go independently of the French? He would also appreciate a brief summary of the current state of AID's preparations for aid to Algeria.” The NSAM was never issued. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria, 4/62-6/62) 67. Editorial Note 67. Editorial Note On July 1, 1962, the Algerian people voted overwhelmingly for independence in cooperation with France. On July 3, President De Gaulle issued a proclamation formally recognizing Algerian independence. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962 , page 812. The White House issued a statement by President Kennedy recognizing “national independence for the Algerian people” on the same day. (Ibid.) Immediately following De Gaulle's proclamation, Ben Bella, who had been Vice Premier in the Provisional Government headed by Ben Khedda, disassociated himself from the PAG. The United States decided to postpone formal recognition of an Algerian Government or establishment of full diplomatic relations until the relationship between the competing factions was clarified. On July 6, Porter reported from Algiers on Dahlab's statement that the PAG and the Provisional Executive (PROVEX) had agreed to divide responsibilities by mutual consent, with the PAG running foreign affairs and the PROVEX administering the country. Porter said that he believed that if Dahlab's statement remained uncontested by the PROVEX, the United States should recognize him as Foreign Minister. (Telegram 38 from Algiers; Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/7-662) On July 7, the Department of State instructed the Embassy in Algiers that it would authorize Porter to deliver to Dahlab a letter accrediting Porter as Charge d'Affaires in Algiers, once Porter was fully satisfied that PROVEX was in accord. The Department, however, questioned whether it was “juridically or practicably feasible” to separate such action from recognition of the Provisional Algerian Government under Ben Khedda, and noted that statements to the press should emphasize the provisional nature of the PAG pending the choice of a permanent government by the Algerian people. (Circular telegram 33 to Algiers; ibid., 751S.00/7-762) On July 9, Komer wrote Bundy that he had told the Department of State that the White House would want to clear any accreditation of Porter to the PAG, which would strengthen the hand of the Ben Khedda faction. He added that he had previously agreed with State that this was “highly desirable though a calculated risk” but that the Embassy in Paris had strongly objected so the matter was being reappraised. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer) On July 13, Rusk cabled Williams, who was in Bonn, that the PAG and the PROVEX had both notified the U.S. Government that Dahlab was responsible for foreign affairs in Algeria and that an official in Dahlab's ministry had informed Porter that the PAG was satisfied to have U.S. representation continue at the Consulate General level until after the elections on August 12. He added that the split between Ben Bella and the PAG under Ben Khedda continued. (Telegram 126 to Bonn; Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/7-1362) 68. Central Intelligence Agency Information Report 68. Central Intelligence Agency Information Report Source Washington, July 10, 1962. [ document number not declassified ] SUBJECT 1. Comments of Ahmed Ben Bella on U.S. and Moroccan Policy Toward Algeria 2. Comments of Mohamed Laghzaoui on Moroccan Policy Toward Algeria 1. Mohamed Laghzaoui had discussion with Ahmed Ben Bella 9 July 1962. Ben Bella requested that Laghzaoui inform United States Govt representatives with whom he is in touch that Ben Bella is friendly to U.S. and supports Evian Accords. However, Ben Bella said that he expects U.S. to maintain a neutral policy vis-à-vis Provisional Algerian Govt (PAG) and himself, keeping in mind that his differences with PAG are purely internal Algerian matters, revolving around a minority (PAG) attempt to seize power from the majority (Ben Bella) (Army of Liberation). 2. Should U.S. not maintain complete neutrality, Ben Bella can guarantee nothing. Ben Bella expressed himself as particularly wary of an overt United States neutrality which did a behind-the-scenes support for PAG. Ben Bella would regard economic aid to PAG as indicating lack of neutrality, and military aid even more so. 3. Ben Bella said he similarly expects complete neutrality of Moroccan Govt (GOM). He is displeased by early GOM appointment of Mohamed Aouad as Ambassador to PAG. 4. Laghzaoui believes GOM policy vis-à-vis PAG and Ben Bella is, as yet, ill-defined (mal definie). He has advised King Hassan II to follow a neutral course because Morocco may soon find itself with another Congo right at its doors. Laghzaoui thinks King will end up by adopting a neutral policy. Laghzaoui personally thinks Ben Bella will win out in the end. 5. Laghzaoui has invited Ben Bella to lunch 11 July for further talks. 6. Field dissem: Ambassador only. 1 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Algeria. Secret; Noforn; No Dissem Abroad; Limited; Background Use Only. 1 On July 10, Bonsal reported to the Department of State that he wished to draw attention to Ben Bella's statements to Laghzaoui, who had been the King's personal representative to Ben Bella during part of his captivity. Bonsal added that he assumed it would be undesirable under current circumstances for the Embassy to have direct contact with Ben Bella. (Telegram 85 from Algiers; Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/7-1062) On July 17, the Department of State cabled Porter that it favored a “discreet attempt” by Tron, the Consul at Oran, to establish “informal contact” with Ben Bella. (Telegram 100 to Algiers; ibid., 611.51S/7-1662) On July 18, Porter reported that Tron had called on Ben Bella at Tlemcen and that the visit had gone off “extremely well.” (Telegram 107 from Algiers, ibid., 611.51S/7-1862) 69. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 69. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Source Washington, August 17, 1962. SUBJECT Policy Differences on Algeria We're marking time in Algeria until after the 2 September election—except for some fairly active relief work and Porter's efforts behind the scenes. The Algerians themselves have asked us to refrain from establishing full diplomatic relations until they launch their new government. 1 A major development aid program will have to wait until we see extent of Franco-Algerian cooperation and what the Algerians want. We have mounted a good-sized relief program and a budding rehabilitation effort. Shipped or in the pipeline is about $30 million (CCC costs plus ocean freight) in PL 480 wheat and 11,000 large Army surplus tents. This week AID is signing off on a $11.5 million PL 480 Food-for-Work program to be administered by Church World Service and its French affiliate in a combined reforestation and farm rebuilding program around Constantine. A CARE-MEDICO surgical team has been working successfully for a month, and we will have ten mobile health units in Algiers by mid-September as an Independence Day gift. State plans a $5.3 million refugee resettlement program under the Refuge Act to meet the needs of the next few months until we can launch a formal aid program. But even this relief activity reveals a sharp difference between State and AID approaches. State has generated almost all of it, although AID has cooperated in some of the staffing arrangements and has two of its refugee and PL 480 experts in Algiers. State believes we have to do some aggressive planning even before the Algerians are ready to launch a major development program. Latter don't fully understand the complexities of development economics, and it will be up to us to provide what positive guidance we can. Hutchinson in AID, on the other hand, has taken a go-slow position on grounds that we don't want to get deeply involved in a long range refugee relief effort, we don't want the French to unload Algeria on us, and we can't do any planning at all until the Algerians come to us with requests. We have to clear the air on this basic policy question—should we be aggressively forthcoming or sit back and wait? We may have to wait until Algerian air clears to act, but we can't afford to wait much longer to get AID and State on the same track. And we can't wait much longer for the French lead. The Soviets won't. Hal * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria, 7/16/62-7/30/62. Secret. A copy was sent to Dungan. 1 On August 2, the Provisional Algerian Government headed by Ben Khedda had agreed to surrender its powers to the Political Bureau headed by Ben Bella. 70. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Sloan) to William R. Polk of the Policy Planning Council 70. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Sloan) to William R. Polk of the Policy Planning Council Source Washington, August 23, 1962. Dear Bill : I want to thank you for supplying me with a copy of your memorandum concerning the possibility of providing military assistance to Algeria which you sent to Mr. Rostow. 1 Advance information of this type is extremely helpful. A review of this subject is both timely and important if we are to take the initiative rather than waiting to react to Soviet efforts. If it is decided to form an interagency working group on this or similar African policy problems, it would be useful if ISA could be represented. In this particular case, I would designate Colonel Howard C. Junkermann and Colonel Joe Whitfield to represent my office. I have several comments concerning the memorandum which you may find helpful in your deliberations. I question the concept of any alternative which envisions the probable use of an Arab country acting as an agent for the Soviet Bloc to furnish aid to Algeria. Further, the furnishing of U.S. equipment through a friendly power such as Pakistan would be such a thin subterfuge as to be practically worthless. For example, we were accused of being a party with the French in the Algerian rebellion because the French used U.S. manufactured equipment. The idea of incorporating other friendly powers such as Sweden, U.K., Italy, Japan, etc., which have an industrial base capable of supporting either partially or in toto the required armaments for training, has considerable merit. However, in such cases, it would be appropriate for the U.S to be disassociated with the effort. Of course, France is the logical choice to furnish such assistance but she may be unwilling to meet the needs in a forthright fashion. Accordingly, I believe that the time has come, if we are unsuccessful after exploring the problem with friendly industrial nations, for the U.S. to speak firmly and clearly to the French about the matter, indicating we are prepared to offer Algeria military assistance if they do not. In this case it would be better for the U.S. to act directly than through a third party. Sincerely yours, Frank K. Sloan 2 * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330,OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Algeria 000.1-121, 1962. Secret. Drafted by Colonel Junkermann. 1 Polk's memorandum discussed several potential sources of military equipment for Algeria, noting that the most disadvantageous to the United States would be for the Soviet Bloc to provide military equipment and instruction directly to the Algerians, which would have a profoundly dislocating effect on the U.S. strategic position in Africa. On the other hand, potential damage to French-U.S. relations placed direct provision of U.S. military equipment near the bottom of the scale of desired actions. The best arrangement would be to have France supply such equipment, but current French attitudes made this unlikely. Better from the U.S. point of view would be to have a friendly Muslim country or another European country act as a source of supply. (Ibid.) 2 Printed from a copy that indicates that Sloan signed the original. 71. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy 71. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Source Washington, October 13, 1962. While the chief purpose in receiving Ben Bella 1 is to get acquainted and to offset any misapprehensions he may have about “neo-colonialist” U.S. policies, we also have a chance to: (1) lay the groundwork for U.S. influence on him; (2) underline the importance of close cooperation with France. This 46 year old comes with great personal respect for you, dating from your 1957 Senate speech (you could give him a copy of Strategy for Peace). He still clings to a lot of naive ideas and thinks in terms of a melange of revolutionary cliches from Marx, Mao, Nasser and Che Guevara. Basically, however, he's much more pragmatic than doctrinaire. Therefore, it should be possible to impress him with our general support of self-determination and social change, our respect for honest non-alignment, and even of our legitimate concern over the Communist threat to new nations (Sekou Toure's experience is relevant here). He understands why we couldn't back his rebellion; indeed your 1957 speech gives you credentials to argue that you didn't oppose it. The best tactic, however, might be to handle him in low key, asking him questions and responding to his sallies. You might want to query him first about his own plans for Algeria. This could lead naturally to an airing of the outlook for the Evian Accords. We emphatically want France to shoulder the main burden in Algeria (the bill will be immense, and we don't have the money—at least this year). But too direct an affirmation of the need for close French-Algerian ties might arouse suspicion. Instead you might ask him what he thinks he can get from the French, how many technicians and teachers he thinks he can woo back, whether he can get Paris to continue the Constantine Plan, etc. Ben Bella recognizes the need for extensive French help, and that Algeria's natural economic links are with Europe. But as a neutralist he's going to tap other counterbalancing sources, both east and west. While State believes he has no shopping list in his pocket, he undoubtedly wonders how generally forthcoming we're likely to be. We've given a lot of relief help already—350,000 tons of food since 1956 through voluntary agencies, a medical team and supplies, ten mobile clinics as an independence gift—and have already approved $40 million more in FY 63 food relief (see Tab C). 2 Beyond this, however, we have no real aid program for Algeria. In fact State and AID differ sharply on this issue . AID believes we should leave Algeria to France. They fear that aggressively seeking ways to help Ben Bella over his economic hump would make us frontrunner, whereas we want to leave France in the driver's seat. They plan to continue emergency feeding and food-for-work projects through the winter. But they are reluctant to volunteer other aid—even in principle—for fear of arousing Algerian hopes of extensive technical assistance or development lending. They claim they can't round up enough French and Arabic speaking technicians for such a program and don't have loan money. State agrees that France must shoulder the chief load, but argues for a U.S. program to support Ben Bella indirectly against an army takeover and to influence development planning as it matures. They feel that the Evian Accords might break down, or at least be greatly modified, and that the Bloc will be all too willing to jump in. They would prefer Ben Bella to turn to us for help if he looks anywhere but in Europe. As for AID's argument about shortage of funds, they argue that a country as important as Algeria should be near the top of the list for what funds we do have. While recognizing how we're strapped, I think State is right. Here we have a chance (albeit a potentially costly one) to buy in on the ground floor in one of the few really important new nations in Africa. Given a $180 million three-year commitment to Tunisia and $40 million yearly to Morocco (plus $12 million MAP for FY 63), it doesn't make sense for AID to program only $2 million (plus food) for Algeria in FY 63. Agreed that we don't want the French to unload Algeria on us. But we need some kind of an independent presence, if only on preclusive grounds. Unless AID settles down to imaginative planning, we'll be in no position to respond quickly to Algerian needs, to identify those sectors where concentrating our resources will best further our interests, or to face the contingency of a breakdown in Franco-Algerian cooperation. I don't know whether either you or Ben Bella will want to bring up Cuba (he still seems to be going there). 3 But he's now heard from many sources how sensitive we are on this issue. His entourage in New York says he is going to Cuba to satisfy the leftists at home, perhaps with some vague notion of healing the U.S.-Cuban rift. He professes to believe that Castro is a “madman.” He excluded Communists from the National Assembly, and even Colonel Boumedienne recently said that the “Communists never sincerely aided the Algerian rebellion.” On the other hand, many Algerians still seem to look at Castro through rose-colored glasses. So Cuba may provide a good text to get across the risk of Communist capture of indigenous national revolutions (I've attached a CIA summary). Finally, you might want to congratulate Ben Bella on his formation of a government and dedication to the principles of parliamentary democracy. He's allowed an opposition in the new Assembly; almost a third of it has opposed him on one issue or another. Whether or not Ben Bella reverts to one-party government, he's a better bet than the army (Major Slimane, whom you'll see at luncheon is along as the Army's man). Although our ability to influence the outcome of Ben Bella's struggle to retain power is negligible, we lose nothing by encouraging him along his current moderate course. We propose an innocuous joint communique after our talk, in order to limit Ben Bella's opportunities to free-wheel with the press (Draft at Tab III-B). You should also skim Scope and Talking Papers and Tab III-D rounding up recent Ben Bella statements on his attitude toward the US, the Evian Accords, socialism, etc. It gives a good feel for the man. R.W. Komer 4 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria, 9/1/62-10/15/62. Secret. A handwritten covering note from Komer to Bundy reads: “This is long, but State briefing book is lousy so I summed up their 30pp. in my three. I also wanted to clue JFK on State/AID hassle over aid to Algeria. Only he can decide it, in last analysis, and now is best time to educate him.” Department of State briefing material for Ben Bella's visit in October 1962 is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2176. 1 The National Assembly of Algeria, which was elected on September 20, designated Ben Bella as Prime Minister of Algeria on September 26. On September 29, the Assembly approved his list of cabinet officers and the United States formally recognized the “newly established Government of the Republic of Algeria.” For texts of the statement issued by the Department of State and messages from the Secretary and President to Ben Bella and Foreign Minister Khemisti, see Department of State Bulletin , October 15, 1962, p. 560. The Embassy in Algiers was established on September 29 with Porter as Charge d'Affaires ad interim. On October 4, the President formally invited the new Prime Minister to visit the White House when he came to the United States for the admission of Algeria to the United States. (Letter from Kennedy to Ben Bella, October 4; Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Countries, Algeria) 2 None of the tabs is attached to the source text. 3 On October 6, following instructions from Washington, Porter told Khemisti that the U.S. Government was deeply disturbed by press reports that Ben Bella planned to visit Cuba immediately after being received by President Kennedy in Washington. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.51S11/10-662) 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 72. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria 72. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria Source Washington, October 23, 1962, 6:03 p.m. 659. Following based uncleared memcons: 1 Summary foreign policy discussions during Ben Bella visit Washington. 2 President asked Ben Bella explain Algerian non-alignment policy. Prime Minister said Algeria did not believe grouping of non-aligned states useful as it would become only another bloc. Algeria deeply committed certain principles however. It against imperialism, colonialism, racial discrimination, nuclear tests, armaments races and spheres of influence. Algerians attributed own suffering during war to attitudes represented by such actions and policies. President said there seemed be impression in Algeria that world divided into two blocs and that one led by US favored nuclear tests, colonialism, and imperialism. Since PM was going to Cuba, 3 it would be useful talk about US policy. US had pursued neutralist and isolationist policy which geography permitted for greater part our history. Since 1945, against their nature, American people compelled become actively interested world affairs in response threat international communism. US wanted world of independent nations each with govt corresponding needs its own people. Communists wanted uniformity tied together and directed by Moscow and Peking. This was danger which forced US assume burden of world defense. Re US policy in Western Hemisphere, President cited examples of Dominican Republic, Venezuela, and Colombia. All were under liberal leadership and had fought for freedom and progress against regressive factions as well as against communists. All were under attack by Castro regime. If these free liberal govts failed, cause of independence and sovereignty of nations might be defeated in Latin America. US could not accept this. Fact that limited minority in Cuba striving bring it about explains US policy towards Cuba. Problems of illiteracy, poverty, and disease as serious in LA as problems of Algeria. Solution must be found within independence. As further evidence US opposition to colonialism Pres cited US dispute with Portugal over self-determination for Angola, and US stand for Congo unity, despite difficulties this entailed with friends in Europe. World struggle not between two great power blocs but between those who wish stable world of independent nations and those seeking establish universal empire. Pres explained that many in US supported Castro at outset because they believed he led national revolution. US Govt cut out military aid to Batista. But Castro betrayed Cuban revolution. Cuban people never had chance express their will but were delivered to communists and appended to Soviet bloc. Ben Bella said experience of Algeria had to be that of radical and general revolution. International communism, however, was not valid for Algeria. Algerians wanted prevent possible danger of communist takeover. Algeria's ideology and religion contrary to it. It against Marxism and communism but for reduction of international tensions. In going to Cuba, BB said he not wish poison already grave situation, but hoped through positive approach help relax tension. BB said he did not differ with Pres on substance of problems but had some reservations re choice of policy or lines of conduct. He thought there must be adequate measures other than attempting destroy Cuban regime. Pres replied Cuba had become world problem only since July when Soviets started shipping in arms. Eighty five shiploads of arms delivered since then, and missile bases established. US had no intention of invading Cuba. If it wanted, would have done so years ago. Our concern was over military reinforcements which Soviets have accumulated in Cuba for purpose of harassment. Ben Bella compared Egyptian experience. Egyptian move to accept Czech arms had been serious mistake. However he felt Nasser forced little by little into intolerable situation in part by unwise moves of US Administration then in power. Now Cuban Govt had taken measures which bad, but it best avoid nailing Castro to communist camp by failing give him any other choice. Pres said Dorticos had not extended very green olive branch in UN. PM agreed but said fact that Dorticos asking for official promise of non-invasion might indicate area for negotiation. BB said he now understood US position very well and was happy to not [note] no hostile intention. Pres said if US did not favor invasion of Cuba, it not because of Soviet military build-up. Real reason was we did not want another Budapest. Sole danger was introduction of Soviet missiles. If those missiles included at any time types capable of striking at US territory, situation would change to such extent that US would be forced reconsider its position. The stronger the military build-up, the more the danger. Cuba's best protection was its own people's support. US does not want war against small country. In talks with Secretary Ben Bella said Algeria had paid high price for entry on international scene and was determined to be constructive. It might make mistakes because it was young and many issues new to it. Because of their practice in international affairs, US and Algeria could face their future relationship with confidence. They might not always agree entirely but could esteem one another. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.51S11/10-2362. Confidential. Drafted by Hooper on October 22, cleared by Little and Bromley Smith, and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Paris. 1 Four separate memoranda of this conversation are ibid., 033.51S11/10-1562, 637.51S/10-1562, 751S.00/10-1562, and S/S Files: Lot 66 D 149, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation. 2 The President met with Ben Bella for discussion and lunch at the White House on October 15. 3 Ben Bella visited Cuba on October 18. 73. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) 73. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) Source Washington, October 25, 1962. SUBJECT Aid to Algeria Despite some speculative press reports, there has not been any offer of any large or long-term aid package to Algeria nor did we receive requests for such during the Ben Bella visit or the brief additional meeting with the Algerian representatives in Washington on Tuesday. (The telegram reporting the conversation with Ben Bella and his advisers is attached.) 1 This is to confirm with you our understanding of the “Stop Order” on Aid to Algeria issued by Mr. Springsteen of your office. We understand from him that this is not intended at this time to apply to emergency PL 480 programs of wheat being distributed in Algeria through American voluntary agencies, nor to the Care-Medico program of assistance to the Ben Massous Hospital in Algiers, nor to similar emergency relief projects. These currently comprise the only aid in effect or contemplated for Algeria. We believe it would react in a seriously adverse manner on our efforts to secure support for our policy on Cuba, not only in Algeria, but elsewhere in the Afro-Asian world, if it appeared that we were cutting off relief supplies to the Algerian people, presently in desperate straits, because of the stand taken by the Political Bureau and certain Algerian newspapers on Cuba. 2 Copies of this memorandum have been given to AID, and AID is awaiting your confirmation of this interpretation. * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.51S/10-2562. Secret. Drafted by Newsom. 1 Telegram 649 to Algiers reported that during Ben Bella's visit to Washington, the Algerians had taken the occasion to outline economic problems and had stressed the urgency of such problems as relief, housing, jobs, and land for peasants, but that it had been evident that they were not ready yet to go beyond discussion of economic problems and a general exploration of ways the United States could help. The telegram noted that, despite press reports to the contrary, no U.S. commitments had been made nor figures discussed. (Ibid., 611.51S/10-1662) 2 On October 26, the Department of State informed the Embassy in Algiers that press reports that economic discussions with the Algerians had been broken off indefinitely were not correct and that relief shipments were continuing. The Embassy was authorized to privately inform the Algerian Government that if it wished additional aid, the U.S. Government was prepared to listen subject to the normal requirements relating to the provision of aid. (Telegram 683 to Algiers; ibid., 611.51S/10-2562) 74. National Intelligence Estimate 74. National Intelligence Estimate Source Washington, November 7, 1962. NIE 62-2-62 THE SHORT-TERM OUTLOOK IN ALGERIA Summary and Conclusions A. Seven years of rebellion and terror have left the Algerians weary, uncertain, and divided. Moreover, the established bases of the society and the economy have been altered; two-thirds of the Europeans have left the country, and 50 percent or more of the labor force is jobless. To a great extent the modern sector of the economy is in a state of collapse. Many enterprises have been abandoned by their owners, and the arteries of commerce and communication have broken down at many critical points. (Paras. 1, 4, 18-19) B. The current period is one of relative political calm. Ben Bella has seized control, and for the moment at least has the support of the largest and best disciplined military force in the country. He is trying, during the present respite in political activities, to consolidate his political position, to improve his popular image, to impose his authority over the Armed Forces, and to revive the economy. (Paras 8-9, 15-16) C. Ben Bella, who calls himself both an “Arab Socialist” and a Marxist, appears at the present time to be much closer to Nasser in policy and doctrine than to the Communists. This judgment, however, is based upon his words and actions to date on both national and international matters; there is as yet not enough hard evidence on the new regime to permit us to assess with any degree of finality Ben Bella's basic philosophic leanings; he may indeed prove to be far more radical than he now appears. At the present time Ben Bella does not appear to be vindictive toward France, and he does not now plan major economic changes likely to affront major French interests. The Ben Kheddists, who oppose him, and Colonel Boumedienne, who now supports him, appear to be more radical than Ben Bella. (Paras. 9, 12-13) D. Little has yet been accomplished in economic revival, and the chances are poor that much will be accomplished in the next few months. Thus, the population in the cities, now dependent upon foreign charity, may become increasingly frustrated, and living standards in the rural areas, already barely sufficient to sustain life, may be further driven down. (Paras. 18-23) E. While Ben Bella's immediate prospects for holding power are fairly good, we believe that within a year he will be confronted with severe political challenges. The intractible nature of Algeria's economic problems, the somewhat chaotic conditions which will persist, and latent hostility to his rule in important sectors of the society, all will tend to undermine Ben Bella's position. Any one of a number of oppositionist leaders might seek to exploit the dissatisfactions of the jobless, and there is always danger of unrest in the countryside. Ben Bella must also somehow establish his authority over the radical Defense Minister, Colonel Boumedienne, and a showdown between the two seems likley to occur sooner or later. If Boumedienne became tired of political infighting, if there were growing insecurity in the cities and subversion in the countryside, or if there were irresolution and confusion in the government, Boumedienne might simply step in and establish a military dictatorship. (Paras. 24-28) F. We do not believe Algeria's announced policy of nonalignment will be followed with purity and consistency. Already the Algerians have sided with Cuba against the US. But at the same time they are bound to France by a host of cultural and economic ties. The present leaders will probably not deliberately move toward the Soviet Bloc, but they probably will, more often than the US or France would like, support Communist initiatives on a variey of international issues. They will almost certainly accept military and economic assistance from the Bloc. Indeed, we cannot rule out the possibility that Ben Bella himself may adopt a more radical international stance in response to internal pressues or external blandishments. If a more radical leader—such as Boumedienne—succeeded Ben Bella, Communist influence and ideology in both domestic and foreign policy would probably significantly increase. (Paras 29, 31, 34-36) [Here follows the Discussion section.] * Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79 R 01012A, Box 215. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet: “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: “The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force.” All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on November 7 except the Atomic Energy Commission Representative and the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction. 75. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Northern African Affairs (Witman) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) 75. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Northern African Affairs (Witman) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) Source Washington, November 7, 1962. SUBJECT Your Appointment with Ambassador Achilles and Mr. Kraft Attached are two memoranda on Algeria prepared by Ambassador Achilles, who headed the U.S. Delegation to the Algerian Independence Day ceremonies, and by Mr. Joseph Kraft, a member of the Delegation. 1 Ambassador Achilles notes that the political and economic situation in Algeria is bad and will likely deteriorate. He recommends, among other things, that we should show patience and understanding of Algerian aberrations, e.g. Cuba, and not stop our current relief efforts. He further states that the U.S. should encourage France and Algeria to come together since French capital and skills offer the only hope for economic salvation. Mr. Kraft, on the other hand, remarks that the important political fact in Algeria is the existence of an opposition which because of its maturity and experience would likely adopt more reasonable foreign and domestic programs, if it came to power. Kraft characterizes the Ben Bella regime as being made up of persons who either spent most of the war in prison or were largely symbolic figure heads. They are following chauvinistic policies and playing East against West. Like Achilles, Kraft sees a key role for France and recommends that if France decides to continue support of Ben Bella, we should undertake modest food for work programs on a government-to-government basis. However, if France discontinues its aid, we should follow suit for we cannot alone avert the crisis and we may be weakening the opposition. * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/11-762. Confidential. Drafted by Gonzalez. 1 Attached to the source text but not printed. The Algerian independence celebration was held October 31-November 1. A note dated November 17 to McGhee from a member of his staff indicated that S/S wanted to remind the Under Secretary of the interest the White House had exhibited in downplaying U.S. representation in Algeria and noted that the choice of Ambassador Achilles as the head of the delegation to the Algerian Independence Day ceremonies had reflected the President's annoyance with Ben Bella's statements about Cuba. The note was attached to a memorandum from Williams to Secretary Rusk, which discussed the possibility of a visit by Williams to Algeria as part of a trip to Europe and North Africa later that month. (Ibid., 110.15-WI/11-1662) The proposed visit to Algeria did not take place. 76. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 76. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Source Paris, December 6, 1962, 7 p.m. 2386. From Williams. Lengthy review of Algerian situation with Porter indicates that while generally unstable political and economic conditions likely persist for some time, bright spots are appearing, particularly in the political orientation of the government. This probably means that while Algerians likely to remain attached to socialist concepts it does seem that they are now deciding that these ideas must be adjusted to the realities of their economic position. They have learned that the world is not what they thought it to be during years of imprisonment and isolation from Western thought and principle. At moment, Algerian Government seems be engaged in serious effort define financial, cultural and administrative arrangements with French. 1 Recognizing that such course undoubtedly unpopular with highly vocal groups such as communists, they are taking action against such groups to minimize criticism and consolidate government position internally. This undoubtedly hampers bloc efforts to take advantage of current confusion to plant apparatus in country. Algerian Government attitude toward United States immediately after Ben Bella visit Cuba was mixture of resentment and bewilderment. This was followed by appreciation of fact that population as whole was very disinterested in Cuba and Castro, and unable comprehend government interest in that situation with so many problems at home. Fact that first question addressed to government in foreign affairs debate indicated concern at possible damage to American-Algerian relations had its own special import, and evoked further conciliatory declarations from government and Ben Bella himself. Porter believes this trend will continue for time being at least, and longer it does more difficult it will be to reverse. Certainly, Algerians will be extremely careful about getting caught in gears of international politics again. In general, I would say that US posture appears well adapted to present situation. We should continue our food shipments to assist Algerians get through hard winter ahead, support for medical program and further student grants. As picture of French-Algerian relations becomes clear, we can examine sympathetically how best to develop supplementary role which will probably be required. We are not past all shoals in Algeria by any means as Algerian-French relationships mentioned are now in process evolution. If reasonable success crowns current efforts in latter sense, we can assume Algerian sentiment, which at its best is strongly nationalist, will prove to be substantial barrier to communist designs. With regard to effect of Algerians on Africa we may expect that they will be so preoccupied with their own problems for foreseeable future that their influence and effort, beneficial or otherwise, will be rather limited. I am assured Embassy Algiers will remain alert to any need to adapt our posture and programs to new developments in this still highly fluid situation. Bohlen * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/12-662. Confidential. Repeated to Algiers. 1 Telegram 2387 from Paris, December 6, reported that the Algerians had asked France for 360 billion old francs in aid but had been assured of only a fraction of that amount, probably 60 billion old francs to carry them to the end of the year. The implication had been that further funds would be forthcoming after the French saw how the new Algerian Government carried out certain commitments with respect to French properties in Algeria, especially those of the 600 French farmers still on their land. (Ibid., 651.51S/12-662) 77. National Security Action Memorandum No. 211 77. National Security Action Memorandum No. 211 Source Washington, December 14, 1962. MEMORANDUM TO The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Director of Central Intelligence The Administrator, Agency for International Development The Director, U.S. Information Agency The Director, Peace Corps SUBJECT U.S. Policy Toward Algeria In view of the Algerian Government's renewed interest in discussing US aid, the President hopes that we are mapping our next steps in this important country. He recognizes that we may want to let the Algerians come to us, and that we clearly want the French to carry the major aid responsibility, with us in a supplementary role. Unless we do some forward planning now, however, we may not be in a position to respond with sufficient dispatch to serve our political interests. We also want to maintain the momentum of our successful emergency program, and to do what we reasonably can to encourage a good Algerian relationship with the West. Therefore, the President requests that the Department of State, in cooperation with other interested agencies, draw up a tentative strategy and plan of action for the period of transition from our present emergency relief program toward what we hope will be primary Algerian focus on sensible development. It should include further steps to insure that our program complements French aid wherever possible, together with a review of what diplomatic, civic action, information, Peace Corps,MAP, covert action, and other measures might be desirable. He desires a report before the end of January. McGeorge Bundy * Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAMs. Secret. A copy was sent to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. 78. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy 78. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Source Washington, December 28, 1962. Here is the interim report on Algeria you requested. Your NSAM has already helped to clear the air. The town now understands that you don't want to rely exclusively on French leadership, that you want more than a token US “presence”, and that you haven't blackballed Ben Bella for his naivete about Castro. Williams launched a working group last week with strong words about Algeria's importance and your interest in it. 1 Our emergency food program now totals about $65 million and will hit $80 million by April. About 35% of the population depend completely on it over the winter, but we will cut back sharply when the spring harvest matures. More will go into food-for-work projects. One reforestation job is supplying intermittent employment for 15,000 workers for 20 months, plus food for their families; Ben Bella wants ten more such projects.AID will support through June a $550,000 CARE-Medico staffing of a hospital near Algiers. We've also sent surplus tents and 10 mobile health units ($181,000), contributed $100,000 to the Algerian Red Crescent, begun US training for several administrators, and brought 53 students to US universities. The Algerians are now acting more soberly as they face up to recovery problems. Ben Bella is trying to get on a better footing with the French, seeking loans from Arab oil producers, and asking us to begin aid talks. While all agree that we must leave the major aid burden in Paris, specific US proposals may spur the French to move faster. Porter also feels that a few specific offers will forestall wild requests. So we're considering four pilot rural rehabilitation projects to employ 60,000 workers (supplying the subsistence for an added 300,000 dependents) at a cost of about $15 million, $11 millon of it in food. We're also looking cautiously at some military aid, largely to give us leverage with the army. Although the French consider this their province, Algeria is reportedly sensitive about seeking substantial military help in Paris. Ben Bella's made some noises about civic action to put demobilized soldiers to work. Ben Bella is looking to Nasser for military training, as well as economic help. As for Bloc aid, it has been limited to a few spot gifts and some Bulgarian doctors. So far, Ben Bella seems to have convinced his colleagues to look west. We will have a tentative action program shortly. R.W. Komer * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria, 10/16/62-12/31/62. Secret. 1 On December 20, an interagency meeting with representatives from the White House; the Departments of State, Defense, Commerce, and Labor; the Bureau of the Budget; the CIA; AID; USIA; and the Peace Corps met at the Department of State to consider NSAM No. 211. A summary record of the meeting is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Algeria 000.1-121, 1962. 79. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 79. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Source Washington, January 3, 1963. SUBJECT US Policy Toward Algeria JCSM-6-63 1. Reference is made to: a. A memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), I-22413/62, dated 22 December 1962, subject as above. 1 b. National Security Action Memorandum, Number 211, subject as above. c. JCSM-10-62, dated 8 January 1962, subject: “Military Assistance for Post-Independence Algeria.” 2. The development of a specific military assistance program, supporting reference 1 b above, is contingent upon French intentions in Algeria with respect to continued economic assistance, French willingness for the United States to play a supplementary role, and upon Algerian desires and needs for a US program. Any US military assistance program for Algeria must be designed so as to satisfy not only the Algerian Government but, at the same time, not impair our relations with France. 3. Concurrently, any US military aid program for Algeria must be examined for its effect on our relations with Tunisia, Libya, and Morocco. In the latter two countries, the continued use of our military bases remains important. Libya, Tunisia, and, in particular, Morocco would view a significant rise in Algeria's military capabilities as a threat to their border claims in the Sahara as well as an effort on the part of Algerian leaders to gain a dominant role in the North African area. Any actions by the United States to strengthen the offensive power of the Algerian armed forces with prestige items such as tanks and jet aircraft would adversely affect relations with these countries and thus indirectly jeopardize our bases. While a US military assistance program for Algeria could serve to lessen Bloc influence to some extent, it can be expected that the Algerian Government will seek military assistance from the Bloc, and the Bloc will be responsive to these requests. 4. Even though the lack of information and the political realities in North Africa are limiting factors in the development of Algerian programs, the US military may still be able to play an important role in assisting Algeria in reconstruction and economic development. This can be done by developing and organizing the Armed Forces primarily along the lines of an internal security force as opposed to a force whose offensive strength could serve as a threat to Algeria's neighbors. The present Armed Forces of Algeria (about 100,000) are beyond the needs of Algeria and aggravate the situation by imposing a financial burden. The present Government has indicated that it plans an Armed Force of 25,000-35,000; however, precise information regarding the make-up of this force is not known. One of the principal problems facing the Algerian Government is to find a way to reduce the size of the armed forces without losing their support. A program to ensure jobs for the released military personnel would serve to lessen the impact on the already staggering unemployment problem. Properly employed, the Algerian Armed Forces could become an effective, constructive force to assist in rebuilding Algeria, in developing the Algerian economy, and in providing an important stabilizing influence. 5. In the light of the above, the following are some potential courses of action which DOD, in conjunction with other US agencies, could pursue in converting the Algerian Armed Forces to a more constructive role and adapting it to the legitimate needs of Algeria. a. Provide vocational training for those military men who are to be released from duty. The training should be in skills which can be utilized in the economy after release and should be conducted, where possible, in concert with civic action programs designed for reconstruction and economic development. b. Assist in programs which will reduce the armed forces and streamline them for an internal security mission only. This would require, primarily, assistance in reorganizations for the mission and attendant training. c. Assist in the development of civic action programs in support of economic development designed to win the support of the people. 6. In order to develop plans for assisting the Algerians, it is recommended that: a. The Department of State advise France that the United States is willing to cooperate with France in providing limited economic and military assistance to Algeria as a supplement to French efforts. b. Subsequent to the Department of State action above, USCINCEUR be invited to participate in any US negotiations with the French to determine the status of the French programs for Algeria, particularly in regard to military assistance and French desires for US support. c. Following the above two steps, and if still appropriate, the Algerian Government should be informed that the United States is willing to assist and is prepared to send a survey team to determine the nature and scope of the assistance which the United States could provide. 7. After the above courses of action have been taken, the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be in a position to make further recommendations. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Curtis E. LeMay Acting Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files:FRC 69 A 3131, Algeria, 1963. Secret. 1 The December 22 memorandum from Bundy informed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Presidential directive in NSAM No. 211, and asked that the Joint Chiefs review their recommendations of January 8, 1962 ( Document 57 ), regarding possible U.S. military assistance to Algeria in light of the current situation and desired future U.S. relations with Algeria. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files:FRC 69 A 3131, Algeria, 1963) 80. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 80. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, February 1, 1963. [Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAMs, NSAM 221. Secret. 2 pages of source text not declassified.] 81. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy 81. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy Source Washington, undated. SUBJECT Plan of Action for Algeria Pursuant to National Security Action Memorandum No. 211 of December 14, 1962, the Department of State has coordinated the efforts of the recipients of NSAM No. 211, as well as several other agencies having interest in programs for Algeria, and now submits a Plan of Action for Algeria. Our Ambassador to Algeria, William J. Porter, also participated in the final deliberations. The Action Plan has been concurred in by all of the participating agencies. Actions projected for the next seventeen months are predicated on the assumption that France and Algeria will by and large be successful in working out their new relationship as independent nations, and that France will continue to carry the major aid responsibility. U.S. strategy is to continue to encourage this trend through advance coordination with the French of planned U.S. actions in Algeria and encouragement of the Algerian Government to take a moderate course in balancing nationalist goals against the immediate necessity of constructive Franco-Algerian cooperation. Basic U.S. objectives are: (1) to prevent significant communist bloc influence, (2) to promote U.S. influence, and Free World influence consonant with U.S. interests, and (3) to contribute to Algerian political stability, economic recovery, and progress toward sound development. In order more effectively to pursue these objectives and to maintain and improve the reasonably good U.S.-Algerian relationship that has developed over the past year, it is recommended that the United States take the following actions in FY 63 and FY 64: First, proceed with diplomatic efforts, which have already made considerable headway, to explain our foreign policies to the Algerian Government and to extend and strengthen contacts with influential elements in and out of Government; Second, continue the emergency feeding program until the Algerian summer harvest and phase it out as soon as possible thereafter; Third, proceed with U.S.-Algerian planning and implementation of a rural rehabilitation program which will require PL 480 food as partial wages, between $2 and $4 million for tools, equipment, and other commodities, and some U.S. technical assistance including planning experts and operational or middle-level manpower; Fourth, explore with the Algerian Government other means of converting food-relief to food-work programs including extension of the reforestation program to other areas; Fifth, continue AID support for the highly successful CARE-Medico teams of U.S. doctors and nurses at Algiers until ways and means can be found to convert this program to one supported by private U.S. resources without loss of impact; Sixth, explore various possibilities for an AID-sponsored impact program in the field of public health designed to help alleviate emergency-type health problems and to train Algerians in the use of mobile health clinics; Seventh, provide selected Algerians with training in the United States in technical and industrial skills through an accelerated AID participants program and encouragement of leading U.S. industries to provide some on-the-job training; Eighth, at a time to be recommended by the U.S. Ambassador at Algiers, send AID development loan experts to Algeria to review a series of development loan projects which the Algerian Government has proposed, with the purpose of being prepared to act upon a selected number as soon as possible in FY 64 within the framework of U.S. appropriations and, of a limited U.S. role in the Algerian development effort; Ninth, Embassy Algiers is to consider and make recommendations concerning other fields where U.S. technical assistance is needed and would be effective; Tenth, take appropriate action to promote U.S. private investment in Algerian development as soon as current negotiations to clarify Algerian policy in this field have been concluded; Eleventh, continue all successful Algerian students currently enrolled in U.S. colleges under U.S. Government-sponsored scholarships, award new exchange scholarships in FY 64 in a number at least equivalent to those granted this year, and continue to encourage activity of private foundations and organizations in this field; Twelfth, proceed with planned build-up of USIA programs and activities in Algiers, Constantine, Oran, and the countryside, endowing them wherever possible with a public service cast related to Algerian aspirations for economic and social development; Thirteenth, promote U.S.-Algerian trade and general relations through planned future participation in Algerian international fairs, through a USIA-Commerce sponsored U.S. National Exhibition, and through various Department of Commerce media and meetings; Fourteenth, limit action on military assistance to such planning primarily oriented toward civic action, reduction of armed forces, and internal security as may be necessary to meet the contingencies of (1) a GOA request for aid unavailable to them elsewhere in the West or (2) indications that the GOA may seek significant new assistance from the Communist bloc under circumstances which may make desirable US initiative in offering a MAP program; Fifteenth, seek further information on the probable nature of French aid and Algerian economic planning, undertake a longer-term assessment of the Algerian economy as soon as possible, and take appropriate steps to encourage other Free World nations and international organizations to assist Algerian recovery and development. Apart from the inter-agency Action Plan, it is recommended that further consideration be given here in Washington to the possibility of a positive and timely response to Prime Minister Ben Bella's recent request for Peace Corps assistance. It is felt that a Peace Corps contribution to Algeria in the near future would be very valuable. The trend in policies and actions of the Ben Bella Government has been pragmatic and promising in terms of basic U.S. objectives. We must, however, remain alert to such contingencies as a rupture in the politico-military alliance which underpins current Algerian stability, or serious disagreement between Algeria and France leading to sharp reduction or retardation of French aid. In any event, constant re-assessment of the adequacy of U.S. actions projected in this plan will be required because of the transitional and quickly changing stage which Algeria will be going through in the period which this Action Plan embraces. Dean Rusk 1 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series,NSAMs, NSAM-21. Secret. Attached to the source text but not printed is a 14-page “Discussion of the Strategy and Action Plan for Algeria.” 1 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 82. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy 82. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Source Washington, February 4, 1963. Here is the Algeria action program 1 you asked for in NSAM 211. I suggest you discuss it with Ambassador Porter when he sees you 12:15 Tuesday. Things seem to be breaking our way in Algeria. Ben Bella has settled down, patched up his relations with the French and begun focusing on his acute domestic problems. He's been pressing us for more aid, and I think your intervention has produced a reasonably good response. This year we'll (1) launch four pilot rural rehabilitation projects; (2) expand the food-for-work reforestation program; (3) mount an immunization and public health training effort; (4) continue college scholarships, participant training and CARE-Medico teams; and (5) go ahead until the mid-summer harvest with the sizable emergency feeding program begun last summer. Cost will be about $2 million in FY 63 for equipment and technicians, plus at least $80 million in food. In FY 1964 we'll continue with perhaps $75 million in PL-480 and up to $15 million in DL and TA funds. Rusk bought Bell's recommendation that France should handle anything above that level; Bell is also concerned about shortage of funds. I suggest that we may end up wanting to go higher than $15 million for political reasons. While the French apparently do intend to carry Algeria (for at least $200 million annually), we want enough of a presence to reflect the fact that Algeria is the key to the Maghreb and one of the top new nations in Africa. Moreover, Ben Bella et al have already asked about several projects worth $10-15 million each that tie into our emphasis on rural rehabilitation. But we needn't decide this issue yet. Peace Corps hesitations create another issue. Ben Bella specifically asked Porter for PC help, and State thinks such a program “very valuable.” But the PC is overextended in Africa, and is sensitive on the general question of relating Peace Corps to other AID-State planning. I suggest you put out attached NSAM, 2 which generally accepts the State program, but leaves the door open for going a bit higher on aid if it seems desirable and gives the Peace Corps a gentle nudge. R.W. Komer * Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer, Secret. 1 Document 81 . 2 Document 83 . 83. National Security Action Memorandum No. 221 83. National Security Action Memorandum No. 221 Source Washington, February 20, 1963. MEMORANDUM TO The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Director of Central Intelligence The Administrator, Agency for International Development The Director, United States Information Agency The Director, Peace Corps SUBJECT U.S. Policy Toward Algeria I generally approve the Plan of Action for Algeria in the Secretary of State's memorandum to me of 2 February 1963, responding to NSAM 211. 1 All concerned should bear in mind the need for a program commensurate with our policy interests in this key North African country. While we want France to shoulder the lion's share of the burden, we also want to increase our own influence. For example, I should like to be advised if it should appear highly desirable to exceed somewhat the $15 million FY 1964 AID level currently projected. Since Prime Minister Ben Bella has requested assistance from the Peace Corps and the Algerians need just the sort of help the Peace Corps is peculiarly suited to give, I hope it will be able to respond if other commitments permit. John F. Kennedy * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAMs, NSAM-21. Secret. A copy was sent to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. 1 Document 81 . 84. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President 84. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President Source Washington, July 15, 1963. We had little chance to stave off Guevara's Algerian visit; we learned of it only two days before he arrived. We don't even know whether Guevara invited himself or whether the Algerians asked for higher-ranking delegations from Cuba and the UAR than from other countries. 1 The press gave him prominent but not excessive treatment and is playing his current trip around Algeria in moderate to low key. Porter says Algerians paid more attention to UAR Vice President Amer. Reasons behind Cuba/Algeria tie are baffling, but we think Ben Bella sees it as a sop to extremists who oppose continued close association with France. Recent financial deal with France, while quite successful economically, was not politically spectacular. Ben Bella hasn't pressed Paris further on Saharan nuclear testing. His economic difficulties may have made him more cautious about nationalization. So he may feel playing up to foreign revolutionaries in Cuba and Angola is one of his few appeals to his own left. In any case, we have no realistic alternative but to live with Cuba/Algeria affair till it peters out, meanwhile helping this along by educating Algerians on how little they gain and how much it might cost. We've been doing so every chance we have, pressing the line both here and in Algiers that things like Guevara visit don't help Algeria win friends in our Congress and public. Salinger and I both chided new Algerian Ambassador on Guevara visit. Guellal says Ben Bella recognizes that Cuba has become a Soviet satellite, but that he hopes to move Castro away from Khrushchev. Ben Bella claims this is not incompatible with good US relations; we'll have to keep working on him that it is. I'm confident that over time Algerians will increasingly realize Cuban tie is worthless, if we can just sit it out till then. Bob Komer * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria, 6/63-9/63. Confidential. A marginal handwritten notation reads: “(Taken from Pres. weekend reading dtd 7/19/63—Tab 6)”. 1 Che Guevara had been the Cuban delegate to the Independence Day celebrations in Algiers. On July 15, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs J. Wayne Fredericks sent a memorandum to Under Secretary Ball noting that members of the U.S. Delegation to that event had expressed concern at the attention paid to Guevara and the lack of attention given to U.S. aid efforts in Algeria. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 17-4 ALG) 85. Memorandum of Conversation 85. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, July 24, 1963, 4:15 p.m. SUBJECT Presentation of Credentials PARTICIPANTS The President The Algerian Ambassador ALSO PRESENT Mr. William J. Tonesk, Acting Chief of Protocol Mr. Robert Komer, White House Staff Mr. William Witman, II, Director, Office of Northern African Affairs The First Algerian Ambassador to the United States, Cherif Guellal, presented his credentials to President Kennedy during the course of a thirty minute interview. After recalling meeting Ambassador Guellal at the time of Prime Minister Ben Bella's visit last year, the President expressed his sympathy for the death of Foreign Minister Khemisti and enquired whether the motive for his assassination had been established. Ambassador Guellal replied that the motive was unclear, but probably personal, the act of a deranged mind. The Ambassador mentioned the devastation which Algeria had suffered in eight years of war, and the enormous problems created by the lack of trained personnel. In response to the President's question, he said that the Algerian Government sought to encourage the French to stay on to help, especially in the fields of education, administration, finance and communications. President Kennedy expressed his concern at the dislocation caused by the departure of these skilled personnel. He said we were very interested in Algeria's success in managing her economic problems. We had assisted through food. He hoped that the situation could now be stabilized, the French encouraged to return, and some private capital brought in to get the economy working. If the economy were restored to a vigorous phase, other problems would be less important. Mr. Guellal agreed that Algeria's problems were basically economic. The President said he thought it was important to provide a stimulus for French assistance. The Ambassador insisted that Algeria encouraged foreign investments, and especially hoped to enlist the interest of American companies. After enquiring about the Algerian investment code, the President remarked that while we were not seeking to place American capital investments abroad because of our balance of payments problem, it was very important for us that Algeria succeed, and we would do what we could to help. The French, he thought, had the primary obligation. But we were concerned for Algeria's economy—if that broke down, everything dissolved. The President then referred to the recent Independence ceremonies at Algiers, and observed that Senator Mansfield had been impressed with the welcome given to the Cuban delegate, Che Guevara. He recalled that he had discussed Cuba with Ben Bella and understood the Algerian feeling that Cuba had supported Algeria during the months and years of the war. However, Algeria should understand sour American feelings at the extent of the welcome to Guevara, beyond that accorded anybody else. Ambassador Guellal replied that he understood American feelings. It was very difficult, he said, to explain the overall situation, a very emotional adjustment. But the Algerian Government was gaining a greater realization of the situation in Cuba now that it had a Charge there. The President said he appreciated Algerian identification with the successful Cuban guerrilla activities, but remarked that the action against Batista was not a serious war, with perhaps 100 killed. It was a political effort, while the Algerian was a bloody affair. Cuba was a pretty hard boiled Communist state, in a satellite relationship to the USSR, being used to communize Latin America. Mr. Guellal responded that they had stressed these points with the Cubans, they realized the Cubans were completely aligned, and suggested that their own relationship with France might serve as a possible formula for US-Cuban relations. He repeated that his Government knew how far Cuba was aligned with the Soviets, and now understood better the issues for the United States. As for US-Algerian relations, Mr. Guellal assured the President that there could be no doubt of Algeria's friendship. Algeria needed America's help in restoring her economy and greatly appreciated the food which had been sent. At this point, the formal letters were exchanged. The President remarked on reading the Algerian message that he greatly appreciated the reference to his Senate speech. He asked the Ambassador to present his best regards to President Ben Bella. Ambassador Guellal conveyed in return his President's personal regards to President Kennedy. He added that if Ben Bella should come to the UN in September, he hoped there might be an opportunity to call on the President. The President replied that he would look forward to seeing President Ben Bella if he came. Ambassador Guellal hastened to add that of course Ben Bella would not go to Cuba this time. In conclusion Mr. Guellal observed that Algeria had passed through a year of difficulties but was now on the way to recovery. The President expressed his pleasure at having an Algerian Ambassador in Washington. * Source: Department of State, President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. Confidential. Drafted by Witman and approved by the White House on August 7. The conversation was held at the White House. Earlier on July 24, Komer sent a briefing memorandum to the President suggesting that he take the time for some serious talk with the new Algerian Ambassador, who was one of Ben Bella's closest confidants. Komer proposed that the President focus on the need for Algeria to put its economy, which was in near chaos, in order before anyone else could do much to help, and on U.S. problems with Castro and how Algeria's relations with Cuba raised difficulties for nations that wanted to help Algeria. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria, 6/63-9/63) 86. Memorandum of Conversation 86. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, September 19, 1963, 9:30 a.m. SUBJECT Algerian Developments PARTICIPANTS The President Mr. G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary Ambassador William J. Porter Mr. Robert Komer, White House Staff The President asked about the significance of Ben Bella's cabinet reshuffle. Mr. Porter said it appeared that the Algerian President is gathering around him people whom he considers to be completely loyal to him personally. The President then inquired concerning Ben Bella's personal philosophy. Ambassador Porter said Ben Bella considers himself to be a foremost African revolutionary figure, and that much of what he says in public is said with that in mind. He added that Mr. Ben Bella is a zealot who makes every move with great vigor. His take-over of 12,000 French farms last spring without giving much thought as to whether markets in France could be preserved or what kind of administrative system would replace the French farmers, was a case in point. Mr. Ben Bella feels convinced of the need to do such things swiftly rather than negotiate about them. He states that swift action is necessary in the interest of his people. The Ambassador expressed the belief that there would be more drastic moves of an economic nature, and the principal question now is whether the French will find the fortitude to live with the difficulties Ben Bella will create for them in this and other fields. The President then inquired concerning current French aid to Algeria and Governor Williams and Ambassador Porter outlined the importance of the French to Ben Bella both in terms of aid and trade as well. Governor Williams asked the Ambassador to comment on the significance of the recent Russian credit of $100 million. Mr. Porter said that the details of this credit have apparently not yet been negotiated, adding that the figure seemed to have been published, as in previous cases, for its propaganda impact. In any case Mr Porter said, if the total sum were available to the Algerian Government today it would hardly meet the Algerian administrative budget deficit over a period of four months. The President then inquired concerning Ambassador Guellal; whether he enjoys a close relation with Ben Bella. Governor Williams and Mr. Porter expressed the belief that this is the case. The President asked Governor Williams if Guellal is getting the proper attention in Washington. Mr. Komer and Governor Williams assured him that the Ambassador received considerable attention here. Mr. Porter said that he had the impression from talking to Ambassador Guellal that the latter is worried about acts and attitudes of his government, and that when Mr. Porter expressed the fact that reports indicate Castro may be in Algiers about November 1, Ambassador Guellal did not deny this. The President said we should do what we can to prevent Castro from visiting other countries and he inquired what could be done to hamper such a visit. Ambassador Porter said if French and Arab (especially Egyptian) cooperation could be obtained that something could be done to diminish the propaganda impact of such a visit. The President inquired whether cutting off aid should be considered in this connection. Mr. Porter and Mr. Komer expressed the belief that this would not produce desired results. Mr. Komer recalled that the President had indicated a willingness to see Ben Bella if the latter comes to the United States. The President said that he does not think this would be a good idea if a week later Castro showed up in Algiers. Something might be arranged if Ben Bella came to the United States some time after such a visit by Castro to Algiers. Governor Williams suggested that the difficulties for us in this connection should be made clear to Ambassador Guellal. 1 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 ALG. Confidential. Drafted by Porter and approved by the White House on September 23. The conversation was held at the White House. 1 On September 23, during a luncheon meeting with Guellal, Williams emphasized that the prospect of another encounter between Ben Bella and Castro would have an adverse effect on the timing of a meeting between President Kennedy and Ben Bella. The Ambassador said that he had already stressed the sensitive nature of this matter to Ben Bella, who had assured him that he had no desire to embarrass the President. Guellal added that he would make these points to Ben Bella if he came to the United Nations. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., POL ALG-CUBA) 87. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 87. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Source Washington, October 14, 1963. McGB: Trouble ahead with Algeria . We are now seeing a major Soviet and Chicom effort to woo Ben Bella regime. First step was Soviet $100 billion [ million? ] three-year credit. Now we have reports USSR may give Algeria 12 MTBs, 3 sub-chasers, and some MIGs; this may be a result of Boumedienne's recent Moscow visit. 450 Algerians are getting military training in the Bloc. Chicoms have entered the competition with $50 million credit at no interest. At this very time, our relations with Ben Bella have been cooling noticeably . BB's nationalizations (especially of three papers) led to a spate of press criticism here (Newsweek was worst—BB another Castro). Algerians reacted violently; they even protested that campaign seemed inspired. Then US press overplaying of Kabylia “revolt” led to expulsion of several newsmen. This will give BB an even worse press here, just when Moscow and Peiping are moving in. If Ben Bella were in real trouble [ 1 line of source text not declassified ] I'd be less worried. But we and French both think BB is in the saddle for quite a while. So holding off in hopes of some new faces leaves me cold. 1 Another complication is that the French, who have been carrying the chief aid burden in Algeria ($200 million this year), might draw back if BB reacts violently to their next A-test or puts squeeze on their oil. If so, BB will no doubt lean even further east. Thus I see a potentially quite adverse trend in our Algerian affairs, especially painful since we gained quite some capital by our responsive attitude during formative stages of Ben Bella regime. I have no panaceas to suggest; I question whether we could or should enter a major competition with the East. But I don't see our present effort as enough either, however. We gave $77 million in food FY'63 and are planning about the same this year (plus $2 million or so for students and Four Areas food-for-work deal). Perhaps $20 million is available for project loans but nobody is pushing this. If Algeria were Chad or Dahomey, I'd worry less, but it's the key to the Maghreb on the one really important coast of Africa. It's worth a larger investment than at present (compared to over $300 million on Congo or $50-55 million on Guinea through FY 64). More important than aid, however, is to be reasonably sympathetic during BB's Sturm und Drang period, no matter how outrageously he may behave. Like Nasser, he may take what he wants from the Soviets without leaning too far East, if we keep a Western door open too. Here again, the problem is how to stay on good terms with a young, doctrinaire and dubious regime, braving the necessary criticism (from Morocco and Tunisia as well as domestically) while keeping our eyes on the long pull. I'm sure the President feels this way, yet unless he gives a clear signal (e.g. by such gestures as receiving BB, or sending suitable delegation to 1 November celebration), the bureaucracy is going to stay timid. 2 R.W. Komer 3 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria. Secret. The source text indicates two attachments: A memorandum from Read to Bundy, October 14, which discussed the revolt in the Kabylia region of Algeria, which had begun on September 29, and the Algerian-Moroccan border conflict, which had escalated since the first serious armed clash on October 8 (Department of State, Central Files, POL 26 ALG); and telegram 734 from Algiers, which advised against sending a high-level U.S. delegation to the Algerian ceremonies planned for November 1, the anniversary of the outbreak of Algeria's revolution in 1954, which Communist governments intended to attend at the ministerial level (Ibid., POL 17-4 ALG). 1 A handwritten note in the margin by Komer at this point reads: “State reached same conclusion. See attached. RWK.” 2 On October 17, Komer sent the President a memorandum stating that Guellal had just informed U.S. officials that Ben Bella had definitely cancelled his U.N. trip. Guellal had also said that Ben Bella had “much appreciated” the word he had received indicating that Kennedy wanted to see him and that he wanted them to understand that the cancellation was caused solely by his problems at home. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria) 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 88. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy 88. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Source Washington, November 7, 1963. Yazid is coming in at Ben Bella's personal request to (1) tell you BB is sorry he couldn't come himself, but appreciates our impartiality in Moroccan hassle; (2) complain delicately about US press campaign against Algeria, which they've hinted is officially inspired; (3) express concern lest US business interests in Morocco have influenced our policy. I know Yazid and think you can be quite direct with him. Indeed a show of some umbrage on last two points would be useful. Algeria has been getting a bad press because of its own actions, including the manner in which it has gone out of its way to befriend Castro. As for very modest US business interests in Morocco influencing our policy, this is nonsense. Nor do US firms have any stake in Tindouf mineral deposits. The basic message we want to get to Ben Bella is that we want to be on good terms with Algeria. In fact, we've leaned a lot farther in their direction than they have in ours. We also intend to stay strictly out of inter-regional disputes unless they get out of hand and threaten to become East-West issues. So if Algeria gets too heavily in hock to USSR/Cuba/UAR and then moves to overthrow Morocco, this would put us on the spot and almost force us to react. On the other hand we aren't going to back Hassan against Ben Bella, unless BB is egged on by outside powers and massive aid to go after Hassan. And a big competitive arms race between Morocco and Algeria would be a pitiful waste of scarce resources both sides badly need at home. Don't hesitate to mention our special problem with Cuba (or you'll make me a liar). That Castro is a threat to our security is 100% obvious from the way he let Soviet missiles in. As a practical fact, Algerian partiality toward Cuba is simply going to cool US-Algerian relations. As to Cuba as a model of Socialist development, only a staggering Soviet subsidy keeps the place from falling apart. Castro can't even grow sugar cane (which we're certainly not stopping him from doing). All in all, as Bill Porter's cable 1 suggested, you can trade a few salutary punches with Yazid; a shrewd operator and basically pro-US, he'll use them to good effect on Ben Bella. Bob Komer 2 * Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Morocco Security, 1960-1963. Secret. 1 In telegram 982, November 6, Porter advised that if Yazid visited the President alone, the conversation could be extremely frank. He suggested that the President raise the constant hostility toward the United States displayed by Algeria's official press, radio, and television. Porter complained that the United States had fed almost half of Algeria's population during the first hard winter following independence, but that they had had to “wring” acknowledgement of U.S. aid from Ben Bella, who in his speech on November 1 had mentioned only aid from Communist countries. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 ALG) 2 Komer's handwritten note at the bottom of the source text reads: “We've just heard from Paris that Algerian emissary to De Gaulle invited him to visit Algeria. You may get the same. Suggest you also tell Yazid to be cautious with press about your talk.” (Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Morocco Security, 1960-1963) 89. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria 89. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria Source Washington, November 8, 1963, 8:59 p.m. 1009. Following summary of Yazid conversation with President today is uncleared summary, FYI only, Noforn and subject to revision on review of memcon. 1 1. Yazid message from Ben Bella was expression GOA appreciation for US position Algerian-Moroccan conflict including both neutrality and indication that US favored solution in African framework. 2. In response Yazid statement that anti-Algerian tenor US press had caused concern in early stages, President countered strongly with point that anyone with real knowledge US press could never have drawn conclusion that it reflected official opinion this administration. Our official position had been made clear to GOA and this was what counted. He expressed annoyance over fact that our efforts correct false Christian Science Monitor story were never followed up by commensurate efforts Algeria and Algerian press to set record straight. 3. President then turned vigorously to subject of Cuba. He said he really disturbed by persistent Algerian attacks on United States over Cuba in such statements as those to Le Monde by Ben Bella (Algiers 994) 2 which he read to Yazid and in treating his friend Senator Mansfield lightly last July while Che Guevara singled out for all honors. He saw no reason for this continued Algerian excitement over Cuba. We would not attack Cuba and less concerned what system it adopted internally. But Cuba had become part of international communist network threatening weaker Latin American states, and with Soviet missiles had presented direct threat to US security. In these respects Castro was our enemy not just a fetish of some Americans. Until gravity of this fully understood, Cuba would continue present real problem US-Algerian understanding. Castro's early revolutionary exploits were impressive and it understandable they had certain appeal to Algerian revolutionaries. But Cuba had lost national identity and integrity and now using dictatorial controls and propaganda to keep up front. President returned repeatedly to Cuban theme and cited quotes from Algiers 994 several times. 4. Yazid said he understood US concern and that Ben Bella and GOA had sought make clear that Algeria neither Marxist nor Communist and believed Cuba wrong in this regard.GOA had sought avoid resorting to arms procurement from Cuba and had done so only because of urgent need more equipment than UAR could readily supply and desire avoid alternative of having to import many Soviet technicians and maintenance crews. Ben Bella determined keep Communism out of Algeria and Africa. He was devout Moslem with political power based on peasantry. Despite difficulties Algeria determined follow own national course and own socialist goals. In relations with Cuba it had sought convince Castro become non-aligned. 5. President said he wished talk frankly on these points for benefit good US-Algerian relations. Our interests North Africa only see progress of countries and maintenance their independence. On this basis good relations possible. But while we sought no praise, we felt greater recognition deserved for fact US had clearly demonstrated its friendship for Algeria. Reciprocal basis for conducting relations and expression of official views one another was most important. Frank talks with Algerian Ambassador always welcome and Ben Bella should not hesitate use him rather than other channels like Tito whenever doubt exists about our policy. 6. Yazid said OAU FonMins meeting should serve to “freeze situation” and prevent further fighting while solution to basic dispute being sought. GOA still hoped latter could be found in system of joint economic exploitation Tindouf and other border areas. King Hassan probably reluctant be too closely associated Algerian socialist experiment out of anxieties over his own internal problem. Yazid believed ways still could be found establish basis cooperation nonetheless, and convinced both countries better off trying achieve it without big power intervention. 7. President urged importance avoiding continuing arms build-up in Algeria. Morocco would move to match it and regrettable arms race might ensue wasting resources both countries. Expressed interest in knowing just what plans GOA had for military build-up over next twelve months. 8. Yazid said he not military expert, but felt certain Algerian build-up was reasonable effort make up basic deficiencies such equipment as tanks, planes, artillery and transport. Admitted that in addition to UAR as source, some equipment coming from USSR and Cuba as result Algerian military mission visits to both Havana and Moscow. Recognized significance of military build-up problem with regard both economic considerations, which still paramount Algeria, and considerations of involvement other powers. Promised he would stress President's views to Ben Bella and inform Ambassador Porter in greater detail about extent Algerian intentions military build-up. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ALG-MOR. Confidential. Drafted by Hooper, cleared by Baldwin and Komer, and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Paris, Rabat, Addis Ababa, USUN, and Moscow. 1 Six separate memoranda of this conversation are ibid., POL ALG-US and POL 32-1 ALG-MOR; and ibid., President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. 2 Telegram 994 from Algiers, November 8, reported Ben Bella's statement to Le Monde that it would be a “cause for despair if Cuban revolution were crushed or smothered because this would signify there is no place in world for justice or liberty.” (Ibid., Central Files, POL ALG-US) 90. National Intelligence Estimate 90. National Intelligence Estimate Source Washington, November 27, 1963 NIE 62-63 ALGERIA Conclusions A. The sum of the political and economic difficulties facing Algeria make the achievement of real political stability an uncertain prospect for some time to come. For the present, however, Ben Bella clearly remains the political personality with the widest popular appeal and he appears to have a fairly firm grip on such governmental institutions as exist in Algeria. His recent negotiations with the Kayble dissidents and other opponents seem likely to contain further threats of armed revolt for the time being. Over time, the greatest danger to him would arise from an erosion of his popular support as a consequence of continued economic misery or of military reverses on the Moroccan border conflict. (Paras 29-36) B. No early improvement in the country's serious economic condition is likely. European colonization gave independent Algeria an impressive physical plant in terms of industries and transportation links, but the exodus left it with only a tiny fragment of trained people necessary to run it. At best, Algeria will probably make only modest progress in putting idle industrial capacity to work, with the result that massive unemployment will continue for some time to plague the three million Algerians in the cities. We think it likley that the nationalized agricultural properties will experience considerable trouble in maintaining a minimum level of subsistence in rural areas. However, Algeria will need to import food for many years to come. (Paras. 2-4, 24-28) C. For a number of years foreign aid will play a critical role in keeping Algeria from financial collapse and in feeding the country. France will almost certainly continue to provide a substantial level of developmental and budgetary assistance for at least the next two years or so. Nevertheless, the Franco-Algerian relationship will be delicate and there will almost certainly be strains, perhaps arising from the use of the Saharan test sites or disagreements over oil revenues, which could threaten the flow of French aid. (Paras. 21, 46-48) D. In the absence of a Franco-Algerian rupture, the Soviet Union is unlikely to play a major role in Algeria. If relations with France deteriorate, Algiers would probably try to obtain more aid from both the US and the Soviet Bloc. Under present circumstances, the Soviets seem to realize that they cannot compete with France and are content to establish a presence, get into the military field where possible, and take advantage of any opportunities which may occur. (Paras. 44-45, 49) E. Algeria's general foreign policy will continue to be governed by the desire of its leaders to align themselves broadly with the neutralist bloc and to oppose “imperialism”. This general attitude will from time to time bring frictions not only with France but with the US and other Western Powers as well. One major source of such frictions will be Algeria's effort to play a prominent role in encouraging revolutionary independ-ence movements in Africa, a policy to which the regime seems fairly well committed. Links to the eastern Arab world are unlikely to be of major importance to Algeria's policy, but Ben Bella will probably continue to look to Cairo for assistance and will cooperate with Nasser on an ad hoc basis. (Paras. 37, 42-43, 49) F. Prospects for a final settlement of the Moroccan border conflict are not promising. Incidents in the disputed border areas are likely to be endemic and could lead to outbreaks of larger scale fighting. If this occurs or if an arms buildup continues because no political settlement can be reached, there may be increasing pressure on the great powers to declare themselves and to give material support. On the whole, however, we believe that if the US preserves a generally neutral stance the USSR will be disposed to limit its intervention. The effort of the other African states to find a solution through the Organization for African Unity (OAU) will also help to insulate the struggle from the wider issues of the cold war. (Paras. 40-41) [Here follows the Discussion section of the estimate.] * Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79 R 01012A, Box 242. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was prepared by the CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and NSA. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on November 27 except the Atomic Energy Commission Representative and the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction. Libya Libya 91. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tripoli, Libya Washington, April 26, 1961, 7:45 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/4-2461. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Root, cleared by Brown, and approved by Penfield. As a result of the transfer of the Government of Libya from Benghazi to Tripoli, the Embassy was transferred to Tripoli effective January 25, 1960, with a branch office in Benghazi. Telegraphic traffic between Libya and the Department of State addressed both Tripoli and Benghazi as Embassies. 92. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tripoli, Libya Washington, August 25, 1961, 9:09 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 773.56311/8-2561. Secret. Drafted by Post (AF) and Junkermann (DOD); cleared by MacKnight, Newman, and Kilduff; and approved by Witman. Also sent to Benghazi. 93. Telegram From the Embassy in Benghazi, Libya, to the Department of State Benghazi, October 22, 1961, 3 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.15-WI/10-2261. Confidential. 94. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy Washington, June 15, 1962. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 773.11/6-1562. Confidential. Drafted by Post (AF/AFN) on June 12 and approved by the White House on June 22. 95. Letter From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Libyan Minister of Defense (Belkhair) Washington, June 25, 1962. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Libya 000.1-121, 1962. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. The text of this letter was sent to McNamara under cover of a memorandum from Nitze indicating that the letter had been prepared in response to McNamara's instructions. McNamara personally delivered the letter to Belkhair on June 25. 96. Editorial Note 97. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Washington, October 15, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Libya, 9/62-12/62. Top Secret. Briefing papers cited in this memorandum are ibid., Crown Prince Hasan Briefing Book, 10/6/62-10/24/62. 98. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Benghazi, Libya Washington, October 19, 1962, 6:11 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 773.11/10-1962. Confidential. Drafted by Post on October 18; cleared by Carr, Jones, Steele, and Junkermann (DOD), Gookin, and Slater; and approved by Newsom. Also sent to Tripoli and pouched to London, Paris for the Embassy and USCINCEUR. 99. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Benghazi, Libya Washington, October 19, 1962, 7:01 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 773.5/10-1962. Confidential. Drafted by Post on October 18; cleared by Jones, Junkermann (DOD), Wolf, and Mossler; and approved by Newsom. Also sent to Tripoli and repeated to Paris for USCINCEUR. 100. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, October 31, 1962. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Libya 123.7-686, 1962. Secret. An appendix containing specific JCS and OSD comments on a July 1962 draft of the U.S. Army Survey Team Report on Libya is attached but not printed. 101. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tripoli, Libya Washington, November 23, 1962, 3:25 p.m. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, Visit of Libyan Crown Prince, Oct. 16-24, 1962. Confidential. Drafted by Carr and McClanahan on November 19; cleared by Mossler, Kent, and Hinman; and approved by Hutchinson. 102. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, December 1, 1962. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Libya 000.1-121, 1962. Secret. Attached is a transmittal note from Bundy to McNamara that reads: “The attached seeks your approval by Monday noon in order to meet a political deadline which has just arisen. Subsequent to writing this, I have seen JCS comments which would accept the lower of the alternatives considered. However, I would myself still accept the State judgment that we cannot keep matters sweet in Libya at that figure. The issue is essentially political.” 103. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Benghazi, Libya Washington, June 29, 1963, 2:22 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA-US. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by McClanahan, cleared by Tasca, and approved by Witman. Repeated to Tripoli. 104. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Benghazi, Libya Washington, July 26, 1963, 3:40 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) LIBYA. Limited Official Use. Drafted by McClanahan, cleared by Walker, and approved by Witman. Repeated to Tripoli. 105. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, September 6, 1963. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15, LIBYA-US. Secret. Drafted by Stookey on September 5. Attached to the source text is telegram 262 to Benghazi, Document 103. 106. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Washington, September 28, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Libya 1963. Secret. 107. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tripoli, Libya Washington, October 7, 1963, 3:26 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 LIBYA. Secret; Priority. Drafted by McClanahan; cleared by Newsom, Walker, McKesson, Junkermann (DOD), Komer, and Warren; and approved by Williams. Repeated to Benghazi. 91. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tripoli, Libya 91. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tripoli, Libya Source Washington, April 26, 1961, 7:45 p.m. 827. Embtel 847. 1 With collapse of insurrection in Algiers immediate danger of insurgent attack on Libya has presumably dissolved. In reply to Prime Minister, however, you may cite Department's statement to press yesterday (Circular Tel. 1673) 2 as evidence US did not intend stand idly by in event such attack. US would view with great concern threat to independence of Libya. Embassy should emphasize that we consider failure of insurrection due to strong, courageous and decisive action by General De Gaulle and support he clearly enjoys not only from bulk French population but within armed forces. Bowles * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/4-2461. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Root, cleared by Brown, and approved by Penfield. As a result of the transfer of the Government of Libya from Benghazi to Tripoli, the Embassy was transferred to Tripoli effective January 25, 1960, with a branch office in Benghazi. Telegraphic traffic between Libya and the Department of State addressed both Tripoli and Benghazi as Embassies. 1 In telegram 847 from Tripoli, April 24, Ambassador John Wesley Jones reported that Libyan Prime Minister Mohammed Othman Al-Said had asked him what the reaction of the U.S. Government would be in the event of a French military attack against Libya from Algeria. (Ibid., 751S.00/4-2461) 2 Circular telegram 1673, April 25, quoted the Department press officer's April 25 statement that the United States would “become directly concerned should the insurrection spread beyond the borders of Algeria and threaten the peace of the area.” (Ibid., 751S.00/4-2561) 92. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tripoli, Libya 92. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tripoli, Libya Source Washington, August 25, 1961, 9:09 p.m. 67. In view possibility present Bizerte debate might stimulate adverse public comment re Wheelus Air Base we feel Ambassador might find it useful have available for use at his discretion statement for public release setting forth mission of Wheelus, giving convincing justification for its use by USAF and underlining fact that US tenure has agreement of GOL (unlike French tenure of Bizerte base). We hope statement would counter criticisms that Wheelus might be used for military action against Libya and would draw Soviet fire on Libya in event of war. Following is suggested draft text on which your comments requested: “As is well known, the USAF uses Wheelus Air Base and certain other agreed areas in Libya under the terms of an agreement concluded between the Libyan and U.S. Governments in 1954. 1 This agreement was based upon the conviction of the two sovereign governments that the cooperation envisaged in the agreement would contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations. The agreement was freely entered into by both parties and has since been carried out in close cooperation and consultation. Satisfaction with the arrangements made was reaffirmed by the two governments during discussions held in 1960. 2 “The activities of the Base are fully consistent with the sovereignty and security of the Libyan people and government. The mission of Wheelus is to provide training facilities for U.S. Air Force personnel: Wheelus enjoys climatic and physical advantages which greatly facilitate the task of providing USAF personnel stationed nearby with the training necessary to maintain efficient performance. The Base also provides servicing and refueling facilities for U.S. aircraft in transit through the area. In this regard, Wheelus has played an important role over the past year in supporting UN flights to the Congo.” Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 773.56311/8-2561. Secret. Drafted by Post (AF) and Junkermann (DOD); cleared by MacKnight, Newman, and Kilduff; and approved by Witman. Also sent to Benghazi. 1 For text of the 1954 base rights agreement, see 5 UST (Pt. 3) 2449. For documentation on the base negotiations, see Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. XI, pp. 575 - 597 . 2 For documentation on the U.S.-Libyan discussions during 1960, see ibid., 1958-1960, vol. XIII, pp. 735 - 755 . 93. Telegram From the Embassy in Benghazi, Libya, to the Department of State 93. Telegram From the Embassy in Benghazi, Libya, to the Department of State Source Benghazi, October 22, 1961, 3 p.m. 73. From Williams. In audience with me October 20, Prime Minister raised question of economic aid. 1 He reviewed background starting with 1954 agreement, described creation and eventual dissolution (“because of dissatisfaction of people”) of Libyan-American reconstruction cooperation and joint services and eventual creation of development council. Although rental of Wheelus had proceeded successfully, American economic assistance to Libya in past, regulated by annual appropriations, had been difficult for planning purposes but this year had virtually ceased. Popular pressures against foreign military bases in Libya continued to build up. It was important that US economic aid continue so that Libyan Government could show people mutually beneficial aspects of US-Libyan agreements. Prime Minister had instructed Foreign Minister to set the foregoing down in memorandum which would soon be presented to US. Prime Minister concluded with assurances continued cooperation, etc. I made polite non-committal reply, saying would examine problem on receipt of memorandum. 2 Dorman * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.15-WI/10-2261. Confidential. 1 On September 14, Libyan Ambassador Mohieddine Fekini told President Kennedy that Libya could look forward to becoming economically self-sufficient in another 4-5 years and that he hoped the United States would be able during this period to give Libya's economic and financial needs special consideration. President Kennedy said that he would look into the matter once the foreign aid legislation currently before Congress was enacted. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., 773.5-MSP/9-1461) 2 On October 24, Williams sent the Department a preliminary report on his 3-day visit to Libya. He noted that 10 years of U.S. economic aid had not had the economic and social impact that the United States might have hoped for. Williams, therefore, proposed a careful review of U.S. objectives, policy, and operations in Libya. (Telegram 303 from Khartoum; ibid., 110.15-WI/10-2461) 94. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy 94. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy Source Washington, June 15, 1962. SUBJECT Proposed Visit of Hasan al-Rida al-Sanusi, Crown Prince of Libya I recommend that Hasan al-Rida al-Sanusi, Crown Prince of Libya, be invited to visit the United States officially in November 1962, or, if more convenient, in the Spring of 1963. Despite our considerable strategic interests in Libya, represented particularly by Wheelus Air Base, and our growing economic interests there in consequence of the recent discovery and development by American companies of extensive petroleum reserves, we have not had a visit by the Libyan Chief of State, 72-year-old King Idris I, who has an aversion to travel outside his kingdom. The Crown Prince's visit would serve as a substitute for a State Visit by the King and would reinforce the favorable disposition towards the United States of the young man who is scheduled to be Libya's next Chief of State. It would also, by enhancing the Crown Prince's prestige among the Libyan people, improve the chances for an orderly succession on the death or abdication of King Idris; we feel that a continuation of the Libyan constitutional monarchy under Hasan al-Rida represents the best available means for ensuring the continued unity, independence, and stability of Libya under circumstances most favorable to United States interests there. Finally, the visit would serve as a dramatic demonstration to the Libyan people of the close ties between the two countries and as a reminder, at a time when Libya is on the verge of financial independence from oil revenues, of the value Libya has received in the form of aid in the past and may expect to derive in other forms in the future from close cooperation with the United States. I would expect that your participation in the visit, which will consist of two days in Washington and several days outside the capital, would be limited to hosting a State luncheon, followed by a meeting, attending a return reception at Blair House and receiving the Crown Prince again at the White House prior to his departure from Washington. We do not anticipate any substantive talks. I request your approval of the visit and your authorization to extend the invitation. 1 Dean Rusk 2 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 773.11/6-1562. Confidential. Drafted by Post (AF/AFN) on June 12 and approved by the White House on June 22. 1 On July 3, the Department of State notified the Embassy in Benghazi that the White House had approved a “modified official visit” for the Crown Prince to commence November 13, and transmitted a letter of invitation from the President to the Crown Prince to be formally delivered once his agreement on the date had been obtained. (Telegram 1 to Benghazi; ibid., 773.11/7-362) After Embassy discussions with the Crown Prince, the date of his arrival in the United States was changed to October 16. (Telegram 14 to Benghazi, August 1; ibid., 773.11/8-162) 2 Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original. 95. Letter From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Libyan Minister of Defense (Belkhair) 95. Letter From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Libyan Minister of Defense (Belkhair) Source Washington, June 25, 1962. Excellency : I wish to express my appreciation for having had the opportunity last Thursday 1 to receive you at my office and to discuss Libyan military problems in the full and frank manner appropriate between representatives of two such friendly nations as ours. Let me say at the outset that I, like you, consider the principle of close collaboration between our two countries in the strengthening of the Libyan forces to be a matter beyond question. I know you will agree that the U.S. through past assistance has already demonstrated the sincerity of its dedication to this principle. Together with the United Kingdom and in full consultation with your government, we undertook to provide assistance in developing a Libyan army of 5,000 men and my Government has considered this program, which was based on a detailed military survey, as appropriate to meet Libya's minimum internal security requirements. Your Excellency has recognized that the U.S. Government has responsibilities extending around the world. In light of your exposition of the need to further strengthen and modernize the Libyan army, however, I am prepared to review the situation for the purpose of determining the extent to which further U.S. military assistance may be justified. Some additional equipment is no doubt desirable. Meanwhile, to reflect my Government's intent to be responsive, I have issued instructions that the delivery of certain items of already-programmed equipment be expedited in order to be on hand for your December 24 ceremonies this year. As regards your desire to develop a Libyan Air Force, let me assure you that the U.S. Government views this matter with sympathy. To provide the nucleus for this force, we have already undertaken to train two pilots, and I take this opportunity to inform you that we plan to deliver two T-33 jet aircraft in 1963 when your pilots will have completed their training. In addition, we plan to provide training for Libyan technical personnel to maintain these aircraft. Finally, we are prepared to send to Libya a team of selected personnel from the Department of Defense to assist you in planning for the future development of the Libyan Air Force. I am, however, obliged to state frankly that your request for more equipment for the Libyan Army appears to me, in a number of respects, to be excessive to your present military needs and capabilities, particularly in view of the 5,000-man ceiling, including both combat and support troops, which you stated to me that you have placed on the size of your army. Past experience makes clear, for example, that the U.S. Congress would be unlikely to provide funds for far more vehicles per soldier in the Libyan army than we supply to our own forces. Accordingly, I feel that such portion of your request as might be provided by the U.S. Government on a grant basis must be determined on the basis of a detailed re-examination of your requirements at the military level in Libya by the MAAG in consultation with Libyan military officials. As I stated to you, the Department of Defense is prepared to send additional qualified personnel to Libya to assist in this re-examination. Furthermore, in view of the role of Great Britain in the training of the Libyan army, I feel that this study should be coordinated not only between representatives of our two governments but also with appropriate British officials. I can assure you that I will give my closest personal attention to the recommendations which result from this reassessment. Should your government feel that additional materiel is still required beyond that which the U.S. agrees to provide as a grant following this study, the Department of Defense would be willing to help the Libyan Government to arrange the purchase of such additional equipment. I trust, Excellency, that this plan of procedure meets with your approval, as I believe it provides the best means of ensuring that the continued cooperation we both desire will proceed on a mutually satisfactory basis. 2 Sincerely, Robert S. McNamara 3 * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Libya 000.1-121, 1962. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. The text of this letter was sent to McNamara under cover of a memorandum from Nitze indicating that the letter had been prepared in response to McNamara's instructions. McNamara personally delivered the letter to Belkhair on June 25. 1 Secretary McNamara met with Belkhair, who was on an unofficial visit to Washington en route to Libya from Taiwan, on June 21. The conversation was recorded in a memorandum for the record. (Ibid.) 2 Belkhair thanked the Secretary for his attention to and appreciation of Libya's military problems and called the letter “encouraging and a source of great satisfaction.” (Telegram 209 to Benghazi, June 25; Department of State, Central Files, 773.56/6-2362) 3 Printed from a copy that indicates McNamara signed the original. 97. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy 97. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Source Washington, October 15, 1962. Crown Prince Hasan of Libya is here as part of our effort to build him up as an effective successor to 72-year-old King Idris. 1 The UAR is very active in Libya; there are also a number of contending domestic factions. We fear that Idris' death may lead either to chaos or a coup endangering our hold on Wheelus Base and our growing oil interests. [ 1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] Backing Hasan is a gamble. We [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] have been pleasantly surprised by the way he has handled himself as Regent in the King's few absences. But we want to prod him toward further initiatives on his own behalf—developing a progressive program to carry out when he becomes king and building his own political base. [ 1 paragraph (5-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified ] As to your formal meeting, I suggest you press three points (the Prince is normally a bit recessive, so you'll have to steer the talk for him): 1. We support the Crown Prince's succession . Although a republican government might be more compatible with our interests in North Africa, the Crown Prince's broad political support from the Sanusi sect makes him a better bet to hold Libya together than even any of the better potential republican leaders. You can put this diplomatically in terms of our continued support for the Libyan constitution and for the arrangements the Libyans themselves have worked out for an orderly transfer of power. It won't do any harm for Libyan officials with the Crown Prince to hear this so the word can get around among potential opposition leaders. 2. Libya should move faster in planning effective use of its new oil revenues . The King finally sacked his incompetent development chief and created a new Ministry of Development Affairs in June. The new crew looks pretty good, but the country's finances are a mess. Unless order is brought out of chaos, increasing oil revenues ($40 million expected this year and $200 million within five years) will become an invitation to waste and corruption which could destroy public confidence in the government. AID has offered to help staff the Development Ministry, but we can't go any faster than the Libyans. The Crown Prince can convey our concern to Idris, and this is a problem he should get involved in himself. His reputation for scrupulous honesty is a major asset. 3. We want to hold on to Wheelus . The Libyans really just want to be left alone to enjoy their oil money, and their government has habitually justified Wheelus to opponents solely in terms of economic benefits derived. But oil revenues will soon deprive us of our economic leverage. So we want to convince the Prince at least that there are other reasons for staying “neutral with the West.” We can't ram down his throat that his own future lies with us, but in addition to our other reassurances we can point out that Wheelus contributes to Free World defense on which Libya's security depends. We can also get some mileage out of a bit more MAP . We'll have to rely on it more heavily as our “rent” for Wheelus because increasing Libyan oil revenues will make economic aid unjustifiable. The trouble is that the Libyans presented some wildly inflated requests to McNamara last spring. Since then USAF and Army survey teams have drawn up more modest plans (Tab III. C) costing around $13 million over five years. JCS is still reviewing this package, but you could say we plan some aid for expansion of the Libyan army and will help develop the nucleus of an air force with both fighter and transport capability. Ambassador Jones will discuss details of these two programs shortly in Libya. As a token of our past aid you can present a new topographic map of Libya —the first of its kind—which the US Geological Survey has just finished. 2 R.W. Komer * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Libya, 9/62-12/62. Top Secret. Briefing papers cited in this memorandum are ibid., Crown Prince Hasan Briefing Book, 10/6/62-10/24/62. 1 Crown Prince Hasan visited the United States October 16-24, 1962. A collection of briefing papers is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, Visit of Libyan Crown Prince. 2 Komer sent a follow-up memorandum to the President on October 15 saying that the Department of State was now urging the President to take the Crown Prince aside for a few minutes and give him the few words of encouragement as proposed. He added that this would do more than anything else to make the visit a success. (Ibid.) On October 16, Komer sent another memorandum to Kennedy, noting that, although the President had taken the Crown Prince aside for a few moments, there had not been any opportunity to tell the Crown Prince privately that the United States was interested in facilitating his succession against possible threats to it after King Idris died. Komer said that the Prince would be grateful for such words. (Ibid.) 98. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Benghazi, Libya 98. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Benghazi, Libya Source Washington, October 19, 1962, 6:11 p.m. 78. Following based in part on uncleared memcons. 1 Crown Prince visit to Washington proceeded smoothly and successfully. Met at airport by Vice President, Crown Prince acquitted himself well at this and other public appearances, with remarks appropriate to occasions, generally but not always read from prepared texts. Well prepared for his hour-long meeting with President, Crown Prince presented Libyan requests for financial aid during three to four year period of continuing financial need, and for military aid, dwelling particularly on Air Force needs. He also expressed Libyan apprehension at US decision sell Hawk missiles to Israel, urging President that decision not be put into effect. He further urged President take action relieve plight of Palestine refugees. Foreign Minister in meeting with Secretary October 17 laid further stress on GOL financial straits, emphasizing GOL need to implement planned projects for benefit of people who otherwise will become susceptible to harmful influences from outside. Foreign Minister also noted GOL desire on return Libya that success achieved by Crown Prince be made known to Libyan people. Secretary explained our policy not tying aid announcements to visits. Further details of talks will follow separately. Crown Prince has cancelled Detroit portion trip, will now proceed directly from San Francisco to New York October 21 with October 22 set aside for rest. Following lunch with U Thant and address to General Assembly, Prince and party now scheduled depart from New York at 1800 hours October 23. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 773.11/10-1962. Confidential. Drafted by Post on October 18; cleared by Carr, Jones, Steele, and Junkermann (DOD), Gookin, and Slater; and approved by Newsom. Also sent to Tripoli and pouched to London, Paris for the Embassy and USCINCEUR. 1 The conversation between President Kennedy and Crown Prince Hasan on October 16 is recorded in four memoranda of conversation; ibid., 773.56/10-1662, and ibid., President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. 99. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Benghazi, Libya 99. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Benghazi, Libya Source Washington, October 19, 1962, 7:01 p.m. 79. Following based on uncleared memcons. In October 16 talk with President on military aid, Crown Prince and Defense Minister expressed hope US would assist Libya to establish nucleus of Libyan Air Force,MOD listing following as basic requirements: two fighters, two transports, and one helicopter. President promised speak to Secretary McNamara to see what could be done. Subsequent to this discussion, pertinent USG agencies agreed inform Libyans of following as basis for US assistance to nucleus Libyan Air Force: 1. In addition equipment already programmed (two T-33 jet trainers), US to supply one C-47 in 1963 and, in period 1964 to 1968, two additional T-33 trainers and five additional C-47 transports. Aircraft to be accompanied by qualified flight instructors, maintenance and supply personnel. 2. Personnel to be provided to advise and assist in establishing Libyan Air Force and in working out long-range plans. 3. Facilities and training assistance to be made available at Wheelus. 4. Discussions to be initiated leading to joint US-Libyan utilization of Wheelus as envisioned in Base Agreement. Summary of first point was conveyed by the President to both Crown Prince and Defense Minister at lunch October 17. President indicated further details would be forthcoming through Ambassador Jones. Libyans seemed pleased and satisfied this aspect of talks. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 773.5/10-1962. Confidential. Drafted by Post on October 18; cleared by Jones, Junkermann (DOD), Wolf, and Mossler; and approved by Newsom. Also sent to Tripoli and repeated to Paris for USCINCEUR. 100. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 100. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Source Washington, October 31, 1962. JCSM-857-62 SUBJECT Army and Air Force Survey Team Reports, Libya 1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated 6 October 1962, subject as above. 2. The US military interest in Libya centers primarily on the continued use of Wheelus Air Base. From a military point of view there is no requirement for assistance to Libya beyond that necessary to assure the unrestricted use of this air base by the United States and to preclude increased Communist influence in Libya. Conditions necessary for such assurance include a friendly Libyan Government, internal stability, and internal security. There is a need to establish conditions in Libya which will favor an orderly transfer of power to a Western-oriented group upon the death of King Idris. However, there is no present external threat to Libya. Further, Libya's treaty with the United Kingdom guarantees that the UK will come to the assistance of Libya in the event of an attack. For these reasons, and especially in view of the prospects of continually decreasing military assistance funds, the United States should carefully scrutinize any proposal for assistance to Libya with a view toward providing the very minimum necessary to realize the US objectives. The Survey Team Reports have been examined with this principle in mind. 3. The Report on the Development of Libyan Air Force, dated 12 September 1962, provides for establishment of a Libyan Air Force of four T-33 jet trainer aircraft, six C-47 transport aircraft, two E-4 helicopters, and ancillary equipment at a cost of approximately $3 million over a six-year period. It is understood that the program outlined in this Report has been approved by you, except for the light helicopters, and that the President has informed the Libyan Crown Prince of the intention to provide this assistance. In order that the Government of Libya may have access to remote areas, conduct border surveillance, and perform rescue operations and civic actions, it is believed the two light helicopters should be retained in the plan as recommended by the USAF Survey Team. Maintenance capability will be available at Wheelus Air Base. 4. The US Army Survey Team Report, dated 24 September 1962, 1 provides for forces necessitating a Military Assistance Program (MAP) of $9.8 million over the period CY 1962-66. In light of the fact that the Libyan Army need not be manned and equipped for countering an external threat, the program recommended in the Report appears excessive. Also, it is believed that such a program is larger than can be afforded under present and anticipated availability of funds. Accordingly, certain reductions should be made in the proposed Army Program. Since USCINCEUR must incorporate Libyan MAPs within his over-all MAP dollar ceiling, he should be given an opportunity to recommend revisions to the US Army Survey Team Report toward the objective of reducing the cost of the program set forth in the Report. In revising the Report, two primary objectives should be kept in mind: a. The over-all cost of the program must be reduced. In revising the program downward, USCINCEUR will need some target as a guide. To this end, $6 million is believed reasonable, taking into consideration the size of the army, the type of equipment needed for the internal security mission, and the possibility of negotiating a cost-sharing formula. b. In establishing the size and organization of the proposed Libyan Army, primary emphasis should be placed on the mission of internal security. In this regard, cognizance must be taken of the 5,000 man army ceiling previously agreed upon between you and the Libyan Minister of Defense in the context of developing Libyan materiel requirements. 5. Consideration should also be given to a cost-sharing formula with Libya. It is noted that the FY 64-68 Military Assistance Plan for support of the Libyan Air Force has been prepared on a 50-50 cost-sharing basis. However, two factors are of especial importance with regard to Libya. First, assistance to Libya is actually payment for the use of facilities in Libya and a cost-shared program has far less bargaining power than an outright grant program, especially to a poor country. Second, increasing oil revenues are expected to materially improve Libya's economic position over the next several years. These two factors might be satisfied through negotiations with Libya toward a cost-sharing formula whereby the United States would pay the entire cost of military assistance furnished Libya for the first two years with the US proportion of costs thereafter being reduced each year. Perhaps a US ratio of 75% the third year, 50% the fourth year, and 25% the fifth year would be acceptable to both countries. 6. Finally, the Army Report recommends that materiel valued at nearly $1 million be delivered in Libya prior to 24 December 1962, Libya's National Independence Day. Shipment of such a large quantity of materiel in the short time remaining before 24 December is impractical and could be accomplished only by establishing an overriding priority for Libyan requirements. However, it is considered desirable that a token shipment be made prior to that date. Ten M-113 armored personnel carriers could be diverted from other claimants, if such action was directed, and would give visible evidence of US intentions to further assist Libya in establishing an effective army. 7. Implementation of the Air Force Program will necessitate a manpower increase for the Air Force Section of the MAAG from one officer and two enlisted to two officers and three enlisted. Additionally, it is contemplated that a MAP training mission consisting of four officers and 13 enlisted will be activated as part of the 7272d Air Base Wing. Approval of the Army Program will necessitate a small increase in the manpower authorization for the Army Section of the MAAG. 8. It is recommended that: a. The two helicopters be approved for inclusion in the Air Force Program for Libya. b. The US Army Survey Team Report be returned to USCINCEUR for downward revision. A proposed message for this purpose is attached as the Appendix hereto. c. A cost-sharing formula be negotiated with Libyan authorities toward gradual assumption of all costs of the Libyan Air Force and Army by Libya. d. Ten M-113 armored personnel carriers be diverted from other claimants and delivered in Libya prior to 24 December 1962. 3 For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: John A. Heintges 4 Major General, USADeputy Director, Joint Staff * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Libya 123.7-686, 1962. Secret. An appendix containing specific JCS and OSD comments on a July 1962 draft of the U.S. Army Survey Team Report on Libya is attached but not printed. 1 Not printed. (Ibid., Libya 091.3-1-20233162, 1962) 3 On November 7, Deputy Assistant Secretary Bundy sent a memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitting the Department of Defense's approval of their October 31 recommendations, except for the proposed cost-sharing arrangement. (Ibid.) 4 Printed from a copy that indicates Heintges signed the original. 101. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tripoli, Libya 101. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tripoli, Libya Source Washington, November 23, 1962, 3:25 p.m. Aidto 223. Subject—Economic Aid to Libya. Joint State/AID message. Libyan expectancy of receiving more aid result of Crown Prince visit stated in MacPhail report of Sikta and Mrusa conversations before leaving Washington. This impression further borne out by Libyan press reports of Prince's “successful” trip hinting US officials promised something tangible forthcoming. Although record of Washington talks politely non-committal on financial assistance, President did undertake to look into matter personally. President and SecState chose occasion of Crown Prince's visit to outline US offer of military assistance for Air Force and indicated in their remarks this was area in which US Government could at this time be more forthcoming. Understanding here at conclusion visit and subsequent conversations Sikta-Mrusa was that Sikta-Mrusa and Embassy would separately convey to Prime Minister US Government's general view that Libya in basically strong economic position with virtually unlimited credit on basis prospective oil revenues beginning next April and increasing rapidly thereafter. In terms AID criteria substantial grants or soft loans simply cannot be justified. Embassy and USAID are urged to make US view on financial economic assistance clear in tactful way while simultaneously seeking focus GOL attention on measures US might be prepared to take in concert with GOL for alleviating immediate fiscal problems. These include as discussed Ambassador and MacPhail “package” containing a) possible advance payment of about $4 million in Deutschemarks against CY 64 cash base rental; b) two year Title IV agreement; c) Libyan request for IMF team to improve fiscal institutions and practices and d) establishment trust fund by GOL for local costs of program support. GOL appears not to have publicized current money crisis and might be reluctant publicize base rental advance even if such transaction acceptable. Believe public announcement advantageous from US point of view as indication US responsiveness Libya's need to get development plans under way before oil revenues peak. This US preference should be intimated to Libyans, and if they unable approve public announcement, US side should nevertheless leave itself room to make our action known in indirect but clear manner. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, Visit of Libyan Crown Prince, Oct. 16-24, 1962. Confidential. Drafted by Carr and McClanahan on November 19; cleared by Mossler, Kent, and Hinman; and approved by Hutchinson. 102. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 102. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of Defense McNamara Source Washington, December 1, 1962. SUBJECT Military Assistance for Libya I-21780/62 This memorandum seeks your approval of additional amounts for the Libyan Army, affecting both the FY 1963 amount and the FY 1963-1967 MAP totals. State considers decision on this matter urgent, as the Libyan Parliament is meeting next week so that notice of this proposed program would give them a firm basis as well as cementing US-Libyan relations at a time when there have been recurrent threats of Libya turning to the UAR or the Soviets for help. Following the visit of the Libyan MOD last summer, we agreed to send Air Force and Army Survey teams to Libya. The Air Force team recommended a total of $2.6 million in equipment, and on 17 October you approved this with the exception of two helicopters, totalling $120,000. We have since learned that the Libyans considered the two helicopters included in the package as stated in general terms by the President, and for this reason as well as to meet what appears a legitimate requirement for command communications, we now recommend that you approve their re-insertion. The Army problem is more serious. The Army Survey team recommended a program of $9.8 million for an 8500 man force over a five-year period, as being required to enhance its internal security capability and insure its superiority over that of the provincial police forces. This plan called for us to fill initial shortages in the proposed modernization and standardization of the Libyan Army with heavy equipment required, including communications and vehicles but with the Libyan Government being responsible for the cost (about $1 million) of small items and maintenance of British equipment which we have furnished in the past. When you approved the bulk of the Air Force team recommendations, you directed that the total program be held to a level of $1.5 million per year. Your discussions with the Libyan MOD had also indicated that he personally accepted maintenance of the present Army force level of 5000 men. Accordingly,USCINCEUR was asked to review the Army Survey Report under these guidelines, and specifically to eliminate M-48 tanks and 155mm howitzers, which the JCS had questioned on purely military grounds as not being necessary to the internal security mission. The revised report just received from CINCEUR proposes a program in accordance with the revised guidelines calling for $4.7 million in new equipment plus maintenance amounting to $1.2 million and reinserting the $1 million to maintain previously supplied British equipment, for a total of $6.9 million over the FY 63-67 period. This plan would support only the 5000 man force level and would not provide for replacement of key old British items (hence the recommendation that we include maintenance of this equipment in toto). The Ambassador had supported the original Survey Report as being the minimum required to maintain our status at Wheelus and prevent Libya turning elsewhere. In addition, both State and USCINCEUR do not believe the revised program level adequate to meet the need, State purely on the Ambassador's grounds, USCINCEUR on the military basis that this reduced program would not provide clear superiority of the Army over the Provincial Police (also about 5000 strong in Tripolitania alone), a political objective stated as essential by the Ambassador and State to prevent a sundering of Libya when Idris dies. Both the Ambassador 1 and USCINCEUR now believe we must support a greater force level than 5000, and the Ambassador reports that despite the MOD's assurances to you the Libyan Government is in fact determined to move to at least 7500 and even has its sights set at 13,000 by 1964 (which we do not think they can achieve in any case). Hence, we have drawn up and recommend your approval of a program between the original and revised, which would: a. Cost $8 million over the FY 1963-67 period. b. Eliminate the M-48 tanks and 155mm howitzers. c. Support a force level of 7500 men. d. Throw onto the Libyan Government the maintenance of old British equipment (much of which would be replaced). The effect of this on the total program levels is as follows: FY 63 FY 64 FY 65 FY 66 FY 67 FY 63-67 Total Army 1.5 1.4 1.8 1.6 1.7 8.0 Air Force .5 .8 .4 .5 .4 2.6 Annual Total 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.1 10.6 For FY 1963, the presently approved figure is $1.473, which includes some Army items now subsumed in the total program. Thus, we would add a little over $500,000 to this. This would come from the Contingency Fund. Essentially, this is an issue of judgment. Wheelus matters to us, the flighty Libyans could turn elsewhere, and there is some case for an internal security force clearly capable of dominating the scene. The Libyans do expect a measure of aid for Wheelus, and over time, with their oil coming in the US will not have much to offer through economic aid. All in all, though I hate these rug merchant deals (and these particular rug merchants) as much as you do, I would endorse State's judgment that the rug cannot be had for less. It may at least stay bought if we can lay out the whole program to the Libyans next week. Tab A shows the program items of the alternatives. 2 Recommend your approval of the $8 million program. 3 William P. Bundy 4 * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Libya 000.1-121, 1962. Secret. Attached is a transmittal note from Bundy to McNamara that reads: “The attached seeks your approval by Monday noon in order to meet a political deadline which has just arisen. Subsequent to writing this, I have seen JCS comments which would accept the lower of the alternatives considered. However, I would myself still accept the State judgment that we cannot keep matters sweet in Libya at that figure. The issue is essentially political.” 1 On November 9, Ambassador Jones wrote that he regretted the Defense decision to re-examine the U.S. Army Survey Team report with the view of reducing the proposed strength of the Libyan Army and the recommended program of U.S. military aid. He noted that if the United States was not sufficiently forthcoming in response to Libyan requests for assistance, it could expect questions regarding the present level of rent for Wheelus. Jones reminded Washington that the Libyan Army might well be the deciding influence in a possible crisis over succession to the throne after the death of the King. Finally, he emphasized the relationship of the overall U.S. military aid program to the success of the recent visit of the Crown Prince. (Telegram 98 from Benghazi; Department of State, Central Files, 773.5/11-962) 2 Not attached to the source text. 3 McNamara's stamped signature apparently indicates he approved the recommendation on December 1. 4 Printed from a copy that indicates Bundy signed the original. 103. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Benghazi, Libya 103. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Benghazi, Libya Source Washington, June 29, 1963, 2:22 p.m. 262. Tripoli's 351. 2 Believe you should at this time leave to Prime Minister Fekini's initiative any discussion changed Libyan attitude toward Wheelus. Endorse your feeling that in such discussion you should not exhibit alarm nor frame your remarks as being on instructions Washington. Subject to your views, Dept inclined believe that matter as basic and important in US-Libyan relations as GOL attitude to Wheelus if it is to be broached from US side by Ambassador should preferably be in conversation with King sometime after his return from his relaxing and therapeutic visit to Greece. Likely in present context Fekini will assume extreme concern if matter is raised probingly at this time because it is so early in your tour in Libya and particular issues of Parliamentary questions do not seem yet to have come to such head as to be upsetting equanimity of Libyan Cabinet. Dept endorses Embassy officer's statements to Foreign Office in Benghazi's 279 3 and believes Abdiyyah's vigorous denial change Libyan policy and subsequent expression of welcome for idea of visit by Vice President or Secretary of State to Libya may indicate that official Libyans are concerned lest GOL's unusually close working relations with US are not sufficiently recognized and appreciated on US side. We have been giving much thought to importance building up in near future confidential, trusting relationship with King and to extent possible similar personal rapport and comfortable working relationship with Fekini and other key members of Cabinet. If Libyan policy is gradually being drawn into greater alignment with prevailing breezes of change in North Africa, these personal relationships plus concrete proofs of friendship such as expanded military assistance program seem likely to prove firmest anchors which we can hold against any drift contrary to our strategic and other interests in Libya. Would welcome your suggestions re best tactics accomplish foregoing. 3 Ball * Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA-US. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by McClanahan, cleared by Tasca, and approved by Witman. Repeated to Tripoli. 2 In telegram 351, June 28, Lightner indicated that he intended to sound Fekini out concerning his government's attitude toward Wheelus. (Ibid.) 3 Not printed. (Ibid.) 3 In telegram 6 from Benghazi, July 3, Lightner reported that he had met with Fekini, who had brought up the recent Addis Abba conference resolution on the elimination of military bases, to which the Ambassador had replied that he thought it was possible to defend the concept that bases contributed to the defense of a country that was not yet ready to defend itself. Lightner added that he had not pressed the issue, but he did not have the impression Libya was about to demand that the United States give up Wheelus. He indicated that he would comment soon on the tactical problems of combating “Libyan policy drift,” but that he was sure the Department would agree that any formal approach to the King on the base problem should be kept in reserve until the situation became much clearer. (Ibid., POL 15-1 LIBYA) 104. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Benghazi, Libya 104. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Benghazi, Libya Source Washington, July 26, 1963, 3:40 p.m. 23. Re Baida's 11 and 13. 1 Dept concerned by report harmfully inaccurate public statement by Libyan Minister Abaidi concerning amount and form of US aid to Libya since 1960. Believe you should raise matter with Prime Minister Fekini at next opportunity, stressing effect in this country, as Fekini should be well aware, of foreign high level official statements which misrepresent US assistance. You should reiterate (Baida's 13) that in considering aid requests US must recognize fact Libya's increased oil revenues. Dept recalls Fekini's aid discussions with ambassador were couched in broad terms (Fredericks-Fekini memcon Jan. 15, 1963). You might remind Fekini that total US aid to Libya during his ambassadorship 1958-63 was over $110 million. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) LIBYA. Limited Official Use. Drafted by McClanahan, cleared by Walker, and approved by Witman. Repeated to Tripoli. 1 Telegram 11 from Baida, July 24, reported that Minister of Development and Planning Abaidi had told the Libyan Senate on July 21 that the United States had given Libya no material assistance in cash or in kind since the dissolution of joint services late in 1960, although leftover funds had been handed over to the Libyan Government for completion of joint services projects, and the United States had provided assistance through experts attached to various government ministries. (Ibid.) In telegram 13 from Baida, July 24, Lightner wrote that he had talked to the Prime Minister about Abaidi's statement and Libya's probable requests for further U.S. economic assistance. (Ibid.) 105. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk 105. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk Source Washington, September 6, 1963. SUBJECT Libyan Policy toward Wheelus Air Base Information Memorandum Our attention has recently been focused on the future of Wheelus Air Base by 1) the resolutions at the Addis Ababa conference; 2) the organization of a Libyan Air Force; and 3) Libyan requests for additional aid. Criticism in the Libyan press and on the floor of the Libyan Parliament of the presence of a foreign base on Libyan soil, while not new, has recently become more pointed as a result of the resolution, adopted by the African summit conference at Addis Ababa in June, that African states should negotiate the elimination of military bases from their territory. The relatively new and more “nationalist” government of Prime Minister Fekini has shown itself sensitive on this subject, and has avoided denying forthrightly and publicly that it contemplates measures to eliminate the Wheelus Air Base. During discussion of a possible joint statement on the recently-expanded U.S. military assistance program, including the allocation of a part of Wheelus Base for the use of the new Libyan Air Force, Fekini attempted to introduce language suggesting that this action was preparatory to the take-over of the entire base by the Libyans. As demonstrated by the good-will trip he has just concluded to the Maghreb states, and by his recent public remarks on Palestine, the Prime Minister desires to associate Libya more closely with the mainstream of African and Arab unity movements. We see no indication, however, that the basic Libyan policy of respecting the Wheelus Air Base Agreement (which expires in December, 1970) has been altered; indeed, a high Foreign Ministry official has assured our Embassy that such is not the case. However, under arrangements made with the Libyans in 1960, the $10,000,000 annual “rent” payment for the base is reduced to $1,000,000 at the end of CY 1964. We interpret recent, unfocused, requests for U.S. economic aid by Fekini and certain of his ministers as an effort to establish a favorable bargaining position for discussions on the future quid pro quo for the Base in anticipation of this reduction. As Libyan oil revenues grow, the economic justification declines, but the political pressures for such payment will remain. The assignment to the Royal Libyan Air Force of facilities at Wheelus gives Libya a stake in the Base which we anticipate will be a moderating factor in Libyan attitudes toward the future presence of Wheelus. King Idris retains ultimate control over Libyan policy, and the cabinet could take no fundamental action affecting the Wheelus Base without the King's approval. We have instructed our Ambassador in Libya to endeavor to establish such relations with King Idris as will ensure the preservation of our strategic and other interests in Libya. (Attached.) We anticipate ultimately extended negotiations on the future of Wheelus, but do not feel the time for such discussions has yet come. The Wheelus Base is used primarily as a very important all weather training facility for U.S. Air Force, Europe. Insofar as we have ascertained the views of the Armed Forces, we understand that the Base will be required at least during the life of the present agreement, i.e., through CY 1970. * Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15, LIBYA-US. Secret. Drafted by Stookey on September 5. Attached to the source text is telegram 262 to Benghazi, Document 103 . 106. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy 106. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Source Washington, September 28, 1963. Monday morning session with new Libyan PM Fekini is so you can gently talk him out of asking for a whole new aid program. This country of only 1,250,000 has lived on US largesse for years ($206 million through FY 1963). Now it's swimming in oil—$64 million royalties this year, over $100 million next year, and up to $300 million annually later. So it is another Kuwait, which doesn't need any more US aid. But Fekini is using Wheelus base as a lever to pry more aid out of us. Under our 1960 agreement the “rent” for Wheelus will drop from $10 million annually 1960-64 to $1 million per annum 1965-71. He alleges growing local anti-base pressures, and says the best way to offset this is a big contribution to Libyan development. Our best counter is to tell him frankly that Wheelus (and the UK bases in Cyrenaica) are oil-rich Libya's best guarantee against takeover by Nasser next door. Our presence is Libya's real security. We don't see why we should have to pay for the privilege of giving protection (and he should get this across to his critics). Besides, it is mostly US investment which provides Libya's oil wealth. So you could explain why Congress won't favor yet more aid to a country which is doing so well (we don't give aid to Saudi Arabia or Kuwait either—yet protect both). We want to make clear that what Libya needs is not money but technical help in learning to use wisely all the money it's already getting (and squandering). We're prepared to continue providing such help, and also some more MAP. Fekini may also make some anti-Israeli noises; if so, you might set him straight that we don't intend to let Arabs attack Israel or vice versa. You impressed Fekini greatly last time he saw you (he was ambassador here) by airing some general policy views. He'll be quite responsive if you do so again. 2 R.W. Komer 3 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Libya 1963. Secret. 2 On September 30, Komer sent a follow-up memorandum to the President, explaining that in 1960 the United States had “upped the ante (1) to keep Wheelus, (2) to take credit for help we were giving anyway to ease the Libyan government over the hump until oil revenues put it on its feet, but (3) to leave the door open to stop grant aid when oil revenues began pouring in.” He noted that those revenues had mounted faster than anyone expected “so while we have to come through with the promised $10 million next year, we want to hold the line after that.” (Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer) 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 107. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tripoli, Libya 107. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tripoli, Libya Source Washington, October 7, 1963, 3:26 p.m. 133. Tripoli's 108. 1 Prime Minister Fekini met with President Kennedy September 30. 2 Following highlights from uncleared memcon are subject to review and should not be discussed with foreign governments: President welcomed Fekini, who replied he brought friendly greeting from King and Crown Prince. After brief mention Fekini's recent trip Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, President inquired about situation in Libya. Fekini said public opinion had favored more unified organization of government and so his government had amended constitution to bring this about. His government had also worked out new 5-year plan and hoped US would help in realizing this plan. Plan was key to stability in Libya, and Libya was counting on US. President described heavy aid cuts being made by Congress and great difficulties this created for US. We were nonetheless trying to do what we could. But with all its oil resources Libya's position should be extremely good on its own. Fekini replied that oil revenue would be main support of Plan, but real problem would be in first 2 or 3 years before most oil revenues came in. Fekini said US had special relationship with Libya, for example, one of our most important military bases is there, and Libya had problem with such bases. President said had noted press attacks on base, but base was important to stability of area and kind of guarantee of Libya's continued independence and stability. Thus it was best to try damp down press attacks and not make Wheelus great dominant political issue. Fekini acknowledged Wheelus not at present big political issue, but remarked US effort to help Libya substantially would serve to remove base issue from domestic political arena. President emphasized burden our global commitments many of which were of indirect benefit to Libya. Libya, like Saudi Arabia, will be target for other countries because of its oil wealth. US would do its best but couldn't do all Libya wanted. President urged Fekini use his influence explain to Libyan people Wheelus helpful to Libyan stability and an asset to Libya. Then when Libya wanted us to leave we would. But if we're told we must either contribute to development plan or lose base, we'd leave. Fekini later said he had spoken frankly because it not easy task to defend base. Only one million dollars rent did not look very great even though there was other aid. President replied Libya had only 1.25 million people yet GOL receiving over $60 million from oil revenues this year, probably $100 million next and perhaps as much as $300 million within few years. We appreciated Libya's situation and its needs, but such oil revenues obviously a major asset. Fekini mentioned that US allowing Libya use small part of base to train Libyan Air Force, which US was supporting. Sharing of base was good, and if we could go further toward joint use it would help. President agreed this would be useful. Conversation concluded with comments by Fekini and President concerning need for caution in viewing prospects for detente in relations with Soviets. After their conversation President invited Fekini to attend swearing in of new Postmaster General, and Fekini there met several members of Cabinet. Later President accompanied Fekini to President's outer office and shook hands with officers of Libyan Embassy. President sent greetings through Fekini to King and Crown Prince and suggested Fekini write to him directly if he wished on matters of mutual interest. President had sent presidential Air Force aircraft bring Fekini from New York and return him there. Governor Harriman met Fekini at Washington airport. Governor Williams present at meeting with President and accompanied Fekini to Washington airport. Fekini brought from New York private secretary Ali Abu Suwayl and Police Major Tahir Rahuma. Ben Gileil, counselor of Embassy, only Libyan with Fekini during meeting with President. Only press notice observed here was New York Times October 1 reference in record of President's September 30 activities. Agence France Presse (AFP) ticker datelined Washington September 30 reported Fekini had meeting of about an hour with President Kennedy and “two statesmen reviewed international situation and discussed problems of mutual interest.” AFP quotes Fekini as terming conversation “very interesting” and adding “I hope that it will contribute to consolidating friendly relations which I am happy to say already exist between our two countries.” Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 LIBYA. Secret; Priority. Drafted by McClanahan; cleared by Newsom, Walker, McKesson, Junkermann (DOD), Komer, and Warren; and approved by Williams. Repeated to Benghazi. 1 In telegram 108 from Tripoli, October 3, Lightner reported that he planned to talk to Fekini “within the next few days at which time it would be helpful have some indication of substance of Washington talks.” (Ibid.) 2 A memorandum of this conversation is ibid., POL LIBYA-US.3 Morocco Morocco 108. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy Washington, February 17, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 771.5/2-1761. Secret; Presidential Handling. Drafted by Root. A handwritten notation on the source text states that the proposal contained in the memorandum was approved by the White House on February 17. The source text is attached to a memorandum from James K. Penfield (AF) to Secretary Rusk recommending that he send the memorandum to the President along with an accompanying draft letter from President Kennedy to King Mohammed V. 109. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco Washington, February 18, 1961, 6:49 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 771.5622/1-1861. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Root; cleared by Grantham (DOD), Bell, Penfield, and Veliotes; and approved by Hare. 110. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy Washington, February 24, 1961. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Morocco, 1/61-10/61. Secret. 111. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Stoessel) to the President's Special Assistant (Dungan) Washington, February 27, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770V.00/2-2761. Confidential. Drafted by McClintic and Root on February 24 and cleared by Ferguson, Root, Penfield, and Hartley and in substance with Lindquist. The source text is attached to a transmittal note from Stoessel to Dungan noting that the Acting Secretary had seen and concurred in the enclosed memorandum on Mauretania. 112. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Bowles to President Kennedy Washington, March 28, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 771.56311/3-2861. Secret. Drafted by Root on March 22 and cleared by Williams and McGhee. 113. National Security Action Memorandum No. 34 Washington, April 5, 1961. Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 34. Secret. 114. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco Washington, April 14, 1961, 9 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 771.5-MSP/3-2861. Secret. Drafted by McClintic, cleared by Junkermann, (DOD), and approved by Witman. Repeated to Paris, Madrid, and CINCEUR. 115. Memorandum Prepared by the Director of Operations for Politico-Military Affairs (Newman) Washington, May 2, 1961. Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 34. Secret. Cleared (in substance) by Williams, Johnson, Gullion, Bell, and Bohlen. The Director of Operations administered a special component for politico-military affairs that served under Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson. This memorandum was transmitted under cover of a memorandum from Battle to Ralph Dungan at the White House which noted that NSAM No. 34 had directed the Department to explore recommendations for a new policy on the Moroccan bases and to seek the views of the Department of Defense, the CIA, and the ICA. Following preliminary discussions with Paul Nitze of Defense, the Department believed that further examination of the military considerations involved was needed before balanced recommendations taking into account political, military, and intelligence requirements could be made to the President. In the meantime, it was forwarding this interim memorandum on the subject, which had been cleared by Secretary Rusk. (Ibid.) Further documentation on the follow-up to NSAM No. 34 is ibid. 116. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco Washington, May 26, 1961, 8:06 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 771.56311/5-2661. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McClintic and Root; cleared by Bronez (DOD), Templeton (ICA), Brown, Bohlen, and Newman; and approved by Williams. Repeated to Paris and Madrid. 117. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer) Washington, June 28, 1961. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files:FRC 64 A 2382, Morocco, 680.1 Jan.-Aug. 1961. Secret. Drafted by Lang on June 23. Attached to a July 27 memorandum from Assistant Secretary of Defense NITZE to Secretary of Defense McNamara recommending that he sign the attached memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 118. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, July 13, 1961. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, 680.1 Morocco. Top Secret. Attached to the source text but not printed are: Appendix A, “State of Post-1963 Military Requirements for Bases in Morocco”; Appendix B, “Possible Courses of Action To Achieve Military Objectives in Morocco”; and Appendix C, “Suggested Bargaining Positions in Possible Negotiations With Morocco.” 119. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of the Navy (Fay) to President Kennedy Washington, July 17, 1961. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Morocco, 1/61-10/61. Secret. Attached to a transmittal note from Kenneth O'Donnell to Bundy stating: “The President would like you to read this and give him the benefit of your thinking as rapidly as possible.” A handwritten notation says “done.” (Ibid.) 120. Paper Prepared by the Ambassador to Morocco (Bonsal) Rabat, August 14, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.71/8-1461. Attached to a transmittal memorandum from Bonsal to Director of the Office of North African Affairs Witman, dated August 14. On August 24, a copy of Bonsal's recommendations was sent to Robert Komer at the White House. (Ibid., 611.71/8-2461) 121. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Secretary of the Air Force (Zuckert) Washington, September 23, 1961. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, Morocco 686, 10 Jan 62. Secret. Drafted by Lang. Attached to a memorandum from Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs William P. Bundy to Secretary McNamara recommending that he sign the attached response to Secretary Zuckert's memorandum, and noting that if he and Under Secretary Bowles approved, the proposed offer would be conveyed to the President. 122. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Washington, September 25, 1961. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 34. No classification marking. 123. National Security Action Memorandum No. 102 Washington, October 6, 1961. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, Morocco, 680.1 Sept.-Dec. 1961. Secret. Information copies were sent to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the U.S. Information Agency, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the Administrator of the Agency for International Development, and the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration. 124. Editorial Note 125. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of Defense Washington, October 25, 1961. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, Morocco, 680.1, Sept.-Dec. 1961. Secret. Attached to a memorandum from the Director of Foreign Military Rights Affairs, William E. Lang, to William Witman, stating that the Department of Defense had undertaken to provide a memorandum on its specific post-1963 communications requirements and the ways in which the facilities in Morocco might be converted without jeopardizing the military mission. Noting that the attached memorandum had been cleared in Defense, Lang asked that it be forwarded to Ambassador Bonsal as a basis for discussion with the Moroccans concerning post-1963 communications arrangements. A copy of the memorandum was transmitted to Bonsal on November 9. (Instruction CW-4125; Department of State, Central Files, 771.56311/11-961) On December 5, the Ambassador responded that it was clear from the record of all previous conversations with the King that he assumed that continued operation of the communications sites after 1963 would be predicated upon generous U.S. assistance. Thus, the Embassy was convinced that any proposal to Hassan should be in the form of a comprehensive package covering in detail U.S. post-1963 needs and spelling out the advantages to Morocco of U.S. technical and economic aid. (Telegram 933 from Rabat; ibid., 771.56311/12-561) 126. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco Washington, December 5, 1961, 11:07 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.7111/12-561. Secret; Niact. Drafted by McClintic on December 1, cleared by Manfull and Smith (White House), and approved by Witman. Also sent to POLADCINCSAC, Madrid, Paris, and CINCEUR. 127. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Washington, January 5, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 121. Secret. Attached to the source text is a transmittal note from Komer to Bundy, saying that the President should be informed immediately since an Air Force colonel was ready to leave for Morocco. Komer added: “I also plan NSAM asking for progress report on Moroccan base question to force State to plan scheme for getting assurances at appropriate point.” Another note to Bundy, attached to the source text and signed with the initials “ab,” noted that Komer was very anxious to know the President's reaction and that the Department of Defense was postponing sending the colonel to Rabat until it knew that the President had no objection. 128. National Security Action Memorandum No. 121 Washington, January 10, 1962. Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 121. Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretary of Defense and Director,AID. 129. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, January 29, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer. Secret. 130. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco Washington, February 9, 1962, 1:34 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 771.5622/1-2762. Secret. Drafted by McClintic, cleared by Whitfield (DOD), and approved by Witman. Repeated to Madrid, Paris, CINCEUR, and CINCSAC for POLAD. 131. Editorial Note 132. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Ball to President Kennedy Washington, March 15, 1962. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 771.11/3-1562. Secret. Drafted by McClintic on March 8. A typed notation on the source text indicates that the memorandum was approved by the President on March 23. 133. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State Rabat, April 2, 1962, 5 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 771.56311/4-262. Secret; Limit Distribution. 134. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Washington, April 4, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer. Secret. 135. Editorial Note 136. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco Washington, April 18, 1962, 7:22 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 771.56/4-1662. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Witman, Root, and McClintic; cleared by Wolfe, Newman, Valliere, Tasca, and Whitfield (DOD); and approved by Fredericks. Repeated to Paris, Madrid, CINCEUR, and CINCSAC for POLAD. 137. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State Rabat, May 4, 1962, 4 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 771.56/5-462. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Madrid, Paris, CINCEUR, and CINCSAC for POLAD. 138. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, August 3, 1962. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files:FRC 66 A 3542, Morocco, 686, 10 Jan 1962. Top Secret. 139. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Washington, August 21, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Morocco, 7/62-12/62. Secret. 140. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer) Washington, September 28, 1962. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files:FRC 65 A 3501, Morocco, 400.3295, 1962. Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretary of the Air Force and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. 141. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) Washington, December 26, 1962. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 771.56311/12-2662. Secret. 142. Memorandum for the Record Washington, January 7, 1963. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 67 A 4564, Morocco, 333-680.1, 1963. Secret. Drafted by Roland A. Paul of the Office of Foreign Military Rights Affairs, Bureau of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense, on January 9. Copies were sent to William Bundy and Sloan. 143. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) Washington, January 31, 1963. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 67 A 4564, Morocco, 333-680.1, 1963. Secret. Also sent to William Bundy, Hutchinson, and Kitchen, with a copy for Witman. 144. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco Washington, March 4, 1963, 6:35 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 MOR-US. Secret. Drafted by Newsom and Lang (DOD); cleared by Bundy (DOD), Bell (AID), Newman, and Witman; and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Paris for USCINCEUR and London for USNAVEUR. 145. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Bell) Washington, March 16, 1963. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 MOR-US. Secret. Drafted by Warren. 146. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Washington, March 25, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Morocco, Hassan Visit. Secret. 147. Memorandum for the Record Washington, March 26, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Morocco, Hassan Visit. Secret. Drafted by Komer. 148. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, March 27, 1963, 4:30 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 MOR-US. Secret. Drafted by Glenn on March 28 and approved by the White House on April 1. The meeting was held at the White House. Documentation on King Hassan's visit, including memoranda of conversation and substantive correspondence, is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2235. 149. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Washington, March 28, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Morocco, Hassan Visit. Secret. A handwritten notation by Komer on the source text reads: “Mac—I gave this to Pres. but I don't think I'll win.” 150. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco Washington, March 30, 1963, 3:30 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL MOR-US. Secret; Limit Distribution; Noforn. Drafted by Newsom; cleared by Ferguson, Fredericks, Witman, Rowe, and Rusk (in draft); and approved by Newsom. Repeated to Algiers, Paris, Madrid, London for USNAVEUR, CINCEUR, and POLADCINCSAC. 151. National Security Action Memorandum No. 232 Washington, April 5, 1963. Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 232. Secret. A copy was sent to Kermit Gordon. 152. Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy Washington, May 8, 1963. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 MOR. Secret. 153. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Washington, August 2, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Morocco. Top Secret. 154. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco Washington, August 7, 1963, 6:39 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 MOR-US. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Newsom; cleared by Hilliker, Komer, and Hinman (AID); and approved by Fredericks. 155. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Regional Affairs (Sloan) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) Washington, September 25, 1963. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files:FRC 67 A 4564, Morocco, 333-680.1, 1963. Secret. 156. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) Washington, October 31, 1963. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 MOR-US. Confidential. 157. Editorial Note 108. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy 108. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy Source Washington, February 17, 1961. SUBJECT Soviet Military Assistance to Morocco The Departments of State and Defense are concerned over the arrival in Morocco of twelve Soviet MIG-17 jet fighters and two MIG-15 trainers for the Moroccan Air Force. There are indications that twenty to thirty Bloc technicians may also have arrived, although this is not yet fully confirmed. The Department of Defense is particularly concerned about the significant threat to the security and potential usefulness of our military bases in Morocco, including the SAC complex, that would be represented by the presence in Morocco of Soviet military equipment and personnel. Last November when Moroccan acceptance of the Soviet offer of jet planes was announced our Ambassador obtained oral assurances from the King and the Crown Prince that they would do nothing in this connection to affect Morocco's commitment (reached between the King and President Eisenhower in December 1959) to permit us to remain at our bases until the end of 1963. Those assurances included an undertaking not to admit any Soviet bloc technicians into Morocco. There is thus some question whether or not this undertaking has been breached. With my approval, and the consent of Governor Stevenson, we have arranged to send Ambassador Yost back to Rabat this weekend, ostensibly to take his official farewell of the Moroccan Government. We are in fact anxious that Ambassador Yost explore with the King personally the significance of the arrival of Soviet jets and perhaps technicians. Last December we provided the Ambassador with a standby authority to offer U.S. jet planes to the Moroccan Government if he felt this was necessary to insure that the Moroccan Government would not make use of the Soviet planes, or as a minimum would refuse to accept any Soviet Bloc technicians. 2 In view of the assurances mentioned above, the Ambassador did not feel it necessary to use this standby offer at the time. However it is still valid and it is our intention that the Ambassador would be prepared to make the offer explicit to the King if the trend of their conversation indicated this as the best course. Ambassador Yost feels, and both the African Bureau and I concur, that it would be particularly valuable to him in his delicate mission to be able to present to the King a message from you. The letter would have a dual purpose, to reaffirm our good will and desire to continue our cooperation with Morocco and at the same time to emphasize the gravity with which we view the latest developments. The enclosed text will show what we have in mind and would enable Ambassador Yost to enter into a detailed discussion of the problem with the King. (I might add that the occasion could also provide an unusual opportunity to ascertain current Moroccan intentions with regard to the Congo and Algeria.) Ambassador Yost is leaving for Morocco today, February 17, 1961, and expects to see the King the first part of next week. If you approve the enclosed message we will transmit it to our Embassy in Rabat for Ambassador Yost. 3 Dean Rusk 4 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 771.5/2-1761. Secret; Presidential Handling. Drafted by Root. A handwritten notation on the source text states that the proposal contained in the memorandum was approved by the White House on February 17. The source text is attached to a memorandum from James K. Penfield (AF) to Secretary Rusk recommending that he send the memorandum to the President along with an accompanying draft letter from President Kennedy to King Mohammed V. 2 For documentation on the U.S. offer, see Foreign Relations , 1958-1960, vol. XIII, pp. 812 - 816 . 3 Attached to the source text but not printed. On February 17, the letter was transmitted to the Embassy in Rabat to hold for Ambassador Yost. (Telegram 1202; Department of State, Central Files, 611.71/2-1761) The letter explained to King Mohammed that Ambassador Yost was being transferred to another post at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, reminded the King of the 1959 U.S.-Moroccan air base agreement, expressed concern over Morocco's recent military transaction with the Soviet Union, and said that Yost would be discussing with the King U.S. concern over Soviet technicians in Morocco. 4 Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original. 109. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco 109. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco Source Washington, February 18, 1961, 6:49 p.m. 1209. Hold for Ambassador Yost. Following will serve as guidance for your conversation with King on the problems posed by Moroccan acceptance of Soviet jet aircraft: 1. Our objective still remains as stated in Deptel 771, 1 (1) persuade Morocco to store Soviet aircraft and (2) in any case prevent Soviet instructors and technicians from entering Morocco (or remaining if already there). 2. Arguments you use with King must be left largely your discretion and will presumably depend on trend actual conversation. 3. You should certainly emphasize extreme seriousness with which we view presence of Soviet bloc technicians and attempt explain, in whatever detail appropriate, jeopardy not only to United States but to Moroccan interests. 4. If King reiterates earlier assurances regarding Soviet Bloc technicians, you should express our appreciation but point out that, apart from problem of instructors, mere presence planes with technical and maintenance difficulties ensuing in time will sooner or later oblige Morocco obtain outside technical help. It would be useful if you could elicit Morocco's intentions this regard. 5. Regarding Bloc technicians already in Morocco, you should express your frank surprise in view assurances given you earlier. If King says they are merely assembly crew and will soon depart you should attempt to pin down exactly when. Throughout conversation you should attempt to elicit all possible information about Soviet planes, other military equipment, intended use thereof and nature and number accompanying personnel. 6. We suggest your tone at outset should be sympathetic but firm. If in course of conversation King adopts unhelpful attitude, and if in particular it appears to you GOM has in fact breached assurances given you, you may emphasize gravity with which US Government will view such development. 7. We naturally hope however conversation will take more encouraging direction. If this proves to be case and you feel King is looking for way out of his dilemma, you may point out, as you had indicated to him some months ago, that USG stands ready see how it can further help Morocco under present military assistance program. Specifically, you may if necessary draw on authority Deptel 771 to offer jet aircraft squadron, training aircraft and necessary training personnel. As you are fully aware, however, any aircraft offer must be contingent on achievement objectives para (1) above. 8. If King not satisfied with offer under Deptel 771 and shows desire either for jets of later model than F-86's or for military transport aircraft (either in lieu of jets or in addition thereto), you may say you will personally recommend that USG give prompt and sympathetic consideration to King's wishes. Such assistance would of course likewise be to subject to conditions specified para (1). FYI. Regarding possibilities discussed Hare meeting Feb. 18 for improving US offer over that contemplated Deptel 771, additional assistance would of course require further formal action here, including Presidential determination. If King prefers military air transport to combat aircraft Defense thinks C-54's could be made available. If he wants such transport aircraft in addition to F-86's, this possibility too could be examined. If what he wants is improved type jet, there is possibility obtaining F-100D's. If delivery any foregoing urgently required, planes could probably be taken from US operational units and delivered to Morocco in 15 to 30 days. Action to implement any part of foregoing would first require your recommendation based on conversation with King and then formal clearance and authorization as above, which we would undertake to obtain as rapidly as possible. Obviously we do not wish to go any further into aircraft aid than situation requires and of course would not wish contemplate such aid at all unless it achieves objectives para (1). But foregoing intended indicate to you lengths to which we are willing to try to go to achieve these objectives. End FYI. 9. Tactics in discussing aircraft assistance must again be left to you. You can perhaps say to King he will understand US assistance this nature could hardly be justified to American Congress or public if USSR, through introduction equipment and personnel, were in slightest position to threaten US air bases. You might then ask whether His Majesty would consider conveying his renewed assurances this regard in reply to President. 10. In connection foregoing, and particularly in regard to Embtel 1502 of February 14, 2 you may also wish to remind King of his written assurances to President Eisenhower that GOM would not permit utilization of US bases relinquished to Morocco in any way inimical to US security. 3 11. You can say that you would like to report urgently to Washington King's responses and (if you have discussed possibility obtaining US aircraft) you are confident US can move rapidly to provide any equipment and training on which agreement reached. 12. Depending on King's reaction in your audience, you would presumably wish to take any appropriate steps that would be necessary to insure that Crown Prince does not feel we are circumventing him and to enlist support friendly members of cabinet. You may even think it desirable that Prince should be present in audience with King. FYI. If conversation does not go as well as we hope, and particularly if GOM seems determined make use Soviet aircraft and technicians, question arises as to means and desirability demonstrating harder US line. On this we wish to be guided largely by your recommendations and assessment of effect any retaliatory measures on overall US interests. US economic aid suggests itself as one area where US could make its displeasure felt. While pressures this regard, particularly those likely to be felt by or revealed to Moroccan public, run risk at some point of dangerous counter-effects, it might be possible take certain meaningful steps in our dealings with GOM officials. For example, while $40 million aid figure has been announced to GOM, most of FY'61 program pending. Although GOM does not appear to be in pressing need this aid, we might, for example, stall on commodity import schedule or tighten up on terms $20 million loan (requiring written Battle Act assurances, etc.). In last analysis, however, this or any other form of reprisal would raise grave considerations requiring most careful study. End FYI. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 771.5622/1-1861. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Root; cleared by Grantham (DOD), Bell, Penfield, and Veliotes; and approved by Hare. 1 Telegram 771 to Rabat, December 7, 1960, provided the Ambassador with standby authority under certain conditions to offer a squadron of jet aircraft to the Moroccan Government. (Ibid., 771.5622/11-2960) For additional information on the Presidential Determination of December 6, 1960, see Foreign Relations , 1958-1960, vol. XIII, pp. 812 - 814, footnote 1 . 2 Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 771.5622/2-1461) 3 See Foreign Relations , 1958-1960, vol. XIII, pp. 806 - 807 . 110. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy 110. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy Source Washington, February 24, 1961. SUBJECT Soviet Military Assistance to Morocco Ambassador Yost presented your letter to the King of Morocco in an audience on February 21 1 and is pursuing the problem posed by Morocco's acceptance of Soviet jet fighters in further conversations this week with the King, the Crown Prince and other key Moroccan officials. Characteristically, the King reserved comment on your letter until a later audience, but did repeat his assurances that nothing would be done to affect the U.S. bases. The Ambassador is planning to offer U.S. jets on condition that Soviet technicians be excluded from Morocco. In this connection, I think you should know that, in addition to the squadron of F-86's which the Ambassador is authorized to offer the King, the Ambassador is also authorized to say he will report sympathetically any interest the King expresses in a later model of U.S. jet fighter or in military air transport. The offer of any U.S. aircraft, however, is contingent on satisfactory assurances from the King that Morocco will store the Soviet jets and in any case will not permit Soviet technicians to remain in the country. As my memorandum of February 17 in connection with the message to the King pointed out, 3 the Department of Defense feels very strongly about the threat which Soviet planes and technicians would pose for our military bases in Morocco, a threat which Defense feels, moreover, extends to our Spanish bases, the Sixth Fleet and NATO's southern flank in general. Defense feels so strongly about this matter that it is willing to go a long way to satisfy Moroccan military air requirements despite the political disadvantages in so doing, including the tinge of blackmail that would color such a move to block the Soviet military presence. A Presidential determination to cover as much as $6.8 million for F-86's was granted on December 6, 1960, but Ambassador Yost did not then feel it necessary to draw on the standby authority given him. If it is now necessary to go beyond this earlier proposition, either by furnishing a later type of jet or by providing military transport aircraft, the cost might rise appreciably and would require a further Presidential determination. I understand Defense estimates that a squadron of F-100-Ds might cost as much as $20 million, not including the expenses for spares and maintenance. I do not know that it will be necessary to go to these lengths. Much depends on Ambassador Yost's success in getting the Moroccans to reaffirm their earlier assurances that Soviet technicians would not be permitted in Morocco. We have strong indications that Soviet personnel are already there, but they may be an assembly crew which will soon depart. In any case, I thought you should know where this matter now stands. The Moroccan Government under the initiative of the Crown Prince, does appear to be opening itself dangerously to Soviet assistance. It is not difficult to understand why the Pentagon is apprehensive about this development, given the importance of our bases in Morocco and in Spain as well as Morocco's strategic position on the Straits of Gibraltar. Dean Rusk 4 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Morocco, 1/61-10/61. Secret. 1 Ambassador Yost's report was sent to the Department of State in telegram 1571 from Rabat, February 21. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.71/2-1261) 3 Document 108 . 4 Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original. 111. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Stoessel) to the President's Special Assistant (Dungan) 111. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Stoessel) to the President's Special Assistant (Dungan) Source Washington, February 27, 1961. SUBJECT U.S.-Morocco Differences over Mauretania The differences between the United States and Morocco over Mauretania are simply stated. Morocco maintains that the government of Mauretania is a puppet regime, fabricated and supported by France to prevent the return to Morocco of territory rightfully hers. Morocco was of course anxious for the support of the United States, as a great power. We have in effect refused this by recognizing the independence of Mauretania and by showing our willingness to vote for Mauretania's admission to the United Nations. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has, for ulterior reasons, favored Morocco in this dispute. Morocco's political claims are not based on conclusive evidence, but there are cultural, ethnic and religious links between the two countries. Roughly two thirds of Mauretania's mainly nomadic population of about 600,000 are Moorish. Only along the Senegal river in the south is the population predominantly negroid. So far as we can judge, most of the Mauretanian tribal and religious chiefs who presently dominate local politics acknowledge the authority of the government of Mauretania's Prime Minister Moktar Ould Daddah, but there is some internal opposition and Morocco makes much of several prominent Mauretanians who have gone into voluntary exile in Morocco and hold important government posts there. Morocco bases its claims on historical links (however tenuous) going back to the early days of Islam in North Africa, on the traditional fealty alleged to have been paid the Sultans of Morocco and, of course, on the “true wishes” of the Mauretanian population. To back the latter assertion Morocco has proposed the holding of a plebiscite under UN auspices. France, on the other hand, alleges that national sovereignty in the present day legal sense did not exist in this remote and desolate land until the French arrived toward the latter part of the last century. The authority of independent Mauretania's present government is held to derive from the French right of conquest and from the elections which led to self-government. What has made the US position particularly uncomfortable is the open and determined espousal of the Moroccan claim by King Mohammed himself. Furthermore, the claim has at least the overt backing of all political tendencies in Morocco and it would now be virtually impossible for the King or anyone else in Morocco to back off from it. 1 At the very least, a face-saving device of some sort would have to be provided. We had hoped that there would be sufficient opposition to Morocco on this issue from other African countries to deflect Moroccan ire from us. This indeed appeared to be the situation at the time we recognized Mauretania's independence but the situation since then has become a good deal more equivocal. While many nations have recognized Mauretania's independence and, therefore, would presumably vote for its entry into the United Nations, Morocco by skillful horse trading with other nations with policies in need of support, has succeeded in lining up behind itself a group of assertive, radical Afro-Asian states. All of the 10-member Arab League, except Tunisia, and there is recent indication that Tunisia is falling back to a more guarded position, support the Moroccan position and do not recognize Mauretania. The three radical West African states—Ghana, Guinea, and Mali—recognized Mauretania but nevertheless approved a resolution at the recent Casablanca Conference which tacitly supports Morocco's claims. Indonesia, also, has publicly come out in favor of Morocco's claim, seeing therein a parallel to its claim to West New Guinea. The Soviet Union has backed the Moroccan position by vetoing Mauretania's application for U.N. membership, seeing in this dispute a chance to exacerbate U.S. Moroccan relations and put pressure on our bases. The Soviets did not take an unequivocal stand on the merits of the Morocco-Mauretania dispute but sought merely to link Mauretania's admission to that of Outer Mongolia. However, the Moroccan Government and press have overlooked this subtlety and give the Soviets full credit for blocking Mauretania's admission to the U.N. The United States recognizes Mauretania, voted for its admission to the U.N., and sent a Presidential delegation to the independence celebrations in Nouakchott. Our Ambassador in Dakar is also accredited to Mauretania. Most Western European and Latin American countries, a majority of the non-Arab Asian countries, and all tropical African states have extended recognition to Mauretania. France and a number of Western-oriented French-speaking African states have vigorously championed Mauretania's cause. What had been a territorial dispute of murky antecedents, is now, as a result of Moroccan tenacity, being presented as an issue of colonialism versus independence, a test of those who support puppets and those that do not. While the other states probably are supporting Morocco for tactical reasons, there is no evidence that Morocco can be dissuaded from pursuing her claim. In Rabat's telegram 1589 of February 23, 2 Ambassador Yost puts the problem vividly from the Moroccan point of view. In Dakar's 379 of December 1, 3 however, Ambassador Villard cogently defended the Mauretanian position. Ambassador Yost thinks we should proceed with “extreme caution” and not aid or support Mauretania “any more than is absolutely unavoidable.” Ambassador Villard's recommendation was that we make a statement when the question of Mauretania's membership in the U.N. comes up urging Morocco and Mauretania promptly to consult on means of overcoming their differences and of developing close and mutually valuable collaboration. The US thus faces a dilemma in which it cannot entirely avoid antagonizing one side or the other. It is possible, however, that we can limit the damage to ourselves in strategically-located Morocco, where we have a particularly heavy military investment, by avoiding any initiative on this primarily African question. Where we are obliged to express a view, we should try to stress the interest which both parties have in an amical relationship. Walter J. Stoessel, Jr. 4 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770V.00/2-2761. Confidential. Drafted by McClintic and Root on February 24 and cleared by Ferguson, Root, Penfield, and Hartley and in substance with Lindquist. The source text is attached to a transmittal note from Stoessel to Dungan noting that the Acting Secretary had seen and concurred in the enclosed memorandum on Mauretania. 1 While the above was written prior to King Mohammed's death the new King can be expected to pursue this claim with equal, if not even greater, vigor. [Footnote in the source text. King Mohammed V died on February 26. (Telegram 1604 from Rabat, February 26; ibid., 771.11/2-2661)] 2 Not printed. (Ibid., 771.022/2-2361) 3 Not printed. (Ibid., 303/12-160) 4 Printed from a copy that indicates Stoessel signed the original. 112. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Bowles to President Kennedy 112. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Bowles to President Kennedy Source Washington, March 28, 1961. SUBJECT Moroccan Bases In response to your letter, I have prepared the attached, rather comprehensive memorandum on Moroccan bases. 1 The Moroccans are now anxious that we accelerate our evacuation and that we assist Morocco to make good use of the bases for civil aviation training and other purposes. In a recent call on me the Moroccan Ambassador urged that we send a special emissary to Rabat to discuss the utilization question with the Moroccan authorities. 2 There seems to me to be an opportunity here—to help in Morocco's technical and economic development, to insure that Communist bloc powers do not come on the bases when we leave and to preserve for as long as possible our essential military interests in the remaining facilities. Although we have an agreement permitting us to retain our bases until the end of 1963, the internal Moroccan political situation is not promising and we would do well to meet constructively and not negatively Moroccan pressures on us. Chester Bowles 4 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 771.56311/3-2861. Secret. Drafted by Root on March 22 and cleared by Williams and McGhee. 1 An undated memorandum, “Status and Problems of U.S. Bases in Morocco,” from Assistant Secretary Williams to Under Secretary Bowles, is attached to the source text but is not printed. 2 The March 22 conversation was recorded in a memorandum of conversation that is in Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/3-2261. 4 Printed from a copy that indicates Bowles signed the original. 113. National Security Action Memorandum No. 34 113. National Security Action Memorandum No. 34 Source Washington, April 5, 1961. TO The Secretary of State SUBJECT Memorandum on Moroccan Bases, dated March 28, 1961, from Acting Secretary Bowles 1 I am returning herewith the subject memorandum and attachment. The memorandum of March 23, 1961 (attached to reference memorandum) on “Status and Problems of U.S. Bases in Morocco,” appears a suitable basis for exploring a new policy towards the Moroccan bases. I suggest, therefore, that the Department of State take the leadership in seeking the views of Defense, CIA and ICA as the memorandum suggests. After these soundings, a definite recommendation should be made to me by the Department of State, with dissenting comment from other agencies if they desire. In particular, these appear to be the critical questions. 1. Should an early beginning be made in the transfer of the Nouasseur base? 2. Should U.S. assistance—possibly through American airlines—be granted in converting that base to civilian use? 3. Should withdrawal of the U.S. Navy from Kenitra be contemplated? 4. Should we seek a Moroccan commitment to the long-term maintenance of U.S. Navy Communications at Sidi Yahia and Bouknadel? 5. Should we associate ourselves with the goal of a denuclearized Africa? 6. Should we seek a firm Moroccan commitment to keep Soviet forces out of the surrendered bases? 7. Should we seek to negotiate the notion of a U.S. return to the surrendered bases at a time of crisis? John F. Kennedy * Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 34. Secret. 1 Document 112 . 114. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco 114. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco Source Washington, April 14, 1961, 9 p.m. 1529. Generally speaking, we are in full accord with Embassy's advice that we must be sufficiently responsive to King's desires to maintain good relations with him but must at same time avoid damaging our relations with his opponents. Dept has carefully weighed proposal contained Embtel 1896 1 but considers dangers U.S. over-involvement with new King do not warrant pressing forward in supply of military items at this critical time, particularly in absence any indication from King he anxious U.S. should proceed. His utilization Soviet technicians with MIGs despite his assurances to contrary, opposition criticism of him for acceptance this Soviet equipment, total absence of past cooperation with U.S. in field training assistance to make U.S. furnished equipment useful and still unresolved question of unloading charges all argue against probable success U.S. overtures of this sort now. Reasons for which GOM has in past withheld publicity U.S. aid still obtain. U.S. programs of support for Morocco in existence prior to King's death are continuing and are of sufficient magnitude to refute any allegations U.S. now withholding support from Morocco. King himself has Amb. Yost's assurances our continuing willingness to be helpful. Furthermore, dramatic evidence this fact will come in next few days with signing FY 61 aid agreement and inauguration sizable famine and work relief programs. On other hand, we agree (Embtel 1816) 3 it preferable not give opposition grounds for believing we have sided with Monarch against it. Embassy has reported many friendly counsels U.S. avoid open support of King himself, as arms program would exemplify, as opposed to program for people of Morocco, i.e. economic aid and famine relief. For foregoing reasons Dept considers it advisable next moves regarding U.S. arms program come from King. Arrival of new Ambassador will give King natural opportunity to do so if he so wishes. Fact of approaching end of our fiscal year does not justify moving forward with program if it is not really wanted by King and if under present circumstances it would result in strong opposition resentment. If, as he well may, King should indicate suddenly he desires U.S. proceed post haste with second slice arms program we would respond to best our ability. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 771.5-MSP/3-2861. Secret. Drafted by McClintic, cleared by Junkermann, (DOD), and approved by Witman. Repeated to Paris, Madrid, and CINCEUR. 1 Telegram 1896 from Rabat, March 28, had asked whether the Departments of State and Defense saw any objection to the Army Attache proceeding with discussion of the Royal Moroccan Army's requirements for U.S. military assistance, without revealing the projected FY 1961 U.S. aid figures. (Ibid., 771.5-MSP/3-2861) 3 Dated March 17. (Ibid., 611.71/3-1761) 115. Memorandum Prepared by the Director of Operations for Politico-Military Affairs (Newman) 115. Memorandum Prepared by the Director of Operations for Politico-Military Affairs (Newman) Source Washington, May 2, 1961. SUBJECT Moroccan Bases Since receipt of National Security Action Memorandum No. 34, April 5, 1961, the Department of State has been reviewing our present policy on Moroccan bases, particularly with a view towards developing answers to the questions posed in the aforementioned memorandum. It is evident that the complexities of the problems involved will require considerable consultation with the other agencies involved and makes possible only the submission of an interim report at this time. The Department of State is moving forward rapidly on the necessary consultations. The Department of State's memorandum of March 28, 1961, 1 on Moroccan bases dealt primarily with the political problems that have arisen in our relations with Morocco as a result of the presence of our bases. While the memorandum points out the real political advantages which would accrue to the United States if certain actions were taken, it is evident that these actions could have serious military implications. These military considerations, revolving essentially around the relationship of the Moroccan bases to the totality of our national security posture, particularly the credibility of our nuclear deterrent and our strike capability, require discussion with Defense. The Department of State feels that it is essential that our recommendation to you reflect the proper balance of political and military considerations to the end that the actions proposed represent a net advantage to US national security. With regard to the specific questions posed, it is possible at this time to provide some tentative answers which will be coordinated with other agencies during our consultations. On the timing of our withdrawal from Nouasseur and Kenitra and the retention of our communication facilities at Sidi Yahia, Bouknadel and Sidi Slimane, these are actively being discussed with the Pentagon to determine their general relationship and importance to over-all United States military posture. In connection with this appraisal, we will also wish to consider the relationship of US bases to our developing disarmament policy. This consideration might well affect the timing of withdrawal for we may wish to seek to gain something for such action through disarmament negotiations. With respect to the role of United States assistance in converting those bases we proposed to relinquish to civilian use, we believe there is a real opportunity through this means to demonstrate our interest in Morocco. The possibilities involved in this line of action are actively being examined by the Department with Defense and ICA. The question of associating ourselves with the goal of a denuclearized Africa is an extremely important but difficult problem which affects our policies in other areas. The pressures for a UN resolution establishing a denuclearized Africa require careful handling because Morocco is one of the sponsoring countries. Fortunately, the resolution for a denuclearized Africa has been carried over to the next session so that it is not necessary to come to an immediate decision on how we are to handle the matter. If military considerations relating to the utility of our installations in Morocco at the present time so dictate, these pressures should not be encouraged, though we should not adopt a public stance against this goal. There is the additional consideration that the adoption of the concept of a denuclearized zone would establish a precedent for the rest of the world. Undoubtedly, communist powers, as well as other nations, would seize upon this precedent to argue for the extension of this principle to other parts of the world which, if successful, could profoundly affect our overall military posture. With regard to securing a commitment from the Moroccans to keep Soviet forces out of the surrendered bases, we have a commitment from the late King, which King Hassan has confirmed, that the bases will never be used against us. While the present commitment may not be as exact or as precise as we might desire, it is nevertheless adequate. It appears that this matter can be safely deferred until Ambassador Bonsal has had an opportunity to appraise US-Moroccan relationships generally. We can then determine if it is desirable to revive the question of securing a more definitive commitment from the King. On the question of whether the surrendered bases should be made available to United States forces at a time of crisis, we believe that any negotiations to gain us this specific right would unduly complicate our relationships with Morocco. The reality of the situation is such that, if the Moroccans were with us in a time of crisis, they would probably permit the return of United States forces. In the event they were not sympathetic with our policies and objectives at that time, it is highly unlikely they would agree to the return of our forces. This, too, is a matter which we feel should be deferred until we have the advantage of Ambassador Bonsal's appraisal. The Department of State anticipates very shortly submitting its recommendations and the views of the other agencies concerned. If approved they will serve as the basis for instructions to be given to Ambassador Bonsal prior to his departure for Morocco. * Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 34. Secret. Cleared (in substance) by Williams, Johnson, Gullion, Bell, and Bohlen. The Director of Operations administered a special component for politico-military affairs that served under Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson. This memorandum was transmitted under cover of a memorandum from Battle to Ralph Dungan at the White House which noted that NSAM No. 34 had directed the Department to explore recommendations for a new policy on the Moroccan bases and to seek the views of the Department of Defense, the CIA, and the ICA. Following preliminary discussions with Paul Nitze of Defense, the Department believed that further examination of the military considerations involved was needed before balanced recommendations taking into account political, military, and intelligence requirements could be made to the President. In the meantime, it was forwarding this interim memorandum on the subject, which had been cleared by Secretary Rusk. (Ibid.) Further documentation on the follow-up to NSAM No. 34 is ibid. 1 Document 112 . 116. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco 116. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco Source Washington, May 26, 1961, 8:06 p.m. 1785. For Ambassador Bonsal: On your arrival Morocco you will face five major problems relating to US bases: (1) evacuation schedule for bases and eventual Moroccan utilization thereof; (2) threat to security of bases from presence of Soviet technicians who arrived with Soviet gift of MIGs; (3) question of post-1963 facilities; (4) US military assistance to Morocco; (5) Moroccan interest in increased use Nouasseur. You aware background these problems and fact there has been little or no forward motion since death King Mohamed V with consequent disruption Moroccan Government. You know that with regard to (1) we have outstanding request from new King to accelerate evacuation and to assist Morocco make appropriate use of base facilities (e.g. for civil aviation); (2) Soviet technicians remain in Morocco despite assurances from both late and present Kings there would be no jeopardy to our bases; (3) King knows we would like to retain communications facilities but has given us no commitment; (4) conditional standby authority to offer jets has not been used and we have not yet negotiated with Morocco second slice of military assistance program for RMA recommended by US Survey Team; (5) USAF authorized the USAF Commander to permit civil use of Nouasseur as weather alternate to Cazes within the limits of Nouasseur's civil facilities but for security reasons have withheld authorization of any use by Soviet bloc civil aircraft. Lapse of time since these questions last discussed with King and changes taking place in Moroccan internal political life indicate desirability your making fresh appraisal of situation and submitting to us your recommendations before we take further steps. Base agreement and military aid program were negotiated in 1959 with popular and respected King Mohamed V and Prime Minister Ibrahim, 1 who also enjoyed wide popular support. Regime under Hassan with which we must now deal is much less popular and secure and to maintain itself in power will probably have to rely increasingly on Army and Police. This suggests we must walk narrow line between over identification with monarchy under attack from some of most dynamic segments population and antagonizing King to detriment our objectives as long as he is in power. We hope you can utilize your first interviews with King and ministers to form judgment their intentions and prospects without being drawn into new commitments, but being careful to guard against giving any indication we intend to withdraw from existing ones. We particularly want to obtain your estimate of best way to retain essential facilities to end of 1963 and to lay ground for any possibility there may be of preserving some position after 1963. You should make recommendations regarding any specific gestures which would gain us concrete advantages in foregoing respects, such as training Moroccans in airport management and maintenance and early release of Nouasseur to Morocco with assistance in the development of civil terminal facilities. In same context, we would like your views on (1) when to proceed with second year of military assistance program, and (2) usefulness of providing planes (and whether jets or transports) to Moroccan Air Force. You will of course have to use your own discretion in determining best approach to King in initial encounters. To strike positive note you can perhaps express interest in King's suggestions for future Moroccan utilization which he promised give us after Ramadan and say we are prepared, if King so wishes, to send experts to examine with GOM means by which bases might be made most beneficial to Morocco. You should emphasize need for careful planning to avoid interference with present military requirements at bases and to resolve many points of conflict that will arise in considering civil use. Some discussion of King's earlier request for accelerated evacuation is probably unavoidable. You may say this matter being considered at highest levels US Government but raises grave problems. World situation has not improved but worsened since base agreement reached in 1959 and importance of bases has therefore actually increased. While we consider departure 1963 firm obligation and orderly phase-out will require beginning of progressive withdrawal well before then, we are convinced that under present world conditions this arrangement will impair the security arrangements of the free world. We would appreciate learning King's sentiments on this subject. US Government anxious to be as helpful as possible but at same time hopes for sympathetic understanding of its own responsibilities. You should indicate to King that it is our firm conviction, and one that we would hope he shares, that the strength of the free world must be preserved to assure the maintenance of peace. To weaken it not only increases the chances of Soviet moves toward general war but greatly augments the likelihood of Communist expansion by military or covert means leading to the takeover of smaller nations. You may find occasion at this point to remind King of our interest in post-1963 communications facilities and to probe how far he seems willing to go by way of assurances in this regard. You should leave King in no doubt about our continued concern over presence Soviet technicians in Morocco. You can refer to assurances which both King and his father gave Ambassador Yost and say you would like to ascertain for your government where this matter now stands. You should reiterate that we consider our bases insecure so long as there are Soviet pilots or instructors anywhere in Morocco. Present tenuous situation in Morocco would seem to make it inadvisable to press arms or aircraft supply questions at this time. If, however, King shows interest in these questions, you can refer to earlier indications of our willingness to try to be of help and say you will report his suggestions promptly to Washington. You may of course repeat assurances contained President's letter conveyed by Ambassador Yost and emphasize importance which President attaches to continuing friendly relations which have extended over so many years. At this point, you should state your view that US economic assistance to Morocco over the past few years had been considerable, that you understand and fully expect to support this assistance in the future and look forward to examining ways in which it can be made even more beneficial to Morocco. Unless you think it would arouse excessive expectations you may find it useful to indicate you expect return Washington within few weeks to give your views on how US-Moroccan cooperation can best be enhanced. 2 Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 771.56311/5-2661. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McClintic and Root; cleared by Bronez (DOD), Templeton (ICA), Brown, Bohlen, and Newman; and approved by Williams. Repeated to Paris and Madrid. 1 For documentation on the negotiation of these agreements, see Foreign Relations , 1958-1960, vol. XIII, pp. 776 - 800 . 2 On June 12, Battle sent a copy of telegram 1785 to Bundy at the White House under cover of a memorandum noting that the Department of State had concluded that an on-the-spot appraisal by Ambassador Bonsal was a necessary element of the review of U.S. policy toward Morocco requested by NSAM No. 34. The Department intended to submit its recommendations once it had received Bonsal's views and consulted with other agencies. (Department of State, Central Files, 771.56311/6-1261) 117. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer) 117. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer) Source Washington, June 28, 1961. SUBJECT Retention of US Communications Facilities in Morocco Beyond CY 1963 In your memorandum of 15 June 1961 (JCSM-409-61), 1 it was recommended that the President be given a briefing on the need for retaining communications facilities in Morocco after 1963 and that we urge the State Department to pursue with increased vigor its efforts to obtain Moroccan concurrence to our continued use of the facilities. I have no objection to a discussion of this matter with the President. He has displayed personal interest in examining the need for retention of our facilities in Morocco, in light of the political liabilities involved. It is suggested, however, that the Joint Chiefs may wish to review for clarity the presentation forwarded with your memorandum of 15 June 1961. Paragraph 7 of the presentation (as well as paragraph 2 of the memorandum itself) indicates that retention of the communications facilities in Morocco is essential. Paragraph 6 of the memorandum states that acceptable alternative means or sites have not yet been found. However, paragraph 5 of the presentation suggests that equivalent substitute facilities could be found through expansion of facilities in Spain and the establishment of new facilities in the Central Mediterranean area. It would also be most useful to me to have clarification along these lines for any subsequent discussion of this problem with the Secretary of State. I have particularly in mind more precise information concerning the effect upon our Defense Communications System should the Moroccan facilities be lost after 1963 and what possible alternatives there may be, including their cost, the additional land requirements they entail in other countries, the minimum period of time required for their development once political arrangements are completed, and the specific extent, if any, to which they would not constitute equal substitute facilities. This information would be especially pertinent in evaluating what economic, military, political or other quid pro quo the United States should be prepared to offer to retain the Moroccan communications facilities after Ambassador Bonsal submits his appraisal as to what would be necessary to obtain Moroccan consent in this regard. Since Ambassador Bonsal is expected to return on consultation in the relatively near future, 2 I would appreciate receiving these clarifying materials as quickly as possible. Roswell L. Gilpatric 3 * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files:FRC 64 A 2382, Morocco, 680.1 Jan.-Aug. 1961. Secret. Drafted by Lang on June 23. Attached to a July 27 memorandum from Assistant Secretary of Defense NITZE to Secretary of Defense McNamara recommending that he sign the attached memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 1 Attached but not printed. 2 On July 7, the Department of State sent a memorandum to Bundy at the White House noting that since Ambassador Bonsal's arrival in Morocco on May 20 and presentation of his credentials to the King, he had had no opportunity to meet with him for further discussions, despite the Ambassador's indications that he would like to do so. Thus, Bonsal was continuing his assessment, and once the King had made known his requirements for U.S. action regarding the bases, he would report promptly and return to Washington, if the situation warranted. (Department of State,S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 34) 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Gilpatric signed the original. 118. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 118. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Source Washington, July 13, 1961. SUBJECT Bases in Morocco JCSM-471-61 1. The United States has no formal base rights agreement with Morocco. The Joint Communique of 22 December 1959 1 by President Eisenhower and the late King Mohammed V commits us to withdraw all our military forces by the end of CY 1963. This commitment necessarily required that the Strategic Air Command bases in Morocco be included in the recent US Air Force submission of overseas base closures to the Secretary of Defense for evaluation within the scope of the Department of Defense, Project 71. Despite the foregoing, significant military requirements still exist for bases in Morocco through 1963 and beyond. A detailed statement of these requirements is attached. The requirement for the retention of US communications and supporting facilities in Morocco, post-1963, has been previously stated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in JCSM-317-60 and JCSM-409-61. 2 2. Military requirements existed in December 1959 for retention of bases in Morocco beyond 1963 but were subordinated to overriding political considerations in arriving at the Joint Communique. These military needs have become more urgent in light of significant changes since December 1959 in the political and military considerations concerning our Moroccan Bases. In his Defense Budget Message to Congress on 28 March 1961, 3 the President expressed two of these changes: (1) the need for an increased alert posture to deter general war, and (2) the need for a ready capability to wage limited warfare with conventional weapons. Since the Joint Communique on Moroccan bases, these bases have become increasingly important for possible contingency operations in Africa or the Middle East. Too, our military force structure has not changed from manned aircraft to missiles at a sufficient rate to eliminate the need for bases in Morocco and it appears that such a change will not occur at least through 1966. 3. At the request of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), certain State Department officials, including the new US Ambassador to Morocco, were provided information by Air Force and Navy representatives regarding the military factors affecting our bases in Morocco. This meeting afforded State Department representatives a better understanding of military problems in Morocco. Subsequent to this meeting, a State Department instruction 4 was forwarded to the US Ambassador requesting that he make a fresh appraisal of the situation and recommend courses of action which might fulfill military requirements in Morocco. The Ambassador's recommendations are expected in a few weeks at which time the Department of State is expected to consult further with Defense representatives on this matter. 4. In anticipation of further action by the Department of Defense on this subject, the Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to reiterate their view, which was previously expressed in June 1959 to representatives of the Departments of Defense and State 5 that the bases in Morocco should be retained until the need for them no longer exists and that all feasible means should be taken to achieve this goal. In this connection, there are attached for your information, in addition to a statement of military requirements, suggestions regarding possible courses of action and possible bargaining positions that might be employed to achieve our military objectives in Morocco. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: L.L. Lemnitzer 6 Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, 680.1 Morocco. Top Secret. Attached to the source text but not printed are: Appendix A, “State of Post-1963 Military Requirements for Bases in Morocco”; Appendix B, “Possible Courses of Action To Achieve Military Objectives in Morocco”; and Appendix C, “Suggested Bargaining Positions in Possible Negotiations With Morocco.” 1 For a record of the December 22 conference between President Eisenhower and King Mohammed V, see Foreign Relations , 1958-1960, vol. XIII, pp. 796 - 800 . 2 JCSM-317-60 is not printed. Regarding JCSM-409-61, see Document 117 . 3 For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961 , pp. 229-240. 4 Document 116 . 5 See Foreign Relations , 1958-1960, vol. XIII, pp. 779 - 785 . 6 Printed from a copy that indicates Lemnitzer signed the original. 119. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of the Navy (Fay) to President Kennedy 119. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of the Navy (Fay) to President Kennedy Source Washington, July 17, 1961. SUBJ Retention of Department of Defense Facilities in Morocco The Eisenhower-King Mohammed V agreement in December 1959 stated in part that the United States would withdraw from its bases in Morocco prior to December 31, 1963 with the possible exception of certain communications facilities in Kenitra. This latter exception was deliberately included to protect and retain if possible, not only the Navy's main radio [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] but also the supporting Navy air and sea communications facilities in Kenitra proper. This complex is the Navy's most important in the European-African area. It is the Navy's position that if certain moves are made, she will be able to keep her very important naval communications installations near Port Lyautey. Our justification for this position is based on the following. King Hassan II had personally scheduled a departure call on Thursday, 13 July for Captain John L. Counihan, File Number 071627, who was under orders to return to CONUS for duty. 1 Prior to Captain Counihan's appointment, the King scheduled Ambassador Phillip Bonsal for his initial discussions which, it is understood, included the question of United States bases. 2 During the conference with Captain Counihan, the King expressed his personal and Morocco's regret at the Captain's departure and inquired if the Captain was interested in remaining in Morocco for a longer time. He said that he would like to have the Captain serve as a special technical adviser to his Minister of Interior and Chief of Royal Cabinet, M. Guedira, in matters pertaining to the bases. He indicated he would amplify these instructions upon the return of Captain Counihan to Morocco after his discussions with the proper Washington officials. He then added that he recognized the importance of the U.S. Navy communications facilities in Morocco to the support of U.S. Navy forces in the Mediterranean and he, the King, felt that a suitable arrangement could be made between the Government of Morocco and the United States for their continued use after 1963. As to the main Navy base in Kenitra, he expressed an opinion that after the French withdrawal, the base could be converted to a Moroccan base in which the U.S. Navy would remain as tenants and with an additional role as instructor in maintenance and technical fields for the Moroccan Armed Forces on that base. He thought that the Moroccan Navy (2 PCs) could profit from U.S. Navy's assistance. He then asked that Captain Counihan personally convey these sentiments in a closely held manner to the responsible authorities in Washington. This unique arrangement could present some problems. It will take the nicest sense of judgment in the relationship between the U.S. Ambassador and Commander, U.S. Naval Activities to successfully exploit this unusual opportunity to influence Moroccan programs and policies regarding the bases. There is a possibility that an opportunity might even arise during this period which could result in extension of tenure of certain U.S. Air Force facilities on a joint basis with Morocco. Captain Counihan has been Commander, Naval Activities, Port Lyautey since 15 December 1957 and has built up an unusually friendly rapport, not only with the King, but with the Moroccans in general in Rabat and Kenitra. He was instrumental in providing extensive aid to the Moroccans during the Agadir earthquake. It is our belief that without Captain Counihan working in this capacity, we stand to lose not only the SAC bases, but all of our military facilities and therefore feel that if the State Department will agree to letting Captain Counihan accept the King's offer, we will be able to retain the approximately $100,000,000 communications facilities that the Navy uses to serve the Mediterranean area. Very respectfully, Paul B. Fay, Jr. * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Morocco, 1/61-10/61. Secret. Attached to a transmittal note from Kenneth O'Donnell to Bundy stating: “The President would like you to read this and give him the benefit of your thinking as rapidly as possible.” A handwritten notation says “done.” (Ibid.) 1 On July 26, the Department of State sent a report of Counihan's conversation with the King “Eyes Only” to Ambassador Bonsal in telegram 111 to Rabat. Bonsal was informed that Counihan had met personally with the President following his return to Washington, and that the Navy intended to follow through with its previous decision assigning him to Washington. Noting that the King had said nothing to either Counihan or Bonsal about his conversations with either, Rusk asked the Ambassador to keep these facts in mind in preparing his final recommendations. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.71/7-2661) 2 Bonsal summarized the portion of his July 13 conversation with the King dealing with bases in telegram 84 from Rabat, July 14. The Ambassador reported that the King had dropped his previous attempt to hasten U.S. evacuation of the bases and was most interested in a careful study of the possibilities of converting those bases to Moroccan purposes. Hassan also said that the Soviet technicians in Morocco had completed their work and would depart soon, and that he believed an arrangement could be reached under which the United States could maintain communications facilities in Morocco. (Ibid., 771.56311/7-1461) 120. Paper Prepared by the Ambassador to Morocco (Bonsal) 120. Paper Prepared by the Ambassador to Morocco (Bonsal) Source Rabat, August 14, 1961. CURRENT UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH MOROCCO [Here follows the body of the paper.] Summary of Recommendations The recommendations contained in this memorandum may be summarized as follows: 1. That we deal with the Moroccan Government as a relatively popular and relatively stable government and that we abandon our concern about overidentification. 2. That the survey group to study post-1963 uses of the bases and to make recommendations thereon be activated and despatched to Morocco without delay (perhaps, however, not until after the Soviet pilots and technicians have departed). 3. That we submit an offer to the King covering a long-term relationship in the field of military aviation training and materiel supply. 1 4. That we prepare and submit a detailed offer covering the use of the naval communications facilities at Kenitra after 1963 for submittal to the King as soon as possible. 5. That we make a thorough re-examination of the justification from the U.S. point of view of maintaining these communications facilities on Moroccan soil after 1963. 6. A decision is required as to policies to be followed by us in the event promises regarding the departure of the Soviet pilots and technicians are not implemented. (This was mentioned to Balafrej again on August 14—he gave fresh assurances.) 7. That the Embassy and USOM be in a position to initiate negotiations with the Government of Morocco for the FY-1962 Aid Program as soon as possible after October 1. 8. That similarly we be in a position to initiate negotiations for the third slice of the Military Assistance Program during the fall of this year. 9. That a date be established for Balafrej's visit to Washington and be communicated to him as soon as possible. * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.71/8-1461. Attached to a transmittal memorandum from Bonsal to Director of the Office of North African Affairs Witman, dated August 14. On August 24, a copy of Bonsal's recommendations was sent to Robert Komer at the White House. (Ibid., 611.71/8-2461) 1 On August 8, the Department of State Executive Secretary, Lucius D. Battle, sent a memorandum to Frederick G. Dutton at the White House concerning the King of Morocco's dissatisfaction with the lack of U.S. aid to the Moroccan Air Force, a subject in which the President had expressed an interest. It noted that Hassan had expressed some bitterness to Ambassador Bonsal on July 28 over the fact that the possibility of Morocco receiving U.S. jets, which he had discussed with General Wade in January, had never materialized. The memorandum pointed out that the removal of Soviet personnel had clearly been a stipulation of any such offer, and that Ambassador Yost had subsequently indicated that Moroccan requests for U.S. aid to the Moroccan Air Force would be sympathetically considered. (Ibid., AF/AFN Files: Lot 63 D 250, M-12 Moroccan Air Force 1961) 121. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Secretary of the Air Force (Zuckert) 121. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Secretary of the Air Force (Zuckert) Source Washington, September 23, 1961. SUBJECT Moroccan Base Problems In your memorandum of 20 September 1961, 1 you recommended that any program of US support for the Moroccan Air Force, involving under present circumstances no guarantee of post-1963 SAC tenure in Morocco, should be carefully designed to avoid prejudicing our relations with Spain and future tenure at our Spanish bases. In considering whether to recommend to the President that an assistance program be undertaken, we have had this aspect of the matter uppermost in mind. While we would hope that the program might later produce Moroccan cooperation on any continuing SAC post-1963 requirements, we foresee no assurance of this. The purpose of the program would be a calculated effort, albeit without certainty, to preclude further Soviet penetration of the Moroccan Air Force with equipment and technicians. Both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Air Force have emphasized the threat which such Soviet penetration presents for our operations in Morocco and in Spain. We agree that the impact of this program on US-Spanish relations is a critical aspect of the problem. ISA has now concurred in the program, because of the considered judgment, at the highest levels of the State Department, that the proposed program would not jeopardize our continued use of the Spanish bases after 1963 (although) we can anticipate increased Spanish demands for military assistance). The recommendation to the President will be that the program should be kept to a minimum consistent with our aim of precluding further Soviet support to the Moroccan Air Force. Initially, we would ascertain whether the establishment of flying training facilities and provision of aircraft to improve Morocco's air transport capability would suffice. If it nevertheless appears necessary to provide jet fighters and training, our offer would be limited to F-86s. Should the King of Morocco, despite our best efforts, insist on an improved type of jet, a further determination must then be made in Washington weighing all circumstances at the time, whether to proceed with our offer of assistance. It is clearly understood by all concerned that F-100s are not now available due to the Berlin and other contingency planning. Ambassador Bonsal has placed heavy emphasis on the need for a highly competent Air Force officer, fluent in French and preferably of general officer rank, to discuss the program with King Hassan and senior officers of the Moroccan Air Force. The success of evolving a program satisfactory to the King, which also falls within limits acceptable to us, could well rest on the influence this officer can bring to bear. Accordingly, it is requested that an officer be carefully selected at the earliest possible time to carry out this task, with the possibility in mind that he may be called to Morocco in the early days of October. It is impossible to predict the length of his stay there. However, we should plan on his being available for this project for at least three months. As to a JCS opinion, the Chiefs have already given us a military judgment on the desirability of retaining the Moroccan bases, and we are well aware of the importance they attach to the Spanish bases. Since the crucial question is one of political judgment—whether this offer to Morocco will jeopardize the Spanish position—I do not think a further opinion by the Chiefs is required at the present time. Robert S. McNamara 2 * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, Morocco 686, 10 Jan 62. Secret. Drafted by Lang. Attached to a memorandum from Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs William P. Bundy to Secretary McNamara recommending that he sign the attached response to Secretary Zuckert's memorandum, and noting that if he and Under Secretary Bowles approved, the proposed offer would be conveyed to the President. 1 Secretary Zuckert's memorandum had argued that since there was little or no possibility of effective use of U.S. bases in Morocco after 1963, the only significant benefit to hope for was precluding their future use by unfriendly forces. This meant that the United States would be forced to rely more heavily on its Spanish bases and thus any U.S. action in Morocco should not prejudice U.S. relations with Spain. (Ibid.) 2 Printed from a copy that indicates McNamara signed the original. 122. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy 122. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Source Washington, September 25, 1961. SUBJECT Action Program on Moroccan Base Issue After long haggling 1 State and Defense have agreed on a program designed to (a) preclude further Soviet air assistance to Morocco; (b) establish a favorable climate to help ensure the Moroccans live up to the base agreement until the end of 1963 and possibly extend our use in some form beyond; and (c) generally insure a reasonably favorable posture on the part of this highly strategic country. The chief means to this end would be to offer aid to the Moroccan air force . As you know, Morocco accepted last year two MIG-15s and 12 MIG-17s, along with technicians. The new king has informally suggested to us that US aid for his air force would be preferable to reliance on Moscow. He also has ideas about running a training program for other African countries. Ambassador Bonsal recommends that we agree in principle to provide such aid and send a survey team to see what the Moroccans would settle for. He believes that Morocco should be asked to put up a substantial portion of the cost. Our share cannot be costed for these reasons, but could run to a total of $20-50 million over several years. Why aid to the air force ? Giving Morocco advanced US jets will create real problems elsewhere (see below). We are already giving it on the order of $40-50 million in economic aid and $4 million in military. Could we increase this instead? The trouble is that we want to preclude a Soviet-supported air arm, and believe the King is otherwise highly likely to continue to accept such Soviet aid. Moreover, a US air mission, etc. in Morocco gives us a leg up on continued access to the bases and facilities after 1963. What kind of air force? State and the Ambassador believe that the Moroccans may not settle for anything less than a squadron of Century series fighters, i.e. F-100s. Giving F-100s to Hassan would at a minimum generate Spanish demands for more advanced types. Spain only has F-86s, although several squadrons of them. We currently contemplate giving Spain one squadron of 104Gs in 1964-1965, but our base rights there too are up for renegotiation by 1963 and will probably generate larger Spanish demands. In any case no F-100s are currently available because of our Berlin build-up, and Defense would oppose F-100s because of the implication for many other areas where we are resisting demands for advanced fighters, e.g. Thailand. The compromise recommendation is that we try hard to sell the Moroccans on F-86s, but if the survey team discovers the price is higher, we'll re-examine our position. Aid to the Moroccan air force is agreed by all concerned to be a gamble, but State and Defense believe it one we should take. On the plus side are the arguments that Morocco is itself highly important real estate because of our SAC bases, which the JCS say will be needed through 1966. We want to preclude a Soviet military presence so close to our Spanish and Moroccan bases, and at the entrance to the Mediterranean. Navy and SAC communications facilities in Morocco are also highly important, and DOD is anxious to arrange for their continued use, perhaps on a civilianized basis, after 1963. The proposed aid would help create a favorable atmosphere for such negotiations. On the other hand, there are so many uncertainties in this highly complex and volatile situation that nobody can guarantee that US aid will ensure any hold on these bases after 1963, or even until then. King Hassan has shown more staying power than we thought he would last February when the old King died, and Bonsal thinks that he is a good bet to stay in power, but the Leftist opposition is strong and Hassan may make a false step at any time. Thus any promises made now by his regime may not be worth much later on. Many other developments might take place which could so upset US-Moroccan relations as to render any aid of limited bargaining value. Morocco has designs not only on parts of Algeria and Mauritania but on the remaining Spanish enclaves. Continued friction with Spain is inevitable and fighting may break out. Our position in this event might completely overshadow the positive gain from an accelerated aid program. Moreover, developments in Algeria might also force Morocco to take an anti-Western stand. In the endeavor to rid itself of Spanish enclaves and remaining French bases, Morocco might find it necessary to put pressure on us too. So offering air force aid to Morocco would create serious problems with Spain and even France. The Ambassador argues that Spain should realize that a US-supported air force would be less of a threat to it than a Soviet-supported one. However, the Spanish doubt that we would buy much with a US air force and have no confidence in Hassan's regime. Finally, can we be sure that US aid would in fact preclude acceptance of further Soviet military aid? Bonsal believes that we must make this in effect one of the terms of the deal, though we should handle it privately with the King. I urge that you read State covering memo and pp. 6-8 of basic paper. 2 Recommendations: 1. That you approve the State/Defense proposals as our best bet; it's frankly a gamble but a good one in view of the military importance of the real estate to us. 2. That, as State recommends, you see Bonsal for a few minutes at New York or Newport. 3 He's been cooling his heels for a month while State and DOD worked over his program, and must return to Rabat before Mennen Williams gets there on 2 October. 3. That you give him a [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] message for Hassan. [ 2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] If you approve in principle an air force program, Bonsal urges the message stress the preclusive angle along the attached lines. Robert Komer 4 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 34. No classification marking. 1 Interagency meetings to discuss Bonsal's recommendations were held on August 29 and September 1. These discussions were recorded in memoranda of conversations that are in Department of State, AF/AFN Files: Lot 63 D 250, 1961-, M-12, Preparations for Continued Use of Communications Sites, and ibid., Central Files, 771.56311/9-161. Final consideration of the resulting policy recommendations took place at a joint State-Defense meeting on September 22. This discussion was recorded in a memorandum of conversation that is ibid., 771.5622/9-2261. 2 On September 23, Acting Secretary Bowles transmitted the paper, “Recommended U.S. Policy Concerning Bases in Morocco,” to the President attached to a covering memorandum entitled “Moroccan Bases and Soviet Penetration of the Moroccan Air Force.” (Ibid., S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 34) Pages 6-7 of the paper contained recommendations that were subsequently approved by the President in NSAM No. 102, printed as Document 123 . 3 Ambassador Bonsal discussed these policy recommendations with the President in New York on September 25. Their conversation was recorded in a memorandum for the files is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Morocco. 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 123. National Security Action Memorandum No. 102 123. National Security Action Memorandum No. 102 Source Washington, October 6, 1961. MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense SUBJECT U.S. Policy Concerning Bases in Morocco 1. The President has approved the following State/Defense recommendations: (1) While being prepared to fulfill our commitment to withdraw our forces by the end of 1963, we should exploit every feasible opportunity to retain the use of the facilities beyond that date. In the interim we should continue to evaluate the need for these facilities to determine whether it would be in the overall US interest to use extraordinary measures, such as a major political concession at an appropriate time, to retain the use of the bases after 1963. (2) Given the present trend of developments in the Near East and Africa and the internal political uncertainties in Morocco, we should not base important military plans upon the expectation that we will be able to retain the military use of any facilities in Morocco after 1963. We should realize that the continued use of these facilities in Morocco, a non-aligned country, is subject to many hazards even under present conditions. (3) There is little evidence that the King is now prepared to grant us, except on presumably unacceptable political conditions, an agreement which would assure the post-1963 tenure of communications sites. Additionally, such an agreement if consummated could become the immediate target of political attacks, and of course there can be no assurances such an agreement would be honored in the political circumstances prevailing at the end of 1963. Nevertheless, the Ambassador should explore the question further with the King on the basis of a detailed Defense proposal as to what would be acceptable after 1963. (4) With due regard for financial costs, we should assist Morocco in the effective utilization of the bases after 1963 and, in this regard, endeavor to preserve some form of U.S. presence (civilian or military) on the bases after 1963. The objectives should be to: (a) insure that the bases will not be made available in any way to hostile forces, (b) insure that Moroccan utilization of the bases would be compatible with possible US use after 1963 and that the bases would be suitably maintained for such use, and (c) make maximum use of the bases in connection with US programs of economic and technical assistance in Morocco. (5) We should continue: (a) to endeavor to improve our intelligence coverage regarding the activities of the Soviet pilots and technicians associated with the Soviet aircraft; (b) to impress on appropriate Moroccan officials our deep concern regarding the presence of these pilots and technicians and to recall to such officials the King's statement regarding the termination of the Soviets' mission, and (c) to consider whether we are in a position to take any sort of “retaliatory” action. (6) In the light both of the King's demonstrated determination to have a modern Air Force and of his demonstrated willingness to accept Soviet bloc assistance in this field, despite his professed interest in US support, we should be prepared to offer US support in the expansion of the Royal Moroccan Air Force, bearing in mind the effect which such support would have on our relations with Spain and France as well as African countries. Such support should be subject to the following general conditions and limitations: (a) We would inform the French and Spanish of our intention to offer assistance to the Moroccan Air Force. (b) If feasible the size of the program should be held down in the initial years to permit us to evaluate the success of the program in achieving US objectives before we become too heavily involved in the support of the Moroccan Air Force. (c) The character and extent of any US assistance should be kept at the minimum consistent with our aim of precluding further Soviet support of the Moroccan Air Force. We should first endeavor to ascertain whether the establishment of a flying training facility and provision of aircraft to improve Morocco's air transport capability would suffice. If it nevertheless appears necessary to provide jet fighters and training, we should limit our offer to F-86s. If the King of Morocco, despite our best efforts, insists on an improved type of jet we should at that point weigh carefully whether or not to proceed further with our offer. We should bear in mind, on the one hand, that an offer of Century Series aircraft would provoke demands from our allies and other unaligned nations for comparable assistance. However, we should, on the other hand, bear in mind that our failure, in these circumstances, to make available this type of aircraft would probably hasten Moroccan recourse to the Soviets, setting an example for other unaligned nations. In addition, although the King would probably carry through on the agreement permitting us tenure at our bases until the end of 1963, it can be assumed he would feel less inclined toward willing cooperation if we turned him down on his air force requests. 2. The following courses of action to implement the above policy have also been approved by the President: (1) That an AID survey group be sent to Morocco in the near future (timing to be decided by the Ambassador after his return to Rabat) to study and make recommendations, with DOD advice and assistance, regarding the ways in which the US could assist the Moroccan Government in the post-1963 utilization of the bases by Morocco. The survey recommendations should point towards the retention of a US presence on the bases after 1963 and terms of utilization which would not preclude post-1963 military use if circumstances later warrant. (2) That the Ambassador, on the basis of a detailed memorandum from the Department of Defense indicating how we would propose to “convert” and “civilianize” the communications sites near Kenitra and Sidi Slimane, should seek such arrangements, under mutually acceptable conditions, which would permit the continued use of these facilities after 1963. (3) That actions in the political field to which the King might attach importance should be continually examined. (4) That the US, through Ambassador Bonsal, offer in principle to support the expansion of the Moroccan Air Force provided the Moroccan Government makes clear its willingness to bear a reasonable proportion of the costs. (5) That a French-speaking Air Force senior officer be sent to Morocco with the agreement of the King to examine ways in which US support to the Moroccan Air Force might be furnished, this officer to be fully conversant with the effect such an effort to substitute the US for the USSR in Moroccan reliance on aviation equipment and training would have both on the possibilities for longer retention of our bases and on our relations with our allies and other African countries. (6) That, based on his recommendations, the US draw up a program of assistance for the Moroccan Air Force to begin in FY '62. (7) That active steps be taken so that the Embassy and USOM may be in a position to initiate negotiations with the Government of Morocco for the FY 1962 Economic Aid Program as soon as possible after October 1. (8) That similarly we speed up procedures to permit the initiation of negotiations for the third slice of the current Military Assistance Program during the fall of this year. 3. The program of aid for the Moroccan Air Force will be predicated upon satisfactory private assurances from Morocco that no further Bloc Air Force aid will be accepted. If these assurances are not forthcoming, or if at any future date the Moroccans do accept further Bloc aid of this nature, the US program will be reviewed. McGeorge Bundy 1 * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, Morocco, 680.1 Sept.-Dec. 1961. Secret. Information copies were sent to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the U.S. Information Agency, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the Administrator of the Agency for International Development, and the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration. 1 Printed from a copy that indicates Bundy signed the original. 124. Editorial Note 124. Editorial Note On October 23, 1961, Ambassador Bonsal met with King Hassan II and Minister of State Ahmed Balafrej. Bonsal conveyed a message from President Kennedy stating that if the King were to come to New York to attend the U.N. General Assembly, he would be pleased to meet with him in Washington. The King responded that he did not plan to go to the United Nations this year but expressed interest in the possibility of a State visit to Washington the following year. He added that he planned to send Balafrej as his personal representative to Washington in late November to present a general explanation of Moroccan foreign policy, and hoped he would be received by the President. (Telegram 644 from Rabat, October 24; Department of State, Central Files, 771.11/10-2461) During the conversation, Bonsal outlined the composition of the U.S. survey group that had been set up to study and formulate recommendations on the conversion of U.S. bases in Morocco to peaceful uses, and the King expressed his hope that the team, with which he personally planned to meet for a working session, would proceed to Morocco at an early date. (Telegram 645 from Rabat, October 24; ibid.) The Ambassador conveyed Kennedy's appreciation of Hassan's willingness to find a formula that would permit continued U.S. use of the naval communications facilities at Kenitra after 1963. The King reiterated his hope that this could be worked out, but stipulated that he wanted it done by the two of them on a very confidential basis. (Telegram 646 from Rabat, October 24; ibid.) Bonsal said that the President had personally and carefully studied the U.S. position on Mauritania in line with the King's expressed desire that this be changed, but had decided, partly in view of previous U.S. commitments, that it could not be. (Telegram 647 from Rabat, October 24; ibid., 611.51T/10-2461) On October 26, Bonsal reported that he and Hassan had not discussed aid to the Moroccan air force, but that he had since learned from Balafrej that the King continued to be interested in this subject and had been surprised that he had not raised it. He had told the Foreign Minister that he would welcome any information regarding Moroccan plans for developing its air force, and stated that he had previously reported his discussion of this subject with Hassan in July to Washington. Bonsal said he then mentioned the problem of Soviet pilots and technicians without eliciting any specific response. He believed that no further U.S. initiative was necessary for the moment, but that the United States should be ready to respond to any Moroccan initiatives. (Telegram 664 from Rabat, October 26; ibid., 771.5/10-2661) 125. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of Defense 125. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of Defense Source Washington, October 25, 1961. DEFENSE REQUIREMENT FOR CONTINUED USE OFCOMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES IN MOROCCO AFTER 1963 There is a need for the continued operation after 1963 of the present U.S. Navy communications facilities at Bouknadel and Sidi Yahia. In addition there is a need for continued operation of certain very limited U.S. Air Force communications facilities at and near the Sidi Slimane air base. The latter specifically include the communications center at Sidi Slimane air base, the receiver site about sixteen miles west of the air base and the transmitter site about ten miles east of the air base. The most effective use of the U.S. Navy communications facilities at Bouknadel and Sidi Yahia would require certain support facilities not available at the sites themselves (for example, some administrative, housing, medical, and commissary facilities, and the limited use of air transport facilities). The most practicable solution for these support needs would appear to be some arrangement, satisfactory to both Governments, under which continued use could be made of certain facilities at the Kenitra naval air station which already serve to support the communications sites. The Air Force facilities at and near Sidi Slimane could be operated after 1963 by approximately thirty-five civilian employees of a U.S. civilian contractor. Operation of the sites at Bouknadel and Sidi Yahia would require approximately their current personnel strength, but we would propose to make maximum practicable use of Moroccan personnel in order to reduce the total number of U.S. naval personnel involved. The naval personnel would wear civilian clothing at all times. As King Hassan was advised during his first visit to Washington as Crown Prince in October 1960, the communications facilities encompassed by the United States proposal are important elements in the world-wide communications system of the United States forces. As such, they are important in the defense of the Western world, including North Africa, against potential Communist aggression. It was also confirmed to the Crown Prince that the function of the facilities would be to provide relay points for the transmission of administrative and operational messages. * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, Morocco, 680.1, Sept.-Dec. 1961. Secret. Attached to a memorandum from the Director of Foreign Military Rights Affairs, William E. Lang, to William Witman, stating that the Department of Defense had undertaken to provide a memorandum on its specific post-1963 communications requirements and the ways in which the facilities in Morocco might be converted without jeopardizing the military mission. Noting that the attached memorandum had been cleared in Defense, Lang asked that it be forwarded to Ambassador Bonsal as a basis for discussion with the Moroccans concerning post-1963 communications arrangements. A copy of the memorandum was transmitted to Bonsal on November 9. (Instruction CW-4125; Department of State, Central Files, 771.56311/11-961) On December 5, the Ambassador responded that it was clear from the record of all previous conversations with the King that he assumed that continued operation of the communications sites after 1963 would be predicated upon generous U.S. assistance. Thus, the Embassy was convinced that any proposal to Hassan should be in the form of a comprehensive package covering in detail U.S. post-1963 needs and spelling out the advantages to Morocco of U.S. technical and economic aid. (Telegram 933 from Rabat; ibid., 771.56311/12-561) 126. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco 126. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco Source Washington, December 5, 1961, 11:07 a.m. 751. During course 3 day visit here Balafrej received by following: President, Secretary, Secretary Defense, McGhee, Rostow, Williams, Kohler, Hamilton. Following based on uncleared memcons: 1 In all discussions Balafrej emphasized Morocco's non-alignment, desire strengthen its long standing friendly relations with U.S., Morocco's development possibilities, lack of technicians, gratitude for US aid, preoccupation with need for rapid solution Algeria, pleasure at US understanding new nations' problems. In addition foregoing more important specific points were as follows: Balafrej conveyed personal letter to President from King expressing King's wishes for opportunity meet President and consolidation traditional US-Moroccan friendship. President mentioned: King's initiative Ben Bell a extremely helpful, our belief De Gaulle moving as far and fast as circumstances permit, that Ghana, Guinea and particularly Mali cause concern and suggested Morocco well placed to steer these countries into more independent non-alignment. President expressed wish meet King sometime soon and said had discussed with Ambassador Bonsal possibility of an early visit of King to US. Secretary emphasized our concern Morocco may be entering into new association with Soviets in direct and sensitive field of military aviation. Pointed out this would be difficult to explain to US people particularly at time when US and Morocco moving together toward regularizing our special situation in Morocco, i.e, bases. Balafrej countered by saying in view Morocco policy non-alignment a military alliance or accord with Soviets out of question as would be such an alliance with US. Said, however, it unthinkable Moroccan relations with US should be affected by a choice Morocco might make of a source from which to receive arms it needed. Continued with allusions to difficulties which US allies have caused Morocco and other newly independent or emerging countries (Algeria). Dwelt on cooperation US had offered and Morocco's gratitude for it. Contended he unaware of any specific offer from Soviets Morocco now had under consideration. Secretary McNamara emphasized to Balafrej US willingness to assist Morocco once it became aware Morocco's military plans and needs. Agreed that Embassy Rabat would be channel for exchange info between GOM and USG. Balafrej said would inform King of US willingness on his return. Comment : While Balafrej was left in no doubt as to seriousness with which US would view further acceptance Soviet aircraft and technicians, he also carried away impression our own willingness examine Moroccans requirements sympathetically. Dept informed Balafrej gave lengthy interview to UPI, in which he allegedly heavily exaggerates, to benefit of Moroccan Monarchy, most of foregoing. Embassy may comment that this report based on Mr. Balafrej's alleged views of discussions about which Embassy has no full report. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.7111/12-561. Secret; Niact. Drafted by McClintic on December 1, cleared by Manfull and Smith (White House), and approved by Witman. Also sent to POLAD CINCSAC, Madrid, Paris, and CINCEUR. 1 Balafrej met with President Kennedy on November 27. A memorandum of the conversation is ibid., 611.71/12-761. Balafrej met with Secretary Rusk on the morning of November 30. A memorandum from Assistant Secretary Williams to Secretary of Defense McNamara summarizing this conversation is ibid., 771.11/11-3061. Secretary McNamara met with Balafrej on the afternoon of November 30. A memorandum of conversation is ibid., 771.56/11-3061. 127. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy 127. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Source Washington, January 5, 1962. SUBJECT Aid to Moroccan Air Force This memorandum is to inform you of at least a tactical modification which seems required in the policy you approved last September of offering aid to Moroccan air force. This program was to be predicated upon “satisfactory private assurances” that no further Bloc air aid would be accepted. If these assurances were not forthcoming, the policy was to be reviewed. Since then Morocco has become more immediately interested in transports than in the jet fighters we were afraid we might have to give. Moreover, the Soviets have made a new aid offer (perhaps including planes) and the Moroccan Defense Minister went to Moscow to discuss it. State is therefore anxious to move quickly by sending an Air Force colonel to survey Moroccan needs. While Bonsal has not yet been able to get to King (who is obviously stalling), he and State feel that we should take this next step on basis of Foreign Minister Balafrej's statement that Moroccans will make no arrangements involving Soviet technicians in Morocco and that King's interest is mainly in Soviet small arms. French were given similar assurances. State argues that even though Moroccans are obviously blackmailing us, it is tactically unwise now to insist on more formal guarantees. They point out that we could get additional assurances later on before making a final offer. Defense will go along (it plans to send the colonel to Rabat this weekend), but is worried that in doing so we are in effect taking one more step down the road without yet getting firm preclusive guarantees the policy calls for. LeMay is concerned because the C-119s Moroccans want will have to come out of our own inventory, and over Spanish objections (French seem to have come around to our view that if we don't help Morocco, Soviets will). I feel that we should go along with State. Although we do not yet have the words from King we want, our overall interest is preclusion in fact, not in words. All recognize that this exercise is a gamble, and that it is how forthcoming we are on aid which will in fact determine whether King keeps Soviets out. While I too think we need and should try for more “satisfactory assurances,” we should allow State leeway as to how and when these can best be obtained. R. W. Komer * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 121. Secret. Attached to the source text is a transmittal note from Komer to Bundy, saying that the President should be informed immediately since an Air Force colonel was ready to leave for Morocco. Komer added: “I also plan NSAM asking for progress report on Moroccan base question to force State to plan scheme for getting assurances at appropriate point.” Another note to Bundy, attached to the source text and signed with the initials “ab,” noted that Komer was very anxious to know the President's reaction and that the Department of Defense was postponing sending the colonel to Rabat until it knew that the President had no objection. 128. National Security Action Memorandum No. 121 128. National Security Action Memorandum No. 121 Source Washington, January 10, 1962. MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretary of State SUBJECT Program to Aid Moroccan Air Force 1. On 6 January the President approved going ahead with the survey of Moroccan air force needs called for under NSAM No. 102, even though the US has not yet received fully “satisfactory private assurances” from Morocco that no further Bloc air force aid would be accepted. While recognizing that our chief objective is such preclusion itself and that we must be flexible as to when and how satisfactory assurances confirming it can best be obtained, the President nevertheless is anxious that we not lose sight of the desirability of appropriate assurances at some point. 1 2. Therefore, may I have a progress report by 1 February on: (a) such changes as have occurred since September in the action program for Morocco outlined in NSAM No. 102; (b) your assessment of the assurances received to date that the Moroccans will seek no further Bloc air force aid; and (c) your current views as to the best means of satisfying ourselves that we have the necessary assurances from King Hassan. McGeorge Bundy * Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 121. Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretary of Defense and Director,AID. 1 On January 15, Saunders sent Bundy a memorandum pointing out that recent reports that the King had decided to accept some Soviet tanks and other equipment underscored the importance of NSAM No. 121 asking Rusk to focus his attention on the political aspects of U.S. aid to the Moroccan air force. He recommended reminding Hassan discreetly that a monarch's future with Moscow was dim and that he should show some concern for his increasingly clear image in the United States as a “blackmailer.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 121) 129. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 129. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Source Washington, January 29, 1962. SUBJECT New Moroccan-Soviet Arms Deal This apparent deal with the Sovs for small arms and some heavy equipment including artillery will force question of US policy to fore again. Balafrej said the Moroccans would try to avoid “as far as possible” presence of Soviet instructors and technicians. He flatly denied Moroccans accepting any air aid. 1 Net effect will probably harden both State and Defense positions, and thus bring to WH the final decision on whether to go ahead with transport aid for the Moroccan air force. State has faithfully passed to Bonsal our desire for assurances from Hassan. But when chips are down, it will probably fall in behind Bonsal in arguing that we'll have to count on US aid, not Moroccan assurances, to minimize Soviet presence. However, DOD will probably contend that the new arms deal proves clearly that nothing but iron-clad assurances will keep Hassan from dealing on both sides of the curtain. [ 1 paragraph (4-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified ] While I believe that Bonsal and State have not pushed Moroccans hard enough (they contend it counterproductive to risk getting Moroccan backs up), in the last analysis we'll probably have to settle for less than absolute guarantees and rely on our aid itself to preclude Moroccans taking too much from Soviets. The fact is that we're competing with the Sovs, and whether it's pleasant or not, [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. I feel Morocco is important enough to warrant our playing, though I haven't admitted this to State lest they totally relax. Bob K. * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer. Secret. 1 On January 27, Bonsal reported that he had discussed with Balafrej the military items being acquired by Morocco from the Soviets and had reiterated U.S. concern over the presence of Soviet pilots and technicians. Balafrej had promised to discuss the matter with King Hassan, but noted that it was well-known Moroccan policy to establish no exclusive relations with East or West, particularly in the matter of arms, and that Morocco reserved the right to acquire arms it needed from any available source. (Telegram 1268 from Rabat; Department of State, Central Files, 771.5622/1-2762) 130. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco 130. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco Source Washington, February 9, 1962, 1:34 p.m. 1152. Dept's reply to NSAM 121 1 (copy by pouch) reviewed principal changes in situation RMAF since Sept, noting possible imminent acceptance heavy Soviet equipment and technicians (Embtel 1268). 2 Concluded by recommending we: (1) hear again from Balafrej, once he has talked to King. Presuming he will reaffirm his previous statements we should (2) instruct Ambassador Bonsal to insist on an audience with King, explain we consider our assistance to Morocco over past year poorly rewarded by this simultaneous recourse to significant Soviet military aid and request his explanation. Noted that while such competition (with Soviets) would create many problems we realize importance our other objectives in Morocco make it highly dangerous to abandon this field to Soviets and that continuing military assistance would hopefully exercise limiting effect on amount Soviet aid King might feel he needed to accept. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 771.5622/1-2762. Secret. Drafted by McClintic, cleared by Whitfield (DOD), and approved by Witman. Repeated to Madrid, Paris, CINCEUR, and CINCSAC for POLAD. 1 The reply, a memorandum from Battle to Bundy, February 5, is ibid., S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAMs. 2 See footnote 1, Document 129 . 131. Editorial Note 131. Editorial Note On February 13, 1962, Bonsal reported that he was prepared to carry out the instructions in telegram 1152 and warn King Hassan that the United States considered its previous assistance poorly rewarded by Morocco's recourse to significant Soviet military aid, but warned that this would be poorly received since the King presumably regarded such assistance as having been to a large extent a reward for maintaining important U.S. base facilities on Moroccan territory. Bonsal appreciated the wish to avoid cold war bargaining, but was afraid that so long as the cold war continued, such bargaining would have an irresistible appeal to many other governments. (Telegram 1376 from Rabat; Department of State, Central Files, 771.5622/2-1362) The Department of State's response noted that the nature as well as the timing of his approach to the King regarding the U.S. reaction to Moroccan acceptance of further Soviet military equipment had been left to the Ambassador's judgment. Although the Department appreciated the complexities of such an approach, it seemed indispensable to further determine the most effective means of achieving essential U.S. aims. (Telegram 1193 to Rabat, February 14; ibid.) In a discussion of U.S. military and economic assistance with the King on February 21, Bonsal raised the question of Soviet military materiel and described the problems this created for the U.S. Government. Hassan responded that it was his hope to give preference “so far as possible” to Western sources for such materiel, and indicated that the pending acquisitions from the Soviets consisted of light arms. However, he specifically stated that he did not feel able to give any binding assurances on these matters because he required freedom of action to meet Morocco's needs. (Telegram 1432 from Rabat, February 22; ibid., 771.5622/2-2262) The Ambassador also apologized to the King for the delay in receiving the conclusions of the U.S. base survey team, but noted that he had been increasingly impressed with the complexity of the problem of base conversion with minimum shock to the Moroccan economy. (Telegram 1434 from Rabat, February 22; ibid., 771.56311/2-2262) On March 7, the Head of the Moroccan Base Survey Team, William O. Baxter, submitted the Team's Report regarding the ways in which the United States could assist the Government of Morocco in post-1963 utilization of the U.S. bases to Secretary Rusk. Baxter's transmittal memorandum stated that specific recommendations for action would be formulated in connection with the Report's “Conclusions” and “Recommendations” sections, following appropriate staff coordination. (Report of Moroccan Base Survey Team; ibid., 771.56311/3-762) 132. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Ball to President Kennedy 132. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Ball to President Kennedy Source Washington, March 15, 1962. SUBJECT State Visit for the King of Morocco In my opinion the time has come to extend to King Hassan II of Morocco, who has repeatedly and pointedly made clear his desire to meet you, a formal invitation to visit the United States. Ambassador Bonsal is strongly of the opinion that an invitation has become an essential factor in ensuring the King's continued benevolence toward our military requirements. The Ambassador has already felt it necessary to tell the King that a visit here is under active consideration. [ 1 line of source text not declassified ] it will be necessary to offer him a State Visit. I do not lightly recommend such a visit. The King's [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] rule is challenged with increasing vigor at home and he has pursued [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] policy abroad, keeping a foot in both Eastern and Western camps. He continues to accept Soviet arms (e.g., forty medium tanks may be the latest item involved). [ 3 lines of source text not declassified ] Nevertheless, I think an invitation is dictated by our military interests and the strategic importance of Morocco's geographic position. Ambassador Bonsal's considered estimate is that the King's rule is secure for at least the next few years, the critical period in our base operations. It is something of a political miracle that our SAC bombers can continue to use Moroccan bases and we would want nothing to interfere with the tenure which has been promised us until the end of 1963. Moreover, the Department of Defense would like if possible to retain certain military facilities after 1963. Even without these considerations, we could not view with equanimity a substantial Soviet foothold in this vulnerable corner of the Mediterranean. To be of maximum political effectiveness in our current discussions with the King over military aid and base reconversion, the invitation should be extended as soon as possible, even if the visit itself should be scheduled for some months hence. While a long lead-time might well allow the King the opportunity to do things in the interval which could be embarrassing to us, the Ambassador argues that the prospect of a visit to Washington is more likely to have a stabilizing effect on him. On balance, therefore, I recommend extending now an invitation for a State Visit early next year at a time to be mutually agreed upon later, inasmuch as practical problems and commitments prevent a visit in the latter part of this year. 1 George W. Ball 2 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 771.11/3-1562. Secret. Drafted by McClintic on March 8. A typed notation on the source text indicates that the memorandum was approved by the President on March 23. 1 On March 16, Komer sent a memorandum to the President urging him to approve the Department of State's recommendation and noting that the United States wanted not only to counter Soviet efforts to establish a foothold in Morocco, but also to show the Algerians that it was greatly interested in North Africa. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Morocco) On April 10, Ambassador Bonsal was instructed to inform the King that the President would be pleased to receive him on a State visit at some future date which would be mutually acceptable. (Telegram 1587 to Rabat; Department of State, Central Files, 771.11/4-1062) 2 Printed from a copy that indicates Ball signed the original. 133. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State 133. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State Source Rabat, April 2, 1962, 5 p.m. 1695. Department telegram 1412 (State-Defense Message). 1 Reference telegram contains basis for exploration with King of circumstances in which GOM might permit US retain use Kenitra area communications facilities after end of 1963. I wish stress extremely sensitive nature this matter. I will limit messages thereon to this channel leaving to State-Defense distribution to other addressees on need-to-know basis. I intend discuss our proposals with King at what in my judgment appears most propitious time and context. This will probably be within next two or three weeks. (State-Defense will recall this matter has been delayed principally for lack of specific proposal on our part since fall of 1960 when it was first broached to King then Crown Prince.) I concur that “Navy package” need not be offered at initial stage of negotiations. If it is to be injected, we should have prior clearance with French who are currently engaged in small but apparently effective and promising Naval assistance program here. I have gone over reference telegram with Captain Cox of Kenitra and with DCM. Captain Cox is fully briefed and prepared advise and assist me. His attitude most understanding and helpful. In airgram of this date 2 I am conveying to State-Defense some personal views on this subject. These views will not prevent my going ahead with presentation to King as instructed but may be helpful in State-Defense's overall policy formulation. Bonsal * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 771.56311/4-262. Secret; Limit Distribution. 1 Dated March 21. (Ibid., 771.56311/12-561) 2 Airgram A-371 from Rabat, April 4. (Ibid., 771.56311/4-462) 134. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy 134. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Source Washington, April 4, 1962. SUBJECT Military Aid Package for Morocco I recommend you approve State's request for 1550 determinations on the air transport and naval packages for Morocco. 1 These are the heart of our effort to minimize Soviet military aid to Morocco and to increase our influence with King Hassan. In doing so you will be waiving the requirement in the plan you approved last fall (NSAM 102) 2 that we review our air aid program if Hassan failed to give “satisfactory private assurances … that no further Bloc Air Force aid will be accepted” or “if at any future date the Moroccans [did] 3 accept further Bloc aid of this nature.” We have only gotten half a loaf. Hassan has told Bonsal he can't give binding assurances but “hoped to give preference as far as possible” to Western sources for materiel requiring foreign instructors and technicians. The Foreign Minister went further in telling Bonsal March 23rd that “he was now in a position to state that there would be no Soviet instructors and technicians” in Morocco. The Moroccans so far have resisted reported new Soviet air aid offers, although they just bought $3-4 million in Soviet tanks and artillery to accompany a Soviet gift of lighter equipment for their ground forces. I join State and Defense in urging that we go ahead on this basis. The Moroccan situation is a highly competitive one. The Soviets have pressed consistently since 1956 to increase their influence. Hassan's early 1961 acceptance of 14 MIGs [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] gave them an opening wedge which they have been trying to widen ever since. So Hassan will simply turn to the Bloc if he doesn't get what he wants from the West. We can't stop him from accepting some Soviet aid to satisfy his domestic leftist opposition and the African neutrals. He's also determined to build up his armed forces—with or without US help. But by meeting certain reasonable demands we can stimulate his apparent desire to avoid getting in over his head with the Communists. Moreover, we can achieve “preclusion” in fact if we saturate his fledgling air force's absorptive capacity, which is what proposed transport package tries to do. R.W. Komer 4 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer. Secret. 1 NSC Action No. 1550 stipulated that no foreign assistance could be offered without determining whether the aid was in accordance with approved policy, whether Congress had approved or appropriated funds, whether the recipient country could support the programs, and what was the probable duration of the assistance. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action of the National Security Council) Kennedy signed the Presidential Determination on April 6, and Bonsal was instructed on April 9 to tell the King that the decision to provide a U.S. air transport package had been made, with the final details to be worked out by a team from CINCEUR expected in Rabat shortly. (Telegram 1571 to Rabat; ibid., Central Files, 771.5622/4-962) 2 Document 123 . 3 Brackets in the source text. 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 135. Editorial Note 135. Editorial Note On April 9, 1962, Ambassador Bonsal reported that two Soviet vessels had unloaded shipments of military equipment in Morocco over the weekend. (Telegram 1738 from Rabat; Department of State, Central Files, 771.56/4-962) The Department of State immediately instructed the Ambassador not to make the approach authorized in telegram 1571 (see footnote 1, Document 134 ) until he had ascertained that the Soviet shipments did not include aircraft. (Telegram 1570, April 9; Department of State, Central Files, 771.56/4-962) Bonsal reported that when he raised the subject with the Foreign Minister on the morning of April 10, he had denied “categorically” that either aircraft or helicopters had constituted part of the arrivals of Soviet military equipment. (Telegram 1745 from Rabat, April 10; ibid., 771.56/4-1062) On April 13, Ambassador Bonsal discussed the recent arrival of Soviet arms with King Hassan, who told him that the Soviet shipment had contained helicopters being acquired by the Provisional Algerian Government for publicity uses in connection with the forthcoming plebiscite in Algeria. He added that his government had just been informed of the imminent arrival of three Soviet technicians to assemble the helicopters, and complained that he had been put in an embarrassing position. Bonsal had commented that the King would have a good basis for refusing to receive the technicians, to which Hassan had replied that the matter was under study. The Ambassador also asked if he could be furnished with further information on what was being received. The King said that he did not think this was possible, but stressed that the materiel received belonged in the category of “light armament” which would require the presence of no Soviet technicians or instructors. Bonsal reported that Hassan, who had been most cordial and had expressed his desire to continue cooperative relations with the United States, had reiterated his preference for U.S. planes, communications equipment, and naval vessels. (Telegram 1786 from Rabat, April 13; ibid., 771.56/4-1362) 136. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco 136. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco Source Washington, April 18, 1962, 7:22 p.m. 1660. As you are aware, decision to provide major military aviation package for King of Morocco was extremely distasteful one to make, and has always been considered at best as gamble which had to be taken to try to limit to extent possible further Soviet involvement with Moroccan armed forces especially aviation. While we have now completed all necessary paperwork here to be in position to move rapidly as soon as agreement reached by you with King, it also follows that if for any reason we should conclude either that such action would fail in its purpose of preclusion, or that even without it King might be induced to reduce his dependence on Soviets, we should not hesitate to withdraw or hold back for time our air transport offer. Arrival of substantial Soviet arms shipments is most unfortunate coincidence, even if King's [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] explanation on helicopters is accepted at face value. This situation will certainly cause adverse public and congressional reaction, and raises certain questions in our mind. We wonder in this respect whether King himself might not have reason be genuinely concerned at our probable reaction, and whether in fact it might not be salutary to encourage such concern on his part. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] do you think that King would really be ready to sever his heretofore fruitful relationships with us and open floodgates to Soviets? Do you think even Soviets would be disposed, against strong Opposition objections and at eventual risk of alienating Algerians, to continue to embrace and fortify “reactionary” Moroccan monarchy? Do you think that failure at this point to proceed with air transport offer would seriously jeopardize our base tenure through 1963 or possibilities of acquiring post-1963 communications rights? We are not persuaded that because King has learned we about to make air transport offer we are irretrievably committed to go through with it. Furthermore, is it wise to cut short opposition criticism of King over present Soviet arms shipments by giving public demonstration his tactic of manipulation both sides is highly successful? Accordingly, we believe that King's uneasiness over our reaction to his moves has made it desirable that you make approach to him along following lines (leaving to your discretion whether more effective cover all points in single audience or in several stages): (1) We are ready to proceed with our programs of assistance but in view his increasing involvement with Soviets, as well as its effect on our public opinion and on sound military policy, we cannot continue indefinitely to increase our assistance to Moroccan armed services in face of what can only appear to everyone as direct competition with Soviets. Tanks and cannons seem to us go beyond definition of “light arms” and we understand there will be Soviet technicians to service tanks. We accept in good faith his assurances helicopters not for Moroccan use. You would like to be able inform USG of positive assurance no further Moroccan-Soviet military deals are under consideration. (2) USG entirely ready implement air transport offer promptly and you are prepared to discuss details forthwith. We could have first group of planes in Morocco by May 14 for fly past, but Washington is seriously disturbed over implications of proceeding in face Soviet arms arrivals and you feel it desirable convey strongest possible assurances from King himself. (3) In your discretion as conversation develops, and in particular if King should be forthcoming on assurances as we would hope, you may discuss State visit, MAP and increased ammunition allocation and Navy package as you propose (Embtel 1799). 1 We feel that in proceeding to talk in foregoing manner with King you should know that we would hope you could make of the occasion a real heart-to-heart talk with him to limit of your discretion, bearing in mind even in course of conversation that if you should detect reasons for holding back offer of such magnitude you should do so. FYI. You should understand that there is no sympathy in Washington for providing a command plane for the King at the present time and your conversation with the King will therefore have to take this into consideration. End FYI. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 771.56/4-1662. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Witman, Root, and McClintic; cleared by Wolfe, Newman, Valliere, Tasca, and Whitfield (DOD); and approved by Fredericks. Repeated to Paris, Madrid, CINCEUR, and CINCSAC for POLAD. 1 On April 16, Bonsal requested Department of State authorization to meet with the King and during this meeting to transmit the President's invitation for a State visit, offer the air transport package, and to discuss furnishing increased U.S. ammunition in connection with MAP. (Telegram 1799 from Rabat, April 16; ibid.) 137. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State 137. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State Source Rabat, May 4, 1962, 4 p.m. 1909. King received me at 7:30 last night. Foreign Minister Balafrej and Minister of Interior and Agzic Guedira also present. Topics discussed were (1) Soviet arms and helicopters (2) our air transport program and third tranche of ground forces program and (3) President's invitation to King. This telegram deals with first and second topics. The third is dealt with in Embtel 1910 1 and my overall comments contained in Embtel 1911. 2 I opened conversation by referring to statement King had made on April 13 which I had conveyed to Washington (Embtel 1786 repeated Paris 457 and Madrid 202). 3 I asked whether King had any further information which he wished to convey on Soviet arms or on helicopters. He replied in negative. In answer to my questions he said that “light arms” being received from Soviets (deliveries not yet completed) include tanks and artillery but will not require presence here of Soviet technicians or instructors and will not involve Moroccan training groups in Soviet Union. King is in no doubt our concern regarding these Soviet activities here but he finds difficult understand such concern in view his statements. He reiterated that preference and hence policy of GOM will be to continue obtaining, to extent possible, arms requiring technicians and instructors from West. I then described our air transport program. Starting from point that survey and recommendations now approved by President designed fully meet Moroccan requirements as set forth last December, I described program in terms of (A) two and one half year period, (B) immediate shipment of 3 C-119's and 3 C-47's, (C) presence here of about 80 US instructors and technicians for maintenance and instruction and (D) our understanding that King would wish consider as purchase rather than gift and would accept terms similar those involved in ground forces package. I told him total value package about $15 million and that we would expect collect about 10 percent over 5-year period. King expressed general satisfaction but stressed, as he has done before, his regret that earlier attempts to achieve cooperation between US and Morocco in military aviation field had been frustrated. He referred especially to episode involving General Wade early last year. He agreed with me that details of package could now be negotiated at military level between representatives of two governments. I told King as emphatically as possible that in making available this package our understanding is that we are meeting complete GOM requirements in this field and would not be confronted with competition from any other sources. Balafrej interjected to say that what was involved was “amitie exclusive” (exclusive friendship). After some discussion King said that obviously GOM has no intention of seeking assistance in this field from any other source. (He did not raise question of command plane nor did I. This however is weak point our position which will come up in military level discussions and on which I regret we are not in position make constructive suggestion particularly as we wish avoid undesirable source for this requirement.) I then raised question of third tranche of ground forces package and told King that President has approved ammunition increment requested by Moroccan military and that we are ready to go ahead as soon as necessary formalities at military level can be completed. He expressed appreciation. I raised, in this connection, our willingness accept Moroccan officers in US training schools and recalled that I had mentioned this to King when I saw him in February. He confirmed his interest in this possibility and said that he believed that by next October current reorganization of training concepts in Moroccan army would permit some of his officers to proceed to US (Embtel 1432). 4 In view of above we are proceeding to approach Moroccan Minister of Defense in order formalize above arrangements. 5 Bonsal * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 771.56/5-462. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Madrid, Paris, CINCEUR, and CINCSAC for POLAD. 1 Telegram 1910 from Rabat, May 4, reported that Bonsal had raised the question of the King's State visit to the United States and that Hassan asked him to thank the President for the invitation, which he accepted in principle. (Ibid., 771.11/5-462) 2 Bonsal reported in telegram 1911 from Rabat, May 4, that the King believed his statements should clear any misunderstanding that might have arisen regarding Soviet arms and helicopters, and would not accept the idea that U.S. or French military aid should involve assurances on his part as to conditions under which he would or would not deal with the Soviets. The Ambassador noted that in Morocco the United States was faced with strong and ruthless competition in the arms field. (Ibid., 771.65/5-462) 3 See Document 135 . 4 Not printed. 5 At the conclusion of the conversation, the Ambassador told Hassan that he was ready to discuss with him a proposal under which the Government of Morocco might permit the United States to retain use of the Kenitra communications facilities after the end of 1963. The King replied that he was still full of “goodwill” on this subject, but would like to have the U.S. proposal submitted first to his Foreign Minister for careful study and examination. (Telegram 1916 from Rabat, May 4; Department of State, Central Files, 771.56311/5-462) 138. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 138. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Source Washington, August 3, 1962. SUBJECT SAC Bases in Morocco JCSM-595-62 1. Reference is made to the memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 1 August 1962, subject as above. 1 2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed their previously expressed views on the above subject and have concluded that, in the interest of US security, the SAC bases in Morocco are highly important because of their role in the US strategic deterrent posture and their use for contingencies in Africa and the Middle East as well as their denial to third powers. Hence their post-1963 retention in operational configuration remains a valid military requirement. It is the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that this requirement cannot be met through small maintenance elements on bases to which we would have only re-entry rights. Therefore, the recommendation contained in JCSM-544-62 2 expresses the course of action believed to be sound from a military standpoint. As expressed in Appendix B to that memorandum, any post-1963 base rights in Morocco which are less than full operational use of Benguerir and Sidi Slimane will not fulfill existing military requirements, as set forth in Appendix A of JCSM-544-62. 3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that re-entry rights, including small maintenance elements, be considered only after negotiation of the more desirable solutions expressed in JCSM-544-62 have been thoroughly explored with the Government of Morocco and have been denied. 4. Although small maintenance elements will not fully satisfy military operational needs, their value in terms of certain contingency operations and the prevention of base use by third powers is recognized. Costs in connection with small maintenance elements in Morocco would not differ appreciably from known average costs involved in maintaining comparable military units overseas. The Strategic Air Command has been requested to provide preliminary estimates of personnel and costs for such arrangements. 5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are prepared to discuss this matter at the meeting with you on Monday, 6 August 1962. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: L. L. Lemnitzer Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files:FRC 66 A 3542, Morocco, 686, 10 Jan 1962. Top Secret. 1 The memorandum asked whether U.S. post-1963 needs could be met through small maintenance elements to keep the bases prepared for re-entry, with Moroccan consent, in time of emergency, and asked for the Joint Chiefs' views on the minimum size of the maintenance elements that would be required and the estimated costs of keeping the facilities prepared for use in varying types of contingencies. (Ibid.) 2 In JCSM 544-62, July 24, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed McNamara of their belief that it was in the overall U.S. interest to use extraordinary measures to retain use of the SAC bases in Morocco beyond 1963. (Ibid.) 139. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy 139. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Source Washington, August 21, 1962. You will want to use your meeting with Ambassador Ferguson 1 Wednesday as an occasion for reviewing our Moroccan policy. It's very important that he have a clear sense of how far you are willing to go on bases and aid. Since you approved our helping Hassan build his air transport force last April, we have delivered the first tranche of equipment and have begun training. The Moroccans appear quite pleased, and we've been successful so far in precluding further Soviet air force activity. However, the Moroccans have bought about 20 Soviet tanks and other army equipment with a few technicians. Some helicopters have arrived too, but the Moroccans claim these are destined for Algeria. The chief outstanding issues now are the status of the Navy communications facility at Kenitra, our three SAC bases—and the FY '63 aid level. The JCS came up recently with another plea that we try to hold on to the SAC bases past end-1963. McNamara has in fact rejected this, and Ferguson has been clued. All McNamara will go for is an attempt to get caretaker status for the three bases or perhaps a civil airport at Nouasseur, unless we can get more free. However, he is not putting this in writing because he's not anxious to challenge the Chiefs frontally on it, while he still has the B-70 argument on his hands. DOD has also approved pressing for arrangements to maintain the Kenitra base, its two outlying transmitter sites, and a USAF communications facility. We have an urgent need for these facilities. In return DOD is willing to train Moroccans in naval operations at Kenitra and to contribute $5 million in naval hardware. Our initial approach to King Hassan on 16 July, however, (which involved keeping there 2200 US personnel, 1300 less than present strength) met with some fudging. Hassan “accepted in principle” that some formula would be found but said he did not wish to decide or discuss details until his meeting with you next March. Because the Navy has to decide finally by then whether to build alternate facilities, we'd rather have Ferguson re-open the dialogue now, while recognizing that we probably won't be able to close the deal until Hassan comes here. To arm Ferguson for this effort, we suggest you give him attached letter2 introducing him as your personal spokesman. Negotiations on the bases will soon get mixed up with the question of the FY 1963 aid level (summary of recent levels attached). 2 AID is planning $20 million in supporting assistance (down from $30 million last year) plus $5-8 million in loans from PL-480 Title I sales and a $1.6 million development grant for technical assistance. (Title II and III programs are estimated at $30 million total, but the Moroccans don't include this in their definition of the aid level.) Because the Embassy believes the aid level must be at least $40 million for us to keep our base rights, AID is also allowing $12-15 million in development loans. The hitch is that we probably won't find enough sound projects to absorb that much development lending, so the pressure will be on to increase supporting assistance. AID wants to hold this line at $20 million this year to press the shift from supporting assistance to development loans, but we will clearly have a major sore point unless we find suitable projects. A minor issue bearing on the base and aid level talks is Hassan's interest in building a shipyard at Tangier. He thinks this would help pull the economy of Northern Morocco out of the doldrums, and his lieutenants hint that the Soviets have offered $30 million for the project. AID says the project would be an economic flop because the world shipb ding capacity is already excess. We believe we should not respond [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] on this one, because so far we don't see the Soviets gaining any significant military advantage from it. However, the Moroccans may inject this into our negotiations. All in all, we'll have to continue to pay handsomely if we want both to make a stab at keeping certain base rights and to compete effectively with the Bloc. [ 1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] Morocco (and the whole Maghreb) is certainly the most important piece of real estate in Africa, and one where the end of the Algerian war opens new avenues for US influence, as well as new opportunities for the Bloc. R.W. Komer 3 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Morocco, 7/62-12/62. Secret. 1 President Kennedy appointed John H. Ferguson to be Ambassador to Morocco on August 21. Kennedy met with Ferguson at 11:54 a.m. on August 21. (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Books) No memorandum of this conversation has been found. 2 Not attached to the source text. 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 140. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer) 140. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer) Source Washington, September 28, 1962. SUBJECT SAC Bases in Morocco Mr. McNamara and I have concluded that the political difficulties of negotiating an extension of our present use of the bases in Morocco beyond 1963, when we are committed to withdraw, and the high political or economic price that would be demanded for such an extension make it advisable to negotiate for the retention after 1963 of U.S. maintenance elements only. Our objectives in such negotiations will be to preclude Soviet use or occupancy of the bases and to permit their occasional use for transit and their availability for post-strike recovery operations. Accordingly, I have sent the attached letter to the Department of State. 1 I have seen the discussion paper of August 6, 1962, prepared by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force concerning the personnel and cost requirements for the maintenance elements at the bases after 1963. In my judgment, the total number of personnel at the three bases should not exceed 500, and the Air Force should proceed in its planning on this basis. Roswell L. Gilpatric 2 * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files:FRC 65 A 3501, Morocco, 400.3295, 1962. Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretary of the Air Force and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. 1 The September 28 letter to Acting Secretary of State Ball provided the Department of State with the following information to help the Department respond to Ambassador Ferguson's request for guidance on U.S. post-1963 objectives for the SAC bases in Morocco. The U.S. goal was to ensure the availability of the Moroccan bases for possible re-entry, with Moroccan permission, in times of emergency. To this end, the United States wished to retain maintenance elements at each of the bases after 1963, but their size and nature would depend on the uses to which the Moroccans put the bases and the forms of U.S. assistance. Therefore, it must be determined soon what use would be made of the bases by Morocco after 1963. (Ibid.) Gilpatric also sent a copy of the letter to Carl Kaysen at the White House. 2 Printed from a copy that indicates Gilpatric signed the original. 141. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) 141. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) Source Washington, December 26, 1962. Dear George : In my letter of September 28th, 1 I outlined our post-1963 objectives for the SAC bases in Morocco. The last paragraph of my letter took into account that AID had conducted a survey, the results of which were given to the Moroccan Government, concerning possible Moroccan use of the bases after 1963. After careful study, the Secretary of the Air Force has concluded that to maintain any military usefulness along the lines proposed in my letter would be inordinately costly in money and personnel, and would have little prospect of success, if integral elements of the bases at Sidi Slimane and Ben Guerir were converted to Moroccan use. The problems of guarding the equipment against theft and the costs of operating utilities and other support facilities would probably be out of proportion to any potential military benefits. Sidi Slimane and Ben Guerir have little, if any, true economic potential for the Moroccans. We know, however, that they are extremely interested in the development of Nouasseur as a civilian airport servicing Casablanca. Accordingly, I propose that in our discussions with the Moroccans we focus on the conversion of Nouasseur into a civil airport, and our willingness to assist Morocco in this regard, and also seek to work out arrangements under which Sidi Slimane and Ben Guerir will be retained by the USAF in a standby or “mothball” status. If you agree with this course, I suggest that appropriate guidance be given to Ambassador Ferguson for his use in talks with the Moroccan authorities prior to the visit of King Moulay Hassan with the President. In the interim, I propose that representatives of our respective departments get together at an early date with other interested agencies, such as AID and FAA, and study how best we could assist the Moroccans in developing Nouasseur for civil use within the means available to our Government. Sincerely, Ros Gilpatric * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 771.56311/12-2662. Secret. 1 See footnote 1, Document 140 . 142. Memorandum for the Record 142. Memorandum for the Record Source Washington, January 7, 1963. SUBJECT The Future of SAC Bases in Morocco I-20180/63 On 7 January 1963 a meeting was held with Mr. Witman and others at State to discuss the import of Mr. Gilpatric's letter to Mr. Ball of 26 December. Major General Wade outlined what the Air Force had in mind when it referred to retaining the bases at Sidi Slimane and Ben Guerir in a “mothball or standby” status. General Wade mentioned 5 purposes: (1) preclusion; (2) support for contingency operations (including the prompt pre-strike stationing of SAC bombers); (3) MATS operations; (4) fair weather training for forces stationed in Europe; and (5) post-strike recovery. Sidi would be manned by 300 AF personnel, and Ben Guerir would be manned by 200 AF personnel, with no more than a total of 1,000 dependents at both bases residing in the guaranteed rental housing which exists at both bases. The bases would be maintained in a status which would permit their use as emergency weather alternates for the Spanish bases, and for MATS landings. To carry out this proposal for the 2 bases would not require the return of equipment already removed under the existing phaseout plan. Only excess equipment has been removed to date. Initially the Air Force does not envisage a great use of the facilities, but it would increase this use from time to time to see “how much the traffic would bear.” Mr. Witman noted that excluding any Moroccan activity at the bases posed two problems: 1) such an arrangement would not provide the economic benefits which the Moroccans were led to expect from the Baxter report; and 2) more importantly, it would be more difficult for Hassan to provide a gimmick to justify domestically a continued US presence at the bases. He also noted that the Air Force's proposal probably would generate Moroccan expectations for greater economic assistance than we presently envisage. We have just informed the GOM that $20 million in support assistance has been programmed for FY 63. The present projection for FY 64 is $10 million and for FY 65 zero. While the FAA will soon visit Nouasseur to see what is required to make that a civilian airport, AID and DOD will check in this country to determine what is needed for such an airport, what is available at that base presently, and what will have to be funded by AID. The Moroccans have suggested that Pan Am be allowed to use Nouasseur as early as this coming April. General Wade indicated that this would not interfere with our present function there, and many thought that this would allow the American carrier to obtain an advantage over its foreign competitors and thus assure an adequate American presence there. In summing up Bill Witman noted that we had three significant projects in Morocco: Voice of America facilities; Naval communications at Kenitra; and the Air Force bases. In view of Hassan's forthcoming visit to the US and the Moroccans' refusal to undertake meaningful discussions on the issue of post-1963 US presence at these facilities until the King's visit, we should endeavor to establish, before then, an order of priority among these three undertakings and to arrive at some estimate of the price, both economic and political, which we are willing to pay for each one. Roland A. Paul 1 * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 67 A 4564, Morocco, 333-680.1, 1963. Secret. Drafted by Roland A. Paul of the Office of Foreign Military Rights Affairs, Bureau of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense, on January 9. Copies were sent to William Bundy and Sloan. 1 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 143. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) 143. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) Source Washington, January 31, 1963. SUBJECT Preparations for King Hassan's Visit Hassan's visit has more potential for trouble than any recent African visit. The President is naturally not anxious to get involved in any more detailed bargaining over “base rights” than is absolutely necessary. 1 I realize you're already hammering out our position, but I thought it worthwhile to highlight some of the points which seem from here to need clarification by, say, the end of February: 1. Are we fully satisfied that we have our Kenitra needs down to the minimum? Do we still think our naval package is an adequate quid pro quo? Should we have a fallback offer if Hassan ups the ante or says he can't buy our full proposal? 2. Exactly what do we mean by “standby status” at Ben Guerir and Sidi Slimane? Precisely what rights should we ask the King for, what services will we perform that he might consider helpful, and how many people will we need? Can we dispose of these details before the visit? 3. How should we handle Nouasseur conversion to a civil airport? Announcement during visit or simply confirm to King that arrangements are well along? 4. What relative priority do we assign to Kenitra, Ben Guerir, Sidi Slimane, Voice of America station in case these end up competing with each other? 5. Can we make an honest case for increased development lending to supplant decreasing supporting assistance? If we are going to make this line palatable, we need a realistic idea of what projects may be nearly ready to go. Do we see enough realistic DL possibilities to argue, even among ourselves, that DL will help maintain the aid level required to cover our various interests? How far should we lean in helping the Moroccans to put together reasonable loan applications? R.W. Komer 2 * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 67 A 4564, Morocco, 333-680.1, 1963. Secret. Also sent to William Bundy, Hutchinson, and Kitchen, with a copy for Witman. 1 On January 25, President Kennedy sent Ambassador Ferguson a message saying that he hoped to avoid too much personal detailed bargaining on bases and quid pro quos with King Hassan during his visit. He asked Ferguson to tell the King that in order to make his visit more fruitful, Ferguson was to find out from him directly what he wished to discuss. (Telegram 1562 to Rabat; Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 MOR) 2 Printed from a copy that indicates Komer signed the original. 144. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco 144. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco Source Washington, March 4, 1963, 6:35 p.m. 1809. Joint State-Defense message. This first of three messages relating forthcoming talks with Moroccans re bases and aid for action as indicated and for information and comment. This outlines base requirements. Others relate aid and negotiating tactics. 1 Requirements generally in line with discussions Embassy has had previously with GOM. We believe, however, it would be helpful for you to discuss them again with Balafrej so King does not come to Washington with inflated idea of what we will want and base his negotiating position accordingly. SAC Bases . SAC reflex phasing out June 1963. Major US forces would be withdrawn by the end of 1963. US would assist in conversion of Nouasseur to civil use. In view large U.S. investment and prospective assistance in conversion, we would expect to have USG planes use the field on occasion without charge. FYI. If occasional use without charge accorded US aircraft, USAF could take this benefit into account in determining what US property could be left at Nouasseur, within limitations 1949 Federal Property Act, in connection with conversion program. End FYI. USAF prepared to retain detachments at Sidi Slimane and Ben Guerir (not exceeding total 500 personnel; dependents additional) to maintain these facilities on standby basis pending decision by GOM on future use, provided USAF has right to use facilities for weather alternates, communications, transit, and occasional fair weather training. USAF would be prepared to accommodate similar use by Moroccan Air Force. FYI: Foregoing must be handled very carefully since USAF does not want to be committed to maintain these bases for an indefinite period and wishes leeway to withdraw maintenance detachments if expense does not warrant benefits gained. Further, USAF is not interested in maintaining facilities unless assured of rights outlined above. Level of maintenance by USAF would be limited to that needed for retaining facilities on standby basis and would not involve major repair or replacement. USAF not prepared to maintain bases if Moroccans want more than limited use parallelling that sought by USAF or if bases are to be turned over to Moroccan command under arrangement where USAF would be responsible to Moroccans for upkeep of bases without control over expenditures or base property. Similarly, USAF not prepared to accept establishment of civil enterprises on bases since this would involve increase of USAF expenditures (through providing utility serv-ices, for example) and increased possibility of theft or pilferage US property. USAF interest in continued presence as outlined based on desirability maintaining facilities working order against narrow, unknown future requirements and precluding unfriendly use. End FYI. Navy Facilities . Navy wishes retain use of outlying communications sites (1000 personnel) and base at Kenitra. Latter, but not communications could be turned over to nominal Moroccan command and used jointly by USN and Moroccan forces, including RMAF. Navy would absorb costs (up to $4 million annually) of operating and maintaining jointly used facility. This would entail initially retaining 1200 USN personnel at Kenitra, of which 400 would be withdrawn as soon as Moroccans were trained and capable of assuming certain responsibilities for maintenance and operation. USN prepared, but reluctant, to agree have personnel in mufti if Moroccans desire. Personnel figures do not include dependents. FYI. Communications facilities [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] are of major importance to US. Facilities at Kenitra [1 line of source text not declassified] also provide logistic support for communications sites. Navy would hope to retain communications and Kenitra facilities for indefinite period. We recognize, however, political obstacles obtaining such indefinite retention and our objective would be to gain at least five-year extension. If this not feasible, we would need two years as minimum period to enable switch to alternate facilities. Minimum of two-year extension would also be helpful in current negotiations with Spain. You are aware of proposed Naval MAP package, which will be discussed in separate telegram, but do not believe this should be discussed with Moroccans now. We would hope gain full benefit, however, from Navy offer to absorb costs of operating and maintaining jointly used facilities. We expect $4 million would cover costs of operating and maintaining facility even if Moroccans wish to make use of it by stationing Moroccan air transit unit there. Dept has received reports some Moroccans may be thinking in terms certain types flat rental payment. No encouragement should be given such approaches. End FYI. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 MOR-US. Secret. Drafted by Newsom and Lang (DOD); cleared by Bundy (DOD), Bell (AID), Newman, and Witman; and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Paris for USCINCEUR and London for USNAVEUR. 1 Telegram 1812, March 5, discussed future U.S. economic and military assistance to Morocco and noted the need to discourage any Moroccan expectations of massive U.S. aid based on an exaggerated estimate of the U.S. need for Moroccan facilities. It stated that the U.S. Government had not yet arrived at a final determination on the level of future aid to Morocco, and asked for the Ambassador's comments on the minimum price likely to get Moroccan agreement on U.S. base requirements as outlined in telegram 1809. (Ibid.) A third message to Rabat suggested negotiating tactics for Ferguson to use in his discussions with Moroccan officials. (Telegram 1838, March 8; ibid.) 145. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Bell) 145. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Bell) Source Washington, March 16, 1963. SUBJECT Base Requirements in Morocco In your consideration of the FY 1964 and future year aid levels for Morocco in connection with the King's visit at the end of the month, it might be useful for you to have my views on the importance of the military facilities in Morocco as an element of our foreign policy posture in that part of the world. The importance of the Sixth Fleet in our diplomatic efforts and our military stance in this area is well recognized. Command and control of the Sixth Fleet is exercised through the facilities at Kenitra which handle a major portion of the Navy's requirements in the Western Mediterranean and the Atlantic approaches. Kenitra serves as a vital link in the communications chain from the U.S. through Asmara, Ethiopia [ 2 lines of source text not declassified ]. There are no practical alternative sites for the Navy communications and security facilities. To relocate this complex would require a two year construction program which we understand would cost $25 million. Loss of these facilities would lower significantly the Navy's operational capability in this area. While the Air Force requirements at Sidi Slimane and Ben Guerir are somewhat less critical from a military point of view, and we don't anticipate any real difficulty in negotiating the retention of these bases on a standby basis, it is important that these airfields not become available to unfriendly forces. The presence of any hostile force on the southern flank would create serious military problems. There are, of course, added advantages for USAF to retain these two bases for such purposes as training, transport and emergency uses. The phase-out of the B-47 SAC Reflex operation in 1963 does not completely reduce the value to us of these installations. I appreciate fully that you must weigh many factors in developing a sound aid program for Morocco. U. Alexis Johnson 1 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 MOR-US. Secret. Drafted by Warren. 1 Printed from a copy that indicates Johnson signed the original. 146. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy 146. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Source Washington, March 25, 1963. Here are some key questions on which you'll want to be satisfied at your 10:00 a.m. Tuesday briefing session on Hassan's visit: Is our aid package adequate to get us the residual base rights we want? Ambassador Ferguson argues that it is an absolute minimum, and Governor Williams will have further increases up his sleeve. Dave Bell will strongly oppose. If Hassan rejects our offer, should we go higher? My own sense is that we can and should hold the presently agreed line. King Hassan needs us as much as we need him, Kenitra is not worth more than we're offering, and we've got to get the Moroccans to use our aid effectively instead of relying on a dole from us. We'd also have a hard time selling Congress on giving more aid than before pulling SAC out. In the last analysis the only reason to raise our offer would be if Defense can make an airtight case that Kenitra is worth it and is willing to pay. Can the Moroccans come up with enough project loans to fulfill our proposed commitment? Hassan knows his government will have trouble coming up with good projects so will resist our proposal to substitute DL for SA. You'll want to be sure AID will make a major effort to help them. Otherwise we'll be wide open to Moroccan charges of backing out on our agreement, if they don't come through with a few decent loan applications. Should we give Morocco any new military aid? We have numerous reports that Hassan will be asking for everything from F-100s to training for a couple of hundred men. We plan on $5 million naval package as partial rent for Kenitra, but aren't enthusiastic about giving any sophisticated hardware. You might probe how far DOD sees sense in going. We've simply been unable to smoke out the King's ideas in advance, so may have to make some quick fixes during the visit or settle for vague agreements in principle which can be pinned down later. Trouble with the latter is that Hassan may again prove elusive, and if we're going to move Kenitra to Spain we've got to start soon. R.W. Komer 1 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Morocco, Hassan Visit. Secret. 1 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 147. Memorandum for the Record 147. Memorandum for the Record Source Washington, March 26, 1963. PRESIDENT'S BRIEFING SESSION, 26 MARCH 1963,ON KING HASSAN'S VISIT PRESENT The President G. Mennen Williams John Ferguson William Witman David Bell Edward Hutchinson William Bundy Frank Sloan R.W. Komer The President was satisfied in general with the proposed US aid package designed to assure retention of base rights at least at Kenitra, though he was aware that there might be great Moroccan pressure for more than we were prepared to offer. He also approved the proposed tactics for the visit: (1) during first meeting he would give King Hassan the broad brush treatment on world and African affairs and then discuss our base requirements, mentioning our willingness to give a $5 million navy MAP package in return for Kenitra; (2) Rusk would then make a general aid offer at his meeting the next morning, sticking with the agreed initial position; (3) if the King reacted with shock as expected, the President would then reveal our fallback position in his second meeting with the King Thursday afternoon. The President asked several questions. He wanted to know why we shouldn't give jet fighters to the Moroccans. Ambassador Ferguson didn't think they'd ask for these, but would ask for considerable training. Bill Bundy thought we could give training, but not in jet fighters. Upon the President's query, Bundy and Williams described the key importance to the navy of the communications installation at Kenitra. The President couldn't see much use in standby rights at two of the SAC bases. It was explained that these were possible transit alternates to the Azores and Wheelus and that we might have some “emergency” use for them, although this was dubious. It was also brought out that Kenitra in particular, but also the SAC bases, gave us certain leverage in the Spanish base negotiations. There was considerable discussion of the price we should pay for continued use of bases. Williams and Ferguson pointed out that the King thought he was taking new risks in allowing us to stay longer than specified in the agreement between Eisenhower and Mohammed V; therefore he might want a lot of aid. In reply to the President's query Bill Bundy indicated that DOD was prepared to pick up the tab on bases in general if it were legally feasible, but that Congress was very reluctant to do so. Senator Saltonstall, for example, had objected to the procedure used in the Libyan case. The President also asked how long we want to stay in Kenitra. We would prefer to stay for five years but could live with two years; it was agreed we would not try to tape down a specific time of stay, but would attempt to keep it open-ended beyond two years. 1 Ambassador Ferguson emphasized that the King would probably press for an increase in FY 63 aid which wasn't specified in our package (Morocco was cut from $30 million SA loans in FY '62 to $20 million in FY '63.) It was agreed that we would try to avoid giving the Moroccans an opportunity to make a counter-proposal to our aid package, because this would inevitably be considerably higher than we could afford. R.W. Komer 2 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Morocco, Hassan Visit. Secret. Drafted by Komer. 1 In a memorandum to President Kennedy on March 26, Komer indicated that Rusk planned to give King Hassan an aide-memoire on base rights before his first meeting with the President, who would thus be relieved of the need to explain what base rights the United States wanted. Komer also noted that the King was so anxious to have this trip appear to be a success that he would try to put a good face on any reasonable aid offer. (Ibid.) The text of the aide-memoire on military base withdrawal is in the Briefing Book for King Hassan's visit in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2234. 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 148. Memorandum of Conversation 148. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, March 27, 1963, 4:30 p.m. SUBJECT American Bases in Morocco PARTICIPANTS His Majesty King Hassan II of Morocco The President Mr. Edmund Glenn, Interpreter The President brought up the subject of the American bases. He mentioned that the U.S. is prepared to withdraw from the three air bases, as this had undoubtedly been communicated to His Majesty by the American Ambassador. We would desire, however, to keep the telecommunications facilities of the Naval base at Kenitra. What are the King's ideas on the subject? The King asked what were the President's proposals. The President said that we attached a considerable amount of importance to the telecommunications base at Kenitra, as there are no other facilities easily available in that part of the world, and as the installation had been quite costly. There might be a possibility to remove the facilities to Spain, but this would take time and call for special negotiations. The King said that when he came to the United States in 1960 as head of the Moroccan Delegation to the United Nations, he spent a full day at the Pentagon where he was thoroughly briefed by representatives of American Naval aviation. He was shown also films about the Kenitra facilities and he fully realizes their importance. At the same time, however, an agreement had been reached between the United States Government and his late Majesty, the King's father, which provided for withdrawal from the bases at the end of 1963. This has a great importance in the eyes of Moroccan public opinion and the King would not wish to appear in any way to have broken an item of his father's will. This is the problem to which a solution needs to be found. The President stated that our withdrawal from the three air bases would amount to carrying out the agreement mentioned by the King. As for the Naval facility, some arrangements might be found—for example, in the area of command—which would make American presence at that base less conspicuous, but which would allow us to continue using the facilities for a period of time, until they could be phased out. The King asked for how long would the U.S. wish to keep its facilities. The President said for as long as the Moroccans would have us. The King asked what would be the minimum. The President suggested that five years might be the minimum. The President further said that an arrangement as to the command structure of the bases might be sought in connection with some economic programs and also with some help to the Moroccan Navy which, although not necessarily directly tied to the Kenitra base, would nevertheless be to the advantage of that Navy. The King said that while he understood the interest of the United States in that question, what is important in fact are the telecommunications facilities, which are needed by the United States to cover the Atlantic and even part of the Pacific. Under those circumstances, it would be useful to seek some sort of arrangement, if this were to prove possible. The President said that the King would be seeing the Secretary of State the next day. It is possible that details could be discussed between the Moroccan Ministers and the Secretaries and then be brought up again before the King and the President in the afternoon. The King asked whether he was going to see Mr. McNamara. According to his schedule, he was to receive the call of the Air Force Secretary, Mr. Zuckert. The President said that Mr. Gilpatric, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, was in the next room and that he was the person from Defense who would be discussing those questions with the Moroccans. The King said that in this case conversations could take place between Secretary Rusk and Mr. Balafrej on the one hand, and Mr. McNamara and Mr. Ahardane on the other. It would be exceedingly important to keep those conversations secret and for that reason the two negotiating delegations must be kept down in numbers to the strict minimum. These conversations could take place the next day. After that, the King might perhaps give up his trip to Annapolis which had been programmed, and instead make another call on the President to conclude the negotiations carried out by the ministers. The King wanted to make clear the reasons which led him to this proposal. Since the beginning of his reign, it has always been his policy to be clear, explicit and frank in his relations with the Moroccan people. Any decision arrived at in regard to the bases would have to be placed in a communique. It is extremely important that this communique be drafted in such a manner that the decisions in question do not appear to contradict in any way those reached at an earlier moment. The President said that these questions could be usefully discussed tomorrow as it had been suggested by the King. The King said that the President, as a person bearing extremely heavy responsibilities, and as a friend of Morocco, certainly understands that the King would not wish in any way to repudiate any part of his father's political will. At the same time, schools, equipment, and hospitals certainly will give more food to the Moroccan people than would the evacuation of some telecommunications facilities. This is a policy of realism. Means have to be found, however, to implement it. For example, civilian mixed US-Moroccan corporations might be established for the reconversion of the three air bases. As for the Kenitra base, the Royal Moroccan Army intended to keep it as its own facility in any case. What might be done is to convert it into a school base, in which Moroccan mid-shipmen would receive training from American instructors. It would be necessary to consider it a Moroccan facility under Moroccan command. There exists an air training facility at Marrakech which is under Moroccan command and which flies exclusively the Moroccan flag. The Moroccan command has, however, French assistants who are highly qualified from the technical point of view and thanks to whom the school in question has remained operational and efficient, instead of becoming a museum piece as it might have been without French assistance. Some such arrangement would enable the King to say with clear conscience to his own people and to friendly countries that there are no more strategic bases on Moroccan territory, since three such bases are converted to civilian use and one is converted into a Moroccan training facility. This, however, is the maximum of what the King can do. The President said that such an approach appeared fruitful. The details would have to be discussed between the ministers. The King said that it is essential that the negotiating parties be kept small and tight. The Soviets are certainly interested in what is being discussed between the Moroccans and the Americans. The French are likewise interested, the more so that they were forced to give up Kenitra. “My friend” Nasser likewise is ready to say that Hassan II has sold Moroccan soil for American gold, in spite of the fact that Nasser himself has 500 Soviet technicians on his territory. The King can say with clear conscience that he has not sold any part or parcel of Moroccan territory, but he would not wish to see Moroccan public opinion poisoned by an adverse propaganda. Therefore, the communique must be drafted in such a way as to make it clear that the 1959 agreements on base evacuation continue to hold. As for the details on further cooperation, that might be described in an exchange of letters between the ministers of foreign affairs. The President asked the King whether other members of the negotiating groups could be brought in. The King suggested that Messrs. Balafrej and Ahardane be brought in from the Moroccan side. The President suggested that Secretaries Rusk and Gilpatric would be called in on the American side. After the four secretaries had come in, Mr. Balafrej suggested that Prince Moulay Abdallah also be invited. The President summed up the decisions taken concerning negotiations for the next day. * Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 MOR-US. Secret. Drafted by Glenn on March 28 and approved by the White House on April 1. The meeting was held at the White House. Documentation on King Hassan's visit, including memoranda of conversation and substantive correspondence, is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2235. 149. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy 149. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Source Washington, March 28, 1963. Secretaries Rusk and Gilpatric want five minutes with you before 4:00 p.m. meeting with Hassan to describe their talk with him this morning. 1 They have a draft letter (for later exchange between Rusk and Balafrej) describing base arrangements. 2 It will probably be the take-off point for this afternoon's discussion. 3 Hassan is willing to let us stay on at Kenitra under cover of running a Navy and commo training program. He wants no standby military presence at USAF bases but would like a civilian contractor to maintain them until Moroccans ready to convert. He also wants an inventory of non-military equipment we can turn over. You'll also have a chance this afternoon to get Hassan's first reaction to our aid package. This morning Rusk gave Balafrej an aide-memoire 4 presenting our earlier fallback position as our initial offer. Rusk may recommend a new fallback offer—raising FY 1963 SA from $20 to $30 million and raising DL minimum for FY 1964 and FY 1965. I'd urge that our interests in Morocco, including Kenitra, simply don't justify more aid. AID feels the same way. So urge you resist upping FY 1963 SA and rely for elbow room on line that we'll consider any good project loan applications Moroccans come up with. Why not tell them we can move Kenitra to Spain for $10 million and don't see why we should pay more when we're giving up three SAC bases. My sense is that the Moroccans will buy what we've offered, even if reluctantly. Hassan needs us, and French cushion of $56 million in FY 1963 and again in FY 1964 means he doesn't really need our aid. Hassan's third meeting with you is Friday afternoon 5 which will give you a chance to wrap up leftover details and put final stamp of approval on the communique. King continues to press for small meetings, so you may want only Rusk and Gilpatric from our side this afternoon. R.W. Komer 6 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Morocco, Hassan Visit. Secret. A handwritten notation by Komer on the source text reads: “Mac—I gave this to Pres. but I don't think I'll win.” 1 Secretary Rusk and Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric met with King Hassan and Foreign Minister Balafrej at 10:30 a.m. on March 28. The conversation is recorded in a memorandum of conversation that is in Department of State, Central Files, POL MOR-US. 2 Not printed. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2235) 3 President Kennedy and King Hassan met at 1:15 p.m. on March 28. A memorandum of conversation is ibid., Central Files, DEF 15-4 MOR-US. 4 Not printed. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2235) 5 Kennedy and Hassan met at 4 p.m. on March 29. The conversation was recorded in three memoranda of conversation that are ibid., President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. 6 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 150. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco 150. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco Source Washington, March 30, 1963, 3:30 p.m. 1977. Following highlights conversations between President, U.S. officials, and Moroccan King and Ministers for information only; contents should not be discussed with foreign officials. This is uncleared and subject to amendment upon review of memcon. Guidance for other purposes will follow later. Bases: King throughout conversations stressed obligation vis-à-vis Moroccan people to see his father's agreement on US withdrawal, which he viewed as political testament, faithfully executed. President at opening session expressed US intention carry out agreement withdraw from three air bases on schedule. King repeated oral assurances Mohamed V had given President Eisenhower that, after evacuation, bases would not be used by any other country. He confirmed this publicly by telling National Press Club Morocco wanted no foreign bases on its soil. Reconversion : Moroccans laid heavy stress throughout conversations on future use air bases and interest in US assistance toward reconversion. Balafrej said Moroccans contemplating possible transfer Marrakech Air School to Ben Guerir and plan convert Sidi Slimane to other civil uses with help joint US-Moroccan private capital enterprise. Nouasseur to be converted to civil airport with US assistance in reconversion in form loan on mutually agreed terms. Problem disposition property of bases upon evacuation discussed at some length. US officials explained restrictions under US law; further expressed willingness consider possibility turning over some material for Moroccan use, possibly under military aid program. King mentioned possibility temporary caretaker detachments Ben Guerir and Sidi Slimane pending preparation specific plans reconversion. Kenitra : Moroccans stated intention use Kenitra base for Moroccan armed forces. US indicated willingness assist in training Moroccan military personnel to develop requisite skills for operation base and in telecommunications; as long as US personnel are employed in this capacity, US shall continue bear cost of operating Kenitra base at about present level of expenditure. King suggested French at Marrakech School as model; invited officer of “President's household” visit and observe. Form of Agreement : Balafrej incorporated understanding in agreed letter to Secretary (text by separate telegram) 1 which Secretary acknowledged as “reflecting understandings reached.” Aid : Secretary presented aide-memoire indicating US readiness continue PL 480 and technical assistance at present levels and, for FY 1964, supporting assistance type commodity loans at $15 million and dollar repayable loans (DL) at minimum level $5 million and, for FY 1965, SA type loans at $10 millon and DL at minimum level $10 million. (Text aide-memoire being pouched Rabat.) King expressed dissatisfaction at figures but did not press subject. At one point, he asked President cost of removing Kenitra facilities to another location; he was told about $10 million. In final meeting with President, King said nature arrangements arrived at during visit changed both nature and intensity relationship. King expressed understanding difficulties in obtaining additional appropriations and expressed full trust in President and Administration to do best possible. President explained Administration subjected severe pressure because of Clay Report (which Moroccans well aware of) and of balance of payments deficit to make severe cuts. President pointed out reduction in US presence after 1963 and, while emphasizing desire help Morocco regardless of question of bases, stressed very large share US aid to Africa which has gone to Morocco. He explained desire change aid pattern to development loans. President added it is intent of US to do as much as possible but he did not want any possible feeling later that he had acted in bad faith in not later increasing indicated aid levels; President said he thought only possibility increase was through Development Loans. VOA : Balafrej, referring to agreement worked out in Morocco, said for all practical purposes, agreement had been reached and it only remained determine amount of time during which VOA transmitters would be put at disposal GOM. IBRD-IMF Meeting: Question raised only briefly by Balafrej with Secretary. Slaoui met with IBRD-IMF and turned over dossier on Moroccan preparations for Casablanca meeting. Now apparently up to IBRD-IMF decide on basis dossier. Military Assistance : Moroccans did not raise, except for training. US mentioned $5 million Naval MAP package in initial aide-memoire given to Balafrej, but there was no further discussion. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL MOR-US. Secret; Limit Distribution; Noforn. Drafted by Newsom; cleared by Ferguson, Fredericks, Witman, Rowe, and Rusk (in draft); and approved by Newsom. Repeated to Algiers, Paris, Madrid, London for USNAVEUR, CINCEUR, and POLAD CINCSAC. 1 The agreed English text of the March 29 letter from Foreign Minister Balafrej to Secretary Rusk was sent to the Embassy in Rabat on March 30. (Telegram 1979; ibid.) 151. National Security Action Memorandum No. 232 151. National Security Action Memorandum No. 232 Source Washington, April 5, 1963. MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Administrator, Agency for International Development SUBJECT Follow-up on King Hassan's Visit The President was pleased by the careful preparations for King Hassan's visit but wants to be sure we tie up loose ends with equal care. He would like a report by 3 May from the Secretary of State in coordination with the Department of Defense and AID covering the following points: 1. How will we set up the military training program at Kenitra and what is the timetable for negotiating with the Moroccans? 2. How can we help the Moroccans plan suitable projects for the development loans we have promised? 3. How can we best fulfill our commitment to help the Moroccans convert the air bases at Sidi Slimane and Ben Guerir and prevent the conversion from dragging on unduly? 4. What is the timetable for converting Nouasseur to a civil airport? What steps remain to be taken? 5. How can we keep disposal of property on the air bases from becoming a serious irritant in US-Moroccan relations? 6. How can we build on the good feeling generated by the visit? The President is also concerned that we take special pains to safeguard agreements reached on the future of our facilities at Kenitra. Unauthorized revelation to the press could seriously damage our relations with the King and the usefulness of these facilities. McGeorge Bundy * Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 232. Secret. A copy was sent to Kermit Gordon. 152. Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy 152. Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy Source Washington, May 8, 1963. SUBJECT Follow-up on King Hassan's Visit REFERENCE NSAM 232 The Departments of Defense and State, including the Agency for International Development, have agreed on actions required to follow up on the visit of King Hassan of Morocco. These actions, in response to the questions raised in NSAM 232 are summarized below with a tentative timetable. The full report is enclosed. 1 1. Military Training and Timetable Brigadier General McHugh of your staff visited, as the King had suggested, the Moroccan Air School at Marrakech, on April 8, accompanied by US Navy and Embassy representatives. Their observations of the austere French presence at Marrakech are being studied by our Embassy, CINCEUR representatives, and the US Naval Commander in Morocco. Washington agencies are preparing an initial negotiating position for Ambassador Ferguson, with the intent that negotiations with the Moroccan Government should begin early in May. The establishment of the training program at Kenitra will be set up under a Moroccan command with US personnel in an advisory capacity. Efforts will be made to reduce both the evidence and size of the US presence. 2. Development Loans AID is presently screening its Development Loan possibilities to determine those capable of early implementation. Subject to confirmation by the Ambassador that the Moroccans are ready to enter substantive discussions, a loan team will go to Morocco between May 15 and May 25 to speed up consideration of loan projects. The Ambassador will in advance and under instructions acquaint the Foreign Minister generally with our procedures, stressing the need for prompt cooperation. AID can provide consulting services to assist loan application preparation and can consider base conversion projects for loan applications. 3. Conversion of Sidi Slimane and Ben Guerir (and Nouasseur in addition to civil airport) AID is prepared to provide assistance through Development Loans if projects meeting loan criteria can be developed. The initiative lies primarily with the Moroccans, although AID is prepared to advise and assist on specific proposals. Property disposition procedures are being proposed to the Moroccans to provide methods by which equipment necessary to the constructive use of the base complexes may be made available. Opportunities which might interest private enterprise will be brought to the attention of US companies. On GOM request, maintenance after December 31, 1963, can be provided temporarily (from MAP funds); GOM will be asked to insure against pilferage. 4. Nouasseur Conversion to Civilian Airport An FAA team in Morocco has reported its preliminary findings in its examination of Nouasseur's possible conversion to civil use, finding a great deal of necessary equipment already available. The FAA will have made a full report by June 15. 5. Property Disposal An aide-memoire to GOM proposing a joint Moroccan-American team to examine disposition of base property has been agreed to and sent to the Embassy and presented to the GOM. 2 US law requires reimbursement to the Air Force for non-excess property. Means of providing such reimbursement from US financing are being determined. MAP funds can be used by DOD for financing non-excess property required for conversion of the bases to Moroccan military uses, or, subject to resolution of the legal and other questions involved, through transfer to AID for financing non-excess property required for conversion of the bases for economic development purposes. (Approximately $3 millon of MAP funds in FY 1963 are available for these two purposes.) 6. To Build on Good Feeling Created by Visit Cognizance has been taken of the need to carry out our commitments as quickly as possible, to seek to meet the King's problems, to make unobtrusive our future requirements, and through follow-up contacts with the Foreign Minister and the King to show an interest in Moroccan views in international problems and to keep them informed, as appropriate, of our policies in Africa and the Middle East. In conclusion The need to guard closely our future plans has been reemphasized, but there is always the danger of speculation creating problems. Moroccan dissatisfaction with the FY 1963 Supporting Assistance level has been noted and simplified procedures suggested whereby the available funds, while not increased, can at least be made quickly available. Some actions are of an interim nature; full development of a response will require several weeks. This, our initial report, will be supplemented as necessary, at the latest by July 30. The tentative timetable for the next three months envisaged as a result of these actions follows: MAY 1—SAC units leave Ben Guerir to be relocated at Nouasseur. Begin negotiation between Ambassador and Moroccan Foreign Minister on training program at Kenitra. Establishment of joint US-Moroccan group for identification of major items of movable US property on bases essential to constructive use of base complex. 15-25—An AID loan team will proceed to Morocco to examine possible loan projects, subject to confirmation by the Ambassador that the Moroccans are ready to enter substantive discussions. Approach by Ambassador in advance and under instructions to acquaint the Foreign Minister generally with our loan procedures and stress the need for prompt cooperation. JUNE 1—Given agreement between Ambassador and Foreign Minister on general principles involved in establishment training program at Kenitra, open negotiations on details between Senior US Naval Officer, Kenitra, and Moroccan military authorities. 15—Report of FAA Team on Reconversion of Nouasseur. Inform Moroccans of recommendations after AID/W review and approval on an urgent basis (possibly one week). Begin action by AID to secure necessary consulting services to assist GOM with feasibility studies and other data required for development loan applications. (Several months will be required.) 30—Determination prior June 30 of property desired by Moroccans which may be made available to the Government of Morocco. JULY 15—Initial Moroccan application on Development Loan for Nouasseur conversion, expected no earlier than July 15. Subject to delays by Moroccans. After initial application has been fully documented and submitted, three months required for approval loan application. 31—Completion of determination of how selected available equipment on bases can be turned over to Moroccans. Dean Rusk 3 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 MOR. Secret. 1 Attached but not printed. 2 Telegram 2153 to Rabat, April 23. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15-10 MOR-US) 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original. 153. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy 153. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Source Washington, August 2, 1963. Attached [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] message from King Hassan 1 shows he's getting worried about his growing isolation. He clamped down hard on his opposition before last week's local elections and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]also probably upset over reports that Ben Bell a is training dissident Moroccans. Behind Ben Bell a he sees Nasser, so is looking to us for reassurance. We think a prompt [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]reply is in order and will have a draft shortly. While we too see some evidence Ben Bell a and Nasser would prefer to get rid of Hassan, it's probably best not to enhance his [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] fears. Instead, this is a good chance to plug the same line we've pushed with the Shah—the best way for a king to survive is to run a progressive government. R.W. Komer * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Morocco. Top Secret. 1 Not printed. On July 29, the King had asked Lieutenant Colonel Canton to convey a message to President Kennedy through Navy communications channels. Hassan stated that there were new and most dangerous threats to the African continent, particularly the North African nations, from Russian and Chinese Communism. Noting that Nasser's aim was to dominate North Africa, he warned that the United Arab Republic had also become very dangerous and that Ben Bell a was aligning himself with Communist ideology. These facts indicated a definite pattern of subversion, infiltration, and an attempt to isolate Morocco and to create a dangerous wedge between black and white Africa. The King said Morocco desired a much stronger attachment with the West, especially the United States, and wanted to join in combating these subversive forces. 154. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco 154. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco Source Washington, August 7, 1963, 6:39 p.m. 340. Ref: COMNAVACTS PORT LYAUTEY MSG M 301635X. Embtel 177. Charge requested seek private audience with King and convey following oral message in response to King's message sent through Colonel Canton. 1 FYI, President desires Canton accompany you to indicate we appreciate meaning of private channel through which King's message conveyed. End FYI. 1. President pleased continue fruitful exchange begun during Washington talks and appreciates King's analysis recent African developments. He fully agrees we must be on guard against new rash of Communist blandishments triggered by sharpened Sino-Soviet competition in Africa as elsewhere. 2. President also shares King's concern over threat of subversion to nations trying to make economic progress through orderly constitutional means. He has thought a lot about this since taking office and early concluded that, while every government must naturally be alert to its own internal security, equally important that government be so identified with meeting of popular needs as to deprive potential opposition of popular support. He believes well-organized reform, an effectively implemented development program, and government responsive to popular needs are the most effective weapons to this end. 3. President is seriously concerned over possibility raised by King that Morocco becoming increasingly isolated from other African nations. Past performance proves King's ability to take an important role in African councils. US has been impressed with recent African steps toward closer cooperation, and President hopes King will find means resume his role and become an important constructive influence. 4. President aware apprehensions in many states concerning activities and frequently stated aspirations UAR. In dealings with Cairo government, US has always made clear it cannot condone activities directed against other free states Middle East and Africa. US also aware that aftermath Algerian war and resulting adjustments have created potentially serious problems as well as new opportunities in relations between new Algerian state and neighbors. While not agreeing with Algerian leaders on some issues, US has sought encourage by its aid those seeking reconstruct country. US has also welcomed such signs of rapport between Algeria and neighbors as those which followed Rabat Foreign Ministers conference in February. US willing express to Algiers, as it has to Cairo, its opposition to activities directed against other independent states of the area. 5. President is especially pleased to have King's reassurance of desire for close association with West, particularly US, and appreciates King's support for mutually beneficial working relationship at Kenitra. President in turn reaffirms strong US interest in success of King's regime, as conveyed in Washington talks. 6. In this connection, President notes with satisfaction successful financial negotiations with France and King's personal effort to improve relations with Spain. He is pleased, too, that plans are being discussed for the conversion of Nouasseur Air Base to a civil airport and hopes we can conclude satisfactorily on schedule arrangements for turnover of air bases. President assures King US will continue to help Morocco within limits its resources in accordance with their conversations in March, though any aid program depends for its success more on recipient than on donor. Ball * Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 MOR-US. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Newsom; cleared by Hilliker, Komer, and Hinman (AID); and approved by Fredericks. 1 See footnote 1, Document 153 . 155. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Regional Affairs (Sloan) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) 155. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Regional Affairs (Sloan) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) Source Washington, September 25, 1963. SUBJECT Morocco We have reached a critical point in the Air Force withdrawal from the SAC bases in Morocco. The Air Force is holding at Nouasseur certain property recommended by the FAA as needed for the conversion of this base to a civil airport. The property is non-excess to Air Force needs, however, and arrangements must be made to reimburse the Air Force for its value ($650,000). To this end, AID has included this sum in the Development Loan under negotiation with the Moroccans for the Nouasseur conversion project. While the Moroccans have stated their willingness to pay for the property with Development Loan financing, this has not yet been reduced to writing. In the absence of a written Moroccan commitment, AID is unwilling to give the Air Force the firm assurances it needs before it can relinquish the property involved. In turn, the Air Force, which has frozen the property since August, states that, unless it receives assurances of reimbursement now, it must begin shipping the property out. To delay further would greatly increase the costs to the Air Force of removing the property, if this could be accomplished at all by the December 31st withdrawal deadline. Our efforts to gain from AID the assurances that the Air Force needs have been unavailing. AID is unwilling to assume any risk, regardless of how small, that the Development Loan might not go through. If the Air Force starts shipping the property, however, we can expect a strong reaction from the Moroccans, with the real possibility that our objectives at Kenitra would be endangered. Accordingly, I recommend that you call George Ball to gain his assistance in trying to persuade Dave Bell to give the Air Force the assurances it needs. Frank K. Sloan 1 * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files:FRC 67 A 4564, Morocco, 333-680.1, 1963. Secret. 1 Printed from a copy that indicates Sloan signed the original. 156. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) 156. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) Source Washington, October 31, 1963. I-14222/63 Dear Alex : With respect to your letter of October 11, 1963, 1 we have taken the steps necessary to assure that those basic utilities at Sidi Slimane and Ben Guerir that are needed to permit the constructive use of these bases by the Government of Morocco will be left in usable condition. You will note from the enclosed memorandum from the Air Force 2 that it will require reimbursement in the sum of $202,000 for those utilities that are not excess to Air Force needs. We understand that our government is committed to leave these basic utilities in place without charge to the Moroccan Government. To this end, we will make arrangements to reimburse the Air Force from MAP funds for the non-excess utilities at the two bases if these facilities are to be used by the Moroccan Government for military purposes. However, there are no funds available to the Defense Department to reimburse the Air Force if the Moroccan Government intends to use these bases for economic development purposes, and in these cases we must look to AID to provide the necessary funds. We hope that the Moroccan Government can be urged to make an early decision on the utilization of the two bases. Sincerely, Bill * Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 MOR-US. Confidential. 1 The letter from Johnson to Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs NITZE referred to the undertaking, made by the President to King Hassan in March, to turn U.S. SAC bases over to Morocco in operable condition. It asked NITZE for his assist-ance in meeting problems related to leaving the bases at Sidi Slimane and Ben Guerir with their basic utilities functioning, including an itemized list of the non-excess material required to meet the U.S. commitment. (Ibid., DEF 15-10 MOR-US) 2 Attached but not printed. 157. Editorial Note 157. Editorial Note On November 20, 1963, the Department of State conveyed its reservations about highlighting U.S. withdrawal from U.S. bases in Morocco any more than absolutely necessary to Ambassador Ferguson in Rabat. The Department noted that despite U.S. efforts to get Moroccan cooperation on post-withdrawal operation of the bases, the Moroccans had given no indication of their readiness to take over, and Washington agencies (except in the case of Nouasseur) were not prepared to assume long-term responsibility. The Ambassador was instructed to inform the Moroccan Government that the U.S. Air Force intended to relinquish Ben Guerir and Sidi Slimane on December 2 and Nouasseur on December 16, and that all U.S. responsibility for the bases would cease on those dates. It was hoped that news of the early withdrawals from Ben Guerir and Sidi Slimane would move the Moroccan Government into taking some action at Nouasseur, where a breakdown of operating capability would be all the more embarrassing in view of the plans for its utilization. The Department stated that civilian technicians still in Morocco could operate the Nouasseur utilities if hired promptly by the Moroccan Government or AID, but not unassisted for any length of time. (Telegram 1159 to Rabat; Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15-10 MOR-US) On December 6, the Embassy in Rabat reported that the last Air Force contingents had left Sidi Slimane and Ben Guerir on the morning of December 2, but that it had received no reaction to its note of November 22 giving the evacuation dates nor any expression of interest in employing technicians after December 16. (Telegram 873 from Rabat; ibid.) The Department asked the Ambassador on December 9 to raise the question of widespread pilferage at the bases formally and at the highest possible level, and to reiterate that the United States accepted no responsibility for the condition of the bases at their transfer since the Moroccan Army had been present on them for months for the specific purpose of maintaining their physical security and equipment intact. (Telegram 1199 to Rabat; ibid.) On December 11, Ferguson reported that he had told Foreign Minister Guedira that the United States was not planning any base turnover ceremonies at either Nouasseur or Kenitra, and that Guedira had asked whether some of the U.S. officers in Morocco could be present at such ceremonies if they were organized by Moroccans. (Telegram 901 from Rabat; ibid.) The Department responded that the Ambassador was authorized to permit participation in such ceremonies to the extent he thought required. (Telegram 1216 to Rabat, December 12; ibid.) Before the turnover ceremony on December 16, Ambassador Ferguson met with King Hassan, who expressed his dismay at the condition in which Ben Guerir had been left by the U.S. Air Force. (Telegram 917 from Rabat, December 16; ibid.) The King reviewed the agreement reached in Washington concerning United States use of the communications facilities at Kenitra, and told the Ambassador that the turnover ceremony marked a new phase of the U.S.-Moroccan relationship. (Telegram 918 from Rabat, December 16; ibid.) Ferguson reported that a brief ceremony was held before the last U.S. airmen left Nouasseur at noon. He had spoken in general terms of the friendship between the two countries at the Kenitra ceremony later that day, and Guedira's speech had attributed the Kenitra cooperation to the close ties between the King and President Kennedy. (Telegram 923 from Rabat, December 16; ibid.) Tunisia Tunisia 158. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France Washington, January 31, 1961, 10:13 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.56/1-3161. Confidential. Drafted by McBride; cleared by Witman, Easum, and Swank; and approved by McBride. Also sent to Tunis. 159. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, February 14, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.11/3-1761. Confidential. Drafted by Root and Chase. The source text is attached to a memorandum from Secretary Rusk to President Kennedy noting that in view of the President's interest in Tunisia's economic problems and in the U.S. assistance program there, Rusk felt that Kennedy would wish to read the enclosed memorandum from Assistant Secretary Williams on the subject. 160. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia Washington, April 20, 1961, 7:30 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.11/4-1861. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Chase and Adams, cleared in substance by Tasca, and approved by Witman. 161. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia Washington, April 24, 1961, 9:20 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/4-2461. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Chase; cleared by Brown, Collopy, and Fredericks; and approved by Witman. 162. Background Paper Prepared in the Office of Northern African Affairs Washington, April 27, 1961. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1853-1854. Confidential. Drafted by Chase and cleared by Williams, Root, and Valdes. This paper was part of the Briefing Book prepared for President Bourguiba's visit to Washington May 3-5, 1961. 163. Presidential Determination No. 61-26 Washington, May 5, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.56/5-361. Secret. 164. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts Washington, May 16, 1961, 1:09 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.72/5-1661. Confidential. Drafted by Chase, cleared by Brown and Manfull, and approved by Witman. Sent to Paris, Tunis, Rabat, Cairo, Ankara (Niact), and London. 165. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France Washington, July 19, 1961, 9:37 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.56351/7-1461. Secret. Drafted by McClintic, cleared by Valdes, and approved by Witman. Also sent to Tunis and repeated to Rabat, Algiers, and USUN. 166. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Tasca) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, July 20, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330/7-2061. Confidential. Drafted by McClintic. 167. Editorial Note 168. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France Washington, July 25, 1961, 8:26 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 332.70G/7-2561. Confidential. Drafted by Pelcovits, cleared by Blue and Root, and approved by Cleveland. Passed to CINCEUR and to USUN and Tunis. 169. Editorial Note 170. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France Washington, August 3, 1961, 9:51 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.00/8-361. Secret; Priority; Noforn. Drafted by McClintic; cleared by Fredericks, Witman, Cleveland, Grant, and Tyler; and approved by Rusk. Also sent to Tunis, Rabat, London, and USUN. 171. Telegram from Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State Paris, August 5, 1961, 1 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.56351/8-561. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Tunis and USUN. 172. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State Paris, August 8, 1961, 9 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.56351/8-861. Secret. 173. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to the Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson) Washington, August 23, 1961. Source: Princeton University Library, Stevenson Papers, Embassy Files, Tunisia. No classification marking. 174. Editorial Note 175. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, August 28, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.56311/8-2861. Confidential. 176. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia Washington, August 28, 1961, 8:09 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.56351/8-2861. Confidential; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Witman; cleared by Tyler, Veliotes, Wallner, Fredericks, Ball, and Schlesinger; and approved by Johnson. Repeated to Paris and USUN. 177. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France Washington, September 1, 1961, 7:33 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.56351/8-2661. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Brown; cleared by Tyler, Manfull, Wallner, Ball, Fredericks, and Smith (White House); and approved by Ball. Repeated to Tunis and USUN. 178. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State New York, September 26, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.56351/9-2661. Confidential. No time of transmission appears on the source text. Repeated to Paris and Tunis. 179. Telegram From the Embassy in Benghazi, Libya to the Department of State Benghazi, October 20, 1961, 5 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.15-WI/10-2061. Confidential. Repeated to Tunis, Paris, and Khartoum for Williams. 180. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France Washington, November 3, 1961, 8:18 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.56351/10-2861. Confidential. Drafted by Stackhouse, cleared by Imhof, and approved by Witman. Repeated to Tunis. 181. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France Washington, January 10, 1962, 6:37 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.56351/1-1062. Confidential. Drafted by Stackhouse, cleared by Imhof, and approved by Witman. Repeated to Tunis. 182. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) Washington, June 26, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, North Africa. Confidential. Copies were sent to Dungan and Amory. A handwritten notation at the bottom of the source text, presumably by Kaysen, reads: “Agreed.” 183. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia Washington, October 19, 1962, 6:57 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 773.11/10-1762. Confidential. Drafted by Stackhouse, cleared by Whitfield (DOD) and Ellis (AID), and approved by Witman. 184. Report Prepared by the Fourth Interdepartmental Survey Group for President Kennedy Washington, April 19, 1963. Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, Report for the President on Liberia and Tunisia. Secret. The source text comprises pp. VII-IX of the Summary. The report was transmitted to President Kennedy under cover of a memorandum from Secretary Rusk indicating that the report had been prepared by the Fourth Interdepartmental Survey Group sent to Liberia and Tunisia as part of the Department of State response to NSAM No. 173 of July 18, 1962, which had directed the Secretary of State “to initiate, in consultation with the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) a program of field visits by senior interdepartmental teams.” (Ibid.) A February 4, 1963, letter from Rusk to Ambassador Russell explaining the mission of the survey group coming to Tunisia noted that the President had expressed a keen interest in assuring closer ties between country team planning and operations and the Washington agencies and departments which participated in U.S. programs in developing countries. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-AFR) 185. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, July 15, 1963. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 FR-TUN. Confidential. Drafted by Stackhouse on July 18 and approved in S on July 25. The source text is the third of five memoranda of conversation of discussions between Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Slim on July 15. The other four memoranda of conversation are ibid., POL 10 PORT, POL 7 ETH, DEF 18-3 USSR, and AID (US) TUN. 186. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of African Affairs Washington, September 11, 1963. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2326. Confidential. Drafted by Stackhouse and cleared by Brown, Heffner (DOD), Hilliker, and Rives. Prepared for the 18th Session of the U.N. General Assembly. 158. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France 158. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France Source Washington, January 31, 1961, 10:13 p.m. 3136. Following based on uncleared memorandum conversation: 1 Alphand called at his request on Secretary January 31 and raised, among other items, question Tunisian arms. French Ambassador said Paris not satisfied with briefing given heretofore on US arms shipments to Tunisia. Alphand said information had been “too general.” He referred again to fact French not fully briefed on contents Anderson report, though admitted he realized our position vis-à-vis Tunisians delicate. He said French felt Tunisians probably had more arms than they needed, and “nightmare” persisted that some of these arms might reach FLN. French would of course keep confidential anything we told them. Secretary said we were reasonably confident our arms for Tunisia were not going to FLN. He referred also to our understandings with Tunisians. He added he had supposed liaison between French and ourselves on this subject in Tunisia had been sufficient but since this apparently not the case in French view, he would look into matter further. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.56/1-3161. Confidential. Drafted by McBride; cleared by Witman, Easum, and Swank; and approved by McBride. Also sent to Tunis. 1 A memorandum of this conversation is ibid. 159. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk 159. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk Source Washington, February 14, 1961. SUBJECT Aid to Tunisia In a letter to President Eisenhower of September 22, 1960, 1 President Bourguiba solicited additional U.S. help in assisting Tunisia to relieve vast unemployment through a carefully worked out development program based on an intensive use of Tunisian labor. In his reply of October 15, 2 President Eisenhower confirmed our intention to maintain the level of Special Assistance at the FY 60 level of $20 millon and to consider increasing it following high-level consideration of Tunisia's needs. The Country Team had recommended an FY 61 aid level of $30 million. Because of congressional cuts and anticipated DLF expenditures (which have not materialized) the actual level was fixed at $20 million. However after the presidential correspondence mentioned above an additional $5 million was to be set aside in our contingency funds to enable us to meet President Eisenhower's commitments. Recent reports from Tunisia have made clear that this increase is absolutely essential if crippling cuts—perhaps as much as 18%—in Tunisia's economic development program are to be avoided. Since the exchange of letters, we have carefully reviewed Tunisia's needs and Mr. Tasca, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs in the African Bureau, made a special visit to Tunis where he personally examined the Tunisian intensive labor program. He was greatly impressed by Tunisian efforts and feels the example Tunisia is setting is one we should do everything to encourage. AF is convinced therefore that in order not only to honor our commitment without further delay but to consolidate our good relations with Tunisia and promote it as an example for other African nations, we should arrange as soon as possible to inform President Bourguiba that, in response to his request, we are increasing our Special Assistance in FY 61 from $20 million to $25 million. We have been informed that other liens have already exhausted the contingency funds. It would therefore be necessary to review our resources in order to determine the means of increasing the Tunisian program by $5 million. * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.11/3-1761. Confidential. Drafted by Root and Chase. The source text is attached to a memorandum from Secretary Rusk to President Kennedy noting that in view of the President's interest in Tunisia's economic problems and in the U.S. assistance program there, Rusk felt that Kennedy would wish to read the enclosed memorandum from Assistant Secretary Williams on the subject. 1 See Foreign Relations , 1958-1960, vol. XIII, pp. 901 - 903 . 2 See ibid., pp. 903 - 905 . 160. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia 160. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia Source Washington, April 20, 1961, 7:30 p.m. 1008. Embtel 1224. 1 As Embassy will note from tel reporting conversations with Hourani we attach great importance fullest possible outlining by Tunisian visitors, beginning with Bourguiba himself, of GOT's three-year plan. We recognize plan may not be complete in all details but it should be possible identify major sectors to be covered, indicate approximate sums to be invested and their anticipated sources; social as well as economic aspects of development should also be provided for. Believe Hourani understands importance of making presentation as concrete as possible, it being understood on both sides that specifics would be worked out at a later date when US aid concepts are more firm. It is most important that Tunisian plan provide analysis present overall economic-social picture in Tunisia, goals to be reached, timing involved, ability to use US aid as stimulant within Tunisian program and present commitments revealing short range plans and how they fit into or support long range goals. Housing as described reftel no doubt can be vital element in such plans, but its position in mosaic of plan itself must be identified and explained. Similarly, needs of university should be presented within over-all plan with specifics to be followed up by Messadi in talks with officials directly concerned. Bowles * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.11/4-1861. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Chase and Adams, cleared in substance by Tasca, and approved by Witman. 1 Dated April 19. (Ibid.) 161. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia 161. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia Source Washington, April 24, 1961, 9:20 p.m. 1139. We aware Algerian developments will be profoundly disturbing to Bourguiba and GOT, and are actively considering what political and other measures we can usefully take in circumstances. If you receive a request for US military support in context Eisenhower-Bourguiba talks December 1959, you should reply that you will of course transmit request to Washington. At same time you should say, making clear you speaking personally, that you sure US watching situation carefully and that you confident US will not shrink from taking whatever measures might be appropriate to prevent spread of rebellion beyond Algeria's borders and to assist De Gaulle to ensure its collapse. 1 You should discourage any request for expedited arms deliveries to Tunisia pointing out that a few additional rifles and mortars unlikely help in controlling situation but could actually be interpreted by Algiers regime as provocation. In any case Embassy should seek impress on GOT at all available levels importance maintaining calm and demonstrating confidence De Gaulle will speedily bring mutiny under control. That Bourguiba might desire to remain Tunis during obviously critical period (Embtel 1246) 2 is entirely understandable and you should inform GOT that we will of course be entirely guided by his wishes. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/4-2461. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Chase; cleared by Brown, Collopy, and Fredericks; and approved by Witman. 1 Circular telegram 1673, April 25, quoted the Department press officer's statement that the United States would “become directly concerned should the insurrection spread beyond the borders of Algeria and threaten the peace of the area.” (Ibid., 751S.00/4-2561) 2 Not printed. (Ibid., 772.11/4-2361) 162. Background Paper Prepared in the Office of Northern African Affairs 162. Background Paper Prepared in the Office of Northern African Affairs Source Washington, April 27, 1961. UNITED STATES-TUNISIAN POLITICAL RELATIONS Since independence Tunisia has tended to look to the United States to provide a counter weight to pressures exerted on Tunisia by France and to an increasing extent by the Algerians. Tunisia is too small a country to carry much weight with either of these elements, although its economic, cultural and political future is inextricably tied to them. Consequently, Tunisia feels that it must work with both France and Algeria but to do so safely it must be able to count on support in critical moments from powerful friends. Bourguiba has constantly sought such support from the United States. The United States, he reasons, is in a position to exert pressure on France to be more understanding of North African needs and the United States has the economic resources to fill at least partially the gap in capital investment which has resulted from the cutting off in 1957 of direct French economic assistance to Tunisia. An active United States interest in North Africa also serves from Bourguiba's point of view to protect the area against Soviet penetration. Bourguiba does not believe in turning his back on the Soviet Bloc altogether. Such a policy would needlessly alienate his younger supporters and play into the hands of his foreign adversaries who constantly portray him as being a tool of the West. Bourguiba also considers that it is too much to expect the United States or even the United States and Western Europe to fill all of Tunisia's needs for foreign capital. He is therefore prepared to consider, although very carefully, any aid offers which the Soviet Bloc might be willing to extend. To date the Tunisians have been unimpressed by the kinds of equipment and techniques which the Russians are prepared to make available to Tunisia. They have found satellite offers considerably more interesting, but to date there has been little concrete Bloc activity in Tunisia. At the present time, Bourguiba is even more interested in securing a United States commitment to support his regime than in the past. Even assuming a settlement with the Algerians is reached, he foresees a period during which North Africa is likely to go through considerable political and social unrest. He does not wish to isolate himself from these developments but rather to influence them in the direction of the reformist and essentially moderate policies which guide his own country. To do this, he needs the moral backing which can accrue to him through demonstrated United States-Tunisia ties. If such ties could lead also to similar relations between the United States and the Algerians and a more democratic Moroccan regime, Bourguiba would be even more pleased. This is not to say that Bourguiba has abandoned his long search for a Franco-Maghreb community of interest, but he probably believes that, for a variety of reasons, relations between France and the Maghreb will be full of difficulties for many years to come, as legacies from the former colonial relationships are slowly converted into more satisfactory arrangements in an atmosphere of mutuality. He would hope that the United States would influence France as the stronger power to be generous in its treatment of specific issues. However, if this should not happen (and Bourguiba is as aware as any one that De Gaulle feels he must set his own pace), he looks to the United States to protect his regime and to act in ways open to it to prevent the Soviet Union from exploiting to its own benefit differences within North Africa and between North Africa and France. Bourguiba was most impressed by our willingness to aid General De Gaulle in crushing the abortive coup of the ex-generals and by the statement of the Department's official spokesman that the United States would become directly involved if the rebellion were to spread beyond Algeria's borders. He considers these statements to be responsive to Tunisia's own expression of concern and will wish to thank the President for reaffirming in this way the importance the United States attaches to the maintenance of Tunisia's sovereignty and independence. * Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1853-1854. Confidential. Drafted by Chase and cleared by Williams, Root, and Valdes. This paper was part of the Briefing Book prepared for President Bourguiba's visit to Washington May 3-5, 1961. 163. Presidential Determination No. 61-26 163. Presidential Determination No. 61-26 Source Washington, May 5, 1961. MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs SUBJECT Determination under Section 451(a) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, permitting the use of funds to furnish military equipment and materials to Tunisia In accordance with the recommendation in your memorandum of May 3, 1961, 1 I hereby determine pursuant to Section 451(a) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), that it is more important to the security of the United States that up to $4,100,000 of funds available under the Act for military assistance purposes be used as described in your memorandum to furnish military assistance to Tunisia without regard to the requirements of Sections 141 and 142(a) of the Act that no military assistance shall be furnished to a nation unless it shall have agreed to the undertaking specified by Section 142(a) of the Act, and without regard to the requirements of Section 511(c) of the Act in respect to arrangements for the return to the United States of military equipment or materials furnished to a nation on a grant basis. You are requested on my behalf to give appropriate notice of this determination, pursuant to Section 513 of the Act, to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives. John F. Kennedy * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.56/5-361. Secret. 1 Attached to the source text is a memorandum from Under Secretary Ball to President Kennedy recommending that the President determine that the specified amount of FY 1961 military assistance funds be used to furnish military equipment and materials to Tunisia. A typed notation on Ball's memorandum indicates that the President signed the Determination on May 5. 164. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts 164. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts Source Washington, May 16, 1961, 1:09 p.m. 1805. We consider Bourguiba visit highly successful and have impression Tunisians equally pleased. Two Presidents held cordial talks and found broad identity views on variety subjects. 1 Tunisian Ministers accompanying Bourguiba likewise engaged in satisfactory discussions throughout U.S. Government. As expected, Algeria was Bourguiba's principal preoccupation. He laid great stress on importance of doing everything possible ensure new Algeria was headed by leaders committed to moderate and constructive policies of intra-Maghreb and Franco-Maghreb cooperation. In Bourguiba's view, French as stronger element should adopt generous line in negotiations with PAG. Such tactics, especially if coupled with release Ben Bell a and other moderates having influence with ALN elements, were essential if positive climate to be created. However, Bourguiba cautioned against undue optimism as regards speedy solution since even in best of circumstances transfer of power would involve many difficulties on internal front, e.g. reintegration guerrillas, quite apart from problems inherent in liquidation Franco-Algerian matters such as Sahara and Mers al Kebir. Second principal topic discussion was Tunisia's economic development planning. Tunisians made impressive presentation in broad terms. U.S. expressed hope that long-term plan on which GOT actually working could form framework for multi-year assistance assuming Congressional acceptance administration's new aid program and concepts. In general, talks confirmed that U.S. and Tunisia had common approach on main political and economic matters of mutual interest. Hence, visit served primarily to demonstrate reciprocal respect between Tunisia and U.S., our recognition of Tunisia's efforts in foreign and domestic fields and our willingness do what we can to help assure success Tunisia's own measures of self-help. Bowles * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.72/5-1661. Confidential. Drafted by Chase, cleared by Brown and Manfull, and approved by Witman. Sent to Paris, Tunis, Rabat, Cairo, Ankara (Niact), and London. 1 The conversations were recorded in two memoranda of conversation. (Ibid., 611.72/5-461 and 611.72/5-561) 165. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France 165. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France Source Washington, July 19, 1961, 9:37 p.m. 387. Following guidance has been given by Department spokesman: “It would be particularly regrettable if attempts were made to settle these differences by any means other than negotiation at this particularly important time in the evolution of French and North African affairs.” 1 For Tunis : You should inform Mokkadem we consider timing of Tunisian moves against Bizerte most unfortunate and destined to be disruptive of progress towards settlement of Algerian question, which to be taken up again at Evian tomorrow. They are also unfortunate in light of world situation generally, i.e., Berlin. Impact of dramatic and contrived Arab pressure against European presence Bizerte can scarcely be reassuring to French who are faced with problem of reassuring French public opinion about security of European minority Algeria. For Paris : You should seek explanation from Foreign Office about reinforcements destined Bizerte, particularly in light of assurances (Paris Tel 207), 2 that any such orders could emanate only from Paris. You may say we have taken strong line Tunisians this matter, deploring their timing in the light of Algerian situation and world situation generally. You may say, however, that we believe Bourguiba's performance undoubtedly caused in large measure by his very real difficulties with Algerians and that we would hope that nothing would be done by France which would complicate his ability to back down. We would welcome French views as to what moves France might envisage to facilitate this. Would further emphasis on willingness to negotiate once duress removed be helpful? Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.56351/7-1461. Secret. Drafted by McClintic, cleared by Valdes, and approved by Witman. Also sent to Tunis and repeated to Rabat, Algiers, and USUN. 1 On July 17, President Bourguiba announced that the French naval base at Bizerte in Tunisia would be blockaded as of July 19 and that he would send Tunisian forces into the disputed territory. The French sent reinforcements to the base and fighting broke out between French and Tunisian forces on July 19. 2 Dated July 19. (Ibid., 772.56351/7-1461) 166. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Tasca) to Secretary of State Rusk 166. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Tasca) to Secretary of State Rusk Source Washington, July 20, 1961. SUBJECT Tunisian Complaint in Security Council The Tunisians have decided to take their difficulties with the French to the Security Council tomorrow afternoon, charging the French with aggression in the region of Bizerte. It would be most unfortunate to have two friends of the West disputing this issue in the Security Council and would provide a great many openings for the Soviets and the UAR. It is our opinion that it would be helpful if you were to call in both the Tunisian Ambassador and French Charge on this matter. 1 You might wish to tell the Tunisian Ambassador that we are most disturbed by the timing of these events and are strongly urging both sides to reconcile their differences among themselves. You might add that recourse to the Security Council is bound to bring cold war issues into this question, particularly now at the time of the Berlin crisis, and will certainly affect United States freedom of action. Furthermore these difficulties prejudice gravely France's ability to be forthcoming at the Evian negotiations and the entire matter opens up opportunities to adversaries of both the United States and Tunisia. You might say that you hope the Tunisian Government will reconsider its decision to bring this matter to the Security Council and say that we are urging the French to take such steps as might facilitate this. * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330/7-2061. Confidential. Drafted by McClintic. 1 On July 20, the Secretary called in first the Tunisian Ambassador, Habib Bourguiba, Jr., and then the French Charge, M. Claude Lebel. Rusk told Bourguiba that the U.S. Government was agreed on the need for an immediate end to the fighting and he urged negotiations to bring about an immediate cease-fire. Rusk also expressed doubt as to whether U.N. Security Council action would help or hinder a settlement during subsequent negotiations. (Memorandum of conversation, July 20; ibid., 772.56351/7-2061) The Secretary then told Lebel that it was “particularly painful” for the United States to see France and Tunisia, which had been on friendly terms, involved in a situation of this kind and said he thought that negotiation was essential. (Memorandum of conversation, July 20; ibid.) 167. Editorial Note 167. Editorial Note On July 20, 1961, Tunisia appealed to the United Nations to convene an emergency session of the Security Council and charged the French with acts of aggression that infringed on the sovereignty and security of Tunisia in Bizerte. When the Council met on July 21, U.S. Representative Charles W. Yost appealed to both Tunisia and France, calling for an “immediate cease-fire” and “a satisfactory settlement of the question directly between the two parties concerned.” For text of Yost's statement, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961 , pages 736-737. In a July 21 telephone conversation between the Secretary and British Foreign Secretary Lord Home and a meeting between D.A. Greenhill, Counselor at the British Embassy, and Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Harlan Cleveland on July 22, the United States and the United Kingdom agreed to make joint demarches to France and Tunisia urging a cease-fire and to support a Security Council resolution urging a cease-fire and commencement of negotiations. Both countries agreed that adoption of some sort of U.N. resolution would be necessary despite French objections. (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations; Memorandum of conversation; ibid., Central Files, 772.56351/7-2261) On July 22, by a vote of 10 to 0, with France abstaining, the Security Council adopted an interim resolution sponsored by Liberia which called for “an immediate cease-fire and a return of all armed forces to their original positions.” For text of the resolution, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961 , pages 737-738. The July 22 Security Council session continued as members attempted to reach agreement on a definitive resolution. A draft resolution sponsored by Liberia and the United Arab Republic, which called upon both parties to enter into immediate negotiations aimed at the speedy evacuation of French forces from all of Tunisia, lost by a vote of 4 to 0 with 7 abstentions (including the United States and France) because it failed to gain the necessary 7 votes for adoption. The draft resolution sponsored by the United States and the United Kingdom, which urged both parties to promptly negotiate a peaceful settlement of their differences, also failed to receive the requisite number of votes, losing by a vote of 6 to 0 with 5 abstentions. On July 23, Yost reported that the French were “on the whole pleased” with the outcome in the Security Council, while the Tunisians were “deeply unhappy” at the failure of the United States and its friends to support them on the evacuation issue. In light of the strong Tunisian resentment, he advised that they should immediately agree to airlift Tunisian troops from the Congo. In view of strong Tunisian objections to the presence of the base on their territory, Yost urged that the United States exert its full influence with the French so that the issue be promptly settled in a manner that would be at least reasonably satisfactory to Tunisia. (Telegram 177 from USUN; Department of State, Central Files, 772.56351/7-2361) 168. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France 168. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France Source Washington, July 25, 1961, 8:26 p.m. 525. Ref urtel 376 1 and Deptel 77 to Tunis rptd USUN 150 Paris 524. US position and reasoning on assistance to airlift Tunisian troops described for your information in Deptel 77. 2 You are authorized inform FonOff that US has carefully considered French objections to our providing airlift support for Tunisian contingent from Congo. In view implications which might be drawn from using US military aircraft to repatriate Tunisian troops at this time, US has decided, contrary to past practice in Congo operations, that US military aircraft will not participate in lift. In fulfilling its obligation repatriate Tunisians, UN has approached commercial carriers including US and European lines to bid on contract for airlift. Since this airlift represents bona fide UN request, USG will not interpose objections to US airlines participating in airlift. We understand Sabena was first airline to bid on UN contract for lift. You may wish emphasize that airlift being handled as strictly UN operation, with combination of UN aircraft and chartered commercial aircraft of European and American carriers. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 332.70G/7-2561. Confidential. Drafted by Pelcovits, cleared by Blue and Root, and approved by Cleveland. Passed to CINCEUR and to USUN and Tunis. 1 Telegram 376 from Paris, July 24, reported that Lyon had informed French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville concerning the planned U.S. airlift of Tunisian troops from the Congo. The Foreign Minister replied that he did not like to see the United States failing to support France and would have preferred to see Soviet planes doing this work. He also expressed concern that Bourguiba wanted these troops for a future operation against France. (Ibid., 772.56351/7-2461) 2 In telegram 77 to Tunis, July 25, the Department noted that the United States was “cooperating fully” in repatriating Tunisian troops from the Congo, but had decided to use commercial carriers rather than have the U.S. Air Force directly involved in the “disturbed situation within Tunisia.” Ambassador Walter Walmsley was authorized to stress to the Tunisian Government that the United States was “responding fully and favorably to their request in the most expeditious way possible,” noting that the difference between using commercial aircraft and USAF aircraft was “symbolic rather than real.” (Ibid., 323.70G/7-2561) 169. Editorial Note 169. Editorial Note On July 27, 1961, Tunisia again requested that the U.N. Security Council be convened on grounds that French military forces had not complied with the interim resolution of July 22. On July 28, the French Government issued a statement declaring its preference for a settlement of the Bizerte problem through direct negotiations with Tunisia. The same day, the French Government informed the Security Council that French troops had not refused to obey the cease-fire, that Tunisia had not accepted French proposals for talks concerning procedures for restoring normal conditions in Bizerte, and that, therefore, France did not consider it necessary to participate in any further debate on this subject in the Security Council. On July 28, Ambassador Stevenson, who was in Paris, met with President De Gaulle, who told him that France would not participate in U.N. deliberations on Bizerte nor be influenced by any resolutions distasteful to France. De Gaulle indicated, however, that France did not intend to remain in Bizerte forever. The French President also warned Stevenson that the Atlantic Alliance was at stake. (Telegram 509 from Paris, July 28; Department of State, Central Files, 772.56351/7-2861) The next day, Stevenson met with Foreign Minister Couve de Murville and expressed U.S. concern at the serious division which Bizerte might cause among Western countries and asked if France would consider acknowledging publicly the principle of eventual evacuation. Couve replied that it was not the French intention to remain permanently in Bizerte, but that they could not leave right away and would not leave under pressure even if the base were worthless. (Telegram 521 from Paris, July 29; ibid., 772.56351/7-2961) On July 29, the Security Council considered three new draft resolutions. Two of these were sponsored by Ceylon, Liberia, and the United Arab Republic and concentrated on France's failure to comply with the resolution of July 22. Each received 4 affirmative votes (the sponsors joined by the Soviet Union) with 6 abstentions. The third resolution, which was sponsored by Turkey and supported by the United States, expressed concern that the interim resolution had not been fully carried out and called for its immediate and full implementation. A third operative paragraph urged the early opening of negotiations for a peaceful resolution of differences, “including a definitive settlement of the question of Bizerte, having due regard for Tunisian sovereignty.” For text of Ambassador Yost's statement supporting the Turkish draft resolution, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961 , pages 741-742. For text of the draft resolution, see ibid., page 742. During subsequent debate, the third paragraph was dropped. The remainder of the resolution also failed adoption by a vote of 6 to 0, with 4 abstentions. France did not participate in any of the voting and the Security Council concluded its meetings on July 29 without adopting any further resolution. Immediately following the last Security Council session, Yost saw the Tunisian Representative to the United Nations, Mongi Slim, who expressed appreciation for U.S. efforts towards a peaceful resolution of the crisis and urged that they continue. Similarly, French Representative Berard urged that the United States try to work out with Couve de Murville a formula that would permit implementation of the July 22 resolution. (Telegram 290 from USUN, July 29; Department of State, Central Files, 772.56351/7-2961) 170. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France 170. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France Source Washington, August 3, 1961, 9:51 p.m. 733. Initial meetings with Secretary morning and President afternoon August 2 confined largely to Ladgham's 1 emphasizing gravity situation following Bizerte and impact on U.S., West and UN if world sees Tunisia's plight ignored by West. US expressed concern, awareness larger issues involved, willingness to examine actively ways in which US influence could be made effective. In luncheon meeting today with Ball, Stevenson, Cleveland and others present, Secretary said we committed to and fully support Tunisian independence and sovereignty and it is US interest that problem be solved with preservation our friendship with Tunisia, with France, and with preservation friendship of Tunisia and France for each other. Despite high emotions both sides we convinced, as a result our soundings, basic motivations both sides are such that agreement can be reached quickly once initial obstacles to negotiations overcome. Problem thus one of method. Secretary emphasized high-level initial contacts should not be considered vital. Said US supports position that future of Bizerte must be consistent with sovereignty of Tunisia, and is for Tunisia to decide. He assured Ladgham US willing work to make this come about. Said in Paris he would actively examine ways to find solution. Ladgham promised GOT would provide assurances re civil order and military communications between French installations as soon as French announced intent to effect troop pull-back and departure significant number recent reinforcements. Secretary strongly emphasized our view that, now that US prestige directly involved, there be no disruption cease-fire. In return for assumption by US of this role, with time and prestige of Secretary directly involved, we entitled to be given full opportunity have our efforts succeed. Accepting importance this US undertaking, Ladgham agreed to recommend to President Bourguiba, on his return to Tunis 6 p.m. local time tomorrow, that action leading to emergency General Assembly not be pressed forward for time being. Should President Bourguiba object, we will be immediately informed. Gov. Stevenson said GOT will be kept informed our findings on day-to-day basis. FYI. French and British Embassies given background of above in general terms only. End FYI. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.00/8-361. Secret; Priority; Noforn. Drafted by McClintic; cleared by Fredericks, Witman, Cleveland, Grant, and Tyler; and approved by Rusk. Also sent to Tunis, Rabat, London, and USUN. 1 Bahi Ladgham, Tunisian Secretary of State for the Presidency and for National Defense, visited Washington as a special emissary of President Bourguiba. He met with Secretary Rusk and President Kennedy on August 2 and again with the Secretary on August 3. (Department of State, President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149; and ibid., Secretary's Memoranda of Converation: Lot 65 D 330) 171. Telegram from Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 171. Telegram from Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State Source Paris, August 5, 1961, 1 a.m. Secto 3. Following based on uncleared memo conversation of Secretary's long conversation re Bizerte this afternoon. 1 Secretary explained that while we did not wish meddle, Franco-Tunisian matter one which vitally touched our own interests, particularly its effect on Berlin problem. Secretary regretted fact already some 47 nations which were anxious scold France, US and other western powers would in GA probably use against us words which we might want employ ourselves with respect to Berlin before end of year. Secretary explained saw no reason why question could not be solved since he did not believe either France or Tunisia contemplated future hostilities toward each other; matters probably had gone further and faster than anyone had wanted them to and he thought it would be useful to explore means of easing tensions. Secretary said he understood that French would be prepared pull their forces back into base if they could receive assurances regarding communications and that law and order would be maintained in area concerned. Secretary also said he understood Tunisians prepared give such assurances. Thus question was how get matter started. Foreign Minister said he thought he should start beginning and explain how whole matter evolved. After considerable detail of past since 1955, including Bourguiba-De Gaulle talks, Couve said he thought immediate cause of Bourguiba's action last month resulted from latter's failure obtain Moroccan and FLN support for his maghrebian ambitions, his Sahara claim difficulty, and generally finding himself on bad terms with Morocco, Egypt and Algeria, thus Bourguiba felt forced play role on international stage. Incident with which everyone familiar ensued. Couve explained France's present position very much as set forth Embassy telegram 658: 2 French must maintain base as long as world situation remains tense and must be judge of when it is safe to leave. They do not intend stay in Bizerte “forever,” but not publicly prepared at this juncture make declaration that effect. Quite prepared discuss future of base with Tunisians, but obviously cannot do this while under pressure. Believe that these discussions which must take place between Tunisians and French divide into two stages: (A) reestablishment of peaceful situation in Bizerte or modalities of evacuation, and (B) reestablishment of some sort relations which will permit discussions concerning future of base. They cannot accept Bourguiba's conditions under present situation with some two thousand Tunisian soldiers in Bizerte City, exits of which French control to prevent smuggling in of arms. Foreign Minister explained complicated physical situation of base which is well known. When he referred to contact telephonic and personal between French Consulate General and Tunisian Government Secretary asked why these would not afford opportunity for Consulate General to discuss matter of troop withdrawals, etc. Foreign Minister indicated that might be possible for Consulate General's conversations to develop more substance than so far but that he thought it would take time for them progress very far. In answer direct question he said he did not foresee much progress within next few days; he mentioned possibly weeks to discuss matter reestablishment normal life, evacuation, etc. Said French must move very cautiously to avoid future incidents. Foreign Minister touched on matter of “hostages,” or some five hundred French civilians being held in prison, an amount approximately same as some six hundred Tunisians being held by French. He agreed this might lead to exchange of prisoners. Foreign Minister was not too concerned with regard to possibility special General Assembly. In first place he did not feel at all certain it would take place, since Soviets were opposed to addressing letter directly SYG. Secretary indicated we were extremely concerned with possibility special GA and President Kennedy himself was most anxious avoid this, particulary in view Berlin. Foreign Minister asked how Secretary saw Tunisian crisis affecting Berlin, saying he believed a crisis must be nourished and once GA over Tunisian matter would normalize itself. Secretary disagreed, believing there would be calls for volunteers, guerilla activities, reprisals against French, etc. Foreign Minister doubted Bourguiba prepared take on both French and Algerian armies. He also thought Bourguiba would not wish have his Saharan action discussed GA since Bourguiba had endeavored establish his position by force. Bourguiba had never mentioned fact that some two hundred Tunisian casualties involved this operation. In answer to Secretary's suggestion that France, more powerful nation, might make some gesture toward smaller nation, Couve replied that he had thought two days ago of taking initiative for direct discussions with Tunisians but learned that Tunisians did not want discussions. In summary, Foreign Minister indicated he saw no difficulty in French Consul General's conversations with Tunisians being broadened and would see what could be done this connection. Couve entirely appreciated Secretary's views that were conversations in progress, GA would be easier handle. It is recommended that Department alert Ambassador Walmsley to Foreign Minister's views regarding possibility of broadening scope of French Consulate General-Tunisian Governor conversations in order latter may be prepared for any possible initiative on France's part in this connection. Memo conversation will be pouched later. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.56351/8-561. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Tunis and USUN. 1 The conversation took place between Secretary Rusk and French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville. Rusk was in Paris August 4-9. (Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330) 2 Not printed. (Ibid., Central Files, 772.56351/8-461) 172. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 172. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State Source Paris, August 8, 1961, 9 p.m. Secto 48. Eyes only for Acting Secretary. No progress whatever with De Gaulle on Bizerte. Subject brought up by me at end of hour's conversation 1 and it was quite clear he considers it a French affair, none of our business, and anything he consented to say was matter of information out of courtesy to a friend. To illustrate this point he said that if we were involved with Cuba or some such problem elsewhere he hoped we would provide him information. He promptly broke off conversation that point by wishing me good journey and expressed warm regard to President. On way out Couve tried to pick up pieces by suggesting he and I talk further before my departure. 2 Gavin or I will do so just to find out whether anything constructive has been done on French side despite De Gaulle's attitude. Nothing I have learned in Paris leads me to believe we are justified in giving any further encouragement to Tunisians about possibilities useful talks unless they can discover such possibilities through direct contacts with French. Reported here that Admiral Amman expected Paris tomorrow for consultations. Will bring complete memcon back with me and will cable anything of interest Couve has to say tomorrow. Sorry mission aborted on this one but Bizerte is the least of our problems with France as we look into the months ahead. 3 No distribution to field desired. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.56351/8-861. Secret. 1 A memorandum of this conversation is ibid., Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. 2 On August 7, Secretary Rusk told Couve de Murville that he was under instructions from President Kennedy to see President De Gaulle and emphasize the importance to the Western Alliance that Franco-Tunisian discussions on Bizerte replace U.N. General Assembly action. Rusk had said that an instruction to the French Consul General in Bizerte to begin talks was the minimum contribution that France ought now to make. Couve promised to discuss this matter with De Gaulle. Rusk asked the Department of State to pass his report of this conversation to the President, adding that they should not underestimate the “precariousness of De Gaulle's position” (Secto 35, August 7; ibid., Central Files, 772.56351/8-761) 3 On August 8, Ball told Stevenson that what had impressed the President the most in the Secretary's report was the reference to the “precariousness of De Gaulle's position” and that Kennedy was “very anxious not to be in a position of hurting De Gaulle.” (Memorandum of telephone conversation, August 8, 4:20 p.m.; Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Tunisia) 173. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to the Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson) 173. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to the Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson) Source Washington, August 23, 1961. I raised the Tunisian question with the President this morning. He said that he saw it as a simple practical matter and hoped that the members of the Delegation would be relatively matter-of-fact and hard-boiled in explaining the reasons for the American position. 1 He thinks that U.S. representatives should say something along the following lines: “Everyone forgets how shaky De Gaulle's position is. A group of generals revolted against him a few weeks back; and the mishandling of the Tunisian affair might well precipitate another and more effective military revolt leading conceivably to his overthrow and to the replacement of his government by a regime of ultras. With all his defects, De Gaulle represents the only hope of gaining a solution in Algeria. Our sympathy continues to be with the nations throwing off the bond of colonialism; but the cause of anti-colonialism will not be helped by the overthrow of De Gaulle; and this seems to us a possible and even likely consequence of too aggressive American support for the Tunisian position.” The President said that he hopes no one will be in the slightest degree apologetic about the American line. He agrees that what will matter in Paris is not what we say but what we do, and therefore will be happy to have you show as much sympathy as possible for the anti-colonial position within the framework of the abstention policy. Arthur * Source: Princeton University Library, Stevenson Papers, Embassy Files, Tunisia. No classification marking. 1 On August 21, a special session of the U.N. General Assembly convened to consider “the grave situation in Tunisia obtaining since July 19, 1961.” 174. Editorial Note 174. Editorial Note France boycotted the U.N. General Assembly special session on Bizerte, which began on August 21, 1961. The general debate, in which 53 delegations participated, continued until August 25. A draft resolution sponsored by 32 members was introduced calling “the presence of French armed forces in Tunisian territory against the express will of the Tunisian Government and people a violation of Tunisia's sovereignty,” recognizing “the sovereign right of Tunisia to call for the withdrawal of all French armed forces present on its territory without its consent,” and calling upon the Governments of France and Tunisia “to enter into immediate negotiations to devise peaceful and agreed measures in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations for the withdrawal of all French armed forces from Tunisian territory.” Speaking before the General Assembly on August 22, Ambassador Stevenson said that the United States believed that the only solution to the crisis was through negotiations between France and Tunisia and that it did not believe that it would be useful for the General Assembly to adopt “a resolution which, regardless of its merits, might serve only to prolong the present stalemate.” For text of his statement, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961 , pages 743-746. On August 25, the draft resolution was adopted by a vote of 66 to 0, with 30 abstentions (including the United States). For text of the resolution as adopted, 1622 (S-III), see ibid., pages 746-747. For a record of the proceedings, see U.N. Doc. A/L.351. 175. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to Secretary of State Rusk 175. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to Secretary of State Rusk Source Washington, August 28, 1961. Dear Dean : In view of the present difficulties which have arisen between the French and Tunisians over Bizerte, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have made an appraisal of the military potential of that base to the Western Allies. 1 The Bizerte base has the following military potential for maritime operations: a. It contains a Naval air facility capable of providing support for antisubmarine warfare, reconnaissance, mining and seaplane operations. b. The port of Bizerte is capable of supporting conventional submarines, minesweeping operations, local craft, an amphibious staging area for landing craft, and minor naval units. c. Geographically, the port is located strategically for both the conduct of submarine operations and the establishment of a defensive barrier line between Tunisia and Sicily. Such operations would assist in the control of sea lines of communication between the Eastern and Western Mediterranean. While recognizing that the United States faces a political dilemma in how to reconcile its need to support NATO France and still maintain a satisfactory political relationship with the Government of Tunisia, I concur with the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, if politically feasible, it would be desirable to have the use of the Bizerte facilities available to the Free World after the present difficulties have been resolved. I recommend that the above comments be considered in the political discussions or negotiations incident to the efforts toward settlement of the problem of the Bizerte base. Sincerely, Roswell Gilpatric * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.56311/8-2861. Confidential. 1 The Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted this appraisal in an August 18 memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, JCSM-553-61. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files:FRC 65 B 3463, Tunisia 370.02) 176. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia 176. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia Source Washington, August 28, 1961, 8:09 p.m. 173. Ref Embtel 336. 1 Deptel 174. 2 Following is text of letter to be delivered to President Bourguiba in accordance instructions transmitted separate telegram (Deptel 174). “Dear Mr. President, I greatly appreciate your letter of August 12, and want to thank you also for the welcome visits to Washington of Messrs. Ladgham and Hourani. I am indeed anxious to reestablish with you a communication which seems to have been partially interrupted by the incidents of Bizerte. I am deeply aware of the reasons why your press and public opinion should feel a sense of disappointment or even disillusionment with what must have seemed to be a lessening of the support and friendship of the United States for Tunisia in an hour of need. But I hope that I do not have to reassure you, Mr. President, of the constancy of our feeling towards Tunisia. You have been kept informed by Ambassador Walmsley as well as by Mr. Ladgham, Mr. Hourani, Ambassador Slim and Ambassador Bourguiba, Jr. of the deep personal interest which Secretary Rusk and I personally have exerted in an effort to seek a solution of this tragic crisis between two nations who have many close ties with each other. Standing as my country does close to a holocaust that could destroy the US as well as Europe and much of the East, I have not found it possible to take a public position on this matter satisfactory to you. I regret this greatly, but I am hopeful that you will recognize our difficulties as well as those of your country in these days. We have felt deeply this tragedy, not only because of our own intimate association with both parties, but because we know that essentially the differences between you are not irreconcilable. It is for this reason that we felt that careful diplomacy could heal the wounds of pride and prestige which both sides feel they have suffered. We have tried to be helpful, as a sincere friend of both parties. We intend to continue these efforts, Mr. President, by whatever means appear to be propitious. If there has been a difference of opinion between us, it has been solely on tactics, how best to exert our influence usefully to help bring about a solution which, ultimately, can only result from negotiations between Tunisia and France. Secretary Rusk has told your representatives that this is a battle which Tunisia, in the exercise of her sovereignty, cannot lose. There remains the problem of working out the details. Knowing as you do my disposition and sentiments, you will I trust not hesitate to communicate to me an indication as to the means by which you may now deem it would be useful for the United States to act to bring about a genuine settlement of the problem of Bizerte. Sincerely yours, s/John F. Kennedy.” 3 Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.56351/8-2861. Confidential; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Witman; cleared by Tyler, Veliotes, Wallner, Fredericks, Ball, and Schlesinger; and approved by Johnson. Repeated to Paris and USUN. 1 In telegram 336 from Tunis, August 26, Walmsley reported that the Tunisian Foreign Office had suggested he meet with Bourguiba before Bourguiba's departure from Tunisia on August 31. Walmsley recommended that he be given a message from President Kennedy for Bourguiba with “some soothing words of encouragement and sympathy.” Walmsley added that it was extremely important that the United States signify its intention to support both U.N. resolutions and to continue its efforts to bring about negotiations. (Ibid.) 2 In telegram 174 to Tunis, August 28, the Department of State conveyed to Walmsley the text of oral remarks to be made to Bourguiba while delivering the letter from President Kennedy printed here. Walmsley was to emphasize U.S. efforts since the start of the crisis to be helpful in bringing the problem to the negotiating table, and would continue to do everything possible to be helpful. (Ibid.) 3 On August 29, Walmsley reported that he delivered the President's message to Bourguiba who had been grateful but who had no constructive suggestion for U.S. diplomatic activity unless the United States was prepared to anger De Gaulle. (Telegram 352, August 29; 772.56351/8-2961) 177. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France 177. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France Source Washington, September 1, 1961, 7:33 p.m. 1250. We share USUN's concern (550 rptd Paris 104) 1 at damage which could be caused by renewal Bizerte issue in 16th GA. We have considered carefully USUN's suggestion for Presidential letter to De Gaulle and believe such an approach would prove counterproductive at this time. Believe, however, it essential we make our grave concern patently clear to French. You should, therefore, seek appointment with FonMin, and make following points: 1. You have been instructed by Secretary of State with full approval of President to raise urgently problem of Bizerte. 2. Bizerte has become far more than issue involving only France and Tunisia. Recent debate in Special Session indicates that renewed debate on Bizerte in 16th GA could rapidly turn into generalized political attack by Soviets and Afro-Asians on Western defense policies. Furthermore, continued existence unresolved Bizerte problem affects adversely our interests on such vital questions as Berlin. 3. With Special Session out of way France and Tunisia have short period in which to arrange modus vivendi. This period may expire when General Assembly convenes. Should it pass without forward movement, highly likely UN will directly condemn France for intransigence and may even entertain proposals for sanctions. 4. Tunisians are attending Belgrade conference and it unlikely they will take major actions by themselves before testing atmosphere that conference. We have indications, however, Tunisians ready make some accommodations which could lessen tension now existing. (FYI. August 28 Tunisian note to GOF sent through Swedes. End FYI.) 5. As major power and as country which achieved military victory on ground, a magnanimous gesture by France could have catalytic effect and lead to gestures by Tunisians. 6. As example of definite actions France might take, we believe announcement of withdrawal to base perimeter and willingness negotiate as envisaged in exchange of letters of 1958 2 would prove most effective as means reach bilateral accommodation necessary and to prevent further growth anti-French feeling throughout world. 7. FonMin. will appreciate fact we worked hard at Special Session prevent condemnation of France and to re-focus Bizerte issue on bilateral plane. Our efforts have not been without heavy cost. We cannot hope be as successful in future. 8. Therefore, we wish FonMin. to convey to President De Gaulle and French Govt. our fervent hopes France will make gesture needed and move this vexatious problem towards resolution so that allies may concentrate on crucial problem now facing us. 3 For USUN: We are considering further suggestions re approach to Algerians noted your 580. 4 Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.56351/8-2661. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Brown; cleared by Tyler, Manfull, Wallner, Ball, Fredericks, and Smith (White House); and approved by Ball. Repeated to Tunis and USUN. 1 Stevenson reported on August 26 that the U.N. special session had shown that the Bizerte crisis had been “gravely damaging” to the reputation not only of France, but to the United States and the West as a whole. The United Nations' reputation as the defender of small states against military intervention by large ones had also been tarnished. Stevenson warned of the most serious effects on Afro-Asian attitudes if the situation were allowed to persist during the 16th General Assembly session beginning September 19 and noted that all of these factors warranted a strong appeal by the President to De Gaulle that he make a “bold and generous initiative” to resolve the Bizerte situation before September 19. (Telegram 550 from USUN; ibid.) 2 On June 17, 1958, France and Tunisia reached agreement that all French troops except those at Bizerte would withdraw from Tunisia and that negotiations for a provisional agreement on Bizerte would begin immediately. For text of the French and Tunisian statements announcing the agreement at the June 18 U.N. Security Council meeting, see U.N. Doc. S/PV.826. 3 On September 2, Ambassador Gavin reported that he had raised the Bizerte problem during a tour d'horizon with De Gaulle that morning before receiving the instructions in telegram 1250. De Gaulle had said that the situation was “all Bourguiba's doing” and that Bourguiba “knew full well that France had no intention of staying in Bizerte forever.” He said that France was “ready to do what must be done to relieve tension” but it was up to Bourguiba to take the first initiative and France would “not relinquish control of the base while present international tension continues.” (Telegram 1198 from Paris, September 2; Department of State, Central Files, 772.56351/9-261) Since the Foreign Minister was absent from Paris, an Embassy officer conveyed the points in telegram 1250 to the chief of the Moroccan-Tunisian section of the French Foreign Ministry that afternoon. (Telegram 1204 from Paris, September 2; ibid.) 4 Telegram 580 from USUN, August 30. (Ibid., 772.56351/8-2961) 178. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 178. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State Source New York, September 26, 1961. Secto 36. Following based on uncleared memcon: 1. Bizerte crisis discussed at length by Secretary with Mokkadem today. 1 Mokkadem reviewed steps taken by Tunisia to help France pull itself with dignity out of the trough (“orniere”) in which it was stuck, emphasizing statesmanship of Bourguiba in seizing on slender openings in De Gaulle statement of September 5. 2 Mokkadem stressed negotiations on dead center. Despite fact agreement reached on withdrawal of French troops to previous positions and on supervision of withdrawal, no actual movement taking place owing to fact French have been waiting for six days for instructions from Paris. Sec indicated Dept would look into this delay. 2. Mokkadem stressed Tunisian desire achieve friendly statesmanlike resolution of Bizerte negotiations which he described as composed of three phases: (1) withdrawal to previous positions; (2) determination of length “dangerous period” caused by Berlin crisis and (3) agreement on eventual French departure from Bizerte base. 3. Sec explained that US position on UN resolution may make it possible for US play constructive role in resolving crisis. He made clear he not offering US assume “good offices” role but that nonetheless he hoped Tunisian Govt would keep him informed of developments as he was prepared do everything possible to end this quarrel among friendly states with whom we on most friendly terms. He pointed out that US should not be assumed have particular influence with General De Gaulle but that he felt there was nonetheless a role which the US should be willing to play. 4. In commenting on US attitude toward Bizerte problem, Sec stressed following fundamentals: (1) Bizerte indisputably Tunisian and subject to Tunisian sovereignty; (2) US security interest in base limited to desire it not fall into unfriendly hands; (3) in commencing negotiations and taking action withdraw troops, French were on path which would eventually end with French return of base to Tunisian Govt. 5. In conclusion Sec informed Mokkadem very confidentially that he tentatively anticipated that within next four to six weeks there would be some clarification of Soviet intentions with regard to Berlin. It was possible and he devoutly hoped there would be a detente. On the other hand, a worsening of the crisis would lead to a situation the end of which no one could foresee but which would assuredly affect scope of considerations bearing on Bizerte issue. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.56351/9-2661. Confidential. No time of transmission appears on the source text. Repeated to Paris and Tunis. 1 The conversation between Secretary Rusk and Tunisian Foreign Minister Sadok Mokkadem at the United Nations in New York was recorded in a memorandum of conversation; ibid., Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. 2 At a September 5 press conference, De Gaulle asked the Tunisian Government to agree first to a modus vivendi for Bizerte and then to open negotiations on conditions for the use of the base during the dangerous period through which the world is currently passing. For text of his remarks, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961 , p. 748. On September 8, Bourguiba announced that he was prepared to allow the French to retain the naval base, subject to its eventual evacuation, and negotiations between the two countries were begun. 179. Telegram From the Embassy in Benghazi, Libya to the Department of State 179. Telegram From the Embassy in Benghazi, Libya to the Department of State Source Benghazi, October 20, 1961, 5 p.m. 72. From Williams. 1 1. During Tunis visit I was struck by warmth shown by both Tunisian Government and people. I could detect few signs US position on Bizerte had seriously harmed US-Tunisian friendship. 2. Outwardly at least I could also see little evidence Tunisian public any longer much aroused by Bizerte issue. This impression no doubt had limited significance however for pullback French forces just being completed 2 and public not yet aware negative French reply to Bourguiba request for negotiations on evacuation. 3. Foregoing notwithstanding, I was made feel aware deep impact of Bizerte episode and President Bourguiba spent most my 75-minute meeting with him dwelling vividly on repercussions which Bizerte has had and will continue to have so long as French refuse negotiate for total evacuation. Come what may, he insisted, Tunisia would push “decolonization” to end. Decolonization and dignity: West had to realize these were for new nations primary goals to which everything else subordinate. Tunisia had resisted aggression on its own soil and had suffered terrible massacre. Report international jurists attested to atrocities. (Bourguiba indulged in impressive histrionics at this point.) 4. I think he was particularly depressed by French reply he had just received through Swiss. He apparently found no shred of encouragement in it. “French seem to have understood nothing,” he said. 5. Second way in which Bizerte impact could be measured was in serious problems created by departure French teachers, professional people and technicians. I was told Tunisian Jews as well as French and Italians apprehensive and many wanting to get out. Basis confidence on which previous GOT-GOF cooperation depended badly shattered by Bizerte and unlikely be restored in foreseeable future. GOT will certainly look elsewhere to fill gaps and additional problems this will create for us can be readily imagined. 6. Our group was made rather conscious of dogmatic, paternalistic even authoritarian way in which GOT directs Tunisian society, politically and economically. Seen in small way, for example, in obvious organization behind public welcome for foreign visitors. More serious, there is growing malaise and dissatisfaction among important elements Tunisian elite. However, there seem to be considerable difference of opinion and discussion on different points by policy makers. 7. In field economic development we wondered whether GOT really had capacity carry out all its fine plans. There is self-satisfaction here bordering on smugness. I am also apprehensive Tunisian planners giving insufficient consideration to role private enterprise and I took occasion tell Bourguiba so. He assured me there would be much for private enterprise to do. (Ben Salah tends to slight this role but in contrast representative government banking institutions I met with appear consider it very important.) 8. Despite these misgivings, I am still impressed by Tunisia's great possibilities. I think US is presented opportunities with few parallels in Africa. GOT has energy, buoyancy, drive and intelligence. In experience and trained manpower Tunisia is years ahead of countries we have just visited south of Sahara. I think most important consideration of all is influence which Tunisia, small in itself, can have, we hope, in greater Maghreb context. No telling what problems we will face in future Algeria and we will need all restraint, moderation and influence Tunisia, as friend of West, can bring to bear. If Tunisia is not proof, politically and economically, of advantages close cooperation with West, we will certainly have hard time making headway in Algeria. In short, I counsel continued emphasis on Tunisia for itself and especially for Maghreb context. 9. Last but by no means least I wish to report I was deeply heartened by Bourguiba's emphatic and what I took to be quite genuine reassurances about his basic affinity for West and especially US. He said this was matter of conviction which nothing not even Bizerte could change. This because we had same fundamental values, same conception of life and liberty. He felt same way we did about danger in USSR desire extend hegemony over world. In showdown Tunisia, so long as he was its leader, would be at our side. As I was first high-level Washington official he has had chance to talk with since Bizerte, I took these assurances as special effort impress on us his friendship and goodwill. Embassy Tunis comments this telegram would be welcome. 3 Dorman * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.15-WI/10-2061. Confidential. Repeated to Tunis, Paris, and Khartoum for Williams. 1 Assistant Secretary Williams, who was on his third trip to Africa September 29-October 26, visited Tunisia October 15-18. He was in Khartoum, Sudan, October 21-24. 2 On September 29, a Franco-Tunisian agreement was signed at Bizerte, whereby French forces withdrew October 1-3, 1961, to positions held before fighting broke out in Bizerte on July 19. 3 On October 26, Ambassador Walmsley reported that he supported Williams' observations and conclusions. (Telegram 601 from Tunis, October 26; Department of State, Central Files, 110.15-WI/10-2661) 180. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France 180. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France Source Washington, November 3, 1961, 8:18 p.m. 2566. Tunis tel 608 info Paris 284. 1 Dept concerned by Emb Tunis reports Bourguiba's growing impatience and frustration with absence indication French readiness negotiate calendar Bizerte evacuation. We recall this was Bourguiba's main preoccupation when Williams saw him Oct 17 (Tunis tel 262). 2 His concern even then appeared tantamount to obsession; he seemed very depressed. Internal political pressures on Bourguiba could force him on irrational course, damaging to Western interests, to recoup prestige or again draw world attention to Bizerte. GOF should be apprised our concern and effort should be made ascertain what steps, if any, GOF contemplates taking to break present impasse. Embassy Paris should at appropriate level Quai: (1) Emphasize Bourguiba's concern as revealed to us, explaining he appears to feel essential begin negotiations based on principle eventual evacuation; (2) We remain keenly interested in evolution of problem and have been gratified at progress made toward normalizing Franco-Tunisian relations in certain spheres. We particularly pleased at foresighted GOF decision resume technical and educational assistance. (3) In spite these encouraging developments Bizerte problem itself remains unresolved and no major break appears imminent. In our view internal political pressures generated by festering dispute could have serious effects on stability and attitudes Bourguiba regime and ultimately on entire North African region in which West has such deep interest. We would be interested GOF's views on direction it believes evolution Bizerte problem will take. We would hope at this time when world attention is focused away from Bizerte and when Tunisian political and propaganda pressures for resolution problem their terms are at minimum that GOF could make gesture opening way to rapid liquidation of dispute. 3 For Tunis . You may inform Fon Off, on receipt info Paris has taken action, that we have again expressed our interest to French in seeing early settlement problem. Bowles * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.56351/10-2861. Confidential. Drafted by Stackhouse, cleared by Imhof, and approved by Witman. Repeated to Tunis. 1 In telegram 608 from Tunis, October 28, Walmsley reported that Bourguiba was “in great agitation” in reaction to the latest French note which restricted negotiation to the status of the base during the current period of international tensions and was totally silent on a date for evacuation. He noted that Bourguiba could “no longer, in his own judgment, talk about any interim measures with the French without a prior indication by French of a ‘date',” adding that he needed this “to vindicate decisions and tragedy of summer of 1961.” (Ibid.) 2 Reference is presumably to telegram 563 from Tunis, October 17, in which Walmsley reported that during his meeting with Williams, Bourguiba had expressed his concern that no progress was being made toward negotiation of a calendar for evacuation of Bizerte. (Ibid., 772.56351/10-1761) 3 On November 7, Gavin reported that an Embassy officer discussed Bourguiba's insistence on the importance of fixing an evacuation timetable with an official from the Morocco-Tunisia section of the French Foreign Ministry, who had said that France was not yet ready to fix a calendar for evacuation with Tunisia. He had pointed out that the French Government also had political problems and said that if the Tunisians would show patience and willingness to start discussing matters without threats, ultimately the matter of Bizerte would be settled to their satisfaction. (Telegram 2469 from Paris, November 7; ibid., 772.56351/11-761) 181. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France 181. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France Source Washington, January 10, 1962, 6:37 p.m. 3798. French strategy to liquidate Bizerte problem seems now to be nicely complemented by Tunisian desires not to be isolated from main train developments in North Africa. Dept encouraged by French-Tun agreement to talk at ministerial level, 1 though we cognizant troublesome central issues remain (Tunis tel 792 rpt Paris 376) 2 and pace toward definitive solution is perhaps decisively dependent on timing Algerian denouement. Emb Tunis and Emb Paris, in conveying to appropriate levels Foreign Ministries our gratification at new fluidity their respective government's positions, should state our conviction that present conjuncture seems propitious for agreement. 3 Emb Tunis may note to Tunisians our belief French now giving clear signs they ready liquidate problem on basis which could be agreeable to Tuns and our hope Tuns will give full consideration magnitude France's Algerian and domestic difficulties in presentation demands. Emb Paris may say we continue be convinced Tuns will be flexible re timing Bizerte base reconversion but convinced also that Tuns must emerge from ministerial talks with something they can represent as solid progress on what for Tunisians is main issue, eventual evacuation. Failure ministerial talks might irretrievably weaken Bourguiba and could set back solution for months to come. FYI. Although French desire for access rights expressed by Guiringaud (Paris tel 3312 rptd Tunis 305) 4 understandable, we hope negotiations will not break down on this issue. 5 Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.56351/1-1062. Confidential. Drafted by Stackhouse, cleared by Imhof, and approved by Witman. Repeated to Tunis. 1 Franco-Tunisian talks on Bizerte at the ministerial level began in Paris on January 16. On January 20, the Tunisian delegation suspended the negotiations because of what it called French intransigence. 2 Telegram 792 from Tunis, January 6, called Bourguiba's decision to negotiate without previous French commitment to a calendar both audacious and realistic, but also noted the potential conflict between the Tunisian condition that the item of eventual demilitarization of Bizerte be included on the agenda and the French goal of negotiating re-entry rights to the base. (Department of State, Central Files, 772.56351/1-662) 3 Gavin reported on January 12 that an Embassy officer had discussed Bizerte with a French Foreign Ministry official, who was going to be “heavily involved” in the forthcoming negotiations. The Ambassador emphasized that the French were “actively interested in emergency re-entry rights” to Bizerte, which was not the minor issue for the French that the last paragraph of telegram 3798 seemed to imply. (Telegram 3436 from Paris, January 12; ibid., 772.56351/1-1262) 4 Dated January 4. (Ibid., 772.56351.1-462) 5 On January 13, Walmsley cabled that French re-entry rights to Bizerte would not, in his judgment, be “politically defensible” for the Tunisian Government. He pointed out that the “tragic element” in this situation was that Bourguiba, more than any other North African leader, could be counted upon in time of real emergency, but could not afford to sign up in advance to “any new servitude which would again expose him to attack as Western puppet.” (Telegram 799 from Tunis, January 13; ibid., 772.56351/1-362) 182. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) 182. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) Source Washington, June 26, 1962. SUBJECT Tunisian Aid Determination Meeting I realize tomorrow's meeting on the Tunisian Determination will deal chiefly with the technical problem of whether to commit our aid under Section 202b or NSC 1550. 1 However, would you put in a word for the mounting political problem our repeated delays are creating in Tunis? From the Tunisian point of view, we look increasingly muddled when we can't yet state publicly what we told them privately four months ago. 2 As you recall, the Patterson Survey Team submitted its appraisal of the Tunisian Plan on 20 December. On 21 February Hutchinson told Plan Secretary Ben Salah informally that AID would recommend a Presidential determination authorizing a $180 million commitment, as soon as Salah furnished certain specific assurances and a copy of the plan. Both were received by 30 March and AID began preparing determination papers. With AID's concurrence, Walmsley told Bourguiba we expected to make our commitment public in time for his National Assembly debate on Plan about 15 May. The Assembly on 30 May finally approved the Plan despite lack of public justification for including a substantial foreign contribution. Finally, on 13 June, State with AID concurrence authorized Walmsley to reassure the Tunisians privately that they could count on $180 million, but to say we still couldn't announce this. On 16 June the Tunisians made their latest plea for an announcement the week of 1 July (Tunis 1268, 3 1298 4 attached). Serious precedents are admittedly involved here. But three months seems a long time to settle them when AID decided back in February to make this commitment. 5 Hal * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, North Africa. Confidential. Copies were sent to Dungan and Amory. A handwritten notation at the bottom of the source text, presumably by Kaysen, reads: “Agreed.” 1 Section 202b of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195) stipulated that whenever the President determined that it was important to the advancement of U.S. interests, he was authorized to enter into agreements committing funds authorized to be appropriated under this title, subject only to the annual appropriation of such funds. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961 , p. 1270. NSC 1550 stipulated that no foreign assistance could be offered without determining whether such aid was in accordance with approved policy, whether Congress had approved or appropriated funds, whether the recipient country could support the aid programs, and the probable duration of the assistance. (Department of State,S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action of the National Security Council) 2 The Department of State announced on February 21, 1962, that during AID discussions with Ben Salah in Washington, it had been agreed that the United States would support Tunisia's long-term economic development effort and that formal agreement on the nature and extent of this U.S. assistance would be reached during the coming weeks. For text of the statement, see Department of State Bulletin , March 12, 1962, p. 425. 3 Telegram 1268 from Tunis, June 16, reported that Ladgham had made a strong plea for the United States to make public its economic assistance to Tunisia before July 1 on the grounds that this would greatly strengthen Tunisia's public posture and permit it to be more flexible in its military negotiations with France in July. (Department of State, Central Files, 872.00-Three Year/6-1662) 4 Telegram 1298 from Tunis, June 23, reported that Bourguiba's special adviser Hourani had reiterated Ladgham's plea, saying that Bourguiba felt a strong need for such a show of U.S. support for its psychological impact on the Tunisian public. (Ibid., 811.00/6-2362) 5 On July 29, AID announced a U.S. commitment of $180 million in aid in support of Tunisia's $785 million Three-Year Plan, a commitment that included all forms of U.S. aid except that provided under P.L. 480 Titles I and II. (Circular telegram 169, August 1; ibid., 811.0072/8-162) 183. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia 183. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia Source Washington, October 19, 1962, 6:57 p.m. 163. Embtel 263. 1 Dept appreciates your full report Ambassador's initial meeting with Bourguiba. Although occasion was one which obviously in Bourguiba's interest make good impression, we believe his description Tunisian role vis-à-vis West, Bloc and “neutral world” is generally accurate in light objective evidence. We find Bourguiba's not unexpected evocation aid problems noteworthy for what appears to be lack appreciation imperatives behind our policies in defense of dollar, and setting forth AID criteria. We hope there will be opportunities bring about fuller understanding by Bourguiba of these policies and of assistance we hope will be forthcoming from our friends, in spirit free cooperation, toward successful implementation these policies. Would appreciate further Embassy comments re Bourguiba recommendation for grant military assistance. Do you believe Bourguiba's broaching this subject foreshadows formal GOT proposal re past and future programs? No encouragement of course should be given to Tunisian hopes for cancellation obligations on equipment which, it might be well recall if subject raised again at Tunisian initiative, has been provided under pricing and payment arrangements quite favorable to Tunisians. 2 Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 773.11/10-1762. Confidential. Drafted by Stackhouse, cleared by Whitfield (DOD) and Ellis (AID), and approved by Witman. 1 Telegram 263, October 17, reported on Ambassador Francis H. Russell's first meeting with Bourguiba, during which Bourguiba had said that Tunisia had always been on the side of the West even when it was struggling against colonialism. Bourguiba said he thought everything would be settled soon with France. He noted that U.S. aid to Tunisia had to be real aid and complained that currently it was subject to conditions, such as transportation in American bottoms, that greatly reduced its value. He also emphasized the desirability of helping Tunisia develop its army through U.S. gifts of military equipment. (Ibid.) 2 On October 26, Russell reported that in talks with Tunisian officials he emphasized that the U.S. desire to see Tunisia succeed in its economic development plan was illustrated by the fact that Tunisia was one of only five countries selected for long-term, multi-annual U.S. aid. He had also explained that restrictions such as expenditure of aid in U.S. funds and shipping in American bottoms were necessitated by the need to protect the soundness of the dollar, which was in the interest of the entire free world economy. (Airgram A-231 from Tunis, October 26; ibid., 772.5/10-2662) 184. Report Prepared by the Fourth Interdepartmental Survey Group for President Kennedy 184. Report Prepared by the Fourth Interdepartmental Survey Group for President Kennedy Source Washington, April 19, 1963. [Here follows the summary dealing with Liberia.] TUNISA United States Policy Basic United States policy toward Tunisia is clearly defined, provides a satisfactory basis for the conduct of day-to-day relations and the formulation of action programs, and has generally been consistently interpreted by all United States elements both in Washington and Tunisia. The main objectives of this policy are: 1) the preservation and further evolution of a moderate, pro-western, and politically independent Tunisia, hopefully with increasingly democratic institutions, 2) the development of close and friendly relations between Tunisia and its North African neighbors, 3) the restoration in non-colonial form of Tunisia's former special and mutually beneficial ties with France, 4) the creation of economic relationships that reflect and exploit the economic interdependence of the Maghrebian states and the interest these states have in long-term commercial ties with Western Europe, and 5) the attainment, with the help of such economic relationships, of a self-sustaining, politically acceptable rate of economic and social progress. United States interests in Tunisia are based mainly on its constructive internal policies and its western orientation which have an important impact on other countries in Africa. 1) Tunisia has supported the West on critical cold-war issues. 2) In Afro-Asian circles it has exercised a responsible and pro-western role. 3) Its development methods provide a good model and the extent of its national self-help is high. 4) It has certain strategic importance. 5) It is a good example of a state with one-party political institutions administered in a manner which gives some encouragement to western concepts of freedom. 6) It is a leader among the nations promoting the decolonization of the southern third of Africa in a manner designed to eliminate or minimize Communist and radical nationalist influences. Adequacy of Information and Intelligence Base United States plans, policies and programs appear to be based on sound information and intelligence. Nonetheless, we need to know more about attitudes of the Tunisian military forces, labor, nomadic groups and the stresses and strains inside the ruling Neo-Destour party. A greater effort should be made to obtain and exploit the knowledge possessed by United States Government employees in Tunisia. Assessment of Local Situation Tunisia's goal is to become a modern state responsive to the needs of its people. It is working to achieve this goal by pragmatic means, using private enterprise, cooperatives or government enterprises as circumstances require. At this comparatively early stage in Tunisia's development, there is no alternative to a major use of government enterprise. Tunisian cabinet officers and other key government officials categorically state that government enterprise will give way to private enterprise when the latter is ready and willing to take over. Tunisia is controlled by one party, the Neo-Destour party, which under Bourguiba's leadership fought for and achieved this country's independence. Its one-party political institutions are administered in a way which gives some encouragement to western concepts of freedom and to the development of a valid popular consensus. The Neo-Destour party is making an effort to broaden its grass roots contacts with the people. Bourguiba's popularity has been diminished by Bizerte, other less major mistakes, and the inevitable corrosion of original enthusiasm after several years of post-independence reality. Although still strong internally, he is more or less isolated from the revolutionary Arabic leaders of the Near East and Algeria who may conceivably try to stir up trouble inside Tunisia at some later date. The Tunisian Government is not at present threatened by any organized subversive force, Communist or otherwise. Its police and security forces have good morale, possess adequate modern weapons and are capable of maintaining public order. The recently attempted coup was an unorganized, incoherent gesture on the part of ineffectual malcontents who had no common cause. It did not reflect any deep-rooted or extensive opposition to the regime. However, Tunisia's long and unmarked frontier, especially with Algeria, is vulnerable to foreign-supported insurgency, although any such activity at this time could be dealt with or contained by Tunisian security forces. Tunisia's Ten-Year Development Plan has been repeatedly reviewed by experts and pronounced reasonable though over-optimistic. Its success, as well as the size of future requirements for American aid, will depend to a large extent on the resumption by France of its natural economic role in Tunisia, and on the working out of mutually satisfactory economic relationships by Tunisia with the Common Market as well as with Morocco and Algeria. It is expected that France will during 1964 resume some financial assistance to Tunisia. Hopefully within three years it will be possible for Tunisia to obtain from Europe the major proportion of the external assistance it then requires. The Survey Group believes that the United States will continue to have strong foreign policy reasons for playing an important, even though not the most important, role in Tunisia's development for several years after the expiration of our three-year commitment. [Here follows the summary dealing with the adequacy of U.S. programs and operations and other issues and the body of the Report.] * Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, Report for the President on Liberia and Tunisia. Secret. The source text comprises pp. VII-IX of the Summary. The report was transmitted to President Kennedy under cover of a memorandum from Secretary Rusk indicating that the report had been prepared by the Fourth Interdepartmental Survey Group sent to Liberia and Tunisia as part of the Department of State response to NSAM No. 173 of July 18, 1962, which had directed the Secretary of State “to initiate, in consultation with the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) a program of field visits by senior interdepartmental teams.” (Ibid.) A February 4, 1963, letter from Rusk to Ambassador Russell explaining the mission of the survey group coming to Tunisia noted that the President had expressed a keen interest in assuring closer ties between country team planning and operations and the Washington agencies and departments which participated in U.S. programs in developing countries. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-AFR) 185. Memorandum of Conversation 185. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, July 15, 1963. SUBJECT Tunisian Relations with France PARTICIPANTS American: The Secretary Mr. Henry J. Tasca, Deputy Assistant Secretary, AF Mr. Woodruff Wallner, Deputy Assistant Secretary, IO Mr. H.H. Stackhouse, OIC, Tunisia Tunisian: His Excellency Mongi Slim, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Tunisia Mr. Ismail Khelil, Counselor, Tunisian Embassy His Excellency Habib Bourguiba, Jr., Tunisian Ambassador Mr. Slim said that there had been considerable evolution in recent months in Tunisia's relations with France. Many important outstanding problems had been resolved and the Bizerte problem seemed to be on the way to solution. 1 But negotiation with the French on remaining issues was difficult and De Gaulle continued to be “mysterious.” The Foreign Minister said that the French continued to try to maintain rights of a colonial character obtained during the Protectorate. Naturally Mr. Slim said, Tunisia opposed this. The Secretary expressed understanding, based on U.S. experience, of Tunisia's difficulties in negotiating with General De Gaulle. He said that it was our conviction, however, that De Gaulle has made a basic decision to put France's relations with all Arab states on a solid, friendly basis. * Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 FR-TUN. Confidential. Drafted by Stackhouse on July 18 and approved in S on July 25. The source text is the third of five memoranda of conversation of discussions between Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Slim on July 15. The other four memoranda of conversation are ibid., POL 10 PORT, POL 7 ETH, DEF 18-3 USSR, and AID (US) TUN. 1 On October 15, France completed a voluntary withdrawal of its forces from Bizerte. 186. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of African Affairs 186. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of African Affairs Source Washington, September 11, 1963. TALKING PAPER—FOREIGN MINISTER SLIM Tunisia 1. Progress of U.S. Long-Term Aid Commitment to Tunisia The first year of Tunisia's Three-year Plan has seen her substantially achieve her investment goals by drawing down heavily on her foreign exchange and restoring [resorting] to extensive internal borrowing. This has generated inflationary pressures which could imperil the Plan's success. The Tunisians say they were forced to rely more heavily on their own resources than expected because of the slow flow of foreign aid, particularly U.S. aid. (Our total commitment in support of the Plan—made in July 1962—is $180 million; allocations thus far are now about $35 million. AID has always regarded the plan as overambitious. Anticipating a stretch-out of the Plan, we made our commitment to the Plan and not for a three-year period.) The Tunisians seem determined to maintain the scheduled pace of investment in spite of the recognized risks of inflation and foreign exchange depletion. Anticipated Tunisian Position Mr. Slim may repeat his plea to you last July for additional flexibility of implementation of our aid program. 1 He may take the tack that the sluggish flow of U.S. aid threatens the success of the Plan. Recommended U.S. Position Reassure Mr. Slim of our desire to see the Plan successful and our admiration of Tunisian efforts to this end. Since you last saw Mr. Slim we have eased certain aid procedures to expedite the flow of aid. Within the limits set by legal obligations and our balance of payments problem, we will continue to make such efforts. Our hope is that Tunisia will be able to find ways to make effective use of its aid commitments from other foreign sources. If total foreign investment was lower than planned during the Plan's first year, the proportion of U.S. aid to total foreign investment was higher than planned—two-thirds against one-half. We believe this is fair evidence of our attempts to provide aid in good time. 2. Future U.S. Military Aid to Tunisia Deliveries on our FY 60-62 Military Assistance Program to Tunisia are being completed. The success of our MAP has been limited by Tunisian reluctance—for reasons rooted in their past experience with the French military—to take full advantage of training and maintenance assistance available under the MAP. With the termination of this program our military assistance to Tunisia comprises only a small training program. During the past several months the Tunisian Minister of Defense has indicated on several occasions to Ambassador Russell the Tunisian Government's hope that additional U.S. military assistance would be forthcoming. The Tunisians have mentioned military jets especially. Our response essentially has been that large quantities of equipment are now being delivered under our MAP (a $15 million program) and we believe for the present our best contribution would be to assist in training in the use and maintenance of this equipment. Anticipated Tunisian Position Alluding to unstable conditions in North Africa and acquisition of arms by Tunisia's neighbors, Mr. Slim may again urge U.S. assistance in supplying Tunisia's future military needs. Recommended U.S. Position You may wish to point out first to Mr. Slim that our readiness to supply arms to Tunisia since 1957 attests to our belief that an effective Tunisian military establishment will contribute importantly to stability in North Africa. We continue to hold to this belief, but at this stage we feel that our best contribution will be to assist Tunisia in training for the utilization and maintenance of equipment still being received under our MAP. Talking Points 1. Mr. Slim, in all likelihood, will be more concerned with African than with bilateral issues, particularly apartheid, the Portuguese territories, and the situation in the Congo. 2. Mr. Slim is always appreciative of hearing our appraisal of the current status of leading cold war issues, and has informed Ambassador Russell he would like to discuss with you the future of East-West relations following the test ban agreement. * Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2326. Confidential. Drafted by Stackhouse and cleared by Brown, Heffner (DOD), Hilliker, and Rives. Prepared for the 18th Session of the U.N. General Assembly. 1 The conversation between Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Slim on July 15 was recorded in a memorandum of conversation; ibid.; Central Files,AID (US) TUN. Africa Region Africa Region 187. National Security Action Memorandum No. 16 Washington, February 13, 1961. Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAMs, NSAM 16. Top Secret. 188. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy Washington, February 15, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.70/2-1561. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. An attached memorandum from George McGhee, Chairman of the Policy Planning Council, to Secretary Rusk recommends that the Secretary sign the memorandum to the President setting forth McGhee's understanding of the interpretation agreed upon at the February 9 NSC meeting by Rusk, Secretary of the Treasury Dillon, and President Kennedy. 189. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Williams) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning (Rowen) Washington, April 5, 1961. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Africa 000.1-091.4, 1961. Confidential. 190. Brief of a National Intelligence Estimate Washington, April 11, 1961. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Africa 121-350.09, 1961. Secret; Noforn. The source text was transmitted to Secretary of Defense McNamara under cover of a memorandum from Major General Robert A. Breitweiser, USAF Director for Intelligence, that reads: “On 11 April 1961, the United States Intelligence Board approved an Estimate on ‘Probable Developments in Colonial Africa' (NIE 60/70-61). A Brief of this Estimate is attached for your information in advance of the regular distribution which will be forthcoming.” 191. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, April 28, 1961. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files:FRC 65 A 3464, Africa 091 (27 Jan. 61). Top Secret. 192. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, April 28, 1961, 8:27 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770.00/4-2861. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Herz on April 27; cleared by Ferguson, Deming, Weiss, McBride, Spiers, Witman, Burdett, Penfield, and Webb; and approved by Williams. Also sent to Paris and repeated to Abidjan, Lagos, and Monrovia. 193. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) Washington, May 3, 1961. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Africa 000.92-Africa, 452, 1961. Secret. 194. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, May 13, 1961. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Africa. Secret. 195. Memorandum of Conversation Paris, May 31, 1961, 2:50 p.m. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, President's Visit to France, 5/31-6/2/61. II. MEMCONS. Secret. Drafted by Glenn. The conversation took place at the Elysee Palace. President Kennedy visited France and met with President Charles de Gaulle May 31-June 2, 1961. Their discussions were recorded in eight memoranda of conversation. (Ibid.) 196. Paper Prepared by the Policy Planning Council Washington, July 24, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770.5-MSP/8-261. Confidential. The source text was transmitted to Secretary Rusk under cover of an August 2 memorandum from George McGhee, Chairman of the Policy Planning Council, that reads: “The attached paper entitled ‘Selected Aspects of US Economic Aid Policy Toward Africa' was initiated and prepared in S/P. After review in S/P it was circulated to the interested Bureaus and Offices of the Department and ICA for information and comment. An earlier version of this study was discussed at your Thursday policy planing meeting on June 29, presided over by Under Secretary Bowles. The revised version is now sent to you for your consideration.” 197. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Williams) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) Washington, August 17, 1961. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files:FRC 64 A 2382, Africa 400.12-680.1, 1961. Secret. Drafted by McQuade and Junkermann. 198. National Intelligence Estimate Washington, August 31, 1961. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files, Job 79 R 1012, Box 189. Secret. 199. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, September 5, 1961. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files:FRC 66 A 3542, Africa, 1962. Secret. 200. Report Prepared by Samuel E. Belk of the National Security Council Staff Washington, September 25, 1961. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Africa, General. Secret. The report was sent under cover of a memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to the President's Naval Aide, Captain Shepard, that reads: “Attached is Soapy Williams' report of his last trip. Sam Belk of our office has put a 4-page summary on top, and I think that is all you need to read.” The report of Assistant Secretary Williams on his second trip to Africa August 8-September 1 is in Department of State, Central Files, 110.5-WI/9-961. 201. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) Washington, September 29, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770.5-MSP/9-2961. Official Use Only. Drafted by Troxel and sent through the Executive Secretariat. Copies were sent to Hartman (B) and Toner (AID). 202. Letter From the Consultative Group on Arms Limitation in Africa to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) Washington, October 23, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770.5/10-2361. Confidential. 203. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Williams) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) Washington, October 26, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770.5411/10-2661. Secret. 204. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussions at the Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting Washington, January 5, 1962, 11:30 a.m. Source: Department of State, State-JCS Meetings: Lot 70 D 328. Top Secret. The meeting was held at the Pentagon. No drafting information appears on the source text, which bears a typewritten notation that it is a Department of State draft not cleared with the Department of Defense. 205. Memorandum Prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Washington, January 31, 1962. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, 092 Africa, Jan.-Mar., 1962. Secret. This memorandum forms the appendix to a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara, January 31. The January 31 covering memorandum indicates that the memorandum printed here was written in response to a January 4 request from the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs for recommendations on substantive courses of action designed to counter Sino-Soviet penetration of Ghana, Guinea, and Mali. The memorandum advises that the Joint Chiefs had re-examined measures they had recommended in the past, as well as others being pursued or planned by the Department of State, and were submitting the results of their review in the attached appendix. They recommended that the Secretary of Defense transmit the substance of the appendix to the Department of State and urged that it be considered by a State-Defense Ad Hoc Committee. On March 9, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Bundy transmitted the memorandum and its appendix to Assistant Secretary Williams under cover of a letter calling it “a sensible and useful paper.” Bundy stated that he was prepared to accept Williams' judgment as to whether an ad hoc committee would be useful, but noted that a continuing watch might have some usefulness. (Ibid.) 206. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, May 9, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC/Standing Group Meetings, 5/1/62-5/17/62. Secret. Sent through the Executive Secretariat. A handwritten note in the margin in an unknown hand indicates that copies were sent to Kaysen, Dungan, Klein, and Komer. 207. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Achilles) to the Under Secretary (McGhee) Washington, May 10, 1962. Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Standing Group Meeting, May 11, 1962. Secret. 208. Record of Actions Taken at a Standing Group Meeting of the National Security Council Washington, May 11, 1962. Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Standing Group, May 11, 1962. Secret. Copies were sent to McGhee, Gilpatric, McCone, Bundy (White House), Halaby (FAA), Bell (BOB), Boyd (CAB), and Bromley Smith (NSC). 209. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) Washington, July 6, 1962. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770.54/7-662. Secret. 210. National Intelligence Estimate Washington, July 11, 1962. Source: Department of State, INR-NIE Files. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet: “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force.” All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on July 11, except the Atomic Energy Commission Representative and the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction. 211. Position Paper Prepared in the Office of the Secretary of State Washington, undated. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2160. Confidential. Drafted by Stoffel and cleared by McGhee, Lister, Russell, Wolfe, Ramsey, and FitzGerald. Prepared for Secretary Rusk's delegation attending the 17th Session of the U.N. General Assembly in September. 212. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State New York, September 20, 1962, 8 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770.00/9-2062. Confidential; Priority. 213. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, December 5, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Africa. No classification marking. 214. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to the President's Assistant Special Counsel (White) Washington, December 17, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Africa, Memoranda and Miscellaneous, 11/62-2/63. No classification marking. 215. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nitze) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) Washington, February 15, 1963. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files:FRC 67 A 4564, 091.3 Africa. Confidential. Drafted by Junkermann and Sloan. A copy was sent to Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Williams. 216. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, February 25, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Africa. Confidential. 217. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Dungan) to President Kennedy Washington, March 6, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Staff Memoranda, Dungan, Ralph A., 1/63-5/63. No classification marking. 218. Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense Washington, undated. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 73 A 2226, Strategic Importance of Africa. Secret. The source text is attached to a memorandum from Colonel Howard C. Junkermann, USAF, to Lieutenant Colonel C.C. Robinson, Defense Intelligence Agency, Commander H.A. Cummings, Department of the Navy, Lieutenant Colonel E.G. Tanassy, Department of the Air Force, and J.J. Blake, Department of the Army. Junkermann indicated that the paper was drafted by Fred Greene, and would be used as a basis for discussion at a forthcoming conference to be held at Georgetown University on May 25. No record of the group's discussion has been found. 219. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain African Posts Washington, May 28, 1963, 6:41 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 ETH. Confidential. Drafted by Sherry, cleared by Hadsel, and approved by Tasca. Sent to Abidjan, Accra, Addis Ababa, Algiers, Bamako, Bangui, Benghazi, Tripoli, Brazzaville, Conakry, Cotonou, Dakar, Dar-es-Salaam, Fort Lamy, Freetown, Kampala, Khartoum, Kigali, Lagos, Leopoldville, Libreville, Lome, Lourenco Marques, Luanda, Mogadiscio, Monrovia, Nairobi, Niamey, Nouakchott, Ouagadougou, Cape Town, Rabat, Salisbury, Tananarive, Tunis, Usumbura, Yaounde, and Zanzibar. 220. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, May 31, 1963. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 69 A 3131, Africa, 1963. Secret. 221. Editorial Note 222. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, November 23, 1963. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 AFR-US. Confidential. Drafted by Elbert G. Mathews. 187. National Security Action Memorandum No. 16 187. National Security Action Memorandum No. 16 Source Washington, February 13, 1961. TO The Secretary of State SUBJECT Economic Support for Newly-Independent Areas The record of action of the NSC meeting of February 9, 1961 1 shows in Paragraph 3. b. that the President has approved revision of NSC policies along the lines recommended by the Secretary of State to provide flexibility for the United States to supplement Western European support to newly-independent areas whenever such action is in the United States interest. In my judgment, this action constitutes a revision of the applicable policies, but if new language is desired in all the appropriate documents, we will expect to receive it from the Department of State. McGeorge Bundy * Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAMs, NSAM 16. Top Secret. 1 A record of the February 9 meeting of the National Security Council is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meeting No. 476. The subject of NSAM No. 16 was covered by NSC Record of Action No. 2404-b. 188. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy 188. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy Source Washington, February 15, 1961. SUBJECT Interpretation of National Security Council Policy on Africa I am informed that certain portions of the guidance contained in present United States policy toward Africa (NSC 6005/1, Policy Toward West Africa, April 9, 1960; 1 and NSC 6001, Policy Toward South, Central and East Africa, January 19, 1960) 2 have in the past been interpreted in such a way as to limit unduly the flexibility and freedom of action required for an effective United States approach to African developments. These limitations have been based particularly on the interpretation of wording of paragraphs having to do with economic assistance. Typical of the language in question is that portion of paragraph 34b of NSC 6005/1 which states that the United States should, to the maximum extent feasible, rely on specified sources other than the U.S. I recognize how important it is that other Free World powers, particularly the former metropoles, continue and where possible expand their efforts to meet the need for external capital of the territories and emerging nations of the area. In our activities and programs we should not take any action that would serve to discourage or supplant these efforts—indeed we should make every effort to urge them to do more. It is my understanding, however, based upon our discussion at the Council meeting of February 9 in which the Secretary of the Treasury participated, that the language of the policy is in the future to be interpreted in such a way as to provide the needed flexibility and freedom of action. Under this interpretation we would not, for example, be called upon for such a strong burden of proof as has been required in the past that the needed assistance was not available from others, before proceeding with assistance deemed to be in the United States interest. The Department is now reviewing the whole of United States policy toward Africa, and we will be developing new proposals for future guidance. Dean Rusk 3 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.70/2-1561. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. An attached memorandum from George McGhee, Chairman of the Policy Planning Council, to Secretary Rusk recommends that the Secretary sign the memorandum to the President setting forth McGhee's understanding of the interpretation agreed upon at the February 9 NSC meeting by Rusk, Secretary of the Treasury Dillon, and President Kennedy. 1 For discussion of NSC 6005/1 at the 438th meeting of the National Security Council on March 24, 1960, and its subsequent approval at the 440th meeting on April 7, 1960, see Foreign Relations , 1958-1960, vol. XIV, pp. 92 - 98 and 106 - 109 . 2 Text of NSC 6001 is ibid., pp. 78 - 92 . 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original. 189. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Williams) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning (Rowen) 189. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Williams) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning (Rowen) Source Washington, April 5, 1961. SUBJECT Military Assistance for African Nations South of the Sahara A number of African countries south of the Sahara have approached U.S. representatives for military assistance and it is evident that we can expect similar requests from others. As you know, NSC policy places preliminary dependence for meeting the military needs of the countries in the area upon the former colonial powers. Strict interpretation of this policy reduces our ability to quickly react to requests for assistance or to achieve maximum political benefit. Too often our assistance has been furnished only after the threat, or actual acceptance, of Soviet military assistance. While it is entirely reasonable that Western military assistance to these African countries should be coordinated, the delay experienced in determining the Metropole's position, the mechanics for coordination with respect to types of equipment and training each country will provide, and the subsequent negotiations with the recipient all tend to retard prompt U.S. response. The ability to react rapidly once a decision has been made to furnish assistance is extremely important to these countries in their current stage of development. There are other problems that arise with respect to funding of new unbudgeted programs and the establishment of sufficiently high program priority to permit the early delivery of equipment to gain maximum impact of programs which are basically political in nature. At present, our military assistance programs in this area are the result of mounting political pressures and are developed on an ad hoc basis without clear long-term U.S. goals, either from a political or a military point of view. It would be appreciated if you could undertake to develop a Defense policy position for military assistance to independent nations south of the Sahara which could be utilized by the Joint Staff and this office in evaluating and developing future programs. I would suggest that your analysis treat the Union of South Africa as a separate entity due to its peculiar position. Haydn Williams * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Africa 000.1-091.4, 1961. Confidential. 190. Brief of a National Intelligence Estimate 190. Brief of a National Intelligence Estimate Source Washington, April 11, 1961. NIE 60/70-61: PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN COLONIAL AFRICA This National Intelligence Estimate was approved by the United States Intelligence Board on 11 April 1961. Significant judgments of this Estimate are as follows: Over the next three years, virtually all the remaining British dependent territories in Africa, as well as the Belgian trusteeship of Ruanda-Urundi, will almost certainly become independent. The Salazar regime has adamantly refused even to consider self-government for the Portuguese territories, much less eventual independence, despite the growing African agitation. We see no prospect for a change in Portuguese policy which could avoid violence and repression in the colonies of Angola, Mozambique , and Portuguese Guinea . Nor do we believe that Portugal alone has the military and economic resources to bear the long and bloody struggle that its present policies seem to ensure. While no substantial nationalist sentiment has appeared as yet in the Spanish areas, the Saharan territories will be increasingly threatened by Moroccan adventures. The areas containing sizable European populations (notably Kenya, the Rhodesias, Angola, and Mozambique) are the principal danger points for racial strife. Outbreaks among Africans are likely in areas in which there are deep tribal antagonisms, such as Ruanda-Urundi and Kenya. While in most areas presently available security forces will probably be able to cope with sporadic, localized disturbances, widespread violence could be controlled only with the aid of metropole or other outside reinforcements. After independence, the quality and capabilities of security forces are likely to deteriorate. Both before and after independence, most of the territories will labor in varying degrees under the handicaps of strong tribal animosities, rivalries between competing political parties and leaders, weak and underdeveloped economies and shortages of trained personnel. These handicaps will inhibit the growth of effective and stable governments. Most areas will expect and need outside support and economic aid after independence. They probably hope also to obtain military assist-ance. We believe that they will look first to the West but that most will adopt neutralist policies and be receptive to Bloc assistance. In the dependent areas the Bloc will be alert to foment and exploit to the disadvantage of the West any dissidence or trouble, even to the extent of clandestine supply of arms. However, we believe that Communist activities in these areas have not yet reached significant levels. * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Africa 121-350.09, 1961. Secret; Noforn. The source text was transmitted to Secretary of Defense McNamara under cover of a memorandum from Major General Robert A. Breitweiser, USAF Director for Intelligence, that reads: “On 11 April 1961, the United States Intelligence Board approved an Estimate on ‘Probable Developments in Colonial Africa' (NIE 60/70-61). A Brief of this Estimate is attached for your information in advance of the regular distribution which will be forthcoming.” 191. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 191. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Source Washington, April 28, 1961. SUBJECT Arms Control Policy for Africa JCSM-280-61 1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA, dated 27 January 1961, in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff are requested to provide views on the military implications of the following two proposals: a. An atom-free African zone. b. Regional arms control arrangements for Africa. 2. In considering the above two proposals, together with the points cited in the referenced memorandum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff note that these notions are inspired largely by a growing feeling that there is a need for action to forestall a possible African “arms race.” There is evidence of some armament activity in Africa. In the main, however, the present rate of acquisition of armed forces by new African nations arises from the need to furnish authority to government, to assure internal security, and acquire the trappings of sovereignty. Where some acceleration can be noted, it is mostly attributable to Sino-Soviet Bloc subversive activity in the military area. This is a symptom of the East-West Cold War in Africa rather than one of African arms competition. 3. The solution to the African “arms race” is tied up in the political solution to the East-West Cold War. While there is need to forestall any developing arms race, serious political and military disadvantages should not be accepted by the West in an attempt to achieve this end. 4. Africa as an atom-free area, and one in which arms control arrangements would be in effect, still would be open to strong Soviet pressures and influence. While the proposed measures could offer some impediment to Soviet military operations and could reduce Soviet military infiltration of Africa, the Soviets are unlikely to abandon their efforts to dominate the area. Any adoption of atom-free/arms control measures would simply cause the Bloc to intensify its political, economic and cultural efforts in attempting to make further gains on the African continent. Also, they could be expected to seize upon any defects in such arrangements as another avenue through which to debilitate the power of African national governments and to lessen the external protection now furnished them by the West. 5. US military interest requires that US atomic capable forces not be prohibited from deployment to or transit through Africa. Otherwise, the US military posture would lose flexibility and be denied full exploitation of its capabilities in the support of our NATO and CENTO Allies. 6. The Cold War is tending to enlarge US military interests in Africa. Foreseeably, this interest especially in tactical or strategic base rights will grow, if communist penetration of the area increases. The possible loss through some regional arms control arrangement of US and especially European military base rights in Africa could have a most serious impact on the United States and Free World defense posture. 7. From a military standpoint, the United States, in the interest of its own and Free World security, should: a. Oppose in the United Nations or elsewhere efforts to establish the African continent as an atom-free zone. b. Support regional arms control for Africa in the lowest possible key and only if it is politically necessary and can be separated from the “atom-free” notion. c. Subject to the limitations in b above, support regional arms control measures provided that they are of such a form as to: (1) Reflect genuine African sponsorship and initiation. (2) Continue to permit bilateral arrangements for guaranteeing external security. (3) Preclude jeopardizing the sovereignty and independence of African nations, through denial of aid for internal security purposes or otherwise. (4) Avoid facilitating Communist subversion of the area. (5) Permit the United States and the West continuing access to Africa in the maintenance of their defense postures. (6) Require inspection and verification safeguards which are no less stringent than those currently being developed by the United States for use in East-West arms control proposals. 8. A more detailed discussion of the factors upon which the above conclusions are based are furnished in the Enclosure hereto. 1 For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Arleigh Burke Chief of Naval Operations * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files:FRC 65 A 3464, Africa 091 (27 Jan. 61). Top Secret. 1 Attached but not printed. 192. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 192. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Source Washington, April 28, 1961, 8:27 p.m. 5093. Dept considering possibility approaches to selected African leaders to encourage them raise subject of arms limitation at forthcoming conference African Heads of State scheduled begin Monrovia May 8. 1 You are requested ascertain FonOff views re desirability such approaches which could take following form: 1. While agenda forthcoming Monrovia Conference is matter which obviously only African participants themselves can decide, we think conference might present excellent opportunity to discuss ways and means for African countries, and especially new countries of West Africa, to avoid dangerous and costly arms competition. 2. We do not wish our interest in this subject to be misconstrued as being due unwillingness help provide necessary military assistance to give new African countries reasonable minimum military establishments for maintenance internal security. We are concerned however that if one country starts exceeding such minimum levels its neighbors would be forced restort similarly to excessive armaments which could gravely unsettle area and detract from resources available for economic and social development. 3. If African countries were willing to agree on reasonable ceilings on their armed forces and limitation on types of armaments requested from foreign suppliers, this would not only constitute constructive development for themselves but would also be inspiring example for other parts of world. Approaches along above lines might be made by US, UK and France separately to selected list of African leaders, or by agreement each of three allied governments approaching countries on which it would have greatest amount of influence. 2 We could for instance raise question with Tubman if French would raise it with Houphouet and Tombalbaye and British with Abubakar and perhaps also Nkrumah. Bowles * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770.00/4-2861. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Herz on April 27; cleared by Ferguson, Deming, Weiss, McBride, Spiers, Witman, Burdett, Penfield, and Webb; and approved by Williams. Also sent to Paris and repeated to Abidjan, Lagos, and Monrovia. 1 Representatives of 20 independent African states attended the Conference of Heads of African and Malagasy States at Monrovia, Liberia, May 8-12, 1961. 2 Telegram 4457 from London, May 3, reported that the British Foreign Office believed that the approach outlined in telegram 5093 was not opportune at that time, and concluded that the reaction of many new African states to the subject of arms limitation would be one of suspicion, especially if they received simultaneous approaches from the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. (Ibid., 770.00/5-361) 193. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) 193. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) Source Washington, May 3, 1961. Dear Ros : I have had the Department make a thorough study of U.S. policy on the supply of arms to Tropical Africa. This study, which I have approved, is set forth in the attachment to this letter. 1 As I know you agree, one of our paramount objectives is to avoid the buildup of an arms race with the Soviets in Africa. On the other hand, we must be prepared to supply some arms to the newly emerging states of Tropical Africa if U.S. interests are to be advanced and Communist encroachment frustrated. The newly emerging African states will insist upon exercising what they view to be their sovereign prerogatives of establishing some military forces, and they will turn to Communist sources of supply if assistance from Western sources is not forthcoming. However, I believe that we should be able, through determined and astute dealing, to meet this essentially politically justified requirement by providing for limited programs of an internal security nature. To this end, cooperation between our two Departments is obviously essential so that we can move forward smoothly and purposefully whenever that is indicated. We must endeavor, to the maximum degree feasible, to avoid large arms buildups in Tropical Africa which drain away resources required for economic development and which could contribute to tension and animosities between neighboring states. We are proceeding to develop our views as to the manner in which U.S. policy can contribute to the encouragement of regional arrangements within Africa designed to limit arms buildup beyond this internal security level. This effort we recognize as a difficult one, requiring a well considered educational program. To the extent that it is successful in achieving its objectives it will be at a more distant point in time. In the meantime we view the positive arms supply policy set forth in the attachment to this letter as an essential interrelated action, indeed to some extent even a precondition to achieving success on arms limitation, which should not be delayed. Because the objectives of the United States arms supply in Africa are essentially political in nature and involve nations which pose foreign policy problems in many respects quite unique as compared to those which we have encountered elsewhere in the world, I think it highly important for our people, working closely with your staff and ICA, to draw up specific procedures reflecting the policies of the attached paper, for the establishment of programs which accommodate these special circumstances. I have asked that Jack Bell, as Deputy for Foreign Assistance Coordination, see that effort is promptly undertaken toward this objective. His office will be in touch with the Department of Defense in the near future, and we would appreciate your designating some one to work with us as closely as possible in devising the necessary measures to put the arms supply policy into effect. With my warmest regards, Sincerely, Chet * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Africa 000.92-Africa, 452, 1961. Secret. 1 Attached but not printed. 194. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 194. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Source Washington, May 13, 1961. SUBJECT De Gaulle, Africa, and Southeast Asia 1. There are two reasons why the major Western powers must concert their policies in Southeast Asia and Africa. First, the Communists are systematically exploiting our differences in policy. They have been a major Communist asset in Africa and Southeast Asia. These differences arise out of the special history of each Western power in each area and from differing short-run interests. The historical differences in outlook must be overcome in the face of present reality. The lesser short-run interests must be resolved so that the larger common interests may come to dominate Western policy in these areas. Second, situations arising in Southeast Asia and, perhaps, in Africa, may draw us close to a test of military strength with the Communists. The possibility of armed conflict affects all of our peoples, notably in an age of nuclear weapons. Moreover, the possibility of a deterring conflict depends substantially on our presenting a united front to the Communists. For these reasons, political and military, the President believes that high level tripartite discussions of a Western strategy in Africa and Asia are urgent. In this matter he finds himself close to the views of General De Gaulle. 2. Africa . The President profoundly respects the deep understanding of the revolutionary forces at work in Africa, which President De Gaulle has revealed. Due to French and British statesmanship the West has some chance of developing over a period of years an Africa which would present us with only modest military and political dangers, and which might, in time, form a constructive part of the Western system. 3. In Africa, Britain and France are still bearing a primary responsibility; but the U.S. is being drawn increasingly into African affairs. In some areas we are working well together; in others we have not yet found a wholly satisfactory basis for common action. 4. In the President's view, what is basically required is a common Western strategy rooted in three objectives. First, where positions of potential political stability and strength exist, we should work with all the wisdom and resources we can muster to create islands of responsibility. For example, this seems possible in Tunisia, Nigeria, and possibly the Ivory Coast. Second, we must work together to fend off Communist efforts to trap areas in Africa where the great revolutionary forces at work have given the Communists opportunity to expand their influence. Mali appears such a case of potential danger, and the Horn of Africa area. Third, we must work together to minimize dangers to the common interest arising from the painful process of disengagement from colonialism. Here Angola is much on our minds. (How much better off we all would be if we had begun three or four years ago to consult seriously together on the Congo and Angola.) 5. Frankly, the U.S. has quite enough commitments in the world, and there is no compulsion in the American Government to extend those commitments where our allies, much strengthened by their remarkable growth in the 1950's can deal with the situation. But we are prepared to sit down and consider together with Britain and France—and with other Western nations where their interests are involved—the broad lines of a common strategy and how the day-to-day tactics and tasks of execution may best be allocated and managed. 6. With respect to North Africa, the President has been impressed by General De Gaulle's vision of the kind of regional development which would be possible after the Algerian settlement is achieved. President Bourguiba is obviously thinking in similar terms. This is a matter in which initiative must arise, evidently, from the Mediterranean powers; but the U.S. is anxious to be helpful in the evolution of a constructive regional solution in the long run. And its emergence as a realistic objective could conceivably contribute to the pacification of the North African area. 7. The President would be interested to hear De Gaulle's views on the appropriate broad strategy which we should all pursue in Africa and believes that these matters should promptly be explored on a communal basis by the Western nations most concerned. [Here follows discussion of Southeast Asia.] * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Africa. Secret. 195. Memorandum of Conversation 195. Memorandum of Conversation Source Paris, May 31, 1961, 2:50 p.m. US/MC/2 SUBJECT Wednesday Afternoon Talks PARTICIPANTS United States President Kennedy Mr. Glenn (Interpreter) France General De Gaulle Mr. Lebel (Interpreter) [Here follows discussion of other matters.] Africa The President said that he wanted to discuss the African problems both the most direct problems of that continent as well as those of relationships between Western Europe and Africa. The U.S. recognizes French experience and French interest in that area. U.S. interests are only complementary and consist mainly in preventing a Communist ingression to that area and the ingression of the cold war itself into Africa. The problem is one of method. If the President understands correctly, General De Gaulle does not think that the United Nations constitutes the best instrument for dealing with African questions and, in particular, that of the Congo. The only advantage which the President sees in relying on the U.N. (and even that advantage is one that is somewhat decreasing as time goes on) is that action taken at the U.N. may prevent a direct clash between East and West. The U.S. is worrying not only about the Congo but also about Angola and in the latter case not only because our Portuguese friends are concerned in it but because the situation is rapidly deteriorating with Ghana, Guinea and the Communists taking a hand. In addition, the loss of Angola to Portugal would create serious economic difficulties to the latter country. General De Gaulle said that there are many Africas. There is Black Africa and even Black Africa is very diverse. There is, for example, a country such as Senegal which has a long history of continuous relations with the West and from which many migrants and traders have gone to many countries even to the U.S. There are other countries of Black Africa which have always been poor and which tend therefore to lean towards extreme solutions. France has had a lot of experience in Black Africa having colonized an important part of it, important not so much because of its population (which amounted only to twenty-five million) but because of the land area represented. French colonization was very fraternal and the French have educated many administrators and political men in those countries. Decolonization was also friendly and most of the French possessions want to preserve their ties with France. An exception is Guinea and Guinea is an exception because of Sekou Toure who is a Communist and who not having been able to keep both French aid and a Communist organization preferred to renounce the former. Elsewhere France continues to count friends even if sometimes their action is marked by their pride and by a certain pretentiousness of young countries. Nevertheless, friendship toward the French is a question of fact. Unfortunately, the same type of policy was not followed in other parts of Africa. In the Congo, the Belgians provided little aid and would not leave cadres capable of administering the country. When the blow-up in the Congo occurred, General De Gaulle wrote to President Eisenhower suggesting that an approach through the UN should be avoided, that it would be better to have a tripartite action of the U.S., U.K. and France which should exercise a joint pressure on the Belgians and the Congolese to bring about the implementation on both sides of the Belgian Congo Mutual Assistance Treaty, which would have enabled Belgian aid to continue and which would have kept the East out of the Congo as it was not covered by that treaty. Pressure should have been exercised on both sides including the consent of the Belgians to a general independence of the Congo while continuing their technical aid. President Eisenhower, however, was of a different opinion and Mr. Macmillan followed him in an appeal to the U.N. Now what is the U.N.? The U.N. is men like Hammarskjold and Dayal and also troop contingents from Nasser or Ghana. The result of the U.N. action was not the re-establishment of order but rather more disorder than before. However, the situation is getting somewhat better at present. There is a slight improvement. It seems that the Congolese want to create a real government under Kasavubu with a Parliament and an Army. They can, however, get little help from the U.N. and it would be better for them to be helped by the three powers mentioned above or even those three powers plus Belgium. The situation is not lost, especially if such a direct contact may be established. There is no evolution toward Communism. Of course, there is Gizenga but the people do not seem to follow in the direction of Communism and will not if they receive help. The situation in Angola, however, is more serious. The President asked if General De Gaulle would have preferred a tripartite intervention rather than an intervention by the U.N. General De Gaulle answered that two interventions would not have had the same character and there would have been no question of a military intervention by the three powers but rather a pressure on the Congolese, including Lumumba (who at that time had not yet decided to throw his lot with the Communists). If the Belgians had carried out the agreement between the two countries, means could have been found to obtain a cooperation between them and even for preventing the Belgians from what they had attempted in Katanga and making them generally recognize the independence of the Congo without withdrawing their technicians who are necessary for the life of the country. [Here follows discussion of other matters.] * Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, President's Visit to France, 5/31-6/2/61. II. MEMCONS. Secret. Drafted by Glenn. The conversation took place at the Elysee Palace. President Kennedy visited France and met with President Charles de Gaulle May 31-June 2, 1961. Their discussions were recorded in eight memoranda of conversation. (Ibid.) 196. Paper Prepared by the Policy Planning Council 196. Paper Prepared by the Policy Planning Council Source Washington, July 24, 1961. PPC 61-7 SELECTED ASPECTS OF U.S. ECONOMIC AID POLICY FOR AFRICA Summary and Conclusions This paper attempts to develop a general framework to help guide our future African aid efforts in four of its aspects: (1) East-West competition; (2) aid coordination; (3) regional vs. country programs; and (4) economic development planning and multi-year aid commitments. 1. Despite our repeated affirmation that the task of US economic assistance “is not to negatively fight communism,” our present African aid policies appear in practice to have an unnecessarily defensive cast. Although we slowly are beginning to recognize the limitations of bloc aid as an instrument of political influence, we continue to be overly concerned with maneuvers to outbid bloc aid offers or to keep the newly independent African states from accepting bloc aid. As a result, we are in danger of undermining the effectiveness of our aid effort for short-term political considerations, and thereby jeopardizing our longer term goals of promoting African economic development. Aside from the questionable assumptions underlying preoccupation with precluding or containing bloc aid to Africa, we should recognize that such a policy, even if we were prepared to shoulder the costs involved, will be self-defeating. It seems quite clear that the newly independent African states, with few exceptions, are prepared to accept economic aid regardless of the source, provided no strings are attached. At the same time the bloc seems bound and determined to expand the scale of its economic activities in Africa. We no longer can expect to keep Africa as an almost exclusive Western preserve. Therefore, instead of futilely trying to outbid bloc aid offers, we should concentrate on trying to limit their political impact. This calls for the carrying out of a more vigorous and imaginative aid effort in Africa responsive to the peoples' fundamental needs to demonstrate that “economic growth and political democracy can develop hand in hand.” Of equal if not greater importance than economic aid in countering bloc influence in Africa, particularly in the years immediately ahead, is the need to demonstrate to Africans that the United States is truly a disinterested friend and that we genuinely and fully support their aspirations to run their own affairs free from outside interference. 2. We need to intensify our present efforts to develop closer aid coordination with other aid donors in Africa. At the present time more than a dozen Western countries and multilateral aid organizations are providing Africa well over one billion dollars of aid annually. The effectiveness of this substantial aid effort could be increased materially through closer coordination and consultation among these many donors. We should press actively to make the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in OECD a really effective instrument for this purpose. Among other things, we should seek to develop in the DAC a Western consensus regarding aid objectives and aid criteria for Africa; and to ensure that all bilateral and multilateral assistance efforts are fitted into carefully prepared long-range country or regional economic development plans. At the same time we should continue our efforts through offers of financial assistance and other means to encourage Africans to take more initiative and assume greater responsibility in planning their economic development. To minimize the risks of being accused of meddling in their internal affairs we should seek to provide whatever assistance African countries may need in formulating and executing their development plans through international organizations or private foundations. In addition, we might encourage the creation of an Inter-African board of experts, such as is now being considered for Latin America, to review these plans and provide assistance in seeking out the necessary external financing. Arrangements also should be made for regular consultation between representatives of the DAC and the Economic Commission for Africa as is the case of the Colombo Plan mechanism for Asia. 3. As a result of extreme political fragmentation, among other things, few African states possess the human and natural resources required to satisfy their leaders' aspirations for economic development. In recognition of this fact most African leaders have spoken out in favor of larger regional economic groupings. We should continue our efforts to encourage such arrangements without, however, making it appear they are merely tools of the West. Among other things, the West should make known that it is prepared to provide substantial aid funds for investment in basic fields of infrastructure to regional associations large enough to offer the prospect of satisfactory economic growth. Some sort of regional African Economic Development Banks or aid consortia might be useful instruments for this purpose. In addition, we and other Western industrialized countries should investigate the possibilities of providing African regional economic groupings as well as other less developed areas significant one-way trade concessions for their exports. This will help demonstrate that the West is not trying to perpetuate the old colonial system through imperial preferences and like arrangements and at the same time will help keep the newly independent African countries in the Western system. 4. Finally, the US should be cautious about making multi-year aid commitments to African states. Once such commitments are made, it will be difficult to hold back on them because of unsatisfactory performance by the aid recipient without causing serious political friction and ill-will. In addition, we should guard against creating the impression, as a result of our emphasis on planning, desirable as it may be, that if a country comes forward with a well-thought-out economic development plan we are prepared to provide all of the required external financing. [Here follows the body of the paper.] * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770.5-MSP/8-261. Confidential. The source text was transmitted to Secretary Rusk under cover of an August 2 memorandum from George McGhee, Chairman of the Policy Planning Council, that reads: “The attached paper entitled ‘Selected Aspects of US Economic Aid Policy Toward Africa' was initiated and prepared in S/P. After review in S/P it was circulated to the interested Bureaus and Offices of the Department and ICA for information and comment. An earlier version of this study was discussed at your Thursday policy planing meeting on June 29, presided over by Under Secretary Bowles. The revised version is now sent to you for your consideration.” 197. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Williams) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) 197. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Williams) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) Source Washington, August 17, 1961. Dear Governor Williams : We have thoroughly reviewed and discussed with your staff the draft paper on “U.S. Policy on Arms Supply to Tropical Africa” which Mr. Bowles sent to Mr. Gilpatric in his letter of May 3, 1961, 1 and fully agree with you that our military assistance policy in Africa should contribute toward limiting the armed forces of the independent African countries to legitimate internal security needs, if possible. We have, however, a number of suggestions for changes which we believe will clarify points open to misinterpretation, particularly by people operating in the field. We believe, for example, that a clear statement of assumptions, by showing the rationale behind some of the stated conclusions, helps assure a single coherent interpretation of the intended policies. These proposed changes also reflect fresh insights on military assistance and other African problems gained during my recent trip with Mr. Bowles. I enclose a copy of the State draft marked with our suggested revisions, 2 and, in addition, a complete redraft setting forth the same basic views in a different format which we believe to state the policy guidance in a manner more useful for operating purposes. Discussions between our respective staffs indicate that we agree on almost all substantive issues, but there are three primary areas where we believe clarification of State language is highly desirable. First is the question of whether the U.S. should ever take the initiative in eliciting requests for military assistance from African governments. Clearly this will sometimes be highly desirable, for example where otherwise the Bloc would supply military assistance or where such assistance will help stabilize an otherwise unstable internal political situation. Second is the question of whether we should “discriminate between countries … in the matter of arms supply according to their political behavior.” The language in paragraph 10 of your draft suggests that we should not, although your staff agrees, citing language elsewhere in the draft, that this implication is not really intended. Presumably neither of us would favor supplying arms to a country which is clearly expecting to use them (perhaps in conjunction with arms from the Bloc) for aggression against its neighbors. The third question is the meaning of “maximum civilianization” in your Conclusion No. 4. We interpret it to mean that, consistent with sound internal security objectives, military assistance should also have a capability to contribute to economic and social betterment, and that the public evidences of U.S. military participation in the military assistance program should be minimized. The State paper makes certain presumptions about U.S. policy for regional arms control (e.g., the opening paragraph, paragraph 8 and Conclusion No. 1) which seem to pre-judge this issue which I understand is presently being examined separately. We are in strong agreement with you that it is desirable to minimize the military capability of the African States to do anything more than maintain internal security. On the other hand, the technique of regional arms control is one which bears examination in depth to assure that the principles and terms of any such arrangement will not have far-reaching and adverse consequences on the U.S. and allied military posture, which, as you know, depends heavily upon certain bases and installations in Africa, as well as its consequences as a precedent elsewhere and upon the U.S. position in East-West disarmament discussions. Therefore, we think that statements on this subject should be deferred until the study now in process has been completed. I also note that your staff is currently preparing a message which will elicit a comprehensive study of the arms supply problem by African posts. Replies to this message, which will bear directly on the various policy questions at issue, are to be received by 15 September. These replies should be taken into consideration before a final articulation of arms policy for tropical Africa is made. We have attempted to clarify the State draft statement of policy in the foregoing and certain other respects. However, I should appreciate your sympathetic consideration of our proposed alternative statement of policy. In view of the substantial concurrence of views evidenced in staff consultations between our two Departments, I would hope that we can work out and issue a statement of U.S. policy on arms supply to tropical Africa which will be mutually satisfactory. Yours sincerely, Haydn Williams 3 * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files:FRC 64 A 2382, Africa 400.12-680.1, 1961. Secret. Drafted by McQuade and Junkermann. 1 Document 193 . 2 Attached but not printed. 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Williams signed the original. 198. National Intelligence Estimate 198. National Intelligence Estimate Source Washington, August 31, 1961. NIE 60/70-2-61 THE PROBABLE INTERRELATIONSHIPS OF THE INDEPENDENT AFRICAN STATES The Problem To estimate the present situation and likely trends in the interrelationships of the independent African states and the effect of outside influences on the regional politics of the area. Conclusions 1. The newly independent African states have not yet developed consistent patterns of relationships among themselves. The problems of political survival and of the maintenance of law and order have kept African leaders from concentrating on their interrelationships. Pan-Africanism, disagreements between “radicals” and “conservative” leaders, and the external influences of the Communist Bloc, the former Metropoles and the US add conflicting and complicating factors to the situation. (Paras. 7-10, 12) 2. Pan-Africanism is a mystical concept, glorifying racial kinship and the African personality and culture. Its chief target is “neo-colonialism,” its eventual goal is African unity. No black African leader can afford to reject these concepts and all of them to some degree assert Pan-Africanist ideals. But the more radical leaders, such as Nkrumah and Toure, have found the slogans of Pan-Africanism especially useful in their efforts to extend their influence and build up their followings. (Paras. 14-17) 3. “Conservative” leaders, such as Balewa, Houphouet-Boigny and Youlou, prefer postponing the issue of political integration. In addition, they wish to gain the material benefits which the maintenance of close ties with the former Metropoles have so far assured them. (Paras. 19-20) 4. Neither the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union nor the Conseil de l'Entente is likely to develop into a real federation. Broader groupings such as the Casablanca powers (mainly radical) and the Monrovia group (mainly conservative) have yet to show any basic cohesion. It is possible that the African states may be able to create some functional organs for economic cooperation. It is also possible that some efforts will be initiated to create broad regional machinery to enable African states to settle their own disputes. (Paras. 40-44) 5. On the whole, African regional relationships are likely to remain fluid over the next several years. During this period, we believe opportunism is likely to prove more compelling to African leaders than ideology, and that there will almost certainly be frequent shifts and recombination of coalitions as African leaders vie for power and international status. Nevertheless, we anticipate that Pan-Africanism will gain support, at least as a visionary proposition, and that the militant anticolonialism of the Pan-Africanists will induce more moderate leaders to adopt neutralist foreign policies. (Paras. 37-39, 45) 6. Western European cultural and economic influence in Africa will probably remain at a relative high level over the next several years, but Africans will increasingly look elsewhere for aid. The US is regarded as an alternate source of foreign assistance, but one which does not fully understand Africa's problems or fully support African aspirations. The Bloc will probably have considerable success in increasing its influence with African states and in promoting neutralist foreign policies, and it will encourage the emergence of additional radical regimes. African leaders will try to play East and West against the other and to extract the maximum amount of aid and assistance from both side. (Paras. 24-30) [Here follows the body of the paper.] * Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files, Job 79 R 1012, Box 189. Secret. 199. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 199. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Source Washington, September 5, 1961. JCSM-591-61 SUBJECT Proposed Regular Scheduled MATS Flights Throughout Africa 1. Reference is made to the memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated 18 April 1961, subject as above, which requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit a recommended plan for the establishment of regularly scheduled MATS flights throughout Africa. 2. In establishing a basis for such a plan, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have fully recognized the comments of the Department of State on this subject contained in their letter, dated 2 March 1961. 1 In particular, these comments point out that a major obstacle which must be overcome will be the obtaining of permission of the many countries involved for the introduction of US military personnel and equipment. This may prove difficult since the advantages which will accrue to these countries by the inauguration of the MATS service are not readily apparent. 3. In view of the above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the most feasible premise for the establishment of scheduled MATS flights throughout Africa at this time would be to provide regular air service to the various US Embassies on that continent. On this basis, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have developed the attached plan for an African “Embassy Run” which is designed to provide the specific information requested. 2 This plan, which would provide MATS service to twelve principal embassies on a weekly basis, is submitted as a realistic initial step toward full-scale MATS operations in Africa. It can be expanded or reduced prior to implementation to meet a specific requirement as may be determined in consultation with the Department of State. A thorough route and site survey would be required, however, before implementation to identify and resolve the many problems inherent to an operation of this type. 4. It will be noted that the tariff proposal contained within this plan would charge Special Assignment Aircraft (SAA) hourly rates for aircraft while on the African circuit. Although the SAA method of billing will result in higher cost to the sponsor than the common user tariff rates, it must be utilized initially since specific route requirements are unknown. Once these route requirements have been established, it may be possible to designate the route as channel traffic and revert to normal channel traffic tariff procedures. 5. In response to the comment of the Department of State that any proposal for the extension of MATS routes into Africa should be accompanied by evidence of those advantages which would accrue to the countries involved, it is appropriate to identify, for future discussions with the Department of State, the advantages which an Embassy Run of this type would offer. In this regard, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the strongest advantage is the fact that the proposed MATS routes would provide a readily available transportation means to facilitate the introduction and support of those US programs designed to assist the cultural and economic development of the countries involved and to provide the various forms of medical aid and health education. Similarly, these routes would facilitate the provision of military aid to those countries participating in the Military Assistance Program. Combining the stated desire on the part of the United States to make such varied programs available to these countries with the use of scheduled MATS airlift in these programs should provide a persuasive argument for permitting initiation of such air service to the countries selected. Additionally, it could be pointed out to these countries that MATS service of this type would provide a means for the United States to respond to the expressed needs of the African nations on a timely, yet orderly, basis. Such a capability would be especially desirable in rendering assistance in emergency situations which may develop in those countries. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: L.L. Lemnitzer Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files:FRC 66 A 3542, Africa, 1962. Secret. 1 The letter from Acting Secretary of State for African Affairs James K. Penfield to Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs William P. Bundy noted that the difficulty with the MATS proposal lay in the fact that the very countries where the United States could use a MATS service to best advantage were also those where it had not yet been able to establish its constructive interest in their stability, welfare, and development. Therefore, the United States needed to go to such countries with a proposal that was clearly to their own advantage as well as to that of the United States. Penfield suggested reconsideration of the question in 6 months, by which time it would be possible to assess developing attitudes, especially in West Africa. (Department of State, Central Files, 770.5411/1-3161) 2 See footnote 1, Document 203 . 200. Report Prepared by Samuel E. Belk of the National Security Council Staff 200. Report Prepared by Samuel E. Belk of the National Security Council Staff Source Washington, September 25, 1961. SUMMARY OF GOVERNOR WILLIAMS' TRIP TO AFRICA August 8 to September 1, 1961 General Conclusions 1. The personal meetings between the President and African leaders at the White House are a tremendous asset to our good relations. 2. In my personal contacts I was able to correct the views of U.S. African policy and thereby increase the good will toward the U.S., not only in the friendly territories but in the Portuguese territories as well. 3. Southern African countries, except for the Portuguese territories, are looking to the U.S. for needed substantial amounts of aid in fiscal '63 and '64, and U.S.-African relations will suffer if we are unable to provide it. 4. The current attempts at self-rule in Africa, particularly in the problem areas of the Congo, where nationalism has gone wild, and in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, where varying views on an adequate rate of progress complicate matters, must be given aid and encouragement toward success, so they can serve as examples for the development of self-government in the surrounding areas. 5. U.S. contribution can best be made in the fields of information, education, technical aid, medical facilities, and development of the economic potentials. In connection with education, one specific field needing sympathetic understanding and guidance, is the education of African women in order to improve their social status and to inculcate a desire for a better standard of living. 6. Two instances of Communist influence—Basutoland and the Malagasy Republic—need to be watched and combatted. [Here follow country-by-country observations.] * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Africa, General. Secret. The report was sent under cover of a memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to the President's Naval Aide, Captain Shepard, that reads: “Attached is Soapy Williams' report of his last trip. Sam Belk of our office has put a 4-page summary on top, and I think that is all you need to read.” The report of Assistant Secretary Williams on his second trip to Africa August 8-September 1 is in Department of State, Central Files, 110.5-WI/9-961. 201. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) 201. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) Source Washington, September 29, 1961. SUBJECT Aid to Africa in FY 1962 I am greatly disturbed by two developments in connection with our aid program for Africa for this year. I am calling them to your attention because of the serious political consequences that they may have. Both relate to attitudes that we find widespread in the new task forces and informal groups that are reviewing our FY 1962 programs. First, there seems to be considerable sentiment for deferring the implementation of many of our projects—a view that we should hold back a substantial portion of the limited funds available to us to permit further program reviews and to allow for the consideration of requirements that may arise later this year. If this view prevails, it may be catastrophic for our relations with Africa. In the best of circumstances, we must expect a great deal of disappointment at the quantity of aid and the speed at which it is made available. The pronouncements of the President, in particular, have raised widespread expectations. But I hope we will be able to live with the disappointment if we move forward promptly with whatever funds we have, demonstrating at least our good will and genuine effort to be of assistance. I am concerned, too, that in Africa, where our program is largely a new one and where we have relatively little record of accomplishment to which we can point, that further delay (three months of the fiscal year have already passed) will mean facing the Bureau of the Budget, and then the Congress, with almost nothing done. Despite our tremendous needs, we will inevitably be told that we must have had little use for funds in Africa, thus weakening the Administration's position in FY 1963. Second, I am concerned by what appears to be a disposition to agree to the expenditure of funds in a few countries to the neglect of a great many. I fully support the concentration of the bulk of our funds and argued strongly for this principle before the Congress. But it is a perhaps unfortunate fact of political life that we must have some program—usually a very modest one—in virtually every country in Africa. We simply cannot, at the beginning of the highly publicized Decade of Development, 1 tell these badly underdeveloped countries that we are not interested in assisting them. Nor can we tell their governments to rely entirely on the former colonial power, unless we wish to weaken seriously whatever moderate leadership exists. This is by no means solely a political requirement. Even small sums, expended in carefully selected projects, can often be of great economic value. Many of these countries need help simply to get them to the point where they have the capacity to consider self-help measures of the kind the President has outlined. Assisting them makes sense both for them and for us. We may already be too late in Africa with too little. Further delay and the lack of a balanced effort could do tremendous damage to our position. It is imperative that we do something to preserve for Africa President Kennedy's Decade of Development and prevent it from becoming a Decade of Disappointment. 2 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770.5-MSP/9-2961. Official Use Only. Drafted by Troxel and sent through the Executive Secretariat. Copies were sent to Hartman (B) and Toner (AID). 1 For President Kennedy's special message to Congress on foreign aid, March 22, which proclaimed a Decade of Development, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961 , pp. 203-212. 2 On October 6, Bowles sent a memorandum to Williams thanking him for his September 29 memorandum and expressing shared concern about U.S. aid allocations to Africa for 1962. The Under Secretary indicated his agreement that the United States should have some program in virtually every country, but pointed out that they needed criteria in order to decide how much aid and to whom it should go. (Department of State, Central Files, 770.5-MSP/10-661) 202. Letter From the Consultative Group on Arms Limitation in Africa to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) 202. Letter From the Consultative Group on Arms Limitation in Africa to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) Source Washington, October 23, 1961. We hereby respectfully submit our views on what we believe the United States can and should do to prevent or moderate wasteful and dangerous military build-ups in Africa. We are pleased that you are giving this matter serious thought at this time. Our deliberations have led us to the conclusion that the dangers of an excessive arms build-up are very real indeed. African leaders are already showing signs of wishing to possess significant military power, partly as a symbol of their newly won independence. The Communist Bloc has surplus arms and is eager to supply them to Africans as a means of creating chaos and of spreading Communist influence. Now, while the arms slate in Africa is still fairly clean, is the time to begin making whatever contribution we can to preventing the ills that inevitably arise when nations enter into unbridled arms competition. 1 Gerard C. Smith Joseph M. Jones Robert E. Matteson Enclosure 2 CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON ARMS LIMITATION IN AFRICA A Report to the Honorable G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs [Here follows the body of the report.] Conclusions There is little if any present prospect for success in efforts to impose arms control on Africa from the outside. We must find ways of stimulating the Africans themselves to take the initiative in working toward effective arrangements for arms limitation. This requires a discreet but purposeful educational program directed to African leaders and other opinion-formers. This is a long-range program—and a start should be made as soon as possible. U.S. officials responsible for African problems, both in Washington and in the field, must be made thoroughly aware of the fact that a major U.S. interest is to bring arms build-ups in Africa under some degree of control. Restraints in military build-ups should be a major aim of U.S. African policy. Such restraints involve a broad spectrum of questions, from U.S. supply of arms to meet legitimate requirements—to the possibility of “educating” the Africans in the necessity for restraint—to the possibility of some agreed arms limitation arrangements to prevent or moderate arms races in Africa—to the concept of general disarmament. The U.S. should continue to support its previous initiatives in this field such as the one put forward at the UN in 1960. Additional major public pronouncements on this subject may, however, be unhelpful. Our principal effort should be to encourage African leaders to become active in this field. One African zealot on arms limitation could be worth ten American and other non-African advocates of that cause. U.S. arms supply policy can, if properly conceived, contribute to our arms limitation objectives. A responsible U.S. arms supply program that helps to meet legitimate requirements offers worth-while opportunities for exerting a wholesome influence on African political and military leaders. In general, in the case of the newly independent African countries it would be better to have non-uniformed and non-service technical military experts at our Embassies, rather than military attaches. Where we have attaches, they, too, must be imbued with the arms limitation philosophy. The U.K. and France have large interests in the matter of African security and should be of great assistance in any educational process to develop restraint. The U.S. should support, but not initiate, a proposal for an African nuclear-free zone. Arms control cannot be expected in isolation. It must proceed in train with other developments giving the African nations a sense of security. * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770.5/10-2361. Confidential. 1 On November 6, Battle sent copies of the Consultative Group's report to McGeorge Bundy and Walt Rostow under cover of a memorandum indicating that the Department of State intended to use it as a basis for further consultations within the Department and with other interested agencies in order to develop and refine U.S. policies for dealing with this subject. It noted that although the report was not a cheerful document, the Department believed it was an important one and that it merited Bundy's attention. (Ibid., 770.56/11-761) 2 Confidential. 203. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Williams) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) 203. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Williams) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) Source Washington, October 26, 1961. Dear Alex : We are giving continuous attention to the specific steps to be taken should the national interest require military operations by United States forces in sub-Saharan Africa. A critical aspect of this problem is the timely movement of combat and support elements into the area. We may also need to use recovery bases, other than the strike-staging facilities, subsequent to air operations. Such movements would involve overflight, landing, and operational rights which we do not presently enjoy. I believe it is important, if we are to be in position for effective action if an emergency arises, to set forth now the scope of our needs in this regard. Military operations in sub-Saharan Africa, as contemplated in current contingency plans, would require the use of combat units from the United States. In an emergency situation, the bulk of such a force would have to be deployed by air. There is attached a description of the routes we expect to use for deployment if the emergency were to arise in the Republic of the Congo, indicating also the new overflight, landing, and operational rights which these routings involve. 1 As plans for contingency operations elsewhere in Africa are developed, additional overflight rights and terminal operating rights would be needed, although the approach routes to sub-Saharan Africa would remain largely unchanged. These deployment plans are based upon technical military considerations. We realize that political circumstances limit our capability for obtaining assurance now that these deployment routes will be fully available. We hope, however, that you will find the attachment a basis for as much advance action as is politically feasible, for advance planning which would save valuable time in an emergency situation, and for comment on political factors which should be taken into account in planning military deployments to sub-Saharan Africa. 2 Sincerely yours, Haydn * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770.5411/10-2661. Secret. 1 Attached to the source text but not printed is an appendix entitled “Planned Routes for Emergency Deployment to the Republic of the Congo.” 2 On December 1, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs Jeffrey Kitchen responded to Williams' request for comment on political factors that should be taken into account in planning military deployments to sub-Saharan Africa. Kitchen's letter emphasized the political difficulties involved in attempting to secure prior overflight, landing, and operational rights from appropriate African nations, which would raise undue alarm concerning U.S. intentions in the area and prejudice continued maintenance of current U.S. base rights in Morocco and Libya. The Department of State therefore recommended that the basic assumptions underlying U.S. unilateral military contingency plans for these areas be revised to reflect these political considerations. (Department of State, Central Files, 770.5411/10-2661) 204. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussions at the Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting 204. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussions at the Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting Source Washington, January 5, 1962, 11:30 a.m. [Here follow a list of participants at the meeting and agenda item I.] II. SOVIET PENETRATION OF GUINEA, MALI AND GHANA General Lemnitzer stated that the JCS were concerned about the trend of political developments in Guinea, Mali and Ghana. Mr. Johnson said that he understood this concern and that he wished to make a few introductory remarks before turning the discussion over to Governor Williams. He pointed out that these countries were very new ones and that they were feeling their way in the world. Under the circumstances it is inevitable that they will swing to and fro like a pendulum in their political leanings. None of them wish to be satellites or vassals of Moscow although they could be unwittingly trapped into such a position. Mr. Johnson said that at the moment Guinea was beginning to swing back to the right from an extreme left position; Mali is swinging to the left while there are signs that Ghana will soon begin a swing back to the right. Governor Williams then made the following comments on the status of developments in the three countries. Mali —The ruling party organization in Mali controls the actions of the President, and the party is inclined further to the left than is he. We are concerned about a possible drift to the left but are not yet ready to conclude that an irreversible movement in that direction is clearly underway. It is our judgment that leaders in Mali are emotionally and psychologically closer to the Soviet bloc than to the West, but at the same time they intend to balance their commitments and avoid undue dependence on either side. As their maturity develops, we hope that Mali's leaders will come to realize that the U.S., and the West as a whole, are not hostile to their genuine aspirations for the future development of the new African states. Guinea —President Toure has publicly accused “Marxist Leninist” groups and their operating centers in Dakar, Paris and Moscow of attempting to overthrow his government. He has expelled the Soviet Ambassador to Guinea, and the Guinean Ambassador to the U.S. has advised the Department confidentially that his government possesses documentary proof that Bloc embassies have been behind the recent difficulties in Guinea. We believe that these recent events will strengthen Guinea's desire to reduce its dependence on the Bloc and thus present us with increased opportunities over the months to come. Ghana —We feel that our decision to assist in the financing of the Volta dam project will be helpful through insuring U.S. presence in Ghana and as a demonstration of U.S. interest in the future of Ghana. We also consider that Nkrumah's Pan-African ambitions will prevent him from going completely under control of the East or the West. The Peace Corps program in Ghana has been highly successful in its first stages, and the Government of Ghana has requested that additional Peace Corps volunteers be assigned. General Lemnitzer stated that the political situations in the three countries appeared to be improving. General Smith asked if grant aid provision of transport aircraft to Guinea would help to improve our position there. Governor Williams said that he felt that this would be helpful at an appropriate time. He pointed out that Toure had been advised to let us know at any time if we could be of help to him, and he had replied that he would discuss this offer with us in the near future. Governor Williams also noted that the gift airplanes which the President has provided to various African Heads of State have been very well received. Mr. NITZE remarked that the U.S. Ambassador to Guinea had recommended that U.S. assistance in local road building projects would be helpful. Mr. Ferguson said that we would consider this important project when and if Toure turns to us for aid. [Here follows agenda item III.] * Source: Department of State, State-JCS Meetings: Lot 70 D 328. Top Secret. The meeting was held at the Pentagon. No drafting information appears on the source text, which bears a typewritten notation that it is a Department of State draft not cleared with the Department of Defense. 205. Memorandum Prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff 205. Memorandum Prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Source Washington, January 31, 1962. JCSM-78-62 COURSES OF ACTION TO COUNTER COMMUNIST PENETRATION OF GHANA, GUINEA AND MALI Considerations 1. Communist influence in these three countries does not appear to have reached a stage where the Communist Bloc dictates the policies of these countries. However, if considered in terms of balance of influence vis-à-vis the West, there seems to be little doubt that the Communist Bloc now has the preponderance of influence in Guinea and Mali. In the case of Ghana, Communist Bloc influence is not so great, but appears to be increasing. Unless this trend is checked, Communist dominance could become a reality soon. 2. In regard to the current situation and Communist Bloc influence in Ghana, Guinea, and Mali, an evaluation of intelligence reports does not indicate a conclusion that significant changes in the current situation in these three countries should be expected. The recent action of President Toure of Guinea in removing the Soviet Ambassador, and the attempted coup with which this action was associated, represent a setback for the Soviet Union, the full ramifications of which are not yet clear. However, the importance which the USSR attaches to Guinea was underscored by the rapidity with which it dispatched Mr. Mikoyan to the scene. Basic Approach 3. US access to and presence in these suspicious, “neutralist,” Marxist organized countries is limited to what might be considered correct diplomatic representation with some small opportunities in the social, economic, and information areas. US military presence is limited to an Army attache in Accra, and a small mission staffed by the US Army in Mali which has been under pressure to leave. Our military presence in Guinea is nil. All these countries have shown interest of varying degrees in social, economic, and arms assistance from Western sources but have actually accepted little. The most recent significant events offering us an entry into one of these three countries have taken place in Ghana. In addition to the Volta Dam project which the United States has agreed to finance, there are both British and Canadian training missions in Ghana and the Ghanaians have purchased Canadian Caribou aircraft. Recent information from Accra indicates that Ghana has secured the services of a Pakistani general officer to serve as deputy to the Chief of the Ghana Defense Staff and that the Ghanaians have requested Pakistan to make six artillery officers available to serve with the Ghana army. Mali has made some tentative soundings for additional military material. Despite Guinea's growing disenchantment with the Communist Bloc, new concrete opportunities in that country have yet to materialize. 4. Because of limitations on funds, higher priorities elsewhere, and the US policy against fostering an arms race in Africa, US military assist-ance programs to any of the three countries are unlikely to be of such magnitude as would significantly affect the evolution of the political situation in the recipient countries. At best, they can only assist in (a) reflecting the US presence and interest in the country; (b) permitting the observation of Sino-Soviet Bloc activities in the area; (c) providing a tenuous connection with the West for elements out of sympathy with the local government, and (d) serving as a symbol of a possible Western alternative to reliance on Communist Bloc military assistance. 5. The timing and scope of such programs as are instituted with Ghana, Guinea, and Mali, will necessarily depend primarily on the assessment by the Department of State of the political advantages to be gained by US military assistance. Because of the need to make certain that US assistance does not simply reinforce a Communist-oriented regime already in power, frequent reviews should be made of all US operations in each country to ascertain the extent to which specific US political objectives have been achieved or are in the process of achievement. 6. In view of the foregoing, it may be readily concluded that prospects for expansion of our influence will be slow. Moreover, it is unlikely to accelerate if our readiness to help remains a one-way street with the United States essentially “begging” to be allowed to help. Nearby are the friendly, Western oriented countries of Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Senegal and the Conseil de l'Entente countries. Accelerated efforts to be responsive to the military aid requirements of these more deserving countries could be the catalyst which might render Ghana, Guinea, and Mali more receptive. Moreover, it is in our interest to foster and strengthen the viability of these countries in any event, as geographically, culturally, and ethnically, they dilute the potential of a Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union and can exert a moderating influence on their radical policies. Therefore, it appears timely and logical to expand our activities in these countries while selectively exploiting such opportunities as may arise to enhance our position in Ghana, Guinea, and Mali. Recommended Actions 7. The following courses of action, lying primarily outside of the capabilities of the US Military Establishment, would enhance our position in Ghana, Guinea, and Mali, and would contribute to the success of the courses of action listed in paragraph 8 which utilize primarily the resources of the Military Establishment. a. Expose by all means [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]Communist Bloc activities in Ghana, Guinea, and Mali, which are inimical to the rights and aspirations of the individual. (This program should be carried on not only by the appropriate US agencies, but by the use of the third party principle.) b. Discredit [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Communist oriented or Communist trained governmental personnel. (The third party principle should be used to the fullest extent.) c. Assist [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] pro-Western opposition parties, individuals, or refugee groups in gaining prestige and in building a strong opposition movement to Communism. d. Assist pro-Western groups in gaining control of news media by [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] providing funds and assist-ance. e. Assist personnel in categories c and d above, in gaining prestige by orientation visits to the United States. 8. The following measures are designed to utilize the resources of the Military Establishment. They could enhance US influence throughout the area of West Africa and take advantage of any apparent swing away from Communist Bloc orientation in Ghana, Guinea, and Mali. a. Initiate US military assistance to the Conseil de l'Entente countries, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, and continue such assistance to Liberia. (1) Every effort should be made to secure early approval and implementation of the recommendations of the US Joint Survey Team to the Conseil de l'Entente countries which was submitted 1 December 1961. (2) The initial effort in this area should be to create, train, and equip forces for internal security and border and coastal patrol to include appropriate air and naval elements. However, support should be extended to include support of the regional security arrangements currently being organized by France and the Entente countries. The purpose of this support should be to reduce the concern of Liberia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, and the Entente countries about the recent build-up of military forces and equipment in Ghana, Guinea, and Mali, by improving the capability of these countries to defend themselves. (3) Emphasize the development within the above countries of military intelligence assets which can be utilized to counter communist espionage, subversion, and insurgency by assisting them in establishing and maintaining high standards of security against communist penetration, and in the development of indigenous military intelligence assets to meet the requirements of combined or bilateral contingency plans. (4) Implementation of aid programs to these friendly countries should be carried out with marked dispatch to create a psychological impact that it pays to be friends of the West. (5) Utilize appropriate specially trained forces to provide counterinsurgency training for friendly forces in West Africa. (6) Offer medical personnel to participate in local tropical medical research. b. Expand efforts to gain and improve the US entree and influence in Ghana, Guinea, and Mali, in order to create an increased US presence there, offer an alternative to dependence on Communist Bloc support, and increase the flow of information from them. (1) Take advantage of Toure's current disenchantment with the Communist Bloc to press for the establishment of a US military attache in Conakry. (2) Take advantage of Mali interest in acquiring US military communications and other material to reopen the question of establishing a US military attache in Bamako. (3) Follow-up on USEmbassy Accra message of 26 December 1961 (DA IN 188840) by inviting the Ghana Chief of Defense Staff to come to the United States for an orientation tour of US military facilities and schools. Extend similar invitations to the Chiefs of Defense Staff of Guinea and Mali. (4) Continue to review the desirability of offers of military training to all three countries in terms of the over-all advantage of such training to the United States. (5) Arrange for the visit of appropriate elements of US armed forces to Ghana, Guinea, and Mali. (6) Offer medical personnel to participate in local tropical medicine research. (7) Offer military Corps of Engineers technical advice especially in the civic area of construction and road building. (8) Offer military Transportation Corps technical advice to assist in overcoming the problems of communications so important to the economies of these countries, especially Mali. (9) Endeavor to encourage in these countries the development of Western oriented intelligence agencies capable of coping with the communist threat. (10) In order to foster Western orientation of the Ghanaian military, consider on its merits the desirability of furnishing financial assistance to Western oriented countries who are otherwise prepared and capable of providing military technical advice, training, or other support to Ghana. * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, 092 Africa, Jan.-Mar., 1962. Secret. This memorandum forms the appendix to a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara, January 31. The January 31 covering memorandum indicates that the memorandum printed here was written in response to a January 4 request from the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs for recommendations on substantive courses of action designed to counter Sino-Soviet penetration of Ghana, Guinea, and Mali. The memorandum advises that the Joint Chiefs had re-examined measures they had recommended in the past, as well as others being pursued or planned by the Department of State, and were submitting the results of their review in the attached appendix. They recommended that the Secretary of Defense transmit the substance of the appendix to the Department of State and urged that it be considered by a State-Defense Ad Hoc Committee. On March 9, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Bundy transmitted the memorandum and its appendix to Assistant Secretary Williams under cover of a letter calling it “a sensible and useful paper.” Bundy stated that he was prepared to accept Williams' judgment as to whether an ad hoc committee would be useful, but noted that a continuing watch might have some usefulness. (Ibid.) 206. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to Secretary of State Rusk 206. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to Secretary of State Rusk Source Washington, May 9, 1962. INTELLIGENCE NOTE Moscow Moves Rapidly on Civil Air Routes in Africa Four More Countries Approached . Following its mid-April negotiations with the Sudanese, the USSR has now asked Libya, Somalia, Niger, and Chad to sign various types of air agreements necessary for Aeroflot operations in North, East, and West Africa. Czechoslovakia and Senegal signed an air agreement on May 2, and there are reports that Air Guinea and Ghana Airways are going to begin service to Moscow via Tunisia and Switzerland. Agreements Presently Deferred . The countries approached have de-ferred action on Moscow's requests, perhaps influenced by uncertainty as to whether a Soviet-Sudanese agreement will be signed and US representations on the undesirability of Soviet bloc civil air expansion in Africa. Sudan, Chad, and Niger have expressed surprise at US concern and a Libyan official has implied to Embassy Benghazi that if some African countries admit Soviet air service, others cannot long refuse. Soviet Officials Exploit Sense of Nationalism. Undoubtedly aware of Western efforts to interdict, the USSR is making quiet, matter-of-fact approaches, taking the line that air agreements with foreign powers are a normal concomitant of sovereignty. Soviet officials incorrectly assured Chad that Niger had already agreed to Aeroflot rights through Niamey. The Sudanese, furthermore, were at first misled into thinking that Soviet air agreements with Nigeria and Liberia had been virtually concluded. * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC/Standing Group Meetings, 5/1/62-5/17/62. Secret. Sent through the Executive Secretariat. A handwritten note in the margin in an unknown hand indicates that copies were sent to Kaysen, Dungan, Klein, and Komer. 207. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Achilles) to the Under Secretary (McGhee) 207. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Achilles) to the Under Secretary (McGhee) Source Washington, May 10, 1962. SUBJECT Soviet Civil Aviation Penetration in Africa The Soviet Union's success since January, 1962 in negotiating four civil aviation agreements in North and West Africa (Morocco, Mali, Guinea and Ghana) and in bringing almost to the point of final conclusion a similar agreement with the Sudanese which would lead to further routes in East and Central Africa have caused us to undertake ad hoc measures directed at the Sudanese problem and longer range planning designed to improve our organizational arrangements for policy formulation in this field. Our efforts to block conclusion of a Soviet-Sudanese aviation agreement were at first based on strong diplomatic representations which stressed the disruptive political effect and the potential security dangers of Soviet aviation penetration for the Sudan and for African stability in general. The technical pitfalls of the proposed agreement were also emphasized (questions of reciprocity, settlements of disputes, rates and standards, soviet non-membership in ICAO and IATA). When the Sudanese indicated that they had committed themselves too deeply to be able to withdraw unless some substantial element “of principle” were introduced, and renewed their expression of interest in securing two Boeing 720B's, high-level consultations between AID and the Department, [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ], produced a new proposal to the Sudanese based on two elements: 1) the immediate despatch to Khartoum of the Vice President of Seaboard International Airlines to discuss the possibilities of developing Sudan Airways, including the obtaining on favorable terms of additional equipment best suited to Sudan airlines needs; 2) notification that the US Government was prepared to consider favorably a loan application for financing Khartoum-Port Sudan Road best suited to the Sudan's needs after the recently completed survey had been considered by that Government. We further informed the Sudanese that our willingness to assist the Sudan can be significantly influenced by a decision to proceed with the air agreement which would be viewed by Congress and the American public as assisting USSR penetration of Africa. As a result of these representations, the Sudanese Government agreed on April 29 to hold off making a final decision for 10 to 14 days, “or even longer.” Discussions with the Seaboard representative are continuing and the relatively favorable Sudanese reaction to his proposal, just received, indicates a further period of postponement while the Seaboard offer is examined. Even before the accelerated Soviet efforts to expand their air routes in Africa, there had been within various parts of the US Government concern that US policies with respect to civil aviation in developing countries were not being properly coordinated among the various interested agencies of Government and were not taking sufficient account of political and security requirements. A Department of Defense study of September 1, 1961 discussed this problem and made a number of useful proposals for making aviation in the less-developed countries a more responsive instrument of foreign policy. Within the Department of State one principal difficulty seemed to be that civil aviation matters were handled entirely within the Bureau of Economic Affairs by the Office of Transportation and Communications, and as a result political consideration of aviation policies was not achieved on a systematic basis or often at a high enough level. As a partial solution to this problem, efforts are underway to obtain the services of a highly qualified professional in the civil aviation field. The leading candidate for this position is Mr. Joseph Fitzgerald, now President of the Ozark Airlines, St. Louis, and formerly Chief of the International Division of CAB. Mr. Fitzgerald will be coming to Washington for an interview on May 11. As a first step to arrange closer consultation among those Government agencies chiefly concerned, you wrote on May 1 to Defense, FAA, CIA,AID and CAB proposing an early meeting to discuss arrangements for some form of ad hoc inter-Agency consultation to discuss steps to counteract Soviet Bloc penetration of the developing countries through aviation activities as well as to assure a constructive response to the aviation aspirations of these countries. As an important element for devising a coherent civil aviation development policy in Africa, the Advisory Group might consider the initiation of thorough surveys of individual countries in order to develop broad guidelines applicable throughout particular regions in Africa. Existing associations such as Air-Afrique and Springbok could be strengthened and the establishment of new regional airlines, for example in the Maghreb, should be explored. One of the elements of difficulty will be in preserving harmonious relationships with the former Metropoles which would, no doubt, resist any massive intrusion of US aviation competition. One proposal suggested by Mr. James Smith is to consider the aviation maintenance and support system separately from the operations of the airlines themselves and to promote, with Exim Bank participation, a series of consortia for building and controlling all national aviation facilities. In this way the basic aviation development of the country could not come under Soviet influence but would be developed as a cooperative economically viable venture with the West. These and many other interesting proposals, such as those set forth in the FAA-Defense study just sent over by Mr. Halaby, 1 suggest the range and complexity of this problem. Our opponent has a strategic plan, a single aviation organization whose operations are closely linked with its foreign assistance programs, considerable resources of modern aircraft and technical personnel, no “colonial” heritage in Africa or Latin America and few problems of coordinating its efforts in the developing countries with other members of the Bloc. The Soviets clearly do not intend to let the momentum already gained to die down: within the last three weeks they have broadened their drive for air routes to four additional countries, Chad, Niger, Somalia, and Libya, although none has yet given any commitment. African States, whether they call themselves neutral or sympathetic to the West, will find the Bloc's offer of new aviation links and quick aviation development on easy terms difficult to resist. The newly formed aviation advisory group has an important and urgent task before it. As background information, I am attaching a memorandum by Mr. Wolfe dated May 5 2 on this same subject. * Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Standing Group Meeting, May 11, 1962. Secret. 1 Attachment to a memorandum from the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, Najeeb E. Halaby, to McGeorge Bundy, May 10. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Standing Group Meetings, 5/1/62-5/17/62) 2 Not printed. Memorandum from Wolfe to Fredericks and Tasca, May 5. (Department of State,S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Standing Group Meeting, May 11, 1962) 208. Record of Actions Taken at a Standing Group Meeting of the National Security Council 208. Record of Actions Taken at a Standing Group Meeting of the National Security Council Source Washington, May 11, 1962. Item I—Soviet Penetration of Civil Air Transport in Africa a. Following discussion of the urgent requirement for a civil air transport program for Africa, agreed that an individual would be appointed on a temporary basis to develop such a program under the policy direction of the steering committee of the International Air Transport Study Group. (IATSG) b. Agreed on the necessity, as a second priority, of developing U.S. long range civil aviation programs. Item 2—Status of NSC 5726/1, “U.S. Civil Aviation Policy Toward the Sino-Soviet Bloc” 1 a. Agreed to recommend rescission of NSC 5726/1. b. Asked the Department of State to review the substance of NSC 5726/1 to determine (1) whether a new statement of policy on this subject is required and (2) whether any such statement should become part of the general aviation policy statement being drafted by the International Air Transport Study Group. * Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Standing Group, May 11, 1962. Secret. Copies were sent to McGhee, Gilpatric, McCone, Bundy (White House), Halaby (FAA), Bell (BOB), Boyd (CAB), and Bromley Smith (NSC). 1 NSC 5726/1, “U.S. Civil Aviation Policy Toward the Sino-Soviet Bloc.” (Ibid., S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5726/1) 209. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) 209. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) Source Washington, July 6, 1962. Dear Alex : The Joint Chiefs of Staff have expressed concern that, if contingency operations were required in sub-Saharan Africa, we would lack assurance of effective communications for command and control of our deployed forces. We would be dependent upon facilities at Kenitra, San Pablo, Wheelus, and Asmara. The use of these facilities to support contingency operations in Africa might be denied or harassed, for political reasons, by the host Governments involved. Accordingly, we attach importance to making arrangements with the United Kingdom under which we could install and operate communications equipment at Ascension Island, when required during contingency operations, and when use of other facilities is not feasible. Such equipment would be used for command and control of forces deployed to Africa and for ship-shore communications coverage of the South Atlantic and the African west coast. The equipment would consist of transportable transmitters and receivers to be airlifted into Ascension Island on approximately 36-hours notice when required. We estimate that about 80 to 120 men would be required for the temporary operation of such facilities, depending upon the type of equipment selected and the extent to which support could be provided by other U.S. activities on the island at the time. There are no current plans for the establishment of permanent communication facilities at Ascension Island, nor for any construction in anticipation of contingency use. Any construction later undertaken in this connection would be the minimum consistent with the circumstances (e.g., the preparatory time available during a contingency, the support available from other U.S. activities at Ascension, and the expected duration of the operations). For the present, the requirement is only to identify and have kept available two suitable sites of 4 to 6 acres each, for receiver and transmitter areas. The former could be co-located with existing Atlantic Missile Range (AMR) receivers; the latter would be located and the frequencies used would be selected and coordinated to avoid interference with existing electronic systems on the island. It is relevant to point out that we have examined the possibility of using existing AMR communications facilities for these purposes. We have concluded that this arrangement would not be practicable. If we rely upon these facilities to carry both AMR traffic and contingency operations traffic between Ascension Island and the continental U.S., we would be risking serious and untimely interruptions in one or the other of these important activities. Moreover, the AMR facilities are not suitable for the essential relay of contingency operations traffic between Ascension Island and the deployed forces themselves. We would appreciate whatever steps you can take to obtain the agreement of the United Kingdom to make sites available on Ascension Island for possible use as described above. As to the form of such an agreement, we have envisaged an exchange of notes authorizing this use of Ascension Island subject to the provisions, insofar as they are applicable, of the Long Range Proving Ground Agreement (Ascension Island), TIAS 3603, of June 25th, 1956. Your views as to the suitability of this approach would also be appreciated. We would be pleased to arrange for any further information or assistance you might desire in this matter. Sincerely, Bill * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770.54/7-662. Secret. 210. National Intelligence Estimate 210. National Intelligence Estimate Source Washington, July 11, 1962. NIE 60-62 GUINEA AND MALI AS EXEMPLARS OF AFRICAN RADICALISM The Problem To examine the nature and effect of the radical policies of Guinea and Mali and to assess their wider significance. Conclusions A. Guinea and Mali, along with Ghana, are the main centers of African radicalism south of the Sahara. Their attitudes and policies are dominated by strong anticolonialism which tends to make them suspicious of the Western Powers and sympathetic with Communist formulas. In domestic policy their approach is militantly nationalistic and revolutionary. In foreign affairs they seek to establish themselves as leaders of radicalism in Africa and to promote policies of neutralism and nonalignment. These policies have given them notoriety and significance out of proportion to their power and resources. (Paras. 1, 6-8, 31) B. Radical governments are still in a minority in Africa, but the state of mind reflected in radicalism is present throughout the continent. At the same time radicalism itself is changing as a consequence of the clash between its theories and practical realities. The trend is toward a blurring of present distinctions and a converging of the radical and moderate viewpoints, with many of the concepts of African radicalism playing an increasingly important role. (Para. 13) C. Communist influence in both Guinea and Mali has been extensive. It has greatly influenced government organization, the dominant authoritarian parties, and the mass organizations characteristic of political life in both countries. The Communist countries have supplied Guinea since its break with France with the bulk of its aid from outside sources and have also assisted Mali, though the latter country has continued to receive roughly equal amounts from France. The foreign trade of both countries has been substantially reoriented toward the Bloc, although Mali continues to import heavily from the West. The two countries together have more Bloc advisers and technicians than all other sub-Saharan countries put together. (Paras. 9, 21-22, 25, 29-30, 35-37) D. Nevertheless, Guinea and Mali have retained their freedom of action under President Sekou Toure and President Modibo Keita. Each heads a group within the dominant Political Bureau of his party which takes a generally flexible and pragmatic point of view, as opposed to the view of doctrinaire pro-Bloc elements. It appears likely that both Presidents will succeed, at least for the next year or two, in maintaining the dominance of their pragmatic approach, which seeks to maintain contacts with the West to balance those with the Bloc. Keita's position, however, is much less strong than Toure's. Over the past few months there has been in Guinea some disillusionment with Bloc assistance and mounting concern about the political wisdom of relying solely on the Bloc. Mali's reliance on the Bloc is likely to be balanced by continuing relations with the West. (Paras. 16, 33, 40-41) E. The most significant thing about Guinea and Mali during the period since their independence is that, while they have offered the Bloc the best opportunities it has had in Africa, and while the Bloc has made a vigorous effort to take advantage of them, the two countries are not Communist and are, in fact, maintaining a more or less independent position. We believe that this experience is germane to African radicalism throughout the continent and may serve in a general way as a guide to its probable long-term attitudes, policies, and orientation. (Para. 42) [Here follows the body of the paper.] * Source: Department of State, INR-NIE Files. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet: “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force.” All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on July 11, except the Atomic Energy Commission Representative and the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction. 211. Position Paper Prepared in the Office of the Secretary of State 211. Position Paper Prepared in the Office of the Secretary of State Source Washington, undated. SOVIET BLOC AIR PENETRATION OF UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS: AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA Recommended US Position The United States hopes that all countries will take precautions against the dangers involved in permitting Soviet Bloc countries to use civil aviation as a means of subverting developing countries. Such penetration is especially dangerous when it takes the form of Soviet Bloc participation in local aviation enterprises (i.e., Ghana, Guinea, Mali), but is also undesirable and potentially dangerous when it consists merely of the operation of secure air routes by Aeroflot, CSA (Czechoslovakia) or other Bloc airlines (i.e., to Cuba, the west coast of Africa, the Sudan et cetera). Anticipated Foreign Position 1. Developing countries need assistance in operating air services in order to develop the country or the region and the USSR is willing to provide such assistance. 2. Air transport rights are granted to western countries so neutralist countries must grant similar rights to the Bloc countries. Furthermore, Poland and Czechoslovakia (not the USSR) as members of ICAO and adherents to the Air Transit Agreement automatically have transit and non-traffic rights from many other member countries (including the United States) and so they cannot be denied at least non-traffic rights. Discussion Present Soviet Bloc Penetration The Soviets are deeply involved in the air operations of Ghana, Guinea, and Mali. Ghana, in particular, has reportedly suffered high financial losses as the result of having too many (eight) expensive-to-operate Soviet turboprop aircraft. The Czech airline has been flying to Egypt and down the west coast of Africa, as well as through Near, South, and Southeast Asia for some time. The Soviets have just concluded a series of air agreements with west Africa countries plus the Sudan. The latter agreement gives Aeroflot routes through eastern Africa to the Malagasy Republic, across central Africa to the west coast and beyond to Latin America. The Czechs also have been flying to Cuba (by way of the U.K., Ireland, and Canada) for some time. Aeroflot is now beginning service to Cuba by way of Conakry, Guinea. Future Penetration The Soviets are likely to be active in many African countries seeking the rights that will allow them to flesh out the routes already obtained. Eventually they will have a permanent network of secure communications. (Had they had such a network two years ago, it might not have been so easy to eliminate them from the Congo.) The Soviets have also publicized the fact that they want routes into, and through, the heart of South America. (Brazil, Bolivia, et cetera.) Although we have been unable to keep the Soviets out of Africa, we want to make every effort to keep them out of South America. If the Latin American countries will cooperate, it should be possible to do so. In the field of technical assistance, a Soviet offer to train Somali pilots has been accepted. Offers of modern Soviet aircraft have been made to Bolivia. Other aid offers will undoubtedly accompany the seeking of landing rights in Latin American countries. * Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2160. Confidential. Drafted by Stoffel and cleared by McGhee, Lister, Russell, Wolfe, Ramsey, and FitzGerald. Prepared for Secretary Rusk's delegation attending the 17th Session of the U.N. General Assembly in September. 212. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 212. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State Source New York, September 20, 1962, 8 p.m. 831. For Secretary from Stevenson. 1. Because of generally negative posture we will be in during GA on Africa, I suspect you might want make special effort in your talks with key African FonMins here to impress on them that while we may have opposed some specific proposals in GA, US objectives in Africa remain unchanged and that we remain as committed as ever to liquidation of colonialism and racism and to early emergence of prosperous and independent African states. Our record re economic and political assistance to independent African states needs no documentation, but Africans know practically nothing about our private efforts to get Portuguese and South Africans and even UK when necessary to be more forthcoming. Perhaps you could usefully describe for some of them our arms control policies vis-à-vis South Africa and Portugal and even allude to other initiatives we have taken with the govts concerned. 2. A second point which you could usefully make would be that American warnings against sanctions reses and extreme language in UN comes not from any desire to protect status quo but from our conviction that such measures will not be successful either in obtaining changes in policy of colonial powers or in hastening the process; indeed they could even harden the attitude of powers involved. We believe political, legal and moral pressure is best course for immediate future. We have influence which can be used within this context; and we are prepared to cooperate with them in so doing. 3. It would also be useful, of course, to get across the point that the USSR has used the Comite of 17 1 for cold war purposes and that they and we should be removed next year. 4. I may have some specific suggestions for your meetings later but thought it might be useful to call your attention to this general problem now. Stevenson * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770.00/9-2062. Confidential; Priority. 1 The Committee of 17, otherwise known as the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, was established by the U.N. General Assembly on November 27, 1961. 213. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 213. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Source Washington, December 5, 1962. Senator Ellender's remark that Africans do not have the ability to govern themselves 1 has now been so widely disseminated by press and radio in Africa that prolonged damage to U.S. prestige is likely to result. It is only a question of time before Communist Bloc propaganda exploits his comments fully. In the long run we may well regain all we lose. However much depends upon our day-to-day prestige in the pulling and hauling that surrounds the Congo issue, the attempts by Nkrumah to force us out of Ghana and a number of less identifiable but equally serious situations related to African nationalism which are up for decision in the near future. The State Department release has helped. The Agency is using all its resources. However more is needed. We suggest that Pierre Salinger give the press—on behalf of the White House—something along the lines of the attached. 2 Ed Murrow * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Africa. No classification marking. 1 On December 1, at a press conference in Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia, Senator Allen J. Ellender of Louisiana said: “My own government, of course, supports the United Nations efforts to make as many of the countries of Africa independent as desired to be, or happen to operate their own government. Now personally I wouldn't have any quarrel with that if those who are to operate the government were competent to do so and had the capability. But I've yet to come to any of them wherein that capability exists and for that reason I stated that the time for this change to independence is a little early, quite early.” (Telegram 222 from Salisbury, December 4; Department of State, Central Files, 770.00/12-462) 2 Attached but not printed. For text of the Department of State statement issued on December 4, see Department of State Bulletin , December 24, 1962, p. 961. 214. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to the President's Assistant Special Counsel (White) 214. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to the President's Assistant Special Counsel (White) Source Washington, December 17, 1962. 1. You may want to pass to the President the following. The group of Negro leaders he is seeing at 4:30 today are ostensibly coming to talk about Africa. 1 In fact, according to Soapy Williams, their main purpose will be to talk about Negro representation in the State Department. Soapy will be talking with them at 2:00, and you might call before they come in to see the President. 2. If some facts on Africa are useful, here is a handful. For this fiscal year we have approximately $1 million available for development loans in Africa and somewhat less than $1 million for development grants. We have aid programs in 34 African countries. In addition, we will be shipping in about $20 million worth of PL 480 food into South Saharan Africa. The Peace Corps has about 1500 people assigned or in training for African programs, of whom about 1100 are teachers. In Ethiopia, Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Camerouns, the Peace Corps volunteers provide a very substantial proportion of the teaching force. Education is the largest single item in our development grant program as well, and took more than 1/3 of all the funds. In addition, we have a major political investment in the Congo situation. We will have spent about $40 million in support of the UN operation, accounting for more than 1/3 of its total cost. Carl Kaysen 2 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Africa, Memoranda and Miscellaneous, 11/62-2/63. No classification marking. 1 President Kennedy met with Theodore E. Brown, Director of the Arden House Conference; James L. Farmer, Executive Director of the Congress on Racial Equality (CORE); Dorothy Height, President of the Council of Negro Women; Martin Luther King, Jr., President of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference; A. Phillip Randolph, President of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters; Roy Wilkins, Executive Secretary of the NAACP; and Whitney M. Young, Executive Director of the National Urban League at 4:55 p.m. on December 17. (Ibid., President's Appointment Books) No memorandum of the conversation has been found. 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 215. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nitze) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) 215. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nitze) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) Source Washington, February 15, 1963. Dear Alex : The problem of U.S. military assistance programs in Africa generally has been giving us considerable concern here in Department of Defense for some time. I recognize that the swiftly emerging and changing character of the African states presents especially difficult problems; but it seems to me that our own internal indecision contributes unnecessarily to the difficulty. After many years of experience with military assistance programs, we should now be able to agree on certain guidelines to apply when these same old questions arise in new African states. I would further say that we all can agree that experience has taught us at least the following basic facts: (1) Military assistance programs must be tailored to fit each country and are not manageable by any sort of over-all “regional” organization. (2) New programs should not be encouraged except in cases where clear benefits can be foreseen; but once a decision in principle is made to provide assistance, it should be done promptly and vigorously or not at all. (3) The program should not be attempted if the recipient state finds it politically or practically impossible to meet our criteria for administration, auditing, training and control; including the understanding that a military assistance program is not simply a gift of equipment but must be a program designed to accomplish specific internal security or defense aims, and extending over a period of time. The U.S. desire to appear forthcoming to the developing states of Africa has apparently led us to make, or imply that we will make, military assistance commitments without a previous decision here that such a program is wise or without making plain our requirements of prospective recipients. It would also appear that no clear-cut policy has fully emerged concerning our attitude with reference to the metropoles of former colonial possessions. We are generally agreed, for example, that we would defer to the metropoles and hope they would carry the military assistance burden; but we have never decided what we should do in event the African state continues to press for assistance but the metropole “voices objection” to our proceeding with a program. The failure to profit from what we have learned over the years in other parts of the world, compounded by the failure to agree to a plan of action when we are caught between conflicting demands of metropoles and African states, have enmeshed us in many problems in the implementation of military assistance to Africa. I have attached some examples of such problems and also attached a draft Department of Defense position for implementation and administration of military assistance to Africa, 1 which is designed to help correct some of the difficulties and deficiencies encountered and to establish a better basis for future programs. The primary concern is to satisfy U.S. objectives and administer the military assistance program in a manner which will reflect credit on the U.S. It is not only essential that these programs be conducted under procedures responsive to the intent and continuing surveillance of Congress, but also in the manner which experience has taught us will make them succeed. If new programs are unable to meet these criteria, then they should be rejected; if a program in existence cannot meet this test, it should be terminated as soon as possible and the funds utilized elsewhere. It seems to me that a full understanding and agreement on the part of all of us in the Government as to our objectives and methods could bring about a rapid solution to present African military assistance problems and preclude the same mistakes in the future. Sincerely, Paul H. Nitze 2 * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files:FRC 67 A 4564, 091.3 Africa. Confidential. Drafted by Junkermann and Sloan. A copy was sent to Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Williams. 1 Attached but not printed. 2 Printed from a copy that indicates NITZE signed the original. 216. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk 216. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk Source Washington, February 25, 1963. SUBJECT Major Conclusions of Williams African Trip 1 1. U.S. Congo policy has won us high esteem in all Africa except for European minorities in Portuguese Africa, Southern Rhodesia, and Republic of South Africa. 2. Southern Rhodesia is new African time bomb. If Nationalist aspirations do not get some hope and if Nationalists are not brought into constitutional dialogue instead of belligerent hostility, there will be major flare-up (after period of gestation). 3. Portuguese Africa will be under increasing pressure for self-determination from all independent Africa. 4. Nigerian development will grind to a slowdown if US and other aid does not soon start flowing significantly. 5. American policy must move imaginatively and quickly in these areas or our present prestige will suffer acute and rapid diminution. 6. PAFMECA 2 promises to become an African association of considerable importance involving all East African countries from Ethiopia to Tanganyika and Congo (L), Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland. It will concern itself with black self-government in Southern Rhodesia, Angola and Mozambique, and Southwest and South Africa. [Here follow country summaries.] * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Africa. Confidential. 1 Result of visit to Algeria, Nigeria, Congo, Rhodesias and discussions with principal officers there and Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, Togo, Dahomey, Angola, RSAF, Mozambique, and Tanganyika. [Footnote in the source text. Williams visited Africa February 1-23.] 2 The Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa (PAFMECA) held its first conference at Mwanza, Tanganyika, September 17, 1958. 217. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Dungan) to President Kennedy 217. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Dungan) to President Kennedy Source Washington, March 6, 1963. SUBJECT Aid to Africa Following your discussion with General Clay on Tuesday, I thought you might be interested in this breakdown of the 1963 AID program for Africa: Countries receiving less than $1.0 million (obligations/authorizations ) Mauritania Malagasy Republic Burundi Dahomey Rwanda Chad Congo (Brazzaville) Togo Central African Republic Upper Volta Zanzibar Cameroon Algeria Countries receiving between $1.0 million and $10.0 million Niger Kenya Gabon Uganda Senegal Ivory Coast Congo (Leopoldville) Guinea Rhodesia & Nyasaland Somali Republic Sierra Leone Ghana Mali Countries receiving more than $10.0 million Sudan $10.8 million Tanganyika 12.3 Libya 12.9 Ethiopia 13.8 Liberia 21.2 Morocco 23.5 Tunisia 39.4 Nigeria 53.8 Total $187.7 million The 1963 total for Africa is $252.2 million. The eight countries receiving more than $10.0 million account for 74.5% of this total. The 26 countries receiving less than $10.0 account for an aggregate of $54.2 million or 21.5%. The remainder—$10.1 million (4%) is for regional programs and expenses. RAD * Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Staff Memoranda, Dungan, Ralph A., 1/63-5/63. No classification marking. 218. Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense 218. Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense Source Washington, undated. THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF AFRICA Working Paper for Discussion Group Meeting May 25, 1963 Abstract From a global perspective Africa is not an area of primary strategic importance to the US, and we therefore have a strong interest in restricting our involvement in Africa. Nonetheless, we have a considerable number of specific interests and commitments there in whose service we might have to undertake serious and extensive burdens. Our military and technological needs include: (1) bases in support of our readiness posture; (2) transit and supply points for efforts in the Middle East; (3) overflight and landing rights to implement contingency plans in sub-Saharan Africa; (4) facilities in support of space and missile programs; (5) communications and intelligence facilities; (6) essential raw materials. In general, we will require more military and space facilities in Africa over the next decade, but they will be more difficult to obtain. Our minimum political interests are: (1) to keep Africa free of Communist regimes and to minimize Sino-Soviet influence; (2) to restrain violence in general and preserve the present territorial order as the most feasible alternative to chaos; (3) to prevent violent racial confrontations; and (4) to prevent or control situations of internal chaos similar to the Congo. We have general commitments to act under the UN Charter and specific defense commitments to Tunisia, Ethiopia, and Liberia. Our interests sometimes conflict with each other. There is a basic conflict between our requirements and our desire to limit commitments, which will presumably be resolved on an ad hoc basis. There are a number of more specific conflicts as well, e.g., between our desire to work with our NATO allies and the difficulty of agreeing with them on fundamental common interests in Africa; and between our desire to draw close to states that show promise of regional leadership and the domestic problems this creates for moderate regimes. We require a basic point of departure which gives proper balance to political and military considerations in light of our overall African posture and which establishes principles for determining future courses of action in response both to our immediate needs and longer-range interests. [Here follows the body of the paper.] * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 73 A 2226, Strategic Importance of Africa. Secret. The source text is attached to a memorandum from Colonel Howard C. Junkermann, USAF, to Lieutenant Colonel C.C. Robinson, Defense Intelligence Agency, Commander H.A. Cummings, Department of the Navy, Lieutenant Colonel E.G. Tanassy, Department of the Air Force, and J.J. Blake, Department of the Army. Junkermann indicated that the paper was drafted by Fred Greene, and would be used as a basis for discussion at a forthcoming conference to be held at Georgetown University on May 25. No record of the group's discussion has been found. 219. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain African Posts 219. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain African Posts Source Washington, May 28, 1963, 6:41 p.m. 2032. Dept not planning make comprehensive public statement on Addis Conference 1 this time, although senior Dept officials will probably be called upon comment. Following summarizes Dept's preliminary assessment Conference. You may use this material in conversations with officials and other responsible personalities, but should not give statements to the press. Dept regards Conference and its outcome as remarkable achievement in that leaders managed in four days agree on certain basic issues despite personal rivalries and serious differences in approach. They adopted charter of Organization of African Unity (OAU), refusing to accept postponement as recommended by Foreign Ministers. Resolutions they adopted also reflected search for workable compromises, but may create problems for U.S. Dept therefore not prepared give unqualified endorsement to resolutions. A. OAU Charter: Signed by 30 countries present with Morocco and Togo probably to adhere later; provides for assembly Heads of State meeting annually, Foreign Ministers Council meeting twice a year, permanent Secretariat with limited powers (no SYG yet, probable location Addis), and Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration. There is no parliamentary assembly and charter contains no collective security provisions. Based on Ethiopian draft and resembles OAS Charter. It is, in Dept's view, a realistic agreement in terms present African capabilities. B. Resolutions: 1. Racism—Condemned racial discrimination everywhere, particularly in US, but coupled this with appreciation for efforts US Gov't end discriminatory practices which otherwise likely cause serious deterioration in relations between US and Africa. This probably as good a resolution as could be expected. More moderate than earlier Foreign Ministers draft and significantly includes recognition and understanding role US Gov't. 2. Decolonization—Great powers urged cease aid colonialist governments, particularly Portugal which engaging genocide. Other references to Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, South Africa. Committee of 9 established at Dar es Salaam to raise funds and coordinate activities for liberation remaining dependent areas. Member states called upon develop local volunteers to provide assistance to national liberation movements. However, proposed fund of 1% national budgets OAU countries for liberation not adopted.UK Ambassador, Addis, believes UK can live with Southern Rhodesia resolution. Pressure on US increased by declaration that Portuguese allies must choose friendship of Portugal or Africa. Although resolution appears to call for economic boycott South Africa by all governments, effect this resolution still not clear. 3. Disarmament—Africa declared denuclearized zone. Great powers called upon sign disarmament agreement with effective controls and reduce arms. Expressed willingness African countries negotiate end military occupation, bases and nuclear testing in Africa. Moderation these resolutions encouraging in that need for disarmament controls recognized and willingness negotiate on removal bases expressed. Effect on tenure US installations North Africa and Ethiopia remains to be seen. 4. Apartheid—Fund set up for anti-apartheid movement. 5. Non-alignment—Doctrine given general support but need for payment UN obligations affirmed and better representation in UN requested. 6. Role of African Leaders: a. Haile Selassi (Ethiopia): Prestige high, Nkrumah called him “Ethiopia the Wise”; good lobbyist; demonstrated high organizational ability. b. Nkrumah (Ghana): Usual mixture extreme and sensible statements. He failed get his views adopted, although outcome Conference owed much to his dedication African unity. c. Balewa (Nigeria): Critically important; turned Wachuku from obstructionism to positive work on charter; good influence; respected. d. Nyerere (Tanganyika): Established himself as African with continental influence. e. Nasser (UAR): Avoided controversy; tried to be good African. f. Ben Bell a (Algeria): Strong activist on decolonization; won approval sub-Saharans. g. Keita (Mali) and Toure (Guinea): Reasonable and moderate. h. Houphouet-Boigny (Ivory Coast) and Senghor (Senegal): Confirmed their reputations as veteran parliamentarians. i. Obote (Uganda): Sought to be disciple of Nkrumah. Some of above subjects may be too controversial or ambiguous for comment in local context. These probably include gamut anti-colonialist activities rooted in new charter, probable South African boycott, and explicit anti-Portuguese resolutions. You should, of course, avoid comment these aspects Conference results and any others which in your judgment inadvisable in our particular situation. You should also, as opportunity arises, offer congratulations US Gov't on success of Conference to leaders who participated, tailoring approbation leader's particular role both to objective assessment his accomplishments and attitude his gov't to value of Conference. Comment on economic aspects Conference to follow. Request you report reaction local government to Conference. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 ETH. Confidential. Drafted by Sherry, cleared by Hadsel, and approved by Tasca. Sent to Abidjan, Accra, Addis Ababa, Algiers, Bamako, Bangui, Benghazi, Tripoli, Brazzaville, Conakry, Cotonou, Dakar, Dar-es-Salaam, Fort Lamy, Freetown, Kampala, Khartoum, Kigali, Lagos, Leopoldville, Libreville, Lome, Lourenco Marques, Luanda, Mogadiscio, Monrovia, Nairobi, Niamey, Nouakchott, Ouagadougou, Cape Town, Rabat, Salisbury, Tananarive, Tunis, Usumbura, Yaounde, and Zanzibar. 1 The Summit Conference of Independent African States met in Addis Ababa May 22-25. For text of President Kennedy's message to the African Heads of State at the conference, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, p. 417. The Presidential message was sent to Emperor Haile Selassie, Chairman of the conference, who read it at the opening session. (Telegram 605 to Addis Ababa, May 17; Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 ETH) 220. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 220. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Source Washington, May 31, 1963. JCSM-416-63 SUBJECT Proposed Regular Scheduled Military Air Transport Service (MATS) Flights Throughout Africa 1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have held for some time that the United States should develop and maintain the capability of conducting small or large-scale military air transport operations in support of US national security policy objectives in Africa. This will require arrangements for operating rights, servicing and supporting facilities, and aircrew familiarity in the area on a continuing basis. 2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the establishment of regularly scheduled MATS operations throughout Africa is the most effective method of achieving this capability. Furthermore, they believe that such action is desirable at this time for the following reasons: a. A series of contingency plans involving 39 African nations has been developed to support US national security objectives, e.g., MATS OPLAN 133/62 supports CINCLANT OPLAN 330/61 and JTF-Four OPLAN 330/61. The establishment of MATS routes will enhance the capability to execute these plans, should the need arise. b. The very substantial assistance (made possible by US military airlift resources) which the United States has recently rendered African nations, as well as other underdeveloped nations throughout the world, has created a favorable image of the United States, demonstrating the advantages accruing to cooperating nations through the maintenance of a MATS operation in their areas. c. The Soviet Bloc civil air offensive in Africa, designed primarily to enhance Bloc capabilities for subversion, intelligence collection, and airlift in support of such operations, is a matter of increasing concern to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. d. US Government activities in Africa are expanding at a rapid rate. In many instances, commercial air service provided by US flag carriers to or near these locations is inadequate or nonexistent. At the same time, sufficient airlift requirements have been generated by the presence of State Department, MAAG, AID, USIA,CIA, and NASA personnel to justify the establishment of a MATS channel traffic route, the operational costs of which might be absorbed by selective adjustments to the Industrial Fund point-to-point tariff rates. It will not be necessary under this funding concept to designate a sponsoring agency. 3. The extension of MATS routes into Africa could, under some circumstances, encounter political problems. The Joint Chiefs of Staff feel, however, that these problems can be overcome by pointing out to African governments the advantages to be gained from the initiation of such air service. Extension of MATS routes into Africa would facilitate the support of US technical, economic, and military assistance programs in the countries concerned. Also, the establishment of MATS service would enable the United States to respond to the contingency needs of African nations and the United Nations on a timely and orderly basis. 4. The most feasible concept for the establishment of scheduled MATS flights throughout Africa at this time appears to be to provide regular air service to various US Embassies on that continent. On this basis, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have developed an illustrative plan, attached hereto as the Appendix. 1 5. The initial step in implementing this plan should be the conduct of a thorough route and site survey to identify and resolve the problems inherent in any operation of this type, including determination of the traffic loads and requirements of the user agencies. It is anticipated such a survey can be completed within four months after authorization. In the light of the findings, and to accommodate specific requirements, as may be determined in consultation with the Department of State, the plan can be modified, changed in scope, or made flexible as to itinerary. Definitive requirements for overflight/landing rights and rights for positioning support personnel and equipment will be based on the result of the survey and the needs of interested agencies. 6. Implementation of this plan will not result in the stationing of large numbers of additional US military personnel in Africa. Other than at the initial entry point, such as Wheelus AFB, Libya, or Torrejon, Spain, where US military presence already is established, and the mid-route support base, where a total of not more than ten MATS personnel will be required, the plan calls for the introduction of only two US military personnel per stop. These numbers may be adjusted as contractual arrangements mature. The political disadvantages resulting from an increased US military presence in politically sensitive countries thus will be avoided. 7. Experience indicates that the annual costs of the operation envisaged would be around $1.75 million. Based on estimated airlift requirements, the anticipated traffic revenues are expected to offset initially about 65%, or $1.13 million of these costs. The Joint Chiefs of Staff suggest that any deficit which may accrue, now estimated at about $620 thousand, might be absorbed by selective adjustments to the Industrial Fund point-to-point tariff rates charged all DOD and other users of MATS airlift. They consider that such adjustments to the Industrial Fund tariff rates, as may be required to support these operations in the initial stages, are justified by the national security policy considerations involved. Neither an increase in total MATS aircraft nor in the total objective flying hour utilization program will result. 8. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you approve in principle the attached plan for conducting regularly scheduled MATS flights throughout Africa. They also request that you approve the conduct, in the near future, of a route survey which will provide the basis for a fuller examination by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the feasibility of the proposed routes and their economic implications. The Joint Chiefs of Staff suggest that you raise this matter with the Secretary of State, in the context of the Department of State letter of 2 March 1961, in order to obtain his concurrence and cooperation. 2 For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Maxwell D. Taylor 3 Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 69 A 3131, Africa, 1963. Secret. 1 Not attached to the source text. 2 On June 8, the Joint Chiefs of Staffs proposal to establish regularly scheduled MATS flights throughout Africa was transmitted under cover of a letter from Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Bundy to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs Kitchen. Bundy noted that the Department of State had refused a similar request in March 1961 on grounds that not enough advantages would accrue to the countries concerned to justify U.S. requests, but argued that in the ensuing period U.S. Government activities had expanded to a sufficient degree to overcome the previous political objections. He requested Department of State approval for the conduct of a route survey which would provide the basis for further examination of the feasibility and economic implications for MATS operations in Africa. (Ibid.) 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Taylor signed the original. 221. Editorial Note 221. Editorial Note On June 19, 1963, President Kennedy sent a Special Message to the Congress on Civil Rights and Job Opportunities. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963 , pages 483-496. On the same day, the Department of State sent a series of instructions and information messages to all U.S. diplomatic missions abroad, which included messages from President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk as well as a background summary of U.S. civil rights accomplishments. The President's and the Secretary's messages asked U.S. Ambassadors and principal officers to discuss civil rights with foreign governments with candor, but also to affirm U.S. accomplishments and to highlight the positive commitment set by the President toward the goal of equal opportunity for all. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Africa) On July 8, Deputy Special Assistant to the President Carl Kaysen transmitted a copy of the Department of State's “Status Report of African Reactions to Civil Rights in the United States” to Kennedy, noting that the report was a roundup of African reactions to the President's civil rights messages and the related material sent out to the Embassies. The evaluation section of the report stated: “Responses from African posts indicate that ensuing direct diplomatic approaches at the highest levels produced a greater understanding of United States efforts and that the approaches were appreciated. The nuances of US federal impediments to progress were more greatly appreciated than before, but still not comprehensively so. By contrast, the President's words and the President's actions were clearly understood and appreciated. Several posts report that this sympathetic understanding of the President's actions by African leaders overlays a latent, unexpressed concern by both officials and the public which could become articulate if the situation worsens.” (Ibid.) 222. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk 222. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk Source Washington, November 23, 1963. SUBJECT Current Key Issues Affecting Our Relations with Africa Our actions during the next few months on the following current, key issues affecting Africa will be anxiously awaited and carefully assessed by the Africans as indicators of the direction of United States policy under President Johnson. 1 Civil Rights in the United States Our greatest asset in dealing with the Africans has been their conviction that President Kennedy's Administration was committed to eliminating racial discrimination in this country. The Africans will be looking for early reassurance in both word and deed that the new Administration is equally committed. Passage this year of the civil rights legislation now pending in the Congress would be a major triumph in United States relations with Africa. Presidential Diplomacy President Kennedy had established close personal relations with many African leaders including such militant nationalists as Ben Bell a of Algeria, Nkrumah of Ghana and Sekou Toure of Guinea. These relations enabled the late President to apply personal influence on a number of African problems. By deciding to utilize his responses to messages of condolences to emphasize the continuity of United States policy, President Johnson will signal to Africa his willingness to assume these personal relations. The President could further evidence his intentions in connection with Kenya's impending independence on December 12 by designating the Attorney General to head the United States Delegation to the independence celebrations and by receiving Prime Minister Ken-yatta when the latter comes to the United States on the occasion of Kenya's admission to the United Nations. The inclusion of African leaders (e.g. President Azikiwe of Nigeria) in the 1964 program of state and official visits would also serve the same purpose. South Africa Despite efforts to prevent it, we may be faced in next few days with a critical choice in the United Nations Security Council of (a) abstaining and thereby possibly permitting adoption of an anticipated Afro-Asian resolution of sanctions against South Africa (probably including oil embargo) or (b) casting our first veto in the United Nations on a racial issue. It is of utmost importance that we should not choose the veto which would be interpreted as a major shift of United States policy by the new Administration. We have already lost heavily in United Nations influence by taking the lead in seeking to moderate resolutions aimed at South Africa. The United Kingdom, which has much more at stake in South Africa than the United States, must, if necessary, bear the onus of casting the veto if that is the only way out. Portuguese Africa African pressures for progress toward self-determination in Portuguese Africa are becoming stronger and, in terms of votes in the United Nations, more effective. The United States finds it increasingly difficult to play a moderating role between Portugal and the Africans. The latter will shortly place before the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly resolutions on Portuguese Africa which will again bring this problem to the fore. Additionally, the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly has invited Henrique Galvao, the hijacker of the Portuguese vessel Santa Maria, to appear before it. Portugal has indicated it will request Galvao's extradition as a criminal. Our posture on the African resolutions and our handling of the Galvao problem will be closely examined by the Africans for clues as to the new Administration's position on African nationalism. Guinea Guinea is the only African country which went almost all the way to the Bloc and then broke with the Bloc and is moving steadily toward closer relations with the United States. Its government has planned to send a Ministerial delegation to the United States in December to seek economic assistance following the beginning of a retreat from extreme socialism, so as to enable it to continue the healthy liberal economic trend. Since the prestige of President Toure and the moderates in his Government depends on the results of this visit, it is important that we be as responsive as possible to their requests. Algeria-Morocco A fragile cease-fire exists along the border between these two North African states. An African solution worked out in meetings at Bamako and Addis Ababa appears to have a reasonable chance to succeed in maintaining the peace. The United States role has been one of impartial efforts to reduce outside intervention and to encourage a solution in an African context. President Kennedy personally intervened to these ends. Should fighting break out again, the ramifications could be serious and prompt United States action, including Presidential messages, may be necessary. Horn of Africa The aim of the Somali Republic to unite Somalis living in Ethiopia and Kenya has created serious tension in this area. It is further complicated by Somali acceptance of an offer of Soviet military assistance—an evidence of the persisting Soviet intention to probe targets of opportunity in Africa. President Kennedy in talks with the Emperor of Ethiopia in October emphasized our interest in stability and peace in this area. Our interests justify pursuing actively efforts to find a modus vivendi between Somalia and its neighbors and to reduce the impact of the obvious Soviet interest in fishing in these troubled waters. * Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 AFR-US. Confidential. Drafted by Elbert G. Mathews. 1 Lyndon B. Johnson became President after President Kennedy's assassination on November 22. Ghana Ghana 223. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Penfield) to the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) Washington, February 17, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 845J.2614/2-1761. Confidential. Drafted by Eisenberg and cleared by Ferguson, Kenney, and Kerr. 224. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy Washington, March 7, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745J.11/3-761. No classification marking. Drafted by Toomey on March 6 and cleared by Penfield, Cleveland, Bell, Kohler, and Nitze. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: “hand carried to WH by AF/Penfield 3/7/61 per R Perkins.” 225. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, March 8, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745J.11/3-861. Secret. Drafted by Penfield on March 9 and approved by the White House on March 21. The conversation was held at the White House. 226. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Springsteen) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Martin) Washington, May 16, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 845J.2614/5-1661. Confidential. Drafted by Springsteen. Copies were sent to Williams, Linder (Export-Import Bank), and Coffin (DLF). 227. Letter From President Kennedy to President Nkrumah Washington, June 29, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 845J.2614/6-2961. Confidential. 228. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ghana Washington, August 4, 1961, 8:34 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 845J.2614/7-2761. Confidential. Drafted by Kenney, cleared by Padberg, and approved by Kerr. 229. Editorial Note 230. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Kennedy Washington, September 13, 1961. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series,NSAMs, NSAM 89. Secret. 231. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, September 14, 1961. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Ghana. Secret; Noforn. On September 15, Battle forwarded a copy of the memorandum to McGeorge Bundy at the White House under cover of a memorandum that reads: “Enclosed is a paper prepared in the Department which might be of interest to you.” 232. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Kennedy and the Acting Under Secretary of State (Ball) Washington, September 21, 1961, 6:40 p.m. Source: Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Ghana, Volta Project. No classification marking. 233. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ghana Washington, September 27, 1961, 8:30 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 845J.2614/9-2761. Secret; Priority; Verbatim Text. Drafted by Padberg and Chayes; cleared by Springsteen, Dumont, and Ferguson; and approved by Chayes. Repeated to London. 234. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Kennedy and the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball) Washington, September 29, 1961, 11:30 a.m. Source: Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Ghana, Volta Project. No classification marking. 235. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Kennedy Washington, October 2, 1961. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Ghana, Vol. I, Volta River Project, 1961. Secret. A copy was sent to Belk. 236. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Chad Washington, October 10, 1961, 8:22 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 845J.2610/10-1061. Confidential. Drafted by Foulon, cleared by Freund and Herz, and approved by Ferguson. 237. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball) to President Kennedy Washington, October 18, 1961. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Ghana. Official Use Only. No drafting information appears on the source text. 238. Special National Intelligence Estimate Washington, November 16, 1961. Source: Central Intelligence Agency,DCI Files, Job 79 R 1012, Box 189. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet: “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Department of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.” All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on November 16, except the Atomic Energy Representative and the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction. 239. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy Washington, December 1, 1961. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Ghana, Vol. I, Volta River Project, 1961. Secret. 240. Notes for the Record Washington, December 5, 1961. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, National Security Council Meetings, 1961, No. 494. Top Secret. Drafted by Bundy on December 18. 241. National Security Council Record of Action No. 2444 Washington, December 5, 1961. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, National Security Council Meetings, 1961, No. 494. Secret. Taken at the 494th meeting on December 5; see Document 240. 242. Letter From President Kennedy to President Nkrumah Washington, December 14, 1961. Source: Department of State, AF/AFW Files: Lot 66 D 53, Volta Project Letters, Miscellaneous. No classification marking. 243. Memorandum From the Vice President's Military Aide (Burris) to Vice President Johnson Washington, January 31, 1962. Source: Johnson Library, Vice President's Security File, Memoranda to Vice President from Burris. Confidential. 244. Paper Prepared in the Office of West Coast and Malian Affairs Washington, February 12, 1962. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745J.00/2-1262. Secret. Drafted by Coote on February 11. The report was transmitted to the White House under cover of a memorandum from Battle to Bundy that reads: “Enclosed is a paper on Ghanaian Subversion in Africa in response to the verbal request by Mr. Brom Smith. While it is not an all-inclusive discussion of the subject, it does contain the most significant elements of the problem. A general summarization of the situation is at the beginning of the paper. The paper has not been cleared with the CIA, but a knowledgeable CIA representative contributed his ideas on the subject prior to the drafting of the paper.” On February 7, Battle sent a memorandum to the Executive Secretariat that reads: “Mr. Brom Smith called me this afternoon to report that the President, in reading the Staff Summary for today, became extremely interested in the item on Africa entitled Ghanaian Subversion in Africa Discussed. The President would like to get on a rush basis full information on this matter including, if it would not delay preparation, anything CIA has on the subject. Can this be prepared urgently and cleared appropriately?” A handwritten notation on the memorandum reads: “AFW—Mr. Coote: S/S would like a B to B report on this within 24 hours.” (Ibid., 770.5245J/2-762) 245. Paper Prepared in the National Security Council Washington, June 13, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Ghana Subjects, Dungan File. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the source text. 246. National Intelligence Estimate Washington, October 17, 1962. Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 79 R 01012A. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet: “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and NSA.” All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on October 17, except the Atomic Energy Commission Representative and the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction. 247. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy Washington, October 29, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Ghana Subjects, Kaysen Letters. Confidential. 248. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain African Posts Washington, December 17, 1962, 6:55 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745J.11/12-1762. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Dorros, cleared by Witman and Ross, and approved by Tasca. Sent to Abidjan, Dakar, Freetown, Lagos, Lome, Monrovia, Tunis, and Yaounde and repeated to Accra, Bamako, and Conakry. 249. Memorandum by the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) Washington, January 24, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Ghana Subjects. Secret. 250. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ghana Washington, February 7, 1963, 8:54 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GHANA-US. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Kaysen and Gebelt, cleared by Kent (S/S), and approved by McGhee. 251. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ghana Washington, April 26, 1963, 8:42 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17-1 GHANA. Secret. Drafted by Fredericks and Gebelt, cleared by Fredericks and Davis, and approved by Fredericks. 252. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Brubeck) to President Kennedy Washington, October 30, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Ghana Subjects. Secret. 253. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, November 19, 1963. Source: Department of State, President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the source text. Transmitted to the White House under cover of a memorandum from Read to McGeorge Bundy, November 26, and approved by Bundy on November 27. 223. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Penfield) to the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) 223. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Penfield) to the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) Source Washington, February 17, 1961. SUBJECT The Volta River and Related Projects The Government of Ghana obtained in 1960 tentative assurances from the U.S. Government, the World Bank, and the UK to assist in the financing of the Volta River Hydroelectric Project. 1 Of the total cost of $168 million, Ghana would finance 50 percent, the World Bank $40 million,DLF and Exim Bank $30 million and the UK $14 million. Foreign financing is dependent on satisfactory arrangements for the financing of the proposed Valco aluminum smelter which is to be the main purchaser of Volta River power. The Government of Ghana is now sending a delegation headed by Minister of Finance Gbedemah to Washington with the objective of working out the details of the contracts under which World Bank and U.S. financing of the hydroelectric project would be made available. They also want to finalize the draft of the tax treaty between the U.S. and Ghana which is necessary to permit satisfactory operation of Valco. Valco (Volta Aluminum Company) is being organized by Kaiser, Alcoa, Reynolds and Olin Mathieson. The total cost of the smelter will be $128 or $178 million according to the size of the smelter to be built. In view of what they believe are unacceptable political risks for private investment in Ghana, given the present pro-Soviet and anti-U.S. policies of the Government of Ghana, these four companies are now asking the U.S. Government for guarantees against all but the commercial risks of the Valco project. The U.S. Government is also being asked by a group of aluminum companies headed by Aluminum Ltd. of Canada and including Kaiser and Reynolds, to guarantee against all but commercial risks a major part of a $162 million investment in the Boke Bauxite Mine in Guinea. Finally, the U.S. Government has offered last year to update a French made study of a dam on the Konkoure River in Guinea and to participate in the financing of this project. This would involve construction of an aluminum smelter. There is general agreement among Washington officials who have studied the problem that strong political and economic reasons speak in favor of U.S. Government support of the construction of the Volta Dam and of the aluminum companies engaged in the Valco project and the Boke project. It is recognized that a refusal to aid the Volta Project or a withdrawal of the aluminum companies from the Valco smelter would have very undesirable effect on Western relations with Ghana. In the case of Boke, a withdrawal of the Western aluminum companies project would make it possible for the Soviets to create an extremely efficient aluminum production on the basis of what is considered the richest bauxite mine in the world and of the very cheap water power potential of the Konkoure River. On the other hand, U.S. guarantees in unprecedented far-reaching terms of the aluminum projects in Ghana and Guinea can only be justified if the terms of investment are such as to give some promise of continued operation. Little permanent benefit can be derived for the U.S. from the Valco and Boke projects unless we make our support of these projects part of a wider program designed to assist the economic growth of West Africa. We also must attempt to create a situation under which it will be more advantageous for the Governments of Ghana and Guinea, politically and economically, to permit these enterprises to continue their operations under Western control rather than to nationalize them. The Under Secretary for Economic Affairs has called for February 21 a meeting of the heads of Exim Bank, ICA,DLF and of the interested Assistant Secretaries in State and Treasury to work out a policy along these lines. 2 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 845J.2614/2-1761. Confidential. Drafted by Eisenberg and cleared by Ferguson, Kenney, and Kerr. 1 See Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, vol. XIV, pp. 657 - 669 . 2 A handwritten notation on the source text reads: “W B will give a report on the results.” 224. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy 224. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy Source Washington, March 7, 1961. SUBJECT Your Meeting With President Nkrumah of Ghana You have agreed to meet with President Nkrumah of Ghana on Wednesday, March 8 at 4:45 p.m. Mr. James K. Penfield, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs and I will join you for the meeting. 1 Unfortunately, I was unable to talk privately with Ghana's Finance Minister Gbedemah during his visit to Washington last week. Members of his entourage managed to be present at both our meetings. 2 However, other officers of the Department did discuss general conditions in Ghana with the Minister. Following much the same tack as he did in the conversation with your brother Edward 3 in Accra on December 12, 1960, Mr. Gbedemah urged the United States to be more aggressive or it would lose out in Africa. He deplored the progress that the Soviets have already made in Ghana and said that he was finding it increasingly difficult to make his voice heard. In a final conversation with Mr. Penfield on the evening of his departure, Mr. Gbedemah pleaded that you seize the opportunity of your meeting with President Nkrumah to review with complete frankness the various points of misunderstanding between us. We agree completely with Mr. Gbedemah and suggest you take the conversational initiative at the outset and raise the various matters discussed in the attached talking papers. Nkrumah should depart with no misconceptions on our firm support of the UN in the Congo, and with the clear understanding that while we are prepared to cooperate in every possible way to assist Ghana in its development we expect equitable treatment in return. Our conversations with Minister of Finance Gbedemah last week were very successful and have created an aura of good feeling you may well wish to exploit during your conversation with President Nkrumah. Mr. Gbedemah will have reported fully on this matter to Nkrumah in New York. A detailed status report on the Volta Project is attached. 4 Our past experience with Nkrumah has been that in private meetings with U.S. officials he adopts a conciliatory and receptive posture; but, all too frequently, he subsequently reverses himself and speaks critically of the West. If Nkrumah can leave Washington with no illusions as to the firmness of our policies and a clear understanding of what we expect of Ghana if our relations are to improve, we will have made a great stride forward. I would suggest an appropriate communique be issued following your meeting, tone and content of course depending on progress made during the discussion. It should be noted that the attached briefing papers 5 were prepared prior to President Nkrumah's arrival in New York. Should he make new and significant policy statements during his talk with Ambassador Stevenson on Monday, March 6, or in his speech before the UNGA, we may provide you with supplementary briefing material. Dean Rusk 6 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745J.11/3-761. No classification marking. Drafted by Toomey on March 6 and cleared by Penfield, Cleveland, Bell, Kohler, and Nitze. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: “hand carried to WH by AF/Penfield 3/7/61 per R Perkins.” 1 A line crossed out in the source text at this point reads: “The Chief of Protocol, Mr. Duke, will introduce President Nkrumah.” 2 Ghana's Finance Minister, Komla Agbeli Gbedemah, discussed the Volta River Project with Secretary Rusk on February 28 and March 3. The discussions were recorded in two memoranda of conversation in Department of State, Central Files, 845J.26/3-361. 3 Edward M. Kennedy. 4 Not printed. 5 Attached to the source text but not printed. Briefing papers for Nkrumah's visit are ibid. and in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Ghana-Nkrumah Visit. 6 Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original. 225. Memorandum of Conversation 225. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, March 8, 1961. SUBJECT Summary Record of Conversation—Visit of President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana PARTICIPANTS U.S. The President The Secretary of State Mr. J. K. Penfield, Acting Asst. Secretary, AF Ghana President Kwame Nkrumah Hon. A.E.A. Ofori-Atta, Min. of Justice Hon. Tawiah Adamafio, Min. for Establishment The bulk of the conversation consisted of a monologue on the Congo and related topics by President Nkrumah, punctuated by occasional questions by the President and the Secretary. President Nkrumah seemed to go out of his way to minimize his differences of view with the United States position. For instance, on his proposal to withdraw diplomatic missions from Leopoldville he said, “why not give it a try? Let them get out for just a month and see if it doesn't make a difference.” (At this point Mr. Adamafio made his only contribution to the conversation, murmuring, “three months.”) Mr. Nkrumah's comments were somewhat rambling and at times repetitious, but he concentrated on two phases of the situation, restoration of law and order, with emphasis on removal of the Belgians, and isolation of the Congo from all outside influences except the UN. On the first, he expressed the conviction that the indiscipline and terrible excesses of the “Force Publique” could quickly and easily be controlled if Belgian military and para-military personnel were removed and the UN made “just a show of force.” He illustrated his point by asserting that the Ghanaian troops in the Kasai had stopped the Gizenga forces at Luluabourg and had then persuaded all the forces there to lay down their arms. He at first maintained that even in Katanga removal of the Belgians should not be too difficult but did not contest the President's explanation of the limitations on United States ability to influence our European allies, Belgium, Portugal or the French on Algeria. On the UN role, President Nkrumah played down his Afro-Asian ideas and emphasized his support of the UN. He expressed approval of the February 21 Security Council resolution 1 and said he had made it clear he did not want his UN speech of March 7 to be used as a pretext for reopening a Congo debate. He felt that practically all Afro-Asian states supported Hammarskjold and said he had told Mr. Gromyko in New York that the Soviets should give up their campaign to force him out. He agreed with the President's expression of hope that more general support of the Secretary General would be manifested because if the United States was too far out in front in backing him there was a tendency in some quarters to pin a U.S. label on him. President Nkrumah implied that his support of the UN has been consistent. He said, for instance, that he had stood alone at the Casablanca Conference 2 against withdrawal of troops from the UN force and had finally succeeded in forcing a compromise under which the participants agreed to await developments for a month before making a decision on withdrawing their contingents. He expressed approval of the work of the CAC and disapproval of a Security Council meeting in the Congo until the situation there has considerably improved. He was very relaxed about U.S. activities in the Congo and said he saw no objection to U.S. planes and ships operating there as long as they were under UN command. On the internal political situation President Nkrumah said he had little hope for constructive results from the Tananarive Conference 3 because the Congolese participating could not take any meaningful decisions which would stick. He expressed some contempt for Gizenga's abilities and suitability as a leader but said he is no Communist. He made no comments on other Congolese politicians except a rather casual remark that Kamitatu is a genuine nationalist who might emerge as a real leader. He mentioned elections and the reconvening of Parliament as necessary steps in Congolese political development but appeared very flexible on details, placing his emphasis on the principle that the Congolese themselves should be free to work things out in their own way. In summary, the two Presidents found themselves in agreement on three principal points on the Congo, (1) removal of Belgian military and para-military personnel, (2) neutralization of Congolese military forces and insulation of the Congo against outside influences and military supplies, and (3) freedom for the Congolese to work out their own political development. On the last point the Secretary called attention to our own history to illustrate the importance we attach to the principle that government must be based on consent of the governed. In addition to examples from our early history he cited our important role in assisting Indonesian independence and President Roosevelt's heavy pressure on Churchill, even while we were allies in a world war, in regard to India. There should be no doubt, therefore, in any reasonable mind, that the U.S. would always be basically, and in the long run effectively, on the side of anti-colonialism and independence, whether the problem is Portugal and Angola or France and Algeria or any other. President Nkrumah exhibited no desire to talk about U.S.-Ghana bilateral relations and at one point turned off the Secretary's attempt to bring up the Volta project. President Nkrumah did, however, make the point that the U.S. should broaden its view of Africa and look at the continent as a whole, a subject which he said he had raised when he was here in 1958. 4 The President took this opportunity to explain the difficulties we face in Africa. He cited the resentment inspired in “colonialist” circles by Governor Williams' alleged statement on “Africa for the Africans” in Nairobi 5 and pointed out that despite this, Governor Williams had been given an unfriendly reception by the press in Lagos. The President also expressed his surprise and puzzlement over receipt of a recent personal message from Sekou Toure accusing him of complicity in Lumumba's murder. President Nkrumah seemed sympathetic but offered no very specific advice or comment. President Nkrumah also made a particular plea to avoid confusing Communism and nationalism in Africa. He said he was told in New York yesterday by an East African who has recently been making speeches in the United States that whenever the speaker mentioned him (Nkrumah) or Sekou Toure favorably, he was accused by his audience of being a Communist. President Nkrumah emphatically insisted that there is not a single organized Communist party in sub-Saharan Africa. He explained that Ghana practices its own form of socialism which is in reality a mixed economy. To illustrate his problems he said the Government has for some years been subsidizing five British gold mines in Ghana. He could not continue this but neither could he permit the mines to close because of the unemployment problems which would be created. In the end, therefore, the Government had bought up the shares. On the subject of aid, President Nkrumah's only substantive comment was that aid from the East is much more speedy and simple than that from the West. He gave as an example his efforts to get transportation for Ghanaian troops to the Congo last summer. When he had exhausted all other means he appealed to the Soviet Ambassador and in three days Soviet planes were at his disposal in Accra. * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745J.11/3-861. Secret. Drafted by Penfield on March 9 and approved by the White House on March 21. The conversation was held at the White House. 1 For text of U.N. Resolution S/4722, “United Nations Security Council Authorization of Measures, Including the Use of Force, If Necessary, In the Last Resort, to Prevent the Occurrence of Civil War in the Congo” adopted on February 21 by a vote of 9 (including the United States) to 0, with 2 abstentions, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 782-784. 2 The Casablanca Conference constituting the Heads of State of Morocco, United Arab Republic, Ghana, Guinea, and Mali and representatives of the Provisional Algerian Government, Libya, and Ceylon met in Casablanca January 3-7, 1961. 3 The Conference of Congolese Authorities met in Tananarive March 8-12, 1961. 4 For documentation on Nkrumah's visit to Washington, July 23-26, 1958, see Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, vol. XIV, pp. 645 - 652 . 5 On February 21, Williams told reporters at the Nairobi airport: “America's declared policy of Africa for the Africans means that African people should have self-determination at the speed they want. As far as we are concerned, this is true of the Rhodesian Federation and South Africa.” The Assistant Secretary subsequently explained that by Africans he meant Africans of all races. (Telegram 36 from Capetown, February 23, and telegram 493 from Nairobi, February 23; both Department of State, Central Files, 110.15-WI/2-2361) 226. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Springsteen) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Martin) 226. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Springsteen) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Martin) Source Washington, May 16, 1961. SUBJECT Volta-Valco On May 15 Mr. Ball discussed with the President the question of proceeding with financing for the subject complex. He indicated that it was our view, in the light of recent political developments in Ghana, 1 that Mr. Black of the IBRD should be urged to proceed to Accra to consult with and obtain the necessary financial assurances from Nkrumah, as suggested by our Embassy, on this activity. The President endorsed this suggestion. Mr. Ball has requested that you proceed to talk to the IBRD about the Black visitation to Ghana. 2 Mr. Ball has also agreed that the ExIm Bank should be requested to undertake negotiations with the Valco people on the loan for that project, it being understood that the finalization of these negotiations would be contingent upon satisfactory findings by Mr. Black. In light of the above, Mr. Ball does not believe that the Bank should invite the Ghanians to come here to negotiate until after Mr. Black's visit. * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 845J.2614/5-1661. Confidential. Drafted by Springsteen. Copies were sent to Williams, Linder (Export-Import Bank), and Coffin (DLF). 1 Telegram 1288 from Accra, May 4, reported that Nkrumah had increasingly pursued a line of action that had put him into alignment with the Soviet bloc on a series of issues. Ghana's policy in Africa and in the United Nations had been closely aligned with the Soviets. Within the past month, Ghana had secretly received a large shipment of Soviet bloc arms. Nkrumah had also been working steadily toward an authoritarian state with power more tightly in his hands. The Embassy still favored going ahead with Volta, but recommended that the agreements not be finalized until after Nkrumah's forthcoming trip to the Soviet Union in order to see how far he intended to go in agreements and statements with the Soviets. (Ibid., 845J.2614/5-461) 2 On June 21, the President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Eugene Black, met with Under Secretary Ball to discuss the Ghanaian Ambassador's request that the signing of the Volta and Valco agreements be accelerated in order to permit President Nkrumah to make an announcement on July 1, Ghana's Republic Day. Referring to Ball's suggestion in May that he personally go to Ghana and talk with Nkrumah, Black indicated that he was prepared to go, but argued that his visit would be more effective once the agreement had been signed. (Memorandum of conversation, June 21; ibid., 845J.394/6-2161) 227. Letter From President Kennedy to President Nkrumah 227. Letter From President Kennedy to President Nkrumah Source Washington, June 29, 1961. Dear Mr. President : I was glad to receive your letter regarding the selection of a Chief Executive for the Volta River Authority. 1 I think it was an excellent idea to ask Prime Minister Diefenbaker to propose a candidate. We have been in touch with our Canadian friends, and I am advised that the Prime Minister is giving this problem his personal attention and hopes to be able to suggest a suitable candidate soon. I have asked my advisers to try to develop some alternative suggestions in the event that others do not prove available. At the same time, we have been in touch with Mr. Eugene Black of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and I know that he is continuing to look over the field for possible candidates. I am delighted to be able to advise you that all major issues involved in negotiations for the United States Government's share of the financing of the dam and smelter have now been resolved. The United States Government representatives are now working with your representatives here to develop the necessary documentation for signature and final closing. Of course, as we all appreciate, our signing is contingent upon your bringing your negotiations with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to a successful conclusion. It is a source of satisfaction to me that we have been able to join with your Government in helping to make this great project possible. It is a good omen that this major initial step has been accomplished during the first year of your Republic and it is a satisfaction to me that this was achieved during the first year of my Administration. I send you my congratulations on Republic Day and my sincere hope for the continued progress of your nation. With kindest personal regards. Sincerely, JFK 2 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 845J.2614/6-2961. Confidential. 1 On June 19, Ambassador Halm delivered a personal message from President Nkrumah to President Kennedy which stated that since basic agreement had been reached about the Volta River Project, it had become urgently necessary to appoint a Chief Executive for the Volta River Authority. Nkrumah noted that he had sent a personal message to the Canadian Prime Minister asking him to propose a candidate, if possible. (Ibid., 845J.2614/ 6-1961) 2 Kennedy's initials appear in an unidentified hand, indicating Kennedy signed the original. 228. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ghana 228. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ghana Source Washington, August 4, 1961, 8:34 p.m. 143. Embtel 141. 1 World Bank has accepted GOG letter re financial policy. Dept. has not seen text but assumes GOG committed to consult re level debt service and development expenditures without fixing absolute ceilings. Agreement was based on Kaldor's suggested formula that debt service be related to level exports and development expenses to GNP. Kaldor departed prior conclusion of talks leaving Gbedemah in charge. World Bank did not insist on set aside GOG's share of financing, but President Black thought GOG would be wise set aside foreign exchange component. Gbedemah agreed and said total would be appropriated and be first charge from Consolidated Fund. Set aside of about G# 10-15 million from existing foreign exchange reserves will be drawn only if current earnings insufficient to cover. Bank accepted this. FYI. Bank has not previously required such set-aside from other borrowers, but in this case GOG (Gbedemah) had made offer. Kaldor had indicated to us earlier such arrangement would be acceptable and no reason to believe any differences to be resolved on GOG side. End FYI. Remaining issues concern current negotiations Valco loan by ExIm Bank. Target date for comprehensive signing now August 29. 2 Ball * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 845J.2614/7-2761. Confidential. Drafted by Kenney, cleared by Padberg, and approved by Kerr. 1 Telegram 141 from Accra, July 17, reported that the Ghanaian-IBRD talks in Washington on the Bank's financing for the Volta Project seemed to have been successful, and that the Government of Ghana was planning to present a side letter describing Ghana's level of economic development and rate of debt repayment in terms that would satisfy the Bank. (Ibid.) 2 An investment guaranty contract providing substantial protection for the proposed equity investment in Valco by Kaiser Aluminum and Reynolds Metals was initialed by representatives of the Development Loan Fund and the investors on September 1. The Executive Directors of the World Bank approved the proposed loan of $47 million to the Volta River Authority on September 7. 229. Editorial Note 229. Editorial Note On September 12, 1961, Ambassador Russell reported that Nkrumah wanted the signing ceremony for the final Volta agreements to take place in Accra on October 5 and to be attended by high-ranking U.S., U.K., and World Bank officials. (Telegram 393 from Accra; Department of State, Central Files, 611.45J4/9-1261) On September 18, President Kennedy sent NSAM No. 96 to Acting Under Secretary of State Ball. It reads: “I want to hold up any final decision and announcement of the Volta project for Ghana. Would you please talk to me about this at your convenience?” (Ibid., S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, National Security Action Memoranda, NSAM 96) On September 21, Ball informed the Acting Secretary's staff meeting of the President's memorandum, and indicated that he had gone into the matter thoroughly and had concluded that the United States should proceed. Acting Secretary Bowles suggested that they consider sending Assistant Secretary Williams and Legal Adviser Abram Chayes to Ghana before signing to explain that this was a hard decision for the United States in view of its concern over Ghana's stability and financial meas-ures. (Department of State, Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 66 D 147) 230. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Kennedy 230. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Kennedy Source Washington, September 13, 1961. SUBJECT Nkrumah's Plans to Send 400 Cadets to the USSR for Training 1 This memorandum is in two parts. The first part is the gist of an attached memorandum from the Secretary of State. 2 The second part contains very recent information, added by your staff, which is not included in the Secretary's memorandum. I President Nkrumah has commanded that arrangements be made for 400 officer cadets to be selected as early as possible for training in Russia for the “African High Command.” General Alexander, the Chief of the Ghana Army Defense Staff, has protested to Nkrumah in an attempt to dissuade him. Leading Ghanaian officers also are opposed and plan to voice their protests to Nkrumah on his return to Ghana. If Nkrumah fails to countermand the order, their opposition might reach the point of revolt or an attempted coup d'etat. Embassy Accra believes Nkrumah will defend his action by saying he is balancing Soviet and Western influence. In spite of a growing opposition to Nkrumah in Ghana, the opposition has not coalesced and we anticipate its collapse upon his return. 3 Sending Ghanaian cadets to the USSR for training would go a long way toward providing a wedge for Soviet domination. We have urged the UK to make a firm demarche to Nkrumah to warn him of this danger in the strongest terms. If the British remain reluctant to make a strong protest, we should do so unilaterally, and should not delay too long or it may become impossible for Nkrumah to reverse his decision. We should emphasize that such training would be a clear indication of Ghana's move away from a position of non-alignment, and may result in pressure from the Congress to hold up on U.S. aid. II In addition to the foregoing, we now know through the British Embassy that General Alexander has protested to Nkrumah. Nkrumah, who continued to be unyielding, acknowledged that it would be difficult to recruit 400 cadets but insisted that he intended to send “some” cadets to the USSR for training. Alexander followed up this initial protest by sending an emissary to Nkrumah at Yalta to explain his objections. The emissary reported on his return to Accra that Nkrumah now plans on sending only 20 cadets to the USSR at this time with perhaps more to follow later. General Alexander believes it will be difficult to find even 20 qualified candidates. Meanwhile Embassy Accra has reported that the Ghana Ministry of Defense has only about 180 applicants for cadet overseas training; that the cadets do not realize the training is to be in the USSR; or that the course will involve about two and one-half years without home leave. The Embassy agrees with General Alexander that Nkrumah will be lucky to get 20 candidates of the 180 applications, pointing out that the Ghana Military Academy barely got 150 candidates out of 1200 applications. In the light of the foregoing, it appears that the situation is not as bad as we suspected. However, as an officer in the British Embassy here has indicated, even 50 or 60 cadets indoctrinated in the USSR for 5 years would create serious problems in the Ghanaian armed forces. I think we must now wait until Nkrumah returns to Accra where, as you know, he will have to face up to a number of problems in addition to this one. We expect him to arrive in Accra on September 16. * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series,NSAMs, NSAM 89. Secret. 1 On August 28, the Embassy in Accra in telegram 285 confirmed previous Embassy reports that Nkrumah, who was on an extended visit to the Soviet bloc, planned to send 400 Ghanaian Army cadets to the Soviet Union and listed several recent developments that indicated Ghana's increasing orientation toward the Soviet bloc. (Department of State, Central Files, 645J.60/8-2861) On September 5, President Kennedy sent NSAM No. 89 to Secretary Rusk. It reads: “I would like to determine whether Mr. Nkrumah is going ahead with his plan to send 400 of his troops to the Soviet Union for training.” (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, National Security Action Memoranda, NSAM 89) 2 Attached but not printed. 3 Reports from Ambassador Russell in Accra indicated that former Finance Minister Gbedemah, who had been demoted to Minister of Health by Nkrumah in May and was serving on the three-man presidential commission governing Ghana in Nkrumah's absence, was considering an attempt to depose Nkrumah. On September 7, Russell reported that Gbedemah had said, “I would be sorry to have to do it but country has had enough of Nkrumah's arrogance, whims and madness.” (Telegram 362 from Accra; Department of State, Central Files, 745J.11/9-761) In 1973, Russell told an interviewer that Gbedemah had received an official assurance of U.S. support in September 1961. (Richard D. Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal in Africa, New York: Oxford University Press, 1983, p. 172) 231. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to Secretary of State Rusk 231. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to Secretary of State Rusk Source Washington, September 14, 1961. INTELLIGENCE NOTE Internal Dissension in Ghana Strikes Reflect Growing Discontent . Week-long strikes in the three main towns of Ghana, called initially to protest the government's compulsory savings scheme, reflect widespread public discontent with the Nkrumah government. Government efforts to persuade the strikers to return to work have gone largely unheeded. Nkrumah, who has been abroad since July, has thus far ignored urgent pleas from party leaders to return home to deal with the situation personally. Moderates May Break With Nkrumah . If the strikes should get out of control, indicating an unexpected groundswell of popular opposition to Nkrumah, some of the more moderate old-guard leaders of the ruling Convention People's Party (CPP) may be tempted to try to depose him, either by force or by political intrigue. The moderates, who include several cabinet ministers, have been increasingly critical of the President because of his growing reliance on younger left-leaning radicals within the party. The moderates command sizeable followings among the major Ashanti and Ewe tribes, two traditional centers of dissatisfaction with the government. Nkrumah would probably use totalitarian methods to suppress any open opposition by the moderates, eliminating in the process most of the pro-Western elements in the CPP. Possibility of a Coup . Aware that an open break with Nkrumah will be met with repressive measures, the moderates may see a coup as the only course open to them. Reports of plottings are filtering out of Ghana. In view of the respect the moderates have for Nkrumah's political astuteness and his ability heretofore to marshal popular support, it is unlikely that they would attempt a coup without army support. (The police are reportedly loyal to Nkrumah.) Ghanaian officers are known to be dissatisfied with the present government, but British officers in command of the Ghana forces will probably caution against the Army's participation in any attempted coup for fear of implicating the UK Government. * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Ghana. Secret; Noforn. On September 15, Battle forwarded a copy of the memorandum to McGeorge Bundy at the White House under cover of a memorandum that reads: “Enclosed is a paper prepared in the Department which might be of interest to you.” 232. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Kennedy and the Acting Under Secretary of State (Ball) 232. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Kennedy and the Acting Under Secretary of State (Ball) Source Washington, September 21, 1961, 6:40 p.m. Ball said he wanted to give him a quick rundown on the Volta River project. The situation is that we have gone very far in committing ourselves to it. Now we have the problem of Nkrumah acting up and also the fact that there is some reason to think final situation may not be stable as it was because there is a strike going on and some trouble out there. What Ball proposes to do is to have Soapy Williams and Abe Chayes and probably Harold Linder go out there the latter part of next week with the statement that since this is such a major project that they want to be satisfied the conditions are such that all the provisions are going to be met before there is any final closing. They will make a complete study of the situation and that will make them come back and in the meantime we will have seen the situation developed there. The Parliament comes back early in October. The President said he supposed we were faced with something a bit like the Aswan Dam situation. Ball said that was what we wanted to avoid. Pres. said that if it is cancelled they will blame everything on us. On the other hand, if we go through with it, everybody will think we are crazy in the Congress and every place else. Ball said that was right. He thought that this formula was probably about the best … The President said we couldn't delay their visit a couple of weeks could we, but announce we are going to do it. He thinks the more time we get, the clearer the situation becomes. Ball said we could do that. We have one technical problem—we may have to close by November 5 in order to get in under the authority of the DLF act which is going out of existence. The President asked how much money are we going to commit of our own. Ball said the total in loans and guarantees would be somewhere in the neighborhood of $240 million. But actually the draw down won't begin for a long time. The draw down on the DLF money won't be until next year and on the bulk of the money (which is what goes into the smelter) won't begin until 1965, so that we are not actually laying out money. There are lots of outs for getting out of this thing—on various breaches of covenance all the way down the line. The President said he had given up on him. He wouldn't mind giving them a little aid just to keep the contact, but he thinks he's been unnecessarily difficult with us, considering the effort we've really made about him. As bad as he's been in Belgrade, as well as his desire to send 400 soldiers to Russia—ideally would be to give them some aid but not to give them that kind of aid. Ball said he thinks what we have to avoid is being in a situation where it appears to all these underdeveloped countries that because he has said some unpleasant things we are terminating a great project. President said on the other hand, these people would much rather have the dough themselves. Ball agreed. We ought to delay that decision, he would think, and do it on a basis of saying we are sending these people out to make the check before. If it is cancelled they … President said otherwise, of course, then it comes out in the paper that we are giving Ghana, no matter how it is stretched out, $220 million. This would make us look sort of foolish in view of his statement about supporting others. Ball said Mollenhoff is writing a story tomorrow to the effect that the thing has been put on ice. Ball thinks if this mission is announced in the next few days they are going out for the purpose of making a check to make sure that all the financial commitments etc. are going to be met without tying it specifically— President said as long as Ball and he are in touch on it so that we don't go beyond the point of [no] return, then we can see how we go in the next month or six weeks. It could really mess up our foreign aid program by giving him that kind of money when we give others almost nothing. President asked what were we doing on Tanganyika. Ball said we had a consortium which we are about to propose through DAG which has German money, our money, and two or three other kinds of money. President said if we decide not to go with them it seemed that we could say it just doesn't make sense to put that kind of money in. Then immediately commit a good percentage of the money to some other African countries. Then at least we wouldn't look like we had pulled the rug out of Africa—just Ghana. Ball said that was a possibility. This fellow might get overthrown in the next couple of weeks and a really solid government come in. The situation is very fluid. If agreeable to the President, he will send these people. Pres. agreed. Ball said we would delay them and not make any final commitment. * Source: Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Ghana, Volta Project. No classification marking. 233. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ghana 233. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ghana Source Washington, September 27, 1961, 8:30 p.m. 425. Dept discussed recent developments Volta with Edgar Kaiser and Calhoun September 27. Kaiser sending following telegram Nkrumah: “Re U.S. Dept State postponement October fifth date. 1 Understand top mission from U.S. has requested meeting with you Accra. I believe very important you see mission at early date. Am advised mission could arrive before end October. Believe it would be helpful if Chad and I meet with you in advance mission's arrival. We can plan arrival Accra Pan Am 150 morning October fourth. Believe important we have several hours together to review with you personally. Please advise.” Kaiser very concerned about report Russians moving forward with Bui and intends tell Nkrumah they hard to live with this, since opposite ideology. Would seek continuously undermine Western operation. Kaiser was urged talk in private capacity frankly with Nkrumah including impact Sov-Bloc loans on ability Ghana service Volta and other debts particularly on East-West relationships and fact U.S. public opinion extremely disturbed result his recent statements. Request you provide Kaiser and Calhoun all possible assistance during their visit. Bowles * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 845J.2614/9-2761. Secret; Priority; Verbatim Text. Drafted by Padberg and Chayes; cleared by Springsteen, Dumont, and Ferguson; and approved by Chayes. Repeated to London. 1 On September 21, Russell had recommended that the United States postpone signing the Volta agreements until after October 5, which coincided almost exactly with the opening of Parliament and the date when critics planned to launch their attack on Nkrumah. (Telegram 462 from Accra; ibid., 611.45J/9-2161) On September 26, the Department of State informed Russell that financial and operational considerations made a final review in Accra of the Volta Project highly desirable before proceeding with a final decision on the agreements, and asked the Embassy to obtain agreement for an informal visit of a team led by Williams sometime in October. It noted that the mission also provided a basis for delaying signing as the Ambassador had recommended. (Telegram 424 to Accra; ibid., 611.45J7/9-2561) 234. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Kennedy and the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball) 234. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Kennedy and the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball) Source Washington, September 29, 1961, 11:30 a.m. The President said on this business of Ghana, 1 it looks like it is getting worse and worse from our point of view so that it does not seem right to him. Perhaps we should be thinking about disengaging ourselves. Ball said we have that in mind. The Mission is not going until the end of October and in the meantime we can see how this thing evolves. Kaiser and Calhoun have gone over and will be coming back with their report. Ball thinks we will have to say this has evolved to the point where it is more clear they are creating a socialist state and it is no place for a private enterprise of this kind. The President said the question would be whether we would have Kaiser do it, or we do it, or the World Bank. Ball said actually we have left the thing where the documents have not finally been signed. Ball has deliberately kept it that way so that the private enterprise people could bow out. This would be a more graceful way. The President said fine. * Source: Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Ghana, Volta Project. No classification marking. 1 On September 22, Nkrumah dismissed General Alexander as his Chief of Staff and relieved all other British officers of command positions in the Ghanaian Army. (Memorandum from Hilsman to Bowles, September 27; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Ghana) Russell reported on September 28 that Nkrumah had asked for the resignations of Gbedemah and several other cabinet ministers and high-ranking officials, and that Gbedemah had urged that any contemplated U.S. assistance be provided as soon as possible. (Telegrams 531 and 535 from Accra, September 28; Department of State, Central Files, 745J.00/9-2861) 235. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Kennedy 235. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Kennedy Source Washington, October 2, 1961. SUBJECT The Volta Project 1. In the attached papers 1 the State Department has made the case for postponing a decision on the Ghana dam until we see what happens to Nkrumah and his policy over the next ten days or so. I concur. In fact, we should seek, if possible, the thirty-day postponement of decision suggested in Accra's No. 577 of October 2, attached. 2 2. The State Department does not, however, lay out the pros and cons of cancellation. Its argument moves towards cancellation, but the issue is not squarely faced. 3. Pro-Cancellation. —Nkrumah's foreign and domestic policies have taken an ugly lurch to the left since your letter of June 29. —Hisdomestic economic and political position is less stable than it was five weeks ago. 4. Anti-Cancellation. —The dam is a long-range project for the people of Ghana and Africa. It should not be handled off-again, on-again in a country that is bound to suffer from various instabilities in the course of its building. —The long-range prospects for Ghana fetching up an independent African country are reasonably good: it has no Communist border; it has strong nationalist, anti-Communist political elements, which are not yet cowed; its trade is heavily tied to Britain and the West. There is risk; but less risk over coming years than, say, the risk of Nasser's taking Egypt into Communism in 1956. —If we pull out on what will be interpreted as political grounds, we shall place extremely heavy pressure on Nkrumah to make any terms with Moscow he can get to build his dam; and Africans (who dislike him) will, on this account, be sympathetic. Accra's No. 577 underlines this point. We shall probably have a second Aswan Dam problem on our hands and have given Nkrumah powerful grounds for justifying his Moscow connection. —The deal itself represents an extremely complex consortium of government, private business, and the International Bank. And, as the memo from the Legal Adviser's office at State indicates, it is extremely hard to find justifiable grounds for breaking it up now. Nkrumah may give us a clean-cut provocation, but his unsatisfactory behavior at Belgrade and Moscow wouldn't hold up in court—or in African and world opinion. 5. Conclusion. a. We should buy a little time to assess where Nkrumah is going; to bring maximum external and internal pressure on him to settle down; and to see if Gbedemah gets anywhere. b. The weight of the argument is for going ahead with the project unless things turn radically for the worse in Ghana. c. If we go ahead, we should do so—and say so—in ways which make clear this is being done for Ghana and Africa—despite Nkrumah, not because of him. Accra's No. 577 has some concrete suggestions as to how this attitude might be effectively communicated. * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Ghana, Vol. I, Volta River Project, 1961. Secret. A copy was sent to Belk. 1 Not attached to the source text. “The Volta Project and the Current Political Situation in Ghana,” memorandum from Battle to Bundy, September 30, is in Department of State, Central Files, 845J.2614/9-3061. 2 Not printed. 236. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Chad 236. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Chad Source Washington, October 10, 1961, 8:22 p.m. 50. For Williams from Fredericks. Depcirtel 644 1 requested judgments African posts re likely local reaction U.S. decision against Volta River Project. Replies to date as follows: Probable adverse reactions predicted in Nigeria, Ethiopia, Togo and Morocco; varying degrees of approval or uncritical reaction in Liberia, Tunisia, Sierra Leone, Niger, Upper Volta and Madagascar; divided or uncertain opinion in Congo (L). Adverse reactions predicted on basis charges we apply political strings and indifferent to Africa's development needs. Aswan “debacle” would be cited and would reinforce adverse reactions to U.S. disapproval Volta project. These charges would be used by radical elements or opposition in some countries whose dominant elements might approve U.S. decision. Embassy Rabat sees possibility King making political capital by supporting Ghana while Lome notes negative U.S. decision would damage U.S. image since would strike at Ewe brethren of Togolese. Predicted approving or uncritical reactions are based in part on governmental distrust of Ghana's subversive intentions (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Niger) or on anticipation more aid for good boys and comeuppance for bad boys (especially in Madagascar, Congo (L), Tunisia, Upper Volta). Embassy Monrovia notes negative decision would buttress pro-West elements against cynics who advocate playing both sides of street. Ouagadougou notes strength respected by Voltans and that millions to Ghana coupled with need plead lack of funds for friendly Entente states almost impossible to explain. Tunis anticipates public indifference and private approval. Several replies indicate possible reversal of uncritical reactions and general disappointment with U.S. if negative U.S. decision Volta project did not result in increased aid for other countries (especially, Upper Volta, Sierra Leone). Bonn states FedRep in quandary, would probably discontinue aid to Ghana except for fear Ghana might recognize GDR, and may well be influenced by U.S. decision. Ambassador Bruce reports Sandys believes U.S. withdrawal would prejudice Western position throughout black Africa, even in Nigeria. Sandys considers Nkrumah not attracted by Soviet ideology but desires imitate Soviet development methods and will continue play both sides to best advantage. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 845J.2610/10-1061. Confidential. Drafted by Foulon, cleared by Freund and Herz, and approved by Ferguson. 1 Circular telegram 644, October 4, asked the Embassies in Africa for their measured judgment as to what the reactions would be in their countries if the United States decided not to go through with the Volta River Project. (Ibid., 845J.2624/10-461) 237. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball) to President Kennedy 237. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball) to President Kennedy Source Washington, October 18, 1961. SUBJECT Clarence B. Randall and Mission to Ghana Mr. Randall, who has agreed to head a small mission to Ghana on the Volta problem, has an appointment to see you at 4:30 on Thursday, October 19. I met with Mr. Randall today and discussed the Volta situation with him. He is familiar with the background of the project as a result of his service with the Eisenhower Administration. He recognizes that a decision to proceed is not an easy one. On the other hand, he believes that failure to go ahead can be even more detrimental to our own longer run interests. He fully understands why he has been chosen for this task and what is expected of him. He does not blanch at the assignment. He understands that he is to go to Ghana to appraise the situation. At the same time he will apprise President Nkrumah candidly of the problems confronting the United States on this project. He understands that he is to return and report to you early in November, submitting a report which will provide the basis for our proceeding with the project. 1 Mr. Randall will leave Tuesday for Accra. He is being briefed now by the Department. He will be accompanied by Abram Chayes, the Department's Legal Adviser, and Harry Shooshan, Assistant Deputy Managing Director for Operations of the Development Loan Fund. I suggest that the White House issue a press release Friday on Mr. Randall's appointment and his mission. A draft of such a release is attached. 2 I will accompany Mr. Randall to the meeting with you. George W. Ball * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Ghana. Official Use Only. No drafting information appears on the source text. 1 Randall, who had been Special Assistant to President Eisenhower on Foreign Economic Policy, visited Ghana October 25-28. Following his return, he recommended a 1-year moratorium on the Volta Project. (Memorandum of telephone conversation between President Kennedy and Ball, October 31, 5:30 p.m.; Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Ghana, Volta Project; Memorandum for the record of the daily staff meeting, November 7; National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily Staff Meetings, September-December 1961) 2 Not printed. For text of the press release, see Department of State Bulletin , November 6, 1961, p. 771. 238. Special National Intelligence Estimate 238. Special National Intelligence Estimate Source Washington, November 16, 1961. SNIE 64.1-61 PROSPECTS FOR GHANA The Problem To estimate Ghana's present situation and the prospects for political stability and foreign policy orientation over the next year or so. Conclusions 1. Nkrumah remains the pivotal factor in Ghana. Considering himself the messianic deliverer of his country, he has used authoritarian means to reinforce his personal control at home and continues political adventures abroad to promote his claim to be Pan-Africa's leading figure. (Paras. 7-8) 2. However, challenges to his political position have recently developed and Ghana faces severe economic problems. As a result of dissension within the ruling Convention Peoples' Party (CPP) Nkrumah has replaced many of the moderate figures in the government. 1 The more radical elements are now in positions of importance in government and will continue to be so in the immediate future. He has also imprisoned large numbers of critics outside the party. These moves, plus unpopular steps the government has taken to alleviate Ghana's economic troubles, have increased the number but weakened the power of his opposition. (Paras. 13-15) 3. We believe Nkrumah will be successful in suppressing any elements within or without the CPP which might challenge his pre-eminence, at least over the next year or so. But the internal strains will remain and may erupt into sporadic disorders. We believe that he will retain the support of the army and the police during the period of this estimate. If he should be assassinated, an all-out struggle for power would be almost certain. (Paras. 17-20) 4. Ghana's economic problems arise principally out of the fall of the price of cocoa, coupled with the continuing use of income and reserves for development projects, extravagances at home and sizable expenditures and adventures in other African countries. Nkrumah is not likely willingly to reduce any of these activities but will probably not be able through his attempted forced savings and austerity measures to mobilize sufficient internal resources to finance them. He will look to foreign aid to fill the gap. (Paras. 21-24) 5. We do not believe that President Nkrumah has decided to align himself completely with the Bloc. The Bloc has been assiduous in cultivating Nkrumah, recognizing in him an invaluable instrument for furthering its ambitions in Africa. Assistance in the way of credits, barter agreements, offers of training, etc., has already been supplied. Nkrumah and the extreme radicals among his followers are attracted by the apparent success of the Communists in promoting rapid economic development, and their avowed anticolonialism. He almost certainly believes that he can use the Bloc to further his own objectives without becoming inextricably committed to the Communists. Nevertheless, Nkrumah will probably try to maintain a Western presence in Ghana to offset the Bloc and to improve his prospects for aid from both sides. As a consequence of the interplay of these attitudes, we believe that for the immediate future there will be both the appearance and the fact of a close congruence between Bloc and Ghanaian actions and policies. (Paras. 8-11, 29) 6. Nkrumah's leftist policies and positions will probably increase the difficulties of his obtaining private or governmental investment and aid from the West. If this trend is aggravated by the West's refusal to honor what is in his view a commitment to finance the Volta River project, Nkrumah will almost certainly react violently and turn even more to the Bloc. Even should the Volta project be backed by the US, we do not believe that Nkrumah will significantly change the present policies of his regime. We believe that he will continue his attempts to reduce the dominating influence which private Western interests have in many sectors of the Ghanaian economy and will continue to develop close economic and political relations with the Bloc. (Para. 25) [Here follows the Discussion section of the estimate.] * Source: Central Intelligence Agency,DCI Files, Job 79 R 1012, Box 189. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet: “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Department of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.” All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on November 16, except the Atomic Energy Representative and the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction. 1 On October 26, Russell reported that Gbedemah had fled Ghana several days earlier. He noted that there was little doubt that the government had planned to place him under preventive detention and that he had undoubtedly decided to get out while still free. (Telegram 754; Department of State, Central Files, 745J.00/10-2661) 239. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy 239. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy Source Washington, December 1, 1961. SUBJECT The Volta Project Since Clarence Randall returned from Ghana in early November, there have been further developments in Ghana about which you should know. You also have received letters from Prime Minister Macmillan and Senator Gore on the subject, 1 and, in addition, CIA has prepared a memorandum on the Volta project and a special intelligence estimate on the future prospects for Ghana. 2 A summary and discussion of these developments immediately follow. The Situation in Ghana The Queen's visit went extremely well. Sir Robert Jackson has told us that Nkrumah is “greatly inflated” by the success of the visit; counting on your approval of proceeding with the Volta project and Khrushchev's visit (probably after the Berlin problem is less sharp) to restore his momentum. Jackson also reported that, following an hour-long conversation between the Queen and Nkrumah, it had become clear that “if a decision were made within the next three or four days to proceed with Volta, the situation here would be most receptive.” He said that if the U.S. wanted to obtain more detailed assurances from Nkrumah on the genuineness of Ghana's non-alignment in the months ahead, he was likely to be more receptive and forthcoming in the immediate afterglow of the Queen's visit. Jackson told us following the Queen's departure that Nkrumah's present mood was to proceed with the Volta dam regardless of the outcome of negotiations with the U.S. and the World Bank, and that he had just authorized an Italian firm to acquire a third dredge. Jackson said the leftist clique had moved in fast following the Queen's departure to bring greater pressures to bear on Nkrumah—one demand being Jackson's early departure. Komla Gbedemah, formerly Nkrumah's Minister of Finance and Minister of State for Presidential Affairs, but now Nkrumah's leading opponent, has told a U.S. official in London that, despite all the drawbacks, the U.S. must go through with Volta financing; that to withdraw at this time would only play into the hands of Nkrumah and his intimates who would use the incident to go all out for socialism, for withdrawal from the Commonwealth and for closer ties with the Bloc. However, Gbedemah emphatically insisted the U.S. should condition any agreement to proceed on the project upon the understanding that funds only will be made available in proportion to the extent Ghana is able to meet its commitments to the Volta authority. Such a procedure would, he said, place the blame for any financial failure of the Volta project directly on Nkrumah. With regard to the effect of a possible U.S. withdrawal upon other African countries, he only repeated the widely expressed view that “another Aswan would result.” The West Germans have informed us that they will follow through on their plans to finance a road from the port of Tema to Accra (a small project) only on the condition that the U.S. will follow through on the Volta project. A group of British African experts which has just concluded talks with the Department stressed that Nkrumah is “balancing” between East and West and despite occasional evidence to the contrary they believe Ghana must be placed in a neutral category and will remain there unless pushed in another direction. They felt it would be a mistake to withdraw from the Volta project; that such action would lead to the withdrawal of Ghana from the Commonwealth and heavy damage to the western position not only in Ghana but elsewhere in Africa. Other miscellaneous items of interest are that Ghana voted with the majority at the UN in the appeal to the USSR against further nuclear tests in contrast to Cuba which voted with the Bloc and Mali which abstained; a large representation of the top Ghanaian leadership appeared at the Soviet Embassy's November 7 reception although their presence at other national receptions is rare; and trade union leader Tettegah, who is on Nkrumah's personal staff, opened the Soviet-Ghanaian Friendship Association in Kumasi with a speech full of praise for the USSR. Throughout the period persons having moderate or pro-western views have been steadily removed from positions of influence with radical elements gaining increased power. The trend toward a totalitarian state also has continued with Nkrumah's Convention People's Party pressing a campaign to establish branches in business and professional firms, churches and Sunday Schools; accompanied by increasing fear on part of people to criticize the regime. Intelligence Estimates The most important conclusion reached in a Special National Intelligence Estimate on “Prospects for Ghana”, dated November 16, is that Nkrumah is counting heavily on U.S. aid for the Volta project. After more than four years of negotiation and several surveys, he firmly believes the U.S. has committed itself to give assistance. Should the U.S. withdraw at this stage, Nkrumah will react violently and turn even more to the Bloc. He might take actions against U.S. operations in Ghana—USIA, the Peace Corps, the modest technical assistance program. The Estimate also concludes that even if the U.S. should back the Volta project, Nkrumah will not significantly change his present policies. He will continue his attempts to reduce the dominating influence which private western interests have in the Ghanaian economy and will continue to develop close ties with the Bloc. An intelligence memorandum on the “Likely Consequences of various U.S. Courses of Action on the Volta Dam” concludes that most African and Asian leaders believe the U.S. is morally committed to proceed with the Volta project. Recent U.S. uncertainty, together with U.S. displeasure with Afro-Asian neutralism, have made the project seem a test of U.S. willingness to give aid without political strings. African moderates, though they would like to see Nkrumah chastised by not getting the assistance, would be fearful that a negative decision might indicate a reluctance to contribute substantially to African developments. The memorandum examines three contingencies: 1. U.S. implementation 2. U.S. withdrawal 3. A moratorium If the U.S. implements the project, Nkrumah's political standing would be much enhanced, particularly with the moderate elements. His policies would not change significantly and he would continue to reduce private Western influence and to develop closer Bloc relations. Afro-Asians generally would be pleased at U.S. tolerance of neutralism. Neutrals would still suspect U.S. motives; radicals would conclude that extremist policies do not preclude U.S. aid; and moderates in other African states could be pressured by radical elements to follow Nkrumah's example. Leaders who have cooperated with the U.S. would resent aid given to an uncooperative leader. If the U.S. withdraws from the project, Nkrumah would denounce the U.S. for its political strings and move even closer to the Bloc. Ghana's current domestic political balance would soon tip in favor of the radicals. Communist influence in all Africa would increase. Although they would exploit U.S. withdrawal as evidence that the U.S. does not intend to help African nations, they would not immediately take over the Volta project but delay until the extent of aid needed to further their aims was determined. Liberia, Nigeria and most of the French-speaking nations would sympathize with U.S. motives but be reluctant to openly support our decision. Most critics would say the U.S. is punishing an African state for not following acceptable policies, remind people of our withdrawal from the Aswan Dam project, and refuse to consider as valid any economic reasons given for the decision. If the U.S. called for a moratorium, reaction would be similar to that of a withdrawal and be expressed more vehemently. Nkrumah would regard delay as an attempt to blackmail Ghana into complete surrender to American interests, and he would be supported not only by Communists but by many neutrals. The U.S. could not convince Nkrumah or other African leaders of the economics of the problem and our influence would be more disastrously affected by a delay than by a complete withdrawal. Macmillan and Gore Letters You will wish to read both of these letters. The Prime Minister's letter strongly re-states the long-standing view of the British that the U.S. must proceed with the project. Senator Gore, however, feels that your decision should be to withdraw. In order to clarify some portions of his letter, we have attached a brief comment following the letter. The section of the comment dealing with tax aspects may not be fully accurate and may have to be revised. McGeorge Bundy 3 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Ghana, Vol. I, Volta River Project, 1961. Secret. 1 A copy of the November 16 letter from Prime Minister Macmillan to President Kennedy is in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Prime Minister Macmillan's Correspondence with President Kennedy—1961. A copy of the November 13 letter from Senator Albert Gore of Tennessee to President Kennedy is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Summary of Volta Project Documents. 2 The intelligence memorandum, entitled “Likely Consequences of Various U.S. Courses on Action on the Volta Dam,” November 16, is in the Central Intelligence Agency, Office of National Estimates Files. The SNIE is printed as Document 238 . 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 240. Notes for the Record 240. Notes for the Record Source Washington, December 5, 1961. NSC MEETING ON VOLTA DAM The meeting began with a very brief intelligence statement by Mr. McCone. In view of the President's tight calendar, he was postponing the briefing on Soviet-Finnish relationships. He confined himself to a comment only that a Soviet space activity was to be expected soon. There did indeed follow an unsuccessful space shot on December 11th. The Secretary of State opened discussion of the Volta project. The Department had reviewed the matter with care, and believed that we should go ahead. 1 We made a commitment in the President's letter of June 29, 1961. 2 The Secretary believed that we should enlist Prime Minister Macmillan in attempting to turn Nkrumah on a reasonable course. He also suggested that we should discuss the matter promptly with Congressional leaders. The President believed that we could not get Congressional support and should make our decision without any further consultations with the leadership. It would be better simply to make our decision and then explain it as persuasively as possible. The President then asked how we could justify a decision to help Nkrumah in the light of the leftward and authoritarian course of his domestic politics, and his unhelpful positions on international issues. The essential reply of State Department officers was that we were committed and that a refusal to go forward here would be misunderstood all over Africa. The Secretary of the Treasury took the other view. To him the essential question was whether Nkrumah was a Castro or a Nasser. On the evidence thus far he was inclined to think him a Castro and on this ground he would withhold approval of the Volta project. There was discussion of the intelligence estimate of Nkrumah's character and purpose, and the precise language of the most recent intelligence estimates was examined by the President. Director McCone interpreted this language as meaning that Nkrumah still intended to preserve his independence from Soviet domination, although he certainly expected to seek increasing help from the bloc. Mr. McCone added that he had taken soundings of business opinion on the Volta project and had found opinion on the whole not unfavorable. Secretary McNamara was in favor of proceeding on the simple ground that we had already committed ourselves. The President then read to the group the entire text of the letter of June 29th, and probably this reading was decisive. The President said dryly that this seemed a fairly warm letter and asked who had drafted it. He was gently reminded by Mr. Ball that it had been made warmer at the President's own direction. The President remarked that as far as he could tell, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General were opposed. The Attorney General had not spoken, the President said, but he could feel the hot breath of his opinion. A little later the Attorney General did speak, arguing that moderate leaders like Houphouet-Boigny would rather that we not go ahead, as he had discovered in his visit to the Ivory Coast. It would be better to take this money and spread it around in all the needy countries of Africa, but if we should go ahead we ought to get something in return. In concluding the meeting, the President directed that there be a careful study of the precise degree of the American financial liability over the early years of the project. Mr. Chayes indicated that this liability would be on the order of $25 million until 1965. The President found these figures comforting and asked that the legal aspects of this involvement be reviewed by both the State Department and the Department of Justice. This review was subsequently conducted and the President's final approval of the Volta project was given on December 12th. McGeorge Bundy 3 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, National Security Council Meetings, 1961, No. 494. Top Secret. Drafted by Bundy on December 18. 1 The Department of State submitted a paper for consideration by the National Security Council recommending this. (Ibid., Countries Series, Ghana, Volta River Project, 1961) 2 Document 227 . 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 241. National Security Council Record of Action No. 2444 241. National Security Council Record of Action No. 2444 Source Washington, December 5, 1961. Volta River Project Discussed the recommendation of the Secretary of State that the U.S. proceed with the project as summarized in a paper entitled, “The Volta River Project,” dated December 5, 1961. 1 Noted that the President would defer his decision pending a report to be prepared by the Department of State and the Attorney General on legal aspects of the project. * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, National Security Council Meetings, 1961, No. 494. Secret. Taken at the 494th meeting on December 5; see Document 240 . 1 See footnote 1, Document 240 . 242. Letter From President Kennedy to President Nkrumah 242. Letter From President Kennedy to President Nkrumah Source Washington, December 14, 1961. Dear Mr. President : I have asked Mr. Clarence Randall, together with Ambassador Russell, to deliver this letter to you informing you of my decision to provide United States financial assistance to the Volta River Hydroelectric Project. When Mr. Randall returned to Washington from his previous trip to Accra, he told me of your cordiality and hospitality and of his frank conversations with you on my behalf. In the same spirit of candor which characterized our talks in March and which has continued in our subsequent communications, I asked Mr. Randall to explain to you the serious concern which the American people and Government have regarding certain political and economic policies of your Government. In all frankness I must say that these concerns still exist. Nevertheless on the basis of the assurances which you gave me in your letter of October 5 1 and your subsequent assurances to Mr. Randall that your policy is truly one of non-alignment and independence and that you share with us the desire to see the dam and smelter through to completion, we are prepared to go ahead with the project on a cooperative basis. The Volta project is an investment in the future generations of the Ghanaians and their African neighbors. This investment promises to pay large dividends, for I am hopeful that these generations will live in a world of increasing freedom in which they will work out a pattern of life to meet their own needs and desires. The United States Government looks forward to a continued close association with the Government of Ghana and the VALCO consortium in the major forward step in the development of your country. With sincere regards. Sincerely, John F. Kennedy 2 * Source: Department of State, AF/AFW Files: Lot 66 D 53, Volta Project Letters, Miscellaneous. No classification marking. 1 Nkrumah's October 5 letter to Kennedy declared that it was his intention “always to be truly neutral and non-aligned” and that he was “neither pro West nor pro East.” (Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Countries Series, Ghana Security) 2 Printed from a copy that indicates Kennedy signed the original. 243. Memorandum From the Vice President's Military Aide (Burris) to Vice President Johnson 243. Memorandum From the Vice President's Military Aide (Burris) to Vice President Johnson Source Washington, January 31, 1962. RE Nationalization of Industry—Ghana In coming to a decision on United States participation in the Volta River Project in Ghana, the President was concerned over the possibility that Ghana would nationalize the project after it was completed. One opinion held that the approval of the Volta River Project would encourage Ghana to permit the establishment of private industry with foreign investment playing a major role in Ghana's industrialization. Ghana's Cabinet has just made a decision to acquire 100% of foreign investment in certain enterprises. Nkrumah has clearly expressed his preference for government establishment of industry and his view that private investment will not play a major role in Ghana's industrialization. U.S. policy continues to be the encouragement of private investment and technical assistance in Ghana for its further development and to counter Soviet activities in industry and in the country as a whole. However, the Cabinet's decision at this time, following so soon after approval of the Volta River Project, is a clear indication of Ghana's intentions and perhaps unwillingness to follow Western philosophy and leadership. * Source: Johnson Library, Vice President's Security File, Memoranda to Vice President from Burris. Confidential. 244. Paper Prepared in the Office of West Coast and Malian Affairs 244. Paper Prepared in the Office of West Coast and Malian Affairs Source Washington, February 12, 1962. GHANAIAN SUBVERSION IN AFRICA General Nkrumah's overpowering desire to export his brand of nationalism has unquestionably made Ghana one of the foremost practitioners of subversion in Africa. Ghana's influence, or interference, is felt in all sections of the continent. Concentrating at first on the dependent areas, of late Ghana has become increasingly interested in the independent African states, particularly Togo and the Congo. There is some indication of a slow-down in activity in recent months, undoubtedly due in part to the domestic political problems which have beset Nkrumah since he returned from his extended visit to the Bloc last summer, as well as Nkrumah's desire that nothing go wrong with the final Volta negotiations. A possible additional influencing factor could be a growing realization that the policies he has pursued with his neighbors have so far caused more harm than good to Ghana. Finally, the deteriorating financial situation in Ghana, and resultant drain on its reserves, could serve as a deterrent to Nkrumah's more ambitious schemes. There remains the possibility, however, that the USSR will be receptive to furnishing supplemental funds for subversive purposes. When Clarence Randall met with Nkrumah last December to inform him of the United States decision on the Volta, he candidly told Nkrumah that the American Government and people were most concerned by the reports of interference by Ghana in the internal affairs of other free and independent African nations. He added that it would be of obvious assistance to the United States in justifying this major contribution if the Government of Ghana could make a statement that it would not engage in such activities. While Nkrumah touched upon the subject of subversion in his subsequent radio address to the nation on the Volta project, his remarks were hardly an assurance that Ghana would refrain from such activities in the future. Nevertheless Mr. Randall's frank confrontation with Nkrumah on this subject, and the knowledge that Mr. Randall was speaking as President Kennedy's personal representative, might have some salutary effect on the Ghanaian President. Also, Nkrumah met secretly with President Maga of Dahomey about three weeks ago at Pusiga in northern Dahomey for the purpose of discussing the deteriorating relations between Nkrumah and President Olympio of Togo. Maga reported to his fellow chiefs of state at the Lagos Conference his belief that in the future his policy might be less aggressive. As a result of Maga's initiative the Foreign Ministers of Ghana, Togo and Dahomey are now meeting in Cotonou. This may or may not lead to an eventual summit meeting between Nkrumah and Olympio. There is perhaps some reason to be hopeful but certainly not optimistic. Nkrumah has been in this game for some time and with his aggressive energy and egotistical ambition he can normally be counted on to play the game for keeps. The situation will bear close watching and continued pressure should be maintained on Nkrumah to cease and desist. [Here follows the body of the paper.] * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745J.00/2-1262. Secret. Drafted by Coote on February 11. The report was transmitted to the White House under cover of a memorandum from Battle to Bundy that reads: “Enclosed is a paper on Ghanaian Subversion in Africa in response to the verbal request by Mr. Brom Smith. While it is not an all-inclusive discussion of the subject, it does contain the most significant elements of the problem. A general summarization of the situation is at the beginning of the paper. The paper has not been cleared with the CIA, but a knowledgeable CIA representative contributed his ideas on the subject prior to the drafting of the paper.” On February 7, Battle sent a memorandum to the Executive Secretariat that reads: “Mr. Brom Smith called me this afternoon to report that the President, in reading the Staff Summary for today, became extremely interested in the item on Africa entitled Ghanaian Subversion in Africa Discussed. The President would like to get on a rush basis full information on this matter including, if it would not delay preparation, anything CIA has on the subject. Can this be prepared urgently and cleared appropriately?” A handwritten notation on the memorandum reads: “AFW—Mr. Coote: S/S would like a B to B report on this within 24 hours.” (Ibid., 770.5245J/2-762) 245. Paper Prepared in the National Security Council 245. Paper Prepared in the National Security Council Source Washington, June 13, 1962. GHANA: ASSESSMENT SINCE VOLTA Our relations with Ghana have considerably improved since the fall of 1961. At that time Ghana appeared to be moving swiftly toward an accommodation with the Bloc. Anti-Western feelings were especially evident in statements by Ghanaian leaders and vitriolic press attacks. Ghana voted with the Bloc on Berlin, disarmament and other UN issues; Nkrumah sent military cadets to the USSR; received and stock-piled Bloc arms in Ghana. He dismissed pro-Western ministers, the UK military chief of staff, and down-graded generally the British military posture in Ghana. Following a trip through the Bloc, Nkrumah accelerated the socialization of Ghana. Especially in the Congo, U.S.-Ghanaian policies clashed head on. Nkrumah had hoped to dominate the Congo as a first step toward achieving his Pan-African goals. Lumumba had assured him that the Congo would join the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union. This hope was dashed by UN action, supported by the U.S.; as a result, he moved closer and closer to the USSR. Internal tensions also were heightened during this period by mounting opposition to Nkrumah over his economic and political policies. Nkrumah turned against the British, blaming them for creating unrest, and became increasingly suspicious of his more conservative ministers who he thought might attempt to replace him. Unquestionably our decision to give assistance on the Volta project changed the atmosphere from one of acrimony into one of guarded cordiality. However, this did not bring about any fundamental change in Nkrumah's foreign or domestic policies. Indeed, Nkrumah has continued over the past 9 months to concentrate increasing authority in his own hands. This has been accompanied by the ousting of Ministers Gbedemah and Botsio, and a long time political associate, Krobo Edusel. As the situation stands today, there are some hopeful developments in Ghana—stemming in part from the Volta decision—which we should watch with care and encourage when possible: —For a variety of reasons, Ghana's relations with the USSR have deteriorated since last fall. Soviet technicians have been too high-handed; the IL-18 aircrafts are expensive to operate; Ghanaian students in USSR are increasingly dissatisfied. —Nkrumah released 160 detainees and granted amnesty to persons who fled the country for fear of detention. —He has shown greater cooperation with his more moderate neighbors including possible rapprochement between Casablanca and Monrovia powers. He has normalized his relations with the Congo and has recognized Adoula's Government. —Nkrumah has indicated that he envisions regional use of Volta power and already has offered to extend the use of Volta to Togo and other neighboring countries. —The Ghanaian press has become less antagonistic toward the U.S. —Nkrumah has shown some inclination to appoint moderates to important positions. The most important of these are the 7 Board Members of the Volta River Authority and Ambassador Halm as Governor of the Bank of Ghana. There are both promising and unpromising aspects in the military situation in Ghana. On the good side, Ghana on May 1 signed a military agreement with the UK under which the British will train Ghanaian armed forces. Canada and Pakistan also will participate, and Nkrumah is sending a small number of junior officers to U.S. Service Schools. However, serious problems could arise in connection with the proposed African High Command, which will be the military arm of the Casablanca Powers, with headquarters in Accra. This may well start an all-out arms race and provide an opportunity for increased Soviet influence through materiel, technicians, etc. The Command might decide to intervene militarily in territories still under Portuguese and Spanish rule. Nkrumah also is supporting two international meetings, either being held or scheduled to be held, in Accra. One is the “Freedom Fighters Congress"—strictly anti-colonial—which includes nationalists from all the dependent areas in Africa. The other is the Government-sponsored “Ban the Bomb” Conference which probably will support a position more in accord with that of the USSR than with the U.S. (In 1961 Nkrumah was awarded the Lenin Peace Prize.) Nkrumah recently decided to assign the Ghana Trade Unions Congress a more active role in Africa to promote his brand of Pan-Africanism through the labor medium. Its leftist Secretary-General, John K. Tettegah, has been put in charge of the offensive. A major objective will be to drive the ICFTU out of Africa; another the ascendency of Ghanaian influence in the radically-oriented All-African Trade Unions Federation. If launched in earnest, the project could have important implications for Africa, the ICFTU, and the U.S. In the economic sphere, although Ghana had acquired a considerable sterling balance at independence, the economy has suffered both from imprudent development spending and depressed cocoa prices. Ghana's gold and foreign exchange reserves, which totalled $532 million at the end of 1955 and $382 million at the end of 1960, fell to an estimated $200 million in March 1962. Moreover, most of these reserves already are committed for currency backing and development projects. In July 1961 the Ghanaian Government instituted fiscal measures which may prove helpful, but preliminary information indicates that revenues were below and expenditures above budget estimates during the first half of FY 1962. Thus the budget deficit may be even larger than anticipated. Concurrently there has developed a discouraging climate for private foreign investment in Ghana, primarily because of a growing uncertainty resulting from contradictions in the Government's attitude—the Government insists that there is a place for foreign investment, but actions and official statements have discouraged it. For example, Ghana violated the contract it had made with Pillsbury early this year and announced the establishment of a state trading company which would compete against private commercial firms. Pillsbury cancelled its contract forthwith. Most of the $196 million of Soviet credits (Tab C) 1 has not been utilized. Ghana is expected to draw more heavily on these credits in the future and unquestionably the Soviet presence in Ghana will concurrently be strengthened. On June 1, Ghana signed a 3-year technical agreement with the USSR under which Soviet credits will be used to establish state farms; the remaining credits probably will be used for similar state-owned enterprises. Our Embassy in Accra has succeeded in maintaining very helpful contacts with various groups in Ghana—especially the more moderate pro-Western ones—which include civil servants, cocoa farmers, small entrepreneurs (including the “mammy” traders), and the university students. Our relations with some other groups, however, are less rewarding. These include the Convention People's Party, the Ghana Trade Unions Congress, the Youth Pioneers and the cooperatives. * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Ghana Subjects, Dungan File. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the source text. 1 Not attached to the source text. 246. National Intelligence Estimate 246. National Intelligence Estimate Source Washington, October 17, 1962. NIE 64.1-62 THE OUTLOOK FOR GHANA The Problem To estimate President Nkrumah's position in Ghana in the aftermath of the recent assassination attempt and terrorist attacks, and, over the short term, the outlook for his continued hold on power and likely developments in the event of his death. Conclusions A. Nkrumah is in trouble at home. In the course of establishing himself as messianic leader of an authoritarian state, he has broken or antagonized internal competitors and alienated many moderates. During the past year persons with marked Communist sympathies came to the fore in the regime, but in recent weeks some persons of moderate tendency have become of increased importance. He has deprived dissenters of all effective means of expression except violence. At the same time he is experiencing doubts as to the reliability of some of the forces upon which he has depended. The recent nearly successful attempt on his life and subsequent terror bombings have dramatized to Nkrumah, to the people of Ghana, and to outsiders the existence of extreme opposition. (Paras. 1-3, 5) B. Not knowing who was responsible for the assassination attempt and the bombings, Nkrumah permitted widespread accusations of blame, including the US and UK. This charge is probably for internal consumption and uses the ever-popular theme of anticolonialism. He arrested members of his government whom he probably suspected of personal ambitions and probably suspects tribal elements, labor leaders, military officers and particularly the exiled oppositionists whom he may believe to be supported by the US and UK. (Paras. 6, 8-9) C. Barring assassination, Nkrumah is likely to retain control. The security forces are not likely to attempt an overthrow, his control of the political apparatus is firm and his popularity still widespread. However, pressures against him will increase, particularly if the tight economic situation does not improve or if taxes and forced savings arouse widespread dissatisfaction. We do not believe he will attempt to attract the support of political moderates by altering his policies, domestic or foreign, though in an effort to forestall a financial crisis the government may attempt to improve the climate for private foreign investment. (Paras. 11-13) D. If Nkrumah were assassinated the security forces would probably take steps to maintain order. The Cabinet would try to follow the constitutional procedures of appointing a commission, probably of old-guard Convention Peoples' Party (CPP) leaders, to rule until a new President was chosen. If they were able to move surely and promptly, the security forces would probably support them. We believe that it is by such means that a successor government would establish itself. In the event the party cannot agree on a commission or successor government, disorders would be likely to result, in which case the intervention of the security forces would give the moderates, both domestic and in exile, a better chance of establishing the successor regime. Whatever group comes to power is likely to follow many of the radical policies espoused by Nkrumah. (Paras. 14-15, 17) [Here follows the Discussion section.] * Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 79 R 01012A. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet: “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and NSA.” All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on October 17, except the Atomic Energy Commission Representative and the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction. 247. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy 247. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy Source Washington, October 29, 1962. 1. You requested a review of our relations with Ghana, and raised the question of whether it might be appropriate at this point to indicate our displeasure with recent Ghanian reactions in the UN and elsewhere in some way. You yourself have just sent a rather sharper letter (Tab 1 attached) 1 to Nkrumah in response to his complaints about Governor Williams' public statement on Ghana's votes in the UN. 2. Ghanian reaction to your message on the Cuban situation, both in the UN and elsewhere, has not been particularly gratifying. However, it is fair to say that the reaction was about what we would have expected in terms of past policy. What we know about Ghana's reaction is as follows. The formal response of President Nkrumah to your letter on Cuba was neutral. (See Accra 696 at Tab 2) 2 Nkrumah's immediate, off-hand response was much less even-handed and more pro-Soviet (Accra 690, Tab 3). 3 At the same time there were some indications that Nkrumah has decided that the more neutral line of his formal response was the right one, and he is reported to have instructed his press and radio along these lines. This instruction was delivered after a first radio reaction of a pro-Soviet type (see Accra 691 and to USIA 179, Tab 4). 4 Ghana joined with the UAR in sponsoring a Cuban resolution in the UN Security Council on Thursday, October 25 (from New York 1450, Tab 5); 5 it had no specific content, and was not acted on. 3. The most obvious way we could deal more harshly with Ghana is to cut down our aid program. The details of our current aid program are shown in the table at Tab 6. In summary, they are as follows. We obligated nearly $2 million in FY 1962 in development grants for a variety of educational and technical assistance projects. The big item was the Volta Project. In connection with that, we obligated $117 million last year, of which $7 million was charged against development loan funds directly; $55 million were Ex-Im Bank funds transferred to the AID account and obligated through AID; and $55 million was committed by Ex-Im directly. Next year we propose a somewhat reduced program of development grants totaling $1.4 million. This represents a continuation of the on-going programs with lower levels for some, and slightly increased levels for others. In addition, we propose once again to commit $7 million in development loans; $4.5 million for the construction of the basic science building and hospital for a medical school, and $2.5 million as capital for an investment bank. The medical school is a project close to Nkrumah's heart. Planning on this is complete, and the project is ready to go as soon as a decision is made. The investment bank is not yet in the same state; so far the report of the survey team on the bank has not been received. AID believes we could usefully spend another $8-9 hundred thousand in development grants on more activity of the present kind, but does not now have the money to do so. 4. Current developments on the economic front in Ghana are encouraging. Ghana has been meeting all its commitments on the Volta Project. So far the Government of Ghana has disbursed $28 million, the U.S. has made no actual disbursements, and the UK has spent a very small amount. Progress on the dam has been good: the work is ahead of schedule, and costs so far are lower than the original estimates. Another encouraging sign of some importance on the economic front is that the government is moving toward establishing an investment bank whose mission would be to finance private enterprise. As originally conceived, the institution would have the purpose of financing State-owned enterprises. Two banking experts from Czechoslovakia were brought in to advise in setting it up. More recently, Ghana has changed the concept of the bank to emphasize the financing of private business, has asked for American advisers, and has let the Czechs go home. The details are given in the attached memorandum from AID. (Tab 7) There are still other encouraging signs. A general law regulating foreign capital investment is now being considered by the administration. The latest draft has removed two features which we thought undesirable: (1) 60% of the earnings of any foreign enterprise be reinvested in Ghana; and (2) a long list of industries was reserved for State enterprise. The law is still in its draft stage. It has many technical weaknesses, and we are not yet sure what in fact will come out. The Sunkist Tuna Fish enterprise, which involved a proposal for operating a fishing fleet and a cannery was scared away from Ghana last Spring by the conditions then proposed. They now feel that the situation has changed sufficiently to make it desirable to look again. Another sign of a turn away from emphasis on exclusively State control of industry are the appointments of W. Halm, former Ambassador to the U.S. as Governor of the Bank of Ghana, and Adomakah, as first head to the proposed investment bank. They are both pro-Western, moderate and technically competent. Still another is the stoppage of work on the Bui Dam project by the Soviets. Attached at Tab 8 is Chad Calhoun's account of his most recent trip to Ghana, September 18-23. Calhoun, a Vice President of Kaiser, is enthusiastic about the progress Valco is making and is in general optimistic about the economic and political outlook in Ghana. He thinks Nkrumah is taking a definite turn away from the Soviets toward the West. 5. Recent political developments point in the same direction. The attempted assassination of Nkrumah on August 1 has resulted in a significant shake-up in the government. This shake-up has displaced some of the more radical advisers around Nkrumah. There are several reports that the next foreign minister will be Alex Quaison-Sackey who is now Ghana's representative at the UN. We consider him a moderate, and an able diplomat. Bill Mahoney, our Ambassador in Ghana, feels he is making a real impression on the situation. He has established good relations with Nkrumah without in any way being inhibited from speaking plainly to him. He shares the view that the outlook in Ghana is favorable to the West in general and to the U.S. in particular. I spoke to him at some length when he was here ten days ago for consultation. If not for the crisis, you would have seen him. It still remains the case that there are no feasible alternatives to Nkrumah who promise a more helpful policy from our point of view. This was the general consensus of opinion at the time we authorized our participation in the Volta River Project. It remains substantially the consensus now. 6. You have already expressed your displeasure at Nkrumah's comments on Governor Williams' statements. It would be easy for Ambassador Mahoney to reinforce the effect of this by further comments on the Ghanian response to your actions on Cuba. We could take a major step beyond this to a harder policy by cutting down on aid to Ghana. There are two arguments that can be made for a harder policy toward Ghana at this moment. First, it would be useful to make an example of one of the left-leaning neutralists, especially in the light of the present situation. Ghana is a country which lends itself well to such treatment from our point of view. Nkrumah has been extreme in his statements. Ghana is not of strategic importance to us in Africa in any direct way. Further, Nkrumah's actions and words have alienated many of his fellow African leaders, especially his neighbors. Accordingly, a strong line by the U.S. might be welcomed by other African countries. The considerations on the other side, however, appear to me much weightier. We have a substantial U.S. economic interest in Ghana in the shape of Valco. The present outlook for the success of that enterprise is favorable, and those in charge of its operations are optimistic. A hardening in our policy toward Ghana, whether by reduction of aid more than is inevitably required by the aid cuts of the Congress, or by other means, may endanger Valco's prospects. This alone would not be persuasive if there were strong political reasons for a harsher policy. However, the political reasons appear to me to go in the other direction. There are signs that Nkrumah is turning away from the Bloc and that his neutralism is moving from neutralism against us to neutralism for us. Just because has has been vociferous and virulent in his previous stand, the gains to us of a permanent change in his attitude will be large. If Nkrumah joins Toure among those who are visibly and publicly disillusioned with the results of close political alignment with, and heavy economic dependence on, the Bloc, this will be a significant gain for the U.S., not only in Africa, but more broadly. At this moment, when Nkrumah is making at least some moves in directions favorable to us, his political situation is fluid, and when the ultimate results are in doubt, it would be unwise to apply pressures on him that might well cause him to return to his previous pro-Soviet orientation. Finally, at a moment when we have won a significant victory in the world political struggle we should show a position of generosity in relation to small neutrals, even those who have been more neutral with respect to the Soviet Union than they have with respect to us. CK * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Ghana Subjects, Kaysen Letters. Confidential. 1 None of the tabs is attached to the source text. 2 Dated October 26. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/10-2662) 3 Dated October 23. (Ibid., 611.3722/10-2362) 4 Telegram 691 from Accra, October 24, reported that Nkrumah had telephoned Radio Ghana to express displeasure at an October 23 radio commentary that had sharply criticized the U.S. Government's Cuba policy. (Ibid., 611.3722/10-2462) 5 Dated October 24. (Ibid., 330/10-2462) 248. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain African Posts 248. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain African Posts Source Washington, December 17, 1962, 6:55 p.m. 1112. For Ambassador. Since attempt on Nkrumah's life last August developments in Ghana have followed trend that appears unfavorable to US and Western interests generally. Situation reflects increasing importance assumed by anti-Western left-wing elements in Nkrumah's entourage and in leading positions Ghanaian information media. There have been violent press attacks against our Ambassador, Peace Corps and press allegations that official and other Americans in Ghana are involved in CIA plot against the regime. Policies of US and those of West have been subject unbridled press criticism and charges of neo-colonialism and imperialism. On other hand Ghanaian press has been lavish in praise Soviet Union and Ghanaian delegation in UN has shown distinct preference for communist bloc positions. UK and US have been criticized by Ghana for responding India's request assistance repel ChiCom aggression and GOG has shown marked inclination favor ChiCom negotiating proposals. Because of uncertainties outlook Ghana including emotional impact on Nkrumah of use of violence against him Dept would find it helpful have views responsible African leaders. Would appreciate soonest evaluation on basis existing knowledge Embassy present attitude leadership government to which accredited toward Nkrumah and developments set forth above. Ambassador also requested in his discretion avail himself suitable opportunity elicit personal views Chief of State or Prime Minister. Approach should be within framework of general discussion on matters of mutual interest between two countries. View delicate nature this consultation and obvious risks if Nkrumah learns of it and concludes US questioning his future, objective should be create impression local authorities volunteering information on matter of common interest rather than our requesting it. 1 Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745J.11/12-1762. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Dorros, cleared by Witman and Ross, and approved by Tasca. Sent to Abidjan, Dakar, Freetown, Lagos, Lome, Monrovia, Tunis, and Yaounde and repeated to Accra, Bamako, and Conakry. 1 On December 19, Ambassador Mahoney urged that maximum caution be used when chiefs of state and heads of government were asked to comment on Nkrumah. He pointed out that Ghanaian press and radio had been charging for the past 3 months that the United States was working against Ghanaian interests and plotting Nkrumah's downfall, and warned that if any word of high-level U.S. inquiries on Ghana in other African states got back to Nkrumah, U.S. relations with the Government of Ghana might be seriously prejudiced. (Telegram 774 from Accra, ibid., 745J.11/12-1962) 249. Memorandum by the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) 249. Memorandum by the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) Source Washington, January 24, 1963. MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT The President met with Mr. Edgar Kaiser, Chad Calhoun and Carl Kaysen on January 23, at 6:30 p.m., to hear a report by Messrs. Kaiser and Calhoun on their visit to Ghana. Mr. Kaiser observed the President had read Mahoney's reporting telegrams and had a fair picture of the substance of his conversations. As a conclusion he offered the proposition that we ought to have a three to six months' period in which we try to make Nkrumah deliver on specific political goals in terms as definite as Valco had got him to deliver on economic goals. The President asked Kaiser to explain Nkrumah's behavior. He could understand his trying to deal with both the U.S. and the Soviet Union, but he could not understand the lack of subtlety and balance. Why did Nkrumah lean so hard against us if he thought continuing relations was not of any use to him. Kaiser responded in terms of two factors. The influence of Bing and others in Nkrumah's immediate entourage and the desire of Nkrumah to respond favorably to everybody who saw him frequently. Kaiser raised two specific questions. Whether Calhoun should return to Ghana as Nkrumah had requested to work on the investment bill and whether Kaiser should persist in his attempt to get Nkrumah to make a trip to the U.S. Kaiser explained the significance of the investment bill both to Valco and to the country in general. The President agreed that we should make an effort along the lines Kaiser suggested. Essentially, however, he thought that the Nydell case was an immediate test and if there was not a satisfactory resolution of the Nydell case in the sense of a complete back-down by the Ghana Government, he did not see how we could expect anything in other areas. 1 Assuming a satisfactory resolution of the Nydell case, he agreed that Calhoun should return and that Kaiser should present his invitation to Nkrumah. In addition, the President suggested that we draw up a list of definite results we could expect in the near future in the political sphere, especially in response to the Ghanaian President, as an indicator of our ability to exercise a minimal degree of influence necessary on Nkrumah. Edgar Kaiser suggested the President write a letter to Nkrumah in response to his own letter in which he, in addition to mentioning Nkrumah's reception of Kaiser and Calhoun, make some statement of his policy views on U.S.-Ghanaian relations, make some mention of Kaiser's invitation to Nkrumah to take a trip to the U.S., and express his regard for and confidence in the Ambassador. Kaiser also raised the question of Mahoney's present instructions and whether it would not be wise to encourage Mahoney to a more intimate contact with Nkrumah. The President said he would consider the letter and Mahoney's instructions. Note: After the meeting, Kaiser agreed to provide Kaysen with a draft of his idea of the letter, and Kaiser and Calhoun agreed that Calhoun would wait for further word from us before returning to Ghana. C.K. * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Ghana Subjects. Secret. 1 On January 11, the Ghanaian Ministry of Foreign Affairs delivered a note to Ambassador Mahoney requesting the unofficial recall of two members of the U.S. Embassy staff in Accra, Dr. Carl C. Nydell, Regional Medical Officer, and William B. Davis, Cultural Affairs Officer. The Deputy Foreign Minister told the Ambassador that he had been instructed not to give any reason for the request. On January 15, Mahoney met with President Nkrumah and told him that such a recall was unjustified since neither man had done anything improper, and stated that the United States did not intend to recall either officer unless the Government of Ghana officially declared him persona non grata. (Memorandum from Brubeck to Bundy, January 18; Department of State, Central Files, 611.45J/1-1863) 250. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ghana 250. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ghana Source Washington, February 7, 1963, 8:54 p.m. 753. President's reply Nkrumah's February 1 letter 1 follows. You should deliver letter as soon as possible and give orally substance of your suggestions your 1015 2 as you think appropriate. Verbatim Text . February 7, 1963 Dear Mr. President: Thank you for your letters of January 21 and 31. As I have said to you before in our correspondence, I believe that a continued frank exchange can be helpful in improving our understanding of each other's viewpoint, and thus contribute to the improvement of relations between Ghana and the United States. I wish, also, to thank you for your kindness and courtesy in receiving Mr. Kaiser and Mr. Calhoun and listening both to their views, and to the points I raised with them as giving me concern in our relations with Ghana. In your letter you discuss the Nydell case. I think Ambassador Mahoney has already told you our views on this matter, and I wish to add only one point. We have seen no evidence of improper behavior on Dr. Nydell's part, and I have been informed by my officials, who have made a close review of his actions, that there is no basis, other than coincidence, for the belief that he is in any way involved in improper activities in Ghana. I appreciate the points you make about the economic problems of Ghana and of other African countries. We are aware of these problems and most sympathetic to the efforts that you are making to deal with them. Our understanding and sympathy lie behind our efforts through aid and other programs to assist in economic and social development in Ghana and other African countries. The question of what particular economic and social arrangements are best suited to development is one on which different governments have differed and will undoubtedly continue to differ. Each country is the best judge of its own institutions. We, for our part, have no desire to impose our own views on these matters on any other government, nor do we believe that what works well in the United States always works equally well elsewhere. However, as Mr. Kaiser pointed out to you, continued fruitful economic relations between our two countries must rest on a broader degree of sympathy and understanding. For whatever reason, our general relations have been difficult recently, and I certainly would welcome whatever can be done on both sides to improve them. In this connection, I think it would be helpful to me, and you might find it helpful to you, if you were to continue the full and frank exchanges you have recently had with Ambassador Mahoney. He has my trust and confidence, and continued discussion with him can do much to improve that sense of mutual understanding and mutual forbearance which is necessary for the improved relations between our two countries which we both desire. Sincerely, John F. Kennedy End Verbatim Text . Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GHANA-US. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Kaysen and Gebelt, cleared by Kent (S/S), and approved by McGhee. 1 On February 1, Ambassador Mahoney transmitted the text of a lengthy letter from Nkrumah to Kennedy dated January 31. Referring to the short letter he had previously sent to Kennedy through Kaiser and Calhoun, Nkrumah reiterated that he and the Ghanaian people continued to cherish the most friendly feelings toward the President and the American people, expressed his approval of the ongoing U.S.-Soviet test ban negotiations, and suggested that these be followed by negotiations toward an agreement limiting East-West involvement in African affairs. Nkrumah also wrote that if Kennedy felt that the Nydell case was a matter that affected the maintenance of good relations between the two countries, he was willing to accede to an official request to do nothing to press for his recall from Ghana. (Telegram 992 from Accra; ibid.) 2 Commenting on the line in Nkrumah's letter stating that he was willing to accede to an “official request” to do nothing on Nydell, Mahoney, in telegram 1015 from Accra, February 6, pointed out that Nkrumah might want an “official request,” partly to get off the hook with his left-wing advisers but also to have documentary proof that the U.S. Government had pressured him. Mahoney recommended not giving Nkrumah what he wanted, but suggested some sort of document, such as an informal letter, making it clear that the U.S. position remained unchanged. (Ibid., 123-Nydell, Carl C. Jr.) 251. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ghana 251. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ghana Source Washington, April 26, 1963, 8:42 p.m. 891. Following summary for information only and contents should not be disclosed to foreign officials. It is uncleared and subject to amendment on review of MemCon. Ghanaian Ambassador Ribeiro presented his credentials to the President April 25 after which a frank and pleasant conversation took place in a cordial atmosphere. The Amb conveyed the greetings of President Nkrumah and expressed appreciation for assistance which US is providing to Ghana. The President reciprocated greetings and noted that Nkrumah was one of the first visitors to White House under his administration. The President told the Ambassador that, although some difficulties had existed in the bilateral relations between our countries, he believed that the situation had improved in recent months. He continued that, nevertheless, the articles that appeared in the Ghanaian press were not helpful. He said that he personally and his Administration were subject to attack in the American press but it was well known that the government did not control the American press. However, when the Ghanaian press attacked the United States he was led to wonder whether this was not in fact a reflection of the policy of the Government of Ghana. The Ambassador replied that such was certainly not the case and that, although the Government of Ghana supported the press financially, it did not control its output and frequently found itself embarrassed by what had been written and had to straighten things out. The Ambassador said that the Ghana press was a matter to which he would give high priority. The Ambassador gave an account of current progress on the Volta Dam. He noted that it should be finished in 1965 and expressed the hope that the President would be present in Ghana at the dedication. The President reminded the Ambassador that he had taken the decision to go ahead with the Volta River Project in face of considerable opposition in the Senate and elsewhere, that it was a large commitment, and that he followed personally and closely developments within Ghana. The President said that it was obvious that our two countries would not agree on all matters but remarked that these disagreements should not be allowed to reach point of interfering with cordial bilateral relations. President stated that critics of US decision to undertake heavy commitments in Ghana must be proven wrong. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17-1 GHANA. Secret. Drafted by Fredericks and Gebelt, cleared by Fredericks and Davis, and approved by Fredericks. 252. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Brubeck) to President Kennedy 252. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Brubeck) to President Kennedy Source Washington, October 30, 1963. Last year you asked that, before Kaiser's first irrevocable commitment of funds for its Valco aluminum project in Ghana we should take one last look at the Volta Dam-Valco project in light of the political situation in Ghana. That time has now come. Unless we object, Kaiser will in the next few days commit a first $1.4 million on Valco. In addition to US, UK, and IBRD commitments for the Volta Dam (already disbursed), US Government liabilities (none yet disbursed) for the Valco project involve: 1. $96 million Eximbank loan to Valco. 2. AID investment guarantee of up to $54 million of Kaiser's liabilities. This first $1.4 million, and indeed any Valco spending, is therefore a US Government liability either as a loan or a guaranty. There have been no political developments in Ghana in the past year that would warrant seriously reconsidering the Valco project. On the contrary the Ghana situation is probably somewhat improved: 1. The Volta Dam is going very well and Nkrumah is very happy about both the Dam and Valco. 2. Kaiser's relations with Nkrumah are excellent and they have a lot of influence on him. 3. Ambassador Mahoney has good relations and some influence with Nkrumah—e.g. Nkrumah threw a reception for the Peace Corps at his request. 4. Nkrumah has made some friendly gestures—such as expressing admiration for your accomplishments on civil rights. 5. Nkrumah is making a major drive, including new favorable legislation, to increase foreign investment. The adverse factors of course remain—active Communist influence, anti-Western propaganda, and Ghanaian performance on international issues that is usually on the other side from ours (e.g. the Ghanaian attack on the US in the UN this week on South Africa). On balance, however, there has been no serious deterioration, and the Volta-Valco project is serving well its political purpose—to retain a significant Western role and influence in Ghana. If you agree, I will indicate to Kaiser that we have no objection to their going ahead with their Valco investment schedule. William H. Brubeck 1 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Ghana Subjects. Secret. 1 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 253. Memorandum of Conversation 253. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, November 19, 1963. SUBJECT Situation in Ghana PARTICIPANTS The President William P. Mahoney, Jr., American Ambassador to Ghana I called on President Kennedy this morning to report on the situation in Ghana and answer questions he might have. I first gave him a brief appraisal. I mentioned that we have had a period of comparative calm in Ghana during the past four months, chiefly because of moderation in the press, but that no fundamental changes had occurred in Nkrumah's attitude, and we should be ready for further outbreaks, especially as African issues sharpen. I told him that Nkrumah had good control but that Ghana is probably moving into an era of political unrest as a result of economic pressures from diminishing reserves, continued heavy spending and a rather severe tax program. I told him I thought Nkrumah would survive this difficulty because of his pragmatic approach to domestic politics. I said that although we could expect further trouble and perhaps increased Bloc penetration, Ghana was a good bet in the long haul because of its many Western institutions and traditions. The President asked me what I thought of Nkrumah's ideas, specifically whether he is a Marxist. I replied that Nkrumah is a badly confused and immature person who is not quite sure of what he wants except that he wants to lead all of Africa. I said he has much Marxism in his makeup but that his performance, as in the development of Ghana's domestic economy, was mixed and that internally there was promise of Ghana's being at least partially Western. I said that in the field of foreign relations Nkrumah frequently serves the purposes of Mao and Khrushchev but that he was too much of an egotist ever willingly to be their pawn. In short, I said, his Marxist bark was worse than his bite and that I felt we must learn to live with him. The President asked how the Volta Project was going, mentioning that we were now at a point where heavy financial outlays are to be made under the loan program. I replied the project was on schedule and going well. I mentioned that I realized his decision to go ahead with this project was a difficult one. I added that in my opinion he would not regret it and that the Volta Project will prove a lasting boon to Ghana, with or without Nkrumah. I also said that it would be very hazardous to withdraw now and that if we did, the Russians would probably pick up the chips, or at least give the impression of doing so. The President also inquired about the leftist press. I said it was still a sore point on which we have been able to obtain only temporary relief. I then mentioned Nkrumah's recent speech to the Pan-African journalists in which he characterized the U.S. as a neo-colonialist power and alleged our press was the tool of the big interests. The President was very warm in his praise of our Mission's efforts. We were together about fifteen minutes. Summary of Action: None. * Source: Department of State, President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the source text. Transmitted to the White House under cover of a memorandum from Read to McGeorge Bundy, November 26, and approved by Bundy on November 27. Guinea Guinea 254. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball) to Director of Central Intelligence Dulles Washington, April 26, 1961. 255. Paper Prepared by the Ambassador to Guinea (Attwood) Washington, May 18, 1961. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Guinea, 1/61-5/61. Secret. Drafted by Attwood during his Washington consultations. 256. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Guinea Washington, June 24, 1961, 5:26 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770B.5-MSP/6-161. Secret. Drafted by Habib; cleared by Johnson, Williams, Springsteen, Bell, and Fluker and in draft by FitzGerald (ICA), Shriver (Peace Corps), Martin, and Chayes; and approved by Ball. 257. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy Washington, July 1, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770B.5-MSP/7-161. Secret. Drafted by Dumont on June 26. 258. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, July 5, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770B.5-MSP/7-561. No classification marking. 259. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy Washington, July 15, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770B.5-MSP/7-561. Secret. Drafted by Logan and Habib on July 11. 260. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Guinea Washington, January 3, 1962, 7:38 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770B.00/1-362. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Dumont, cleared by Hall (USIS) and O'Sheel, and approved by Ferguson. Repeated to Accra, Dakar, London, Bamako, Paris, and Moscow. 261. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, May 10 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Guinea. Confidential. Drafted by Abrams on May 23; cleared by Hutchinson (AA/AFR), Dumont (in draft), and Tasca; and approved at the White House on June 15. The conversation took place at the White House. 262. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Guinea Washington, September 13, 1962, 8:31 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770B.11/9-1362. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Logan, cleared by Rogers, and approved by Trimble. 263. Background Paper Prepared in the Agency for International Development Washington, October 4, 1962. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2173. Confidential. Drafted by Eugene Abrams and cleared by Trimble, Hutchinson (AID), and Tasca. Prepared for President Toure's visit to Washington in October. 264. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 10, 1962, noon. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Guinea, 10/12/62-10/31/62. Confidential. Drafted by Trimble and Porson (LS) on October 11. The conversation was held at the White House. 265. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 10, 1962, noon. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Guinea, 10/12/62-10/31/62. Confidential. Drafted by Trimble and Porson on October 12. The conversation was held at the White House. 266. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, May 1, 1963, 9:30 a.m. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Guinea, 5/63. Confidential. Drafted by Porson and Trimble. The conversation was held at the White House. 267. Memorandum From Samuel Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) Washington, May 17, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Guinea. Confidential. 268. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, July 19, 1963. Source: Department of State, President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. Confidential. Drafted by Toumayan, Dean, and Poole, and approved in the White House on July 22. The conversation was held at the White House. 269. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Washington, November 12, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Guinea, Security. Confidential. 254. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball) to Director of Central Intelligence Dulles 254. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball) to Director of Central Intelligence Dulles Washington, April 26, 1961. [Source: Department of State, Central Files, 870B.2569/4-2661. Secret. 1 page of source text not declassified.] 255. Paper Prepared by the Ambassador to Guinea (Attwood) 255. Paper Prepared by the Ambassador to Guinea (Attwood) Source Washington, May 18, 1961. SUGGESTED APPROACH TO TOURE As I understood our last conversation, his [Toure's] priorities are industrialization and education. These priorities are quite consistent with the aims of US aid programs in Africa. Therefore, we are prepared to propose to Guinea US aid for a comprehensive, balanced development program 1 to include: 1. A dam on the Konkoure River capable of providing sufficient power for a network of light industry within two years. 2. Assistance in detailed planning of a diversified industrial center geared to Guinea's three-year plan and powered by the dam. 3. Increased generating capacity at Grande Chutte to meet Conak-ry's immediate needs plus a quick start on essential plants. 4. A training program—including staff and equipment—to prepare skilled Guinean administrative and technical personnel for positions in both industry and government. 5. Assistance in expanding facilities for higher education at the projected University at Delaba. 6. Staffing of an expanded English-teaching program under the Ministry of Education. 7. An offer of food and other commodities in the US which would generate local currency as required to finance above projects. 8. A Peace Corps contingent to be placed at the disposal of the Guinean Government for ancillary projects urgently needed by Guinea—these to be decided upon in consultation with Mr. Shriver. We count on maximum Guinean participation in all phases of the program. The keynote of US aid is not charity but cooperation. To speed the programming and implementation of the development program, an ICA mission consisting of ______ will arrive in Guinea on June ____. To determine the scope and nature of the Peace Corps program, Mr. Sargent Shriver will be in Guinea on June ____ as President Kennedy's personal representative and can discuss the matter with him then. To facilitate the financing of portions of the program, we will urge a representative of the IBRD to come to Conakry to discuss with him the advantages of joining the IBRD. (If mention is made of the big Konkoure Dam and/or smelter) The USG is primarily interested in creating the conditions for sound economic development aimed at raising living standards. We feel that the program we propose is better designed to meet Guinea's immediate problems—such as employment, production and education. The big dam and smelter are essentially designed to support and expand the existing bauxite industry and will not show results for several years. We doubt if the American people will set aside this much money at this time for an African project that will not directly or promptly benefit people. Our proposed program does not rule out the eventual construction of a big dam and smelter. Much depends on the trend of the world aluminum market. The private companies involved in the Fria and Boke might well be more disposed to reconsider the financing of this project in the future. (If he says he is obliged to accept the Russianoffer to build the dam and smelter) I will have to return to Washington to determine how this would affect our proposal. The problem is not that we object to his accepting Russian aid. The problem is that Russian preemption of Konkoure hydroelectric power for their purposes might make our development program no longer feasible. 2 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Guinea, 1/61-5/61. Secret. Drafted by Attwood during his Washington consultations. 1 Attached to the source text but not printed is a 15-page paper entitled “A US Aid Program for Guinea.” 2 On May 25, Ambassador Attwood met with President Kennedy and outlined the proposed aid program for Guinea, which had been approved at a conference of representatives of the several interested bureaus and ICA. The President commented that if they could find the money, it looked good to him. (Department of State, AF/AFW Files: Lot 64 D 93, Guinea Aid Package 23.4) On May 31, Attwood presented the integrated U.S. aid proposal to President Sekou Toure in Conakry. (Telegram 537 from Conakry, June 1; ibid., Central Files, 770B.5-MSP/6-161) 256. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Guinea 256. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Guinea Source Washington, June 24, 1961, 5:26 p.m. 728. Re: Embtel 557. 1 Dept agrees your approach Sekou Toure along lines set forth reftel with modifications and additions indicated below. In reviewing Guinean counter-proposals Dept has been guided by three basic considerations: First, we wish use current favorable climate Guinea-US relations to move into a position in which US has increased role and influence in Guinea. Second, we wish alter previous drift Guinea into Soviet camp and move Guinea to neutral position at this stage and re-integration into African political-economic scene. Third, we wish to provide basis for continued US and other Free World access to Guinea's bauxite reserves. Key element in achieving these objectives is pre-emption by West of Konkoure dam site. Convinced here Russians will, if possible, undertake construct large dam and related smelter. If Soviets succeed takeover Konkoure in addition to present magnitude their role Guinea, overwhelming Soviet presence will make achievement general US objectives more remote if not impossible. Dept hopes that within these broad guidelines you will be able to maneuver on basis excellent reception you have received. We therefore view your current negotiations with Toure as a series of proposals and counter-proposals but always with our basic objectives in mind. At this stage therefore suggest you explore proposals with Toure along following lines: 1. Express pleasure basis for cooperation and understanding has been established, and indicate we welcome seriousness with which GOG considered US proposals. In view of positive nature GOG reply we wish proceed with cooperative aid program to assist Guinea's economic and social development. Guinean counter-proposals have been studied carefully and you now wish convey our reactions. 2. Make frank approach question small Souapiti dam along lines you propose in reftel. If this does not result in Toure accepting original offer inform him that Kinkon project completely new to us and difficult judge feasibility without study. This will take considerable time. Stress fact we willing proceed with Souapiti on belief French studies have established feasibility. Souapiti could be basis early widespread industrialization and electrification Conakry and coastal areas, while Kinkon may be suitable only meet more modest needs Labe region. Moreover, Souapiti remains feasible as first phase larger project. 3. If Toure still insistent our undertaking Kinkon you should then indicate US willingness examine Kinkon project while going ahead with Souapiti. FYI. Should results Kinkon study prove favorable US would still not finance that project (and Souapiti) without help IBRD and maximum GOG contribution. IBRD has informed Dept that expression of interest on part Ambassador Conte would suffice for Bank send mission discuss membership. We are unable see way make any offer major Konkoure project at this time. Your suggestion shift Boke financing not feasible as aluminum companies unwilling proceed Boke without extensive US Govt financing in any case. Nevertheless, Dept believes control Konkoure remains key to Guinea development and retention bauxite for West and we prepared consider Kinkon only if this would enable us pre-empt Souapiti site. End FYI. 4. Do not associate our offer to look into Kinkon with Guinea assurance three year postponement decision on big Konkoure project. We believe postponement would not contribute to our basic objective of pre-empting Souapiti site. 5. FYI. Dept is reviewing its position on support for Boke in light possibility Konkoure project remains open to Soviets. Pending resolution Souapiti problem we are delaying decision assist financing Boke on basis companies new proposal and informing consortium we cannot give definite answer for some time, probably two months. This will allow you time conduct unhurried negotiations with GOG. If Soviets build smelter and dam, this will put entirely different complexion on US consideration aid to Boke. You should therefore avoid mentioning possible US aid to Boke although Dept agrees you should point out uncertainties will arise in minds of aluminum companies if Soviets build Konkoure. If it develops that Boke consortium ceases operations, US should be disassociated from decision. End FYI. 6. Re other points in package while we will try complete industrial plants by end 1963 we prefer avoid firm commitments until projects surveyed. Re-emphasize proposed plants illustrative, dependent upon Souapiti power, and on results surveys as well as GOG desires. Changes may occur but we hope mutual agreement on technical and economic feasibility would be ruling factors. 7. We believe our aid would be more effective through providing aid to school of administration rather than technical school as proposed by GOG. Administration was one of problems Toure cited earlier and aid this field would enable more rapid Guineaization public and private sectors. Without closing door to possibility technical training as proposed by GOG you should seek return their attention to our original proposal. FYI. Our interests would be better served through developing channels influence on administrative personnel. We might be willing to do both but wonder if there any relationship between such assistance and Soviet Technological Institute. End FYI. 8. Nature of US aid to agriculture should be left for final determination USOM survey. 9. Make clear that US proposal to supply imports for generating local currency was related to agricultural commodities available under PL 480 and limited amounts other commodities related directly to aid projects within package. FYI. We are reluctant consider new projects at this time e.g. road construction, nor are we prepared have US equipment used on non-US projects. End FYI. 10. Use Peace Corps Volunteers subject of separate instruction. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770B.5-MSP/6-161. Secret. Drafted by Habib; cleared by Johnson, Williams, Springsteen, Bell, and Fluker and in draft by FitzGerald (ICA), Shriver (Peace Corps), Martin, and Chayes; and approved by Ball. 1 In telegram 557, June 16, Ambassador Attwood reported that he and U.S. Peace Corps Director Sargent Shriver, who was in Guinea as President Kennedy's special representative, had discussed the Government of Guinea's response to the U.S. aid proposal with the Minister of Public Works, Ismael Toure, and Guinea's Ambassador to the United States, Seydou Conte. Attwood summarized Guinea's counterproposals, offered some specific suggestions for a U.S. response, and asked for the Department's comments and instructions as soon as possible. (Ibid., 770B.5-MSP/6-1661) 257. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy 257. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy Source Washington, July 1, 1961. SUBJECT Latest Developments with Regard to our Guinea Aid Program I have read with interest Mr. Shriver's thoughtful memorandum to you of June 20 regarding his recent visit to Guinea. 1 His conclusions confirm our own conviction that now is the time for us to make a really serious endeavor to help Sekou Toure and his Government in order to reduce Guinea's dependence on the Soviet Bloc and bring that country back somewhere near a line of true neutralism. The submission of Mr. Shriver's memorandum takes place at a propitious moment, for Ambassador Attwood has now received a formal response to his presentation to Toure of our aid package, about which you were informed by the Ambassador during his recent consultation here in Washington. From the paper Ambassador Attwood showed you at the White House you will recall the essentials of our aid package to Guinea, 2 so I will not go into detail in enumerating its component parts. Let me simply say that Ambassador Attwood has made his presentation to President Toure, and the latter's reaction was favorable. Now we have received Guinea's specific counter proposals, which, while not entirely to our liking, are nonetheless not discouraging and are of a nature to encourage our going back to Toure with further details and reemphasis on the most important parts of our original package. The principal element in the Guinea Government's counter proposal is that Toure apparently wants to keep the Souapiti site on the Konkoure River available for the original large Konkoure project involving an aluminum smelter plant and a dam, hoping that an offer will still be forthcoming (from us or the Russians) to carry out this major undertaking “from any source at some future date.” Instead of accepting our proposal for going to work right away to build a modest dam and power installation at Souapiti (which could later on be expanded to meet Guinea's original desires for a major smelter-dam operation), Guinea suggests that we construct a hydro-electric project (40,000 kw) at Kinkon, located on one of the tributaries of the Konkoure, farther up north in the Fouta Djallon. Sekou Toure's half brother, Ismael Toure, who is Minister of Public Works, informed Ambassador Attwood that the Kinkon project is desired because it would permit the development of industry and the expansion of agriculture in the Labe region, and because it would also serve as a potential source of power for eventual exploitation of the bauxite deposits in Northern Guinea. Reactions in the Department to undertaking the Kinkon project have been unenthusiastic, first because we have no information whatsoever regarding this proposal (and it would take some time before an adequate study of its merits could be undertaken), but primarily because this would leave the Konkoure open for Soviet pre-emption. On the other hand, we have sufficient information on the Konkoure, since surveys of it were begun by the French almost a decade ago. The Guinea Government also suggested other counter proposals, including the substitution of a school for engineers, technicians, and electronic technicians for our own proposed school for administration. The Government also iterated some of the reservations it has had on joining the IMF and the IBRD, although they indicated they would be willing to discuss the possibility of membership with the officials of the Bank, and, we hope, of the Fund. We cannot accept the counter-proposal regarding the use of the Peace Corps for roadbuilding instead of education and health because it implies the furnishing of equipment and materials on a scale too costly to fit into the aid package. We have now considered Guinea's counter-proposals in detail and have just sent Ambassador Attwood a telegram, 3 a copy of which is enclosed, instructing him to stress to President Toure that it would be to Guinea's advantage to have another long and serious look at our original proposal for a modest dam and power installation at Souapiti. We hope that Ambassador Attwood will manage to see President Toure alone when he makes this second approach. If President Toure stands firm on the request that we build a dam at Kinkon we may have to agree to examine this new project, but in such case we would make it clear that we would still be going ahead with our Souapiti proposal. For, as pointed out in enclosed telegram, unless we thus preclude a USSR takeover of the Konkoure, Soviet presence and influence in Guinea could reach a point where our own objectives become remote and perhaps even unattainable. Dean Rusk 4 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770B.5-MSP/7-161. Secret. Drafted by Dumont on June 26. 1 Memorandum from Director of the Peace Corps Shriver to President Kennedy and Secretary of State Rusk, June 20. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Guinea) 2 Document 255 . 3 Document 256 . 4 Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original. 258. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk 258. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk Source Washington, July 5, 1961. With reference to your memorandum of July 1, 1961 concerning the latest developments with regard to our Guinea Aid Program 1 is there any chance that we could finance the big dam in Guinea if we omitted all the other elements of our aid program? How much would we pay off dollar wise to be able to do this? * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770B.5-MSP/7-561. No classification marking. 1 Document 257 . 259. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy 259. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy Source Washington, July 15, 1961. SUBJECT Guinea Aid Program In your memorandum of July 5, 1 you asked whether we could finance the big dam in Guinea if we omitted all other elements of our aid program for that country and what it would cost in dollars to do this. The big Konkoure hydro-electric project would cost about $180-200 million, but it would serve no purpose unless it were associated with an aluminum smelter to use most of the power generated. Depending upon the size of the installation, a smelter would cost anywhere from $115 million to $160 million. The entire project would, therefore, cost from a minimum of about $295 million to a maximum of about $360 million and would take about five to six years to complete. The projects in the aid program which Ambassador Attwood proposed to the Guinea Government involve a total cost of about $45-50 million over a period of two to three years. This program is composed of $34-40 million for a small version of the Konkoure Dam plus about $10 million for other projects such as industrial development, a school for public administration, and English language training. Therefore, if the United States were to undertake only the dam and related smelter the total cost would be $250-310 million more than we presently contemplate undertaking, assuming Sekou Toure accepts our package program. In addition to the preceding, however, we are also considering financial assistance for the development of the Boke bauxite resources by a private Western consortium. Here the amount of the United States commitment could be as much as $130 million in loans plus a guaranty of equity investment for which we would have to reserve as much as $15 million, or a total of $145 million. The entire complex—Konkoure, smelter, and Boke—could cost us anywhere from about $440 to about $500 million. If we were to undertake the big Konkoure project, we would, of course, seek participation by the IBRD and third countries. We have as yet no assurances that Guinea would join the Fund and Bank, and the chances are that other non-US Government participation will be limited. If the US were to undertake financing this complex (or even the small dam), we would be obligated to provide the entire sum, reduced only to the extent we could get participation by others. The sums involved would appear to require a disproportionately large amount of US aid to Guinea relative to other demands on our limited aid resources. More friendly African states would react adversely if the US were heavily involved in the financing of a large dam and other extensive facilities in Guinea especially following announcement of our support of the large Volta project in Ghana. Several of these nations have also requested or indicated they will be seeking US assistance to construct large dams, (i.e., Kouilou, Sotuba, Inga and Niger dams). We have, therefore, concluded that we should not make any offer on the big Konkoure project at this time, but should permit Ambassador Attwood to continue exploring our current proposals with Sekou Toure, and await the results before developing any alternative programs in Guinea. Dean Rusk 2 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770B.5-MSP/7-561. Secret. Drafted by Logan and Habib on July 11. 1 Document 258 . 2 Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original. 260. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Guinea 260. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Guinea Source Washington, January 3, 1962, 7:38 p.m. 406. US Govt policy during present Guinean crisis 1 has been strict hands off and playdown by official US media including VOA. Reasoning: Bloc activity may possibly be reduced, we hope it will be curtailed and come under closer GOG surveillance, but there is no evidence USSR or other Bloc countries will be kicked out of Guinea. Any Western propaganda hailing Guinea events as smashing victory for West could boom-erang if, as likely, it forced Toure to soft-pedal or stop present attacks on Marxist-Leninists. Obvious Toure is caught in serious intra-party quarrel and is not free agent. Because Dept has made serious efforts to play down Guinea crisis in official media (with exception South American audiences) believe it in our interest you make known to Toure efforts US Govt to make things as easy as possible for Toure, insofar as its activity and influence make this possible. Assume Toure would be appreciative this forbearance as constituting gesture sympathy towards him in his present trouble and mark of US good-will and friendship. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770B.00/1-362. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Dumont, cleared by Hall (USIS) and O'Sheel, and approved by Ferguson. Repeated to Accra, Dakar, London, Bamako, Paris, and Moscow. 1 Reference is to the outbreak of violent strikes and demonstrations against the Government of Guinea by teachers and students which began in mid-November 1961. President Toure and other officials accused Communist groups and Soviet bloc embassies of trying to overthrow the government, and asked the Soviet Ambassador to leave the country. 261. Memorandum of Conversation 261. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, May 10 1962. SUBJECT The President's Meeting with the Guinean Ministerial Delegation PARTICIPANTS Guinea M. Moussa Diakite, Minister-Governor of the Bank of the Republic of Guinea M. Alassane Diop, Minister of Telecommunications M. Alpha Abdoulaye Diallo, Director of Cabinet, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ambassador Seydou Conte M. Mamadou Bah, Director of the National Credit Bank U.S. The President Mr. Edmund C. Hutchinson, Assistant Administrator, Bureau of African and European Affairs, A.I.D. Mr. Henry J. Tasca, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, State Dept. Mr. Donald Dumont, Acting Director, Office of West African Affairs, State Dept. Mr. Eugene Abrams, Acting Director, US A.I.D. Guinea The President welcomed the Delegation and inquired whether Mr. Diakite had any comments to make. Mr. Diakite stated that the Guinean Delegation was most pleased with the results of their visit to the U.S., adding that the Delegation was grateful for this generous assistance that the President, through A.I.D., was making available to Guinea. The Minister reviewed Guinea's past relations with the U.S., expressing gratitude for the timely U.S. assistance given at the outset of Guinea's difficult access to independence. He went on to describe Guinea's current economic difficulties, mentioning the failure of certain countries to live up to their promises, and specifically Guinea's balance of payment problems. The President inquired as to whether the Delegation had discussed this situation with Mr. Per Jacobssen of the IMF. Mr. Diakite replied that discussions with the IMF were still under way and requested that the President support Guinea's request for membership in the IMF. The President replied that he would speak to Secretary Dillon regarding the best course of action to take. Mr. Diakite stated that the IMF was attempting to put Guinea in the same class as Togo; i.e., a small small country, eligible for an $11 million quota, whereas the Guineans felt that based on comparisons of exports and imports Guinea should be more appropriately considered a big small country like Senegal, which had a $25 million quota. The President then inquired as to the amount of aid, budgetary or otherwise, that Guinea was receiving from the French. Mr. Diakite replied that Guinea was receiving no assistance whatsoever from the French. In fact, he went on to state, the French owed Guinea a considerable amount of money. He described this debt as taking the form of pensions owed by the French Government to veterans of French Military service which Guinea had been paying since independ-ence at the rate of some $8 million per year, now totaling approximately $30 million. The President then inquired as to whether the Guineans had attempted to resolve their differences with the French with a view to re-establishing normal relations between the two countries. Mr. Diakite replied that President Sekou Toure had written to President De Gaulle upon the signature of the Evian agreements, but that this gesture had had no echo. The President then stated that he was seeing French Ambassador Alphand the next day and would inform him of the visit of the Guinean delegation. He went on to say that he did not want to see most African countries having access to the Common Market with Guinea left out. The President then inquired as to Guinea's reserves in gold. Mr. Diakite replied that Guinea had no gold reserves, but that her foreign exchange reserves consisted of approximately $30 million. He went on to describe in general terms Guinea's balance of payments difficulties. He described how certain foreign enterprises had made commitments to their foreign lenders and how Guinea respected these commitments. He stated that Guinea's imports matched approximately her exports but that the capital repayment requirements of these foreign enterprises resulted in a deficit of approximately $30 million per year. He went on to state that Guinea wished to settle its accounts with France, but that raising of the question of Guinea's participation in the Common Market prior to normalization of relations on an overall basis would be premature. Mr. Diakite reiterated the gratitude of his Government for the generous assistance provided by the U.S. He specifically mentioned the Investment Guaranty Agreement which had been signed the day before, as well as the commodity import assistance to which the U.S. had committed itself. He stated parenthetically that Guinea should be considered apart from other African countries because it had no metropole to support its currency system. He suggested that a possible solution to this problem might lie in permitting Guinea to utilize local currencies generated by U.S. import programs for the purchase of U.S. material. The President explained that local currencies generated by P.L. 480 or other import programs could not be converted to dollars. He again expressed his surprise that no French assistance was being made available to Guinea. The President then pointed out that the U.S. also had its balance of payment problems. He cited the $100 billion that the U.S. had made available to other countries for aid. He pointed to the loss of $11 billion in gold from U.S. reserves, pointing out that if the U.S. ceased its aid operations it would have no balance of payments problem. He explained that in the U.S., a free country, he had requested the Congress for $4.75 billion in foreign aid funds but that he had no assurance that these funds would be forthcoming, pointing to last year's cut of $1 billion in the foreign aid program. He described how, whenever a dam was proposed for a foreign country, certain congressmen said they needed dams in their districts. The President stated that he did not wish the Delegation to leave thinking that the U.S. was not concerned with the problems of Guinea. He stated that on the contrary he had been impressed by the cordial and sincere welcome given to the various American representatives who had gone to Guinea, mentioning specifically the hearty welcome given to his brother-in-law, Mr. Shriver. The President went on to state that the U.S. desired a truly independent Guinea, free from the East-West struggle. He understood Guinea's position, citing the neutral policy that the U.S. had maintained for 100 years. The President concluded by expressing the hope that the Guinean Delegation would understand why the U.S. could not do all that it wished. The President, in an aside to Messrs. Hutchinson and Abrams, stated that efforts should be made to make full use of the P.L. 480 program in assisting Guinea in its balance of payments problems. In a final observation, as the group broke up, the President remarked that the U.S. considered Guinea a big small country. The group then went out on the veranda off the Cabinet room for pictures, followed by an introduction to Miss Caroline Kennedy, who was playing on the lawn. * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Guinea. Confidential. Drafted by Abrams on May 23; cleared by Hutchinson (AA/AFR), Dumont (in draft), and Tasca; and approved at the White House on June 15. The conversation took place at the White House. 262. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Guinea 262. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Guinea Source Washington, September 13, 1962, 8:31 p.m. 184. Deptel 180. Following based upon uncleared memo conversation between Secretary and Amb. Conte Sept 12 requested by latter. 1 Secretary assured Conte that although President's schedule very full he would make every effort see President Toure if this can be arranged. He emphasized that US aid commitment would be most difficult even though USG has genuine interest in Guinean development. He hoped concrete expression this interest would be shown in discussion with President and that public statement could be made following meeting that talks had covered problems of Guinea's economic development in which USG prepared interest itself. Announcement any definite aid commitment would set unfortunate precedent in regard President's meetings with other distinguished foreign visitors and might aggravate Administration's difficulties if made while Congress was still considering FY63 aid appropriation. Secretary also stressed importance economic assistance from other Western industrialized nations and suggested proposed talk between two Presidents would provide opening obtain such assistance. Hoped that Conte and Toure would agree that under circumstances main emphasis would be placed on fact that conversations had taken place and other questions treated in subsidiary manner. Conte thanked Secretary for comments. He stated that although meeting with President most important aspect of trip, possible public announcements should convey impression Toure here to attend UNGA. Among several reasons for this is fact Guinea having difficulties with SovBloc. Guinea had oriented trade and economy toward Bloc. Furthermore, recently Bloc has sought to meddle in Guinean internal affairs. Guinea's economic situation difficult although not “dramatic.” US had been unable respond to first Guinean overtures for aid immediately after independence; now that new difficulties have arisen Guinea again turning to US. Conte said he appreciated difficulty which precise statement on aid would present for US. He had come to understand philosophy of US assistance and understood President might not have authority make commitment until Congress had acted on aid appropriation. He intended fly Conakry next day to explain US position to Toure. Since relations between US and Guinea have greatly improved and further improvement anticipated, Conte felt particularly important that possibility misunderstanding be avoided. Secretary said he encouraged by Conte's comments. Present Administration had taken political risks to improve relations with Guinea; these appear have paid off. Asst Sec Williams pointed out Conte had also taken political risks in working improve US-Guinea ties and therefore deserved much credit for present situation. Secretary continued that improved relations would be further justification for direct contact between two Presidents and also provide good explanation for meeting. USG felt meeting should in no way be interpreted as signifying some crisis exists. On contrary, meeting useful step in normal development international relations. Conte agreed. In closing, Secretary asked Conte for early indication Toure's intentions in order permit rearrangement President's schedule for possible meeting Toure. Conte promised furnish information soonest. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770B.11/9-1362. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Logan, cleared by Rogers, and approved by Trimble. 1 The memorandum of conversation is ibid., Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330, 9/62. 263. Background Paper Prepared in the Agency for International Development 263. Background Paper Prepared in the Agency for International Development Source Washington, October 4, 1962. U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IN GUINEA Summary The United States is providing the major portion of Western assist-ance to Guinea. To date, total United States aid commitments in all categories amount to just under $20 million, the majority of which has been Food for Peace. The bulk of United States assistance commitments, approximately $16 million, have been made in the past year, starting with the aid offers made by Ambassador Attwood in May 1961. The offers, consisting of projects in the fields of education (vocation), industry, power, public administration, agriculture, and commodity imports, were well received by the Guineans and continue to be the basis for the FY 1962 and 1963 programs. At the time of the visit of the Guinean Ministerial Delegation in May 1962, $2.5 million of balance of payments assist-ance for commodity imports was added to the commitments previously made. Implementation is now well under way with commodity deliveries being made on a regular basis. With improvement of Guinea's relations with the United States, Guinea in August 1962 requested a Peace Corps program. The objectives of the United States program in Guinea have been to lessen Guinea's dependence on the Soviet Bloc and to stimulate private investment from the West as one of the ways to start the country toward economic development. It has become apparent that a measure of success has been registered in these areas. The trend towards United States sources of supply, using private importers, has been accelerating. An Investment Code, encouraging private investment, has been promulgated by the Guinean Government. Individual Guinean entrepreneurs are planning various industrial enterprises in collaboration with United States investors. An Industrial Growth program, financed by a United States Development Grant, will shortly be activated for the purpose of accelerating private investment. Discussion The first assistance given by the United States to Guinea consisted of $1.7 million of Title II PL 480 rice and flour delivered in 1959. This was in response to an urgent request from the country based on widespread rice crop failures. At the time of President Toure's visit to the United States in October 1959 a further United States offer consisting of 150 scholarships and an English language teacher training program was made. This offer was accepted and the program became operational during the summer of 1960. Again in response to Guinean requests for assistance $1 million of Section 402 rice, flour, and milk were made available to Guinea from FY 1960 funds with deliveries made in the spring of 1961. With the scholarship and English language programs costed at a total of $1.1 million, cumulative United States assistance up until the spring of 1961 was $3.8 million over the preceding three years. In April 1961, with the arrival of Ambassador Attwood in Guinea, a significant United States aid offer was made to President Toure consisting of projects in the fields of education, public administration, industry, power, and agriculture. These activities were estimated to cost $2.5 million. In addition, $1 million of commodity imports for balance of payments assistance was offered. A small dam and a Peace Corps contingent were included in this aid offer but were not accepted by Guinea at that time. Negotiations were also begun for a three-year program to provide Guinea with needed surplus agricultural commodities. These negotiations were completed and agreements were signed in February 1962, providing for $10.2 million worth of rice and flour over a three-year period. An increment of $470,000 was added to this agreement in May 1962, providing for deliveries of edible oil, milk and milk products. Also, at the time of the visit of the Guinean Ministerial Delegation to Washington in May 1962 an additional $2.5 million for commodity imports balance of payments assistance was made, thus bringing the total commodity import assistance for FY 1962 to $3.5 million. As of June 30, 1962, total obligations for that year were $6,106,000. Based on analysis by the Embassy and USAID, a program has been drawn up for FY 1963 which provides for a total of $18,525,000 composed of $7 million for commodity imports, $2,535,000 in development grants and $9 million of prospective development loans. It is anticipated that in addition to the foregoing the value of the PL 480 Title I will be considerably augmented by new Guinean requests for increased quantities of items already provided for in that program, e.g., rice, flour, and milk as well as the addition of new items such as meat, fruit, vegetables, etc. The Guinean Government has drawn up a tentative list of import requirements to be financed by the United States. This list, totaling $30 million, was informally transmitted to USAID in Conakry on September 25. A preliminary analysis shows that a great many of the items requested would be ineligible for United States financing because of either the source of supply (France, Italy, West Germany) or the type of item in question (luxury goods). It is possible that further discussions over the coming weeks with the Guineans in Conakry will permit reduction of this list to a hard core of essential commodities totaling $15-$18 million including Title I sales. Furthermore, the Guineans have included in this import requirements list provision for certain equipment which would be ineligible for financing as commodity imports but would rather be included in project assistance either under development grants or loans. It is becoming apparent that one of the major United States objectives, that of encouraging participation by both American and Guinean private enterprise in the development of that country's economy, is being accelerated considerably by the A.I.D. program. The signature of the investment guaranty agreement in May 1962 has generated considerable interest on the part of small, medium, and large United States investors (Harvey Aluminum, Olin Mathieson, Pan American Airlines, etc.) and several projects are now under active consideration in the mining and manufacturing areas. Additionally, the United States financed commodity import program has tended to encourage the Guineans to do their importing through normal commercial channels. Activities (such as feasibility surveys, promotion of investment opportunities, training of Guinean entrepreneurs, etc.) of American consulting engineering firms are being launched and should be operational before the end of this calendar year. * Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2173. Confidential. Drafted by Eugene Abrams and cleared by Trimble, Hutchinson (AID), and Tasca. Prepared for President Toure's visit to Washington in October. 264. Memorandum of Conversation 264. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, October 10, 1962, noon. SUBJECT African Unity and Guinean-American Relations PARTICIPANTS Americans The President Carl Kaysen, Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs William Attwood, American Ambassador to Guinea Edmond C. Hutchinson, Assistant Administrator for Africa and Europe, AID William C. Trimble, Director of the Office of West Coast and Malian Affairs Foreign Sekou Toure, President of the Republic of Guinea Saidou Conte, Ambassador of the Republic of Guinea Louis Lansana Beavogui, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Guinea N'Famara Keita, Minister of Commerce of the Republic of Guinea Alassane Diop, Minister of Posts and Telecommunications of the Republic of Guinea Ousmane Balde, Vice Governor of the Bank of the Republic of Guinea The President opened the conversation by assuring President Toure of United States interest in Africa and its problems, an interest, which he was sure President Toure had already sensed in his talks with Ambassador Attwood and Assistant Secretary Williams. We believe that the interests of the United States are closely linked with those of Africa. Consequently, we believe that increased stability, increased economic development, a more intimate association of African nations and greater security in Africa will lead to greater security in the Free World as a whole. As an example of our interest, the President mentioned our efforts to bring about stability in the Congo and our support of the UN to prevent the secession of Katanga. He also cited our efforts to aid the African countries within the limits of our own resources. The President continued that he had been very interested in President Toure's speech at the UN on October 9, in particular the point he had made on the drop in raw material prices, a development which was a matter of concern not only to Africa but also to other parts of the world such as Latin America. The decline has been very sharp over the past three years and, unfortunately, gone far to wipe out the benefits of aid the under-developed countries have been receiving from the United States and other nations. In Latin America the drop in the price of certain commodities, such as coffee and bananas, has led to a decrease in the stand-ard of living despite foreign aid. This is a major economic problem for the under-developed countries and therefore should receive greater attention from the industrially advanced nations. The President stated that we are trying to persuade the countries associated in the Common Market and the other nations of Western Europe to open up their wealth for products of the under-developed countries and we are seeking commodity agreements for the stabilization of prices. Furthermore, we are endeavoring to encourage private capital to invest in the under-developed nations and to further the industrialization of those countries so that they will not be dependent on one or two basic commodities. The President said that these are problems which should concern all industrially developed nations as well as countries like Guinea. The President concluded his opening remarks by asking President Toure's opinion on the possibilities for increased unity among the African countries, pointing out that such unity would permit the African countries to play a greater role in resolving problems of mutual concern such as the Congo. President Toure did not comment on the President's remarks regarding raw material prices. With respect to African unity, he said that Guinea had taken various steps. Contacts with other African Governments had made clear that they are unanimous in their support for greater unity, and he predicted that this will become increasingly evident in the coming months. A greater cooperation among the African nations will lead to greater confidence and provide greater possibilities for the rapid economic and social development of the Continent. All African countries, President Toure stated, are in agreement that the terms of unity should respect the institutions and traditions of each country and that cooperation among them should be centered in the cultural and economic fields. Guinea, he said, is pleased to see that the United States recognizes the need for and favors greater African unity, for a divided Africa would be detrimental to world peace. President Toure continued that his present visit to the United States demonstrates the sincere desire of the Guinean Government and the people to cooperate with the United States, and that they are very happy at the understanding that has been established between the two countries. He wished to pay tribute to the Administration for removing various misconceptions which had existed about Guinea and its Government. He also paid tribute to the work of Ambassador Attwood, stating that his efforts are much appreciated by the people of Guinea and have contributed greatly to the present understanding and friendship between Guinea and the United States. * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Guinea, 10/12/62-10/31/62. Confidential. Drafted by Trimble and Porson (LS) on October 11. The conversation was held at the White House. 265. Memorandum of Conversation 265. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, October 10, 1962, noon. SUBJECT Problems Facing Guinea and Guinean Suggestions with regard to United States Aid PARTICIPANTS [Here follows the same list of participants as Document 264 .] President Toure said that Guinea is a small underpopulated country, but along with other African nations has many big problems. The countries of Africa now find themselves at a crossroads, with various routes open. Guinea's choice will depend on how rapidly it can move to meet its human needs. First efforts after independence were to consolidate the bases of the new State. The evolution of the nations of Africa has not followed the same pattern as in Europe. In the older countries, economic organization preceded the State. In Africa, the State must create the nation. During the colonial period the countries of Africa were divided in such a way that traditional ethnic groups were separated from one another. The Guinean Government has sought to create a viable State, and for this political action is indispensable in order that all ethnic groups may share the same goals. Certain people have criticized the Guineans or have harbored certain misconceptions about them. This has occasioned difficulties for the Guineans, but thanks to the efforts of men of goodwill, President Toure believed that Guinea's position is now more clearly understood. Today, the bases of the State have been created. Although Guinea, like other African countries, has pressing economic problems, the Guinean people have faith in themselves and are prepared to make every sacrifice in the development of their country. President Toure asserted his Government must now deal with human needs: the people must have adequate food and adequate housing, the sick must be cared for and the illiterate taught—these are the main preoccupations of his Government. To meet these needs, Guinea must have the cooperation of other countries, and Guinea attaches great importance to the cooperation of the United States. President Toure hoped that this cooperation would develop further: that is his desire and the desire of the Guinean people. Guinea has many latent possibilities. It is a country of great economic diversity, since most of the natural resources found elsewhere in Africa also exist in Guinea. With respect to industrialization, Guinea possesses enough; necessary raw materials, and its power resources only need to be developed. President Toure said he wished to suggest that the United States aid take various forms. The assistance thus far received has been extremely useful, particularly in 1961 when Guinea was suffering from a severe draught and the United States generously made food available. He hoped that American aid can be broadened and diversified, thus permitting the further development of his country. After mentioning the reasons why Guinea had initially turned to the East for assistance and summarizing the difficulties which had arisen in dealing with the Bloc (covered in separate memorandum), 1 President Toure expressed his concern about the execution of the three-year development plan. He was, he said, fearful that it would be unsuccessful despite its modest nature and the full support being given to it by the Guinean people. For example, the plan gives priority to infrastructure projects such as aviation, a printing plant, schools and health facilities. This is all well, but President Toure is worried whether there will be enough food for his people. Agricultural production has declined, and this was also true in the industrial sector. To illustrate the point, he said, that although Guinea produces large quantities of coconuts and palm kernels, serious shortages of soap and edible oils exist. This situation also has a political aspect, for the Guinean people wish the plan to succeed. President Toure therefore would like to see more vegetable oils proc-essed in Guinea in order that his country can meet some, if not all, of its needs for these products. Also, he would like more soap to be produced locally from domestic raw materials, thereby eliminating the depend-ence upon imported soap. He added that these two sectors had been neglected by the Socialist countries in their aid program for Guinea. He did not consider it necessary to give all the reasons why these projects would be of great value to Guinea, but felt strongly, that if carried out, they would show the Guinean people that something is being done for their country. With respect to current and future United States aid, President Toure said he wished to suggest three forms it might take: 1. Assistance in bringing Guinea's foreign trade into balance. AID has helped this year, and continued assistance would be very useful; 2. Assistance to small firms and enterprises which do not require large capital but do need equipment. This type of aid, he suggested, could be carried out through joint cooperation—the United States providing equipment and Guinea the manpower and local costs. Americans could even manage the enterprises until the investment has been amortized. President Toure believed that this kind of assistance would have considerable impact, not only in Guinea but also in other parts of Africa for the latter would see for themselves that Guinea does not permit “certain nations” to introduce systems it does not wish. Guinea has been able to resist this type of pressure from the Bloc because of the stability of its institutions, but there are other countries which do not possess the same capacity to resist; 3. Large scale economic development projects. In 1960 the United States Government had sent a message to Guinea expressing its interest in the Konkoure dam project. President Toure believed that the completion of the Konkoure dam would lead to the establishment of many small enterprises. Guinea has great potential power resources, but at present many villages lack electricity, and power is very expensive. Guinea therefore attaches major importance to the project. During his visit to the USSR the Soviet Government had told President Toure that it favored the project, and a communique to that effect had been issued. However, his experiences with FRIA had shown him what complications and technical difficulties might develop if the Russians were to take charge of the project, and he therefore had decided not to carry out the agreement with the Soviets. If the United States were willing to help build the dam, its assistance might come from the United States Government direct or from private American firms or from national or international banks. President Toure then mentioned several other projects of importance in the development of his country. He first alluded to the railroads, stating that they are over 65 years old and no longer capable of transporting the country's products. The highway system must also be improved, and he would like to see 3000-4000 km. of roads surfaced in oil or asphalt. As illustration, he said, that despite the fact that there are miles and miles of natural palm plantations, less than a third of the crop ever reaches the market. President Toure said he realized that the United States Government always wishes to have plans before it is prepared to discuss individual projects. He therefore asked that American technicians be sent to Guinea to draw up the necessary plans with their Guinean counterparts. Some highway plans have already been prepared, but he would like them also to be studied by United States experts before these projects are started. President Toure reiterated the importance of setting up small firms to make soap and edible oils and to process and crush palm kernels. In reply to the President's question, he indicated that the soap produced would be for domestic consumption. Another problem is education. President Toure expressed gratitude for the AID projects already started, mentioning the vocational school and the school of administration. He said that 1600 Guineans are presently studying abroad, of whom 130 are in the United States. As he had mentioned in his speech at the UN, the lack of trained manpower is acute in most countries of Africa. After alluding to his reluctance to send young Guineans to the Bloc countries for technical training (covered in separate memorandum) President Toure said he strongly favored the establishment of training schools in Africa. This would permit students to remain in their own environment and thus not lose contact with the people of their country; would not expose them to alien political ideologies; and, finally, would represent a financial saving for the African countries. President Toure therefore hoped that the proposal he had made at the UN for the establishment of African universities would have the support of the United States. With regard to health and sanitation, President Toure said that Guinea is encountering great difficulties in combating various diseases. He had therefore established a health program which will utilize teachers, doctors and technicians provided by the Peace Corps. The matter is presently being discussed in Conakry with representatives of the Peace Corps, and the latter will soon return to the United States with the Guinean proposals. Peace Corps assistance would, he concluded, be of importance to Guinea. The President said he could well understand the economic problems facing a country like Guinea which sells raw materials at wholesale prices and must import finished goods at retail prices. This, of course, leads to a balance of payments problem. The United States is also having its own balance of payments difficulties. We bear a heavy international financial burden, and while it does not have serious effects on our domestic economy, it does create a serious balance of payments problem. This limits the amount of funds at our disposal for foreign aid. The Soviet Bloc has an easier time. In Latin America, for example, they concentrate on Cuba alone, while we are trying to help all the other countries of the Hemisphere. As regards the French, the bulk of their assistance is directed toward Africa and, furthermore, it does not create a payments problem because all of their aid is tied to the franc. The President said he believed the United States should do everything it can to help Guinea, and as evidence of this desire cited our aid during the past 12 months. He stressed, however, that our whole foreign aid program constitutes a very heavy burden. For example, in 1961 we gave $1.6 billion in economic aid. We were happy thus to assist others, but it did put a drain on our dollar reserves. The President continued that these have dropped by about $12 billion during the past four years. We have given over $80 billion in aid in the past 15 years, with most of it going to Europe, and we therefore hope that Europe will now meet its responsibilities in assisting the under-developed countries. Europe also receives a large amount of dollars through United States defense expenditures. For example, we spend about $350 million in France on defense. This means that one third of France's dollar surplus comes from defense expenditures. The President stressed that this situation can not continue indefinitely, and we feel that the other countries must bear their share. The President said he had wished to explain our financial position because of his interest in Africa and in Guinea's success. He thought that the United States had made a mistake when it did not respond to Guinea's request for aid at the time it became independent. We cannot, however, he concluded, do as much as we would like because of the balance of payments situation he had just outlined. * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Guinea, 10/12/62-10/31/62. Confidential. Drafted by Trimble and Porson on October 12. The conversation was held at the White House. 1 The two leaders' discussion of Guinea's experience with bloc aid and Franco-Guinean relations on October 10 was recorded in two memoranda of conversation. (Ibid.) 266. Memorandum of Conversation 266. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, May 1, 1963, 9:30 a.m. SUBJECT Call on the President by Dr. Saidou Conte, Special Representative of Guinean President PARTICIPANTS The President G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Edmond C. Hutchinson, Deputy Administrator for AID William C. Trimble, Director, Office of West Coast and Malian Affairs Mrs. Sophia Porson, Interpreter Dr. Saidou Conte, Minister of Youth, Education and Culture Karim Bangoura, Ambassador of Guinea The President welcomed Minister Conte and asked him how it felt to be back in the United States. The Minister replied that it seemed as though he had never left. In reply to the President's further question, Minister Conte said that he had a great deal of work to do in Guinea since he is responsible for education and youth affairs, but that he found it very exciting. The President then asked after President Toure. Minister Conte said that his President was very well, that they had left Guinea on the same day, himself to Washington and the President on his way to Nigeria but that he should be back in Guinea by now. Minister Conte said that he was very happy to be back in Washington and to have a chance to see his many good friends here. He explained that his Government and President Toure had asked him to come to the United States on a mission of friendship, and that he brought with him a message from President Toure to President Kennedy. His visit marks the occasion of the opening of the American Fair in Guinea which the Guineans consider to be a major event and to which they attach great importance. He also wished to take advantage of his trip here to go over economic relations between Guinea and the United States. He added that the Government of Guinea would be happy to receive any representatives to the Fair that the United States Government might care to send. He said that the Government of Guinea was very pleased to learn that Mr. Shriver had been appointed as representative, and was looking forward to having both Mr. and Mrs. Shriver in Conakry. Governor Williams said that he understood that Mrs. Shriver would be unable to go to Guinea as she had previously accepted an engagement to deliver a speech at that time under the auspices of the Mental Health Foundation. The President said he would look into the matter. The President then asked Minister Conte about Guinea's economy. Minister Conte replied that it is getting off the ground, but that the situation is not brilliant. There are serious economic problems as President Toure had described on his most recent visit to the United States and these difficulties are increasing because Guinea's relations with the USSR and, as a matter of fact, all the Bloc countries are poor and are getting even worse. The President inquired as to the percentage of Guinea's exports going to the Bloc. Minister Conte said it was difficult to give an exact figure but he estimated it at around 30% to 35% and that it might be as high as 40%. This is Guinea's great problem, because this 40% cannot be sold elsewhere to earn hard currency and, thus, in effect, is blocked. Therefore, a considerable part of Guinea's production is mortgaged for some time ahead since it has long-term credit arrangements with the Bloc based on barter agreements. In reply to a further question Minister Conte said that arrears to the Bloc covering the last three years amount to some $40 million to $48 million; and, of course, these arrears continue to accumulate from year to year. The President then inquired about Guinea's relations with France. The Minister said that a French mission had visited Guinea and the Government of Guinea had sent one mission to France. The two governments are now examining the points at issue between them, and the Government of Guinea believes that they will soon reach a solution. He pointed out that since 1958 Guinea has received no aid at all from France, and moreover, that Guinea had had to pay out of its own funds military pensions which the French Government should have paid. France owes Guinea some G.Fr. 6 billion, i.e., $24 million, for these pensions. Reverting to relations with the Bloc, the President asked how Guinea expected to pay off its debt to the USSR. The Minister answered that Guinea cannot mortgage all of its exports, because it must live and thus export elsewhere to earn hard currency. The USSR has been told and the latter must understand that this is a credit which Guinea will pay off within its production capabilities, but that some of the production must be used to earn hard currency. The President asked how Guinea planned to earn hard currency to improve its balance of payments. Minister Conte said that Guinea hopes to do it in three ways: 1) When their differences with France are settled, the $24 million owed by France will be paid over; 2) By increasing agricultural and mineral production. In this connection the Government of Guinea and FRIA have agreed that FRIA is to increase its output this year, thus increasing Guinea's earnings; 3) Through aid from friendly countries. He mentioned that besides FRIA, Guinea is now negotiating with the Harvey Aluminum Company for the export of bauxite. The President asked what products Guinea exports to the Bloc. Minister Conte replied that they largely consist of agricultural products such as coffee and bananas. The President inquired what Guinea received from the Bloc in return. The Minister replied that this was a real problem for Guinea. The Bloc furnishes some food products, but mostly equipment, and the difficulty is that the Bloc equipment is not suited to Guinea's climate. In fact, it is not unusual to see Soviet equipment lying alongside the roads because it does not work. He said that the principal types of equipment supplied were tractors, vehicles and maintenance equipment. The most serious problem is with the vehicles; they do not work at all. The result is that Guinea is losing on two counts: first, because exports don't earn foreign exchange, and secondly because the equipment can't be used. He added that Guinea has made this quite clear to the USSR. President Kennedy said that we are trying to do what we can to help Guinea solve its economic problems. He said that he takes a great interest in Guinea; he was aware of problems with the USSR and to its still unsettled differences with France, and appreciated both put Guinea at a disadvantage. We are trying to do what we can, although we may not have been able to do as much as we would like. We are trying to obtain enough dollars to be able to meet our responsibilities around the world. We are hopeful that we can do something for Guinea, but we must wait to see what action the Congress will take. He trusted that the negotiations with France will work out as this would be very helpful. For our part, the President repeated we shall do what we can for Guinea. Minister Conte thanked the President and said that Guinea realizes that the United States has many commitments around the world, and is most grateful for what the United States has done for it. Guinea is asking for more assistance, but it is because Guinea believes that it has given proof of its courage and because Guinea believes that a nation must first help itself. The purpose of foreign assistance is to help a nation to help itself. For this reason, American aid helps Guinea increase its own efforts. He then expressed the Government of Guinea's thanks to the United States Government and AID for their assistance which, he said, has been very effective. He concluded by handing the President a letter from President Toure. The President thanked Minister Conte for the message and asked him to convey his best regards to President Toure. * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Guinea, 5/63. Confidential. Drafted by Porson and Trimble. The conversation was held at the White House. 267. Memorandum From Samuel Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) 267. Memorandum From Samuel Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) Source Washington, May 17, 1963. SUBJECT Next U.S. Moves Toward Guinea The meeting in the Governor's office yesterday was for the most part a belaboring of the obvious, with some confusion thrown in. However, we finally formulated a short-range line of action with which I hope you will agree. By way of background, you probably are aware that Sargent Shriver has done an excellent job of convincing the town that the time had indeed arrived when Guinea will make a clean break with the Bloc. Ambassador Bangoura made calls yesterday on both Williams and Hutchison, taking the same line, saying the break (“de couper”) will come soon and that they are depending on the U.S. to step in and fill the gap. Neither Shriver, Attwood nor Bangoura have given any indication as to the actual timing of the “break,” nor how Sekou Toure plans to do it. This of course is something for Toure himself to decide on his own. Assuming that the break does come, we should take great care not to give the impression that we are calling the shots. If we do decide to move in, we face a dilemma as to how and with what we should do it. We do not know the extent of the Bloc aid programs. The Guineans have always been very secretive about it. When I asked if the Guineans probably would not be more forthcoming now that they plan a break, Williams and the others doubted very seriously that the Guineans knew enough about Bloc assistance themselves to be very helpful. Apparently Toure himself is totally ignorant about foreign assistance to Guinea, whether it be Bloc or non-Bloc—he simply does not and will not understand it. Most of the discussion centered about a possible letter to Toure from the President. The majority of those present had bought Attwood's suggestion that the President should reiterate existing aid programs and cite a figure (e.g., $31 million). The Governor overruled them on this, strongly supported by me. I said I saw no reason why the President should reiterate in a letter a list of programs which have already been publicly announced, and that there were obvious dangers in citing the $31 million figure which, as the Governor had said, would lend itself to very unfortunate interpretations. If there were to be a letter at all, it should be one that would express the President's sentiments in general terms, but in such a way as to inspire Toure's confidence in our intentions should Guinea face difficulties in the future. (Trimble has just read me the first draft which isn't bad. I will have it shortly.) Toure leaves for Addis on May 21 (Tuesday) where Attwood thinks he may make a strong pro-Western statement. Any letter we send, therefore, should go out over the weekend. We will have no control over what Toure says at Addis and in the light of his past his statement, if unrestrained, might be damaging to our posture with other African states. This is why the President's letter should be reassuring but not so much so that it will appear that we have, on such short notice, rushed in pell-mell to replace the Bloc. The important conclusion of the meeting—to which I personally agreed—was that the President should send Toure a letter over the weekend which would be drafted along the general lines set forth above. As you know, Toure has asked for a Presidential letter and knows that Attwood has recommended it. Tasca is calling a meeting to draft such a letter today, which they will then send to the White House for approval. 1 In addition, an instruction is being sent to the Country Team in Conakry to get more specifics on exactly what the U.S. should do if Guinea breaks with the Bloc and, hopefully, some idea as to timing. Everyone at the meeting yesterday agreed it would be foolish to go ahead when we are still uncertain as to exactly what the situation is that we are facing. It was felt that we should go slowly and respond readily to requests for short-term assistance—e.g., Guinea needs rice, and this we can furnish quickly and easily, and we should say so in the letter. Finally, I have laid on a requirement with CIA to prepare a paper telling us absolutely everything they know about Bloc programs in Guinea. This we should have shortly. Sam * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Guinea. Confidential. 1 The letter from Kennedy to Toure was transmitted in telegram 1039 to Conakry, May 17. (Department of State, Central Files, POL GUIN-US) On May 20, Ambassador Attwood delivered the letter during his farewell call on President Toure. Attwood told Toure that the total U.S. aid commitment to Guinea during the previous 18 months had totaled $31 million, of which only about $6 million had been expended, but pointed out that public announcement of this figure in the President's letter might have had a negative effect on the economy-minded U.S. Congress. (Telegram 747 from Conakry, May 20; ibid., AID (US) 8 GUIN) 268. Memorandum of Conversation 268. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, July 19, 1963. PARTICIPANTS U.S. The President Henry J. Tasca, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs William C. Trimble, Director, Office of West Coast and Malian Affairs Alec Toumayan, Interpreter Republic of Guinea Ambassador Diallo Telli, Guinean Representative at the U.N. and Special Envoy of President Toure Karim Bangoura, Guinean Ambassador to the U.S. SUBJECT Meeting of Diallo Telli, Special Envoy of President Toure with President Kennedy The conversation opened with an exchange of amenities in which Ambassador Diallo recalled that he had already had the privilege of being presented to the President shortly after his inauguration. He added that he had also had the privilege of attending a meeting between the then Senator Kennedy and President Sekou Toure in Los Angeles in 1959. After these opening remarks, Ambassador Diallo gave the President Sekou Toure's personal message. 1 After reading the letter, the President expressed his appreciation and added that he was well aware of the problems which exist in South Africa and Portugal. He noted that even though the U.S. is allied with Portugal in NATO, we have actively urged Portugal to accept the principle of self-determination for its colonies. For the past year, we have consistently pursued this policy. Our relations with Portugal have become strained as a result of these efforts. And because our relations with Portugal are now more strained than ever, we probably do not have much influence left which we can bring to bear on this issue. We have supported the policy of self-determination and we believe that sooner or later Portugal must also see the light. It is not only a question of what the U.S. can do, but also of what other European countries will be willing to do. There is an added difficulty in that, if we exert too much influence upon Portugal, she may seek the support of other European countries. If so, she might receive a measure of support from some of them. We are very dependent upon our defense installations in the Azores. However, on the question of the Portuguese possessions in Africa, we have acted in accordance with our principles. The President then turned to South Africa, which, he said, seems to pose a more difficult problem. While, in the case of Portugal, one could feel that she would adopt a more progressive attitude in the future, this was not the case with respect to South Africa. The President pointed out that he had clarified his position on this subject in his recent press conference. He expressed his concern that neither expulsions from world organizations nor sanctions would change the policy of South Africa. He feared, he said, that such actions would do for the U.N. what Abyssinia had done for the League of Nations. Another effect would be to create demands for similar pressures against Cuba. If sanctions were applied to South Africa, the American public would ask why the same measures could not be applied against Cuba. The President noted that he had discussed this question yesterday with Ambassador Stevenson who would present the U.S. policy on South Africa and the Portuguese territories at the U.N. The President felt that the world organization ought not to proceed according to Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter in regard to South Africa because “the situation there was different.” The President noted that he had used the expression “threat to peace” in his recent press conference in which he discussed South Africa. However, the President said he had reread his own statement on this subject. The United States favors proceeding according to Chapter 6 of the U.N. Charter, and he hoped Guinea would be able to support this position. The President assured Diallo that the matter is receiving his very close attention. He had discussed these subjects with President Nyerere of Tanganyika this very week, and he is well aware of the strong feelings the African people have on these issues. Nonetheless, he said, it is difficult for us to preach to others about racial discrimination when we still have so many unresolved problems in our own country. The United States Government is opposed to discrimination, and we will, therefore, continue to act as we have in the past. The President added that Ambassador Stevenson and Ambassador Diallo would undoubtedly keep in contact on this subject. He again expressed his appreciation for President Sekou Toure's letter, and said that he would send a reply to it. After thanking the President, Diallo said that Toure had entrusted him with three tasks in addition to delivering his message to President Kennedy. The first was to clarify the Guinean view on a number of points of direct interest to Guinea and the United States. The second task was to give the President any additional information or documents concerning the Addis Ababa Conference that he might require. Finally, if the President had any suggestions or proposals to present to Sekou Toure, the Ambassador would be happy to convey these to Toure. Ambassador Diallo added that he would like to stress that his mission was an additional proof of the personal confidence which Toure has in the President and that Guinea is grateful for the assistance extended by the U.S. Having himself been Ambassador in Washington for three years, he was greatly impressed by the improvement in U.S.-Guinea relations. However, he noted that, since relations between Guinea and the United States had begun to improve, a press campaign, led by Agence France Presse, had attempted to block this development. At Addis Ababa, immediately after an announcement of U.S. aid to Guinea, AFP had reported that Guinea's representative at the conference had opposed President Kennedy's racial policy. Prior to leaving Conakry Ambassador Diallo had been instructed by President Sekou Toure to enlist the full support of the African Chiefs of State for President Kennedy's policy which Sekou Toure himself fully endorsed. Diallo said that Toure felt this issue was sufficiently important to instruct the Guinea delegation to seek out the U.S. Ambassador at Addis in order to inform him of Toure's position. Agence France Presse (AFP) also referred to an agreement between the Soviet Union and Guinea for a regular air service. However, relations between Guinea and the U.S. were such that Guinea would never do anything like this without prior consultation with the U.S. The purpose of this AFP campaign is that some elements in France do not look with favor upon the improvement of relations between the U.S. and Guinea. They would like to see Guinea reintegrated into the UAM. This is not possible. Relations with France must be conducted on the basis of full equality and frank cooperation as they are with the U.S. President Sekou Toure had asked him to say that he had been happy to support the President's racial policy in October 1962 when he came to the U.S. and that he again wishes to congratulate the President and his brother for all they had done in this field. Finally with respect to Gizenga, Diallo stated that Guinean leadership had been grateful for the interest shown by the President in that matter. Total reconciliation in the Congo is indispensable for progress and President Sekou Toure will do all he can to achieve that end. Because President Kennedy has voiced his concern regarding intervention on this matter, President Sekou Toure wishes to assure him that before taking such action Toure would make absolutely certain that Gizenga is “recuperable” and that he could perform a constructive role. Toure would appreciate any suggestions the President might care to make. Diallo Telli said that whenever President Toure traveled in Africa, he noted that the people were very emotionally involved in the problems of the Portuguese colonies and South Africa. Because of President Kennedy's responsibilities and the hopes placed in him by the Africans, the President should do something, otherwise the African governments would be forced by their people to take extreme measures. The President reiterated the importance of having other African countries exert their influence, specifically the African countries of the French Community. He said that our influence was now very slight. Portugal would not want to become isolated. The President's personal feeling was that Portugal would probably see the light when it would be too late. The President concluded by indicating that he would write to President Sekou Toure on the various questions discussed at the meeting. In this letter he would also address himself to the problem of civil aviation in Guinea. The President again stressed the importance of having other European countries bring their influence to bear upon Portugal because otherwise it would appear that Portugal was pitted against the U.S. as well as Africa. At the present time, Europe was very sensitive to U.S. influence. President De Gaulle had rallied the forces of European nationalism against U.S. influence in Europe. France and the French Community could do a great deal on the Portuguese issue, even if Guinea could not do very much. The President reassured his visitor that his interest in this issue would remain constant. * Source: Department of State, President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. Confidential. Drafted by Toumayan, Dean, and Poole, and approved in the White House on July 22. The conversation was held at the White House. 1 Not found. 269. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy 269. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Source Washington, November 12, 1963. SUBJECT Guinea Aid Program Ambassador Loeb reported this morning Toure's unhappiness over the US aid program in Guinea but, in a telegram later today (attached), 1 indicated that the issue is being resolved. The major problem, as Loeb says, is educating Toure. Toure's unhappiness reflected primarily his confusing counterpart (local currency generated by dollar financed commodity imports) and PL 480-generated local currency. Contrary to his belief, counterpart (about $5 million per year in Guinea francs) is totally available to the Guinea Government for development purposes and this should satisfy Toure, when explained. The restrictions Toure complained about apply instead to PL 480 local currency. It is US-owned with 51% available to the Government of Guinea in loans that are virtually grants (40 year—3/4%); 25% for private industry loans, and 24% for US Government use (Embassy expenses, etc.). PL 480 to date is about $20 million. In any event, the main point of Toure's complaint—that local currency should go for development projects and not for technical assist-ance—can and will be satisfied. The key point is simply to make him understand a set of facts which he will find generally agreeable. More important is the situation behind Toure's complaint. Guinea is in desperate economic shape and, for the first time Toure is concentrating with some realism on his economic problems. He wants the largest amount of visible, “meat and potatoes” development projects, particularly to stem the political unrest. To this end he is trying to make peace with the French, improve the climate for private investment, and to control spending. He is putting together an ambitious and probably impractical new economic development plan and is tentatively sending a mission over here to talk about increased aid the beginning of December. Our problem is to keep our aid commitment down to sensible limits without Toure getting so disillusioned he turns back to the Bloc. Ambassador Loeb is coming back this month for consultation and AID and State are working on the problem. I am following this closely and when we reach the point of difficult decision I believe you may want to consider it. William H. Brubeck 2 * Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Guinea, Security. Confidential. 1 Telegram 495 from Conakry, November 12, not printed. (Ibid.) 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. Horn of Africa Horn of Africa 270. Editorial Note 271. Special National Intelligence Estimate Washington, January 24, 1961. Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, DCI Files, Job 79 R 1012, Box 190. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet: “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Department of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.” All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on January 24, except the Atomic Energy Commission Representative and the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction. 272. Letter From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Penfield) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nitze) Washington, March 7, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 775A.56311/3-761. Secret. Drafted by Allen on March 6. 273. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia Washington, May 29, 1961, 9:34 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 777.5-MSP/5-2961. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Allen, cleared in draft by Williams and Moffett, and approved by Witman. Repeated to London, Mogadiscio, Rome, and Paris (by pouch). 274. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, September 8, 1961. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Somalia. Confidential/Noforn. No drafting information is given on the source text. Transmitted to the White House under cover of a memorandum from Battle to McGeorge Bundy that reads: “Enclosed is a paper prepared by the Department which may be of interest to you.” 275. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, November 21, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.41/11-2161. Confidential. Drafted by Buckle on December 12. 276. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia Washington, May 19, 1962, 12:20 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 775.5/5-1962. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Buckle on May 17; cleared by Whitfield (OSD/ISA), Tasca, and Wolfe in draft and by Hutchinson, Kitchen, and Bowles; and approved by Williams. Repeated to Mogadiscio and pouched to Paris for the Embassy and CINCEUR. 277. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia Washington, May 19, 1962, 12:22 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 775.5/5-362. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Buckle on May 17; cleared in draft by Whitfield (OSD/ISA), Tasca, and Wolfe and by Hutchinson, Kitchen, and Bowles; and approved by Williams. Repeated to Addis Ababa. 278. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, July 13, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Somalia, 1/62-10/62. Official Use Only. Drafted by Tasca. 279. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia Washington, August 11, 1962, 1:05 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 777.5/8-962. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Adams on August 10; cleared by Witman, Troxel, Hamilton (AID) in draft, Snowden, FitzGerald, and Hunt; and approved by Witman. Repeated to Addis Ababa, London, and Rome. 280. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, November 8, 1962, 4:02 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 775.5/11-762. Secret. Drafted by Newsom; cleared by Junkermann (OSD/ISA) in substance, Stout, and Bergesen; and approved by Tasca. Also sent to Rome and repeated to Addis Ababa. 281. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia Washington, November 17, 1962, 6:16 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 675.77/11-1662. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Post; cleared in draft by Cole, Tank (AID), and Harrison (AID) and by Witman, by Godley and Whitfield (OSD/ISA) in substance; and approved by Williams. Repeated to Mogadiscio, Leopoldville, and Asmara and by pouch to USUN, London, and Rome. 282. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia Washington, November 21, 1962, 9:33 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 775.00/11-1962. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Newsom on November 20; cleared by Sisco, Junkermann (OSD/ISA), Witman, Harrison (AID), Tank, Hackler, Bergesen, and Stone; and approved by Tasca. Repeated to London, Mogadiscio, Rome, Asmara, and USUN. 283. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Washington, November 24, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Countries Series, Somali Republic. Secret. 284. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Washington, November 26, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Somalia. Secret. 285. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, November 27, 1962, noon. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Somalia. Confidential. Drafted by Witman. The conversation was held at the White House. A memorandum of President Kennedy and Prime Minister Abdirascid's discussion of U.S. economic assistance to Somalia on November 27 is ibid. 286. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Washington, November 28, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Somalia. Secret. 287. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia Washington, November 30, 1962, 12:22 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.7711/11-3062. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Newsom on November 29; cleared by Coffin (AID), Whitfield (OSD), Little, Tasca, and Bromley Smith (White House); and approved by Witman. Also sent to Addis Ababa, Rome, Bonn, and London. 288. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Italy Washington, November 30, 1962, 4:18 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 777.5/11-3062. Confidential. Drafted by Newsom on November 29; cleared by Kyle (AID), Junkermann (OSD/ISA), Stout, and Burke; and approved by Witman. Also sent to London and repeated to Addis Ababa, Mogadiscio, and Bonn. 289. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia Washington, January 7, 1963, 6:19 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 777.5/11-2462. Confidential. Drafted by Post; cleared in substance by Whitfield (OSD/ISA), Tank (AID), and Kent (AID); and approved by Witman. 290. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Washington, February 26, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer. Confidential. 291. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Brubeck) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, March 18, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Somalia. Secret. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: “(Taken from Pres week-end reading dtd 3/23/63—Tab 1).” 292. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Washington, March 21, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Somalia. Secret. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: “(Taken from Pres week-end reading dtd 3/23/63—Tab 1).” 293. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia Washington, May 23, 1963, 11:19 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-SOMALI. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Galanto; cleared by Newsom, Kyle (AID), Muller (AID), Whitfield (DOD), and Oulashin; and approved by Tasca. Repeated to London, Bonn, and Rome. 294. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia Washington, July 3, 1963, 6:38 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 SOMALI. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Post; cleared by O'Mahony, Judd, Whitfield (DOD), Stout, Warren, Witman, and Polansky in substance and Tank (AID); and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Bonn, Rome, Mogadiscio, London, Nairobi, and Paris (also for CINCEUR). 295. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia Washington, July 5, 1963, 6:56 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-3 US-SOMALI. Confidential. Drafted by Post on July 3, cleared by Whitfield (DOD) and Kyle (AID) in substance, and approved by Witman. Repeated to Addis Ababa and Nairobi and by pouch to Rome, London, Bonn, and Paris (for CINCEUR). 296. Memorandum for the Record Washington, July 12, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Somalia. Confidential. Drafted by Komer. 297. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, July 25, 1963, 12:30-12:50 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 AFR. Confidential. Drafted by Jones and Fredericks on July 31 and approved in the White House on August 12. The conversation was held at the White House.Prior to this meeting on July 25, Komer sent President Kennedy a memorandum recommending that during the meeting Kennedy stress that domestic reform and development were Ethiopia's prime needs, and that the United States was not backing Somali territorial ambitions, but attempting to retain a relationship with Somalia in order to prevent its leaning too heavily on the United Arab Republic, the Soviet Union, or the People's Republic of China. (Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Ethiopia Security) 298. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Northern African Affairs (Newsom) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) Washington, August 26, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Somalia. Confidential. Drafted by Newsom on August 24. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: “Sent to Mr. Bundy for info. Aug. 26. S.B.” 299. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, September 23, 1963, 8:01 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 SOMALI. Confidential. Drafted by Galanto, cleared by Judd and O'Neill, and approved by Newsom. Repeated to Mogadiscio, Nairobi, Bonn, Rome, and Addis Ababa (by pouch). 300. Briefing Paper Prepared in the Department of State Washington, September 29, 1963. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 ETH. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. Cleared by Bell (AID) and Gilpatric (OSD). A copy was sent to the Bureau of the Budget to meet the requirements of Presidential Determination 1550 relating to military assistance. The paper was transmitted to McGeorge Bundy under cover of a memorandum from Benjamin Read that reads: “In response to Mr. Brubeck's request there is enclosed a memorandum supplementing the briefing papers previously submitted for the visit of Emperor Haile Selassie.” A handwritten notation on this memorandum reads: “Original sent to White House on 9/29/63.” 301. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Washington, September 30, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Ethiopia, Haile Selassie's Visit, 10/63. Secret. 302. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 1, 1963, 4:30 p.m. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Ethiopia, Haile Selassie's Visit, 10/63. Confidential. Drafted by Newsom and Korry. The meeting was held at the White House. The source text is labeled “I of III.” President Kennedy's discussion of African issues and assistance to Ethiopia with Emperor Haile Selassie on October 1 and their discussion of assistance to Ethiopia on October 2 were recorded in three memoranda of conversation that are ibid. 303. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, October 11, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Somalia. Confidential. 304. Editorial Note 305. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany Washington, October 16, 1963, 7:19 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 SOMALI. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Galanto; cleared by Robinson, O'Mahony, and Heffner (DOD); and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Rome, London, Mogadiscio, Addis Ababa, and Nairobi (by pouch). 306. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Washington, October 25, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries, Somali Republic. Confidential. 307. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Tasca) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Sloan) and to the Assistant Administrator for Africa-Europe, Agency for International Development (Hutchinson) Washington, October 31, 1963. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 SOMALI. Confidential. Drafted by Galanto. 308. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany Washington, November 6, 1963, 6:20 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 SOMALI. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Newsom; cleared by Warren, O'Mahony, Stout, Heffner (DOD), and Wolf (AID); and approved by Tasca. Also sent priority to Rome and repeated to Mogadiscio, Addis Ababa, Paris, and London. 309. National Policy Paper Washington, December 19, 1963. Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, AFRICA 1963. Secret; Noforn. Prepared in the Department of State. A handwritten notation on the cover sheet of the 114-page paper reads: “Secretary approved 1/6/64” and “Part I revised by AF 3/5/65.” 310. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia Washington, December 30, 1963, 4:53 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-SOMALI. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Galanto, cleared by Newsom, and approved by Williams. 270. Editorial Note 270. Editorial Note According to NSC Record of Action No. 2381, taken at the 474th meeting of the National Security Council on January 18, 1961, the National Security Council “Adopted the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 6028 [‘U.S. Policy Toward the Horn of Africa'].” The Record of Action also indicates: “ Note : NSC 6028, as adopted above, subsequently approved by the President for implementation by all Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, and referred to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency.” (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action) For text of NSC 6028, December 30, 1960, see Foreign Relations , 1958-1960, volume XIV, pages 197 - 210 . On the recommendation of Secretary of State Rusk, President Kennedy authorized the recission of NSC 6028 on December 17, 1962. (Memorandum for all holders of NSC 6028, December 17, 1962; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Africa) 271. Special National Intelligence Estimate 271. Special National Intelligence Estimate Source Washington, January 24, 1961. SNIE 76.1-61 ETHIOPIAN PROSPECTS AFTER THE ABORTIVE COUP 1 The Problem To assess the significance of the abortive coup of December 1960 and its likely consequences for Ethiopian internal stability over the next few years. The Estimate 1. Emperor Haile Selassie has re-established his personal authority in Ethiopia after a bloody three-day coup attempt initiated by the Imperial Body Guard against his regime in December 1960. Nevertheless, the Emperor's position was, if only briefly, seriously challenged, and he is confronted with serious problems involving the rebuilding of his Administration, and over the longer run, the stability of Ethiopia and the perpetuation of the imperial dynasty. 2. The abortive coup appears to have been intramural in character; the active protagonists on both sides came almost exclusively from the small Amhara ruling group and its supporters. Fighting took place between the Imperial Body Guard and the army, the principal military components upon which Haile Selassie had depended for the retention of his power. However, the immediate consequences of the short struggle and its implications for the future suggest that it was more significant than a “palace revolt.” In addition to the blatant and well-publicized challenge to his authority suffered by the Emperor, many of his most trusted ministers and advisers have been assassinated, his Imperial Body Guard and the security services have been proved unreliable, and his doubts concerning the competence and resolution of the Crown Prince have been confirmed. Most importantly, the way in which the revolt unfolded dramatized the existence of social and political discontent at key points in the Empire's social structure. 3. The issue which sparked the coup appears to have been the dissatisfaction of the Imperial Body Guard officers with their low pay and what they felt to be their declining status in the military hierarchy. Nevertheless, there exists a wider range of dissidence in the country, arising from a more complex set of factors. These include dissatisfaction of some middle level government officials with His Imperial Majesty's autocratic rule, and the thwarted aspirations of the growing number of young “modernists” and western educated intellectuals for more rapid social and economic advance. The Body Guard leaders probably anticipated support from large numbers of civil servants, army, and police officers. However, initial alarm at the audacity of the undertaking, realization that Haile Selassie was not in full eclipse, and most important, the unpopularity of several plot leaders probably prevented the rebels from gaining the support they anticipated. Since the attempted coup was engineered by a small segment of the ruling group, and because the revolt was quickly snuffed out, there was neither inclination nor opportunity for discontent among civilian elements to manifest itself. Moreover, coup leaders approached the important army and air force commanders only after the initiation of the coup, and failed to secure their support. The longstanding prestige of the Emperor almost certainly had its effect in limiting enthusiasm for the attempted revolt. Ultimately, it was the vigorous action of the armed forces in putting down the rebellion that was the decisive factor. 4. Although Haile Selassie has indicated that he intends to deal charitably with opponents who did not directly lead the revolt and who are now willing to make public apology, the experience will almost certainly reinforce his penchant for a constant shuffling of top government officials. He must not only replace those who were murdered by the rebels—a slow and difficult task—but is likely to continue his longstanding practice of assigning potential troublemakers abroad and making frequent shifts of cabinet ministers and other high officers. A number of the Emperor's advisers and aides perished in the coup or are under suspicion, and this will reinforce his customary practice of using a variety of foreign advisers of miscellaneous nationalities. The ineffectual perform-ance of the Crown Prince has almost certainly reinforced the Emperor's grave doubts about him as a successor. However, there are no clearly qualified alternative candidates, and the Emperor will probably be in no hurry to name a substitute. 5. Security measures will almost certainly be tightened, and the Emperor's suspicions of the more progressive of his civil servants will almost certainly persist. Nevertheless, pressures by the latter for major reforms probably will grow. The Emperor faces the dilemma whether he should seek to control these “modernist” elements by somewhat more concessions to their point of view or should rely on traditionalist supporters and thus risk further alienation of the literate class. On the whole, we do not anticipate any massive internal reprisals or dramatic changes in Haile Selassie's program of painfully gradual economic and social reform. If the Emperor succeeds in the task of re-establishing an effective government apparatus, we do not believe that any important coup attempt by disgruntled military and civilian elements will develop during the next year or so. 6. Haile Selassie, who may have been harboring fears concerning US intentions under precisely such emergency conditions, has probably been reassured by the assistance rendered by the US for the Emperor's cause during the rebellion—[ 3 lines of source text not declassified ]. Moreover, some uncertainty apparently exists in the Emperor's mind concerning possible Bloc or Yugoslav support of the revolt leaders. While we have no evidence of such involvement, Haile Selassie is perfectly capable of becoming obsessed with such a possibility. He will continue to weigh American friendship by its support of his own position at home and in his foreign relations, especially in his difficulties with the neighboring Somali Republic. In any case, Ethiopian demands on the US will probably increase. 7. The abortive coup has served to underscore the personal importance of Haile Selassie as the dominant force in a far from united Empire, and the potentialities for sustained conflict and fragmentation when the Emperor leaves the scene. In addition to the question of the succession, which traditionally has been resolved in conflict among the pretenders and contenders, the ruling group is likely to find itself deeply divided over the direction Ethiopia should take in the modern world. The conservatives, led by the Coptic Church and the traditional aristocracy, are likely to oppose strongly the ambitions of young “modernists” who wish to end Ethiopian isolation and expose the country to far-reaching social, economic, and political change. If dissension within the ruling and educated groups broke into open conflict, this might release the floodgates of separatism among the other peoples of the Ethiopian Empire. * Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, DCI Files, Job 79 R 1012, Box 190. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet: “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Department of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.” All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on January 24, except the Atomic Energy Commission Representative and the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction. 1 This estimate supplements the discussion of Ethiopia in NIE 76-60, “Probable Trends in the Horn of Africa,” dated 21 June 1960. The underlying factors in the Ethiopian situation are more fully analyzed in that estimate. [Footnote in the source text. For text of NIE 76-60, see Foreign Relations , 1958-1960, vol. XIV, pp. 188 - 190 .] 272. Letter From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Penfield) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nitze) 272. Letter From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Penfield) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nitze) Source Washington, March 7, 1961. Dear Mr. Nitze : In view of the fact that we have recently authorized our Ambassador in Ethiopia to proceed with negotiations for the additional facilities desired by the Department of Defense near Kagnew Station in Eritrea, I believe that I should call to your attention Assistant Secretary Williams' impressions of the political climate in Ethiopia. A copy of telegram 389 from the Embassy at Mogadiscio is enclosed. 1 Assistant Secretary Williams' impressions are consistent with our own analysis. It is clear that there is a very real danger that political developments in the Horn of Africa over the next few years may result in limitations on our freedom of action at Kagnew Station or even in demands for its evacuation. Therefore, although we are presently in a relatively good political position in Ethiopia, I believe it would be only prudent for the interested agencies to begin now to study seriously alternative means by which the functions of Kagnew Station could be carried out. I do not mean that we will in any way relax our efforts to preserve the status of this valuable facility—I am simply calling attention to a contingency which it would be shortsighted to overlook. Sincerely yours, James K. Penfield 2 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 775A.56311/3-761. Secret. Drafted by Allen on March 6. 1 Not printed. In telegram 389, February 21, Williams reported that Ethiopia had been deeply affected by the unsuccessful coup of December 1960 and would never be the same again. He noted that in the minds of many forward looking Ethiopians, U.S. assistance to the Ethiopian army had aided in maintaining what had become an unpopular regime, and that if a revolution should occur in the near future, there was reason for concern that Americans might be among those attacked. (Ibid., 775.00/2-2161) 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 273. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia 273. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia Source Washington, May 29, 1961, 9:34 p.m. 880. Addis for Ambassador. As Embassy aware, we have for some time contemplated approach to IEG in hope latter could be convinced Western arms for Somalis less dangerous to Ethiopia than arms from unfriendly sources. Department feels it now time to make approach and unless you perceive serious objection, you should at earliest convenient occasion have frank conversation with Foreign Minister Imru referring to his call on Satterthwaite (Deptel 429 to Addis, rpt London 3212, Mogadiscio 288, Rome 1638, Paris unn), 1 as well as to your recent conversation (Addis 1123, rpt London 32, Paris 26, Rome 17, Mogadiscio 64) 2 and outline U.S. analysis Somali Army situation as provided recent Deptels. After explaining carefully arguments for Western action, you should reiterate U.S. position it has no plans assist directly in training or arming Somali Army but in circumstances feels former metropoles should do so and has so informed UK and GOI. We feel this source supply in best interests IEG as well as West. You should say that if IEG feels U.S. participation with UK and Italy would reassure IEG as to intentions Western powers, USG prepared give serious consideration doing so. Alternatively, if IEG feels smaller (and possibly non-European) power might be more acceptable as source training for Somali Army, then USG would be willing see if one is prepared make offer to GSR. Naturally we have no idea whether GSR likely accept. You should offer discuss matter with Aklilou and HIM if desired. FYI. One purpose above approach (details of which you may modify in your discretion) is to test validity Embassy belief (which Department shares) that IEG reaction to U.S. support of Somali Army would be so negative as to result in unacceptable damage to U.S. position Ethiopia, including but not restricted to possible loss of Kagnew. We feel possibility IEG would tolerate U.S. aid to Somali Army slight but that suggestion in above terms enables us test this hypothesis with minimal risk. In our view IEG just might reluctantly accept idea of small power as source training and channel for arms in view fact Deressa once indicated such possibility not out of question (Addis 10, July 1, 1960, rpt London 1, Rome 1, Mogadiscio 40). 3 We also feel IEG most likely accept “small power” concept if faced with fact U.S. feels alternative is unfriendly power (in view IEG repeated opposition to U.S., U.K., or Italy) and gravely concerned at this possibility. End FYI. This message repeated other posts strictly for information and contents should not be passed to third parties at present. For Rome : If Italy and UK should meanwhile wish to begin tripartite talks, you should be guided in your comments by Deptels 3127 and 3145. 4 Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 777.5-MSP/5-2961. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Allen, cleared in draft by Williams and Moffett, and approved by Witman. Repeated to London, Mogadiscio, Rome, and Paris (by pouch). 1 Dated December 13, 1960. (Ibid., 877.00/12-1360) 2 Dated May 27. (Ibid., 777.5-MSP/5-2761) 3 Not printed. (Ibid., 777.5/7-360) 4 Neither found. 274. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to Secretary of State Rusk 274. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to Secretary of State Rusk Source Washington, September 8, 1961. INTELLIGENCE NOTE Somali Republic May Seek Bloc Military Aid The Somali Republic may soon seek military aid from the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia: there have been new Ethiopian incursions into tacitly neutralized border areas; a recent major Cabinet crisis has weakened the government; and Somali officials have been unhappy with the implementation of Western military and budgetary aid. The Somali Army Commander recently appealed to his government for arms “regardless of source.” Prime Minister Abdirascid discussed the Somali military program with Bloc officials in June, but sought no military aid commitments at that time. Western Aid Delayed . UK-Italian discussions of a coordinated military supply and training program for the Somalis have dragged on without concrete results. Only small deliveries of Italian military supplies have been made. During Somali President Aden Abdulla Osman's visit to Rome en route to the Belgrade Conference, Italy reaffirmed its intention to supply Somali arms requirements. However, the details remain to be worked out, and the extent of UK participation is uncertain. The Italian Parliament has adjourned without legislative action on Italy's major share of the tripartite Western (Italy, US, and UK) budgetary aid agreed upon in principle late in 1960. Final action by Italy is not expected until late September. A crisis in financing Somali Government operations may be expected by November. Deterioration in Western Position . Recent developments suggest that Western prestige is declining steadily as a result of the prolonged delays in providing aid. Radical Somali elements contrast the West's plans for assistance with those of the USSR and Czechoslovakia, which promised unusually large-scale economic aid in June. The acceptance of Bloc offers at that time was a concession to strong, neutralist factions which continue to exert pressure upon the unsteadily based Abdirascid government. Any introduction of Bloc arms into the explosive Somali-Ethiopian border situation would seriously increase instability in the Horn of Africa and aggravate US and Western difficulties in balancing Somali and Ethiopian demands for support. * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Somalia. Confidential/Noforn. No drafting information is given on the source text. Transmitted to the White House under cover of a memorandum from Battle to McGeorge Bundy that reads: “Enclosed is a paper prepared by the Department which may be of interest to you.” 275. Memorandum of Conversation 275. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, November 21, 1961. SUBJECT US-UK Talks on Africa: The Horn of Africa PARTICIPANTS United Kingdom: Sir Roger Stevens, Deputy Under Secretary, Foreign Office Sir Algernon Rumbold, Deputy Under Secretary, Commonwealth Relations Officer M.K.M. Wilford, Foreign Office J.D. Hennings, Colonial Attache, UK Embassy J.D.B. Shaw, First Secretary, UK Embassy United States: G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs J. Wayne Fredericks, Deputy Assistant Secretary, African Affairs William Witman II, Director,AFN Martin F. Herz, Special Assistant for Planning, AF John F. Buckle, AFN Marcus Gordon, AID Colonel Joseph Whitfield, USAF,DOD/ISA Sir Roger remarked that if two years ago anyone had asked where trouble was most apt to arise in Africa the answer inevitably would have been “in the Horn”. The absence of that trouble was no cause for self-congratulation, however. The problems are intractable and trouble is standing in the wings. The West had to be particularly careful not to appear to favor one side or the other since the side which felt neglected would inevitably turn toward the East. While other African countries certainly did not regard them as the leaders in any movement, because of their geographical position Communist penetration of either would probably result in the spreading of the infection to all of the adjoining areas in Africa. The problem is further complicated by the racial difficulties involved in the territorial overlapping of the Somali people. The Governor of Kenya, for example, felt that the most difficult problem facing that new nation was the resolution of the question involving the Somali people in Northern Kenya. The British definitely did not intend to alter territorial boundaries prior to independence. Furthermore, he was happy to say, the Somali Government was not pressing them particularly in this regard. However, the British were advising all important Kenyan political leaders that the Somali section of their country held little but trouble for them in the future. There was little indication so far that any future Kenyan Government would be willing to part with this area. On the other hand, if one should show any such inclination, the problems of the area would be even more aggravated, for the cession of this territory to the Somali Republic would provoke similar claims against Kenya from Ethiopia and would inevitably result in increased pressure by the Somalis on Ethiopia for the Ogaden as well as a stepped-up campaign against the French in Djibouti. While the French had not informed the British as to their intention regarding French Somaliland, it would seem to be the last vestige of French colonialism in Africa, with obvious consequences. But if the French should pull out, it would create extremely serious problems for the Ethiopians and so the British were inclined to hope that the French would hold fast. Governor Williams agreed it was a problem area and remarked that we also had received little information from the French on their intentions. Sir Roger then turned to the problem of economic and military assistance. The main principle all of the Western parties involved should follow was one of balancing the assistance given Somalia and Ethiopia. Unfortunately, the British had found it extremely difficult to work with the Ethiopians and had very few projects in that country. However, they were expecting a fairly large private participation by the firm of Michael Cotts in a Gezira-like scheme in the Awash Valley. The United States, of course, was meeting Ethiopian requirements quite successfully as well as providing for the military. On the other hand, the British were giving very significant amounts of assistance to Somalia and were now also undertaking the training of the Somali Army in conjunction with the Italians. The United States should be aware that the UK could not continue to provide assistance to Somalia at the present level. The Treasury had informed the Foreign Office that the most that could be hoped for next year was #1.3 million. Since it was expected that military expenses would increase from #150,000 to #250,000 there obviously would have to be considerable decrease in the amount of money available for developmental activities in the North. Perhaps it might be useful, Sir Roger said, if the United States could obtain a better balance in the assistance it was providing the two countries and thus somewhat compensate for this reduction. Mr. Witman corrected the misapprehension of the British regarding the theoretically disproportionate amount of assistance being furnished by the United States to Ethiopia. He pointed out that if military aid were excluded—which should be the case since it was primarily a quid pro quo for Kagnew Station—the economic assistance on a per capita basis was very much in Somalia's favor. Furthermore, in FY 1962 Somalia was one of the few countries where we were increasing our assistance. We would actually be providing more economic assistance to Somalia than to Ethiopia this year. Mr. Gordon explained that the total contemplated for Somalia in FY 1962 was approximately $9 million with $5.6 million of this amount going to the Chisimaio Port. When Sir Roger asked how the remaining roughly $4 million was to be spent, Mr. Gordon explained that specific amounts had not yet been decided upon, but the United States planned to concentrate on two or three sectors of the Somali economy—the inter-river area, education and water resources, plus the public safety program—and the various projects in these sectors would probably total $3.2 or $3.4 million. Sir Roger remarked that this was very interesting information and confirmed his views that tripartite discussions among the British, Italians and United States should be held in the near future. The British had recently talked with the Italians in Rome, where they had found the Italians questioning the United States contributions to developmental aid. The Italians had said that they did not know what the United States had done to fulfill its commitments made during the Rome talks in November 1960 with the exception of Chisimaio Port. In view of this lack of communication it would probably be useful for the three powers to review what they had done and what they contemplated doing in 1963. Governor Williams said he agreed that such a tripartite meeting would probably be useful. He felt that a balanced approach as proposed by Sir Roger was generally right. However, it should be noted that although the United States seemed to be providing a considerably larger amount to Somalia, this was not a deliberate policy on our part. It resulted from our wanting to provide one large project the Somalis particularly desired. Since this had been Chisimaio, the picture had been thrown somewhat out of focus. Mr. Witman then said we hoped both the British and Italians would come forward soon with the military items they proposed to provide in the forthcoming year. The Somalis seemed very concerned over that particular subject. Sir Roger said that they had that problem very much in mind and did intend to inform the Somali Government shortly. He gathered from what had been said that the United States would not object to a tripartite meeting which he envisioned primarily as a discussion of what could be done in the developmental field since the United States obviously was not prepared to participate in budgetary support and military assistance. The Italians and British, of course, would use the occasion to inform the United States of their intentions in these areas. Governor Williams said that inasmuch as the British had talked to both the Italians and us about the meeting, he would suggest they consider themselves delegated to coordinate the arrangements for it. When Sir Roger asked if the United States preferred any particular site, the Governor said he thought it would be better to hold it outside of Washington. Sir Roger agreed and said he would probably propose to the Italians that a preliminary discussion take place among our Ambassadors in Mogadiscio which would be followed up in Rome in the Spring in formal tripartite consultations. Mr. Gordon said he would like to point out that any reduction by the British in their aid level would create quite a problem for us with Congress. It was extremely difficult to make a convincing case of why we had to pick up additional aid requirements when former metropoles reduced their contributions. Sir Roger said he realized this, but, if it would be of any help, it could be pointed out that the British reduction would probably occur entirely in its former protectorate as far as the developmental sector went. If the British in addition had to reduce the amount of budg-etary support they were providing, this would not effect the American aid level since we are not participating in the budgetary sector. Mr. Witman inquired whether the British were aware of the activity surrounding the new Haile Selassie I University. Specifically, were they going to send a representative to the Founder's Day celebration on December 18, 1961? Sir Roger replied that while they were aware of some new stirring within the University, they had not been invited as far as he knew to send a representative to the convocation and had made no preparation to do so. * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.41/11-2161. Confidential. Drafted by Buckle on December 12. 276. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia 276. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia Source Washington, May 19, 1962, 12:20 p.m. 544. Embdes 233. 1 While numerous notes received from FonOff in last six months requesting additional military equipment, believe presentation Ethiopian position given Bowles by Emperor (ref des) most important and inclusive. Therefore, unless you perceive objection, you should seek audience with Emperor and, in response to referenced memorandum, orally present points outlined below. You should also leave an aide-memoire along same lines. USG appreciates opportunity given Ambassador Bowles Feb 21, 1962 discuss with His Imperial Majesty problems which Ethiopia and US share. Bowles returned to Washington deeply impressed not only with Emperor's dedication to Ethiopian people and their political and economic development but also with Emperor's views on social development and importance of individual citizen. U.S. believes, as indicated by Bowles, there broad areas of agreement on almost every point discussed: need for economic planning; for widespread distribution of land so that every peasant family will have share in country's development; for expansion education and medical services; for improved communications and particularly for greater emphasis on rural areas.USG is anxious continue to assist IEG carry out these plans for development and will work with IEG on those projects which meet AID criteria and which both governments agree will contribute to social and economic betterment of Ethiopian people. Only need of additional military equipment seemed require further study by both governments. USG has reviewed memorandum given Bowles after meeting and comments as follows: Scope and purpose US-IEG military program decided in 1953 agreement as modified 1956 and 1960. Since that time efficient, modern Ethiopian fighting force has been developed capable defeating any potential invader. In fact, nowhere near Ethiopia's borders does there appear to exist a well-armed adversary capable of launching a serious sustained attack on Ethiopia. The possibility of successful aggression against Ethiopia has therefore, if anything, markedly decreased. The military case for expansion Ethiopian forces for defensive purposes is thus difficult to substantiate at this time and justification to numerous interested observers would be necessary not only by Ethiopia but also by U.S. in view Somalia's recent complaint to UN SYG and increasing concern over Ethiopian military might. USG, and presumably IEG, would wish to be especially careful at this point re taking any action which might trigger an arms race in Horn of Africa. While Italy and UK undoubtedly would not provide Somalia with any more military equipment than required for internal security and basic defense, there is little doubt Communist countries would exploit any possibility of causing an armed conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia. Furthermore, and important as a separate consideration, support for additional military equipment and forces at this time would place considerable additional strain on Ethiopia's resources and quite probably necessitate postponement of some important economic development measures. Therefore in the interest of peace, and in order to prevent hasty counter-action by Somalia, USG regrets that it is unable to meet IEG request for additional fighter aircraft. With regard to transport aircraft for Ethiopian airforce,USG considers, and assumes IEG would now agree, that planned delivery of 2 C-54 aircraft in August of this year together with C-47 aircraft already delivered fulfills IEG requirements. With reference other military items mentioned in note given Ambassador Bowles Feb 21, 1962, USG has already undertaken to meet most these requests on a continuing basis in regular program. While M-24 tank has been considered adequate for Ethiopian needs, Ethiopian program nevertheless already calls for change which should meet Ethiopian request this item (13 M-41 tanks in FY 62 program to be delivered in FY 63; 27 more in proposed FY 63 program for delivery in FY 64). Twelve 155 mm Howitzers are proposed for FY 63 program for delivery in FY 63. While USG always willing consider other IEG requests such as prefabricated housing mentioned in memorandum, it should be noted that 26 quonset huts and 16 prefab buildings were delivered in Oct 1959. Four of these quonsets and 7 prefab buildings are still in original crates at Engineer Depot Addis Ababa. With respect to the quartermaster items requested in IEG note of Sept 6, 1961, a substantial quantity of personal equipment is proposed for FY 63 program with delivery before end that fiscal year. Believe facts enumerated this para strong evidence that USG is in fact planning meet IEG needs on a continuing basis. Of course, firm program for such of above items as proposed for FY 63 program depend-ent upon annual Congressional action which for FY 63 still pending. In conclusion USG wishes assure IEG it expects to continue fulfill all of its commitments re Ethiopian military establishment and is prepared jointly review Ethiopian needs yearly and meet continuing requirements on basis military, political and economic situation prevailing in two countries at that time. 2 Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 775.5/5-1962. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Buckle on May 17; cleared by Whitfield (OSD/ISA), Tasca, and Wolfe in draft and by Hutchinson, Kitchen, and Bowles; and approved by Williams. Repeated to Mogadiscio and pouched to Paris for the Embassy and CINCEUR. 1 Despatch 233, February 26, reported the discussion between Chester Bowles, Presidential Special Representative and Adviser on African, Asian, and Latin American Affairs, and Emperor Haile Selassie of U.S. military assistance programs in Addis Ababa on February 21. (Ibid., 123-Bowles, Chester) On February 24, he sent a telegram from New Delhi recommending that the Ethiopian request for a second squadron of F-86s [ text not declassified ] be rejected tactfully but firmly. He noted that there was no rational military justification for the request and that if the United States increased military aid to Ethiopia, the result would be an arms race with its neighbors. (Telegram 2633 from New Delhi; ibid., 775.56311/2-2462) 2 On May 24, Ambassador Arthur Richards reported that he had discussed the points in telegram 544 with the Emperor that morning. Haile Selassie expressed gratitude for U.S. aid and said that it was because of the build-up of the military capability of Ethiopia's neighbors, especially Somalia, that the Imperial Ethiopian Government felt it necessary to increase the capabilities of the Ethiopian Air Force. Thus, he was disappointed that the United States had rejected his request for F-86s. (Telegram 618 from Addis Ababa; ibid., 775.5/5-2462) 277. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia 277. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia Source Washington, May 19, 1962, 12:22 p.m. 311. Embtel 420 to Dept, rptd Addis Ababa 89, 1 Embdes 184. 2 View certain contentious statements in GSR note Embdes 184, Dept had hoped be able avoid official reply. However, Embtel 420 indicates GSR awaiting response. Therefore, unless you perceive objection, you should reply along following lines: USG previously unaware that thousands of Somalis had been massacred in their villages by Ethiopian troops using arms furnished by the USG as stated in GSR's note of April 7, 1962. USG would of course wish to review carefully any evidence GSR has to substantiate this accusation. Use of military equipment furnished IEG by USG is restricted to internal security and defensive measures or in support UN operations. As far as we have been aware, this is all that arms we have furnished have been used for and USG would certainly take appropriate measures if investigation proved otherwise. USG policy in Horn of Africa is to help both Ethiopia and Somalia help themselves in battle against underdevelopment. This is only battle which USG supports. We profoundly hope all disputes between Somalia and her neighbors can be settled by peaceful means and have used our good offices in past in pursuit this objective. USG more than willing attempt do so again if tensions should once more rise. Moreover, GSR does not have to be reminded of special interest of UN in welfare of Somali Republic, which acquired its independence under UN supervision. Somali Republic has won respect of world in promising that pursuit of national interests will conform to principles UN charter. In return, Somali Republic's best hope of security lies in protection offered by UN charter. USG has been extremely careful to avoid any action which would seem to be a contribution to an arms race anywhere in Africa. In line with this objective USG has refrained from assisting GSR in military field particularly since it is understood that governments of Italy and UK have agreed satisfy her defense requirements. Similarly USG has not responded favorably to Ethiopian requests for military equipment over and above quantities reasonably needed for internal security and defense. Should be noted that equipment USG currently providing IEG is in fulfillment of commitments made in 1953 as amended 1956 and 1960. No expansion of force goals set at those dates is currently contemplated.USG, of course, cannot refuse to honor its limited commitments, however, and various replacement items will be provided from time to time. USG is well aware Somali concern over possible border difficulties and would of course endeavor use its influence to discourage aggression should it threaten. USG believes its continued role in Ethiopian military program actually one of great usefulness to Somalia as well as IEG. As long as USG satisfying IEG's minimum materiel and training requirements, peace has much greater chance remaining in Horn than if USG withdrew and left a vacuum. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 775.5/5-362. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Buckle on May 17; cleared in draft by Whitfield (OSD/ISA), Tasca, and Wolfe and by Hutchinson, Kitchen, and Bowles; and approved by Williams. Repeated to Addis Ababa. 1 Dated May 3. (Ibid.) 2 Despatch 184, April 20, transmitted a translation of a Somali Government note verbale of April 17 stating that the Somali people were deeply convinced that the massacres perpetrated by the Ethiopian armed forces against thousands of innocent Somalis had been carried out with arms furnished to Ethiopia by the U.S. Government, and expressing the hope that the United States, having realized the gravity of the situation currently existing between Somalia and Ethiopia, would stop furnishing arms to Ethiopia. (Ibid., 775.5/4-2062) 278. Memorandum of Conversation 278. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, July 13, 1962. SUBJECT Presentation of Credentials to the President by the New Ambassador of the Somali Republic PARTICIPANTS The President Omar Mohallim Mohamed, Somali Ambassador Angier Biddle Duke, Chief of Protocol Henry J. Tasca, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs After the usual opening pleasantries, the President referred to United States interest in Somalia and limitations on United States aid arising from the balance of payments position. He stressed the large and continuing drain which had resulted from our aid program over the years. The President underlined the importance of continued aid from Italy and Great Britain. The Somali Ambassador expressed his gratitude for United States aid to date and requested the President to urge the Italians to continue their aid and to pay the amounts promised for budgetary support. In reply the President promised we would urge the Italians to take appropriate action. He remarked that Italy's gold and balance of payments position made this quite feasible, particularly, since Italy was doing nothing elsewhere of this kind in the field of direct aid. It was noted that the United States was not in a position to provide budgetary support. In this connection, the Ambassador referred to the Soviet offer to finance certain items which are included in the United States plans for the second phase of Chisimaio. He said that the Somali Government would turn down the Soviet offer. However, they would wish the second phase to be financed by United States grants, not loans. The President stated it was unwise to mix Soviet assistance with ours. The Congress does not like this. The Ambassador then raised the question of United States military aid to Ethiopia. In reply the President noted (a) our aid was for internal security purposes; (b) it began in 1952, long before Somalia's independ-ence; (c) we counted on the Italians and British to provide aid in this field to Somalia. In closing the meeting the President said that the United States would address itself again to Italy requesting it to provide aid to Somalia. * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Somalia, 1/62-10/62. Official Use Only. Drafted by Tasca. 279. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia 279. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia Source Washington, August 11, 1962, 1:05 p.m. 40. Embtel 52 to Dept, rptd London 13, Rome separately by Dept; Embtel 53 to Dept, rptd London 14, Rome 23. 1 You should inform Prime Minister in response your tels 52 and 53 that although USG desires help Somalia and has shown unfailing good faith in this respect, our ability to continue to do so has been increasingly handicapped by repeated instances of his Govt's simultaneously dickering with both US and USSR in same or related fields. Sometimes we have learned of prior commitments to Soviets only after negotiations with US well advanced. While we have endeavored where possible to provide Somalia with Western alternatives, in notable recent instances our efforts have been rewarded by Somali decision to accept Soviet offers. Reftel 53 indicates Minister of Interior and Soviet Economic Counselor already discussing Soviet aid for Somali national airline. USG can not deliver DC-3 aircraft and provide training for 8 pilots previously offered, to be incorporated in Soviet-managed airline. Therefore, in context above paragraph, you are requested inform Somali Govt as follows: USG will offer following package to GSR on clear understanding latter not accept Soviet offer re aviation training (civil or military) and airline management or assistance: USG will provide three DC-3s as formerly discussed with GSR plus training 15 civilian pilots and 20 mechanics if Italian Govt does not meet its portion previous proposal, together with management assistance for purpose establishing internal airline system. Rejection of any one of these three parts (aircraft, training, or management) by GSR will be considered rejection total package. In presentation to Somali Gov't officials you should make clear this does not mean open end provision of funds by USG for all expenses required to operate an airline. FYI. Dept still considering whether or not recommend invitation Prime Minister for Presidential visit. Outcome likely depend upon negotiations aviation problem Mogadiscio. End FYI. 2 Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 777.5/8-962. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Adams on August 10; cleared by Witman, Troxel, Hamilton (AID) in draft, Snowden, FitzGerald, and Hunt; and approved by Witman. Repeated to Addis Ababa, London, and Rome. 1 Both dated August 9. (Ibid.) 2 Telegram 58 from Mogadiscio, August 14, reported that General Abscir said that although it was the firm policy of the Somali Government not to accept military assistance from the Bloc, the “Defense Establishment” had persuaded the Prime Minister that accept-ance of training did not violate this policy. (Ibid., 775.5/8-1462) On August 15, the Department instructed the Embassy in Mogadiscio to make the package offer as directed. (Telegram 44 to Mogadiscio; ibid., 777.5/8-1562) Telegram 66 from Mogadiscio, August 17, reported that after learning that the three DC-3s previously offered would be withdrawn if Somalia sent pilots and mechanics to the Soviet Union for training, the Prime Minister rejected the U.S. package. (Ibid., 777.5/8-1762) 280. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 280. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Source Washington, November 8, 1962, 4:02 p.m. 2505. London's 1793 1 (not repeated to other posts) and Deptel 216 to Addis. 2 Dept plans inform UK and Italian representatives Washington that, as result discussions in Addis and with General Merid in Washington, US has agreed accelerate shipment limited number tanks and personnel carriers to Ethiopia in context basic US commitment to strengthen Ethiopian armed forces and in light cooperative Ethiopian attitude with respect Korea and Congo. US has not agreed provide additional jet fighters beyond replacement for two F-86s lost in accidents. US has agreed provide additional propeller-driven training aircraft and 5 additional jet trainers. U.S. continues be guided in assessing Ethiopian requests by its desire, within context US commitments and interests in Ethiopia, avoid increasing tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia and stimulating arms race Horn of Africa. Deptel 124 to Mogadiscio requesting latest information status UK and Italian arms aid Somalia is indication continuing US interest in assuring Somalia on its part can meet its defense needs from friendly sources. Dept aware this subject likely be discussed during Abdirascid visit November 27. London and Rome may similarly inform foreign offices. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 775.5/11-762. Secret. Drafted by Newsom; cleared by Junkermann (OSD/ISA) in substance, Stout, and Bergesen; and approved by Tasca. Also sent to Rome and repeated to Addis Ababa. 1 Dated November 7. (Ibid.) 2 Dated November 5. (Ibid., 775.5/11-562) 281. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia 281. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia Source Washington, November 17, 1962, 6:16 p.m. 232. Addis Ababa's 281 1 and 283. 2 For Ambassador. You should on urgent basis seek earliest possible audience with Emperor or failing this appointment with Prime Minister Aklilou to discuss following: 1. Congo: Only three Saabs and one Canberra combat equipped and operational in Congo. In view Emperor's continued indications firm support UN operation in Congo, Department hopeful IEG will dispatch four F-86s with pilots soonest. 2. At your discretion, convey our desire move ahead rapidly to complete arrangements for Kagnew extension in implementation of Emperor's 1960 agreement in principle. 3. At your discretion, advise that RCA has informed Department and is informing IEG that after full consideration problem, they are unable continue with present contract. You should also advise that USG urgently examining alternatives. 4. You should present military assistance for Somalia in following manner (to Emperor only): (a) USG has consistently demonstrated its sincere interest in security Ethiopia through variety means including support for Ethiopian military and police. US opposition to any activities threatening Ethiopia's territorial integrity was publicly announced shortly after Ambassador Richards' presentation credentials in 1960. USG continues adhere firmly to this position. (b) USG is aware of Ethiopia's concern that Somalia might again become avenue for threat to Ethiopian territorial integrity. It clear to us that Somalis not likely ever have sufficient military establishment to encourage them attempt unaided promote their aim of Greater Somalia by force. We are concerned however at penetration of Somali military through medium military assistance from nations whose intentions towards Ethiopia suspect. This raises possibility Somalis might lend themselves to adventure against Ethiopia supported by forces from outside. (c) Military assistance to Somalia which UK and Italy willing provide leaves gaps in Somali military requirements which being filled in part by UAR. Soviet Union has recently made beginning in filling one such gap by initiating program of training for 20 Somali military pilots and 30 mechanics. Soviet plans with regard Somali military clearly do not stop there. Undoubtedly training will be followed by offers military hardware. (d) USG has already made major effort influence Somalis against allowing entrance into such sensitive field of nations whose intentions towards Ethiopia dubious. Principal inhibiting factor in US ability exert influence on Somali Government has been our refusal, based on our knowledge Ethiopian sensitivities, to provide military assistance to Somalia. (e) We feel time has now come when both USG and IEG must take under urgent reconsideration problem of military assistance to Somalia. There is now no longer any question of whether Somalis are going to continue build their military establishment, but by how much and from whom. We feel interests of both USG and IEG require that sources of military aid for Somalia be nations who can be counted upon keep Somali military development within reasonable bounds and whose friendship for Ethiopia and dedication to Ethiopia's territorial integrity are amply demonstrated and not open to question. (f) USG accordingly is coming to conclusion that some form of limited US military assistance to Somalia may be necessary to supplement efforts of UK and Italy in order preclude Soviet Union from this field and to reduce and if possible eliminate UAR as well. We are coming to Emperor before making any final decisions on this matter in hope he will appreciate urgency of need to ensure that major outside influences on Somalis in this sensitive area so important to Ethiopia's security will be exercised by nations sincerely desirous retaining Ethiopia's friendship and to promoting peace and security in Horn of Africa. FYI. In your discussion if you think it would be useful, you might wish draw also on following: Somali Prime Minister arriving Washington November 27 and has already indicated this topic will be one of foremost subjects for his discussions with President and Secretary. His visit here will be part of tour of Western countries from whom Somalia now receiving aid. Degree of responsiveness he meets on tour could have significant effect on where Somalia will place its future reliance for aid of all types. You might also wish explain that any US military aid to Somalia would be closely coordinated with UK and Italy and would consist of minimum supplement to Italo-UK aid required for preclusion. End FYI. 3 Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 675.77/11-1662. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Post; cleared in draft by Cole, Tank (AID), and Harrison (AID) and by Witman, by Godley and Whitfield (OSD/ISA) in substance; and approved by Williams. Repeated to Mogadiscio, Leopoldville, and Asmara and by pouch to USUN, London, and Rome. 1 Dated November 16. (Ibid.) 2 Dated November 16. (Ibid., 975.40/11-1662) 3 On November 24, Ambassador Richards reported that when he had discussed Ethiopian-Somali relations with the Emperor during his farewell audience, Haile Selassie had told him he was convinced that U.S. military aid to Somalia would neither enhance U.S. influence nor prevent Somalia from accepting military aid from unfriendly quarters. (Telegram 299 from Addis Ababa; ibid., 777.5/11-2462) The Ambassador also reported that the Emperor had told him that if the United States was interested [ text not declassified ] he would agree in order to “give pleasure.” (Telegram 296 from Addis Ababa, November 24; ibid., 775.56311/11-2462) 282. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia 282. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia Source Washington, November 21, 1962, 9:33 a.m. 237. Addis Ababa's 287 to Dept, rptd Asmara 44; Addis Ababa's 288 to Dept, rptd Mogadiscio 42, Asmara 45. 1 In audience with Emperor Thursday, Dept suggests further points for discussion in addition those outlined Deptel 232: 2 (1) Re Eritrean Unification: In frank and friendly manner which has characterized our relations with Emperor, we wish state we have noted step and appreciate that there are factors relating nation's security which bear on Ethiopian policy toward Eritrea. Step has, however, placed US in difficult position. While USG wishes give full support measures designed increase security of Ethiopia, Eritrean federation was action supported by US in UN, action which, at time, was considered favorable to Ethiopia. (2) If it appears appropriate pursue subject, or if Emperor raises question message you may inform HIM that, while US does not feel it appropriate commend Ethiopia on dissolution of federation or participate in formal observances of event, in view history federation and general interest international community, US has noted with favor Emperor's intention maintain rights and freedom Eritrean constitution and hopes unification may strengthen IEG's hand in moving forward with plans for reform and modernization (Embtel 287). (3) If it would be of assistance in presentation that portion Deptel 232 relating arms for Somalia, you may indicate that, while our program by no means certain, and will in part depend on how other programs develop, our initial thinking solely in direction training and minimum supplement to equipment provided by UK and Italy. (4) You may state, if occasion arises, US remains interested, as Ambassador Bowles stated, in viewing Five Year Plan (Embtel 249). 3 (5) We hope have further telegrams re visit to you prior Thursday audience. 4 Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 775.00/11-1962. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Newsom on November 20; cleared by Sisco, Junkermann (OSD/ISA), Witman, Harrison (AID), Tank, Hackler, Bergesen, and Stone; and approved by Tasca. Repeated to London, Mogadiscio, Rome, Asmara, and USUN. 1 Both dated November 19. (Ibid.) 2 Document 281 . 3 Telegram 249 from Addis Ababa, October 19, reported Ambassador Bowles' conversation with Emperor Haile Selassie on October 18. (Department of State, Central Files, 675.77/10-1962) 4 Telegram 304 from Addis Ababa, November 27, reported that during his farewell audience with the Emperor on November 23, the Ambassador stressed that the U.S. Government was gratified at the Emperor's public pledge to uphold human rights and fundamental freedoms in Eritrea. (Ibid., 775.00/11-2762) 283. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy 283. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Source Washington, November 24, 1962. Somali Prime Minister Abdirascid's visit may prove a delicate one. He's after more US aid and our support against Ethiopia; on neither account are we in a position to satisfy him fully, though we're trying to be as forthcoming as we can. Somalia's whole outlook is dominated by its fear of Ethiopia (it has an undemarcated border with Ethiopia's Somali-populated Ogaden province), and its ambitions for a greater Somalia—including Ogaden, part of Kenya and French Somaliland. Though Somalia's inclinations are pro-Western, it regards the US as so committed to Ethiopia that it has tended to reinsure with the UAR and the Bloc (this in turn feeds Ethiopian fears). The Soviets have been quite responsive, to the tune of $57 million in credits. Both the UAR and USSR are training Somali military and technicians. Because of our Ethiopian ties, we've tried to get the UK and Italy, as the former landlords, to shoulder the main burden of supporting this desperately impoverished little country (see Tab V-B). 1 But we've also invested quite a bit, especially in the Chisimaio port. Abdirascid will no doubt complain about our military aid to Ethiopia (primarily as rent for the Kagnew communications facility we've given about $10 million MAP annually to build up the largest—and most useless—force in East Africa). Here again we've relied on the UK and Italy to help Somalia, but their aid, always small, is declining. If we don't start a small MAP program ourselves Somalia will turn increasingly to the all too willing Soviets and UAR. A few hundred thousand a year in preclusive MAP for Somalia (we already support the police) will be much cheaper than the Ethiopian bill if Somalia goes to the Bloc and UAR. So if Abdirascid presses, we urge you tell him we'll examine his needs. Haile Selassie will holler, but we propose to make the same points to him. Even more important, I hope you'll impress on Abdirascid the dangers Somalia is running if it pursues an irredentist course. It faces two broad choices, either to compose its quarrel with Ethiopia and take the road of internal development or to engage in an arms race in which we'll inevitably be on the other side. We don't see how Somalia can win out over Ethiopia; on the other hand, it could well use the UN route to mediate its boundary dispute (we don't want to mediate this one because the prospects for success are poor). Abdirascid also wants more economic aid. We've already given more than to most comparable African states (average of $2.5 million FY 1957-61, $14.2 million in FY 1962 and $8.8 scheduled for FY 1963). The biggest item has been $7.3 in development grants for the Chisimaio port; we're committed to a $3 million second phase but there's an argument over whether it should be loan or grant. AID rightly insists that all other such African capital projects are going on a loan basis and that our DL terms are hardly onerous (3/4%, ten years grace, 40 years to pay). But Abdirascid contends that we promised a grant. The history is sufficiently fuzzy that you may want to concede if he presses the issue. We've been more than forthcoming enough with Somalia to justify lecturing our visitor gently about the dangers of walking both sides of the street. Guinea's experience alone suggests that the Bloc eventually demands payment for its aid in one form or another. The visit will be a success if we can send this fellow away thinking that (1) we'll help defend him against Ethiopia if he'll only stop tweaking Selassie's nose; and (2) the West will be reasonably helpful on aid if he doesn't play too much to the Bloc. R. W. Komer * Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Countries Series, Somali Republic. Secret. 1 Not attached to the source text. 284. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy 284. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Source Washington, November 26, 1962. Following last minute developments are worth noting before your talk with Abdirascid: 1. We have a report that Somalia, backed by Arab states, may bring Ethiopia's recent formal annexation of Eritrea before the UN (Eritrea was “federated” with Ethiopia as part of the Italian colonies settlement). Though we hardly applaud Haile Selassie's action, we ought to tell Abdirascid that for Somalia to complain to the UN about it would not only be futile but further exacerbate Somali-Ethiopian relations. If they refrain instead, we could tell Selassie the Somalis did so as a contribution to better relations. 2. In his final audience with Selassie, Richards asked his reaction to possible US military aid to Somalia (see Addis 299 attached). 1 Selassie doubted this would either enhance US influence or preclude Communist aid, but said he would not object if we decided to go ahead. So the field is clear. Selassie has also accepted your invitation for a visit in 1963. 3. Before Abdirascid's departure, State tried to remove one recent irritant in US-Somali relations by promising three DC-3's for an internal Somali airline on condition that the Somalis arrange for effective management and agree not to accept Soviet aid for the line. We had promised these planes a year ago but withdrew the offer when we thought erroneously that the Somalis were negotiating for Soviet management. Abdirascid was annoyed by the withdrawal and is not fully satisfied with our conditions for renewing the offer. If he raises this, you may want to soft-pedal the conditions by describing them as simply a normal effort to insure effective use of our aid and to assure Congress that it will not be mixed with Soviet aid. 4. Abdirascid also let his hair down on the US aid program. He feels our procedures are too slow, conditions too restrictive, and that we often fail to consult the Somalis. AID rejoins that the chief difficulties are poor Somali planning and lack of coordination within the Somali government. If Abdirascid brings up this issue, why not agree that improved US-Somali cooperation is essential but deliver a little lecture on the need for sound planning and self-help. Our projects take time because we, unlike the Soviets, are more interested in making a well-planned economic contribution than a political splash. 5. The Somalis have made a pitch for Abdirascid to see you alone. State doesn't know what he wants to say. Since his English is only fair, State will have an Italian-speaking interpreter (our visitor's Italian is fluent). We have no good Somali speaker available, so will have to depend on their interpreter if they choose Somali. 6. A supplementary State memo is attached. 2 R. W. Komer * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Somalia. Secret. 1 Not attached to the source text. Telegram 299 from Addis Ababa, November 24, reported Ambassador Richards' discussion of Ethiopian-Somali relations with the Emperor during his farewell audience on November 23. (Department of State, Central Files, 777.5/11-2462) 2 Attached to the source text but not printed is a paper entitled “Visit of the Somali Prime Minister, November 27-December 2, 1962: Contingency Talking Paper for the President.” 285. Memorandum of Conversation 285. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, November 27, 1962, noon. SUBJECT United States-Somali Relations PARTICIPANTS Somali Prime Minister Abdirascid Ali Scermarche Foreign Minister Abdullahi Issa Mohamud Ambassador to the U.S. Omar Mohallim Mohamed Ambassador to Ethiopia Abdulrahim Abbey Farah Deputy in the National Assembly Michael Mariano Deputy in the National Assembly Abdinur Mohamed Hussein United States The President Deputy Administrator, AID, Frank M. Coffin Assistant Secretary G. Mennen Williams Deputy Assistant Secretary Henry J. Tasca Chief of Protocol, Angier Biddle Duke Director, Office of Northern African Affairs, William Witman II The President welcomed the Prime Minister and asked his judgment on events in East Africa, as well as how he felt relations between Somalia and the United States could be improved. Prime Minister Abdirascid thanked the President for the opportunity of expressing views on problems of interest to both countries, which he would do with the President's indulgence in a frank and direct manner. He asked that it first be established, however, that the Somalis were grateful for American interest and support both before and after independence. The Prime Minister went on to say that Somalia could not solve its problems by itself; it needed the help of the developed countries, especially the United States as a world leader. Somalia's problems were political, economic and social. Political independence was not enough if the country did not advance with economic development, especially for such a backward country as Somalia. Abdirascid then gave an historical account of the “artificial and unjust” division of Somali lands during the last century into five parts by Italy, Great Britain (2 parts), France and Ethiopia. The greatest hope of the Somali people was for reunification, but the Somali Constitution condemns all manifestations of violence. He felt there was a necessity for good offices or mediation by friendly states, and hoped the U.S. could be helpful. Ethiopia toward the end of the last century had incorporated a large part of Somali territory, and was using troops against the Somali population. These troops were equipped with arms furnished by the United States. He said he had told the U.S. Embassy the U.S. should stop the moral and material aid it was providing Ethiopia against the defenseless Somali people. The Government knew what the U.S. explanation was, but it was very difficult to explain to the man-in-the-street that the U.S. was furnishing arms to Ethiopia. The Prime Minister appealed to the President as the highest authority in the United States to stop furnishing arms to Ethiopia. He added that Ethiopia was also encouraging the Kenyans not to come to terms with Somalia over the Northern Frontier District. In the interest of avoiding a new Congo situation, he hoped the U.S. would intervene with Kenya before independence to transfer the Somali-inhabited area to Somalia. President Kennedy replied that the problem of arms for Ethiopia was a difficult one. We had had similar situations elsewhere as in the Pakistan-India dispute over Kashmir. We would attempt to prevent the use of our equipment against the other. We recognized that as long as Ethiopia possessed the important territory Somalia claimed, relations between the two countries would be complicated. Our assistance to Ethiopia was begun long before Somalia became independent, and was not related to Somalia in any way. We would like to see relations with Ethiopia improved but were not sure what the U.S. could do. The Kashmir dispute had gone on for 14 years, but we were not able to influence it. Nor the Pak-Afghan, Thai-Cambodian, Ecuador-Peru, even Cuba-U.S. disputes. There was tremendous popular feeling, and we were not able to settle them as we would have liked to see them settled. Perhaps the UN could help. But it was beyond the resources of a single country like the U.S. to solve all problems, especially those going back in time. We could only try to minimize differences, and try to keep a balance. The President noted that we were providing relatively large economic assistance for Somalia in addition to the obligations of the Italians and British which they should fulfill. We were anxious to see the problems between Somalia and Ethiopia settled, and would do anything we could. Prime Minister Abdirascid remarked that he understood U.S. difficulties over good offices. Somalia was anxiously awaiting arms, but was not asking for arms just because Ethiopia was getting arms. The President responded he would like to talk to the Prime Minister about how we might assist Somalia in this area. (Abdirascid did not take the President up on this point.) The President then went on to cite the use by the Portuguese in Angola and the French in Algeria of NATO arms, and said he understood Somali irritation, but assured the Prime Minister we would attempt to prevent the wrong use of the arms we were giving Ethiopia. He reiterated that we would be glad to talk to see if we could be of any assistance to Somalia. (Again Abdirascid seemed not to grasp the meaning of the President's remark.) The President added that the Ethiopians alleged Somalia was getting arms from the UAR and the Soviets. The Prime Minister vigorously asserted that Somalia was getting absolutely no arms from the Soviets. President Kennedy summarized this part of the discussion as follows: a. We would be glad to talk about any assistance we might give, and b. We would look again at the use of American equipment against the Somali people. An Italian interpreter was used. * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Somalia. Confidential. Drafted by Witman. The conversation was held at the White House. A memorandum of President Kennedy and Prime Minister Abdirascid's discussion of U.S. economic assistance to Somalia on November 27 is ibid. 286. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy 286. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Source Washington, November 28, 1962. I understand Rusk and Coffin took care of most remaining specifics this morning, so your second talk with Abdirascid can be short. However, one problem area deserves a reprise. Nothing you can say will be of more benefit to US policy than urging Abdirascid to lay off Somali-Ethiopian disputes. Unless the trend is reversed, things are heading toward an eventual clash in which we will end up backing Ethiopia and the UAR/USSR the Somalis. There is no point in debating the specifics. We understand Somali's ethnic claims. But the overriding fact is that Ethiopia is so much bigger than Somali that Somalis can't win. You could drive this home by warning Abdirascid that if the issue is pressed to a confrontation, we may be forced to take the Ethiop side, something we don't want to do. On the other hand we oppose any Ethiopian pressures on Somali. In fact we will consider limited military aid along with UK and Italy (this point apparently didn't sink in at last session) in addition to our support of Somali police. But we think it folly for so desperately poor a country as Somali to burden itself with a big military machine. This is a mistake made by all too many underdeveloped states. Also worth saying is that we can protect the Somalis even more by controlling the flow of MAP to the Ethiops than by giving compensatory aid to Somalis. But we cannot resist Ethiopian pleas if the Somalis get a lot of equipment from Moscow and Cairo . Therefore, we're happy to hear that Somalis aren't seeking arms from the Soviets. Why not tell Abdi that you've looked into his complaints about handling of US aid projects. We can and will improve, but Somalis need to jack up their planning and improve coordination within their own house. We're serious about self-help. R. W. Komer 1 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Somalia. Secret. 1 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 287. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia 287. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia Source Washington, November 30, 1962, 12:22 p.m. 161. Following is summary discussions with Somali Prime Minister and party in Washington November 27-28 based on uncleared memcons. Prime Minister and party met with President November 27 and 28 1 and with Secretary November 28. 2 AID Acting Administrator Coffin present at all meetings. Abdirascid expressed gratitude for US interest and support and expressed need for help. Then followed exposition Somali desire for reunification and expression concern over difficulties with Ethiopia and US military assistance to Ethiopia. President explained problem US arms for Ethiopia was difficult one similar to those faced by US in certain other areas in which we endeavor prevent use of US equipment by one nation against another. Recognizing complications in Ethiopian-Somali relations and long history US assist-ance to Ethiopia unrelated to Somalia, US could only try minimize differences and keep balance. President noted large US economic assistance to Somalia in addition to Italian and UK obligations and expressed desire see problems between Somalia and Ethiopia settled. US would do what it could. Prime Minister mentioned Somali need for arms. President said he would be prepared see how US could be of assistance. Secretary separately enunciated further US agreement in principle study Somalia's genuine security needs and to consider supplementing efforts other Western powers. Prime Minister expressed satisfaction with changed US position and expressed hope for vehicles and equipment and training for both Army and police. He agreed with suggestion security forces could play useful role in economic development as well as security field. He stressed Somalia's needs were strictly for internal security and defense and promised any assistance provided would not be used for offensive purposes. Prime Minister also stressed fact Somali Government committed by Constitution to pursue its national goals only by strictly legal and peaceful means. President presented case for long-term low interest loan on second phase Chisimaio with ten-year grace period. Somalis did not press for grant. Prime Minister outlined points dissatisfaction with aid program including slowness execution projects and high administrative costs. Details various aid problems were later reviewed in separate meeting Coffin and Muller of AID and Abdinur and Ali Sheikh. US opposition to commingling was stressed. Prime Minister said Somalia constitutionally neutral but fundamentally pro-Western and would not go to Soviet Union for essential needs if they could be obtained in West. Prime Minister asked US put in good word for Somalia with IBRD. Noted 5-year plan would be ready in next few months and indicated Somali intention seek support for plan from EEC, US, and international agencies. He stated IBRD had approved November 27 proposal to send IBRD survey team to study projects. President concluded that visit useful in focussing attention on Somali needs. Somalis must recognize difficulties US has in meeting Somali needs, but assured Prime Minister US anxious do best it can and is very sympathetic to Somalia's difficulties. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.7711/11-3062. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Newsom on November 29; cleared by Coffin (AID), Whitfield (OSD), Little, Tasca, and Bromley Smith (White House); and approved by Witman. Also sent to Addis Ababa, Rome, Bonn, and London. 1 These discussions were recorded in four memoranda of conversation. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Somalia) See also Document 285 . 2 These discussions were recorded in four memoranda of conversation. (Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330) 288. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Italy 288. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Italy Source Washington, November 30, 1962, 4:18 p.m. 1035. Department November 29 handed representatives UK and Italian Embs following memorandum re military aid for Somalia: “During the visit of Prime Minister Abdirascid Ali Scermarche of Somalia to Washington November 27 and 28, he raised with United States officials the question of military assistance to the Somali Republic. The United States stated its readiness to talk with the Somalis regarding a coordinated program supplementing assistance being received from Italy and the United Kingdom. Presumably such discussions will take place in Somalia at some appropriate time after the Prime Minister's return. In advance of any such discussions, the United States would welcome the views of the Governments of Italy and the United Kingdom on the matter and the details of their current program which would be helpful to the United States in assessing supplemental requests from Somalia. The United States decision represents a further expression of the importance with which we regard the maintenance of a Western position in this area and a further indication of our desire to support, to the fullest extent possible, the assistance being rendered Somalia by Italy and the United Kingdom.” In presenting memoranda to UK and Italian representatives Dept added orally U.S. had raised question military assistance Somalia with Emperor of Ethiopia who did not like idea but said he would not oppose. Dept also stressed hope expressed to Somalis that arms program could serve dual purpose of military needs and civic action. Finally, Dept expressed earnest desire that U.S. willingness contribute to program would not cause cessation or diminution military aid from UK and Italy. Re discussion with Somalis, Department noted new U.S. Ambassador Somalia expected arrive Mogadiscio January or early February. Rome and London may give memo and background to Foreign Offices. 1 Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 777.5/11-3062. Confidential. Drafted by Newsom on November 29; cleared by Kyle (AID), Junkermann (OSD/ISA), Stout, and Burke; and approved by Witman. Also sent to London and repeated to Addis Ababa, Mogadiscio, and Bonn. 1 On December 12, the Embassy in Rome reported that the Italian Government intended to maintain economic assistance to Somalia at the current level. (Telegram 1181 from Rome; ibid., 877.0000/12-1262) 289. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia 289. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia Source Washington, January 7, 1963, 6:19 p.m. 320. Addis Ababa's 299 to Dept, rptd Mogadiscio 45, Nov 24, 1962. 1 If Embassy should be queried by IEG concerning military aid results Somali Prime Minister's visit to U.S. you may advise IEG that: (1) In response his request for military aid, Somali Prime Minister was informed USG willing in principle consider supplementing military aid supplied Somalia by other Western powers and that matter would be discussed further after arrival Mogadiscio new U.S. Ambassador (ETA end January). (2) Somali Prime Minister gave assurances Somali military forces would be used solely for purposes internal security and defense and would be designed as dual purpose forces with capability contributing to economic development. (3) Somali Prime Minister also has assured us Somalia will not accept military aid from Soviets (i.e., arms and equipment) and that if training available in West “we will send no more to Communist countries.” (4) USG has reason to hope other Western powers will bear main burden arms supplies to Somalia and that therefore relatively small U.S. program will be needed supplement efforts other Western powers to fill gaps through which Soviets might otherwise effect entry. 2 Ball * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 777.5/11-2462. Confidential. Drafted by Post; cleared in substance by Whitfield (OSD/ISA), Tank (AID), and Kent (AID); and approved by Witman. 1 See footnote 1, Document 284 . 2 On January 17, the Embassy in Addis Ababa reported that Getachew Mekasha, Assistant Minister for African Affairs at the Ethiopian Foreign Office, had been informed of the military aid results of the Somali Prime Minister's visit to Washington. The Minister said that Ethiopia would prefer that Somalia not be given military aid, but added that Western aid to Somalia was perhaps the lesser of two evils because Ethiopia could count on U.S. influence to prevent these arms from being used against it. (Telegram 400 from Addis Ababa; Department of State, Central Files, 777.5/1-1763) 290. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy 290. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Source Washington, February 26, 1963. Military aid to Somalia . When Abdirascid was here last November, you told him we were willing to discuss how we could help Somalia in a limited way. State amplified that we would consider supplementing UK and Italian aid if the Somalis promised not to use it for aggression. Somalis agreed that we might help their military contribute to economic development. Ambassador Torbert mentioned our offer to Abdirascid early this month. The Somalis last week agreed to our sending a survey team by mid-March. We have in mind very limited civic action and internal security support. We're still not sure why Sunday's demonstrations in Mogadiscio rubbed off on us. However, Somalia hadn't announced our offer (PM intended to include it in a recent speech then got sick), so most Somalis still think of us as the guys who arm their enemies, the Ethiops. Our embassy stands only a block from Ethiopia's and a small goon squad could easily have diverted the main anti-Ethiopian demonstration. We think we ought to go ahead with the team anyway, as our aim is to forestall Somalis turning to Bloc and UAR for a lot more hardware. R. W. Komer * Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer. Confidential. 291. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Brubeck) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 291. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Brubeck) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Source Washington, March 18, 1963. SUBJECT Current Crisis in the Horn of Africa Present Situation The present situation in the Horn of Africa contains elements of serious concern which would be particularly aggravated by a break in British-Somali relations: 1. The USSR and Communist China, which have from time to time shown particular interest in Somalia would be presented with the most favorable opportunity since Somalia's independence to establish a position of influence by encouraging the Somalis to press their claims in various ways including the provision of financial and military support. The Communist countries would have to weigh very carefully the effect on their position in Ethiopia and East Africa of supporting what may well be the miniority side of an intra-African quarrel. Their support of Somalia in this crisis might therefore be so conceived and so purveyed as to minimize damage to their interests elsewhere in the area. 2. The situation poses threats to the peace in three areas: a. Within Kenya's Northern Frontier District, where Somali tribesmen, possibly with Somali Government support, might clash with British-led African troops. b. On the Ethiopian-Somali frontier, where Ethiopia might move military forces, enhancing the risk of incidents with Somali military or police units. c. Within Somalia itself, where a breakdown in internal security could occur, fomented by anti-Western elements and directed indiscriminately against all Western nationals (there are 437 Americans in the country, including 40 Peace Corps Volunteers widely scattered in the interior). 3. The termination of British aid to Somalia would leave gaps of approximately $2 million in budgetary support, $700,000 in development aid and $700,000 in military aid. (The US in the FY63 program is providing $4.6 million in development grants, $4.4 million in loan funds, and $1.7 million in PL-480 aid.) Steps We Are Taking To meet these possibilities we have taken the following steps: 1. Urgent consultations carried on with the British continuously over the past few weeks to ascertain what they might be able to do to mollify the Somalis at least temporarily for the purpose of postponing or averting the rupture in relations. 2. Presidential message delivered to the Somali Prime Minister on March 14 strongly urging that channels of communication and negotiation with the UK be kept open. 3. Strong demarches made to both Ethiopia and Somalia on March 16 urging that they avoid such actions as troop movements which might appear provocative to the other side. 4. Temporarily delaying the US military survey team for Somalia, earlier scheduled to depart Washington March 17 to arrive Mogadiscio March 25. 1 5. Urging the Italians on March 17 (to be repeated March 18) to accede to the British request that Italy assume responsibility for UK interests in Somalia in the event relations are definitely broken (we are willing to assume this burden ourselves but would prefer not to have our maneuverability so circumscribed). Recommended Steps Additionally, we are recommending: 1. that Governor Stevenson, after consulting with the UK UN Representative, approach the UN Secretary General to alert him to the situation, acquaint him with our concern, and discuss possible influence he may be able to bring to bear, either through the dispatch of a special emissary or through the UN Resident Representative in Mogadiscio; 2. that we urge the UN SYG to prevail upon the Somalis and the Kenya leaders to accept a formula calling for retention of the status quo for a 90-day period, to be followed by talks between Kenyans and Somalis after the May 18-26 elections in Kenya; 3. that we request the UK to urge moderation on Kenya leaders, particularly in public pronouncements concerning the problem; 4. that we instruct our African posts to solicit the views of African leaders and to suggest the possibility of African discussion of the problem in the PAFMECSA context or at the Addis Ababa conference of African heads of state tentatively scheduled for May 23; and 5. that if hard information is received of Ethiopian troop movements into areas where their presence might provoke hostilities, (a) a demarche be made to the Ethiopians reminding them that our military assistance agreement with them prohibits the use of US-supplied arms for aggressive purposes, and (b) a Presidential message be sent to the Emperor expressing our concern over the course of events and asking the Emperor's assistance in reducing tensions. Additional Factors 1. Another measure we have considered is to slow down the return of two battalions of Ethiopian troops which we are committed to airlift from the Congo. However, this movement will not begin until early April at the earliest, and it is not wholly clear that these two battalions are or would be a crucial factor in the problem described above. In the circumstances, we are not now prepared to recommend that we set aside or compromise the important principle that a country providing troops to a UN force gets them back when it asks for them. 2. The Department is considering the conditions under which we should regard it as useful to bring this matter to the Security Council, or to see it brought there by the Secretary General or one of the parties involved. Grant G. Hilliker 2 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Somalia. Secret. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: “(Taken from Pres week-end reading dtd 3/23/63—Tab 1).” 1 A handwritten notation in the margin of the source text at this point reads: “Addis and Nairobi strongly objected to our sending team just now. It would also encourage Somalia to think we'd back them. RWK.” 2 Hilliker signed for Brubeck above Brubeck's typed signature. 292. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy 292. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Source Washington, March 21, 1963. Attached is a fuller rundown on how we're trying to damp down Somali-Kenya-Ethiopia tension. 1 We've already invested considerable effort, but must be careful because of our larger interests in Ethiopia and Kenya. Also, the Somalis have painted themselves into a corner by breaking relations with the UK, despite our best efforts. This will cost them $3.4 million in UK aid. Kenyan leaders have hardened against ceding any of their Somali-inhabited territory. UK ineptness has added to this mess. The British have long encouraged the Somalis to think the UK would give them Somali Kenya before granting Kenyan independence. But Sandys, in negotiating the Kenyan constitution and paving the way for self-government there in May, reversed field and triggered off the Somalis. We're in the middle. The Somalis will ask us to fill the aid gap, but we're already hard-pressed to justify the $10.7 million we're giving this year. We don't want to oppose Kenya, and most other Africans back Kenyans. But Kenyan refusal to cede Somali region will provoke further Somali agitation and invite Bloc meddling. Moscow may go slow to avoid alienating Ethiopia and Bantu Africa. However, the Soviets have increased their effort in Somalia in the past year and may be willing to pay the price for a toehold on the Gulf of Aden. As for the Somalis, Abdirascid wants to avoid Bloc aid, but his opposition is pressing for it. Immediate job is to keep the Somalis from further violence. We'll use our MAP survey team (held up until current flurry ends) to maintain our influence. State recommends we get U Thant to propose 90-day cooling-off period leading to Somali-Kenyan talks. What happens in Kenya in the next year will be the key to ultimate solution. If Kenyan leaders foresee so much trouble controlling the Somalis that they decide to allow increasing autonomy, there might be a way (cession, purchase, UN plebiscite) to transfer Somali region to the Somali Republic. But this sets a bad precedent in rest of Africa, and Ethiops would violently oppose. So best line may be to dampen Somali irredentist hopes and convince Somalis their best bet is cooperation in some sort of East African federation. Bob Komer * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Somalia. Secret. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: “(Taken from Pres week-end reading dtd 3/23/63—Tab 1).” 1 Document 291 . 293. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia 293. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia Source Washington, May 23, 1963, 11:19 a.m. 482. Based on findings and recommendations US Military Survey Team, 1 Department and other agencies are now proceeding with preliminary steps necessary to implement quickly a final decision on US military assistance when it is reached. Because some of team's recommendations, such as the “impact package,” involve obligation of FY 1963 funds prior June 30, there is need for moving quickly. Without raising subject with Somali officials at this time, Department would like CT evaluation of desirability proceeding through Presidential Determination on waiver of bilateral agreement military assistance, or attempting obtain bilateral agreement and possible problems involved. This would include Somali reaction to provisions US-Ethiopia and US-Libya military assistance agreements, and role of Somali National Assembly. Re latter point, is Department correct in assuming Assembly would have to authorize ratification of bilateral agreement? 2 Ball * Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-SOMALI. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Galanto; cleared by Newsom, Kyle (AID), Muller (AID), Whitfield (DOD), and Oulashin; and approved by Tasca. Repeated to London, Bonn, and Rome. 1 Text of “Recommended Military Assistance Program for Somalia” is ibid. 2 On May 25, Ambassador Torbert recommended proceeding with a Presidential Determination, but avoiding advising the Somalis of this fact in order to have extra leverage for negotiation if necessary. (Telegram 601 from Mogadiscio; ibid.) 294. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia 294. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia Source Washington, July 3, 1963, 6:38 p.m. 12. Ref: Rome's 2833. 1 As outlined reftel numbered paragraph one, participants at Rome talks agreed US should undertake initial approach to IEG, in relatively low key, re western military aid to Somalia. Following suggested approach is provided for comment by Embassy Addis Ababa and for subsequent comment Germany, Italy and UK. Embassies Bonn, Rome and London should delay discussion this approach with FonOffs pending further instructions after Addis comments received. Department feels approach should be made directly to Emperor in context desire acquaint him with our concern and intentions re current situation Horn of Africa, taking advantage groundwork already laid with other IEG officials. Suggest you make these points: 1. As HIM aware, US long interested in peace and stability Horn of Africa, including particularly territorial integrity and independence states of Horn. As problems have arisen this area and US has made decisions it has always sought keep HIM informed its concern and intentions. 2. We welcomed progress toward closer relations among Africans achieved at Addis conference. 3. We are conscious Emperor's special concern over Somalia. We hope HIM's efforts improve relations will be successful. As HIM knows, we have been ready at all times assist in this matter. We believe close relations important to peace of significant area of Africa. 4. At same time, as HIM knows, we and other western friends of Ethiopia have for some time faced problem posed by Somali determination acquire modern defensive capability. We see problem against background intention Somali Prime Minister visit Peking, significant Soviet economic efforts Somalia, Somalis training in USSR, possible Somali acquisition of Soviet-type aircraft from UAR or USSR, and of possible arms shipments from USSR or China. We believe presence Soviet arms in Somalia, particularly if they are compatible with those held by UAR, would present threat to Ethiopia as well as to stability area and interests other neighboring African states. We are conscious Soviets and Chinese might not necessarily proceed to point giving actual support Somali claims, but we cannot underestimate willingness of communist powers to provide sufficient aid to Somalia to complicate situation in Horn. 5. US and western allies have consulted on problem and feel situation can best be met by continuation limited western arms program of which HIM aware, previously instituted by Italy and UK with supplementary help from Germans and US for modernizing force for defensive purposes at modest level. 6. We are hopeful that programs of three western participants will soon reach stage where Somalis may be presented with both plans and tangible evidence western good faith to convince them their basic and legitimate needs for internal security and limited defensive capability will be met without resort to communists. As Emperor aware, Italy has had continuing program in this field since shortly after Somali independence and hopes delivery in near future of long-planned items will prove timely in context recent renewed overtures to Somalia from communists. While UK has of course withdrawn from this field following break in relations, FRG, as Emperor no doubt aware, has volunteered assist in this joint effort and plans shortly to conclude formal military aid agreement with Somalia. US plans provide supplement to other efforts in form small amount defensive equipment to be delivered later this year and engineering equipment, which will constitute bulk of US contribution over next several years. Latter designed enhance Somali Army's capability to contribute to economic development and civic improvement activities and hence to stimulate them to engage in such activities. Total western program will not provide Somalis with offensive capability and arms will be delivered under most effective guarantees against misuse as can be devised. 7. Development this joint western program has been undertaken in full recognition of and sympathy for Ethiopian security interests. Western nations concerned have entered into this program with reluctance and only after careful assessment, concurred in by all western nations with major interests in Ethiopia and Horn, that program of extremely limited nature, providing Somalia with minimum internal security and defensive requirements, and in which powers friendly to Ethiopia maintain measure control, best serves interests of peace and security in Horn in situation where Somalis determined build defense establishment and where alternative sources supply available and being pressed on Somalis. In view scheduled visit Somalis to Germany July 11, German problem of protest note from IEG (separate tel), and early Italian shipment, would hope Addis comments and, subsequently, those of allies could be received in time make formal approach prior July 10. 2 Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 SOMALI. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Post; cleared by O'Mahony, Judd, Whitfield (DOD), Stout, Warren, Witman, and Polansky in substance and Tank (AID); and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Bonn, Rome, Mogadiscio, London, Nairobi, and Paris (also for CINCEUR). 1 Dated June 25. (Ibid.) 2 On July 9, Ambassador Korry reported that he had reviewed these points with the Emperor in a very friendly conversation. The Emperor had then pointed out that this was an unusually bad moment to take such action since Somalia had just reaffirmed its territorial claims against Ethiopia, Kenya, and French Somaliland. Western emphasis on establishing only a modest defense force in Somalia was meaningless if such a force were used for guerrilla warfare. In addition, the Emperor asked how the West could believe that Western aid, if it was in fact so small, would stop Somalia from obtaining more aid from the East. (Telegram 27 from Addis Ababa; ibid.) 295. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia 295. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia Source Washington, July 5, 1963, 6:56 p.m. 15. Presidential determination for “impact package” signed June 29. Package to be delivered in two shipments, first comprising 12 106 mm recoilless rifles mounted on jeeps with spares and ammo to arrive end September or early October. While recognizing problem presented by introduction new vehicle, modification mounts for use with Land Rovers presents technical problems which would delay shipment. We have accordingly decided proceed with jeeps. Second part of impact package to arrive January/February will comprise following engineering equipment: 1 motorized 10-ton roller 2 motorized heavy graders 1 scraper 2 16-cu yd concrete mixers 2 angle-dozer cables 2 medium tractors Spares for above and related maintenance equipment. Mobile training teams to arrive concurrently with equipment. Above information to be treated as Noforn. 1 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-3 US-SOMALI. Confidential. Drafted by Post on July 3, cleared by Whitfield (DOD) and Kyle (AID) in substance, and approved by Witman. Repeated to Addis Ababa and Nairobi and by pouch to Rome, London, Bonn, and Paris (for CINCEUR). 1 The telegram is unsigned. 296. Memorandum for the Record 296. Memorandum for the Record Source Washington, July 12, 1963. I saw Mohamed Awale Liban, Chef de Cabinet to Somali President Aden, on 11 July 1963, following his talks with Ken Hansen and Dick Donahue. I expressed our concern that Somalia is “isolating” iteself from its neighbors. Though professing our strong friendship and desire to help Somalia, I pointed out that there was very little non-Africans could do to help the Somalis if they persisted in pushing Greater Somalia to the point where they alienated all the surrounding countries. I'm not sure he got the point, but I suggested the Somalis should realize that the cards are stacked against them and that it would be in their interest to come to some peaceful terms with their more powerful neighbors. Mr. Liban, after blaming the current NFD tension on the British, said he hoped the US could help with some sort of arbitration since we are friendly with the Kenyans, the British, and the Ethiopians. I reiterated that the primary obstacle was one we couldn't do much about—the problems and aspirations of Kenyan leaders. Somali and Kenyan rather than US actions would determine outcome of this issue. It had become an “African” issue not a colonial one. Somalis would find same problem if they turned to Soviets, Chicoms or UAR for backing. These powers would probably be no more willing than we and UK, in last analysis, to provide arms or back Somali claims to point of alienating many other bigger and more powerful African states. After an exchange of pleasantries about our respect for the Somali president, we left it that he understands our difficulty over backing Somalia against our other African friends, and our desire to help within our limitations. Liban is obviously a thoughtful and moderate fellow, but he is naturally a heartfelt spokesman for the Somalis whom he feels history has greatly wronged. R. W. Komer 1 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Somalia. Confidential. Drafted by Komer. 1 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 297. Memorandum of Conversation 297. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, July 25, 1963, 12:30-12:50 p.m. SUBJECT Prospects for Ethiopian Development; Ethiopian-Somali Dispute; Portuguese African Territories and South Africa PARTICIPANTS U.S. The President Angier Biddle Duke, Chief of Protocol J. Wayne Fredericks, Acting Assistant Secretary for African Affairs William J. Tonesk, Deputy Chief of Protocol William B. Jones, Acting Chief Northern African Programs, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Ethiopia His Highness Assrate Kassa, President of the Senate of Ethiopia Senator Lij Araya Abebe, Member of Senate of Ethiopia Honorable Ato Tadele Yigezou, Member of Chamber of Deputies of Ethiopia Mr. Tesfaye Roba, Charge d'Affaires, Embassy of Ethiopia The President expressed his pleasure at the role played by Ethiopia in Africa and particularly of its leading role at the recent Addis conference. The President expressed gratitude for the fine welcome and response to the Peace Corps in Ethiopia. Prospects for Ethiopian Development The President asked the impression of His Highness on the prospects for the future of Ethiopia. His Highness replied that Ethiopia has a chance for a grand future, provided it receives help. Ethiopia is tied down by her economic needs and her inability to obtain finance for development. She is less fortunate than some other African countries in that she has not had the benefit of direct assistance during a colonial period. Ethiopia would welcome an increase in the size of the Peace Corps and they wish to explore the possibility of forming their own peace corps type organization. ( Note : this point was discussed in some detail earlier when His Highness talked with Mr. Shriver.) They are also engaged in the exploration for minerals. Ethiopia has a five-year development program, but at least one-half of the program must be based on outside financial aid. Ethiopian-Somali Dispute The President introduced the subject of the prospects for settling the dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia. His Highness remarked that it would be easier for Somalia to answer this question as they initiated the dispute. There is no way to settle the matter until Somalia changes its present inflexible “Greater Somalia” policy. The demands of Somalia cannot be met by Ethiopia. To accede to the Somali position would set a dangerous precedent in Africa as there are many countries which could have boundary disputes based on ethnic considerations. “Where would the mapping of Africa end if Somali claims are honored?” Ethiopia views arming Somalia as the arming of an aggressor. Ethiopia has no aggressive intent toward Somalia, there being no economic attraction. Ethiopia has no claims on Somalia and wants to pursue a policy of peaceful co-existence. The President expressed concern at the direction Somalia might take and inquired where Somalia might go for arms. His Highness stated that the Somalis are fanatical on the question of “Greater Somalia”. It would not surprise Ethiopia if Somalia turned east for arms and support. There is nothing the Somalis would not do in pursuing their aims. The world can't afford to see a breach of peace which might lead to World War III. Somalia should be firmly told that her aims will not succeed. The idea of a “Greater Somalia” was originally started by certain foreign countries. The President inquired if the reference was to the British, and received an affirmative reply. The President stated that the U.S. has no evidence that the British now hold these views. The President noted Somalia's strategic location and expressed the hope that a peaceful settlement of Somalia's disputes with Ethiopia and Kenya will be worked out. His Highness asserted that there is little hope for settlement unless the Somalis change their view. Ethiopia has gone as far as possible in offering co-existence, including a plan whereby the various nomadic tribes would be free to use Ethiopian territory, but Somalia refused. Portuguese African Territories and South Africa In response to a question from the President concerning the situation in the Portuguese areas of Africa and in South Africa, His Highness described as “painful” Ethiopia's decision to break relations with Portugal. Ethiopia has a long history of friendly relations with Portugal and offered to act as mediator in the present dispute. Her plan would have called for a continued Portuguese presence, but a gradual turning of control to the Africans with eventual independence. This was rejected by Portugal, so a break in relations between Ethiopia and Portugal was necessary. The situation looks very dangerous and it appears that unless Portugal modifies its positions there will be bloodshed. Concerning South Africa, His Highness felt that there is apparently no hope at all. The South African government appears inflexible and this may lead to disastrous consequences. It is a more difficult situation than with Portugal. The President wondered if success in South Rhodesia might help the situation in South Africa, to which the response was “this is dubious.” * Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 AFR. Confidential. Drafted by Jones and Fredericks on July 31 and approved in the White House on August 12. The conversation was held at the White House. Prior to this meeting on July 25, Komer sent President Kennedy a memorandum recommending that during the meeting Kennedy stress that domestic reform and development were Ethiopia's prime needs, and that the United States was not backing Somali territorial ambitions, but attempting to retain a relationship with Somalia in order to prevent its leaning too heavily on the United Arab Republic, the Soviet Union, or the People's Republic of China. (Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Ethiopia Security) 298. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Northern African Affairs (Newsom) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) 298. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Northern African Affairs (Newsom) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) Source Washington, August 26, 1963. U.S. Policy Toward the Ogaden 1. Peace in the Horn of Africa depends in large measure on the stabilization, if not the ultimate solution, to two problems: the Northern Frontier District of Kenya and the Ogaden Province of Ethiopia. 2. Britain, Somalia, and the new African government of Kenya are currently seeking a modus vivendi on the Somali-inhabited portion of Kenya's Northern Frontier District. The United States, representing British interests in Somalia, is acting as an intermediary in the steps leading to talks between the parties, but has not taken a stand regarding the substance of the issue. 3. The Ogaden is internationally recognized as being within the boundaries of Ethiopia, but is largely inhabited by Somali tribes, closely related to the peoples of the adjacent Somali Republic. It is one of the five parts of Greater Somalia (the other two unredeemed being: French Somaliland and the Northern Frontier District of Kenya) which the Somali Republic aspires, by its constitution, to bring under the sovereignty of the Somali Republic. It is a plateau area, for centuries the grazing place of nomadic tribes. These tribes, of Somali origin, wander across the international frontiers. One area in the north of the Ogaden Province, the Haud, contains water and livestock forage used by tribes on both sides of the line. 4. The problem of the Ogaden has, therefore, three elements: Somali irredentism, Ethiopian insecurity, and the traditional movement of nomadic tribes. 5. Somali irredentism toward the Ogaden has been pursued at various times in the past by press and radio propaganda and by seeking support in international meetings (e.g. Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conferences) for resolutions in favor of unification of all Somali inhabited areas. The Somalis were undoubtedly given some hope and stimulus immediately following World War II when the British administered all of the five Somali lands except French Somaliland, and proposed a Greater Somaliland Trusteeship under UK administration. The Somalis were led to believe, at a minimum, that Britain might hold the Ogaden for ultimate incorporation in an independent Somalia. The exact degree of Somali Government stimulation of unrest within the Ogaden is frequently difficult to determine because of the inherent sympathy of the Somali tribes for the Somali Republic and their antipathy for Amharas, because of the more or less free traffic back and forth across the frontier, because of the normal tribesman's penchant for carrying a rifle, because of traditional illicit arms traffic through the area, and the fact that sizeable quantities of arms were acquired by tribesmen during World War II, and because of the Ethiopian tendency to assume that all unrest in the Ogaden is ultimately traceable to the Somali Republic. The Somali Republic, while having the reunion of all parts of Greater Somalia as its ultimate aim, has been careful to pursue this objective “by peaceful and legal means” as the Somali Constitution requires, and its leaders have frequently stressed their intention to adhere to this requirement. 6. Ethiopian insecurity is compounded of the fact that, historically, Somaliland has been an invasion route into Ethiopia, of the inherent Christian Ethiopian fear of being engulfed by Moslem expansion, and of the keen apprehension that the Somali Republic, perhaps with the assist-ance of the United Arab Republic, can, by subversion in the Ogaden, succeed in rendering the Ogaden unmanageable, if not detaching it. Basically, many leading Ethiopians undoubtedly see in the existence of a Somali Republic, as weak as it may be, a latent threat to the security of the Ethiopian Empire. Many Ethiopians undoubtedly see the elimination of an independent Somalia as the ultimate solution of the Ogaden problem. 7. The intractability of the problem cannot be overemphasized. The Ethiopian apprehension is very deep, going back to the sixteenth century when Somali tribes almost destroyed the Empire and, of course, to the Italian invasion in 1935, when an incident in the Ogaden became a casus belli. It is difficult, indeed, to see any real detente between the two peoples. It appears possible, however, to work for some form of modus vivendi which will lessen the continuing possibilities of serious trouble between them. 8. The United States is vitally interested in this problem essentially because of its important interests in Ethiopia. Any United States policy which would clearly alienate the Emperor of Ethiopia would seriously affect these interests. Similarly, any unrest affecting the security of the area or permitting the establishment of greater influence by either the Soviet Union or the Chinese Communists would also threaten these interests. It has, therefore, been the conclusion of the United States that, while not alienating the Emperor, we should seek to retain a broader influence in the Horn than our influence in Ethiopia, itself. 9. The United States cannot take any action which would appear to lend support to Somali irredentism. The United States supports the validity of current frontiers in Africa, despite the many claims and counter-claims which surround them and believes changes should come about only with the consent of all parties involved. The United States should continue to make this clear to the Somali Republic. 10. At the same time, it does not seem feasible, in a search for a formula which would stabilize the area, to seek to obtain a formal renunciation of Somali claims on Ethiopia. There is strong emotional and constitutional support in Somalia for these claims and it is doubtful any political leader could successfully make such a renunciation. Alternative formulae must, therefore, be found. 11. Essentially, the Ethiopian position is to leave Somalia weak and to isolate it as much as possible from other African relationships. Ethiopia feels that it can, with its military power, guarantee that unfriendly influences will not establish themselves in Somalia. At least one high-ranking Ethiopian has stated that Ethiopia would prefer to see arms coming into Somalia from the Sino-Soviet Bloc or the UAR because Ethiopia might then get wide support to eliminate the threat and, in the same action, establish Ethiopian suzerainty over Somalia. The Ethiopians feel that, because of Soviet and Chinese desires for influence elsewhere in Africa, they will not undertake support for Somali irredentism to a point that would genuinely threaten Ethiopia. 12. The United States cannot accept fully the Ethiopian position in this matter. The United States supports the integrity of independent nations in Africa except where there are changes in status brought about by peaceful means. We cannot appear to support the Ethiopian reluctance to accept fully the continued independence of Somalia. While it may well be true that neither the Soviets nor the Chinese would give support to Somali irredentism, it is also true that they have already shown a willingness and capability to establish positions of influence in Somalia which represent a threat to Western interests in the area, if not to Ethiopia. 13. Ideally, the United States would prefer that the alleviation of tensions in this area could be accomplished by direct talks between the two parties or by the intervention of an international agency. Unfortunately, direct talks appear possible only with the stimulus and diplomacy of a third party. The United Nations had a major role in the creation of Somalia and in some of the readjustments of frontiers after independence. Ethiopia, however, is not enthusiastic about bringing in the United Nations because of its reluctance to “internationalize” the Ogaden problem. The machinery of the Organization of African States is a possibility, but this machinery is not yet established. No other individual nation appears at the moment to have the influence in both capitals possessed by the United States. 14. Given these circumstances, United States policy should be directed toward establishing a peaceful modus vivendi between Ethiopia and Somalia which will set aside conflicting claims and result in a measure of actual accord which might result, in turn, in a reduction of the current emphasis of both on the building of military establishments. 15. To establish this policy, the United States might consider the following measures: a. Continued efforts to stimulate direct Ethiopian-Somali talks leading, perhaps, to: (1) some form of frontier control, jointly administered by the two governments. (2) agreement to the joint development of the Uebi Scebelli River basin. (3) agreement on the use of watering places and forage in the frontier area. (4) agreement on periodic meetings at the Ministerial level to discuss common problems. b. An examination by the United States, perhaps jointly with Britain and Italy or in connection with a UN agency of the arms traffic into the Ogaden. c. A statement to the UAR (and Israel) of our interest in the peace and stability of the Horn of Africa and our concern over any activities which might disturb that peace. d. A statement to both that we are interested in the maintenance of peace in the Horn of Africa area, will not condone aggression of one state against another, and will take appropriate measures in the UN or, if necessary, otherwise, in order to prevent aggression. e. A clear statement to the Somalis that we do not support irredentism, but clearly support their independence. f. A clear statement to the Ethiopians that we support the independence of Somalia, but do not support Somali irredentism. * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Somalia. Confidential. Drafted by Newsom on August 24. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: “Sent to Mr. Bundy for info. Aug. 26. S.B.” 299. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 299. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Source Washington, September 23, 1963, 8:01 p.m. 1935. Ref: Mogadiscio's 242 to Dept (copy pouched London) and previous;Deptel 1821 to London. 1 Recent Embassy Mogadiscio telegrams, sent info London, have highlighted difficult situation which Somali officials believe confronting their country and resultant pressures building up on GSR to turn to Communist China or Soviet Union for arms assistance. Mogadiscio's 224 to Dept rptd London 80 2 gives particularly vivid account Ambassador's encounter with Somali Prime Minister following latter's return from Peking. Department believes seriousness of situation in Somalia makes it all the more important for US, FRG and Italy to move ahead with western military aid program in interest strengthening and encouraging moderate elements opposed to extension of bloc influence in military field. As parallel to Department's contacts with UK Embassy officials here, we would appreciate Embassy London discussing situation with Foreign Office. We would be especially interested in: 1. British views on possible Soviet or Chinese Communist arms assistance to Somalia. 2. British assessment of Kenyan reaction to such assistance. 3. British thoughts on possible courses of action to forestall Soviet or Chinese Communist efforts at supplying Somalia with arms aid. Ball * Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 SOMALI. Confidential. Drafted by Galanto, cleared by Judd and O'Neill, and approved by Newsom. Repeated to Mogadiscio, Nairobi, Bonn, Rome, and Addis Ababa (by pouch). 1 In telegram 242 from Mogadiscio, September 20, Ambassador Torbert described his conversation with Foreign Minister Abdullah Issa on September 19, during which he emphasized the positive aspects of U.S.-Somali relations and asked the Minister to consider whether turning elsewhere for military help, which would weaken Somalia's ties with the West, would actually strengthen Somali security or the reverse. (Ibid.) Telegram 1821 to London is not printed. (Ibid., POL 7 SOMALI) 2 Not printed. (Ibid., POL 32-1 ETH-SOMALI) 300. Briefing Paper Prepared in the Department of State 300. Briefing Paper Prepared in the Department of State Source Washington, September 29, 1963. SUBJECT Visit of the Emperor of Ethiopia The briefing memorandum of September 27 1 on this subject stated that the U.S. positions with respect to Ethiopian requests for military and economic assistance were still under discussion and that a supplemental memorandum would advise you of the decisions. Decisions have now been reached and will presumably be conveyed to the Ethiopian advance party by Defense and AID prior to the arrival of the Emperor. In reaching these decisions, full consideration has been given to the significance of Ethiopia on the African scene and to our own special interests in the present Kagnew communications stations and future space-probe installations at this site. The positions we have taken represent in dollar commitments only a fraction of the total initial Ethiopian requests. The final Ethiopian military assistance requests, scaled down from an original $60,000,000 represented $20,000,000. Our reply commits us immediately to approximately $2,000,000 over a five to six year period although the prospect of more expensive aircraft looms in the distance (probably 1968 and beyond). Out of economic requests estimated at between $50 and $70 million, no commitments have yet been made and the immediate prospect is only for a commitment of approximately $200,000 in Bailey bridges and experts, with the possibility in the future of a loan for the Finchaasdam, subject to the completion of surveys and availability of funds. Our replies will undoubtedly be below the Emperor's expectations, although, given the prospect that he will avoid either a discussion of details or bargaining, we may not know his true reaction. He feels we have a commitment to support him in the military field and he places prime importance on aid for Ethiopia's economic development. To be certain of his acceptance of these replies, we must convince him that (a) we have a keen desire to assist Ethiopia; (b) we had a very short time (one week) to examine the requests; (c) the laws governing our aid program require that we have the fullest possible supporting data before committing ourselves to a project; and (d) we are currently experiencing special difficulties with foreign aid appropriations. A. Military Assistance. 1. The MAAG in Ethiopia will be authorized to commence discussions prior to December 31 with Ethiopian Defense officials on force goals for the Ethiopian Air Force. 2. For an initial planning basis, we would hope to support the present squadron of F86's. 3. We would program two C54 transport aircraft in FY 1965. 4. We will consider future years modernization of the Air Force as recommended by MAAG and subject to Ethiopian ability to absorb, operate and maintain, and subject to our own appropriation. (In discussions with the IEG between now and December 31, 1963, we will probably have to agree to an eventual “force goal” of two jet squadrons for the Ethiopian Air Force. The modernization will be phased so as to support the F86's as long as economically possible. Finally, the modernization of the second squadron will not commence until the first is operational, and all of the training requirements set by the MAAG been met by the Ethiopian Air Force.) B. Economic Assistance. We would not approve a line of credit or advance commitment, but will consider further the individual projects as follows: 1. Dam for Power and Irrigation on Finchaa River ($15-30 million) . We are willing to examine this project further. Subject to the results of the Bureau of Reclamation reconnaissance investigation, and studies of engineering feasibility, cost, power demand, land use and an over-all cost/benefit analysis, the USG would be willing to consider a loan. 2. 154 Bailey Bridges—($1.2 million) We have suggested that IEG consider the possibility of carrying this out through its military establishment as a “civic action” program. If agreeable, AID will provide loan assistance for the bridges and DOD will provide technical assistance through the MAAG. 3. Meat Processing Facilities—($5 to $10 million) On basis of the material at hand, many questions must be answered before we could agree to pursue the project. A man from the U.S. meat packing industry will be hired by AID to make a study. 4. Grain Storage Facilities—($10 million) While the Export-Import Bank is considering this proposal, approval is doubtful and AID is not at this time interested. 5. Mining Projects in Gold and Iron Ore—($8 million) As a matter of policy, AID normally does not finance mining ventures directly. We will attempt through Commerce to interest an American firm in the iron ore proposition; and AID will hire a Bureau of Mines expert to further study the gold (latter to be a State industry). 6. Additional Aid for Malaria Eradication and Other Health Activities—($12.7 million) We are willing to continue assistance in this field at the pace dictated by IEG's ability to support and operate the program. * Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 ETH. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. Cleared by Bell (AID) and Gilpatric (OSD). A copy was sent to the Bureau of the Budget to meet the requirements of Presidential Determination 1550 relating to military assistance. The paper was transmitted to McGeorge Bundy under cover of a memorandum from Benjamin Read that reads: “In response to Mr. Brubeck's request there is enclosed a memorandum supplementing the briefing papers previously submitted for the visit of Emperor Haile Selassie.” A handwritten notation on this memorandum reads: “Original sent to White House on 9/29/63.” 1 Briefing papers for Emperor Haile Selassie's visit October 1-2, 1963, are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2330-2331. 301. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy 301. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Source Washington, September 30, 1963. Attached is a briefing memorandum and background book for the Emperor of Ethiopia's visit beginning Tuesday. 1 In the briefing paper you should note particularly Ambassador Korry's personal appraisal of the Emperor and the annex on economic and military aid. In the background book the most important papers are those on the Ethiopian-Somali relations (Tab A) [ 1 line of source text not declassified ]. Key points on this visit: 1. This is primarily a personal exchange between two world statesmen. The Emperor is very vain and will want to discuss world affairs. He will be particularly flattered if you take him aside for private sessions, not only on world affairs generally but soliciting his views as a predominant leader in the Organization for African Unity, on African affairs. 2. His greatest domestic preoccupation is with the border dispute with the Somalis over Ethiopia's Ogaden District, occupied by nomadic Somali tribesmen, where a good deal of fighting is going on. (See Briefing Book, Tab III-A.) Since he is critical of our help to Somalia it is particularly important that you invite his views on this as a problem in which we have a common concern. 3. Most important to the United States, we are in a bargaining situation over the price we will pay, in increased economic and military aid, for highly classified new intelligence facilities (for monitoring Soviet space communications) 2 [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] (Briefing Book, Tab III-D). We are, in principle, agreeing to maintain, and eventually modernize and increase from one to two squadrons Ethiopia's present F-86 jet force; and to explore several economic projects, the biggest a $15-30 million dam on the Blue Nile still some years off. Miscellaneous points: 1. The Emperor is very protocol conscious and was unhappy on his 1954 visit because Eisenhower did not meet him at the plane; he thinks he was kept waiting 12 days in a New York hotel for answers to some aid requests; and they didn't take him to TVA because the Dixon-Yates fight was on at the time (by his own choice he is going to Canaveral not TVA this time). 2. He will be arriving by way of Geneva and an over night stay in Philadelphia and his schedule includes: seeing Shriver (419 Peace Corps in Ethiopia, secondary teaching and small public health group); laying a wreath at the Lincoln Memorial with Udall hosting; lunch on the Sequoia hosted by Chief Justice Warren; usual State and Defense meetings; in New York, doing a Meet the Press; addressing the UNGA; lunch with U Thant; and a private lunch with businessmen, reflecting his special interest in private investment for Ethiopia; visiting Canaveral and then going on to Canada. 3. He is a little resentful that the President of the Ethiopian Senate Assrate Kassa, whom you saw on July 25, was treated too well here. Play any mention in low key. 4. The Emperor will speak Amharic with his American-trained Foreign Minister (formerly his private secretary) interpreting for both sides, since we have no Amharic interpreter. Under the circumstances, you might want to take Ambassador Korry when you withdraw for private talks. WB * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Ethiopia, Haile Selassie's Visit, 10/63. Secret. 1 None of the tabs is attached to the source text. They refer to briefing material prepared by the Department of State for Haile Selassie's visit. Documentation is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2330-2331. 2 On September 3, Ambassador Korry reported that the exchange of notes [text not declassified] had been completed. (Telegram 206 from Addis Ababa; ibid., Central Files, DEF 15-4 ETH-US) 302. Memorandum of Conversation 302. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, October 1, 1963, 4:30 p.m. SUBJECT Somalia PARTICIPANTS United States The President Ambassador Edward M. Korry The Hon. G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary, AF Mr. Edward Hutchinson, AID Mr. Frank Sloan, OSD/ISA Ambassador Angier Biddle Duke Brigadier General John J. Tolson, Military Aide to the Emperor Mr. William Brubeck, The White House Mr. David D. Newsom, Director, AFN Ethiopia His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie I, Emperor of Ethiopia His Highness Ras Imru Haile-Selassie His Excellency Tsahafi Tezaz Teferra-Work Kidane-Wolde, Minister of the Imperial Court His Excellency Yilma Deressa, Minister of FInance His Excellency Ketema Yifru, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr. Menassie Haile, Chief of the Political Section of His Imperial Majesty's Private Cabinet His Excellency Berhanou Dinke, Ambassador of Ethiopia In a preliminary session with the Emperor (with Ambassador Korry and Dr. Menassie Haile present), the President brought up the question of Somalia with the Emperor and asked for his views. The Emperor, citing that he had said all of this to the Ambassador previously on several occasions, repeated familiar arguments that arms assistance to Somalia encouraged Somali irredentism, had caused bloodshed and unrest within Ethiopia, had been particularly harmful because of its timing, and had not precluded communist assistance. On this last point, he stated that the Somalis had received nine million sterling in assistance from Peking. The Ambassador interjected that there was no military assist-ance. The Emperor rather disdainfully asked what else would it be for. The President in his reply made these points: 1. The U.S. arms program was very small and provided over three million dollars of assistance over a period of five to six years; 2. It was mostly designed for civic action; 3. The objectives of this policy were exactly the same as Ethiopian objectives, which was to encourage the moderates in Somalia and to keep peace and stability in the Horn of Africa; and 4. If either the Chinese or the Soviets gave military assistance in significant amounts, the U.S. Government would be forced to review its policy of arms to Somalia. In the course of the discussion, the Emperor said that a modus vivendi was necessary between Somalia and Ethiopia and the U.S. must support this. The President agreed. The Emperor also acknowledged that there was no conflict between U.S. and Ethiopian objectives. The President said that in the United States view, Ethiopia was the key country in that part of the world and that it was with that in mind that we made our policies. In the full session, the Emperor again expressed concern over United States military assistance to Somalia. The President reiterated the United States reasons for this action, stating that only time will tell whether these reasons are valid. The United States, he said, was aware of the Somali mission to the U.S.S.R. and the possibility that Somalia might receive some assistance from China. Assistance from these quarters could produce more instability. The United States has made no deliveries to Somalia. It will continue to watch the situation closely and will keep in touch with the Emperor on developments. The Emperor said that he wished to make it plain that he did not feel that the United States should give no assistance to Somalia. He was preoccupied with the kind of arms assistance which would encourage Somalia to provoke Ethiopia. Arms from Somalia have already been used in the eastern part of Ethiopia. The Emperor knows of the United States interest in friendly relations between Ethiopia and Somalia and is prepared to work to that end. If the Somalis are stimulated through military assistance, however, the situation could get out of hand. The President said that in the United States view by responding with some assistance, it is possible to increase influence and promote stability. The United States has had some harsh experiences when it has rejected requests for assistance in such situations. He reiterated that it was necessary to wait and see what developed. The Emperor said that another aspect of his fears was that with the Somali election coming up, Somalis were out-doing one another in attacking Ethiopia. The opposition in Somalia has accused the Government in the Ogaden and the Ethiopians have been forced to retaliate against the tribes. The President said there would be a better view of the situation when information was received on the Somali mission to Moscow. He promised to keep in close touch with the Emperor. * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Ethiopia, Haile Selassie's Visit, 10/63. Confidential. Drafted by Newsom and Korry. The meeting was held at the White House. The source text is labeled “I of III.” President Kennedy's discussion of African issues and assistance to Ethiopia with Emperor Haile Selassie on October 1 and their discussion of assistance to Ethiopia on October 2 were recorded in three memoranda of conversation that are ibid. 303. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 303. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Source Washington, October 11, 1963. In view of his exchange with Haile Selassie on the subject of military assistance to Somalia the President should know that: 1. Our Ambassador in Somalia has been unofficially informed that the Somalis have accepted a Soviet offer of $30 million in military assist-ance. 2. As soon as this is made public we will announce promptly termination of our own military aid program (no deliveries have yet been made). 1 The amount is trivial (half a million dollars a year US, $5-6 million German and Italian annually which will probably also end). This will make the Ethiopians happy. 3. We will stay in Somalia with limited economic aid ($4 million a year) and the Peace Corps. Bill Brubeck 2 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Somalia. Confidential. 1 Telegram 221 to Mogadiscio, October 11, instructed the Embassy to call on the President to express the deep regrets and concern of the U.S. Government at the reported decision of the Somali Council of Ministers to accept an offer of large-scale Soviet military aid. (Department of State, Central Files, AID 6 SOMALI) 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 304. Editorial Note 304. Editorial Note On October 16, 1963, the Somali Government presented an aide-memoire to the U.S. Embassy in Mogadiscio stating that when it had previously complained to the U.S. Government regarding large-scale U.S. military aid to Ethiopia, it had received assurances that the United States would not permit its military aid to Ethiopia to be used for aggressive purposes. It noted that the Somali Government had every reason to believe that these weapons were primarily intended by the Ethiopian Government for use against the Somalis under its domination or against the Somali Republic itself, and declared that experience had shown that Ethiopia had no compunction about using these modern weapons against defenseless men, women, and children, as the massacres committed since 1960 had shown. Thus, the Somali Government was justified in placing responsibility for Ethiopian aggression on the United States, since its military aid had permitted Ethiopia to carry out its policies of repression and aggression; and it asked the U.S. Government to reconsider its policy of providing large-scale military aid to Ethiopia. (Airgram A-192 from Mogadiscio, October 16; Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-3 US-ETH) On October 18, the U.S. Government responded that the program of U.S. military assistance to Ethiopia had begun long before the Somali Republic became an independent country and thus could not be construed as being directed against Somalia. It pointed out that the agreement between the United States and Ethiopia stated that the Ethiopian Government would use this assistance exclusively to maintain internal security and legitimate self-defense, and that it would not undertake any act of aggression against any other nation. (Telegram 238 to Mogadiscio; ibid., POL 32-1 ETH-SOMALI) 305. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany 305. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany Source Washington, October 16, 1963, 7:19 p.m. 1114. Ref: Rome's 1062 rptd Bonn 128; 1 Mogadiscio's 305 rptd Bonn 49. 2 Reftels indicate there may still be room for saving western aid program and precluding Soviet arms to Somalia. Department particularly notes President Aden's appeal to President Segni for support from west, coupled with Aden's remark about confronting two plans of military aid in order allow Somalis balance political and economic as well as military factors. Also significant are Abscir's statements to effect final commitment to USSR has not yet been made by GSR and that President Aden may still be able exert influence against arms deal with Soviets. Department requests US reps explore with Germans and Italians following lines of action: 1. Presentation in writing western military aid plan, giving approximate size and scope of program and indicating willingness to meet with Daud and other Somali military reps to discuss requirements and programming. At same time inform Somali officials clearly that contemplated western military aid program could not be carried out if GSR accepts arms assistance from Soviet Union or any other bloc source. 2. Note to GSR to be followed by joint meeting at Mogadiscio with reps western embassies on one side and top level GSR officials on the other at which western reps will stress to GSR officials the political and economic difficulties which would be created if GSR accepted Soviet arms offer. Points listed by western reps could include: (a) observation that western military aid program is largely grant whereas Soviet policy is usually insist on cash or credit terms; (b) disastrous effect of Soviet arms on Somali budgetary and financial situation. Western powers ask how GSR can meet payments to USSR as well as provide substantial support costs needed to implement Soviet program; (c) despite GSR's proclamations of neutrality, acceptance Soviet arms offer will inevitably lead in minds African and western states to strong identification Somalia with Soviet policies and objectives; (d) western powers recognize that on various and frequent occasions, GSR has reiterated its intention pursue national policy goals only by peaceful and legal means. If GSR accepts Soviet arms, however, Ethiopia and Kenya will almost automatically conclude that such arms would be available for use in Ogaden or NFD. On other hand, if GSR receiving military aid only from western sources, Ethiopia and Kenya would retain some degree of confidence that no encouragement being given by aid suppliers to using of arms in irregular actions. Moreover, fact that west is source of supply would reduce temptation engage in preventive action against Somalia. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 SOMALI. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Galanto; cleared by Robinson, O'Mahony, and Heffner (DOD); and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Rome, London, Mogadiscio, Addis Ababa, and Nairobi (by pouch). 1 Telegram 1062 from Rome, October 15, reported that the Italian Government was prepared to come up with a definite plan to meet Somalia's defense needs. (Ibid., POL 7 SOMALI) 2 Not printed. (Ibid., DEF 19 SOMALI) 306. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy 306. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Source Washington, October 25, 1963. This is the first time you have seen Horace Torbert, our Ambassador to Somalia. He has been in Mogadiscio, his first Ambassadorial post, since December 1962, is career Foreign Service Officer whose background is mostly Western and Central Europe. You remember that Haile Selassie complained about our military aid to the Somalis and you promised to reexamine it after we found out what deal the Somalis were making in Moscow. The Somalis are about to accept a $30 million Soviet military aid package knowing that they will thus lose an $18 million five-year US-German-Italian program. 1 Although they are Western oriented their primary drive is a military strength (which they can't afford) to back up their quarrel with the Ethiopians and Kenya over borders. In addition to our small economic aid program the Somalis have received large aid grants from the Chicoms and Russians. William H. Brubeck 2 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries, Somali Republic. Confidential. 1 At a tripartite meeting in Bonn October 17-18, U.S., German, and Italian representatives reached agreement on a joint military aid package for Somalia. (Telegram 1413 from Bonn, October 18; Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 SOMALI) 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 307. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Tasca) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Sloan) and to the Assistant Administrator for Africa-Europe, Agency for International Development (Hutchinson) 307. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Tasca) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Sloan) and to the Assistant Administrator for Africa-Europe, Agency for International Development (Hutchinson) Source Washington, October 31, 1963. SUBJECT Views of the President on the Situation in Somalia The President received American Ambassador to the Somali Republic, Horace G. Torbert, Jr., on October 25, 1963. 1 Excerpts of the memorandum of conversation covering the views of the President on the military aid situation with respect to Somalia and the desirability of maintaining our non-military programs are given below for your information. “The President was also given a brief sketch of the territorial claims situation. He asked whether we could stay in the military picture in some way, possibly in the training area, even though the Soviet program went ahead. Ambassador Torbert said that he understood the consensus was that we could not enter a training program at the same time that the Soviet program was starting and indeed the Somalis probably would not want it; however, it seemed advisable that we should maintain careful watch on the situation and be prepared to enter the military training field on short notice if an opportunity presented itself in the medium term future. The President indicated agreement with this idea. “Ambassador Torbert said he felt the next year or so would be a difficult time because the Somali Government would be seeking to justify its turning to the Soviet Government for aid and might therefore make anti-western statements which might tempt us to an indignant retort or a gesture of cancelling our other programs. It seemed, however, highly desirable, at least for the next year or so, to maintain our non-military programs in Somalia in order to keep all the influence we have in key sectors of the Somali Government and economy. He hoped therefore that any contrary pressures in the United States could be kept under control. The President indicated full understanding of this idea and general agreement with it.” * Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 SOMALI. Confidential. Drafted by Galanto. 1 A memorandum of this conversation is ibid. 308. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany 308. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany Source Washington, November 6, 1963, 6:20 p.m. 1377. Ref: Mogadiscio's 354. 1 Embassies Bonn and Rome requested confer with respective governments and state that, while Somali note clearly ends chance for tripartite arms program, US believes it important record be made straight in non-argumentative fashion in order support friends in Somalia who urged western military support and in event GSR should attempt in future charge west failed respond its defensive needs. US wishes propose, therefore, for consideration FRG and GOI presentation by respective Embassies Mogadiscio of parallel notes along following line: “The Government of … acknowledges the receipt of the note dated November 3 from the Government of the Somali Republic concerning the program of military assistance presented by the Governments of the United States, Italy, and the Federal Republic of Germany. The right and the duty of the GSR to take all measures to safeguard its territorial integrity are fully acknowledged. The Governments of the United States, Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany, however, note that the decision to accept military aid from the USSR appears to have been taken on the basis of certain assumptions by the GSR regarding the details with respect to units, quantities and quality of the tripartite program as set forth in the annex to the letter of October 23. It is regretted that the GSR has made its decision without taking advantage of the offer, set forth in the aforementioned letter, to hold a meeting with the responsible Somali military authorities to define these technical aspects of the tripartite program. Paragraph three of the letter of the respective governments was not intended in any way to be inconsistent with the principle of nonalignment adopted by the Government of the Somali Republic, but was based on the practical difficulties of conducting two substantial parallel programs of military assistance in the face of problems of preserving uniformity of equipment and training, providing adequate spare parts, and allocating local financial and manpower resources. The Government of … notes the expression of confidence by the Government of the Somali Republic that friendly relations with the three governments will not be affected and the desire of the Somali Government that these relations be strengthened in the interest of peace, welfare, and stability. The Government of … shares this desire for continued friendly relations. To the extent that the new arrangements of the Somali Republic with the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics and the diversion of resources which may accompany the new substantial military assistance program permit, the Government of … fully intends, within this spirit of continued friendship, to continue the close ties and activities of mutual benefit which now exist.” 2 Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 SOMALI. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Newsom; cleared by Warren, O'Mahony, Stout, Heffner (DOD), and Wolf (AID); and approved by Tasca. Also sent priority to Rome and repeated to Mogadiscio, Addis Ababa, Paris, and London. 1 Telegram 354, November 3, transmitted a note from the Somali Government rejecting the Western military aid offer. (Ibid.) 2 On November 27, Ambassador Torbert delivered a slightly revised version of the tripartite note to the Somali Prime Minister. His report noted that the Italian and German notes had preceded his. (Telegram 391 from Mogadiscio, November 27; ibid.) 309. National Policy Paper 309. National Policy Paper Source Washington, December 19, 1963. An introduction to the report, signed by Secretary Rusk on January 4, 1964, indicates, among other points, that Part I of the paper, covering objectives, strategy, and courses of action is “a comprehensive, authoritative and approved statement of United States Policy toward Ethiopia.” It also notes that “all agencies with major responsibilities affecting our relations with Ethiopia participated in drafting the paper and concur in the Strategy and Courses of Action which it sets forth.” ETHIOPIA Part One I. The Problem The difficulties of formulating and attaining US policy objectives in Ethiopia derive not only from the complexities of Ethiopia's problems but also from the nature of US governmental operations. Thus far the various US agencies with programs affecting Ethiopia have different and not always mutually consistent missions. Our immediate and short-term goals do not seem at first glance entirely consistent with our longer-term objectives. Some are essentially positive and progressive in character, looking forward to considerable change, while others appear negative, preclusive, or in support of the status quo. The risk is always present that the pursuit of longer-term policies relating to reform could unleash forces which could jeopardize immediate US interests. A balance of objectives is needed, therefore, in the interest of a continuing US influence in Ethiopia. Our planning is complicated because we are uncertain how soon a change of regime will occur, in what manner, and with what group emerging in control. The Emperor, for example, could live another ten years or pass from the scene tomorrow. We must examine this and other contingencies as they relate to the power struggle and its implications for US policy. II. Objectives Principal objectives of the US with respect to Ethiopia are as follows: Long-Term 1. To establish a relationship with any Ethiopian regime friendly to the US which will permit the continued, unhampered use of Kagnew Station and a continued exercise of effective US influence on Ethiopian policies. 2. To assure a stable, cohesive, and friendly government in Ethiopia, and to assist that government in making measurable economic and social progress, becoming more responsive to the desire of a broadening range of Ethiopians for political participation. 3. To bring about a reconciliation between Ethiopia and the Somali Republic involving, to the extent possible, recognition of borders, with agreement that force will not be employed in settling disputes. 4. To retard any further growth of Communist Bloc influence in Ethiopia. 5. To help preserve Haile Selassie's moderating influence in All-African councils. Short-Term 1. To maintain the unhampered use of our military communications facilities in Ethiopia (Kagnew Station). 2. To maintain correct and friendly relations with the regime of Emperor Haile Selassie while discreetly encouraging economic and social reforms and more rapid progress toward the development of Ethiopia as a modern state, especially by the introduction of political changes which will give the trained elements more participation in political processes. 3. To obtain the friendship and respect of elements likely to succeed the present regime in Ethiopia either by evolution or by revolution, e.g., young, educated Ethiopians, junior governmental officials, and liberal military officers. 4. To work toward minimizing friction between Ethiopia and the Somali Republic and the lessening of existing hostilities in the border area between the two countries. 5. To avoid or overcome to the extent feasible situations in which we might be obligated to support either Ethiopia or the Somali Republic against the other on a basic issue between them. 6. To maintain Ethiopian support of the UN and of concepts of collective security. 7. To encourage Ethiopia to use moderation in development of her military establishment and, as far as possible, to aid her in re-directing governmental expenditures from military to needs beyond that required for internal security. 8. To support the Emperor's position of leadership in the Organization of African Unity as a means of tempering radical pressure within that body which are inimical to the West. [Here follow Sections III-IX (pages 3-113).] X. Conclusion Political power relationships in Ethiopia still operate within a feudal-type framework. Loyalty to person, family, and clan are far more significant than are institutional ties to the State. The vast majority of Ethiopia's people, an aggregate of disparate ethnic groups, of several different faiths, is still treated by the dominant Christian Amhara minority like conquered subjects. In this fragmented society, respect for military power is a major cohesive ingredient. The present political structure, with the Emperor at its apex, is supported by four main groups. These include two traditional—the aristocracy and the clergy—and two more modern (in both of which the aristocracy is prominent), the armed forces and the government bureaucracy. A discontented younger educated elite is seeking greater power and influence, but within the present system rather than through its abolition. It appears that this system still has a good deal of resilience, political and economic, and should continue at least for the next few years with no great change if Haile Selassie remains in control. It will probably continue, with certain adjustments primarily within the Amhara oligarchy, if his death occurs within the same short time-span. While there has been incipient plotting against the Government (and there may be new attempts to overthrow the Emperor), thus far these efforts have been disorganized and the dissidents are mindful of the need to retain the present system. Barring the unpredictable “sergeant's revolt” or assassin's bullet, we do not anticipate a radical and thoroughly revolutionary movement emerging unless the Emperor (1) remains on the throne beyond the next five or six years, (2) makes further reforms which are only window-dressing, and (3) leaves behind him the threat of a prolonged struggle over the succession. The longer this period lasts, however, the more important it will be that the system show valid evidence of constructive development which is uncertain without US pressure. If this estimate is correct, we have more flexibility than would otherwise be apparent both in US policy formulation and timing. Thus we do not face the bald choices of supporting either those in power or those who will probably succeed them. Since those young modernists desiring change are still seeking it through enlarging and modernizing the present system, we should be able to work for the enhancement of their position without necessarily jeopardizing our relations with the governing authorities or upsetting the system. Furthermore, the crucial period in which we have to operate against a major threat to the internal political structure is not just the next few weeks or months but a range of several years. Within this longer interim we see the possibility of dynamic forces in the military and educated elite coming forward. Under the conditions posited above, they would either take over control or support a system which is more progressive but which still rests basically on the ethnic supremacy of the Amhara minority. Our own progress in this interim period could influence the direction in which these forces move and reinforce the social cement needed to build a stronger Ethiopia. During this breathing spell, we must make every effort to maintain and improve the climate for Kagnew and to find some means of dampening or extinguishing the unfriendly fires on both sides of the Ethiopian-Somalian border. If we meet these objectives with straightforward and timely action, the strategic influence of the US in the Horn of Africa should be assured for the predictable future. * Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, AFRICA 1963. Secret; Noforn. Prepared in the Department of State. A handwritten notation on the cover sheet of the 114-page paper reads: “Secretary approved 1/6/64” and “Part I revised by AF 3/5/65.” 310. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia 310. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia Source Washington, December 30, 1963, 4:53 p.m. 327. Ref: Mogadiscio's 429. 1 For Ambassador from Governor Williams. Conversation with Issa at Nairobi touched on general subject US military aid to other countries, with Somali Foreign Minister observing that there had been examples of concurrent US and Soviet military aid to the same country. I replied that where this had happened there had been other overriding considerations which did not exist at present moment in relation to Somalia. However we did not have closed mind on this subject, and future developments might turn out in such a way as to warrant a re-examination of our attitudes. Nevertheless, for the present, mixed military aid was out in view size Soviet arms program, which was largest granted to any single African country, and because of our apprehensions, repeatedly voiced to Somali leaders, that arms program such magnitude would deflect Somalia's meagre resources from priority needs of Somali people and result progressive weakening of economic situation. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-SOMALI. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Galanto, cleared by Newsom, and approved by Williams. 1 Dated December 26. (Ibid.) Southern Africa Region Southern Africa Region 311. Paper Prepared in the Department of State Washington, June 28, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Africa. Secret; Noforn. Drafted by Duggan and Lewis. Sent to George McGhee and U. Alexis Johnson, Department of State; Paul Nitze, William Bundy, Henry Rowen, and Major General T.W. Parker, Department of Defense; Henry Fowler, Department of the Treasury; Richard Helms and Ray S. Cline, CIA; and McGeorge Bundy and Carl Kaysen, the White House, under cover of a memorandum from Henry Owen (S/P) that reads: “The attached paper, ‘The White Redoubt' of June 28, 1962, will be discussed at the Planning Group meeting on Tuesday, July 10.” The paper was discussed at the Secretary's Planning Meeting on July 17. A summary of the discussion is in Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, Departmental Organization. 312. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, August 21, 1962. Source: Department of State, AF/AFI Files: Lot 64 D 467, United Nations 17th GA, Pol 1, General Policy, US. Confidential. Drafted by Sisco and approved by the White House on August 29 and by the Office of the Secretary of State on August 27. 313. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State London, December 6, 1962, 7 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770.00/12-662. Confidential. 314. Paper Prepared in the Department of State Washington, March 25, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Africa. Confidential. Drafted by Foulon, Sanger, and Mathews. Transmitted to Planning Group members on April 17 under cover of a memorandum from Walt Rostow, S/P, that reads: “The attached paper entitled ‘Problems of Southern Africa' dated March 25, 1963 will be discussed at the Planning Group meeting, Tuesday, April 23.” 315. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to Attorney General Kennedy Washington, July 1, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, Schlesinger Papers, White House Files, Africa 7/1/63-7/9/63. Secret. 316. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, July 10, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, South Africa, 6/6/63-7/12/63. Secret. 317. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts Washington, July 19, 1963, 8:58 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 10 PORT/AFRICA. Confidential. Drafted by Brown and Schwebel on July 18; cleared by Tasca, Burdett, Meeker, and Sisco; and approved by Cleveland. Sent to USUN, London, Pretoria, Paris, Oslo, Rio de Janeiro, Caracas, Manila, Accra, Rabat, Taipei, Tunis, Monrovia, Tananarive, and Freetown and repeated to Lagos, Dar-es-Salaam, Leopoldville, Lisbon, Lourenco Marques, and Luanda. 318. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Read) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, July 24, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Portugal. Confidential. 319. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, October 29, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, South Africa, 9/30/63-10/29/63. Secret. 311. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 311. Paper Prepared in the Department of State Source Washington, June 28, 1962. THE WHITE REDOUBT I. Introduction and Summary The seeds of another Algeria have been sown in Southern Africa. Blacks face Whites across a sea of developing hate. With this confrontation and the increasing polarization of racial relations the White supremacists are seeking to strengthen their established positions. The white peoples of these territories—the Republic of South Africa, the Portuguese African possessions of Angola and Mozambique and the Central African Federation (the Rhodesias and Nyasaland)—are taking up a defensive position along a rampart from which they feel there is no retreat. They appear to be developing bonds of mutual fear in the face of advancing Black African nationalism and their governments are contemplating a mutual defense strategy, if not economic and political union as well. Theirs is, in effect, a last white stronghold against black invasion from the north and racialist-inspired upheavals from within. From the north pressing against these white communities comes the tide of nationalism. In this area, 26 newly independent states, mainly black, have found their freedom since the end of World War II. More new black nations will add to these pressures this year and next. The possible collision of these rival forces in a world already full of racial hatreds is highly dangerous. A Black-White confrontation on the southern tip of Africa, particularly in an area where U.S. investments are extensive, and U.S. nationals are numerous, is perilous in terms of U.S. objectives in Africa as a whole. There are even more cogent reasons than these which must give us concern—notably the likelihood of the Cold War being introduced into Africa on the wings of racial bias; the weakening of our own relationships with Africa which would ensure [ ensue ?]; the weakening of the UN; and the domestic dilemma with which the U.S. would be confronted in event of such tragedy. It should be the policy of the United States to mitigate the polarization of the races into two warring factions. Unfortunately, this polarization has already proceeded a long way, and our efforts must now be directed toward preventing it from developing so completely that strife cannot be averted. Unless this aim is accomplished, we may be faced with a major racial war, the consequences of which could even mean that masses of white inhabitants will be driven out of Africa. We have not yet made a full assessment of the military potential of the Redoubt group. South Africa could no doubt supply her own military needs but probably would have difficulty in meeting all the needs of her partners. It is difficult if not impossible accurately to estimate the pace of events. The problems of Angola are upon us today. The Rhodesian problems (at least those of Southern Rhodesia) are developing so swiftly they may be with us full force within the next year. The problems of South Africa are only slightly more long range. In all areas time is running out. [Here follows the body of the paper.] * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Africa. Secret; Noforn. Drafted by Duggan and Lewis. Sent to George McGhee and U. Alexis Johnson, Department of State; Paul Nitze, William Bundy, Henry Rowen, and Major General T.W. Parker, Department of Defense; Henry Fowler, Department of the Treasury; Richard Helms and Ray S. Cline, CIA; and McGeorge Bundy and Carl Kaysen, the White House, under cover of a memorandum from Henry Owen (S/P) that reads: “The attached paper, ‘The White Redoubt' of June 28, 1962, will be discussed at the Planning Group meeting on Tuesday, July 10.” The paper was discussed at the Secretary's Planning Meeting on July 17. A summary of the discussion is in Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, Departmental Organization. 312. Memorandum of Conversation 312. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, August 21, 1962. SUBJECT United States Strategy at the 17th General Assembly PARTICIPANTS The President The Secretary Harlan Cleveland—IO Ambassador Stevenson Arthur Schlesinger Joseph J. Sisco—UNP The following principal points emerged from the discussion with the President on US strategy in the United Nations at the 17th General Assembly. [Here follows discussion of other subjects.] 5. Colonial Questions The President agrees we should oppose sanctions as a way for the Assembly to deal with Portuguese colonial policy and the South African questions. He also agrees we should attempt to get the Soviets off the Committee of 17 on the assumption that we would also do the same. The Secretary reported we had made no progress in our negotiations with the Portuguese on the Azores base and that they have linked this question with the United States position in the United Nations on colonial questions. The Secretary said we want to make a strong effort to get the Azores base negotiations completed before the General Assembly gets involved in a number of the Portuguese colonial questions. The President agreed we should see how far we can get with the Portuguese on this matter, although he was not disposed to make concessions on the colonial issues if the Portuguese were not going to make any movement towards moderation and were going to use the base negotiations as a means of exerting pressure on us. [Here follows discussion of other subjects.] * Source: Department of State, AF/AFI Files: Lot 64 D 467, United Nations 17th GA, Pol 1, General Policy, US. Confidential. Drafted by Sisco and approved by the White House on August 29 and by the Office of the Secretary of State on August 27. 313. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 313. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State Source London, December 6, 1962, 7 p.m. 2120. African talks with British completed this afternoon. 1 Congo, Horn and Arab Africa not discussed except that British summarized conversations with Somali Prime Minister which being reported separately. Atmosphere was cordial but British made no startling revelations of policy or fact. Focus of attention was Southern Africa. British agreed with US assessment of importance of area and of necessity of showing progress there in order not to lose gains of decolonization to the north. With respect South Africa, it was agreed that US and UK Ambassadors should consult together and make recommendations as to possibilities of persuasion and pressure on SAG to weaken apartheid. Re UNGA apartheid resolution, we commented that UK perhaps less concerned about public posture vis-à-vis the Afro-Asians than the US. Stevens said this not the case but UK was inhibited by problem of High Commission territories. Re Southwest Africa possibility of joint or parallel approach to SAG making clear that US and UK could not support SAG in event of unfavorable ICJ decision was discussed. Maud strongly favored such approach but Stevens indicated Foreign Office wished to consider further. We expressed view such approach could be useful. Re High Commission territories British would welcome a greater American interest and specifically designation of FSO to cover these territories. Re Federation we emphasized key importance in general Southern African context. British agreed and did not dissent when we expressed view that after Southern Rhodesian elections UK would feel free to exercise influence in Federation and particularly Southern Rhodesia. We explained tentative US thinking re provision of training assistance in public administration and related fields to African nationalists in Southern Rhodesia and pointed out that this designed inter alia to achieve immediate effect of providing constructive activity for some ZAPU restrictees when released. British reaction was not enthusiastic. They stressed rather the need to improve secondary education facilities with a view to increasing African capabilities over the long run. While not objecting to discussion of US idea with Whitehead, they stressed need for caution. UK agreed that Whitehead had not closed door to possible UN SYG good offices and apparently do not rule out possibility that Whitehead might accept some UN role after elections. One interesting sidelight on Federation discussion was that UK dis-sented from US view that African governments in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia would wish to be assured of early African government in Southern Rhodesia if there were to be continuation of some form of association. UK held two northern governments would be willing deal with white government in Southern Rhodesia and that issue was really not one of color. The real problem is existence of Federation in present form which stands in way of accommodation among three members. Re Portuguese territories there was general agreement on estimate of situation. British somewhat pessimistic about prospects rapporteur proposal in UNGA. We asked them to suggest individuals who might serve as rapporteur. British agreed that we both should urge other NATO allies to make known to Portuguese their concern over Portuguese policy in Africa. [Here follows discussion of East Africa and West Africa.] Bruce * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770.00/12-662. Confidential. 1 The U.S.-U.K. talks in London, December 5-6, are recorded in six memoranda of conversation. (Ibid., 641.70/12-1762) 314. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 314. Paper Prepared in the Department of State Source Washington, March 25, 1963. PROBLEMS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA Summary The southern quarter of the African continent has become the last major area of the world in which white minorities still control territories where they are far outnumbered by colored populations. While there is an outside chance of a peaceful transition from white dominance to multiracial democracy, it is more probable that over the next few years southern Africa will see a great intensification of hostility between whites and blacks. This probable development will embarrass the West throughout the Afro-Asian world and could compromise the global U.S. strategy of fostering a cooperative community of free nations across the North-South dividing lines of race and wealth. This in turn would enhance Sino-Soviet Bloc opportunities in Africa. These consequences would be the more certain and the more serious should the white governments of Southern Rhodesia, Portugal and South Africa pool their political, economic and military assets in a common front against black Africa. To prevent such a coalescence and to ease as far as possible the black-white confrontation, the U.S. should as a general strategy chip away at Southern Rhodesia, South-West Africa and the Portuguese territories rather than make a frontal assault on the hard rock of South African apartheid. In Southern Rhodesia we should cooperate with the UK to bring about resumed progress toward multiracialism. We should continue to press the South Africans to reach an accommodation with the UN with respect to South-West Africa. The avenues most likely to influence a change of Portuguese policy toward its African territories are to reduce the bargaining value the Portuguese place on the Azores base and to exert the combined persuasiveness of important Western powers. To carry out this strategy the U.S. will have to work closely with the UK which has a huge direct stake in the area and with the West European and old Commonwealth governments which share our interest in peaceful transition to multiracial societies. We must at the same time apprise the African governments of the northern three quarters of the continent of our broad objectives and keep them currently informed of our major tactical moves. [Here follows the body of the paper.] * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Africa. Confidential. Drafted by Foulon, Sanger, and Mathews. Transmitted to Planning Group members on April 17 under cover of a memorandum from Walt Rostow, S/P, that reads: “The attached paper entitled ‘Problems of Southern Africa' dated March 25, 1963 will be discussed at the Planning Group meeting, Tuesday, April 23.” 315. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to Attorney General Kennedy 315. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to Attorney General Kennedy Source Washington, July 1, 1963. SUBJECT Our Policy in Africa We are confronting a major decision in our African policy, and I think this is something you may well wish to get in on. I attach four documents 1 which will set forth the problem: (A) a memorandum from Mennen Williams to Rusk; (B) a memorandum from Alexis Johnson to Rusk; (C) a memorandum from Rusk commenting on the Williams memorandum; and (D) a letter from Stevenson to the President. The basic problem is what position we should take in the meeting of the Security Council late in July when the African states, following the Addis Ababa meeting, plan to force the issue on the Portuguese colonies and on South Africa. Their basic policy is to try to make us choose between Portugal and South Africa, on the one hand, and the rest of Africa, on the other. We wish to evade that choice. We are opposed to sanctions against Portugal and South Africa, to their expulsion from the UN, etc. On the other hand, we recognize that the African states have history on their side and probably justice too; and that, unless we want to abandon Africa altogether, we will have to do something to show our support of the principle of self-determination. The question is how far we can go without risking the Azores base and various tracking stations, etc., made available to us in South Africa—or, even more essentially whether these military facilities are so indispensable to us that they must determine our African policy. The choice may well be between the military risk of losing the Azores and the South African tracking stations and the political risk of losing Africa. As you will see from the attached documents, the Secretary and Johnson are fearful of pushing Portugal and South Africa too hard, while Williams and Stevenson would like to go at least as far as some form of arms embargo. It is not an easy question. My own feeling is that DOD should make a much more rigorous examination than it seems yet to have made of the alternatives to the Azores and the tracking stations. We should also know much more than we seem to know at present about the prospects of the Salazar regime; I doubt if even this regime can hold out forever against the winds of change. I think it would be a great mistake to base our African policy on the indispensability of the military facilities and the permanence of the Salazar regime if neither of these things turns out to be so. In any case, I hope you will be interested. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr . 2 * Source: Kennedy Library, Schlesinger Papers, White House Files, Africa 7/1/63-7/9/63. Secret. 1 Tabs A, B, and C are not attached to the source text. Tab D is attached but is not printed. 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 316. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 316. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Source Washington, July 10, 1963. JCSM-528-63 SUBJECT US Policy Toward Portugal and Republic of South Africa 1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the problems set forth in the memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA, I-24800/63, dated 2 July 1963, 1 subject as above, and express the following views. 2. The US policy toward Portugal and the Republic of South Africa, when reviewed in relation to the independent countries of Africa, must take into account the relative importance to the over-all US strategy of military requirements in the entire area. 3. The importance of Portugal lies primarily in the importance of US base rights in the Azores, and secondarily in the membership of Portugal in NATO. Loss of the Azores would seriously degrade the responsiveness, reliability, and control of major US forces. With regard to air transportation to Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, costs in tonnage and time would be raised appreciably, with a direct effect on limited war or contingency actions. [ 2 lines of source text not declassified ] Loss of support for antisubmarine patrol aircraft would require the addition in wartime of increased Hunter-Killer forces. Defense Communications System radio facilities at Lajes provide an important communications route between the United States and the Europe/North Africa/Middle East areas. Logistic support facilities in the Azores are also important. 4. The divisive effect on NATO of further censure of Portugal cannot be dismissed. At a time when the Alliance is already strained, the withdrawal of Portugal as a result of affronts by her Allies could dangerously weaken our efforts to revitalize NATO. 5. The peacetime contribution of the Republic of South Africa to US security is considerably less important than that of Portugal. There is a missile tracking station there, but the chief interest lies in its strategic location in relation to the rest of the African continent, the ocean approaches to other areas, and its potential value in contingency operations because of its seaports and airfields. Also of importance are its industrial complex, skilled labor, and strategic materials. 6. North Africa, as the southern flank of the Mediterranean, is of great strategic importance to NATO and to access routes to the Middle East. Two of three important US installations remaining in Africa are in North Africa: the Naval Communications facility at Kenitra, Morocco, and Wheelus Air Base in Libya. The third is a major communications site in Ethiopia. 7. Sub-Saharan Africa is of secondary importance to US military strategy. The armed forces of independent nations in that area are scarcely able to maintain internal order. There is, however, a need to deny the area to the Sino-Soviet Bloc because of the natural resources and the flanking geographical position of Africa in relation to Europe, the Middle East, and South America. Consequently, the United States must be prepared for contingency operations alone or within the framework of the United Nations, and efforts to extend US influence should be continued in every feasible manner including economic and technical assistance programs, and limited but selected military assistance programs. We should not, however, yield to blackmail. 8. There is concern that the African nations will form a solid front in supporting resolutions in the UN Security Council calling for severe measures against Portugal and the Republic of South Africa. If such action occurs, positive US support for Portugal and the Republic of South Africa could threaten continued use of US facilities in Morocco, Libya, and Ethiopia. Development of a solid front on this question would appear unlikely. Despite the adoption of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Charter and the many manifestations concerning African unity, there is a real demarcation between Moslem Arab North Africa and Negro Sub-Saharan Africa. There are indications that the Addis Ababa Conference and the OAU Charter were of greater interest and importance to the Negro Africans than to the Arab North Africans. Thus, any US position which favored Portugal or the Republic of South Africa would undoubtedly have greater impact on Negro Africa than on Arab North Africa. 9. Consideration of any UN resolutions should be consistent with the provisions of the Charter. Thus, measures which advocate (a) elimination of colonial rule by force, (b) support of military or subversive action in any of the territories or countries, or (c) interference in internal affairs of legally established governments, should be resisted as being inconsistent with the principles of the Charter. 10. A detailed evaluation of US base requirements on Portuguese and African territory is attached as Appendix A hereto. 2 Included are discussions of missions, importance, possible alternatives, and effects of alternatives or loss of the bases. A brief discussion of the potential of the armed forces of Portugal and South Africa is attached as Appendix B. 3 11. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have concluded that: a. For the foreseeable future, the US requirements in the Azores are of primary strategic importance by comparison with those in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, North Africa is also of major importance because of its geographical position and its relationship to Southern Europe and the Middle East. b. The need to deny the African continent to the Sino-Soviet Bloc is a basic consideration. Sub-Saharan Africa, while now of secondary importance, may eventually become of increased strategic value because of location and natural resources. Consequently, denial of the area to the Sino-Soviet Bloc is important, as is true of the rest of Africa. c. Sweeping generalizations should not be made in dealing with African problems, as conditions and interests vary widely in diverse regions of the continent. d. If a resolution is directed against Portugal and South Africa jointly, the United States should endeavor to have the issues separated to permit more rational consideration of them. Not only are our strategic interests and military requirements very different in the two countries, but the issues which would be of concern to the United Nations are different. e. In order to protect vital US strategic military interests in the Azores and avoid further weakening of the NATO Alliance, the United States should resist the institution of strong measures against Portugal. Such a course of action would be justified by the improvement which has taken place in Portuguese policy, and progress made in Angola and Mozambique. f. Any resolution directed against the Republic of South Africa should be examined upon its merits, and harsh and irresponsible castigations should be avoided, in keeping with the peaceful purposes expressed in the UN Charter. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Maxwell D. Taylor 4 Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, South Africa, 6/6/63-7/12/63. Secret. 1 Not printed. 2 Attached to the source text but not printed. 3 Not attached to the source text. 4 Printed from a copy that indicates Taylor signed the original. 317. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts 317. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts Source Washington, July 19, 1963, 8:58 p.m. 117. Deptel 168 to USUN 1 outlines position US will take in SC on Portuguese territories. This message provides broader framework in which both South Africa and Portuguese questions will be treated, including legal aspects. We believe it would be helpful to achievement of our objectives in SC for other Council members to have general preview of our position both on substance of problem and on legal issues posed, since question whether action to be taken falls under Chapter VI or Chapter VII of Charter directly affects character of action to be taken. 1) Apartheid . (a) US remains basically opposed to apartheid and will support resolution reaffirming UN disapproval of apartheid and recommendation of embargo on arms suitable for enforcement of apartheid. (b) We foresee however that African members likely seek much more drastic and far-reaching action, including mandatory (Chapter VII) sanctions and expulsion. US could not support such far-reaching measures since we do not believe they would help promote peaceful solution of problem and—in case of more extreme sanctions—are unlikely be effectively implemented. (c) We also believe Council should recommend SYG appoint high-level special representative such as past GA President to discuss with South Africans how their racial policies could be brought into conformity with Charter. We believe above course permits us to reaffirm our dedication to eradication of apartheid by peaceful means while avoiding measures against South Africa to which we could not agree in principle. Secretary has already described to South African Ambassador above position. He emphasized US opposition to expulsion of South Africa and to mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII. 2) Legal . Chapter VI of Charter defines powers of Security Council in “pacific settlement of disputes” and covers situations as described in Article 33 “continuance of which is likely to endanger maintenance of international peace and security.” Chapter VII concerns “Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.” For example, measures which US prepared support in resolutions on South Africa are of Chapter VI character: disapproval of apartheid, appointment of Special Representative and request for partial arms embargo. In view USG, present situations in Portuguese Territories and South Africa fall in category described above by Article 33 and do not now constitute threat to or breach of peace or act of aggression in legal sense of Charter. However, some Members of UN, and two-thirds majority of GA, have previously characterized Portuguese and apartheid situations as threats to peace. Such characterizations not binding on SC, though they undoubtedly will influence character of SC's debate. SC typically has not made explicit decision as to whether it acted under Chapter VI or Chapter VII. In Dept's view, it would not be desirable for SC now to engage in debate or to take formal action designed to establish under what chapter SC acts. Rather, focus of Council's consideration from outset should be on what concrete steps it can take which may advance peaceful solution of Portuguese and apartheid problems. We have begun discussions with Africans. Secretary informed Mongi Slim (Tunisia) of general elements of US position in both cases. While Slim insisted some form of “sanction” necessary, he gave definite impression Africans wished SC action to result from negotiated agreement. Resolution of type described above we hope provides basis for SC action which Africans might be prepared acquiesce, although way tactical situation in SC may develop is unpredictable. USUN has already been requested in Deptel 151 2 to inform UK, French and Norwegian dels generally of our position. Other action addressees should draw on above with FonOff as appropriate. Rio, Caracas, Manila and Taipei should make full presentation. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 10 PORT/AFRICA. Confidential. Drafted by Brown and Schwebel on July 18; cleared by Tasca, Burdett, Meeker, and Sisco; and approved by Cleveland. Sent to USUN, London, Pretoria, Paris, Oslo, Rio de Janeiro, Caracas, Manila, Accra, Rabat, Taipei, Tunis, Monrovia, Tananarive, and Freetown and repeated to Lagos, Dar-es-Salaam, Leopoldville, Lisbon, Lourenco Marques, and Luanda. 1 Document 368 . 2 Dated July 17. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 10 PORT/AFRICA) 318. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Read) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 318. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Read) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Source Washington, July 24, 1963. SUBJECT ECOSOC Action on Expulsion of Portugal and South Africa In view of the President's interest in this matter, I suggest you fill him in on the developments recounted below. A full reporting cable is expected from Geneva Thursday morning. As you know, the Economic and Social Council has had before it resolutions calling for the expulsion of Portugal and South Africa from the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). Today ECOSOC voted to expel Portugal by a vote of 7-0-11 (U.S., U.K., France). Final action regarding South Africa has been postponed to sometime early next week. Expulsion of Portugal The principal reason why we were not able to prevent Portugal's expulsion is that it refused to accept associate membership in ECA, as have the U.K., France and Spain. We were ready to be helpful in this regard and submit and campaign for a resolution providing associate membership for Portugal as an alternative to expulsion. The Portuguese turned down our suggestion that they accept such status. We abstained on the expulsion resolution, along with the British and the French and others. We explained this vote in ECOSOC, to the Portuguese, and to the press on grounds that: (a) the decision was really made last year by the ECA that its membership should consist only of African countries; (b) that the U.K., France and Spain have accepted associate membership, which we believe is the appropriate status for Portugal; and (c) that to vote against the ECA recommendation for expelling Portugal would be an anomaly since it would imply we believe Portugal, a European metropole, should be a full member and have a status greater than the U.K., France and Spain which accepted associate membership. In short, since Portugal insisted on full membership, the proposition on which we wanted to vote—for Portugal to become an associate member—was not available to us. In order to minimize any adverse repercussions we have explained the above several times to the Portuguese, the latest being about noon today. The Portuguese, of course, will remain unconvinced that we could not have prevented its expulsion by voting “no” on the resolution. Last night they informed us there were seven sure votes against expulsion and asked us to reconsider our abstention. This appears to be part of a deliberate campaign by the Portuguese to misrepresent the voting alignment and how individual delegates would vote, including our own. We nevertheless took the prudent step of once again checking the vote count this morning. Our delegation reported telephonically, after a meeting of the Western caucus, that the vote count was 7 in favor of expulsion, 0 against, and 11 abstentions. This is exactly how the vote came out. Expulsion of South Africa The situation regarding possible expulsion of South Africa is much more complicated. As a device to prevent adoption of an expulsion resolution, South Africa, in contrast to the Portuguese, heeded our advice and informed ECOSOC that it has voluntarily decided not to participate in the ECA. We were therefore in a position to support a resolution which would have the effect of making South Africa a temporary non-participant in ECA in lieu of a resolution calling for its outright expulsion. The non-participation resolution failed of adoption 6 in favor (U.S.), 6 against (Soviet bloc plus Africans) and 6 abstentions (U.K., France, Australia and Latin America). The Communists and some of the Africans voted against because they favor expulsion, whereas some of our close allies abstained because they felt it was too strong. The expulsion resolution has not yet been voted upon. In this confused parliamentary situation, Ambassador Bingham successfully got a postponement of further voting for a few days. While we wish to make our decision based on a full report from Geneva, we believe our likely next step will be to submit a slightly changed resolution embracing the non-participation formula and to work on the Latins, Australia and the U.K. to support this proposition in order to prevent adoption of the expulsion resolution. We believe there is better than an even chance of succeeding in this tactic. Grant G. Hilliker 1 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Portugal. Confidential. 1 Printed from a copy that indicates Hilliker signed the original above Read's typed signature. 319. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 319. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Source Washington, October 29, 1963. The South African issue will probably be up in the Security Council again in the next couple of weeks and Stevenson will be here this week to prepare with State a recommendation for a US position for the President's approval. The Portuguese-African issue will remain at low temperatures so long as the talks don't break down. Within State several new proposals are being argued involving expanded student programs and covert assistance for South African and Portuguese-African refugees. I think we need some basic reconsideration and clarification of policy at this point. There are no early or easy solutions in prospect in Portuguese Africa or in South Africa. It will take a long process of political, economic and possibly military attrition before the Portuguese accept the necessity for serious negotiation; South Africa will be even tougher. The United States has interests on both sides of these issues so substantial that we can't afford to “choose sides.” Nor do we have sufficient leverage to compel the antagonists to come to terms. In the past several years, accordingly, we have sailed an improvised, often erratic course between the antagonists, with a series of minor concessions to the Africans as the pressures mounted, while avoiding an irreparable break with the Portuguese or South Africans. While this has been the most sensible—indeed the only sensible—course open to us, we are beginning to run out of sailing room. I think we can gain some space for maneuver, and continue to defer the dilemma, if we raise our present tactic to a deliberate, systematic policy. Here are some things we can do or, in some cases, just do better, to improve our position. They are based on the proposition that since we can't now bet on a winner, we should be hedging our bets and buying time. 1. At the UN : The key fact is that we are reaching a point where no further concessions can be made to the Africans. We are going to have to take positions which will be more pleasing to the Portuguese and South Africans and less so to the Black Africans, as we did on the Portuguese African resolution in the Security Council in August and on the Southern Rhodesian resolutions since then. Plimpton has already proposed as much in recommending that we vote against any resolution for sanctions on the South Africans. Thus our position in New York will become more difficult, and we will have to seek offsetting gains with the Africans outside the UN. However, we can at least limit our damage in New York if, for negotiating with the Africans, our Mission has clearer guidance on our strategy and purposes. Our performance in the UN has been weakened by lack of firm instructions for the Mission itself, which has had conflicting feelings on the African issues. 2. With the Portuguese and South Africans : While our problem with the Portuguese and South Africans will be a little eased if we stop making further concessions to the Black Africans in the UN, we still need improved communications and whatever rapport can be developed through quiet diplomacy. The Ball-Salazar channel should be cultivated assiduously, primarily for friendship and only secondarily for education. Secretary Rusk and Alex Johnson should continue to cultivate their own special relations with the South Africans. With both countries we should take every opportunity for quiet cooperation and avoid unnecessary frictions. 3. With the Black Africans : Leaving aside the nationalists directly involved, in Portuguese Africa and South Africa, there is little we can do with the leaders of Black Africa that we are not now doing. However, I believe the Africans' bark is much worse than their bite on the Portuguese African and South African issues. These are propaganda issues in the internal politics of Africa, but less important by far than their own domestic problems which are becoming more and more immediate and pressing. I believe the cost of resisting the Africans at the UN has been overstated and CIA analysis of African reaction to the August Security Council vote bears this out. In any event, we have one important asset, the President's status and personal relations with the Africans, on which we can draw heavily—for example in personal communications with key African leaders. 4. Portuguese African and South African Nationalists : Most of the above is simply reiteration, perhaps with new emphasis, of things we are already doing. If, in fact, we follow a more restricted policy in the UN, that will itself ease our problem with the Portuguese and the South Africans. In the case of the Africans, I believe we can afford to pay some price; but only if, at the same time, we strengthen our ties to the Portuguese African and South African black nationalists themselves. This is where we should be hedging our bets, and are doing the least, even though the risks are slight and the potential returns large. At the present time, US programs for South African and Portuguese African students support only sixty students in the Lincoln University program here and a small AID grant for the African American Institute's secondary training school in Tanganyika. We do nothing with the large Angolan refugee population now in the Congo or the large exodus from both areas that will soon be moving through Northern Rhodesia. [ 2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] Meanwhile bloc programs for wooing refugees are increasing particularly in Dar-es-Salaam. Communism is a really serious force within the South African nationalist movement. [ 2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] Clearly, we cannot engage in military training or aid. However, we can expand our student program, help develop training and assistance programs for refugees within Africa (Tanganyika, Northern Rhodesia, Congo) and [ 3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified ]. We need clear guidance for all involved as to our purposes and priorities and I think it might be useful to ask for comprehensive recommendations [ 2 lines of source text not declassified ] so that the President himself can pass on the issues. Bill Brubeck 1 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, South Africa, 9/30/63-10/29/63. Secret. 1 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. Rhodesia and Nyasaland Rhodesia and Nyasaland 320. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, May 2, 1961. Source: Department of State, President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. Confidential. Drafted by Deming on May 3. 321. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Salisbury Washington, May 12, 1961, 9:42 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.45C/3-3061. Confidential; Verbatim Text. Drafted by Picard, cleared by Burdett, and approved by Fredericks. Repeated by pouch to London and Pretoria. 322. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, August 24, 1961, 8:40 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745C.00/8-2261. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Dunham and Wight, cleared by Sweeney and Veliotes, and approved by Ferguson. Also sent to Salisbury Niact and repeated to Dar-es-Salaam Priority. 323. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Dar-es-Salaam Washington, September 8, 1961, 10:42 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745C.00/9-861. Confidential; Priority; Verbatim Text. Drafted by Dunham, cleared by Korn, and approved by Wight. Repeated Priority to London and Salisbury. 324. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Washington, January 11, 1962, 7:56 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745C.00/1-1062. Confidential. Drafted by Simms; cleared by Reis, Kellermann, Deming, Sweeney, and Acly (ODA); and approved by Wallner. Repeated to Salisbury. 325. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Salisbury Washington, March 9, 1962, 5:20 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745C.00/3-662. Confidential. Drafted by Dunham and Deming on March 8, cleared by Bergesen, and approved by Fredericks. Repeated to London. 326. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Salisbury Washington, March 19, 1962, 7:35 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745C.00/3-662. Confidential. Drafted by Deming and Wellons and approved by Tasca. Repeated to London, USUN, and by pouch to Dar-es-Salaam, Nairobi, and Pretoria. 327. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Salisbury Washington, April 17, 1962, 11:19 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745C.00/4-1762. Confidential. Drafted by Dunham on April 16 and approved by Deming. Repeated to London and USUN. 328. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Battle) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, May 7, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Rhodesia. No classification marking. Attached to the source text is a transmittal note from Battle to Bundy that reads: “Prior to Governor Williams' departure for Africa, the President asked him to prepare a paper on the Rhodesias. The completed paper is attached.” 329. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Washington, June 11, 1962, 7:13 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745C.00/6-1162. Confidential. Drafted by Buffum; cleared in draft by Bergesen, Freeman, MacKnight, and Monsma, and by Rogers; and approved by Wallner. Repeated to London, Salisbury, and Buenos Aires. 330. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, August 17, 1962, 8:56 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745C.00/8-1362. Confidential. Drafted by Parker; cleared by MacKnight, Sanger, Friedman, and Buffum; and approved by Cleveland. Repeated to Salisbury and USUN. 331. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, September 30, 1962. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745C.00/9-3062. Confidential. Drafted by Tyler, cleared in U, and approved in the White House on October 8. Separate memoranda of conversation were prepared on Cuba and Congo. 332. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, October 5, 1962, 5:56 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.41/10-562. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Wallner and Mathews; cleared by Little, Swank, and Burdett; and approved by Ball. Repeated to USUN and Salisbury. 333. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, November 29, 1962, 6:11 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745C.00/11-2962. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Mathews on November 23; cleared by Burdett, Sisco, Furnas, and McGhee (in substance); and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Salisbury. 334. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Salisbury Washington, November 30, 1962, 6:26 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745C.00/11-1062. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Dunham on November 21; cleared by Knox, Burdett, Furnas, and McGhee (in substance); and approved by Williams. Repeated to London. 335. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, January 7, 1963, 4:06 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745C.00/1-763. Confidential. Drafted by Mulcahy on January 4; cleared by Goldstein, Wallner, and Chapin; and approved by Mac-Knight. Repeated to Salisbury and USUN. 336. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Brubeck) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, January 28, 1963. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745C.00/1-2863. Confidential. Cleared by Lennon, MacKnight, Fredericks, Dunham, and Conroy (AID). 337. Telegram From the Consulate General in Salisbury to the Department of State Salisbury, February 20, 1963, 4 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL RHOD & NYAS. Confidential. Repeated to London, USUN, Lusaka, Blantyre, Lourenco Marques, Paris, Bonn, Rome, Pretoria, Leopoldville, Elisabethville, Dar-es-Salaam, Nairobi, Kampala, and Luanda. 338. Paper Prepared in the Department of State Washington, April 6, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Rhodesia. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the source text. Attached to a memorandum from Brubeck to McGeorge Bundy that reads: “There is attached a situation report regarding developments in Southern Rhodesia. It is suggested that you may wish to bring the report to the attention of the President.” 339. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole Washington, April 16, 1963. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD & NYAS/UN. No classification marking. Drafted by Mulcahy. The source text bears a typed notation that reads: “Original copy handed to Sithole by G. Mennen Williams 4/16/63.” Reverend Sithole was a prominent African nationalist. 340. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, June 15, 1963. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD/UN. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the source text. 341. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ghana Washington, August 29, 1963, 7:49 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD & NYAS/UN. Confidential. Drafted by Hennes; cleared by Friedman (in draft), Buffum, and Strong; and approved by Gardner. Also sent to USUN and repeated to London and Salisbury. 342. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Washington, September 6, 1963, 8:19 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD & NYAS/UN. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Sisco, Buffum, and Hennes; cleared by Burdett, Williams, Monsma, and Judd; and approved by Cleveland. Also sent to Caracas, London, and Oslo and repeated to Accra, Manila, Paris, Rabat, Rio de Janeiro, Taipei, and Salisbury. 343. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, September 18, 1963, 2 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD & NYAS. Confidential. Drafted by Judd and approved in S on September 24. The conversation took place in the Secretary's office. 344. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 8, 1963, 10:30 a.m. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Rhodesia. Confidential. Drafted by Brubeck. A notation on the source text indicates that a copy was sent to the Department of State. The conversation was held at the White House. 345. Telegram From the Department of State to the Resident Consul in Blantyre, Malawi Washington, October 17, 1963, 7:20 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 RHOD & NYAS. Confidential. Drafted by DuPont on October 16, cleared by Looram and McKesson, and approved by Coote. Repeated to Dar-es-Salaam, Salisbury, Lusaka (by pouch), and Lourenco Marques. 346. Memorandum of Conversation London, December 19, 1963, 9:30 a.m. Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential. Drafted by Armstrong on December 19 and approved on December 26. The source text is labeled “Part II of III.” The conversation took place in Sandys' office at the Commonwealth Relations Office. 320. Memorandum of Conversation 320. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, May 2, 1961. SUBJECT The Situation in the Federation of Rhodesia & Nyasaland PARTICIPANTS The President Dr. Hastings K. Banda, President, Malawi Congress Party of Nyasaland Mr. Aleke Banda, Editor, Malawi News Olcott H. Deming, Director, AFE The President said he was delighted to meet Dr. Banda, a distinguished African leader whose role he knew would increase in importance. He said America took a great interest in African affairs, and visits such as Dr. Banda's gave us the opportunity to increase our knowledge of the state of affairs in the various countries. Dr. Banda said he greatly appreciated the President's interest and support. He then oulined briefly the historical background of the formation of the Federation, pointing out that the Rhodesian settlers at that time (1953) hoped that it would prevent states like Nyasaland from moving towards eventual independence. It was for this very reason that Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia wished to break up the Federation, though, once independent, they might move back into a voluntary association of their own. Dr. Banda said that Iain MacLeod, the Colonial Secretary, was a very close friend of his and that the Colonial Office was working hard to bring early self-government to Nyasaland. Following elections in July the Africans would have a majority in the Legislative Council and then would work out with the British the next steps towards independence. The President changed the subject to the Congo, and asked Dr. Banda his estimate of the situation there. Dr. Banda said that all friends of the Congo should work to bring Gizenga and Kasavubu together, that both of them were true nationalists and put the good of the country above selfish interests. By contrast, he said, Tshombe was a “Quisling” who thought only of his own interests, and that everyone in Africa knew he was a stooge of Belgian and other mining interests in Katanga. He had no standing as an African leader. Dr. Banda observed that he thought the UN role was essential in the Congo. The President said he was glad to hear this as he thought the smaller and newer countries must look to the UN for protection in such circumstances. Dr. Banda and the President agreed the big powers conflict must be kept out of such situations and the UN can be very effective in such situations. Dr. Banda mentioned his long friendship and association with Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, and the President said he had had a most useful conversation with President Nkrumah on his recent visit to Washington. In response to a question, Dr. Banda said he thought Sekou Toure of Guinea was too much of a nationalist and “African individualist” ever to be “put in the pocket” of the East. The President said it was his observation that none of the new African states wanted to be in anyone's pocket. The President asked Dr. Banda if he would take a minute to be introduced to the members of his Cabinet, who were meeting next door. On concluding the call, the President assured Dr. Banda that he could count on his continuing personal interest in developments in Nyasaland and that we recognized his country's needs for assistance in education and other fields. Dr. Banda said that next time he came he would bring a “shopping list” with him. * Source: Department of State, President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. Confidential. Drafted by Deming on May 3. 321. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Salisbury 321. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Salisbury Source Washington, May 12, 1961, 9:42 p.m. 457. Salisbury D-819. 1 Congen should submit following note to Federal Government: “The Consulate General of the United States presents its compliments to the Ministry of External Affairs, and with reference to the Ministry's note of March 25, 1961, has the honor to inform the Ministry that the Consulate General has been instructed to make the following reply: The United States has long favored the peaceful evolution of dependent areas to full independence on a democratic basis. The views of the United States Government on self-determination are a matter of public record. The statements made by Mr. Williams in Lagos 2 were a positive reaffirmation that the United States Government has an abiding attachment to the consistent application of the principle of self-determination for all peoples. Mr. Williams' remarks should not be construed as indicating in any way the view that independent states in Africa are subject to what is termed ‘neo-colonialism' or ‘neo-imperialism.' It is natural that officials of the United States should, from time to time, make statements concerning the basic principles to which the United States is committed, e.g., orderly progress toward democratic self-government. It is not believed, however, that an expression of general principle should be interpreted as having the direct, specific local application which the Ministry's note apparently imputes to one such general statement made by Mr. Williams. With respect to the Ministry's question regarding the policy of the United States toward the Federal Government, it is the firm belief of the United States Government that the problems of any country, including the question of the pace of progress toward democratic self-government, are best resolved by the peoples and governments concerned. In countries where the population consists of various ethnic groups, it is the hope of the United States that political, social and economic progress will occur without reference to the race of individual citizens.” Consul General should orally inform GRN too much apparently read into alleged statements, there no intention single out any country, that Department somewhat surprised at occasionally tendentious tone sounded in GRN formal note. Consul General should add that our note intended make it clear United States believes in racial cooperation on democratic basis. It follows we do not believe domination any race by another. In oral presentation Consul General should endeavor avoid detailed exchanges regarding specific statements, and leave Ministry External Affairs with understanding matter under discussion is clarified and concluded so far as Department concerned. Bowles * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.45C/3-3061. Confidential; Verbatim Text. Drafted by Picard, cleared by Burdett, and approved by Fredericks. Repeated by pouch to London and Pretoria. 1 Despatch 819 from Salisbury, May 12, transmitted the text of a note from the Office of the Prime Minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland formally requesting that the Consulate General provide it with a statement of U.S. policy toward the Federation in light of certain statements made by Assistant Secretary Williams during his recent trip to Lagos. The Federation asked whether the announced U.S. policy of favoring self-determination for all African territories implied that the United States “supports the vesting of political control in a country such as the Federation in the numerically preponderant black African population in the immediate future.” (Ibid.) 2 In response to a question during an airport interview in Lagos on March 6, Williams had said that he thought the U.S. people and Government were firmly committed to the idea of self-determination and that he was quite confident that they were going to back the African people in their aspiration for self-determination. (Telegram 843 from Lagos, March 9; ibid., 611.45C/3-961) 322. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 322. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Source Washington, August 24, 1961, 8:40 p.m. 932. Dar es Salaam 144 rptd Salisbury 7, London 34. 1 President Kennedy has received telegram from Kaunda 2 as reported reftel pleading for US intervention in current session UNGA and with Macmillan to end loss life and alleged uprooting villages Northern Rhodesia. Department planning friendly but generally worded reply from President regretting loss life and deploring violence, hoping parties concerned can come to statesmanlike agreement, and mentioning continuing exchange views with United Kingdom. Department urgently requests views of Governor Williams and Consul General concerning proposed reply and possible reaction Federal Government. Embassy London comments would be appreciated. While we do not wish give British impression of veto over any action to be taken, will leave to Embassy's judgment whether discreet consultation with UK officials would be helpful. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745C.00/8-2261. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Dunham and Wight, cleared by Sweeney and Veliotes, and approved by Ferguson. Also sent to Salisbury Niact and repeated to Dar-es-Salaam Priority. 1 Dated August 22. (Ibid.) 2 Kenneth Kaunda, National President of the United National Independence Party (UNIP) in Northern Rhodesia. 323. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Dar-es-Salaam 323. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Dar-es-Salaam Source Washington, September 8, 1961, 10:42 p.m. 177. Ref London's 1007. 1 If feasible Consulate General should transmit following message to Kaunda: “President Kennedy has asked me to let you know that he has received your message and regrets to hear of the loss of life resulting from the recent violence in Northern Rhodesia. It is his hope that law and order can be restored in such a way as to be mutually advantageous to all concerned. As you are aware, Assistant Secretary of State G. Mennen Williams has recently visited Northern Rhodesia, and the President will be particularly interested in receiving a full report from him.” 2 Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745C.00/9-861. Confidential; Priority; Verbatim Text. Drafted by Dunham, cleared by Korn, and approved by Wight. Repeated Priority to London and Salisbury. 1 Dated September 8. (Ibid.) 2 Telegram 201 from Dar-es-Salaam, September 16, reported that when Kaunda returned to Dar-es-Salaam on September 15 en route to Northern Rhodesia, the White House message was given to him. (Ibid., 745C.00/9-1661) 324. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 324. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Source Washington, January 11, 1962, 7:56 p.m. 1819. US-UK Talks: Southern Rhodesia. Your 2364. 1 Dept believes there are essential differences between Southern Rhodesia case and case of Portuguese territories. In latter, Administering Authority unwilling recognize its responsibilities under Chapter XI, while UK on contrary, clearly striving carry out its responsibilities. Re argument contained last sentence your reftel that because info re status Southern Rhodesia not submitted to UN we unable judge whether or not territory is self-governing, Dept satisfied that Southern Rhodesia is self-governing. Dept did not propose suggest British that they try avoid vote on draft res by threat withhold cooperation from Committee of 17, merely noted its view this likely in fact be only possibility preventing vote. Dept agrees there would be advantages from our standpoint for Committee on Info, rather than Committee of 17, consider question Southern Rhodesia's status, but does not agree it would be more logical and doubts Afro-Asians be willing refer question to Committee on Info. Dept notes UK's intention not make its case for self-governing character Southern Rhodesia before Fourth Committee and will seek in US-UK talks convince British wisdom contrary course of action. Present Southern Rhodesian Government making earnest effort promote multi-racial society, outlaw discrimination and substantially increase African participation in government and public affairs. At same time, Federation Rhodesia Nyasaland in midst important constitutional crisis which could result in independent Nyasaland and possibly Southern Rhodesia in year or two. If US Government denies or ignores fact of full internal self-government, position of Southern Rhodesian Government would be undermined, tendency toward disorder in Central Africa would be increased, and US relations with UK and Southern Rhodesian authorities would be complicated. Dept continues believe, therefore, USGADel should vote against resolution, not merely abstain. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745C.00/1-1062. Confidential. Drafted by Simms; cleared by Reis, Kellermann, Deming, Sweeney, and Acly (ODA); and approved by Wallner. Repeated to Salisbury. 1 In telegram 2364 from USUN, January 10, Ambassador Yost reported serious misgivings on the part of the delegation about some aspects of a proposed Department of State position paper on Southern Rhodesia. (Ibid.) 325. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Salisbury 325. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Salisbury Source Washington, March 9, 1962, 5:20 p.m. 716. Embtel 3242. 1 Contel 632, 2 635. 3 Department believes that constitutional proposals for Northern Rhodesia, as modified by Colonial Secretary Maudling's announcement on February 28, offer best basis possible under existing circumstances for peaceful political development. While proposals do not guarantee an African majority in the legislature, they appear to make such majority possible if the African parties make a determined and honest effort to participate in the elections. Although both Kaunda and Welensky have called the proposals unworkable, neither seems eager or prepared to oppose implementation. We regard this as favorable development. At present any alternative to these proposals would be opposed by one side or the other and lead to extra-legal means to safeguard or advance the interests of the aggrieved party. Continued indecision in NR would postpone and complicate efforts to establish stable, representative government in the territory and would make the solution of problems at the federal level increasingly difficult. Possibility of strikes, violence, and use of federal troops would be increased. Unrest could also induce Southern Rhodesian authorities to strengthen security measures and postpone further racial advancements. Department favors orderly, peaceful political evolution toward representative government in all territories of the Federation and believes NR constitutional proposals permit such evolution, perhaps not at pace desired by Kaunda but still with unmistakable forward motion. There is no question that all pressures are in direction early establishment African majority in NR and US hopes Kaunda aware this fact and can exercise necessary statesmanship and patience called for at this critical juncture. Department pleased that Pletcher has already made overtures to Kaunda in above spirit. However, ConGen should now arrange for informal transmission Department views to Kaunda either directly or by Resident Consul expressing our satisfaction his conditional acceptance February 28 constitutional revisions and emphasizing our hope UNIP will participate fully in elections and preparations therefor, drawing on above points as appropriate. FYI. ConGen's estimate that UNIP position may undergo several reexaminations between now and election leads Department to believe clear knowledge US Government views at this time may have some value to Kaunda in dealing with UNIP extremists. End FYI. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745C.00/3-662. Confidential. Drafted by Dunham and Deming on March 8, cleared by Bergesen, and approved by Fredericks. Repeated to London. 1 Dated March 4. (Ibid., 745C.02/3-362) 2 Dated March 5. (Ibid., 745C.02/3-562) 3 Dated March 6. (Ibid., 745C.02/3-662) 326. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Salisbury 326. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Salisbury Source Washington, March 19, 1962, 7:35 p.m. 732. Urtel 659. 1 While Department fully appreciates post's concern over likely reaction of Europeans and Africans re position taken by US at UN on Southern Rhodesia, Department also relies on post interpret as necessary to leaders both groups main elements of US policy which supports advancement democratic principles and practices SR under conditions peaceful change within framework Charter. This general view presented by US Delegate Bingham in speech to Committee of Seventeen on March 16 (copy pouched to Salisbury). You will note from speech there has been no “flip-flop” in US policy on Southern Rhodesia: we favor greater African participation in government, do not express view that SR is non-self-governing and point out it will not help for Cte make concrete and detailed recommendations. Perhaps there some misunderstanding about procedural nature GA resolution which referred SR to Cte of Seventeen. 2 That resolution, which US opposed unsuccessfully on grounds it would not promote desired objectives in SR, referred SR to Cte of Seventeen to determine whether SR has attained full measure of self-government within meaning of Charter and report to next GA. When Cte of Seventeen first met US opposed detailed study individual territories but that view did not prevail. Now we face situation where other members Cte, especially Afro-Asians, are pressing their extreme views. US policy consistently aimed at exerting moderating influence in direction reasonable solution problems before Cte whether or not white settlers and Africans in territories concerned fully realize or appreciate what US trying to do. Ball * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745C.00/3-662. Confidential. Drafted by Deming and Wellons and approved by Tasca. Repeated to London, USUN, and by pouch to Dar-es-Salaam, Nairobi, and Pretoria. 1 Dated March 13. (Ibid., 745C.00/3-1362) 2 For text of Resolution 1745 (XVI), “United Nations Investigation of the Measure of Self-Government Attained by the Territory of Southern Rhodesia,” adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on February 23 by a vote of 57 to 21 (including the United States) with 24 abstentions, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962 , p. 973. 327. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Salisbury 327. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Salisbury Source Washington, April 17, 1962, 11:19 a.m. 811. UNIP President Kenneth Kaunda discussed Northern Rhodesian problems with Department officers April 13. 1 He appealed for U.S. sympathy and political support, stressed that Welensky's threat to use force to preserve Federation should not be underestimated and declared that the present Federation must be dissolved before useful discussions can be held concerning practical relationships among the territories. Although outcome of Northern Rhodesian elections in autumn uncertain, Kaunda confident that UNIP would emerge in better shape than any other party. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745C.00/4-1762. Confidential. Drafted by Dunham on April 16 and approved by Deming. Repeated to London and USUN. 1 A memorandum of conversation is ibid., 611.45C/4-2662. 328. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Battle) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 328. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Battle) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Source Washington, May 7, 1962. SUBJECT Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland The complex racial-political situation in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland is producing strains which could lead to violence and bloodshed if not promptly remedied. The objective of the British Government, which still has ultimate responsibility for the three territories of the Federation, is to bring about rapidly the advancement of the African population and their full political participation in government. The British have declared that there is no future for the Federation if it cannot secure the support of the African majority. The United States supports British objectives while encouraging greater speed in transferring responsibility to the Africans. In Nyasaland the Africans in the Legislative Council already have a majority and, under the leadership of Dr. Hastings Banda, have achieved a wide measure of self-government. Dr. Banda is determined to take Nyasaland out of the Federation though he may be able to continue some economic association. In the protectorate of Northern Rhodesia the British Government has been under extreme pressure from African Nationalists on one side and the white settlers on the other over the preparation of a new constitution. After a year and a half of controversy both sides have reluctantly agreed to a constitution which calls for elections in October that may result in a slim African majority. Kenneth Kaunda, leader of the United Independence Party (UNIP), does not consider the new constitution workable but his party will fully contest the election, nevertheless. Sir Roy Welensky, Federation Prime Minister, has denounced the constitution which he sees as a threat to Federation. Kaunda has recently told us that his real fear is that Welensky will use force or other unconstitutional methods to prevent the Northern Rhodesian elections and that the UK will not come to the defense of the protectorate. We are confident, however, that the British will make every effort short of the use of troops, in their power to prevent any such rash act by Welensky. In Southern Rhodesia, which has by far the largest number of white settlers and which has been virtually self-governing since 1923, the Africans have never been allowed to participate in the government. However, the new constitution worked out in London calls for elections this Fall in which Africans may fill 15 seats of a total of 65 in the Southern Rhodesian legislature. The largest African national party, Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU), under the leadership of Mr. Joshua Nkomo has recently appealed to the United Nations Special Committee of Seventeen for help in securing democratic rights for Southern Rhodesia. The fear of the Africans is that further political evolution in Southern Rhodesia will be frozen once the new constitution goes into effect, unless the UK retains and exercises control over the political destiny of the colony. While the British dispute this, we are inclined to agree with the Africans that the possibility is real. The United States therefore hopes that the UK will continue to exercise its influence in Southern Rhodesia, aimed at increasing African participation in government. It appears to us that the potential for real trouble is greater in Southern Rhodesia than in any other part of the Federation. Prime Minister Whitehead has pressed actively and successfully for removal of racial discrimination and for educational and political advancement at all levels in Southern Rhodesia. In doing so, he may have pushed the white settler electorate about as fast and as far as is politically possible. There is a real danger that if Whitehead takes a too-liberal line, he may be overthrown and a reactionary white group could come to power which could lead to an Algerian type racial stand-off or conflict. The United States recognizes and supports the efforts of the British Government to resolve the complex problems of the Federation by maintaining the present direction and the trend of African advancement in the territories of the Federation, recognizing the difficulties, the hazards, and the injustices which will occur along the way. We also maintain and develop close and friendly contact with the African leadership that will head the Central African states of tomorrow. The attention which the UN Committee of Seventeen is now focusing on this area could, we hope, have a helpful effect, both in convincing the UK and Federation authorities that it's later than they think, and in allaying the fears of Africans that their plight is forgotten. At the same time current consideration in the UN Committee could have a damaging effect. A number of its members including the USSR are pushing for the adoption of resolutions which would call on the UK to abrogate the 1961 constitution for Southern Rhodesia and recommend early independence for both Rhodesias. The United States Delegation is opposing the adoption of any resolution. We fear in particular that passage of an immoderate text would make the UK task of conciliation more difficult, might make Welensky even more extreme, and might reduce the willingness of the UK to cooperate with the UN. Walter Collopy 1 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Rhodesia. No classification marking. Attached to the source text is a transmittal note from Battle to Bundy that reads: “Prior to Governor Williams' departure for Africa, the President asked him to prepare a paper on the Rhodesias. The completed paper is attached.” 1 Collopy signed for Battle above Battle's typed signature. 329. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 329. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Source Washington, June 11, 1962, 7:13 p.m. 3202. Southern Rhodesia. U.K. Ambassador informed Wallner morning June 10 Foreign Office had decided make floor fight in Plenary against inscription of item on Southern Rhodesia and requested U.S. help in vote and in obtaining Latin American support. In latter connection U.K. particularly anxious we seek move at least one major Latin American to negative vote. After discussions with USUN, Secretary agreed U.S. should support British on vote and help them with Latin Americans. (Discussions with USUN indicated Argentina most logical major Latin American which might be moved by discussions in New York to cast negative vote.) 1 Secretary informed U.K. Ambassador afternoon of June 10 of our position. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745C.00/6-1162. Confidential. Drafted by Buffum; cleared in draft by Bergesen, Freeman, MacKnight, and Monsma, and by Rogers; and approved by Wallner. Repeated to London, Salisbury, and Buenos Aires. 1 On June 28, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution 1747 (XVI), “United Nations Request for the Drafting of a New Constitution for Southern Rhodesia,” by a vote of 73 to 1, with 27 abstentions (including the United States). For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 977-978. 330. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 330. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Source Washington, August 17, 1962, 8:56 p.m. 976. Southern Rhodesia. Salisbury's 63 and 64 (rptd info London 19 and 20; USUN 7 and 8). 1 Dept seriously concerned at prospect in 17th UNGA of extremely anti-British debate on Southern Rhodesia and passage highly critical resolution. Heated debate and undesirable resolution could in any case be expected in absence indications UK prepared take some steps carry out June resolution calling for new constitutional endeavors. However, criticism of UK in debate and in probable resolution will, Dept believes, be intensified as result new and more stringent security measures against Africans which SR Govt intends to enact and increased possibility widespread violence, as reported reftels and indicated by recent disturbances and ZAPU threats. Emb requested inform FonOff at appropriately high level and, in your discretion, ColOff above appraisal and inquire whether, subsequent to talks with Cleveland and Williams, UKG has given further thought to measures it might take vis-à-vis SR to head off extreme criticism and drastic res in 17th UNGA. FYI. Emb will recall both Williams and Cleveland came away from London with impression UK possesses more political and legal authority re SR, with considerable room for maneuver, than British have been willing to admit to us or UN. End FYI. Emb should point out that in absence UK action US would find it difficult defend UK's position at 17th UNGA since we opposed inscription SR item in June resumed session largely on grounds that postponing discussion until 17th session would give UK time to exert its influence on SR situation. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745C.00/8-1362. Confidential. Drafted by Parker; cleared by MacKnight, Sanger, Friedman, and Buffum; and approved by Cleveland. Repeated to Salisbury and USUN. 1 Both dated August 13. (Ibid.) 331. Memorandum of Conversation 331. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, September 30, 1962. SUBJECT Southern Rhodesia PARTICIPANTS US The President The Secretary of State Under Secretary Ball Ambassador Bruce UK Lord Home, Foreign Secretary Sir David Ormsby Gore, Ambassador to the US The gist of what Lord Home had to say was that it was impossible for the UK to do anything with regard to Southern Rhodesia until after the elections in March 1963. It was UK policy to push forward with a broad educational program with the hope that it might be possible for the UK to get rid of Southern Rhodesia in five years or so. This was very much the desire of Her Majesty's Government. After the elections Prime Minister Whitehead would undertake some forward-looking projects relating to the enfranchisement of the population. Nothing should be done to make Whitehead's task more difficult, particularly at this time, since the only alternative to Whitehead was apartheid. 1 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745C.00/9-3062. Confidential. Drafted by Tyler, cleared in U, and approved in the White House on October 8. Separate memoranda of conversation were prepared on Cuba and Congo. 1 On September 29, Acting Secretary Ball sent a memorandum to President Kennedy suggesting the President indicate to Lord Home that the United States recognized that Southern Rhodesia was a problem for the United Kingdom and did not propose to tell them what to do about it. Predicting that the United Kingdom would come under attack by the Afro-Asian majority during the U.N. General Assembly session, however, Ball warned that he saw a situation developing where it would be increasingly difficult to support the United Kingdom effectively during the U.N. debates on this issue. He noted that the United States would, of course, do everything possible to avoid embarrassing the British. (Ibid., 745C.00/9-2962) 332. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 332. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Source Washington, October 5, 1962, 5:56 p.m. 1949. For Ambassador from Secretary. Southern Rhodesia. This message reflects some further consideration both in New York and here. Appreciate your delivering it to Lord Home and discussing matter with him. Begin Verbatim Text: Dear Alec: The talk with you at lunch on Sunday about the situation in Southern Rhodesia has given us a better insight into your difficulties there. We fully appreciate the prime importance of Sir Edgar Whitehead's election, and we do not wish to compound your difficulties by offering advice from the sidelines. We do, however, have a common problem facing us almost immediately in the UN General Assembly where the question of Southern Rhodesia will be considered next week. We, of course, want to support you to the extent that this support can be effective and consistent with our own necessities. I understand Adlai Stevenson has outlined to you the sort of statement he thought would alleviate the pressures for a wholly unacceptable resolution. I hope you can give careful consideration to this or some alternative device for coping with what promises to be a very sticky situation in New York. 1 Whether it is possible for the Government in Salisbury to effect an exchange for a removal of the ban on ZAPU in return for a ZAPU pledge of non-violence, or whether the Government can give assurances that the fifteen African members of the legislature would not be overridden by the two-thirds white majority on matters affecting the rights of the Africans are points where your judgment is better than mine. I am quite sure that there are moderate leaders in Africa who want to avoid chaos and violence and who want to move toward a moderate solution, particularly in view of the good record of Britain in the colonial field. We would be glad to consult with Africans privately to try to get them to understand some of the elements which call for more time, if it seems clear things in Southern Rhodesia are moving in a moderate direction. Of course, we will vote against any resolution recommending sanctions. 2 With warm personal regards, Sincerely, Dean Rusk. End Verbatim Text. Ball * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.41/10-562. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Wallner and Mathews; cleared by Little, Swank, and Burdett; and approved by Ball. Repeated to USUN and Salisbury. 1 Lord Home's October 18 response to Secretary Rusk's message noted that any appearance of yielding to U.N. pressure could cost Whitehead and his colleagues the election, and said that the British Government thought it absolutely essential that he win the election. Thus, putting forward the U.S. suggestion about lifting the ban on ZAPU would only arouse resentment. Home noted that the formula suggested by Adlai Stevenson on the question of sovereignty also presented the British with very serious difficulties, since granting independence to Southern Rhodesia could not be a live issue so long as the Federation remained in being. (Letter from Home to Rusk, October 18; ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, UK Official Correspondence with Secretary Rusk) 2 The United States abstained on Resolution 1760 (XVII), “United Nations Request for Suspension of the 1961 Constitution for Southern Rhodesia and the Convening of a Constitutional Conference To Formulate a New Constitution,” which was adopted by the General Assembly on October 31 by a vote of 81 to 2, with 19 abstentions. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 982-983. 333. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 333. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Source Washington, November 29, 1962, 6:11 p.m. 2830. Inform appropriate UK officials that US representatives will wish discuss during December 4-5 African talks possibility of more effective UK and US roles re Southern Rhodesia if Whitehead wins substantial victory in December 14 elections. US believes that in new situation following coming into force of new constitution and elections, UK and US may be able help bridge gap between Whitehead's government and African nationalists. Important element of such effort would be provision increased training opportunities to prepare more Africans for participation in government activities. This should ease way to more expeditious expansion of African participation in government which US considers essential to orderly political progress in Southern Rhodesia and to continuation of at least economic ties between three components of Federation. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745C.00/11-2962. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Mathews on November 23; cleared by Burdett, Sisco, Furnas, and McGhee (in substance); and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Salisbury. 334. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Salisbury 334. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Salisbury Source Washington, November 30, 1962, 6:26 p.m. 308. For Geren from Williams. Department currently reviewing possibilities exerting greater US influence in Southern Rhodesia after December 14 elections. Your comments this regard in contels 193 1 and 199 2 most helpful. To maintain momentum gained from recent talk with Whitehead request you convey to him orally at earliest opportunity my appreciation for his having come to Washington and for his forthright and encouraging exposition GSR intention move toward genuine non-racial government. Assure him, as practical politician I understand his need for sizable majority in new legislature to contain reactionaries and to move forward with liberal program. I hope he is successful in forthcoming elections. At same time, reiterate my concern that Whitehead timetable for increasing African participation in government still seems too slow and could be speeded up without jeopardizing good government and high standards in Southern Rhodesia. Report reactions soonest. 3 Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745C.00/11-1062. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Dunham on November 21; cleared by Knox, Burdett, Furnas, and McGhee (in substance); and approved by Williams. Repeated to London. 1 Dated November 5. (Ibid., 745C.00/11-562) 2 Dated November 10. (Ibid., 745C.00/11-1062) 3 In telegram 309 to Salisbury, November 30, Williams instructed Consul General Paul Geren to arrange an interview with a representative of the ZAPU leadership as soon as possible after seeing Whitehead in order to attempt to ascertain the conditions under which African nationalists could be induced to seek their goals within the framework of the new constitution and to ask what U.S. and British roles they realistically envisaged. Geren was told to stress the confidential character of his approach and to mention the U.S. view that the new constitution offered new challenges and new opportunities for the African nationalist leadership. (Ibid., 745C.00/11-3062) 335. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 335. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Source Washington, January 7, 1963, 4:06 p.m. 3518. Southern Rhodesian situation following December elections 1 causing Department serious concern in view probable adverse impact on long range U.S., UK and Western interests. Moreover, probability early consideration Southern Rhodesia Question at UN by Committee of 24 prompts urgent reassessment U.S. position and tactics. Dept requests Embassy (a) inform HMG at high level extent U.S. concern, (b) obtain comprehensive and authoritative UK assessment post-election situation in Southern Rhodesia and (c) provide indication how UK plans deal with it with particular emphasis on SYG's good offices and stance UK will take on Southern Rhodesia item when next raised at UN. 2 Ball * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745C.00/1-763. Confidential. Drafted by Mulcahy on January 4; cleared by Goldstein, Wallner, and Chapin; and approved by Mac-Knight. Repeated to Salisbury and USUN. 1 Prime Minister Sir Edgar Whitehead was voted out of office in the December 14 election, which was won by Winston Field's Rhodesian Front party. 2 On January 9, Ambassador Bruce responded that the Minister for Central African Affairs, R.A. Butler, would most likely want to postpone a comprehensive assessment and discussion of the U.K. stance in the United Nations until after he completed his forthcoming visit to Central Africa. (Telegram 2555 from London, January 9; Department of State, Central Files, 745C.00/1-963) 336. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Brubeck) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 336. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Brubeck) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Source Washington, January 28, 1963. SUBJECT Constitutional Advance in Nyasaland Recent reports suggest that Nyasaland will emerge as an independ-ent nation within a year to a year and a half. Although it is now a British protectorate and one of the three constituent territories of the semi-autonomous Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the groundwork has been laid for rapid constitutional advance this year. On November 23, 1962, the British Government announced agreement to grant self-government to Nyasaland early in 1963. On December 19, 1962, the British Government announced acceptance of the principle of the secession of Nyasaland from the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Our Resident Consul in Nyasaland has reported that on January 30, 1963, Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda is expected to become Prime Minister and that simultaneously most, if not all, of the forms of self-government are to be introduced into the territory. Banda has told our Resident Consul that secession would be accomplished during the summer of 1963 and that he had no desire to delay the attainment of full independence from the United Kingdom. The problems of Nyasaland are great and will continue for decades. Most of the population engages in subsistence agriculture; schools and hospitals are few; the population of nearly three million is relatively dense and steadily growing. Nevertheless, the new African political leadership, headed by Dr. Banda, has resolutely tackled the problems and appears to enjoy the overwhelming and enthusiastic support of the people. United States operations in Nyasaland are moving forward in accompaniment with the constitutional advance. We are planning to raise the level and capacity of our consular representation in the territory while continuing our modest, but effective, information program. Our AID program, long in the planning stage, is now entering the implementation stage. Obligations in FY 1962 amounted to around $2 million; obligations in FY 1963 and FY 1964 are expected to continue at approximately the same level. Finally, the arrival on January 15 of about 40 Peace Corps Volunteers doubled the number of secondary school teachers in Nyasaland. Partly as a result of our operations and partly as a result of the influence of Dr. Banda, the United States enjoys a favorable reputation in Nyasaland. Howard Furnas 1 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745C.00/1-2863. Confidential. Cleared by Lennon, MacKnight, Fredericks, Dunham, and Conroy (AID). 1 Printed from a copy that indicates Furnas signed the original above Brubeck's typed signature. 337. Telegram From the Consulate General in Salisbury to the Department of State 337. Telegram From the Consulate General in Salisbury to the Department of State Source Salisbury, February 20, 1963, 4 p.m. 441. From Williams. In hour and quarter frank conversation February 18 Prime Minister Winston Field emphasized he seeks period of peace and prosperity which is attainable if “others leave us alone.” Tanganyika is chief present interference and training ground for SR saboteurs. By implication US and UN also interfere. Field stressed increased employment as chief need, claiming predecessor government neglected this type development. Field does not believe Africans would be interested in politics if they were spared influence of politician-agitators. He reminded us he gets on well with Dr. Banda and expects do likewise with Kaunda. [2 lines of source text not declassified]However, Field wants them to have right to their party and DuPont, Minister of Law who was present, has prepared legislation for this purpose. Their plan is to deal with African Nationalists not by banning parties but by arresting and trying their leaders if and when laws are transgressed. When I asked what he thought of possibility of wider African participation and representation in political process he said he would support present constitution though he had opposed it at time of adoption on grounds complicated franchise. Of Republic South Africa Field said, “Though we disagree with them, we have strong economic relations with them (with trade balance favorable SA which SR will reduce) and they do not interfere.” Field repeated reports that “State Department representatives in FE markets (?) 1 were encouraging customers for Rhodesian tobacco to believe SR not a reliable source supply since whites would like to leave in view African Nationalism.” DuPont with air injury produced copy letter of young Americans working University College behalf World Council Churches as example Americans giving false information SR. Field regrets break-up Federation which now seems to him inevitable. He will do his part toward new association if such possible. 2 Geren * Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL RHOD & NYAS. Confidential. Repeated to London, USUN, Lusaka, Blantyre, Lourenco Marques, Paris, Bonn, Rome, Pretoria, Leopoldville, Elisabethville, Dar-es-Salaam, Nairobi, Kampala, and Luanda. 1 As on the source text. 2 Assistant Secretary Williams also met with Federation Prime Minister Roy Welensky and with four ZAPU leaders while he was in Salisbury. (Telegram 444 from Salisbury, February 20, and telegram 451 from Salisbury, February 22; Department of State, Central Files, POL RHOD & NYAS) 338. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 338. Paper Prepared in the Department of State Source Washington, April 6, 1963. SUBJECT Situation Report on Southern Rhodesia Demise of the Federation To meet the demands of Messrs. Kenneth Kaunda and Harry Nkumbula, who control the Northern Rhodesian coalition government, Mr. R. A. Butler, as Minister for Central African Affairs, announced in London on March 29 that any member of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland had the right to secede from the Federation. As all three territorial governments are now in the hands of parties opposed to the continuance of the Federation and as Nyasaland's right to secede had been conceded in December, this was the actual death knell of the Federation. The British hoped by this decision to clear the atmosphere for talks in June aimed at finding some alternative form of association acceptable to all three territories. Independence for Southern Rhodesia This development was followed on April 1 by a demand from the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, Mr. Winston J. Field, that HMG now state in principle that Southern Rhodesia has the right to achieve independence at a date no later than the secession of either of the other two territories from the Federation or the granting of independence to the other two territories. He set HMG's agreement to this proposition as a pre-condition for Southern Rhodesia's participation in any talks regarding the future of the Central African territories. The British cabinet held an emergency meeting on April 1 and had subsequent discussions on this problem. To date, however, it has not made known its decision. Mr. Iain MacLeod told Governor Stevenson in London this week that he did not think HMG would agree to Southern Rhodesian independence at this time. If independence is not granted, however, there is a possibility that the Southern Rhodesian Government may decide to declare independence unilaterally. Sir Roger Stevens has told officers of our Embassy in London that a unilateral declaration of independence by Southern Rhodesia could be prevented only by force and that HMG would find it impossible to use force. UN Aspects The Southern Rhodesian question has also been under debate in the Committee of 24 at the UN. The British have agreed to receive a sub-committee of the Committee of 24 in London in about a fortnight, but it is unlikely that they will be able to reassure the sub-committee fully regarding the ability of the UK Government to control the course of developments in Southern Rhodesia. The British have informed us that, subject to appropriate timing and to the still withheld consent of Prime Minister Field, they would agree to a visit to London and Salisbury by U Thant later in the year pursuant to a General Assembly resolution empowering the Secretary General to use his good offices in the Southern Rhodesian issue. The Indian Delegation at New York has informed us of a commitment by the UN Afro-Asian group to Mr. Joshua Nkomo, leader of the nationalist movement in Southern Rhodesia, to place the Southern Rhodesian question on the agenda of the Special Session of the General Assembly in May if Mr. Nkomo were arrested on his return to Southern Rhodesia. On April 1 Mr. Nkomo was sentenced to six months at hard labor with three months of the sentence suspended on condition that he not be found guilty of further offenses against the stringent security legislation of the Colony for three years. Mr. Nkomo's appeal seems unlikely to be successful and it is now virtually certain that the Southern Rhodesian question will come before the General Assembly next month. British Attitude The British share essentially the same objectives as the United States in Southern Rhodesia. From a narrow national interest point of view they would probably prefer to get out as quickly as possible. However, as in the case of other dependent territories, they are showing a marked sense of responsibility and making persistent endeavors to work out pragmatically arrangements acceptable to the various elements concerned. Mr. Harold Wilson, Leader of the Labour Party, paid high tribute to Mr. Butler's handling of this difficult situation in a conversation with a Department officer during his recent visit to Washington. HMG is fully aware of the explosiveness and the intricacies of the Rhodesian situation. It is aware also, through representations made at all levels, of US nervousness over the problem and of our views as to how it should be handled. We have recognized that this is essentially a British problem and sought to extend what assistance we could in the UN. Loss of British control of the situation could, of course, entail wide repercussions on our policy objectives in Africa as a whole. Implications If the British succeed in the short term in deflecting the Southern Rhodesian Government from its demand for the right to independence at an early date it is possible that: 1. The Southern Rhodesian question may be inscribed on the agenda of the special UNGA session in May. 2. There would be a continually heightened interest by the Afro-Asian Bloc in expediting a settlement of the problem. 3. There would be a gradual increase of nationalist agitation within the Colony accompanied by a resort to arson, sabotage and the use of explosives. If the British concede Mr. Field's present demand or if Southern Rhodesia declares its independence unilaterally it is possible that: 1. There would be a move by the Afro-Asian Bloc to refer the question to the Security Council. 2. The African nationalists would form a government-in-exile in Tanganyika. 3. The US and UK would face difficult decisions regarding their positions on the question at the UN. 4. The likelihood would increase of the formation of a white-controlled bloc of states in Southern Africa. 5. The US would be obliged to reassess its small-scale AID program as well as its communications requirements and intelligence operations in Southern Rhodesia. 6. There would be a sharp increase in nationalist agitation. * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Rhodesia. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the source text. Attached to a memorandum from Brubeck to McGeorge Bundy that reads: “There is attached a situation report regarding developments in Southern Rhodesia. It is suggested that you may wish to bring the report to the attention of the President.” 339. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole 339. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole Source Washington, April 16, 1963. Dear Reverend Sithole : Your letter to President Kennedy 1 which was left at the American Embassy at London on April 8 has been received in Washington, where it has been carefully studied. The views which you expressed were of great interest to our Government. The President has asked me to acknowledge your letter. The developments in the Southern Rhodesian situation during the past several months have been followed with great interest and concern by my colleagues in the United States Government as well as by our delegation at the United Nations where, as you know, we are presently participating in the discussions of the Southern Rhodesian question by the Committee of 24. In the forum we have had an opportunity to express the United States outlook on the difficulties and complexities facing all the people of Southern Rhodesia. In that Committee our representative has made known our support for what the British spokesman described as his Government's wish to see established in Southern Rhodesia “a political climate favorable to liberal and orderly constitutional development” and his Government's readiness to give what help it can consistent with their constitutional relationship with Southern Rhodesia. We have expressed our hope that the new government of the Colony will not adopt an adamant and uncompromising manner and that violence will not be resorted to by any of the parties concerned. The United States has made known its awareness of the complex nature of the internal problems of Southern Rhodesia as well as its belief that the tides of official and political change, like the tides of the ocean, cannot be halted. Speaking officially for the United States, our representative, Mr. Sidney R. Yates, on March 25, 1963 told the Committee that it was understandable that there would be vehement objection to a system which apparently froze political control in a privileged few by means of unrealistic voting barriers euphemistically designated as “qualifications”. On this occasion, as during a previous debate last October, the US representative summarized the hopes of the United States for Southern Rhodesia in the following words: “We believe the people of Southern Rhodesia should be given the opportunity for self-determination—of development of a government deriving its just powers from the consent of the governed—all the governed. We would hope and expect to see changes in the Constitution which would provide for a realistic liberalization of the franchise looking to universal adult suffrage. “Secondly, we would hope and expect to see steps provided for to break down patterns of racial discrimination, to permit the development of a society which would permit each man to exercise his talents to the fullest, free from the imposition of any racial barriers. “Thirdly, we would hope and expect that such self-determination would bring the establishment of peaceful and advantageous relations between Southern Rhodesia and its neighbors in Africa, an association founded on the freely-given support of the majority of the people concerned.” On the same occasion Mr. Yates took note of previous public assurances by the British spokesman in the Fourth Committee late last year that any future change in the relationship between Southern Rhodesia and the United Kingdom could not come about through unilateral action. The United Kingdom has consistently maintained that Southern Rhodesia is neither sovereign nor independent and has asserted its ultimate international responsibility for Southern Rhodesia. Our spokesman, Mr. Yates, stated emphatically that “for our part we do not believe that independence should be granted to Southern Rhodesia until a more satisfactory situation has been achieved within the territory”. On behalf of the United States he urged the United Kingdom “to apply its special influence, regardless of what its legal authority may be, towards the rapid broadening of the franchise and the rapid elimination of racial discrimination.” He pointed out, furthermore, that the United Kingdom has a fine record of cooperation with the United Nations and with the Secretary General. He expressed his confidence that it would embellish that record in the case of Southern Rhodesia. You may rest assured that the grave problems of Southern Rhodesia are being followed by my Government with intense concern. Within recent weeks, as you may know, I have had the opportunity of examining personally many facets of the situation both in Salisbury and in London. Governor Stevenson has also been taking a great personal interest in this pressing problem. All of us will continue to do so in the hope that the leaders of Southern Rhodesian opinion will appreciate the heavy responsibility which history is placing upon their behavior and their decisions. It is particularly hoped that the situation in Southern Rhodesia will not be allowed to deteriorate for lack of contacts between the leaders of all elements of the population. We consider it essential that a continuing dialogue be maintained and that all parties would avoid regrettable precipitate action while there is yet hope that a solution satisfactory to all may yet be achieved. Thank you again for keeping my Government informed of your thoughts. Sincerely yours, G. Mennen Williams 2 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD & NYAS/UN. No classification marking. Drafted by Mulcahy. The source text bears a typed notation that reads: “Original copy handed to Sithole by G. Mennen Williams 4/16/63.” Reverend Sithole was a prominent African nationalist. 1 Sithole's April 8 letter noted that the danger that Southern Rhodesia would face when granted independence under the white minority government had considerably increased due to the latest demands voiced by Field and Welensky. He warned that if independence were granted, it would mean that a situation where 250,000 whites would brutally dominate 3,800,000 Africans had been finally decided upon. He asked the U.S. Government to condemn publicly any attempt to grant independence before the present constitution was amended so that every adult person had the right to vote, and to caution the British Government regarding the bitter consequences of such a step. (Telegram 3917 from London, April 8; ibid., POL 16 RHOD & NYAS) 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 340. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk 340. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk Source Washington, June 15, 1963. SUBJECT Southern Rhodesian UN Resolution 1 1. It is submitted that no real purpose is served voting against subject resolution and a great deal of damage would be done by such a vote. As a matter of fact the best way to help the UK as well as the US is to abstain. Therefore, it is recommended that the US abstain. 2. A negative vote serves no real purpose. a. It will in no way change the outcome of the voting. b. At this point it is not going to accomplish the hoped for moderation in Afro-Asian parliamentary tactics. Our vote is not sought for, and a negative vote will neither chasten nor instruct. c. The British would not be seriously hurt, or hurt at all, as indicated by their original request we abstain. See USUNNY 4503. 3. A negative vote would seriously damage the US. a. Long after our statements would be forgotten, and in some areas they wouldn't even be heard, a negative vote would be understood in Africa to indicate the US was less than sympathetic to African aspirations for majority rule. Our friendly vote on Angola in 1961 still redounds to our credit and our last negative vote on Rhodesia still haunts. Perhaps this isn't logical but this is the way it is. b. An anti-black African vote, and this is the way a negative vote here would inevitably be interpreted, will not ease our serious domestic civil rights situation. More and more African self-determination and Negro equality in the US are linked together. 4. If we want to help the British, and in this case they certainly seem deserving of our help, we can do so only in so far as we can influence African nationalists. The British have far more influence with white Southern Rhodesians than have we assuming we have any influence at all. A negative vote here will certainly diminish severely our ability to influence African nationals and thereby the British. * Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD/UN. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the source text. 1 On June 20, by a vote of 19 to 0 with 4 abstentions (including the United States), the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (the Committee of 24) adopted a draft resolution deploring the fact that the United Kingdom had ignored the General Assembly's resolutions on the question, stating that this had created an “explosive situation” in Southern Rhodesia, and calling upon the United Kingdom to abrogate the 1961 Constitution and hold a new constitutional conference. 341. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ghana 341. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ghana Source Washington, August 29, 1963, 7:49 p.m. 146. Ref: Accra's 160 and 163. 1 Southern Rhodesia. In its discretion Accra may confirm to GOG that US does not believe Security Council meeting now on Southern Rhodesia is necessary or useful. FYI: We have stated to UK that we would abstain if sufficient abstentions available prevent adoption Southern Rhodesian item. This would require Norwegian and Brazilian abstentions which by no means assured. End FYI. Presumably October date referred to by GOG (Accra's 160) pertains to October 15 beginning of transfer of powers pursuant to decision Victoria Falls Conference. However we see SC meeting as likely exacerbate situation in critical intervening period and contribute to intransigence Field Government. More productive course for GOG might be quiet exertion its influence in Commonwealth context. If queried USUN authorized take above line. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD & NYAS/UN. Confidential. Drafted by Hennes; cleared by Friedman (in draft), Buffum, and Strong; and approved by Gardner. Also sent to USUN and repeated to London and Salisbury. 1 Telegrams 160 and 163 from Accra, August 29, reported that the Government of Ghana would be very unhappy if the United States opposed Security Council consideration of the Southern Rhodesian question. (Ibid.) 342. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 342. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Source Washington, September 6, 1963, 8:19 p.m. 650. Southern Rhodesia. At initiative Ghana, and with general endorsement African group, Security Council will begin debate on issue Southern Rhodesia morning September 9. We expect Ghana will attempt to establish that continuation of situation in Southern Rhodesia likely endanger international peace and security and that British plans for dissolution Federation Rhodesia and Nyasaland will result in transfer in near future of effective power (including substantial armed forces) to present white minority Government Southern Rhodesia. British, on other hand, expected contend situation outside competence SC and that any action by Council at this time will make it much more difficult to achieve satisfactory solution. US has followed situation in Southern Rhodesia carefully and maintains sizable staff in Salisbury. We feel, therefore, we are in good position arrive at independent evaluation of direction and speed of evolution situation in Southern Rhodesia. We believe this summer's Victoria Falls Conference dealing with procedures for transfer Federation powers to its Southern Rhodesian, Northern Rhodesian and Nyasaland elements was generally successful. Subsequent course events supports this evaluation. For example, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland expected become independent next year under black African governments. Foregoing does not mean US underestimates complexity of dissolution problem nor particular difficulties in Southern Rhodesia. Although we believe British intentions and record good, we have consistently pressed UK not to grant Southern Rhodesia independence on basis present constitution and we believe UK doing much to assure satisfactory outcome. US has reached conclusion that any Security Council resolution on question Southern Rhodesia likely be unhelpful in view extreme complexity situation. While Ghana has insisted on this meeting and has corralled substantial nominal African support, private indications are that many African Governments recognize SC consideration now untimely and not helpful in getting solution of problem. For Caracas : Ambassador should seek urgent appointment with President or with Foreign Minister if Betancourt unavailable. Ambassador should indicate our intention to abstain on type resolutions we expect to be put forward in Council and strongly urge Venezuelan Government to take similar position to assure through abstention defeat of any resolution. In his discretion, Ambassador may also state we recognize that Venezuela may have considered its freedom of action has been restricted in recent Security Council deliberations because of Sosa Rodriguez candidacy as GA president. However, this element no longer need be considered because our estimate shows no other candidate in field, no other opponent could be successfully mounted at this point, and Sosa's election foregone conclusion. For London : We have informed Greenhill here of US decision support UK in Caracas, in Oslo as followup to UK efforts, and with Brazilian delegate in New York. You should also urge HMG to take lead especially in Oslo. For Oslo : You should inform Foreign Office immediately at appropriately high level of foregoing US analysis Southern Rhodesian situation and urge as a followup to UK demarche, that Norwegians join UK, US, and others in steering outcome proceedings so that no resolution adopted. This would require abstention by Norway. For USUN : Confirming Cleveland-Yost telecon you should present foregoing analysis to Bernardes (Brazil) and inform him US supports UK position mobilize abstentions against Southern Rhodesian resolution, seeking his advice as to whether there is anything we might usefully do in Rio to help obtain similar position on part GOB. You should also inform Sosa of our demarche in Caracas. 1 Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD & NYAS/UN. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Sisco, Buffum, and Hennes; cleared by Burdett, Williams, Monsma, and Judd; and approved by Cleveland. Also sent to Caracas, London, and Oslo and repeated to Accra, Manila, Paris, Rabat, Rio de Janeiro, Taipei, and Salisbury. 1 On September 11, Ghana, Morocco, and the Philippines submitted a draft resolution on Southern Rhodesia to the Security Council which “invited” the United Kingdom not to transfer powers or attributes of sovereignty nor armed forces or aircraft to Southern Rhodesia “as at present governed.” The resolution also asked the United Kingdom to implement previous General Assembly resolutions on the question. (U.N. Doc. S/5425/Rev. 1) On September 13, the resolution was vetoed by the United Kingdom in an 8 to 1 vote, on which the the United States and France abstained. 343. Memorandum of Conversation 343. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, September 18, 1963, 2 p.m. SUBJECT Southern Rhodesia PARTICIPANTS Sir David Ormsby Gore, British Ambassador The Secretary William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Mr. Thomas M. Judd, EUR/BNA The Secretary asked Ambassador Ormsby Gore if there was any resentment in London because the U.S. had not joined the UK in vetoing the Security Council resolution on Southern Rhodesia. The Ambassador said that on the contrary, London was most grateful for the support received from the U.S. There was some annoyance with the Norwegians. The Secretary said he was sorry that we couldn't get the required number of abstentions. We had worked hard on this. Ambassador Ormsby Gore again expressed thanks for U.S. effort. Mr. Tyler said that Mr. Greenhill had on a previous occasion passed to him an expression of British gratitude for the U.S. effort. * Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD & NYAS. Confidential. Drafted by Judd and approved in S on September 24. The conversation took place in the Secretary's office. 344. Memorandum of Conversation 344. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, October 8, 1963, 10:30 a.m. The President Sir Roy Welensky In response to a question from the President Sir Roy opened the conversation with a lengthy rehearsal of his well known views on the situation in Southern Rhodesia—the need for gradualism, the rights of the whites as long term inhabitants, multiracialism, etc. The President asked Sir Roy's estimate of the practical possibility of multiracialism in Africa. Welensky conceded that there will be an eventual black majority but reiterated the case for gradualism. He said the whites are fighting for time now and will use violence to defend their basic interests. He expressed some discouragement and said he doesn't see what the next step will be in light of black African intransigence. In response to another question from the President Welensky said that there will be no closer links between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa and that Verwoerd had “repudiated” Southern Rhodesia as already too liberal for South African cooperation. He believes that South Africa will continue down its present road until the sheer impact of reality reveals such serious trouble as to make change unavoidable. However, he argued that there would be some Zulu support for the SAG in event of attack from the north. When the President pressed him with regard to specific steps on the Southern Rhodesian problem Welensky expressed the hope that the United States will pressure the British to propose a constitutional settlement. He will urge Butler, in his forthcoming talks in London, to put to Prime Minister Field a proposal for independence coupled to concessions to the black Africans—primarily the blocking third and reform of the Land Apportionment Act. He insisted the British must take the lead in proposing terms for a settlement. When the President asked what would happen if no such settlement could be reached, Welensky said with conviction that it is unthinkable not to find a solution and that the British role and leadership are crucial. He added that his American trip is really only a “facade” for his talks with Butler. On African problems more generally Welensky suggested that big power cooperation in stabilizing commodity prices (he mentioned copper) would be a more practical help to Africa than conventional foreign aid. The President pointed out that the tide of African nationalism is so strong that as a practical matter we can only try to moderate and influence, not stop it. He suggested that many of the problems are pragmatic rather than moral. Welensky charged that the Congo has regressed seventy years since independence and declared that in spite of his own prior feelings, he feels that in the present situation the UN must stay in the Congo to avoid anarchy. In response to a question by the President, Welensky observed that he does not think Communism is appealing to most Africans but that their disposition to non-alignment is to some degree a Communist victory in that it denies the West full access to Africa. WB * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Rhodesia. Confidential. Drafted by Brubeck. A notation on the source text indicates that a copy was sent to the Department of State. The conversation was held at the White House. 345. Telegram From the Department of State to the Resident Consul in Blantyre, Malawi 345. Telegram From the Department of State to the Resident Consul in Blantyre, Malawi Source Washington, October 17, 1963, 7:20 p.m. 10. Banda-President talk 1 covered important subjects also raised with other officials. Banda expressed appreciation to President for moral and financial assistance. AID projects singled out for praise. PM hoped for help for western lake shore highway and Shire River Scheme. President expressed desire to help but raised budgetary problems and could not be too encouraging. Banda countered contention made by Welensky in Washington that Nyasaland not economically viable. Stated that development of rich agricultural potential and local processing would achieve viability. Fight against poverty, ignorance, disease required massive economic development, particularly in agricultural field. Banda expressed concern Bloc activity Dar. Also expressed concern that US and UK not making proper contact with Mozambique nationalists and liberal white Portuguese. In other conversations raised his wish for rail link Vila Cabral as alternate route to ocean. Expressed belief he could get along with Portuguese. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 RHOD & NYAS. Confidential. Drafted by DuPont on October 16, cleared by Looram and McKesson, and approved by Coote. Repeated to Dar-es-Salaam, Salisbury, Lusaka (by pouch), and Lourenco Marques. 1 The October 10 discussion is recorded in a memorandum of conversation ibid. 346. Memorandum of Conversation 346. Memorandum of Conversation Source London, December 19, 1963, 9:30 a.m. US/MC/10 PARTICIPANTS United States The Secretary of State Assistant Secretary Tyler Oscar V. Armstrong, American Embassy, London United Kingdom Duncan Sandys, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and the Colonies Sir Saville Garner, Permanent Under-Secretary, Commonwealth Relations Office Sir Hilton Poynton, Permanent Under-Secretary, Colonial Office N. B. J. Huijsman, Principal Private Secretary to Mr. Sandys SUBJECT Southern Rhodesia Mr. Sandys said that the British have made it clear that independ-ence would not be granted on the basis of the present franchise. The situation has now reached a point of deadlock. The Southern Rhodesian Government will not go as far as the Afro-Asian countries want, and these countries probably recognize that some compromise is necessary. The Government is in a relatively strong position: one-tenth of the population is white; they have their own European forces; the police force is African but loyal to the Government. In response to the Secretary's question, Mr. Sandys said that he doubts that the Southern Rhodesian Government will unilaterally declare its independence. There are three possibilities: (1) a solution acceptable to all (2) an illegal declaration of independence (3) Southern Rhodesia's dropping its demand for early independence. The Southern Rhodesians are probably aware of the serious effects of an illegal declaration of independence. Moreover, what would they get out of it? They now pass their own laws, have their own military forces, conduct some of their external relations. They could not get into the United Nations or the Commonwealth; their ability to obtain loans would be wrecked. Since they would be on the “wrong side of the law,” they would be exposing themselves to military attacks from outside. The Southern Rhodesians may continue their clamor for independence, but probably won't go through with it. It is not clear how long such a situation would last, but short of a solution acceptable to all, it may be the best answer. Sandys said he had been trying to obtain Commonwealth assistance in finding a solution. Canada, Australia, Nigeria, and Tanganyika have agreed to meet jointly with the British and Southern Rhodesians. Field, however, rejects this idea, although he says he is willing to have private informal talks with some Commonwealth countries, presumably on a bilateral basis. The Secretary asked if the British have publicly stated they would not grant independence on the basis of the present franchise. Sandys said they had, and referred to his recent speech in Parliament. (He later read excerpts from this speech.) The Secretary commented that we had the impression that African countries are taking a more moderate stand on the subject than a year ago. Mr. Sandys agreed, but said he hoped the U.S. would help “take the heat out of the subject,” particularly by using our influence at the UN. 1 The Secretary noted that several months ago he had asked Ambassador Ormsby-Gore if the U.S. could privately tell the Africans that the British had assured us that independence would not be granted on the basis of the present electoral franchise. The Ambassador had demurred at the time. Mr. Sandys said that he thought that what he and the Prime Minister have said on this point (for example, his speech in Parliament) adds up to a fairly clear expression of the British position, but the British might be able to make a more precise statement if the U.S. thinks it would be helpful. * Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential. Drafted by Armstrong on December 19 and approved on December 26. The source text is labeled “Part II of III.” The conversation took place in Sandys' office at the Commonwealth Relations Office. 1 On October 14, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1883 (XVIII), “Question of Southern Rhodesia,” by a vote of 90 to 2, with 13 abstentions (including the United States). The United Kingdom did not participate in the voting. The text of Resolution 1883 was substantially the same as that of the draft Security Council resolution vetoed by the United Kingdom on September 13. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 719-720. Portuguese Africa Portuguese Africa 347. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Washington, March 1, 1961, 8:30 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 753N.00/3-161. Confidential; Priority; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Sisco, cleared in substance by Kohler and Penfield and Dumont in draft, and approved by Cleveland. Repeated to Monrovia and Lisbon. 348. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal Washington, April 23, 1961, 3:55 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 753N.00/4-2361. Secret. Drafted by Brown and Beigel on April 22; cleared by Fredericks, Collopy, and Kohler; and approved by Rusk. 349. Letter From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, May 23, 1961. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Angola, 1/61-6/61. Secret; Eyes Only. 350. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) Washington, June 18, 1961. Source: Department of State,INR/IL Historical Files. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. The source text is attached to a June 19 memorandum from Johnson to Rusk stating that he had discussed the Secretary's June 18 memorandum on CIA support of Holden Roberto with Williams, who had said that he felt he had not yet been able to present the full AF point of view regarding this matter to Rusk and had asked for an opportunity to do so. 351. Memorandum From Samuel H. Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, June 29, 1961. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Angola, 1/61-6/61. Secret. 352. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) Washington, July 17, 1961. Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files. Top Secret. 353. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy Washington, August 31, 1961. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Angola, 8/61-12/61. Secret. The source text bears the following notation (presumably in Bundy's hand): “Noted. Discussed with Pres.” 354. Memorandum From Samuel E. Belk of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Washington, September 14, 1961. Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Portugal, Security. Secret. The “From” line on the source text shows Rostow's initials (WWR) crossed out and “S.B.,” pre-sumably Samuel Belk, inserted by hand. A question mark appears alongside in the margin. A memorandum from Belk to Dungan, January 9, 1962 (Document 356), confirms that Belk wrote a memorandum to President Kennedy on Portuguese Africa in September 1961. 355. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of the Congo Washington, October 5, 1961, 7:30 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 753N.00/10-561. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Wight on October 2; cleared by Vance, Wellborn, Brown, Brubeck, and Ferguson; and approved by Johnson. Repeated to Lisbon. 356. Memorandum From Samuel E. Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Dungan) Washington, January 9, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Africa. Secret. 357. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State for President Kennedy Washington, January 25, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Portugal, General, 12/1/61-1/31/62. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the source text. An attached transmittal note from Battle to Kaysen reads: “As agreed in your conversation with Mr. Ball, attached is the proposed Department of State position on the Angola Resolution.” A handwritten notation on the note reads: “cleared cable 1/26/62. 6:30 pm”; see footnote 2 below. 358. Department of State Policy Directive Washington, March 15, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Portuguese Africa. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. On March 2, the NSC Standing Group discussed and agreed in general with this Policy Directive. (Record of Actions; Department of State,S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Standing Group—March 2, 1962) 359. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Battle) to the Bureau of African Affairs and the Bureau of European Affairs Washington, May 4, 1962. Source: Department of State, AF/AFC Files: Lot 65 D 189, Lisbon Talks. Secret. A copy was sent to the Bureau of International Organization Affairs. 360. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, October 23, 1962. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770.00/10-2362. Secret. Drafted by Mathews on October 19. Copies were sent to Ball, McGhee, and the Bureau of European Affairs. 361. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 24, 1962, 4:45 p.m. Source: Department of State, President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. Confidential. Drafted by Tyler and approved in the White House on October 29. 362. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Washington, December 8, 1962, 7:53 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 753N.00/12-862. Confidential. Drafted by White; cleared by Stone, Fredericks, Sisco, and Buffum; and approved by Cleveland. Repeated to Lisbon and by pouch to Luanda and Lourenco Marques. 363. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the Portuguese Ambassador (Noguiero) Washington, April 4, 1963. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 10 PORT/UN. Unclassified. Drafted by Hartman and approved in U on April 5. 364. Memorandum From the Chief of the Africa Division, Central Intelligence Agency (Tweedy) to Director of Central Intelligence McCone Washington, May 13, 1963. 365. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of the Congo Washington, July 1, 1963, 6:28 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 US-AFR. Secret. Drafted by High, cleared by Starrs, and approved by Whitehouse. Repeated to Lisbon, USUN, Paris for Cleveland, and Luanda. 366. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy Washington, July 10, 1963. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 10 PORT/UN. Confidential. Drafted by Oakley and Sisco and cleared by Cleveland, Burdett, Meeker, Williams, and Kitchen. 367. Memorandum for the Record Washington, July 18, 1963, 4:30 p.m. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Meetings with the President, 5/63-7/63. Secret. Drafted by Brubeck. The meeting was held at the White House. 368. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Washington, July 19, 1963, 6:44 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 10 PORT/UN. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Cleveland and Sisco on July 18; cleared by Yost, Williams, Chayes, Burdett, McGeorge Bundy, and McKesson; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Lisbon, London, Paris, Oslo, Rio de Janeiro, Caracas, Manila, Accra, Rabat, Lagos, Taipei, Dar-es-Salaam, Pretoria, Leopoldville, Tunis, Monrovia, and Tananarive. 369. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, July 25, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Portuguese Africa. Secret. 370. Memorandum for the Record Washington, July 30, 1963, 11 a.m. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Portugal, General. Secret. Drafted by Brubeck. 371. Memorandum for the Record Washington, September 9, 1963, 11:30 a.m. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Portugal, General. Secret. Drafted by Brubeck. 372. Research Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, November 5, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Portuguese Africa. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. 373. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, November 7, 1963, 4 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL AFR-PORT. Confidential. Drafted by Meloy and approved by the White House on November 18 and in U on November 20. The conversation was held at the White House. 347. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 347. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Source Washington, March 1, 1961, 8:30 p.m. 1577. Re Angola. In view fact that Liberians insist on going ahead on SC meeting on Angola, 1 and fact they have requested US as President of SC to initiate consultations with other members re timing meeting, believe we have no alternative but to acquiesce in consideration this matter by Council. Believe US should go along with whatever consensus may be re timing of Council meeting. Re question of inscription, our present assumption is that we would vote affirmatively. In order to seek make Council consideration of this matter more manageable and minimize possible adverse effects, Dept giving urgent consideration possible courses of action which might be suggested to Liberians in particular so that US efforts with Portuguese to get them to liberalize their policies will not be seriously jeopardized. 2 Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 753N.00/3-161. Confidential; Priority; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Sisco, cleared in substance by Kohler and Penfield and Dumont in draft, and approved by Cleveland. Repeated to Monrovia and Lisbon. 1 On February 4, several hundred Angolan nationalists attacked a Portuguese police station in Luanda, with heavy losses on both sides. On February 20, Liberia formally requested the U.N. Security Council to take up the situation in Angola. On March 14, the United States voted in favor of a draft Security Council resolution urging Portugal to introduce reforms in Angola for the purpose of permitting the Angolan people to exercise the right of self-determination, and calling for a U.N. subcommittee to report on conditions in Angola. The draft resolution failed of adoption by a vote of 5 to 0, with 6 abstentions (including the United Kingdom and France). 2 On March 2, Ambassador C. Burke Elbrick reported from Lisbon that he regretted that the United States was considering an affirmative vote on the Liberian proposal. He noted that such a vote would produce an immediate anti-U.S. reaction in Portugal and would also jeopardize any chance of effectively persuading the government to take further liberalizing steps in Angola. (Telegram 549 from Lisbon; Department of State, Central Files, 753N.00/3-261) 348. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal 348. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal Source Washington, April 23, 1961, 3:55 p.m. 621. For Ambassador from the Secretary. I have read Portuguese presentation to NAC this week and I have also received intelligence reports on developments in Angola. There is great concern here that Portuguese repression in Angola is even bloodier than has come to light. I am concerned that when details of true situation in Angola inevitably come to public attention this will greatly exacerbate situation for Portugal and for its friends in the world. We plan to discuss the situation privately with French and British and also to take it up in NAC. In meantime at your discretion you might inform Portuguese officials of our concern and of approach we plan for NAC. Could also be pointed out that GOP has not responded to our March 7 presentation, details of which could be repeated. 1 We are also fearful that unless steps are taken and bloodshed stopped Soviets may develop increasing inclination send arms to Africa for distribution to Angolan underground. This will inevitably lead to increasingly brutal and widespread Portuguese retaliation. Tempo such developments may tend increase in Angola and that if measures are not taken very soon there may be little chance for orderly change to come about in that territory. In discussing our concern with Portuguese officials you should indicate I hope also have serious talk with Mathias at forthcoming NATO meeting at Oslo. 2 Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 753N.00/4-2361. Secret. Drafted by Brown and Beigel on April 22; cleared by Fredericks, Collopy, and Kohler; and approved by Rusk. 1 Telegram 471 to Lisbon, March 4. (Ibid., 753N.00/3-461) 2 On April 25, Ambassador Elbrick reported that he had expressed the Secretary's concern regarding Angolan developments to Secretary-General Norton De Mattos, who had told him that the Portuguese military was now in control of the situation. (Telegram 795 from Lisbon; ibid., 753N.00/4-2461) 349. Letter From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 349. Letter From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Source Washington, May 23, 1961. Dear MAC : We are sending guidance today to Tom Finletter on how to handle the Angola item at tomorrow's meeting of the North Atlantic Council (Polto 1590). I am enclosing a copy of the Department's response. 1 Regarding the background of this issue, it is true that the Union des Populations d'Angola (UPA) was involved in the recent terrorism and that the Agency has been giving Holden Roberto, the leader of the UPA, financial assistance for some years. The Department first learned of this connection last March when the Agency raised with the Department the question as to whether it would be in the U.S. interest to support the UPA itself. On March 22, the Department responded to the Agency to the effect that we would be prepared to consider a proposal from the Agency regarding possible support to the UPA if such support could be developed on a completely non-attributable basis. The Department added that we would like to have a full background sketch of Roberto as well as information on the UPA, its mission, present sources of support, etcetera. In response to this the Agency sent us a biographic sketch of Roberto [ 1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified ]. Pertinent portions of this information are enclosed. 2 After further discussions between Department representatives and representatives of the Agency, it was decided that it was not necessary for the Agency to advance Roberto any funds in addition to the “subsistence” funds he has been receiving. As for the matter of continuing contacts with Roberto, which in the past have been largely conducted by the Agency's station in Leopoldville, the Department sent out an instruction on 10 May, which I enclose for your information. 3 Sincerely, Roger * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Angola, 1/61-6/61. Secret; Eyes Only. 1 Polto 1590 from Paris, May 9, is not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 753N.00/5-961) On May 23, the Department of State instructed the U.S. Representative to the NAC to state, if the Portuguese Representative raised the issue, that the U.S. Government had not provided support or aid to Angolan terrorists, although such aid might have been provided by private U.S. groups with no U.S. Government connections. He was also instructed to say that Holden Roberto had a U.S. visa because he was not regarded as inadmissible, and to point out that it was traditional U.S. practice not to refuse interviews with political oppositionists when they requested them. (Topol 1649 to Paris; ibid., 753N.00/5-2361) 2 Not printed. 3 Telegram 2162 to Leopoldville, May 10, instructed U.S. Embassy officials not to initiate further contacts with Roberto unless otherwise instructed. If he requested an interview, however, he should be seen as it was U.S. practice not to refuse such interviews when asked. (Department of State, Central Files, 753N.00/5-461) 350. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) 350. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) Source Washington, June 18, 1961. We must take immediate steps to cut off any relationship with Holden Roberto which would interfere with or discredit an official denial that the US Government is giving aid and support to the terrorists in Angola. This would mean, as a minimum, two steps: (1) to stop any regular monthly payments from any official agency to Roberto; (2) to cease direct contacts between him and any members of our Embassy staff in Leopoldville. I am not suggesting any attempt to interrupt any aid which the American Committee for Africa might give him as a private matter. Nor do I exclude the possibility of discreet and indirect bribes for specific information. I do exclude assistance with arms or any funds which could purchase arms. I recognize certain risks but the present arrangement is not sufficient to overcome such risks but is enough to involve the US Government in the charge that we are supporting terrorism aimed at men, women and children in Angola. As a matter of utterly fundamental policy, a country like the United States must use its influence to moderate oppressive regimes on the one side and terrorist movements on the other. We cannot do the former unless our hands are clean with respect to the latter. Nor can the Secretary of State or the President be put in the position of lying on such matters; the answer is not that we two need not just be informed; there are too many situations where such activities can be surfaced and the lie be proved. I leave it to my colleagues to find the operational answers on this one, but I expect them to be found promptly. Dean Rusk 1 * Source: Department of State,INR/IL Historical Files. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. The source text is attached to a June 19 memorandum from Johnson to Rusk stating that he had discussed the Secretary's June 18 memorandum on CIA support of Holden Roberto with Williams, who had said that he felt he had not yet been able to present the full AF point of view regarding this matter to Rusk and had asked for an opportunity to do so. 1 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 351. Memorandum From Samuel H. Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 351. Memorandum From Samuel H. Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Source Washington, June 29, 1961. SUBJECT Angola With only one more meeting of the Angola task force 1 presently scheduled, the Defense Department has submitted a Military Annex which invalidates a large portion of the work already done. The major problem the task force now has before it is to define clearly the difference between the view of the State Department and the Defense Department with respect to the Azores base. State feels strongly that we must maintain our posture as a champion of self-determination in Africa as set forth in our position on the Angolan problem in the UN. They see the continuance of this policy as absolutely necessary if the U.S. is to have good relations with the Afro-Asian and many other Free World states. They feel that the U.S. and its allies must press Portugal strongly to undertake adequate reforms in its African territories now. They believe quite correctly that the time may come when, because of this policy, the Portuguese may withdraw from NATO and/or demand that the U.S. evacuate the Azores base. State's view is that if and when this situation arises, the U.S. must be prepared to abandon the base and/or see Portugal withdraw from NATO in the interest of larger and more important considerations. According to the Military Annex, Defense is concerned lest “precipitant and overly aggressive implementation of the policy produce reactions on the part of Portugal and, possibly, Spain which would result in an unacceptable reduction of U.S. capabilities to support required military missions to Berlin, Western Europe, and the Middle East and Africa.” The Military Annex states further: “It is the view of the DOD that retention of U.S. military facilities in the Azores and Spain is vital to our ability to execute required military missions under wartime and emergency conditions. Accordingly, courses of action which would gravely jeopardize retention of the Azores and bases in Spain would be unacceptable from a military point of view for the foreseeable future.” In the present draft of the task force paper, the extent of the DOD's belief in this view is reflected in a caveat over all the recommendations for action which states, “Keeping in mind the sensitivity of base rights problems and our NATO relationships and their essentiality to U.S. national security, we will, where appropriate” take certain actions. Faced with this dilemma, Governor Williams is meeting tomorrow with Chester Bowles, Alexis Johnson, Foy Kohler, and others to map future strategy. Following that meeting, Williams now has in mind meeting with you or Walt and, finally, he plans to have a meeting with his counterparts in Defense. All these meetings notwithstanding, I do not believe he will get Defense to alter its view at this stage. Williams does not plan to see the President at this time. Since the President may have to spend considerable time on this problem later, you may wish to forego discussing the subject with him at this time. 2 Sam * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Angola, 1/61-6/61. Secret. 1 The Presidential Task Force on Portuguese Territories in Africa, consisting of representatives from the White House, the Departments of State and the Treasury, the Bureau of the Budget, the CIA, the ICA, and the USIA, was formed to review the situation in Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea. The Task Force, which was chaired by Assistant Secretary Williams, held its first meeting on June 15. Copies of its final report, July 12, and additional documentation are ibid., Angola, Presidential Task Force on Portuguese Territories, and Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Standing Group. 2 NSAM No. 60, “U.S. Actions in Relation to Portuguese Territories in Africa,” July 18, in which President Kennedy approved recommendations for action based on the Task Force report, is scheduled for publication in the Portugal compilation in volume XII. 352. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) 352. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) Source Washington, July 17, 1961. SUBJECT Holden Roberto REFERENCE Attached Memorandum of July 11, from Joe Scott on Foregoing Subject 1 The arrangements suggested by the Agency are satisfactory on the understanding that: 1. Efforts will be continued to locate an individual or institution willing to assume on a strictly private basis the current payments. 2. Any payments made [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]to Roberto will be intermittent, through a secure, non-official cutout, in return for specific information and under no circumstances in a magnitude to permit the purchase of arms or otherwise materially supporting terrorism in Angola. 2 * Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files. Top Secret. 1 Attached is a July 11 memorandum to Hilsman from INR Deputy Director for Coordination Joseph W. Scott transmitting a [text not declassified] memorandum reporting no success in securing a private source of funds for Roberto. Scott noted that since the Secretary had not excluded the possiblility of indirect payments for specific information, they might consider whether these could be substituted for the regular monthly payments. 2 A handwritten notation on the source text initialed by Johnson reads: “[text not declassified]given gist of above 7/18/61 by phone. Text of points 1 & 2 forwarded by Keppand memo dated 7/18/61.” 353. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy 353. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy Source Washington, August 31, 1961. SUBJECT Portuguese Use of U.S. Military Equipment in Angola In response to your memorandum of August 21 1 in which you asked whether we could successfully persuade the Portuguese not to use U.S. military equipment in their African territories, whether this requirement would have an adverse effect upon our use of the Azores base, and whether a public statement on the matter would be sufficient, the Secretaries of State and Defense have sent memoranda containing their views (attached). 2 The essence of the two memoranda follows. Of the approximately $300 million worth of U.S. equipment made available to Portugal under MAP, some has admittedly been diverted to Portuguese military forces in Angola without U.S. consent, contrary to our bilateral MDA agreement. Embassy Lisbon reports that no MAP weapons or ammunition were among materiel shipped to Angola, but mainly vehicles approaching obsolescence. The Departments of State, Defense and Commerce are now following a restrictive arms policy by: (1) Making sales of U.S. materiel and granting commercial export licenses for materiel on the Munitions List only to fill actual needs of Portuguese NATO forces remaining in Europe. (2) Screening previously issued and still valid licenses authorizing export of Munitions-List articles either to Portugal or Portuguese overseas territories to consider possible desirability of suspending or revoking those licenses. (3) Holding in suspense all other applications or Portuguese requests, pending future developments. The Portuguese were informed of this restrictive policy on August 16, and the reaction was expectedly bitter. 3 The Portuguese Foreign Minister informed our Ambassador that it was not a question of arms supply since they have alternate sources, including the Communist bloc, but the important fact was the hostile attitude of an ally in the face of the crisis confronting Portugal. The Foreign Minister said Portugal's national interest was paramount, and that the Portuguese would have no interest in a U.S. victory over the USSR if this meant that Portugal itself would be lost. In view of the Portuguese reaction, the Secretary of State feels that a public statement at this time would only further infuriate them. If inquiry is made, the Department is prepared to state that “the U.S. Government is currently reviewing the whole question of the supply of military equipment for Portuguese overseas territories and in the meantime such shipments have been suspended.” The Secretary of Defense feels that “for the immediate future, the success of our efforts to restrain the Portuguese from the use of U.S. materiel already in Angola is indeed problematical"… and that “a quiet, persistent, but unpublicized campaign appealing to the Portuguese understanding of our position might in time be successful. The critical military importance of our rights and continued use of our facilities in the Azores, and of securing extension of our rights in negotiations which must be undertaken in 1962, are such that any further public pressure on the Portuguese regarding the use of U.S. military materiel in Angola should be avoided.” The Secretary of State feels that Portuguese reaction to our restrictive arms policy and our over-all policy with respect to Portugal's overseas territories makes the outlook for the successful extension of the Azores base agreement less hopeful. My own feeling is that the departments are adequately following through on this problem for the time being. We will keep close watch on it from here and keep you informed of any new developments. We shall wish, at any rate, to bring you fully up to date on the over-all problem of Portugal and its African territories before the new Portuguese Ambassador presents his credentials. McGeorge Bundy 4 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Angola, 8/61-12/61. Secret. The source text bears the following notation (presumably in Bundy's hand): “Noted. Discussed with Pres.” 1 President Kennedy's memorandum (NSAM No. 77) reads: “I understand that we have cautioned the Portuguese government against the use of American equipment in Angola. I also understand that a recent story in a London newspaper reported the finding of a ‘Made in America' mark on part of a bomb dropped on an Angolan village. This is going to present problems to us both in Angola and in Portugal. Have we considered (1) whether we can be successful in persuading the Portuguese of this, or (2) whether this will have an adverse effect upon use of the Azores base. I wonder if we should perhaps content ourselves with a public statement in regard to the matter.” (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 77) 2 Attached to the source text but not printed. 3 Ambassador Elbrick described the reaction of Portuguese Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira to his demarche in telegram 240 from Lisbon, August 16. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Angola, 8/61-12/61) 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 354. Memorandum From Samuel E. Belk of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy 354. Memorandum From Samuel E. Belk of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Source Washington, September 14, 1961. SUBJECT Your Meeting with the New Portuguese Ambassador Pedro Pereira You are now scheduled to receive the new ambassador's credentials at 1200 on Friday (September 15). The State Department has sent you very thorough briefing papers, but you should be aware of several additional points which are outlined below. The signs are that our relations with the Portuguese are going to be very difficult in the forthcoming period. They apparently intend to pull out all the stops in an attempt to bring about a turn-around in our policies toward Portugal and its African territories. The accounts of Pereira's first meetings with the Secretary of State are far from encouraging. Pereira continued to expound the rigid Salazar line of equating Communism and African nationalism. Moreover, we doubt seriously that the much-touted reforms in the African territories will be far-reaching enough or carried out fast enough to allow the Portuguese to remain in Africa without extensive and continuing use of military force. In addition, a group of Portuguese businessmen—“The Overseas Companies of Portugal"—have awarded the public relations firm Selvage and Lee a contract of a million dollars “to place the affairs of Portugal and Angola in a true and proper perspective” in the United States. $500 thousand of this amount is to be spent over the first twelve-month period. In addition, we expect that the Angolan item will be inscribed almost immediately on the agenda of the General Assembly which opens on September 19, either by the Africans or the bloc. There is every reason to believe that Portugal will be more sharply denounced than ever before. You also should know that, on the same day the General Assembly opens, the National Broadcasting Company is showing a one-half hour television film on Angola which is strongly anti-Portuguese. It is necessary that you know this because there reportedly are jeeps and napalm bombs shown in the film which might well be of U.S. origin. As State and Defense reported to you earlier, the U.S. sometime ago instituted a system of control of arms to Portugal, but we have never announced this publicly. In this connection, there is strong feeling in town that the U.S. should make a public statement to the effect that the U.S. will henceforth refuse to make available any arms to Portugal that are to be used in the African territories. A statement of this kind was made by the UK on June 27 in Parliament. As you may recall, when you approved the recommendations of the Angola Task Force, paragraph 12 read as follows: “Implement the foregoing quietly [italics provided] 1 insofar as possible and in a manner designed to bring about basic and far-reaching reforms in Portuguese colonial policy, and to minimize the possibility of losing the Azores, recognizing the grave military consequences which would attend such a loss.” The arrival of a new, probably very active ambassador, the expected activities of the public relations firm, the U.N. debates and the NBC film, suggest that we may have to be more outspoken than we have been in the past, especially with regard to the use of U.S. arms in Africa. This is one point we think you should stress. * Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Portugal, Security. Secret. The “From” line on the source text shows Rostow's initials (WWR) crossed out and “S.B.,” pre-sumably Samuel Belk, inserted by hand. A question mark appears alongside in the margin. A memorandum from Belk to Dungan, January 9, 1962 ( Document 356 ), confirms that Belk wrote a memorandum to President Kennedy on Portuguese Africa in September 1961. 1 Brackets in the source text. 355. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of the Congo 355. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of the Congo Source Washington, October 5, 1961, 7:30 p.m. 579. Eyes Only for the Ambassador. Personal for Ambs Gullion and Elbrick. Dept increasingly concerned by number of reports from intelligence sources indicating that Holden Roberto leader UPA is at the end of his rope and seriously in danger of losing control of Angolan Nationalist Movement to more radical elements who are unfriendly to West. CIA reports that the MPIA organization is moving into Leopoldville and that they are being supported by Gizenga elements, with intention of throwing out Roberto. Dept considers Roberto genuine non-Communist nationalist and believes his continued control of Angolan nationalist movement in our best interests. Roberto who believes Adoula friendly to him has sought assistance from Adoula and Mobutu but no aid has been forthcoming. Roberto feels that unless he can show results soon, he may be overthrown. Dept hopes Roberto's position can be strengthened in case some accommodation should be reached between UPA and MPLA. Therefore suggest Embassy make discreet approach to Adoula indicating reports we have had of MPLA moving into Leopoldville and attempting to bring arms into Leopoldville from Stanleyville. We believe that MPLA takeover of Angolan nationalist movement would not be in Adoula's interest. Dept considers it would be helpful to Roberto and Adoula if latter informed US regards Roberto as the leader of the genuine Angolan Nationalist Movement. Unless you perceive objection Dept requests approach be made on above lines, pointing out to Adoula need for extreme secrecy in order to avoid word of our approach getting back to Portuguese authorities. Pre-sumably Adoula may wish to inform Mobutu of our approach. 1 Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 753N.00/10-561. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Wight on October 2; cleared by Vance, Wellborn, Brown, Brubeck, and Ferguson; and approved by Johnson. Repeated to Lisbon. 1 On October 10, Ambassador Gullion discussed Holden Roberto with Adoula, emphasizing the obvious delicacy of the matter, since Portugal was an old and valued U.S. ally, but noting the United States considered Roberto a more bona fide nationalist than his Communist opposition. (Telegram 965 from Leopoldville, October 12; ibid., 753N.00/10-1261) On the same day, Ambassador Elbrick warned the Department of State that expressing U.S. support for Roberto would be a delicate and highly dangerous matter. He noted that if the Portuguese found out, it would confirm their suspicions that the United States was planning (or at best acquiescing in) the destruction of the Portuguese regime at home as well as in its overseas territories in order to curry favor with the Africans. (Telegram 454 from Lisbon; ibid., 753N.00/10-1061) 356. Memorandum From Samuel E. Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Dungan) 356. Memorandum From Samuel E. Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Dungan) Source Washington, January 9, 1962. SUBJECT Portuguese Africa With the end of Portuguese rule in Goa, Diu and Damao and the annexation of Fort Ajuda in August by Dahomey, the image of Portugal in Africa has been severely damaged. Although until recently regarded by the Angolans, Mozambiques and the Portuguese Guineans as a hard and invincible overlord, Portugal will now be regarded as vulnerable; as a nation rapidly in decline. The activities of the insurgents almost certainly will be stepped up, and there is abundant reason to believe their activities will be more successful this year than last. First, Tanganyika is now independent and Nyerere will be willing to provide safe haven for guerrillas operating in Mozambique—the first time that this will be possible. You may recall that we expected an explosion in Mozambique during the Angolan disturbances last summer; one reason it didn't occur was that Mozambique was surrounded by totally unsympathetic neighbors—the two Rhodesias, South Africa and the then U.K. trust territory of Tanganyika. Second, if we ever achieve a situation in the Congo even bordering on calm, the Congolese will most certainly aid and encourage the Angolan insurgents operating from and living in the Congo. This has been the insurgents base for mounting their operations in Angola. It should be a more effective one in the future. Third, there are now considerably more trained Angolan guerrilla fighters than there were a year ago. Training has continued in the Congo. Training has taken place in Tunisia and Algeria and possibly in Guinea and Ghana. Holden Roberto—the most promising leader among the Angolan nationalists—told the State people last month that active guerrilla operations would soon be resumed inside Angola. The rainy season has only just begun and, according to Roberto, “the elephant grass is not yet high enough and there is need for more arms.” The rainy season is ideal for guerrilla warfare in Angola because the roads—which are vital to the Portuguese—are impassable and the guerrillas can operate from the bush. The New York Times has reported that Roberto, while in New York, said his movement would accept humanitarian support from any country, but went on to emphasize that direct military aid would be accepted only from African countries. There is no doubt in my mind that the arms can and will be acquired in ever-increasing amounts. I point all of this out because I think that the Portuguese colonies possibly will present one of the toughest problems in all of Africa. We should plan constantly, utilizing the best brains in town, in order to make sure that we are in the strongest possible position if and when great trouble comes. The Angola Task Force was a small forward step, but its conclusions and recommendations need to be reexamined, up-dated and fortified if the demands of U.S. policy in the forth-coming period are to be met. Ever since the Task Force exercise, I have felt that a small group of carefully chosen high-level people could accomplish more than by any other means. The group should be chaired by someone like George Ball, Alexis Johnson or someone from the White House. I think this is the next step we should take. The best man at State on this problem is Olcott Deming. Ken Hansen also has a strong background on the problem and played a vigorous role during the Task Force exercise. I have attached a memorandum to the President which I wrote in September 1 that might be of immediate interest. State is now engaged in preparing for me a detailed report on the activities of the Selvage and Lee public relations firm. I will shoot it to you as soon as it arrives. I suggest that you keep the folder I have enclosed. 2 It contains the essential materials on the Angolan problem. Samuel E. Belk 3 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Africa. Secret. 1 Presumably September 14, 1961; see Document 354 . 2 Not attached to the source text. 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 357. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State for President Kennedy 357. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State for President Kennedy Source Washington, January 25, 1962. SUBJECT United States Position on Angola in the United Nations General Assembly A draft resolution on Angola, sponsored by a group of forty-two Afro-Asians, was introduced in the General Assembly on January 23 (text attached as Tab A). 1 It will probably come to a vote early next week. The draft goes somewhat beyond earlier General Assembly resolutions on Angola, but is essentially moderate in that it neither condemns Portugal nor suggests sanctions. To this extent it represents a victory for the more reasonable members of the Afro-Asian group. However, there are several elements in the resolution which we would prefer to see revised. In view of the overwhelming support for the draft, our ability to influence the text is limited, and we are confining our efforts to seeking elimination or modification of paragraphs 6 and 7. Details on the changes we are requesting are contained in the attached instruction which has been transmitted to USUN (Tab B). 2 We have also weighed carefully whether the United States should vote affirmatively on the resolution even if our minimal changes are not accepted. There are a number of important factors involved. We have to take into account that the moderates among the Afro-Asians have sought to keep the resolution moderate with a view to getting our affirmative vote. We need to encourage them to continue such efforts in the future. We also believe it is important that we maintain what has come to be regarded as a significant forward movement by your Administration on colonial questions. A key factor is our relations with Portugal. While an affirmative vote by the United States would come as no surprise to the Portuguese, it is clear that the substance of the resolution goes beyond the position which we informed the Portuguese we were adopting in the United Nations. It is not possible to assess with precision the extent of the adverse effects of an affirmative vote on the various facets of our relations with Portugal, specifically: the retention of our Azores base rights, Portuguese participation in NATO, and Portuguese membership in the United Nations. On balance, our best judgment inclines toward the view that Portugal will not make our affirmative vote an immediately decisive factor of retaliation on the Azores question, though the cumulative effect of all of our votes on the Angola question, will undoubtedly be taken fully into account by the Portuguese at such time as US-Portuguese negotiations are begun. This point has been discussed informally with Bill Bundy (Defense Department) who shares a similar assessment. Governor Stevenson favors an affirmative vote on the resolution. There is no doubt that an abstention on the resolution would be widely regarded as a retreat from the position adopted by your Administration last spring. In light of the foregoing considerations, I have sent out instructions to Ambassador Stevenson which authorizes an affirmative vote on the resolution as a whole, even if our minimal changes are not accepted. In addition, Ambassador Stevenson would make an interpretive statement regarding the resolution which would put on record our reservations regarding certain provisions in the draft. * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Portugal, General, 12/1/61-1/31/62. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the source text. An attached transmittal note from Battle to Kaysen reads: “As agreed in your conversation with Mr. Ball, attached is the proposed Department of State position on the Angola Resolution.” A handwritten notation on the note reads: “cleared cable 1/26/62. 6:30 pm”; see footnote 2 below. 1 Not attached to the source text. For text of Resolution 1742 (XVI), “The Situation in Angola,” which was adopted by the General Assembly on January 30 by a vote of 99 (including the United States) to 2 with 1 abstention, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962 pp. 949-950. 2 Not attached to the source text. Presumably reference is to telegram 1959 to USUN, January 26. (Department of State, Central Files, 753N.00/1-2662) 358. Department of State Policy Directive 358. Department of State Policy Directive Source Washington, March 15, 1962. PD/AF-1.1 SUBJECT Angola REFERENCE Presidential Task Force on Portuguese Territories in Africa OBJECTIVES In their relations with officials of Portugal, the United Nations, the North Atlantic Council and interested governments, every effort will be made to achieve the following: I. Reform in Angola A. Tasks 1. Establishment of a program of reform within the framework of eventual self-determination which is acceptable to the Africans, or which at a minimum reduces the struggle in Angola from military to political means. 2. Encouragement of the Portuguese to recognize the positive and legitimate interest of the United Nations in the Angolan and Portuguese African questions. B. Proposed Actions 1. Continue to urge Portugal to move toward a prompt implementation of a significant reform program and to extend a degree of cooperation to the UN. Such approaches are to be made through normal diplomatic channels, although as a measure designed to point out the gravity with which we view the crisis in Portuguese Africa, we remain alive to the possibility of sending a special Presidential envoy to Lisbon to talk with Salazar. 2. Consult appropriately with Great Britain and France, and urge them to make similar bilateral approaches. We consider as other possible intercessors Spain, Brazil and/or the Vatican. 3. Consider the utilization at an appropriate time of the North Atlantic Council as a means of impressing upon Portugal the importance attached by its NATO allies to the need for a major change in its colonial policy. 4. As the questions of Angola and Portuguese Africa arise at the UN, press for moderate and constructive measures aimed at providing for orderly transition toward eventual full self-determination in the territory. II. Objectives re African States A. Tasks 1. Understanding and support within the world community, particularly among the newly independent African states, for the U.S. position. In so doing, disassociate ourselves equally from programs seeking extremist solutions to the Angolan problem and from any suggestion of support for Portuguese colonialism. B. Proposed Actions 1. Make all possible efforts to insure that MAP equipment supplied to Portugal, or other U.S. military material, is not diverted to Africa and is not employed for other than NATO purposes. 2. Continue to deny authorization of licenses for the commercial export of arms from the U.S. to either side. 3. As appropriate, advise select African governments on a continuing basis of our diplomatic and other efforts to bring about an equitable and mutually beneficial solution to the Angolan problem. This is to be accomplished through the briefing of African leaders by our UN delegation at New York, and through normal diplomatic channels. III. Economic and Educational Assistance A. Tasks 1. Induce Portugal through offers of economic assistance to accelerate movement toward effective and significant territorial reform. 2. Direct educational and relief assistance to qualified Angolans abroad. B. Proposed Actions 1. Offer to provide U.S. economic assistance, primarily in the form of manpower training, to help develop technical and administrative skills of the Africans within Angola. In this connection, the U.S. has offered Portugal economic assistance in the magnitude of $3 million this year and $5 million next year to supplement its own program of economic and social reform. Although the initial Portuguese reaction was adverse, we are still prepared, if they subsequently show some interest in the offer, to send technical experts to Lisbon to negotiate mutually acceptable programs in the field of education and work out necessary details. 2. Should the Portuguese prove receptive to this offer and at the same time demonstratively liberalize their colonial policy, we should grant reasonable requests for other types of economic assistance in accordance with existing commitments and monies available. In addition, we should seek assistance from the UK, NATO countries, possibly Brazil and other African countries as well as from Portugal itself. 3. Continue and expand if necessary U.S. assistance to refugees suffering from the Angolan conflict. 4. Provide and augment as necessary US supported educational programs for qualified Angolan students both in the United States and in Leopoldville. IV. Azores A. Task 1. Retention of Azores base rights. B. Proposed Action 1. Implement the foregoing quietly insofar as possible and in a manner designed to minimize the possibility of losing Azores base rights. [Here follows a list of actions to be undertaken by the posts in Lisbon, London, Paris, Madrid, Rio de Janeiro, Rome, Leopoldville, Dar-es-Salaam, Salisbury, and Luanda and USRO and USUN.] * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Portuguese Africa. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. On March 2, the NSC Standing Group discussed and agreed in general with this Policy Directive. (Record of Actions; Department of State,S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Standing Group—March 2, 1962) 359. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Battle) to the Bureau of African Affairs and the Bureau of European Affairs 359. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Battle) to the Bureau of African Affairs and the Bureau of European Affairs Source Washington, May 4, 1962. For your information, the following is an excerpt from a Memorandum of Conversation between the President and Ambassador Adlai Stevenson on May 2: The Azores . The President said that in the nature of things the two issues—Azores and Angola—cannot be separated because Portugal will not permit them to be separated. The Ambassador said that, since the Azores were important not only to American security but to NATO as a whole, he felt that more of an effort should be made to seek the cooperation of the NATO countries, as well as Brazil, in bringing pressure on Portugal. He reported that he had talked to Macmillan along these lines, that Macmillan had said that Britain would be glad to cooperate to this end, and that Sir Patrick Dean was ready to do anything he could. The Acheson memorandum was discussed. 1 With regard to Acheson's recommendation that the US not participate in drafting any more resolutions on Angola, the Ambassador said that American participation was essential in order to moderate the resolution; without American participation, any resolution on Angola would be much more extreme. Acheson's recommendation that aid to Angolan nationalists be stopped was not discussed. Action : Schlesinger to get a precise statement of Ambassador Stevenson's views as to how he recommends that we proceed. ESL 2 * Source: Department of State, AF/AFC Files: Lot 65 D 189, Lisbon Talks. Secret. A copy was sent to the Bureau of International Organization Affairs. 1 The April 25 memorandum, prepared by former Secretary of State Dean Acheson at Secretary Rusk's request, urged that the United States make a determined effort to create a more favorable climate for renewal of the Azores Base Agreement, which was due to expire at the end of 1962. (Kennedy Library, Cleveland Papers, Azores, 4/62-6/62) 2 Deputy Executive Secretary Edward S. Little initialed for Battle above Battle's typed signature. 360. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk 360. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk Source Washington, October 23, 1962. SUBJECT Contact with African Nationalist Leaders The difficulties which we are now having with the leaders of the new Algerian Government must recall to the President's mind with particular force the following sentence in his 1957 Senate speech on Algeria: “Instead of abandoning African nationalism to the anti-Western agitators and Soviet agents who hope to capture its leadership, the United States, a product of political revolution, must redouble its efforts to earn the respect and friendship of nationalist leaders.” There can be little doubt that our current difficulties stem in part from the fact that this Government at the insistence of the French Government for a considerable time cut itself off from anything other than covert contact with the leaders of the Algerian independence movement. Our Algerian experience shows that covert contact is not enough. Nationalist leaders seek overt, public association with us as a means of bolstering their position at home and abroad. If we deny them this support, they are the more grateful for—and the more swayed by—the public backing they receive from the Communists. The recent decision that Holden Roberto should not be received at USUN or the Department has moved me to place before you once again the AF view of the critical importance to long-range U.S. interests of maintaining effective contact with nationalist leaders in the remaining African dependent territories. Whether self-determination or independ-ence is to come early or late to these remaining dependencies, nationalist movements have come into being in each of them. The hopes and beliefs, attitudes and intentions of the adherents of these movements will be influenced by the contacts of their leaders during the formative period. If we cut ourselves off from these leaders, the result can only be, as the President said in 1957, to abandon them to anti-Western agitators and Soviet agents. This may be particularly true with respect to the Angolan nationalist movement. Roberto, the leader of the UPA, has sought to remain aloof from the Communists. The leaders of the other major group, the MPLA, admit to connection with the Communists. By turning our back on Roberto, we may force him to an accommodation with the MPLA and thus ease the way for the expansion of Communist influence throughout the Angolan nationalist movement. Our policy of aloofness may also prevent our acquiring some influence with the MPLA. The newly chosen head of that group, Agostinho Neto, has recently let it be known that he would like to have overt contact with our Embassy in Leopoldville. If we could establish relations with him, we might be able to counteract Communist influence in his group. The Portuguese, of course, tell us that Roberto is a terrorist, and it is true that Roberto's group stimulated the insurrection in northern Angola. It is clear from the record, however, that today's terrorist is tomorrow's statesman, and much as we deplore the use of violence to obtain political ends, we cannot in our own interest refuse to deal with nationalist leaders because they resort to violence. The problem of contact with nationalist leaders has been with us since the beginning of the Republic. With occasional exceptions (e.g. Algeria), we have traditionally kept our doors open to these leaders despite the displeasure of the established authorities. The Administration has until recently adhered to this traditional position, but it now seems to AF that the doors are closing. Thus to deny our heritage in this last stage of the dissolution of the Western colonial empires would, I believe, seriously damage our position in much of the free world. I would like very much to have an opportunity to discuss this difficult problem with you and other interested officers of the Department at your convenience. 1 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770.00/10-2362. Secret. Drafted by Mathews on October 19. Copies were sent to Ball, McGhee, and the Bureau of European Affairs. 1 On November 5, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs George McGhee responded to Williams' memorandum, noting that the Secretary had been preoccupied with Cuba. McGhee stated that he did not believe that Williams should at that time press for review of U.S. contacts with African nationalist leaders and reminded the Assistant Secretary of the importance of the current U.S. negotiations with Portugal, which had given rise to U.S. commitments regarding contacts with Portuguese revolutionary leaders. The Under Secretary argued that Williams should accept those commitments for the time being and not keep raising the subject as AF repeatedly had done. (Memorandum from McGhee to Williams, November 5; ibid., 770.00/11-562) 361. Memorandum of Conversation 361. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, October 24, 1962, 4:45 p.m. SUBJECT U.S.-Portuguese Relations PARTICIPANTS The President Alberto Franco Nogueira, Foreign Minister of Portugal Dr. Pedro Theotónio Pereira, Ambassador of Portugal Ambassador C. Burke Elbrick Assistant Secretary William R. Tyler The President told the Foreign Minister he was glad to see him, and that he welcomed the chance of discussing with him the general state of relations between our two countries. He said he was aware that there were certain differences between us on how to handle various problems, but he hoped that means might be found to draw our two countries closer together again, in the atmosphere of friendship and cooperation which is characteristic of our traditional relationship. The Foreign Minister thanked the President for receiving him and said that he on his part wished to do all that he could to improve relations. He agreed that there were certain differences between us which were in part due to the importance which the United States attaches to the United Nations, and to the role which the United States plays there. He said that Portugal had certain vital national interests in Africa which are under attack and that Portugal was defending not only her own interests but those of the free world. He said that the whole of Africa was unstable politically, and that if things continued as they are now going the African Continent would become Communist. The President pointed out that the broad currents of nationalism in the world, including Africa, were creating new demands and stimulating new aspirations on the part of the peoples of Africa, and that unless farsighted and forward looking policies were adopted to meet these demands, we would run into even greater difficulties and make our tasks harder. He said that it was evident from what had happened to former French, Belgian, and British territories in Africa that these pressures stemmed from the basic desires of the populations and were not due to any external agency. He said that the United States had not played a large role in Africa. However, we were concerned that events should move in direct consistency with the broad and peaceful interests of the free world and hoped that the Portuguese Government would pursue policies which would lead toward the creation and strengthening of free societies. The Foreign Minister repeated at some length the classic Portuguese position with regard to the United Nations, and said that it was a forum for the formulation of extreme, unreasonable, and hostile accusations and demands, which could not be met without creating chaos and paving the way for Communist domination. The President asked the Foreign Minister whether Portugal could not see its way to proclaiming publicly its acceptance of the principle of self-determination. This would constitute an important move forward by Portugal in the direction of protecting and preserving her position and influence in Africa. The Foreign Minister said that Portugal was not opposed to the principle of self-determination, but that it was not possible for her to take a public position on this. Were she to do so, the Afro-Asian members of the United Nations would then call on her to carry out immediately the provisions of the resolutions that had already been voted, calling for the prompt granting of independence to Angola and Mozambique “by the end of this year”. The conversation concluded with the President expressing his hope that ways would be found to reduce the differences between us so that Portugal and the United States could cooperate more closely in the face of the many grave problems facing both countries. * Source: Department of State, President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. Confidential. Drafted by Tyler and approved in the White House on October 29. 362. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 362. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Source Washington, December 8, 1962, 7:53 p.m. 1558. Subject: Angola. We most concerned over reported move introduce Committee 17 draft res on Angola into plenary and believe we should wage major battle to muster blocking third against its passage. 1 This resolution aimed not only at Portugal but also at NATO and U.S. and Dept judges it imperative to make strenuous effort defeat it. We realize that vote in Committee of 17 has made your position most difficult. However, Dept intends circularize all LA Capitals on this question emphasizing reasons why we believe it in their interest oppose resolution. We assume that all NATO delegations, including that of Italy, will line up solidly against res and we are of course prepared to go to any NATO Capital at once should any division develop. You should make it clear that this res totally out of keeping with Salamanca Report on which consideration of Angola question should logically be based. You should also point out that GOP's admission of ILO visiting mission, announcement of reforms, participation in debate, willingness accept rapporteur should call, if not for recognition in resolution, at least for some diminution in its tone and temper. In corridor discussions we believe you should take following line. (1) US position on self-determination for Angola peoples is constant. To advance towards this goal we put heaviest diplomatic pressures on GOP and our efforts met with success: Portugal agreed accept rapporteur. (2) In spite of this forward step, and in spite of new spirit of moderation Portugal has displayed at this GA, some Africans and Asians apparently intend to torpedo this progress by introduction of propagandistic resolution. (3) Resolution factually wrong on following points: (a) reference to mass extermination of indigenous population is fantasy. While Portuguese claims of peace, order and normalcy are undoubtedly overdone, we know from our own reports and assessments that this much nearer to truth than wild charges of mass extermination; (b) no arms being supplied by “certain member states” i.e. US, for Portuguese use in Angola; (c) accusations that GOP denies all rights and freedoms, practices racial discrimination and uses forced labor are at best distortions of truth and, as far as forced labor concerned, explicitly contradicts findings of ILO report. (5) US of opinion Salamanca group did responsible job and we ready support resolution roughly along lines recommended paragraph 227 of report. In particular attention all should be called to para 230 which states that chances of peaceful solution would be greatly enhanced if member states tried convince GOP of need to “face political realities and adjust its policies thereto.” This exactly what US has done and precisely what GOP has taken step toward. Tragedy is that entire effort will go for naught because of penchant of some nations heap more and more abuse on Portugal. Dept aware our drive to defeat resolution could possibly endanger whatever chances remain for success rapporteur initiative. On other hand, you have indicated rapporteur has no chance unless GOP agrees more than one representative and blocking third against extreme res may be what is required to increase GOP flexibility on this point. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 753N.00/12-862. Confidential. Drafted by White; cleared by Stone, Fredericks, Sisco, and Buffum; and approved by Cleveland. Repeated to Lisbon and by pouch to Luanda and Lourenco Marques. 1 The Committee of 17's draft resolution condemned the mass extermination of the population of Angola and Portugal's colonial war; requested all U.N. members to deny Portugal any support which could be used to suppress the Angolan people and to terminate the supply of arms to Portugal; and asked the Security Council to take appropriate measures, including sanctions, to secure Portugal's compliance. On December 18, the General Assembly adopted a resolution very similar to the Committee of 17 resolution by a vote of 54 to 14 (including the United States), with 18 abstentions. For text of Resolution 1819 (XVII), “The Situation in Angola,” see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 954-955. 363. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the Portuguese Ambassador (Noguiero) 363. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the Portuguese Ambassador (Noguiero) Source Washington, April 4, 1963. SUBJECT UN Resolution re Portuguese African Territories Mr. Ball returned the Ambassador's call at 6:10 p.m. after returning from a morning and afternoon session on the Hill. He apologized to the Ambassador for not being able to get back to him earlier. The Ambassador said that he was under instructions to approach the Secretary or Acting Secretary to take up the question of our position on the UN resolution re the Portuguese-African territories. 1 Mr. Ball explained the position that Mr. Yates had taken during the afternoon's discussion in New York. 2 Mr. Ball added that we had felt our position would have been helped if the Portuguese delegation in New York had had advance talks with us on the position that they were going to take. The Ambassador said that he was very disappointed in the position taken by the United States and was sure that his Government would share that view. He wondered why we had apparently changed our position from the strong and determined one we took in the General Assembly last December. Mr. Ball explained that we took an affirmative position only on the matters where we had consistently expressed views in the past. As far as the sanctions were concerned, Mr. Ball said that we were very definite in our opposition. The Ambassador explained that he had hoped that the US, because of its position in the UN—the fact that it sets an example for other nations—could have taken a different position. He said that he considered this quite a setback. Mr. Ball reiterated that quite frankly we could have been more useful in persuading other nations if the Portuguese Government had been a little more forthcoming. In our opinion, the Afro-Asian Bloc had tried to be a little more restrained than they had in the past. After all, all they were suggesting was the reception of a mission to undertake discussions, and it had not seemed to us that the response of the Portuguese Government furnished any opportunity to start conversations in the UN that would be useful. The Ambassador explained that his Government had tried to be helpful but within their interpretation of the true meaning of the Charter. Mr. Ball said that as far as we could interpret the nature of the mission, the Portuguese were contemplating a kind of meeting with neighboring countries which would really be outside the framework of the UN. The Ambassador replied that he had thought that they were working within the UN because the original agreements and understandings would be based on recommendations and procedures of the UN. Mr. Ball concluded by saying once again that greater advance consultation with our delegation in New York should have occurred and that simply handing us a note did not make it easy for us to appreciate the Portuguese Government's intentions. The Ambassador said that he understood and thanked Mr. Ball very much for his call. * Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 10 PORT/UN. Unclassified. Drafted by Hartman and approved in U on April 5. 1 On April 4, the Committee of 24 (formerly the Committee of 17) adopted a draft resolution noting with deep regret and great concern the continued refusal of Portugal to cooperate in implementation of the U.N. resolutions relating to the territories under its administration; noting that Portugal had continued its repressive measures against the indigenous population by the use of military and other forces; and drawing the attention of the Security Council to the present situation with a view to its taking appropriate measures, including sanctions, to secure Portugal's compliance with the relevant resolutions. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 19 to 0, with 5 abstentions (including the United States). 2 U.S. Representative Sidney Yates had stated that because the United States was in sympathy with the attitude reflected in the draft resolution, it would not vote against the text as a whole. However, since the United States also had serious objections to some of the resolution's provisions, it could not vote for the resolution and would abstain. 364. Memorandum From the Chief of the Africa Division, Central Intelligence Agency (Tweedy) to Director of Central Intelligence McCone 364. Memorandum From the Chief of the Africa Division, Central Intelligence Agency (Tweedy) to Director of Central Intelligence McCone Washington, May 13, 1963. [Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files, Job 80 B 01285A. Secret. 2 pages of source text not declassified.] 365. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of the Congo 365. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of the Congo Source Washington, July 1, 1963, 6:28 p.m. 5. Embtel 3198. General instructions contacts with Port African nationalists contained CA-14448, June 24. 1 Gist of instruction: you should not initiate or seek out contacts with these nationalists. If they ask see Embassy officer, should be received by officers other than Ambassador, preferably at Pol Officer level. Since GOP has post at Leo, Port Embassy should be informed after meetings that nationalists seen at their request, but no indication of substance should be given. If nationalists press to see Ambassador and Ambassador believes direct contact by him desirable, he should submit appropriate justification and request prior authorization from Dept. If Embassy officers meet Holden Roberto socially or otherwise, they may of course converse with him. Utmost discretion required in such contacts. These occasions need not be reported to Port Embassy. Ball * Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 US-AFR. Secret. Drafted by High, cleared by Starrs, and approved by Whitehouse. Repeated to Lisbon, USUN, Paris for Cleveland, and Luanda. 1 Airgram CA-14448 to Algiers, Conakry, Dakar, Dar-es-Salaam, Elisabethville, Leopoldville, Rabat, Salisbury, and USUN, June 24. (Ibid.) 366. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy 366. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy Source Washington, July 10, 1963. SUBJECT U.S. Policy re Portuguese Territories and U.S. Strategy in UN Security Council The Problem The difficult decision we must make in the Security Council session on Portuguese territories in Africa will have far-reaching effects on overall United States foreign policy interests. Basically, we will be faced with the choice of: 1) Pursuing our present policy; 2) Moving to a stronger and more vigorous anti-colonial stance, but recognizing that there is greater risk of deterioration in United States-Portuguese relations. Should we elect the first course of action, we are likely to have serious difficulties in the Council and will almost certainly find that within several months our position will be almost universally understood as one of support for Portugal against Africa. The second course of action would incur increased risk of a deterioration of our relations with Portugal, but would strengthen our position on the colonial issue throughout the non-Communist world, increase our influence and diminish opportunities for Communist settlement of the hard-core problems of the southern third of Africa. It would probably be applauded by those who are fighting for equal rights for Negroes here at home. Policy Considerations 1. African Interests After years of advocating moral suasion and peaceful evolution and opposing coercive measures, such as sanctions and ostracism, our moderate approach has not moved Portugal toward acceptance of self-determination. At the recent Addis Ababa Conference of African Chiefs of State, the Africans made clear their determination to see an end put to Portuguese domination of its African territories, one way or another. African diplomatic pressures are increasing on the United States as foremost among those countries (the United Kingdom and France are the others) believed to have it in their power to effect a peaceful change in Portuguese policies. The avowed intent of the Africans is to force us either to bring about an acceptable solution or choose between Portugal on the one hand and Africa on the other. Ambassador Korry has reported from Addis Ababa on his talks with many African Chiefs of State and Foreign Ministers, “it would be a fatal error in my view to believe that the summit merely produced resolutions.” The African walkout at the ILO and their action in barring Portuguese participation at the UNESCO Education Conference confirm this. He went on to say that failure of the United States to take positive action with respect to Portugal “could negate our material aid and political gains of the past year (in Africa).” Sekou Toure is sending a personal letter to you making essentially the same point. Recent actions such as Congolese recognition of the Angolan Government-in-Exile, Liberian intention to expel Portuguese nationals, and the United Arab Republic and Ethiopia breaking of relations with Portugal show the determination of the Africans. There are indications that the Communists will make a major effort to exploit this issue to compensate for their failures in the Congo, Guinea, Algeria and elsewhere in Africa. Such friendly and responsible leaders as Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, Balewa of Nigeria, Adoula of the Congo, and Nyerere of Tanganyika have told us that their ability to resist pressures for a radical, violent solution will depend in good part on the extent to which they can show that the United States is moving with them in an effort to reach a peaceful and evolutionary solution. They cannot publicly take issue with Ben Bella and the African Liberation Committee in Dar-es-Salaam as to the necessity for armed action. We believe that these individuals and a number of other African leaders as well are willing to settle for less than their public positions if the Portuguese make some move soon in admitting the principle of self-determination and initiating meaningful steps toward that end. Moreover, the explosive and widely-publicized developments in our own racial situation give even greater significance to the position that the United States elects to follow during the Security Council session domestically as well as internationally. 2. European and NATO Interests On the other hand, the United States has a number of interests in common with Portugal, a NATO member which owns the Azores. We seek to maintain close relations with Portugal despite our strong disagreements with its colonial policy. Too sharp a break with our past position may cause Portugal to decide to terminate our use of the Azores, to adopt a policy of non-cooperation with or even withdrawal from NATO, and to cancel the Radio Free Europe broadcasting agreement. We believe the course of action proposed in this paper carries the risk that one of the above steps might be taken by Portugal, but we believe it can be implemented so as to minimize the possible adverse reaction of the Portuguese. However, at the same time it is prudent that we consider on a contingency basis any alternatives to the Azores which may exist. The United Kingdom indicated to Assistant Secretary Cleveland its willingness to make the Azores a matter of NATO wide discussion if necessary. 3. Conclusion The totality of U.S. interests argues strongly for a further step forward, analogous to our action in the Security Council on Angola in March 1961 and our support for the UN operation in the Congo. It also seems clear that the best time to take the forward step is when the Security Council meets late in July. Whatever action we take at that time will have a maximum impact, enabling us to extract more initial mileage by a smaller step than would otherwise be the case. We have prepared a set of policy recommendations for actions to be taken on the issue of Portuguese territories at the United Nations beginning with the Security Council. These recommendations are designed to preserve the opportunity for a peaceful solution, to protect U.S. interests in Africa and to seek to minimize the danger of a sharp break with Portugal. Although they are not sufficient to produce a solution, they seem to offer a balanced way of handling the present phase. Courses of Action A. Preparatory to the Security Council 1. Demarche to the Government of Portugal We should make a high-level effort: (a) to convince Portugal to acknowledge publicly the principle of self-determination for the Portuguese territories and to undertake early discussions with African and nationalist leaders on this basis; (b) to indicate the difficulties we foresee in the Security Council and the need to find an appropriate alternative to Chapter VII sanctions; and (c) to foreshadow the position the United States is likely to take in the Council. Ambassador Stevenson and Assistant Secretary Cleveland found considerable support for this view in their recent talks with several of our NATO allies, including the British and the French. While the United Kingdom is skeptical about the effect of any further demarche, it is encouraged and the French impressed by a report from Haile Selassie that General Franco has told Salazar he could not go along with Portuguese colonial policies. Moreover, the Brazilians are giving serious thought to pressing the Portuguese to liberalize their policies. For our part, we should do everything possible to encourage our friends to persuade the Portuguese to make a constructive move. 2. Discussion with African Leaders We should discuss with a broad range of African leaders our policy toward Portugal's territories in Africa and our position on this question in the Security Council. These discussions should take place in the capitals, at the United Nations, and in Washington. The four African Foreign Ministers (Tunisia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Madagascar) who have been selected to represent the African case in the Security Council should be invited to Washington for discussions with the Secretary and possibly yourself before the Security Council meeting. B. In the Security Council In the expected event Portugal remains unwilling to recognize publicly the applicability of the principle of self-determination to its African territories, we should pursue our broader national interests in the Security Council, making sure that Portugal clearly appreciates our intentions. The United States should initiate or support a resolution containing four basic elements: (a) A reaffirmation of our support for the timely exercise of self-determination in Portuguese territories; (b) A call upon Portugal and all other interested parties to seek a peaceful solution in accordance with the Charter, making clear that negotiations must be directed toward establishing a timetable within which this principle will be exercised, and that negotiations should include nationalist leaders from Portuguese territories and other African leaders; (c) A request that the Secretary-General designate a special representative (rapporteur) for the Portuguese territories who would help facilitate such talks and otherwise assist the parties concerned; and (d) A request that all member states refrain from providing Portugal any arms for use in the Portuguese African territories and otherwise refrain from actions rendering more difficult the peaceful and timely achievement of self-determination in the Portuguese African territories. We have supported most of the above elements in previous resolutions either in the General Assembly or the Security Council. The new features would be their combination in a hortatory (Chapter VI) Security Council resolution, the inclusion of a call for nationalist leaders to participate in negotiations directed toward establishing a timetable for self-determination, and a partial arms embargo paragraph. This latter element would “codify” in a Security Council resolution our present arms policy. The United Kingdom sees no problem with such a provision. We have previously voted for a general provision to this effect in the General Assembly in January, 1962 which reads: “Requests all States Members of the United Nations and members of the specialized agencies to deny Portugal any support and assistance which may be used by it for the suppression of the people of Angola.” We believe it is possible to develop a consensus among the majority of the Security Council along the above lines which would be acceptable to the United States. At the same time, our taking the lead in developing such a forthcoming resolution should enable us to ensure that no unacceptable resolution calling for sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter or expulsion of Portugal from the Organization will receive the minimum seven votes required for adoption. Dean Rusk 1 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 10 PORT/UN. Confidential. Drafted by Oakley and Sisco and cleared by Cleveland, Burdett, Meeker, Williams, and Kitchen. 1 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 367. Memorandum for the Record 367. Memorandum for the Record Source Washington, July 18, 1963, 4:30 p.m. MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT ON PORTUGUESE AFRICA PRESENT Secretary Rusk, Ambassador Stevenson, Ambassador Yost, Messrs. Harlan Cleveland, G. Mennen Williams, Henry Tasca, Abe Chayes, Department of State; Secretary McNamara, Mr. William Bundy, Department of Defense; Messrs. Schlesinger and Brubeck, The White House 1. Before the President entered Secretary McNamara raised the problem of the 1951 US-Portuguese letter of understanding which committed us, on Portuguese request, to permit use of US supplied arms in Portuguese Africa. Since our freedom of action on Portugal is in fact greatly limited so long as this understanding is in force, it was agreed that State and Defense would review the problem and possible renunciation of the 1951 agreement, for later Presidential consideration. 2. The President suggested that we should so far as possible, sit back and let others take the lead. He thought the French might use an American lead as a pretext to criticize us to the Portuguese. He thought we should listen to the Africans, Portuguese, etc., express our concern but offer no specific solutions, and let the situation develop next week. He agreed that the timing of any compromise proposal must remain a matter of judgment and flexibility. 3. Ambassadors Stevenson and Yost pointed out that it is not enough simply to block an extreme resolution since this would simply ensure a possibly drastic resolution in the Assembly in the fall. 4. The President agreed with Secretary McNamara that, even if we reach the point of ourselves surfacing such idea as a mediator scheme, we should avoid if at all possible taking the lead on any embargo proposal. The State Department undertook, at the President's request, to revise our draft resolution language to soften the onesided effect of arms embargo language against Portugal. 5. The President authorized Ambassador Stevenson in light of the guidance of this discussion and the President's desire to avoid a conspicuous American initiative to use his own discretion in the development of tactics of a Security Council debate. He stressed, however, that in light of the critical issues up this year, such as a possible test ban treaty, it is of the utmost importance to avoid a risk of losing the Azores. WB * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Meetings with the President, 5/63-7/63. Secret. Drafted by Brubeck. The meeting was held at the White House. 368. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 368. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Source Washington, July 19, 1963, 6:44 p.m. 168. For Ambassador Stevenson. Re Portuguese Territories. Following confirms your negotiating instructions after your meeting with President and Secretary: 1. General Objective Our overall objective in the Security Council is to protect both our African and European interests. With this in mind, we should seek to satisfy the objectives of the moderate Africans in the Security Council while refraining from initiating or supporting a resolution of the character likely to cause Portugal to deny us the use of the Azores. In our judgment course of action contained in this telegram is not likely to risk the loss of the Azores. It would attempt to preserve our position in Africa by giving the moderates something to take home, thereby helping to neutralize those who seek a militant and a violent solution rather than a peaceful one. It would decrease the opportunities for the Communists to exploit the situation to their own advantage. 2. Elements of An Eventual Resolution US will clearly oppose expulsion Portugal from UN or mandatory sanction against Portugal. Subject to tactics below, you are authorized to participate in a consensus built around following basic elements: (a) A reaffirmation of our support for the timely exercise of self-determination in Portuguese territories; (b) A call upon Portuguese and certain African leaders to discuss how self-determination could be achieved within reasonable time and under certain UN guarantees as to timing and concrete sequence of steps; (c) A request that the Secretary-General designate a special representative (rapporteur) for the Portuguese territories. That representative should have a broad mandate to consult with all parties concerned, to facilitate such talks, to use his good offices, and to take steps to secure the cooperation of all parties concerned to achieve a peaceful solution; (d) A call upon all concerned (1) to cooperate with the Secretary-General's Special Representative, (2) to refrain from providing Portugal with any arms for use in its overseas territories, and (3) otherwise to refrain from any acts which would make a peaceful solution more difficult. Objective is to get started a process of peaceful change, stimulated by an independent political negotiator. As you have recommended, we should insist on a single rapporteur, not a three-man Commission. As consultations proceed, please consider whether it would be useful to establish a time period during which rapporteur would be trying to get dialogue under way, with the idea that special restraint on arms supply or other non-peaceful acts in or around territories, might be exercised during such period. 3. Tactics While US should assist as necessary to bring about consensus along above lines, it is important that we not seem to be in a leadership position especially in those elements of package (notably arms embargo) that will be particularly offensive to Portuguese. Every effort should be made to get French, British, and some members of “middle group” (Norway, Brazil, Venezuela, Philippines) to take lead in developing consensus around moderate resolution that can be viable alternative to African starting position. Within this general framework, you have full tactical discretion on how much of our position to reveal, when, and to whom. You will presumably be seeing Nogueira early in the process. You should discuss with him entire SC situation emphasizing our opposition to Chapter VII sanctions and expulsion which reflects our desire to be helpful to Portuguese, but also bring out frankly above difficulties which confront both Portugal and ourselves in SC. We should not, at this stage, become involved in discussion of possible resolution except to say we consider rapporteur proposal an important element thereof. 4. Participation by Non-Members of SC Nogueira has decided to come to SC and we of course will support hearing Portuguese. If Slim's views reflect present African position and Addis Ababa decision followed, we can expect that Tunisia, Sierra Leone, Madagascar and Liberia will ask to represent the Africans as interested parties. We believe that such procedure would be reasonable and that in addition, Chairman of Committee of Twenty-Four might appropriately be heard. We would hope that this limited participation would suffice, and would oppose expanding of hearings to include miscellaneous groups or individuals such as ICFTU and DG of ILO. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 10 PORT/UN. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Cleveland and Sisco on July 18; cleared by Yost, Williams, Chayes, Burdett, McGeorge Bundy, and McKesson; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Lisbon, London, Paris, Oslo, Rio de Janeiro, Caracas, Manila, Accra, Rabat, Lagos, Taipei, Dar-es-Salaam, Pretoria, Leopoldville, Tunis, Monrovia, and Tananarive. 369. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 369. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Source Washington, July 25, 1963. In light of the President's concern of the possible effect of the Azores issue on ratification of a test ban treaty, I think we may need to review by the first of the week the bidding on the Security Council debate on the Portuguese territories. Although Ambassador Stevenson has followed the President's guidance with great skill, we seem to be unavoidably in a rather conspicuous position in the development of a compromise Security Council position. At the same time the Portuguese are suffering some blows which, rightly or wrongly, are likely to aggravate them against us: (1) They were expelled on July 23 from the Economic Commission for Africa in Geneva and feel that we were partly responsible (see attached State Department memorandum). 1 (2) We are today turning down their request for transfer of T-33's and F-86's to Portuguese Guinea. (3) To avoid embarrassment on an arms embargo resolution, we may find it necessary in the next few days explicitly to repudiate our 1951 “understanding” with the Portuguese on the use of US-supplied arms in the colonies. Depending on the course of negotiations in New York in the next couple of days, therefore, I propose to explore again on Monday 2 the risk to the Azores involved in our current posture, in anticipation of a Security Council vote on the Portuguese territories issue by the middle of next week. 3 Bill Brubeck 4 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Portuguese Africa. Secret. 1 Not attached or further identified. 2 July 29. 3 On July 26, Ambassador Stevenson told the U.N. Security Council that the two essentials were to facilitate a meaningful dialogue between the Government of Portugal and appropriate African leaders, and to make sure that they talked about the right things, including the means of exercising self-determination. Thus, the United States found the draft resolution unacceptable, since some of its language seemed certain to inhibit such a dialogue. It also could not agree that a threat to the peace already existed. For text of Stevenson's remarks, see Department of State Bulletin , August 19, 1963, pp. 303-307. 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 370. Memorandum for the Record 370. Memorandum for the Record Source Washington, July 30, 1963, 11 a.m. MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT ON PORTUGUESE AFRICA PRESENT Secretary Rusk, Under Secretary Ball, Deputy Under Secretary Johnson, Messrs. Harlan Cleveland, Wayne Fredericks, Abe Chayes, William Burdett, Department of State; Messrs. William Bundy, Frank Sloan, Department of Defense; Messrs. Bundy and Brubeck, The White House Mr. Ball presented a New York text proposed by Ambassador Stevenson as of Monday night. He said Governor Stevenson believed that, even with revisions proposed by Secretary Rusk, the text was negotiable. Mr. Ball then showed the President Lord Home's personal letter to Secretary Rusk objecting to the Washington text worked out by the United States and others on July 26. The President asked what alternative the United Kingdom would propose. He noted that Home's letter was very strong, deserving serious consideration, and that we should listen to any British initiative. He noted also the United States interest in British Guinea is vital, with reference to Lord Home's comment on that country. The President asked for comment on a proposal that we join with the British in abstaining and permitting a Chapter 6 permissive resolution to pass. If the alternative were to lobby for sufficient abstentions to defeat a resolution which would be preferable? Mr. Cleveland felt it would be better to abstain passively and permit such a resolution to pass. At the request of the President, who then left the room, Mr. Ball called Lord Home and agreed to show Home a further revised version of the Rusk text of this day. With Secretary Rusk participating it was agreed to recommend to the President abstention, permitting a resolution to pass if it were strictly Chapter 6 and permissive. It was agreed that the President and Secretary Rusk should phone Ambassador Stevenson. Following the meeting Secretary Rusk, the President, Messrs. Bundy and Cleveland talked privately and the President and Secretary Rusk talked to Ambassador Stevenson by phone. 1 William H. Brubeck 2 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Portugal, General. Secret. Drafted by Brubeck. 1 On July 31, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution S/5380, “The Situation in the Territories Under Portuguese Administration Is Seriously Disturbing Peace and Security in Africa,” by a vote of 8 to 0, with 3 abstentions (including the United States). The resolution urgently called upon Portugal to recognize the right of the peoples of the Territories to self-determination and independence, and requested that “all States should refrain forthwith from offering the Portuguese Government any assistance which would enable it to continue its repression of the peoples of the Territories under its administration, and take all measures to prevent the sale and supply of arms and military equipment for this purpose to the Portuguese Government.” For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 156-158. 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 371. Memorandum for the Record 371. Memorandum for the Record Source Washington, September 9, 1963, 11:30 a.m. MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT ON UNDER SECRETARY BALL'S DEBRIEFING ON HIS LISBON MEETINGS WITH SALAZAR PRESENT Secretary of State, Under Secretary Ball, Under Secretary Harriman, Deputy Under Secretary Johnson, Assistant Secretary Williams, Department of State; Secretary McNamara, Mr. Paul Nitze, Admiral George Anderson, Department of Defense; Messrs. McGeorge Bundy and William Brubeck, The White House Mr. Ball reported on his Lisbon conversations on Portuguese Africa, 1 concluding by saying he saw little hope for a satisfactory negotiation with the Africans based on the position Salazar had stated in Lisbon. The President asked if he thought we could expect any new initiatives from the Portuguese in the near future on the Portuguese Africa territories. Mr. Ball said there was nothing significantly new apparent in his Lisbon talks but something might come from further discussions scheduled with Nogueira here and between U Thant's representative and the Portuguese in Lisbon. The President raised the question of the Azores bases and Secretary Rusk suggested the Portuguese want the continuation of the base as leverage on us on African problems. The President agreed but observed that the problem was how far we can go at the UN and still hold the Azores. The President then asked about the status of our arms embargo on the South Africans and requested that State and Defense review their differences with regard to sale of submarines to South Africa and present him with recommendations not later than next Monday. 2 William H. Brubeck 3 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Portugal, General. Secret. Drafted by Brubeck. 1 As President Kennedy's Personal Representative, Under Secretary Ball visited Lisbon, where he met with Prime Minister Antonio de Oliveira Salazar and Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira August 29-30 and September 6-7. Documentation on Ball's mission is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2301; ibid., Central Files, POL 7 US/BALL, POL 19 PORT, POL AFR-US, and POL AFR-PORT; and Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Portugal Subjects, Ball Mission. Ball's own account of his mission to Portugal is in The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1982), pp. 276-279. 2 September 16. 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 372. Research Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk 372. Research Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk Source Washington, November 5, 1963. RAF-51 SUBJECT Prospects for Angolan Nationalist Movement The Angolan rebellion is now entering the last half of its third year. It has also entered a new psychological and political phase. This study surveys not only the prospects for the nationalist movement, but its policies and general orientation. Abstract Militarily, the Angolan situation has changed little over the past year. Rebels and Portuguese alike have followed a policy of entrenchment, while concentrating on improved training for their respective troops. A small group of rebels (5,000-7,000 active fighters) prevents a large Portuguese force (42,000) from completely pacifying the northwestern sector. The rebels plan new assaults in the near future, perhaps over a slightly broader area. However, they are incapable of seriously challenging Portugal's hold in Angola—certainly not during the next year or two. Politically, the rebellion has entered a new phase in which the configuration of forces and opportunities is significantly altered. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) has selected Holden Roberto's Government of the Republic of Angola in Exile (GRAE) as the sole legitimate nationalist agency. Eleven governments have formally recognized the GRAE. It is now unlikely that African states would accept any transitional arrangements in Angola that excluded the GRAE. Africans seek a political rather than a military victory in Angola. However, Portugal is unlikely to agree to negotiation under terms acceptable to Africans in the foreseeable future. Thus, with broad African support, the GRAE will seek during the coming year to secure a firmer military position. The prospects increasingly are for a protracted struggle, a la Algeria. The GRAE now commands support from tribal groups representing approximately 25 percent of the African population of Angola. These groups are located in the northwestern sector of the country. Faced with enormous obstacles to clandestine organization, the political parties comprising the GRAE nevertheless have attempted to extend their influence beyond the northern tribal groups. Heretofore strongly western-oriented, the GRAE is rapidly assuming a more neutral position and may seek some Eastern European assistance during the coming year—probably for tactical, rather than ideological reasons. The GRAE's rising fortunes have been reflected in the dramatic decline of the rival Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). Once a strong contender for pan-African support, the MPLA faces an uncertain future and, possibly, political oblivion. During the coming year, we anticipate the following developments: 1) a gradual but still indecisive step-up of military activity in Angola, 2) a sharpening of racial antagonisms within Angola, 3) increasing attacks on Portugal at the UN and in other international forums, 4) continuing Portuguese rigidity on the issue of self-determination, 5) increasing pan-African involvement on behalf of Angolan nationalists, 6) growing nationalist estrangement from the US and other NATO allies. [Here follows the body of the paper.] * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Portuguese Africa. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. 373. Memorandum of Conversation 373. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, November 7, 1963, 4 p.m. SUBJECT Portuguese African Problems PARTICIPANTS United States The President Under Secretary Ball Mr. William C. Burdett,EUR Mr. Francis E. Meloy, Jr., WE Portugal Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira The President inquired of the Foreign Minister how his talks with the African group in New York were going. The Foreign Minister replied by describing the disappointing communique issued by the African group the previous evening in which the Africans rejected the resumption of the talks except under new conditions which they laid down. Franco Nogueira went on to say that the Portuguese had regarded the talks as falling into three headings: (1) conditions in the Portuguese African territories; (2) the threat to peace and security; and (3) self-determination. The Africans had been interested only in discussing self-determination. In order to cut through other discussion they had been willing to concede that conditions were good in the Portuguese territories and that there was no threat to peace and security. The Foreign Minister said the Portuguese Government defined self-determination in the same manner as did the United States Government. If there were to be true self-determination all options should be open including independence. Self-determination as defined by the Africans is not self-determination at all as it is limited only to independence. The African communique shows that the Africans do not accept the U.S. and Portuguese definition of self-determination. The President said that it is true that the Africans say self-determination and independence. We always say self-determination. We mean that all options are open. The Foreign Minister recounted a conversation he had had in New York with the Guinean representative in which he had asked hypothetically if Guinea would accept the results of a plebiscite in Portuguese territory, even one supervised by Guinea, should the result opt for continued ties with Portugal and against independence. The Guinean representative had rejected this saying such a result could not be accepted. The President asked why the Portuguese Government does not say publicly that it accepts self-determination. They would be in a much more powerful position. The Foreign Minister replied that they had said this in effect and that their position is set forth in the UN Secretary General's report. The President said he had seen a definition of self-determination ascribed to Dr. Salazar as meaning participation of the people in the administration and political life of the community. Did this exclude opting for independence? The Foreign Minister said it excludes nothing. An examination of Dr. Salazar's statements will reveal this. The President asked where we disagree. The Foreign Minister said we agree on the definition of self-determination but we do not agree on phasing. He asked Mr. Ball if this were correct. Mr. Ball said that in conversations he has had over the past months both with Dr. Salazar and with the Foreign Minister he believes we differ on our sense of timing. The U.S. feels that there is a tidal wave moving in Africa, that time is telescoped and that there is great urgency in timing. Ten years would be a maximum to bring about conditions where the exercise of self-determination is possible. This would include urgent programs of education and the creation of a situation where the population could exercise the right of self-determination. The real issue between the U.S. and Portugal is timing. The Foreign Minister said Portugal does not agree that a tidal wave is moving in Africa. If it is doing so, Portugal believes this is only because the U.S. supports it. More important, Portugal feels that once you make a statement you unleash forces which cannot be controlled. Political forces come to the top which cannot be managed. You start by saying ten years and you end up with ten months. This is the great point. The Foreign Minister continued saying Portugal has now reached a position of political strength where even the Africans admit no war is going on in the Portuguese territories. There is an economic boom in the territories and a return of confidence. Portugal does not see why it should be obliged to submit to the Africans under these conditions. Franco Nogueira said another point arose in conversations he had the previous day with the Secretary and Mr. Ball. In private talks many of the African representatives take moderate positions. They say individually that what Portugal has said in New York about its policies should be enough to satisfy the Africans for a long time. But when the African representatives are together it is another story. The President said he understood. Groups are different than individuals. In a group the most extreme becomes the common denominator. The Foreign Minister referred to a conversation he had in New York with an African representative who personally opposed Ben Bella and felt that Ben Bella was a danger to Africa. He had told the Foreign Minister, however, that publicly he was obliged to support Ben Bella and was afraid not to do so. The President inquired as to the capability of guerrillas in the Portuguese territories. The Foreign Minister said it was too costly for the Algerians, for example, to send large numbers of guerrillas; secondly the people of the Portuguese territories do not support the guerrillas. Recently during the tour of the President of the Portuguese Republic through the African territories there was not a single untoward incident. The rebels have no support. There are many leaders in Angola who support the Government. They see what is going on elsewhere in Africa and especially in the Congo just across the border. They want to retain the status quo in Angola and they so state to foreign ambassadors and journalists who visit Angola from time to time. To answer the President's question, the rebels do not have a very great strategic capability. They are able to cause incidents but the security situation in such South American countries as Colombia is worse today than is the situation in Angola. In response to a question from the President the Foreign Minister said Portugal has about 40 to 50 thousand troops in Angola at the present time. One third at any one time are on active duty in the north. The remainder are resting or are on garrison duty. The Foreign Minister had asked African Delegates what else they had to talk about at Addis Ababa after they had condemned Portugal and South Africa. They had replied “nothing.” The Foreign Minister said Portugal still feels that it is the underdog in world opinion. Predictions, however, that Portugal would fall apart have not been fulfilled. He might be accused of bias but in his opinion the situation was far more encouraging than it was two or three years ago. The Foreign Minister said he was told by an old friend at the UN that many people were not happy with the Portuguese talks with the Africans, that Portugal was not playing the game. The UN thrives on crises and tensions, and the Portuguese talks with the Africans tended to reduce tensions. The President said that the UN has a special atmosphere. The Africans are becoming more extreme. The Foreign Minister had mentioned an African representative who opposed Ben Bella privately but felt obliged to follow him. In the President's view that is what we are going to hear more of in the future. The President asked what the Portuguese had said about self-determination at the UN. Franco Nogueira said Portugal had outlined a certain concept which they had said they were implementing. They had indicated precisely the steps planned into 1964 but were unable to be exact as to timing beyond that. These steps had included increased franchise, elections, etc. The Portuguese had indicated two very important things: (1) a plebiscite; and (2) the acceleration of plans for economic development and education. The Foreign Minister said when you expand electoral roles and step up economic development and education, isn't the result self-determination? The Africans say one man one vote. There is no point to this unless there is a structure within which to operate. Such a structure comes about only through economic and educational development. The population then has a stake in the life of the community. At that point it should then have a say in what happens to that community. Franco Nogueira asked what is happening in some African countries where one man one vote exists. The result in many cases is an authoritarian regime where 99 percent of the vote is represented as being for the winning candidate. The Foreign Minister said the President would be amazed at what is said about Portugal in the UN. He, himself, had been called the representative of a cannibal regime, for example. These reports are printed at home in Portugal and cause strong adverse public reaction to the UN. There is opposition in Portugal to doing anything which appears to be giving in to the UN. He, himself, would be out of office if he agreed to UN demands. The President said that the Foreign Minister had indicated he was happier now about the situation in the African territories than a year ago. He asked if in fact the situation were more secure. The Foreign Minister said that short of an invasion by an army, the situation was secure and under control. The population is not in favor of the rebels. The people have a feeling of security again and have resumed building and investing. There is no problem except in an area of Angola along the border which represents only 1.8 percent of the total territory of Angola. The chief source of the trouble comes from approximately 200,000 members of the Bakong tribe who overlap from the Congo into Angolan territory. The President asked what the UN African group will do. The Foreign Minister said he could not predict but there will probably be a Security Council meeting, perhaps not soon but eventually. The Africans will seek a resolution with strong measures against Portugal. These could include sanctions or even expulsion from the UN. The President said he did not believe the Africans could expel Portugal but he thought they would condemn the Portuguese. The Foreign Minister replied that Portugal has a clear conscience and does not mind condemnation which really does not amount to much. The U.S. bears a large responsibility in Security Council matters and cannot escape this responsibility. 1 The President replied that this is true. The U.S. does have this burden. That is why we interfere to the extent that we do in Portuguese affairs because sooner or later Portuguese-African problems will come to the UN where we must take a position. We have been attempting to find a way in which we can be more helpful to Portugal than in the past. In view of the Foreign Minister's optimism regarding the state of affairs in the Portuguese African territories and the problems regarding timing, it is clear that we are not in complete accord. The United States is in a different position than Portugal and must therefore regard matters differently. We are not in entire agreement with Portugal but he thought we would survive our differences. Franco Nogueira said if the Africans turned to the Soviets this would place a great burden on the Soviets. He did not believe the Soviets were prepared to take on the support of all of Africa. Secondly, the Soviets are moving in other ways than the United States. The Soviets are doing great work in secret subversion all over Africa. Houphouet-Boigny, the President of the Ivory Coast, had told him about this. In the view of Portugal, continued links between Africa and non-Communist European nations gives stability to Africa. The Foreign Minister said that he was not saying that the U.S. was responsible for events in Africa but the U.S. must bear some responsibility because of the support it is giving to the trend of events. Independ-ence in Africa has been achieved artificially and this has created a fragile situation conducive to Communism. Houphouet-Boigny had told him that most of the African leaders were very young. What will happen to other young and ambitious Africans if the present leaders stay in office twenty or thirty years? Ambitious new comers find an outlet only through revolt. At this very moment there is a plot in the Ivory Coast which Houphouet-Boigny knows about. The Foreign Minister anticipated that we face a period of unrest ahead in Africa. The President said he was glad to have this talk with the Foreign Minister. There is likely to be a debate in the UN and a resolution. We will do the best we can to make the resolution as restrained as possible. We will keep in close touch with the Portuguese. The struggle is likely to be violent. The UN is becoming more extreme. Last year's resolutions are not enough and there is a tendency to go to extremes. * Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL AFR-PORT. Confidential. Drafted by Meloy and approved by the White House on November 18 and in U on November 20. The conversation was held at the White House. 1 On December 11, by a vote of 10 to 0 with 1 abstention (France), the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution S/5481, “All Peoples Have the Right to Self-Determination,” reaffirming previous U.N. resolutions on the Portuguese Territories and calling upon all States to comply with the paragraph of the Security Council Resolution of July 31 that was directed against the provision of arms and military equipment to Portugal for use in its territories. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 161-162. Before the vote, Ambassador Yost told the Security Council that the United States agreed with the definition of self-determination cited in the resolution and would vote for the resolution as a whole. South Africa South Africa 374. Memorandum for the Record Washington, February 27, 1961. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, Union of South Africa 000.1-680.1, 1961. Secret. Drafted by William E. Lang, Director of the Office of Foreign Military Rights Affairs, International Security Affairs, Department of Defense. Copies were sent to Hare, NITZE, and General Yates. 375. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, March 15, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745A.00/3-1561. Confidential. Drafted by Penfield on March 16 and approved in S on March 29. 376. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) Washington, March 16, 1961. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Africa, 000.92-Africa 452, 1961. Confidential. A copy was sent to Harold Brown, Director of Defense Research and Engineering. 377. National Security Action Memorandum No. 33 Washington, March 22, 1961. Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 33. Secret. 378. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) Washington, May 17, 1961. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Africa 000.92-Africa 452, 1961. Secret. A copy was sent to George Newman in G. 379. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State Cape Town, May 25, 1961, 5 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.45A/5-2561. Confidential. Repeated to Pretoria. 380. Letter From the Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson) to Secretary of State Rusk New York, June 2, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770X.56311/6-261. Personal and Confidential. 381. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Eastern and Southern African Affairs (Wight) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) Washington, June 6, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745X.00/6-661. Confidential. Also sent to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Fredericks. 382. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (Bundy) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) Washington, June 7, 1961. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Africa 000.92-Africa 452, 1961. Confidential. 383. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) Washington, June 30, 1961. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Africa 000.92-Africa 452, 1961. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. 384. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa Washington, August 25, 1961, 9:05 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.70X/7-161. Confidential; Verbatim Text. Drafted by Wight on August 22; cleared by Packard, Hennes, Winfree, and Bronez (OSD); and approved by Fredericks. 385. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Williams) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) Washington, September 16, 1961. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Africa, 000.92-Africa 452, 1961. Secret. 386. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, September 21, 1961. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Africa, Vol. II, General. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. 387. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa Washington, September 28, 1961, 10:36 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.70X/9-2561. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Wight on September 12; cleared by Martin, Brubeck, and Bowles; and approved by Fredericks. 388. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa Washington, September 29, 1961, 8:08 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770X.5622/9-2961. Confidential; Niact; No Distribution Outside of Department. Drafted by Deming, cleared by Fredericks, and approved by Bowles. 389. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Wiesner) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, October 18, 1961. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Africa. Secret. 390. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa Washington, October 24, 1961, 6:55 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770X.56311/10-1261. Secret. Drafted by Wight, Gathright, and Hennes on October 23; cleared by Kitchen, Brubeck, William P. Bundy in substance, and Fredericks; and approved by Bowles. 391. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa Washington, October 25, 1961, 7:57 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.70X/10-2461. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Durnan and Deming, cleared by Manfull and Swanks, and approved by Fredericks. Repeated to USUN. 392. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Battle) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, November 13, 1961. Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Countries, South Africa, Republic of. Official Use Only. No drafting information appears on the source text. 393. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, November 20, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.41/11-2061. Confidential. Drafted by Cook on December 13. 394. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa Washington, February 20, 1962, 4:47 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.70X7/2-1762. Secret. Drafted by Bronez (OSD/ISA) and Durnan on February 19; cleared by Packard, Hunt in substance, Robinson, Deming, Manning, and Bronez; and approved by Fredericks. Repeated to Pretoria. 395. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State Cape Town, March 17, 1962, 11 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.70X7/3-1762. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Pretoria. 396. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, August 31, 1962. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 601.70X11/8-3162. Confidential. Drafted by Sanger and approved in S on October 4. Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Naude's discussion of other subjects on August 31 was recorded in four additional memoranda of conversation. (Ibid., Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330) 397. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State New York, October 6, 1962, 9 p.m. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2150. Confidential. Drafted by Sanger and cleared by Grant. Repeated to Pretoria and London and by pouch to Tananarive and Salisbury. 398. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, November 23, 1962. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.45X/11-2362. Limited Official Use. Drafted by High on December 6. The source text is labeled “Part I of IV.” The discussion with Nujoma of SWAPO objectives and of working conditions in South West Africa was recorded in two memoranda of conversation. (Ibid., 745X.021/11-2362, and AF/S Files: Lot 66 D 344, South West Africa-1962-1963, UN) 399. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State New York, February 19, 1963, noon. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 SW AFR/UN. Confidential. Repeated to London and Cape Town. 400. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State Cape Town, March 1, 1963, 6 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 SW AFR/UN. Confidential; Priority. Also sent to USUN and repeated to Pretoria and London. 401. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy Washington, March 16, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Africa, General. Secret. 402. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) Washington, April 9, 1963. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files:FRC 67 A 4564, South Africa Rep. 1963, 383.8-676. No classification marking. 403. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa Washington, April 23, 1963, 7:25 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 S AFR. Confidential. Drafted by Hall and approved by MacKnight. Repeated to Pretoria and USUN and by pouch to Johannesburg, Salisbury, and Durban. 404. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State Cape Town, May 14, 1963, 2 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-5 S AFR. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Pretoria and USUN. 405. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State Cape Town, June 10, 1963, 4 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17-4 US-S AFR. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Pretoria, London, Durban, Johannesburg, and Port Elizabeth. 406. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) Washington, June 15, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Africa. Secret. Also sent to Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs Johnson, Williams, Tyler, and Rostow. 407. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy Washington, July 13, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, South Africa, 7/13/63-7/31/63. Secret. 408. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Kennedy Washington, July 16, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, South Africa. Confidential. 409. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, July 17, 1963, 3 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 S AFR. Confidential. Drafted by Campbell and approved in S on August 6. 410. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, July 17, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, South Africa. Confidential. 411. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Washington, August 2, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, South Africa. No classification marking. 412. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Washington, August 7, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, South Africa, 8/7/63-8/12/63. Confidential. 413. Research Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, August 12, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, South Africa, 8/7/63-8/12/63. Secret; No Foreign Dissem/Controlled Dissem. No drafting information appears on the source text. A marginal notation reads: “(Taken from Pres. weekend reading dtd 9/14/63, Tab [illegible]).” 414. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa Washington, August 28, 1963, 3:39 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 BAS. Confidential. Drafted by Hall on August 27, cleared by MacKnight and Brown, and approved by Hilliker. Repeated to USUN and London. 415. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, September 23, 1963. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12-5 S AFR. Secret. Also sent to Secretary of Defense McNamara. 416. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Washington, September 27, 1963, 8:03 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL-19 SW AFR/UN. Confidential. Drafted by Parker on September 26; cleared by Strong, Streeter in draft, Friedman, and Buffum; and approved by Wallner. Also sent to Pretoria and repeated to London. 417. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 4, 1963, 10:30 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL-1 S AFR. Confidential. Drafted by Judd and approved by the White House on October 15. The conversation took place at the White House. The source text is labeled “4 of 6 parts.” 418. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 18, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, South Africa, 9/30/63-10/29/63. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Rusk. 419. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Washington, October 23, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Africa. Confidential. A marginal notation reads: “(Taken from Pres. week-end reading dtd 10/26/63, Tab 4).” 420. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, November 1, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, South Africa. No classification marking. A handwritten notation reads: “(Included in Pres. week-end reading dtd 11/2-3/63).” 421. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy Washington, November 6, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, South Africa. Confidential. 422. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, November 7, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, South Africa. Confidential. 423. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Washington, November 19, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, South Africa. Confidential. 424. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, November 26, 1963. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Aides File. Confidential. 425. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, December 5, 1963. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, South Africa, Vol. 2. Confidential. A copy was sent to Belk. 426. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa Washington, December 10, 1963, 6:14 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, ORG 7 AF. Confidential. Drafted by Hooper, cleared by Cahn, and approved by Hooper. Also sent to Nairobi for Williams. 374. Memorandum for the Record 374. Memorandum for the Record Source Washington, February 27, 1961. SUBJECT Long Range Proving Ground Facilities in the Union of South Africa I-12, 823/61 On Friday, February 24th, Mr. Haydn Williams told me of a conversation which he had had with Mr. Hare, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, concerning the proposed agreement with the Union of South Africa for the establishment of a missile and space vehicle tracking station near Pretoria. 1 Mr. Williams stated that Mr. Hare indicated that the proposed agreement was under review by the Department of State and the latter wished to know the importance which the Department of Defense attached to the proposed agreement. This morning, I spoke to General Yates who reaffirmed the long-range need for the facilities as essential to the development of long range missiles and space vehicle operations. General Yates also indicated his view that it was important that we proceed to negotiate a permanent agreement with the Union of South Africa as recommended by Ambassador Crowe. Following my conversation with General Yates, I reaffirmed to Mr. Hare the need for the facilities. I asked Mr. Hare whether he would like a briefing by the Department of Defense or a letter from the Department of Defense explaining its continuing requirement for the facilities. Mr. Hare said that this would not be necessary but suggested that I record the Defense view in a Memorandum for the Record, a copy of which should be sent to him. William E. Lang 2 * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, Union of South Africa 000.1-680.1, 1961. Secret. Drafted by William E. Lang, Director of the Office of Foreign Military Rights Affairs, International Security Affairs, Department of Defense. Copies were sent to Hare, NITZE, and General Yates. 1 In August 1960, the Department of State agreed to a Department of Defense proposal to enter into negotiations with the Union of South Africa for the establishment of a U.S. missile and satellite tracking station in South Africa. See Foreign Relations , 1958-1960, vol. XV, pp. 755 - 756 . 2 Printed from a copy that indicates Lang signed the original 375. Memorandum of Conversation 375. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, March 15, 1961. SUBJECT Visit of the South African Ambassador PARTICIPANTS Dr. W. C. Naude, Ambassador of the Union of South Africa Mr. A. G. Dunn, First Secretary, South African Embassy The Secretary J. K. Penfield, Acting Asst. Secretary, AF The Ambassador said that he had endeavored to get in touch with the Secretary even before he assumed office and wanted, in the course of this conversation, to set forth some basic considerations upon which he felt there should be an early exchange of views between his government and the new Administration. He was afraid, he said, that if this kind of heart-to-heart exchange did not take place, public positions might be taken on each side which would greatly damage the chances of continuing harmonious United States-South African relations. The Ambassador then spoke for approximately twenty-five minutes from notes, a copy of which he left with Mr. Penfield and which is attached hereto. 1 Acting on instructions, he also left an Aide-Memoire (copy attached).1 At the end of his presentation he made a fervent plea for American understanding of the South African position and for recognition of the principle that one cannot dogmatize about Africa. In this connection he referred to the President's statement when commenting on Mr. Williams's trip in Africa, that “Africa is not simple.” He closed on a personal note of relative optimism by saying that when his friends wrote from South Africa asking what he thought of the chances for a better understanding with the United States, he replied that he was very much impressed with the “intellectual gift” around the President and that he thought this would bring about a fair and reasonable view of South Africa. In an indirect reference to the problem of the black, colored and Asian urban populations, which the Ambassador had not mentioned in his presentation, the Secretary asked whether the objectives of South African policy could be brought about without the full cooperation of everyone involved. The Ambassador replied evasively by referring to the plans for gradual growth toward a commonwealth of independent countries within the present borders of South Africa and the necessity of white South Africans to preserve their Western identity and, at the same time, do justice to others. Referring to the Ambassador's comment on how much the South African Government is doing to educate its colored populations, the Secretary asked whether this was not educating revolutionaries. In reply, the Ambassador said that when he was participating in the conference to organize FAO, an Asian delegate asked him “Why are you doing this; you are preparing to feed us all and we will eventually eat you up.” The Ambassador said that his reply was that this is perhaps true but there are certain imperatives of civilization and ideals which must be followed through regardless of the consequences. In conclusion the Secretary reassured the Ambassador that the United States underestimates neither South Africa's contributions to the Western world nor the difficulties of the problems which it faces, and emphasized that our attitude would be based on the most full and careful consideration of all the factors involved. * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745A.00/3-1561. Confidential. Drafted by Penfield on March 16 and approved in S on March 29. 1 Attached to the source text but not printed. 376. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) 376. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) Source Washington, March 16, 1961. Dear Chet : As you requested, I have looked into the necessity for concluding an agreement with the Union of South Africa for the establishment in the Johannesburg/Pretoria area of a missile and space vehicle tracking station extending the Atlantic Missile Range. Many months ago it became clear that the full development of our national missile and space vehicle capability would require the geographical extension of our Atlantic Missile Range facilities into the general area of southeastern Africa. Such facilities are required for the testing of missiles at ranges over 5000 miles, and for tracking and telemetric data acquisition in connection with test satellite launchings from Cape Canaveral. These facilities would also be ideally located to support certain test launchings in polar orbit from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. The use of instrumentation vessels in the area has been considered. However, there is no reasonable prospect that such an unstable platform could provide the reliable and accurate tracking capability which these development programs demand. Further, a ship-based station could not possibly satisfy the need for local airfields to support the specially-equipped aircraft whose participation is also essential in the long-range missile tests. Possible sites for a land-based facility were discussed in great detail with officials of the Department of State last Spring and Summer. A number of alternatives to the Union of South Africa were examined, among them Zanzibar, Mozambique, the Rhodesias, and Bechuanaland. Some of these presented political difficulties quite as formidable as those in the Union, plus serious technical and logistical difficulties which a site in the Union would not involve. The Department of State therefore agreed in July to sound out the South Africans. In August, given the apparent readiness of the South Africans to cooperate on this defense project despite our acknowledged differences over racial policy, the Department of State agreed to go ahead with the station. While awaiting the arrival of our proposals for a long-term agreement, the South Africans have cooperated fully in occasional use of their airfields and ports, and our use of a temporary site for certain portable tracking equipment. The ultimate requirement, however, involves facilities and activities which we could not reasonably expect to handle indefinitely on an ad hoc and informal basis. We in Defense do not see any effective alternative to a station in the Union of South Africa if we are to handle the development of Transit, Midas, Advent, Ranger, and other programs which will follow from the availability of the Centaur/Atlas and Saturn boosters. A draft agreement satisfactory to both State and Defense has been prepared. We believe that this draft will be generally acceptable to the South Africans, since it follows as closely as circumstances permit the recent U.S.-South African agreement concerning the NASA station at Pretoria. The latter agreement, which in our view presented comparable questions of U.S. policy, was signed on September 13, 1960. We urge that in view of the foregoing the negotiating instructions which are now being prepared in working level discussions in State and Defense be forwarded to the Embassy in Capetown as soon as possible. Sincerely, Roswell L. Gilpatric 1 * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Africa, 000.92-Africa 452, 1961. Confidential. A copy was sent to Harold Brown, Director of Defense Research and Engineering. 1 Printed from a copy that indicates Gilpatric signed the original. 377. National Security Action Memorandum No. 33 377. National Security Action Memorandum No. 33 Source Washington, March 22, 1961. TO The Secretary of State SUBJECT Review of U. S. Policy Toward South Africa The recent action of the Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa in withdrawing his country from the British Commonwealth and the recent action of the UN on Angola have created problems not anticipated in the outstanding national security policy relating to Angola, the Union of South Africa, and the Portuguese possessions in Africa. The present situation appears to call for a review of the policy and the development of such recommendations for change as you consider appropriate under the new circumstances and in light of the probable future developments. In this connection, it seems to me that we need to have a particular look at the provisions with respect to the encouraging of American private capital to seek investment outlets in South Africa and with respect to the purchase of gold and other raw materials that provide a major source of economic support for the South African economy. 1 McGeorge Bundy * Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 33. Secret. 1 Documentation in Department of State files indicates that Martin Herz of the Bureau of African Affairs was assigned to draft the response to NSAM No. 33, but then notes that a draft prepared by the Bureau of African Affairs in June was unsatisfactory. (Ibid.) On August 3, Samuel Belk transmitted an 11-page Department of State paper, “Guidelines for U.S. Policy Toward the Republic of South Africa,” prepared by Herz, to the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Walt W. Rostow. Calling it a far-above-average paper, Belk recommended that Rostow read the first six pages. He noted, however, that the paper had not been well-received in S/P and was still in the process of being cleared. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Africa) A copy of the paper is in the compilation on South Africa in the Supplement. 378. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) 378. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) Source Washington, May 17, 1961. Dear Chet : As a result of your letter of April 3, 1961, 1 I asked the Deputy Director of Defense Research and Engineering and the Under Secretary of the Air Force personally to re-examine the need for a tracking station in the Union of South Africa and possible alternatives to such a station. This study has confirmed that tracking facilities in South Africa or its vicinity will be needed for an extended period in support of Midas, a program of very high national priority. Other important satellite programs which require the support of the facilities are Advent, Ranger, Vela Hotel, and Saint. In addition, the station will provide extended range support for long-range ballistic missile tests of recognized importance to national security. The specific conclusions of our re-examination are as follows: a. The use of shipborne tracking equipment is definitely not feasible because the three years required to provide this equipment would cause completely unacceptable delay in a program of highest national priority. Additional expenses of the order of $75 to $100 million would also result. b. A station on land is necessary in an area, the center of which would be in the northeastern portion of the Union of South Africa and which would include the southern portions of Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia, the eastern portion of Bechuanaland and the enclaves of Swaziland and Basutoland. The limits of this area are dictated by the geometrical relations between satellite trajectories and the ground based instruments which collect tracking and telemetry data. Specifically, tracking and telemetry instrumentation at this location is essential to cover apogee and orbital injection events which occur over this area. c. Schedules require facilities in the area for tracking Midas shots in May, June and August 1961, January, March, April and May of 1962 and an Advent shot in March 1962. Shots are projected thereafter for various programs through 1964, and the station would be of great importance in development programs to follow. The Midas shots must be supported by tracking facilities in the area designated. Lack of data on more than one of these shots could cause unacceptable delay or damage to the program. As a result of our review, it appears to us that an early decision must be made—(a) to seek assurances of South African cooperation for continued use and expansion of the present tracking facilities in that country, or (b) to make firm arrangements to move the facilities to one of the other above-mentioned countries in the area. If the latter alternative were adopted, we would want agreement in principle from the country concerned not later that July 1, 1961. This data is dictated by the lead time involved in site surveys, site preparation, and the installation and calibration of equipment. Even with initial access by July 1, 1961, it would not be possible to track the January 1962 Midas shot. Any later date would be unacceptable because it would prevent the tracking of the March 1962 Midas and Advent shots. Even if a site outside of the Union of South Africa is selected for the tracking facilities, we must preserve the good will of the Union to assure the availability of its airfields and ports for the aircraft and ships which must operate in the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans if long range missile tests are to be conducted effectively. Similarly, denial of commercial (government or privately owned) communication, transportation and other logistic support within the Union would seriously impede the operation of alternate facilities in one of the other countries. In view of the need for an early decision on this matter, we earnestly hope that Ambassador Satterthwaite's appraisal of the situation will be available soon, and that we can then give expeditious joint attention to the course of action we should take. In the meantime, if you desire to consider the technical details which support the conclusions set forth above, we would be most happy to arrange for their presentation, at your convenience, by the Defense officials concerned. Sincerely yours, Roswell L. Gilpatric 2 * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Africa 000.92-Africa 452, 1961. Secret. A copy was sent to George Newman in G. 1 Bowles' letter to Gilpatric pointed out that the use of South African territory for the U.S. missile tracking program posed serious difficulties for the U.S. Government because of the racial policies of the Union Government and the recurring controversies between that government and the United Nations over South West Africa and apartheid. Therefore, he argued, it was unwise for the United States to enter into any long-term military agreement with South Africa for a permanent tracking station, and asked the Department of Defense to investigate other means of satisfying its requirements, such as the use of instrumentation vessels. He also suggested waiting for the views of the new U.S. Ambassador to South Africa before taking any action on the proposed agreement. (Ibid.) 2 Printed from a copy that indicates Gilpatric signed the original. 379. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State 379. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State Source Cape Town, May 25, 1961, 5 p.m. 140. Prime Minister Verwoerd received me cordially this morning on my first protocol visit and expressed desire establish friendly personal relations. With apologies for being extremely busy before his departure for Pretoria for Republic Day ceremonies 1 he said he would endeavor arrange one or more long meetings with me soon after his return Capetown for serious discussion our respective policies. We did however engage in substantive conversation briefly. He expressed belief we did not fully understand his government's position and its importance to defense of African continent against Communist menace. I said President has told me he was not sending me here to point finger at his government but that latter must realize importance to us of our relations with African, Asian and Latin American states who had very strong feelings re South Africa's racial policies. We desired maintain friendly relations with Union which we looked to as an old friend and ally but unless his government could develop some flexibility and give in its racial policy this would be very difficult. I wondered also whether his government realized intensity of feeling on South Africa's racial policy which was developing throughout world. He mentioned that it did. While interview was most cordial throughout and he seemed genuinely desirious of maintaining friendly relations with US which he said he greatly admired, his general attitude and reaction tended confirm prevailing impression that there is little likelihood of change in SAG racial policy as long as he remains Prime Minister. Satterthwaite * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.45A/5-2561. Confidential. Repeated to Pretoria. 1 On May 31, the Union of South Africa became the Republic of South Africa and severed its ties with the British Commonwealth. 380. Letter From the Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson) to Secretary of State Rusk 380. Letter From the Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson) to Secretary of State Rusk Source New York, June 2, 1961. Dear Dean : I have recently heard about the proposed agreement with the Union of South Africa for (a) a missile tracking station, and (b) a sale of arms including fighter aircraft. While I am not fully informed about the necessity for this transaction, I am sufficiently concerned to presume to send you this note of caution. At a time when the feeling about apartheid and the policy of the Union of South Africa is rising everywhere, including pressure for sanctions in the U.N., I would think that the necessity must be very compelling to risk the repercussions from a transaction of this kind if and when it becomes known, as it must inevitably. I hardly need add that relations with the rest of Africa, and especially the new states, are important to our security too. Sincerely yours, Adlai * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770X.56311/6-261. Personal and Confidential. 381. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Eastern and Southern African Affairs (Wight) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) 381. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Eastern and Southern African Affairs (Wight) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) Source Washington, June 6, 1961. SUBJECT Consideration of South West African Item in the 16th General Assembly Recently you asked for information concerning the position on items involving the Republic of South Africa which may be expected to come up at the 16th Session of the General Assembly. I am attaching for your information an excellent background paper on the subject of South West Africa which discusses in detail the actions taken by the United States up to the present. 1 Between now and the 16th General Assembly I believe we should instruct Ambassador Satterthwaite to approach the Republic Government to urge it to cooperate with the United Nations in carrying out its obligations with respect to South West Africa. At a minimum, we feel that South Africa should resume reporting on the territory in accordance with paragraph 6 of the Mandate Agreement. Even though the International Court of Justice now has the case of South West Africa, we may be faced with extreme resolutions in the 16th General Assembly calling for diplomatic or economic sanctions, divestiture of the Mandate or expulsion from the United Nations. We believe it would be preferable to oppose such extreme resolutions (which in any event may be illegal or unenforceable) and to await the judgment of the ICJ. Then, if the Republic should fail to abide by the Court's decision, the matter could be taken to the Security Council, under Article 94 of the Charter. * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745X.00/6-661. Confidential. Also sent to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Fredericks. 1 The background paper is attached to the source text, but is not printed. On March 16, the United States voted for U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1593 (XV), which appealed to those U.N. members having particularly close and continuous relations with the Government of South Africa to bring all their influence to bear on that government with a view to ensuring that it would live up to its U.N. Charter obligations and give effect to previous U.N. General Assembly resolutions on South West Africa. On April 7, the United States voted for Resolution 1596 (XV) which noted with regret that the South African Government had refused to cooperate with the U.N. Committee on South West Africa and requested that the Committee proceed with its investigation—with or without that government's cooperation. 382. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (Bundy) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) 382. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (Bundy) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) Source Washington, June 7, 1961. SUBJECT Defense Interest in the Union of South Africa I-4945/61 Attached is a memorandum, prepared at your request, concerning the importance of the Union of South Africa to U.S. naval and maritime interests. This memorandum could serve as the basis for such discussion of this matter as you may wish to initiate with Mr. Bowles. In addition, the Air Force has raised with ISA the desirability of inviting Mr. Bowles and Mr. Williams to visit the Air Force Missile Test Center at Cape Canaveral, Florida. They have suggested a visit on or about the 14th of June because, if present schedules are maintained, that period offers an excellent opportunity to witness missile launchings. The Air Force would make appropriate arrangements for transportation and accommodations. We concur that such a visit could be valuable. It might give Mr. Bowles and Mr. Williams a more concrete grasp of the operations and objectives of the Atlantic Missile Range, out of which such problems as the South African tracking station have been generated. If you agree, it is recommended that you extend the invitation. If Mr. Bowles or Mr. Williams is interested, we would undertake through the Air Force to make the necessary detailed arrangements with the State Department staff. WP Bundy Enclosure 1 SUBJECT Importance of the Union of South Africa to U.S. naval and maritime interests The Union of South Africa possesses the most extensive and well-equipped harbors in its part of the world. These ports have a combined capacity to handle approximately 250 vessels, primarily at Capetown and Durban. The facilities include adequate numbers of powerful cranes and excellent floating and graving docks permitting major repair and maintenance work on large ships. For example, the largest graving dock in Capetown would handle the Forrestal class carrier. The nearest adequate facilities are at Bahia Blanca, Argentina, and Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, but even these are not equal in capacity to the facilities at Capetown alone. The South African ports are used regularly by our naval and merchant shipping in peacetime. In the event of emergency, their value would be even greater. Closure of the Suez Canal would require extensive use of the route around the Cape of Good Hope. The ports would be then needed not only for services to expanded merchant traffic on that route, but also for support of the antisubmarine forces which might, depending upon the nature of the emergency, be required to keep the route open. The facilities would be needed also for support of any general naval operations by a U.S. Indian Ocean Fleet, and would be important for the staging of U.S. forces should contingency operations be undertaken in the southern part of the African continent. In addition, effective U.S. naval operations south of the equator would require additional shore-based communications to supplement our present facilities in Morocco and Ethiopia. In the circumstances, we would have to rely on the use of South African naval radio facilities at Durban and Simonstown. For all the foregoing purposes, naval visits to the ports of the Union of South Africa are most valuable for familiarization and indoctrination purposes should the need for use of facilities become more urgent. * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Africa 000.92-Africa 452, 1961. Confidential. 1 Confidential. 383. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) 383. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) Source Washington, June 30, 1961. Dear Ros : I am writing to confirm the understanding which was reached at our meeting at the White House yesterday regarding our future course of action on the missile tracking station in South Africa. We will instruct our Embassy in the Union of South Africa to negotiate a two-year extension of existing arrangements in order to retain our present missile tracking facilities there for that period of time. The Navy on its part will undertake to develop seaborne missile tracking facilities to take over the necessary functions upon the expiration of the aforesaid arrangements. Concerning the large aircraft order which the government of the Union of South Africa wishes to place with Lockheed, I understand that we all agreed that it will not be possible under present circumstances for the U.S. Government to authorize it. We will, however, try to avoid giving Lockheed a final decision in this matter until our negotiations with South Africa for an extension of existing arrangements on the missile tracking facilities are complete. 1 With my warmest regards, Sincerely, Chet * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Africa 000.92-Africa 452, 1961. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. 1 On August 11, Gilpatric sent Bowles a letter noting that he had instructed Defense Department staff to cooperate in preparing appropriate instructions to Ambassador Satterthwaite for negotiating continued use of tracking facilities in South Africa through 1963. He warned that the approach had to be very carefully thought out so as not to create undue resentment or suspicion concerning U.S. motives, and pointed out that South Africans had been given to understand that the United States wanted their cooperation for a much longer period. Gilpatric stated that he had issued instructions concerning the development of shipborne tracking capabilities for use after 1963, but reminded Bowles that it had been previously estimated that it would take 3 years to develop this capability. (Ibid.) 384. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa 384. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa Source Washington, August 25, 1961, 9:05 p.m. 175. Reurtels 665 and 3. 1 Department has given careful consideration to points raised by FonMin Louw with Ambassador on June 30 when he requested an indication of attitude of USG regarding future cooperation. Department agrees SAG should have clear and frank statement US policy both in interest of South African Government and to clear air for future cooperation. Department has therefore prepared Aide-Memoire for presentation to FonMin Louw or for Ambassador's background use in conversations with PM and Cabinet officers. Aide-Memoire is in accord with new policy paper now in final stages. Text of Aide-Memoire follows: Begin Verbatim Text “Upon instruction from his Government Ambassador Satterthwaite called on FonMin Louw to discuss with him questions that had been raised by Mr. Louw in his conversation with Ambassador on June 30 as recorded in informal memorandum handed to Ambassador on that occasion. USG has carefully studied Ambassador Satterthwaite's report of this conversation as well as memorandum confirming frank observations made by Mr. Louw. It wishes to respond with equal frankness to those observations because it believes that relations between our two countries should be based, above all, on a clear understanding of respective viewpoints. The US is mindful of long tradition of collaboration between our two countries as exemplified by our brotherhood in arms during First and Second World Wars, during Berlin blockade, and in UN resistance against Communist aggression in Korea. US is gratified to note that SAG still adheres to convictions which led to these common actions, convictions to which US continues to be devoted in equal measure. US also is mindful of wholehearted cooperation it has received from SAG in connection with US civilian and military space vehicle and missile research programs, and others. US however would be lacking in honesty and would be untrue to feelings of friendship it holds for peoples of South Africa if it failed to state its profound concern at evidence of increased racial tensions in South Africa and in country's drift toward international isolation. US can only view continuance of South Africa's official policy of apartheid in terms of ultimate disaster to South Africa. US would agree that there is much misunderstanding and misrepresentation in world concerning South Africa's racial problem, and an unwillingness to give credit for what is being done for benefit of Republic's non-white population. There is no escaping fact however that most nations of world, including many who wish to retain close friendship with South Africa find themselves unable to accept a governmental policy which compels and perpetuates a system which denies fundamental human rights to vast majority of country's population only because of color of their skin. Position of USG in this respect is well-known to SAG. US had taken view before Mr. Williams assumed his duties as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs that situation in South Africa ‘is one that has led to international friction and if continued might endanger international peace and security' as expressed in resolution of UNSC of April 1, 1960. 2 US finds itself unable to agree with SAG's contention that Republic's racial policy represents exclusively a domestic matter. In our view this policy not only does violence to human rights provisions of UN Charter but tends to weaken position of West in its efforts to resist Communist influence and penetration in newly emerged Afro-Asian nations, a matter in which SAG itself has expressed deep concern. As a consequence US for its own and for world security must continue its disapproval of a policy which arouses emotions and resentments of such large segments of population of world. US regrets that press reports of statements by Assistant Secretary Williams have given impression in some circles in South Africa that we regard white population as being expendable and that we urge immediate and unqualified granting of political power to vast non-white majority of South African population. This certainly has never been and is not now intention or desire of US. It is because US is thoroughly aware of great complexity of problem and tremendous importance of white population to future well-being of South Africa that it believes in a planned, purposeful and progressive evolution of institutions that would safeguard basic rights of all elements of South Africa's population. US is deeply concerned over ever-widening chasm between whites and non-whites in South Africa and evidence that non-white moderation is being supplanted by non-white extremism which can only endanger future stability of country. US therefore would warmly welcome the beginnings of any steps which SAG could take to permit non-whites to play a greater role in life of their country and which would be apt to remove some of opprobrium which attaches to South Africa not only in eyes of colored people of world but also in eyes of people of most white nations. Should such steps be taken with view to ultimate full participation US would gladly cooperate to fullest extent possible with South Africa in all fields of endeavor to mutual benefit of both countries and to Free World generally. In absence of such indications of change however US could not be expected to cooperate in matters which it believed would lend support to South Africa's present racial policies. On other hand USG agrees with Mr. Louw's view which we believe is shared by SAG that there are numerous fields in which our two countries can continue to collaborate closely and fruitfully to our mutual benefit and for good of Free World especially in areas of common defense against threats emanating from Communist Bloc. Mention might also be made of our continued desire to cooperate in fields of missile activity and space exploration, atomic energy and in entire range of scientific, technical and research activities. Furthermore USG believes it desirable to maintain and strengthen mutually desirable cooperation and exchanges which have existed in cultural, educational, health and welfare and other fields. USG is confident now that divergent views of both Governments have been made clear that relations between our two countries will continue to be characterized by frankness, sincerity and mutual trust as in past.” End Verbatim Text . State and Defense have agreed on desirability negotiating with SAG for continued use and planned expansion of AMR tracking facilities, at least through 1963. Department has received impression that until US policy towards Republic clarified we cannot expect their cooperation on matters of interest to us. Situation may have changed since July 1 however and Ambassador may feel it desirable to advise SAG and SAAF informally of US desire discuss tracking station arrangements even before presentation of aide-memoire, particularly if it appears appointment with FonMin will be delayed. As Embassy is aware USAF would like to let contracts within next few weeks for construction necessary to install Phase 2 equipment which should be operational in January. Department's hope is that SAG's reaction to aide-memoire will be reasonably favorable and that Ambassador can indicate at same time or shortly thereafter US desire discuss tracking arrangements. (FYI: If SAG agrees to discussions Department and Defense would send small joint team to assist Ambassador in negotiations and to explain USAF plans and needs. End FYI) 3 Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.70X/7-161. Confidential; Verbatim Text. Drafted by Wight on August 22; cleared by Packard, Hennes, Winfree, and Bronez (OSD); and approved by Fredericks. 1 Telegram 665, June 30 (ibid., 110.15-WI/6-3061), and telegram 3, July 1 (ibid., 611.70X/7-161), reported Ambassador Satterthwaite's June 30 meeting with Foreign Minister Eric Louw. 2 For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, pp. 635-636. 3 On September 5, Ambassador Satterthwaite reported that Louw's reaction to the aide-memoire giving the U.S. position on future cooperation with South Africa had been so negative that he had not raised the question of the U.S. tracking station with the Foreign Minister. (Telegram 178, September 5; ibid., 611.70X/9-561; telegram 180, September 6; ibid., 611.70X/9-661) 385. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Williams) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) 385. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Williams) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) Source Washington, September 16, 1961. I-16, 421/61 SUBJECT South African Tracking Facilities Foreign Minister Louw's reaction to the U.S. aide-memoire explaining its policy towards South Africa (Tab A) 1 was adverse in the extreme (Tab B). 2 In essence, he interpreted our policy as one in which we would cooperate with the Federation only in matters of benefit to the U.S., such as the missile and satellite tracking facilities. On other matters we would not only not cooperate with South Africa, but would oppose it, until it changes its apartheid policy. In Louw's view, the U.S. appears to want “to have its cake and eat it too.” There are two matters of immediate interest to South Africa which, if the U.S. fails to cooperate, would most likely mean the end of South African assistance with respect to our missile and satellite tracking activities there. The first concerns the possibility of South Africa seeking a second drawdown of IMF funds. According to Louw, South Africa hoped not to have to make this second drawing, but would seek it if necessary to strengthen the economy of the country and further to improve the welfare of the Bantu. Louw, however, had heard that the U.S. intends to oppose the second drawdown and indicated that, if this were so, it was a most serious matter in our relationship. The second matter concerns the recent formal request by the South African Embassy here for approval of the sale of seven C-130 aircraft by Lockheed. It is Ambassador Satterthwaite's view that refusal of the sale may foreclose any further South African cooperation in the field of mutual defense and make it impossible to negotiate arrangements for the continued use of the tracking facilities. We understand that the State Department is seeking Secretary Rusk's approval of a reply to the South African Embassy which would deny its request for the sale of the seven C-130s. I strongly recommend that you call Secretary Rusk personally, asking him to hold up action on this until our two Departments can review thoroughly the South African response to the U.S. aide-memoire and its implications concerning future South African cooperation in the field of mutual defense. In this regard, Foreign Minister Louw will attend the UN General Assembly next week and is scheduled to meet with Secretary Rusk. I further recommend that you arrange a meeting with Mr. Rusk before then to discuss these problems with him. If Secretary Rusk should indicate that it had previously been agreed between State and Defense that the sale of aircraft to South Africa should not be authorized, you may wish to point out that this was done in the context of South African desires for F-104s as well as C-130s and with the anticipation that this could be accomplished without jeopardizing arrangements for the tracking facilities. Haydn Williams * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Africa, 000.92-Africa 452, 1961. Secret. 1 Not attached to the source text. See Document 384 . 2 Not attached to the source text. See footnote 3, Document 384 . 386. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 386. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Source Washington, September 21, 1961. Dear Mac : We are now facing a difficult situation in regard to the Republic of South Africa on which I would appreciate your assistance. As you know, the Republic's apartheid policy has made it a primary target of the Asian and African bloc; indeed, of a large segment of opinion in the United States and Western Europe. If we were free agents, our voting position in the United Nations on the Republic and our policies in regard to this government would be designed to encourage a change in the basic attitudes, and in the interval to express our strong disapproval. However, a year ago we agreed with the Pentagon to negotiate for the establishment of the tracking station in South Africa for which an initial agreement runs out on December 31st; as a result we are under direct and indirect pressure to make concessions to this government which are bound to be costly to us in the United Nations and in our relations with the world generally. At present, I can think of five points which bear upon this problem. 1. Naval maneuvers involving a few American warships with additional vessels from the South African and British navies, and with Portuguese observers, are scheduled for late October and early November. This is a continuation of maneuvers held in 1959 and 1960. If it were not for the leverage provided to the South African government by the tracking station, I do not think we would consider participating in these maneuvers. Their military importance can be no more than marginal to us. However, for South Africa the advantage is very real in that this can be used to indicate that this Republic is an “ally” of the United States. The impact in the United Nations when reports of these maneuvers appear in late October should be carefully weighed. 2. South Africa is considering the purchase of $100 million worth of airplanes from a U.S. corporation. Although the transaction would be for dollars, it requires licenses from us. If it were not for the tracking station, our reaction would certainly be negative in view of the fact that public opinion generally would assume that the primary use of these planes would be to suppress internal disorder. There is now a fair possibility that South Africa may decide to buy the planes in France so our present position is to stall. 3. South Africa has requested $75 million from the International Monetary Fund. Although we have no veto power over such a transaction, our position as a principal contributor is of great importance. We have agreed to the sum of $37.5 million because to refuse to do so would be to break all kinds of precedents. Once again, however, if it were not for the tracking station we would under no circumstances agree to the additional $37.5 million which in the eyes of the world will be connected with the purchase of the airplanes. 4. The Republic of South Africa is urgently calling on us for support for its membership on the United Nations Outer Space Committee. Although they do not have a chance of being elected even with all the influence we can bring to bear, it would be difficult for us under present circumstances to refuse to make this effort. Yet if we do so we will be taking one more step toward allying ourselves with what is perhaps the most unpopular nation outside the Communist world. 5. When Ambassador Satterthwaite went to Africa, we instructed him to invite black Africans to private and public receptions at his home. We did this knowing that such action would undoubtedly be subjected to criticism by the local government, criticism which we were fully prepared to meet, if necessary leaving our Embassy under the supervision of a Charge. Ambassador Satterthwaite has had black Africans to his home privately. But because of our desire not to upset the government in view of pending negotiations for the tracking station, he has not invited black Africans to his public receptions. If we are forced to take these actions, most of which will become known to the public in the midst of a highly explosive United Nations session in which the attitudes of the Asians and Africans will be of decisive importance, we will probably have to pay a heavy political price. I have great sympathy with the Pentagon's problem and I have no desire to make this situation more difficult. However, when the agreement was reached a year ago in an exchange of letters between State and Defense in August and September of 1960, it was agreed that “the (tracking) station would be removed if, due to later political developments in the African area, it should become a net disadvantage to United States interests.” The Pentagon now apparently feels that the tracking station is of such great military importance that we have no alternative but to bargain out the situation as best we can. Because of the basic importance of this question to our political position not only in the Republic of South Africa but in Africa as a whole, I would be grateful if Jerry Wiesner or some other outside authority in the scientific field could examine the possible alternatives and perhaps bring a fresh mind to bear on the problem. If such a study accepts the view that this tracking station is of primary vital importance to our defense effort and if no other alternative is available, then I suppose we shall have to do the best we can. I have discussed this matter with Ros Gilpatric, and he has agreed that we should hold up decisions on the question of maneuvers for a few days. He also agrees that it would be a good idea if Jerry Wiesner, or some other competent outside scientific authority, reviewed the entire matter of our tracking stations. 1 This is a difficult situation with foreseeable political consequences, and I hate to see us take the final plunge without making every effort to try to find a way out of the dilemma. With my warmest regards, Sincerely, Chet Bowles * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Africa, Vol. II, General. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. 1 See Document 389 . 387. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa 387. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa Source Washington, September 28, 1961, 10:36 a.m. 249. Urtels 180, 181, 220, 229, 230. 1 Following guidance is supplied in reply reftels. In view FonMin's emotional reaction to aide-memoire, leave to your judgment whether amplification and further interpretation are useful. Dept surprised that aide-memoire interpreted to mean that “USG desired cooperate only in fields useful to it” since we consider certainly of mutual benefit cooperation which has existed in cultural, educational, health, scientific and other fields. In reply to FonMin's request for further interpretation two sentences mentioned urtel 180 Dept considers first sentence refers to position USG must take bilaterally, as well as in UN and international organizations. It seems unnecessary to reiterate why we feel SA policy not in accord with human rights provision of UN Charter. It appears obvious that apartheid policy does not recognize “dignity and worth of human person” when individuals not permitted by law to live where they wish or travel without special permit, as well as hundreds of other regulations, such as job discrimination, based solely on grounds of race. Correction should be made in Deptel 190 in reply to urtel 161. 2 In third paragraph Deptel 190 change phrase “several generations” to “a number of years.” FYI: Re SAG drawing from IMF, on July 5 IMF announced it had entered into standby arrangement under which SAG may draw up to 75 million dollars during next 12 months. Agreement with the IMF provides for review of situation after six months, such review being necessary before SAG could draw second tranche 37-1/2 million dollars. Since the six months have not yet elapsed, no review has been made and the question of a further drawing has not yet arisen. As FonMin pointed out it is quite possible that no further drawing will be necessary. If a second drawing is requested, the Department is not now prepared to consider it favorably. However this is Dept of State position which has not yet been adopted as USG decision. Dept understands that Per Jacobsson of IMF was planning tell SA officials, in connection original IMF action in approving drawing and line of credit, that SAG intention expend large sums foreign exchange for purchase military fighter and transport aircraft does not seem in consonance with SAG's need conserve foreign exchange. End FYI. In view of uncertainties mentioned above and the impossibility of foreseeing what situation may be in January, suggest you should not inform SAG of above. You may note that IMF review has not taken place and that much depends on result of this review and situation which exists at the time; but that the US position on this matter, if it arises, will not be based on political considerations. Secretary has agreed to see FonMin Louw in Washington. Appointment with President appears impossible in view large numbers FonMins who may be attending UN session and who might then also request Presidential meeting. Sale of C-130 aircraft, participation in CAPEX exercise, and negotiation of tracking agreement all matters receiving high level consideration. Will inform you soonest when decisions reached. Bowles * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.70X/9-2561. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Wight on September 12; cleared by Martin, Brubeck, and Bowles; and approved by Fredericks. 1 Telegrams 180 and 181, September 6, are ibid., 611.70X/9-661. Telegram 220, September 20, is ibid., 611.70X/9-2061. Telegrams 229 and 230, September 25, are ibid., 770X.5622/9-2561 and 611.70X/9-2561, respectively. 2 Both dated August 29. (Ibid., 611.70X/8-2961) 388. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa 388. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa Source Washington, September 29, 1961, 8:08 p.m. 256. For Satterthwaite. The Department has approved licensing C-130 transports for sale to Government South Africa but cannot approve licensing and sale of F-104s. South African Embassy informed of above. Department is continuing urgent high level review with appropriate agencies need for continuation Tracking Station Agreement after expiration date and wishes arrive at this decision insofar as possible unhampered by other considerations. Department will advise you promptly of results review this important matter and decision as to whether or not negotiations for extension Tracking Station Agreement will be required. Bowles * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770X.5622/9-2961. Confidential; Niact; No Distribution Outside of Department. Drafted by Deming, cleared by Fredericks, and approved by Bowles. 389. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Wiesner) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 389. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Wiesner) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Source Washington, October 18, 1961. In response to your request, 1 I have investigated the matter of the Air Force tracking station in South Africa raised by Chester Bowles' memorandum to you (attached). 2 I have talked to a number of people in the Air Force, including Assistant Secretary McMillan, and to Ros Gilpatric. The following are the facts: The South African station is used for receiving telemetering data to provide diagnostic information in the event of failure in certain of our satellite tests. At the present time the only programs involved are the Midas Ballistic Missile Warning Satellite and the Advent Communications Satellite. Both of these are research programs of importance, but are not among the highest priority Defense Department space programs. If we were forced out of the Union of South Africa, we would have to operate without this particular diagnostic data until either we get another land-based site (the Air Force is seeking a new site, but we shouldn't count on their finding one), or we are able to prepare a tracking ship to substitute for the land-based station. The Air Force estimates that this could not be done until late fall of 1962 at the earliest. However, since the test programs could be carried on, albeit some-what less effectively, Secretary Gilpatric has agreed to the position that loss of this site would be painful, but not fatal, and therefore we should advise the State Department to proceed in the following manner: neither be deliberately provocative and thus insure that we will be ordered out, nor permit the need for the site to be the reason for compromise on issues which the State Department regards as fundamental in the conduct of its foreign policy. Jerry * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Africa. Secret. 1 An attached memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to Secretary Rusk reads: “Some weeks ago I had a long letter from Chester Bowles reporting disagreement between his office and Ros Gilpatric on the importance of the Air Force tracking station in South Africa. A copy of the letter is attached. He asked that the matter be arbitrated through a review by Jerry Wiesner. Wiesner's review is now at hand, and in essence his view is reported in the third paragraph of the enclosed memorandum from him to me. From the little I know of the matter, it makes sense. I hear you are receiving Foreign Minister Louw tomorrow, and accordingly I think you will want to know of this episode and of Wiesner's technical conclusion in which Secretary Gilpatric concurs.” 2 Document 386 . 390. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa 390. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa Source Washington, October 24, 1961, 6:55 p.m. 349. Embtel 292. 1 For Ambassador. You are requested commence negotiations with SAG for extension on open-end basis of present informal agreement for military research tracking installation. You should make clear US would desire now proceed with installation of programmed equipment as already informally discussed with SAG. In pre-senting foregoing, you should point out US space program requirements under continual review and that in this fast changing field both space programs and requirements for supporting them are subject to substantial change from year to year. For this reason US believes most satisfactory arrangement would be continuation of present flexible informal undertakings by new exchange of letters. You should also state USG desires continue use ports and airfields in connection long range missile tests, and would provide periodic schedules as heretofore concerning these tests. In explaining delay to South Africans you may wish point out well known fact new administration undertook very thorough extensive review of national space program, that of Department of Defense as well as NASA. During period this review present arrangements for military tracking station operated very satisfactorily. As indicated above, results this review show desirability of continuing flexible arrangements of present type of South Africa, subject cancellation by either Government within such reasonable period as may be mutually agreeable. FYI. White House Science Adviser has reviewed with Defense requirement for military tracking stations South Africa. Conclusion is that loss this station would be “painful but not fatal.” Conclusion also supports Department's attitude on which State-Defense understanding exists that we will not alter our basic national policy toward South Africa including our opposition to apartheid in order to retain station. Alternatives to South African station would require at best six months to two years to make ready. It therefore necessary for US seek extension of present facilities on present site for time being. As you know, Department of Defense is undertaking to prepare shipborne capability with view to having this ready by end of 1963. Secretary's discussions with Louw on 20th which is subject following telegram 2 did not include subject of tracking station agreement though Louw referred to stations as tangible evidence SA desire cooperate with US. End FYI. 3 Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770X.56311/10-1261. Secret. Drafted by Wight, Gathright, and Hennes on October 23; cleared by Kitchen, Brubeck, William P. Bundy in substance, and Fredericks; and approved by Bowles. 1 Dated October 12. (Ibid.) 2 Document 391 . 3 On October 30, Ambassador Satterthwaite called on Foreign Secretary Jooste and left an aide-memoire containing the substance of the U.S. proposal contained in the telegram printed here. (Telegram 347 from Pretoria, October 30; Department of State, Central Files, 770X.56311/10-3061) On December 19, Satterthwaite reported that the South African Government had decided to grant a temporary 90-day extension of the exisiting missile tracking agreement. (Telegram 507 from Pretoria; ibid., 611.70X7/12-1961) 391. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa 391. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa Source Washington, October 25, 1961, 7:57 p.m. 352. Urtel 327. 1 Fol summary uncleared memorandum conversation Rusk-Louw Oct 20: 2 Louw stated South Africa's position international issues clearly on side West, anti-Communist, and SAG support could be depended on any future world conflict. However, South Africa unclear where other Western countries stand in relation South Africa. At UN his delegation not taken into confidence of West and therefore resented being asked how they will vote on UN matters just before vote taken. Ambassador Naude interjected at this point to say day to day contacts with West at UN quite satisfactory but would prefer systematized arrangement. As further example isolation Louw said he not informed US and Western views Berlin issue. Secretary thereupon informed Louw frankly and at length US policy on Berlin, position principal allies, Soviet objectives and our estimate long-range outlook for reunification Germany. Louw said his government disturbed by US aide-memoire September 5 especially what he regarded as our policy of “divided cooperation.” Indicated not satisfied so far with US explanation this policy which seemingly based on premise US cannot cooperate with South Africa because it denying human rights. Such conception apparently based misapprehension conditions South Africa and reasons for its policy. Wrong describe South Africa's policy “separate development” as denial human rights since this policy necessary to ensure most fundamental human rights of survival to which South Africa's whites entitled. Louw said objective observer in South Africa would see Bantu developing own independent political and social system. South African white knows we can't transplant white man's system government on Bantu. Therefore SAG helping them develop their own systems on ethnic basis to preserve own cultural values. He noted Ambassador Satterthwaite in discussion with him had noted “job reservation” as one example denial human rights. FonMin said this not case, that reserving certain jobs for whites and blacks related to question “survival” and was also means protecting whites and blacks against Coloreds. Louw summarized by saying despite our misapprehensions and despite our criticism and opprobrium toward his government on race policy, South Africa has cooperated and continues cooperate with US in providing missile tracking stations and military facilities, her ports and airfields on highly confidential matters often on short notice. Now he wanted know how USG intended cooperate with SAG. Secretary stated he would like see total US-SA cooperation in this troubled world. However, we cannot as nation and people with our history accept apartheid policy. This a major moral issue which affects our relations with other countries and we have chosen take our stand forthrightly in UN in accordance with our beliefs and conscience. Despite this we have for considerable period attempted to act as moderator in UN on items involving SA and this role quite frankly has been an increasing burden to us. We sincerely hope SA can find ways improve her position in UN these matters and give opportunity for wisdom and time to moderate these issues. Secretary observed that all of us in West presently faced historical problem of coming into some reasonable relationship with non-white world. In this connection he expressed to Louw concern that our Embassy in SA cannot have normal relationship with population that prevails all other countries. Louw responded if Secretary meant that Embassy cannot have Bantu at its receptions that he would always oppose any change in this policy since it would mean for SA accepting social integration and the end of SA Race Pride to which it had a right. Secretary summarized by stating that while US and SA cannot agree on matter race relations he saw no need why this disagreement should infect total range our relations. Louw complained failure US Delegate support his right free speech in GA debate rather than in statement issued after session adjourned and observed that seemed to him US fearful antagonizing African members UN. Secretary replied principal US delegate unable attend session in question and issued statement as soon as he learned what had taken place. Secretary told Louw he could not accept inference that US positions based on fear other nations rather than on our best judgment what would be in best interests free world. Louw said he wished retract statement. Call ended on cordial note Louw stating he expected be in attend-ance at UN until end November and Secretary suggesting they might meet again in New York to continue discussion. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.70X/10-2461. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Durnan and Deming, cleared by Manfull and Swanks, and approved by Fredericks. Repeated to USUN. 1 Dated October 24. (Ibid.) 2 The memorandum of conversation is ibid., Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. 392. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Battle) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 392. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Battle) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Source Washington, November 13, 1961. SUBJECT Presidential Message to Chief Luthuli, Winner of 1960 Nobel Peace Prize Chief Albert John Luthuli, President of the African National Congress and the best known opponent of the South African Government's racial policies, has been awarded the 1960 Nobel Peace Prize. This is in recognition of Chief Luthuli's consistent efforts over the past thirty years against racial discrimination and his attempts to advance his people, using non-violent methods. A congratulatory message from the President will be a source of encouragement to him and all opponents of apartheid, and will be beneficial to us in the over-all African context. The Government of South Africa will, of course, be greatly displeased. However, such a message falls clearly within the strong position this Government has taken on apartheid, and there will be important segments of the South African white population and the press who will understand and applaud our move. In accordance with the White House request 1 there is enclosed a proposed message from the President to Chief Luthuli to be delivered to him at Oslo in the form of a letter. 2 The award is to be made on December 10, and Chief Luthuli should be arriving in Oslo sometime early in December. The Department recommends that the President's message be published shortly following delivery to Chief Luthuli. M L Manfull 3 * Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Countries, South Africa, Republic of. Official Use Only. No drafting information appears on the source text. 1 A previous Department of State memorandum proposing that the President send a message to Chief Luthuli bears a handwritten notation that reads: “JFK does not approve—no message.” (Memorandum from Battle to Bundy, October 26; ibid., National Security Files, Countries Series, Africa) On November 3, Assistant Secretary Williams sent Kennedy a personal letter strongly recommending that it was in the interest of the United States that Luthuli's great cause be recognized and celebrated anew by a public message from the President of the United States. He noted that Luthuli, who was an avowed protagonist of building a future based on equality and cooperation among all the races of the Republic, might well play an important role in the future of South Africa. (Ibid.) 2 The message attached to the source text reads: “I have been moved by the award to you of the 1960 Nobel Peace Prize and I join with many others from all parts of the world in extending sincere congratulations to you. This high recognition of your past and continuing efforts in the cause of justice and the advancement through peaceful means of the brotherhood of man is applauded by free men everywhere. Please accept my best wishes for your continued health and well-being.” (Ibid., President's Office Files, Countries, South Africa, Republic of) On December 14, Chief Luthuli sent Kennedy a letter from Oslo expressing his very sincere thanks for the President's most inspiring message. (Ibid.) 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Manfull signed the original above Battle's typed signature. 393. Memorandum of Conversation 393. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, November 20, 1961. SUBJECT US/UK Talks—Summary Minutes—South Africa PARTICIPANTS United Kingdom Sir Roger Stevens, Deputy Under Secretary, Foreign Office Sir Algernon Rumbold, Deputy Under Secretary, Commonwealth Relations M. K. M. Wilford, Foreign Office J. D. Hennings, Colonial Attache, British Embassy D. A. Greenhill, Counselor, British Embassy J. D. B. Shaw, First Secretary, British Embassy R. W. H. DuBoulay, First Secretary, British Embassy United States G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs J. Wayne Fredericks, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Henry J. Tasca, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Olcott H. Deming, Director, AFE Martin F. Herz, Special Assistant for Planning, AF Philip R. Cook, AFE Sir Algernon Rumbold opened the discussion and stated that his remarks would be grouped under three main headings: (1) Speculation about the future of the Republic, (2) Negotiations to bring UK-South African relations up-to-date following the latter's withdrawal from the Commonwealth and (3) Pressures for sanctions against the Republic. Under heading (1) Sir Algernon commented that there would be no change in the South African Government's policies without a change in the government itself and there was no chance of this taking place. The Afrikaners were tough, stubborn, in-bred people and pressure from outside would simply drive them further into “laager.” Internal pressure was ineffective and if the African people tried to overthrow the government by force they would be massacred. Suggestions about an effective African general strike were pointless since the African people could not afford to keep it up long enough to do any good. The doctrine of “apartheid” was nothing new in South Africa and was deeply ingrained in the backgrounds of all people, black and white, in the Republic. What liberal elements there were came mainly from the English speaking group sprinkled with a few Afrikaner intellectuals. Sir Algernon continued by stating that the British Government [ 2 lines of source text not declassified ] saw no possibility of multi-racial sharing such as was being tried in the Federation. The UK's major concerns in this area were: (1) the dependence of the High Commission Territories on the Republic and the ease with which the Republic could squeeze these territories if it chose to do so, (2) the safety of the sea routes, the Simonstown base, flying rights and other Defense arrangements, (3) the #900 million UK investment in the Republic, (4) the fact that 5% of the UK's total exports were bought by the Republic and (5) the importance of gold production to the Sterling area. Turning to current negotiations with the Republic (heading 2), Sir Algernon explained that the UK's over-all objective was to cease treating the Republic as a member of the Commonwealth but to arrange means to treat it as a friendly country and protect the UK interests just mentioned. He referred to the present “stand fast” law, which will expire on May 31, 1962, and spoke of the complicated new legislation which was required. The UK, he said, hoped to complete its negotiations with the Republic on this matter before Christmas but the South Africans were very slow. Among the problems which had been or were being discussed were: (1) The Nationality Problem—The UK would not apply the Irish formula. South Africans would be aliens but certain South Africans would have the right to register as British up to 1965. Special provisions would be made for the High Commission territories and free movement between them and the Republic would continue. (2) Customs—The UK wanted the customs agreement between the H.C. territories and the Republic to continue. (3) Extradition Problems. (4) Defense—The Simonstown base would continue, there would be provisions for the defense of the sea routes and for flying rights and, the UK would provide certain types of military equipment and military training (but not anti-riot equipment or training). (5) Sterling Area—The Republic would stay in. (6) Commonwealth Preference—It would continue. (7) Sugar Agreement—It had been completed. Sir Algernon stated that the UK believed sanctions against the South African Republic would be counter-productive. Therefore, he said, the UK would not apply sanctions, would not support a UN move to do so and certainly would not sever diplomatic relations. The African people, Sir Algernon said, would be the first to suffer from sanctions and the people in the High Commission territories would be adversely affected. Imposing sanctions would create an awkward precedent. Who would be next? The UK did not wish to prejudice her interests in the Republic. Furthermore, sanctions would tend to force the present opposition into alignment with the Nationalist Government since no South African could approve a move designed to harm the economy. Finally, Sir Algernon said he doubted whether sanctions would be effective in view of the basic strength of the South African economy. Assistant Secretary Williams responded stating that the U.S. did not have such important interests in South Africa as the British. He noted U.S. investment, the tracking station and the U.S. Navy's anti-submarine interests but said that the U.S. was unwilling to compromise its principles to maintain those interests. Therefore, the U.S. was relatively free in South Africa as compared, for example, with Angola. The Assistant Secretary said that U.S. policy towards the Republic was based on three factors:—(1) South Africa's economy could make great contributions to Africans and to the rest of the African continent. Accordingly, the U.S. hated to see it destroyed. (2) The U.S. and the Republic shared a common western heritage, had been comrades in arms in two world wars and in Korea and were both unquestionably anti-communist. (3) Apartheid, however, was obnoxious. It created a breeding ground for communism and made U.S. relations with the rest of the African continent very difficult. Therefore, U.S. policy was to “rifle in” on the aspects of South Africa we did not like but support those aspects we did like. We had conveyed this policy in an Aide-Memoire to the Republic but it had been viewed as a serious impediment to the maintenance of friendly relations. Examples of our policy in action were:—(1) The Aircraft Sale —They wanted fighters and transports but we approved only transports. (2) The IMF Loan —We had scrutinized this closely but had approved the first tranche since first tranche approvals were traditionally granted by the Fund. (3) The Tracking Station—We were going ahead with this but we would not sacrifice our policies or our freedom of action to get it. Assistant Secretary Williams said the U.S. might 1 have to pick and choose sanctions which bilaterally would help the U.S. position with the rest of Africa. He commented that the U.S. had opposed sanctions in the UN and might continue to do so. The U.S. wanted to “zero in” on the real targets but, at the same time, it did not want to force the Republic into “laager.” The U.S. recognized that South Africans were tough and wanted to show them it was just as tough. During the course of the discussion which followed Mr. Tasca advanced the view that the West African nations would attack the U.S. and the U.K. for an “easy” South African policy and would turn to the Soviet Union. Sir Roger Stevens replied that this was a problem but he believed it could be met. He said that the UK did not believe its South African policy would seriously damage the UK's relations with other African nations. He felt that the other nations appreciated that the UK was a large trading partner with the Republic and pointed out that India had opposed sanctions in the UN too. Sir Roger warned that the question of how apartheid was attacked was crucial and stated, “you must be careful you don't do more harm than good.” Governor Williams reiterated that the U.S. believed it was necessary to do something about apartheid and expressed the belief that the time of the Europeans in South Africa was limited. Sir Roger and Sir Algernon replied that if this were true there were only two possible results. Either a “bloody revolution,” which would be a “terrible mess,” or a gradual “leavening of the lump” on the race question. The UK believed that the latter was the best hope. Sir Roger added that the U.S. would bear a very grave responsibility if it gave any encouragement to Africans to attempt to overthrow the South African Government. Governor Williams asked whether sabotage of the Republic's gold mines would not cripple the economy. The British delegation replied that the situation in the mines was quite good and there was no history of disorders in this sector. However, there were undoubted economic weaknesses in apartheid and the Bantustan border development plan was described as “just talk.” At the close of the meeting Governor Williams stated that the U.S. wanted to be sure that U.S. inter-racial policies were reflected in its operations overseas. Accordingly, Ambassador Satterthwaite had been instructed to hold inter-racial dinners and improve contacts with non-Europeans. Sir Roger commented, “I presume the U.S. does not want to provoke a break in diplomatic relations with South Africa.” Governor Williams replied that the U.S. wanted to maintain diplomatic relations as long as relations were meaningful but it would run the risk of a break if its operations were restricted. * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.41/11-2061. Confidential. Drafted by Cook on December 13. 1 At this point in the source text the word “would” is crossed out and replaced with a handwritten “might.” 394. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa 394. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa Source Washington, February 20, 1962, 4:47 p.m. 12. State/Defense message. Embtel 31 repeated Pretoria 40. 1 In connection negotiation tracking station agreement you are authorized in your discretion: (1) Indicate we agree in principle authorize sidewinder purchase, subject completion certain technical security procedures and with delivery dates subject availability of equipment. Department awaiting reply note to SA Embassy January 31 requesting information concerning SA timing requirements and the control and associated equipment planned for acquisition and for utilization with sidewinder; (2) Indicate we would welcome having SAAF liaison officer at site, FYI keeping in mind we not in position assume SAG personnel costs, end FYI; (3) Reiterate substance Deptel 360 to Pretoria 2 concerning our willingness compensate SAG for out-of-pocket costs of alternative site. 3 Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.70X7/2-1762. Secret. Drafted by Bronez (OSD/ISA) and Durnan on February 19; cleared by Packard, Hunt in substance, Robinson, Deming, Manning, and Bronez; and approved by Fredericks. Repeated to Pretoria. 1 Telegram 31, February 17, reported the reservations of some senior South African Defense officials regarding the proposed tracking station agreement. (Ibid.) 2 Dated October 26, 1961. (Ibid., 770X.56311/10-2661) 3 On February 27, Ambassador Satterthwaite reported that he had discussed the tracking station agreement with Foreign Minister Jooste as instructed. Jooste had insisted that his government was requesting nothing except essential military items required to protect the country from external military aggression, by which he meant specifically Communist-supported forces from abroad. The Foreign Minister also declared that he was sure South Africa could comply with U.S. security requirements. (Telegram 37 from Cape Town; ibid., 611.70X7/2-2762) 395. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State 395. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State Source Cape Town, March 17, 1962, 11 a.m. 59. Department pass Defense. Acting under instructions Department telegram 22 1 Clark and I met this morning with Jooste and Botha leaving with them draft aide-memoire containing verbatim text of reference telegram and incorporating expression our appreciation evidence SAG willingness cooperate in extension tracking agreement. 2 I made clear we prefer convey our intent regarding military equipment procurement in aide-memoire, altering as little as possible form and content draft letter provided Department telegram 460. 3 I also gave Jooste additional copies draft letter already furnished informally to Peter Phili on December 11. Jooste said he would pass our aide-memoire and draft letter immediately to his own people and would take up with Cabinet first thing Monday morning. Until Cabinet had reacted he could make no comment officially although it was evident from his pleased expression that he felt negotiations were “back on the tracks.” I enquired about further “negotiable details” which Jooste might have in mind. He said he had opposed an earlier suggestion of three-months termination notice and would prefer six which was more consistent with existing agreements. I replied that six months was exact period we had in mind as he would find when he read our draft letter. One or two other points Jooste said he preferred not to discuss further until Cabinet had seen our proposals. In general however, he agreed with us that we should introduce as few new elements as possible into discussion beyond those which USG already prepared to clear. Comment : We were encouraged by evident satisfaction with which our reply to SAG aide-memoire of March 9 was received and by Jooste responses, which were free of implications that any new obstacles from their side evident on horizon. 4 Satterthwaite * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.70X7/3-1762. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Pretoria. 1 Telegram 22, March 15, authorized Satterthwaite to express the U.S. Government's gratification at South Africa's willingness to cooperate in extension of the tracking agreement and to propose a formal exchange of letters. (Ibid., 611.70X7/3-1062) 2 Telegram 52 from Cape Town, March 9, transmitted the text of a South African aide-memoire that stated the South African Government was prepared to agree to the U.S. proposal regarding an arrangement to be arrived at between the two governments in regard to U.S. tracking operations for an unfixed period subject to termination after due notice by either party. (Ibid., 611.70X7/3-962) 3 Not found. 4 On June 15, Satterthwaite and Jooste exchanged diplomatic notes in Cape Town signifying the conclusion of the Missile Tracking Agreement. The Embassy in Cape Town transmitted the texts of the notes and accompanying aides-memoire to the Department of State in despatch 81 from Cape Town, June 18. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.70X7/6-1862) 396. Memorandum of Conversation 396. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, August 31, 1962. SUBJECT Southwest Africa, the United Nations, and Self-Determination PARTICIPANTS His Excellency Dr. Willem C. Naude, South African Ambassador Mr. Pieter H. J. J. van Vuuren, First Secretary The Secretary Mr. Richard H. Sanger Secretary Rusk then asked Ambassador Naude regarding the size of population of South West Africa and was told it was about one-half million persons. On being asked what the attitude was towards their present associations with South Africa, Ambassador Naude remarked that a plebiscite had been held in 1946 which indicated that the majority wished to continue their association with South Africa. The South African Ambassador then reminded Mr. Rusk that, at Versailles, Smuts had pressed hard for the mandate system for places such as Iraq where eventual independence could be envisioned. However, some places in the world were of such a nature that they had to be regarded as an integral part of the mandating power. Mr. Rusk confirmed his knowledge of these “C” mandates, and asked the Ambassador what he felt was the attitude of the inhabitants of South West Africa towards South Africa at the present time. The Ambassador said he did not feel he could express himself on this topic. He stated that some of the inhabitants of South West Africa are not happy with the present situation, but he felt that the so-called “representatives of the people of South Africa” did not represent the thinking of the majority of the people of that area when they testified at the UN. One South West African who was at New York three years ago was now completely discredited by his own people, and had gone to live in Scandinavia. Secretary Rusk then asked the Ambassador why, if his Government really had confidence in the attitude towards it of the people of South West Africa, they did not “nail down” the fact that those Africans were pleased with their present relationship to South Africa. * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 601.70X11/8-3162. Confidential. Drafted by Sanger and approved in S on October 4. Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Naude's discussion of other subjects on August 31 was recorded in four additional memoranda of conversation. (Ibid., Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330) 397. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 397. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State Source New York, October 6, 1962, 9 p.m. Secto 88. Fol based on uncleared MemCon: During course two hour discussion with Secy on Oct 6, 1 FonMin Louw made somewhat rambling presentation South African position mostly along lines previously brought out by him, by Amb Naude, or in GSA aide-memoire handed Secy Aug 31. Among chief points touched on were: 1. Most of SA's troubles and those of US as well due to new found strength Afro-Asian-Bloc coalition. 2. GSA believes just solution racial problem is in gradual development of Bantustans, permitting Africans slow but steady move toward self-government. 3. Communist undercurrent in SA growing stronger and GSA forced to take unusual measures to deal with it. 4. GSA seeking closer relations with other African states but recent overtures to Madagascar turned down flatly as was move toward Japan. 5. FonMin expressed discouragement over political future in much of Africa including deteriorating situations in Nigeria, Kenya, Angola, Tanganyika and Rhodesias. Said target of Africans not just colonialism but White domination and even removal White man from scene. He quoted series anti-White utterances as proving this point. 6. Louw said SA not Africa but Europe. Much of agitation in SA being encouraged from UN and by US citizens, such as George Hauser of ACA. Critical remarks of Asst Secy Williams unhelpful. Many so-called African petitioners “not genuine.” Real headquarters for African revolutionary movement now moved from Ghana to Cairo. 7. Further discussion of Bantustans followed, including problems with troublesome visitors, fact that Bantu not farmer but cattleman, and growing instances of sabotage. 8. Louw explained his govt firmly on side of West in Korea, Berlin, etc., and cooperating closely with US space program. He wondered why US leaving GSA to fend for itself in face communist gains in Ghana, Mali, Guinea and elsewhere in Africa. White positions ending in Kenya, Nyasaland, Rhodesias and possibly Angola, but GSA has “appreciation of importance of White bastion.” South Africans cannot go to Europe and so must hold where they now are. In reply, Secy said US appreciated SA role in three wars and in cold war, and wishes for good relations with GSA in spite of disagreements. But FonMin must realize that if expressions US attitude on race problems not well received in SA, US determination to have good relations with SA complicates our dealings with other African states. He reviewed US commitments to basic democratic principles as defined Preamble of UN Charter. Secy also made point that although we well aware views of GSA on subject, we feel White peoples handing Black races over to communism unless satisfactory relationships between Whites and Blacks can be established. US working against Afro-Asian demands for sanctions against SA at this GA session. 2 We cannot satisfy everyone's wishes but we can work for moderation. If this US position understood, no reason why US-GSA bilateral relationships cannot improve. FonMin thanked Secy for his explanation US commitment to principle and said South Africans have commitment to right of survival. Because US has relatively few Blacks, “what is for you a common cold is for us double pneumonia.” Rusk * Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2150. Confidential. Drafted by Sanger and cleared by Grant. Repeated to Pretoria and London and by pouch to Tananarive and Salisbury. 1 The discussion was recorded in three memoranda of conversation. (Ibid., Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330) Secretary Rusk was in New York attending the 17th Session of the U.N. General Assembly. 2 On November 6, the United States voted against U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1761 (XVII), which requested all Member States to dissuade South Africa from pursuing its policies of apartheid; requested the Security Council to take appropriate measures to secure South Africa's compliance with U.N. resolutions; established a Special Committee to review and report on the racial situation in South Africa; and requested all states to break off diplomatic relations with South Africa, close their ports to South African vessels, boycott South African goods, and prohibit trade with South Africa. The Resolution was adopted by a vote of 67 to 16, with 63 abstentions. 398. Memorandum of Conversation 398. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, November 23, 1962. SUBJECT United States Policy on South-West Africa PARTICIPANTS Mr. Samuel Nujoma, President General of South West Africa Peoples Organization (SWAPO) Mr. Jacob Kuhangua, National Secretary of SWAPO Mr. J. Wayne Fredericks, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Mr. Henry J. Tasca, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Mr. Elbert G. Mathews, Director, Office of Eastern and Southern African Affairs Mr. Waldemar Campbell, INR/RAF Mr. George B. High, AFE Mr. Nujoma opened the conversation by describing the recent UN resolution on South West Africa 1 as being very good, but in view of South Africa's defiance of the UN he wondered how it could be implemented. He suggested that the US and the UK could use influence on South Africa and this would lead the territory to independence. This point was made several times during the meeting. Mr. Tasca asked him what are the South African Government's objectives in South West Africa and whether the Bantustan policy would be applied. Mr. Nujoma responded that the South African Government wants to incorporate the territory into the Republic, and that the Territory's Africans have opposed the Bantustan policy as they have opposed partition. He recalled that the 1958 UN Good Offices Committee suggested partition with South Africa continuing to administer the Northern Territories. This would provide South Africa with a supply of labor, and SWAPO has fought this. Turning to another point, Mr. Kuhangua said that SWAPO is thankful for what the US has done—support for all the UN resolutions, offers of scholarships, and a commitment to the International Court case. However, more than voting is required; we should seek to implement the resolutions. SWAPO wants the US to help the UN Secretary General in this regard. Mr. Kuhangua referred to the need for the United States to establish a consulate in Bechuanaland, or if possible in South West Africa, in order to assist South West African students stranded in the High Commission Territories and to serve as a listening post. The recent UN resolution called for the UN Specialized Agencies to operate in the Territory. Mr. Kuhangua asked if it would be possible to send in the Peace Corps. There are many ways the US can act. The Episcopal Bishop of Damaraland, an American, is very sympathetic and US financial assistance could be given to him to expand his educational, health, and other social services. Later in the conversation Mr. Kuhangua pointed to USG action in Mississippi. He said we have an obligation in South Africa and a great role to play there, for South African policy is an insult to the world. Mr. Mathews replied that it is one thing to persuade and another to be persuaded. The USG position is perfectly clear. How effective this will be is hard to say. Mr. Tasca added that the International Court case will be very important for the South Africans can be very stubborn. Our real hope is in building up public opinion in South Africa. Mr. Kuhangua commented that some UN members mistakenly feel that political action is proscribed by the court case. That case is a clear attack against apartheid. The South African Government will be reluctant to become involved in a war unless South Africa is attacked. While SWAPO opposes violence, there may be no other alternative solution. Later, at the end of conversation, Mr. Nujoma reiterated his pleas for US support saying that the situation is explosive. Mr. Fredericks replied that we are trying to use our powers of persuasion at the UN and in talks with South Africa officials. In Mississippi we acted to deal with our own problems. We hope that other countries will see this resolve. While we can take such steps in our own country, we are not free to do so elsewhere. We are agreed on the nature of the problem in South Africa, the question is how to determine steps that will be persuasive enough. Mr. Campbell said a very real effort of persuasion is being made, but he was not sure much has been accomplished. In this regard Mr. Fredericks said he had talked to a great number of visitors. Our approaches were not simply to officialdom. One is never sure of the results of these talks. He did not want to give any idea of optimism, simply that we are trying. 2 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.45X/11-2362. Limited Official Use. Drafted by High on December 6. The source text is labeled “Part I of IV.” The discussion with Nujoma of SWAPO objectives and of working conditions in South West Africa was recorded in two memoranda of conversation. (Ibid., 745X.021/11-2362, and AF/S Files: Lot 66 D 344, South West Africa-1962-1963, UN) 1 On November 19, by a vote of 96 (including the United States) to 0 with 1 abstention, the Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Territories (Fourth) Committee adopted a draft resolution on South West Africa that reaffirmed the inalienable right of the people of South West Africa to independence and national sovereignty, condemned the continued refusal of the South African Government to cooperate with previous U.N. resolutions on South West Africa, requested the Secretary-General to appoint a Technical Assistance Resident Representative for South West Africa and to take all necessary steps to establish an effective U.N. presence in South West Africa, and urged all member states to refrain from any action likely to hinder the implementation of present and previous U.N. resolutions on South West Africa. 2 On December 14, the General Assembly adopted the Fourth Committee resolution by a vote of 98 to 0 with 1 abstention (Portugal). For text of Resolution 1805 (XVII), “Question of South West Africa,” see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 940-941. 399. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 399. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State Source New York, February 19, 1963, noon. 3069. Subj: Southwest Africa. 1. We spoke to UKDel along lines Deptel 2123 1 Feb 18. Campbell (UK) said question already raised in London. He understood UK and US Embs in Capetown would be in consultation on what would be best approach to South Africans and gave impression joint or parallel action depended upon this discussion. (UK apparently anxious initial consideration be in Capetown.) 2. We told Campbell we also intended raise problem with SYG this week in order to ascertain SYG's plans re establishing UN presence in SWA in accordance with GA Res. Campbell said he would appreciate report from US on this discussion. (Important that whatever steps we take re UN presence be in accord with SYG's plans.) So far we know of nothing other than appointment of technical assistance rep but it may be he has other ideas in mind. 3. Besides general approaches to South Africa re problem they face with ICJ opinion and on UN presence, Campbell expressed desire for further US-UK talks here on UN tactical issues we likely to face (including presumably both apartheid problem in South Africa, on which UKDel has already expressed concern, and SWA issue). Plimpton * Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 SW AFR/UN. Confidential. Repeated to London and Cape Town. 1 Telegram 2123, February 11, instructed USUN to undertake, in concert with the United Kingdom, a sustained effort to convince the South African Government that its own interests, as well as those of the Free World, required it to seek a political accommodation with the world community regarding the Mandated Territory of South West Africa—ideally before the International Court of Justice rendered its decision in late 1963 or early 1964. (Ibid.) 400. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State 400. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State Source Cape Town, March 1, 1963, 6 p.m. 41. Political. SWA. Deptel 32. 1 Reference telegram was received yesterday p.m. and I made requested representation to Foreign Minister Louw at 3 p.m. today. Foreign Secretary Jooste was with Louw and Clark accompanied me. I read following statement but did not leave text; Jooste however took careful notes: “Minister will recall that US voted in favor UNGA Resolution 1805 of December 14, 1962. 2 Paragraphs five and six of that resolution request Secretary General: “5… . to appoint a United Nations Technical Assistance Resident representative for Southwest Africa … “6… . to take all necessary steps to establish an effective United Nations presence in Southwest Africa. “I recall that Prime Minister last year indicated that SAG would be prepared to explore possibilities of inviting one or two experts working in particular fields with WHO and/or FAO who could be consulted on matters in regard to which they were particularly qualified. We are also aware that Prime Minister has constituted special commission of outstanding men charged with responsibility for advising him on plans for development of territory. “In light of evident desire of SAG on one hand to work for development of territory and on other in recognizing earnest desire of UN, as expressed in Resolution 1805, to ensure same objective, terms of resolution appear reasonable in eyes of my government. “My government hopes, therefore, that SA Government will take positive attitude toward Secretary General's requests, especially in regard to acceptance of a UN Technical Assistance Resident representative but also of course in regard to establishment of a UN presence in territory. “Minister will recall that US representative, Mr. Bingham, explaining our vote in Committee IV, stated: “We would be profoundly gratified if SAG were to comply with this resolution and earnestly urge it to do so, so as to open way at long last to a bright future for all peoples of Southwest Africa. We are particularly hopeful that the government will seize the opportunities for constructive cooperation which the UN has offered in operative paragraphs six and five.” “It is our firm belief that positive and early action in response to SYG's request for compliance with these operative paragraphs will enable US delegates in corridors and in committee to urge moderation when Committee of 24 takes up issue of SWA. 3 Above all we hope that SAG will not respond to SYG's request in manner which will freeze into an irrevocably negative position. “My government at the moment is giving careful study to SWA question and its long-range implications for the United States. Department will shortly be forwarding to me instructions to lay before you outlining our views on this crucial subject. Should there be any inclination to reject out of hand SYG's requests, and we assume that such is not intent of SAG, we earnestly hope that no final response will be rendered until our views have been fully set forth.” Following my representation Louw spoke for about half an hour large part of which was past history well known to Department and USUN. We will report this conversation in detail in a following telegram. Following are however essential points: (A) SAG will not make definite decision re UNTA representative for SWA until its own commission has made its report. While Louw's position was not clear-cut it does appear that possibility exists of reaching agreement with UN on this point. (B) If paragraph six means opening of a permanent political UN office in Windhoek this can be definitely ruled out. (C) Louw does not consider that SYG has yet made formal request of SAG re paragraphs five and six of Resolution 1805. He said only that Protitch had made informal low-level approach but he still expected Secretary General to take matter up formally. (I did not tell Louw that I knew of Protitch's conversation. He confirmed that Botha is in SA. Fourie is now Under Secretary for African Affairs and resides in Pretoria.) (D) Minister's reaction to our representation was reasonable and conversation throughout was friendly in tone. We have sent British copy of notes from which I read. Clark is seeing Gordon at dinner tonight and will fill him in re SAG reaction. Satterthwaite * Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 SW AFR/UN. Confidential; Priority. Also sent to USUN and repeated to Pretoria and London. 1 Telegram 32, February 27, instructed Ambassador Satterthwaite to obtain a high-level appointment, preferably with Foreign Minister Louw, to urge South Africa to adopt a positive attitude toward the U.N. Secretary-General's request to establish a U.N. presence and a U.N. Technical Assistance Representative in the Territory of South West Africa. Satterthwaite was to explain that such action would enable the United States to urge moderation when the Committee of 24 took up the question of South West Africa. (Ibid.) 2 See footnote 2, Document 398 . 3 On April 16, the South African Representative to the United Nations refused the invitation of the Committee of 24 (formerly the Committee of 17) to attend its meetings on South West Africa. On May 10, the Committee adopted a resolution that essentially reaffirmed the provisions of Resolution 1805 (XVII), but added a provision recommending that the General Assembly consider any attempt to annex the Territory of South West Africa as an act of aggression. Twenty-three members of the Committee of 24 (including the United States) voted for the resolution as a whole; the United Kingdom abstained. 401. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy 401. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy Source Washington, March 16, 1963. SUBJECT South African Interest in Purchase of US Submarines The South African Naval Chief of Staff urgently asked our Naval Attache in Pretoria to ascertain informally whether the US Government would be willing to entertain a request to permit the purchase of two or three modern conventional attack submarines of about 1700 tons, and would provide crew training for key personnel. Our Ambassador notes that our present policy with respect to South Africa, of which they have been advised, permits the sale of military equipment for external defense, and that this request could be given favorable consideration provided submarines were available. Submarines of this class are understood to cost approximately $40 million each. They would have to come from new construction, and there would be a three-year lead time from acceptance of order to delivery. There are both benefits and difficulties inherent in this South African request. An affirmative reply to South Africa would aid in maintaining good military relations, this being of evident consequence in the light of the importance to us of various US military facilities and rights in the country, particularly tracking stations for Atlantic Missile Range operations, port facilities, and overflight rights. In the event the Suez Canal is closed to us, the Navy believes South African harbor and dock facilities are virtually irreplaceable. It is doubtful these strategic interests will be materially changed within the period in which the submarines would be delivered to South Africa. On the other hand, the prospect of growing racial conflict in South Africa and of intensified international condemnation of the South African Government will make significant US arms deliveries to that country increasingly costly to us in political terms. Our efforts to encourage a moderate African approach to the problems of Southern Rhodesia and Portuguese Africa will be made more difficult. Furthermore, if South Africa's international position continues to deteriorate, it is probable that delivery of US submarines in 1966 could have highly unfavorable repercussions abroad and at home. On balance, however, in terms of our political relations with South Africa and potential benefits to our balance of payments, I believe we should give an affirmative reply to this informal inquiry and be in a position at least to discuss this sale. Military assistance credits should not be made available. It should be noted that the sale may not eventuate, since the UK is also offering similar submarines for mid-1967 delivery, and the UK price may be lower than ours. I would appreciate your views. 1 Dean Rusk * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Africa, General. Secret. 1 On March 22, Carl Kaysen sent a memorandum to Secretary Rusk that reads: “The President has reviewed the course of action you propose in your memorandum of March 16 with respect to the sale of submarines to the Union of South Africa. He concurs with your judgment that on balance it is desirable to make such a transaction if it can be made on acceptable terms.” (Ibid.) 402. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) 402. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) Source Washington, April 9, 1963. Dear George : During the spring and summer of 1961, Chester Bowles and I discussed the requirement for a missile tracking station in the Republic of South Africa. These discussions resulted in our agreement to proceed with negotiations for the use of a station at Grootfontein through the end of 1963. In turn, I agreed that Defense would undertake to develop ship-borne tracking capabilities for use after that time. As you know, an Agreement was subsequently concluded with South Africa which authorizes our use of a tracking station there through 1963, and thereafter subject to six months notice. It is the purpose of this letter to advise you that we are planning to reorient our efforts to obtain a ship-borne tracking capability for the South African area by up-grading one or more of the ships now used by the Atlantic Missile Range. While it was our original intention to secure a sophisticated tracking ship at an estimated cost in excess of $40 million, the current and foreseeable requirements do not warrant such an expenditure at this time. The Grootfontein station has contributed greatly to our missile program. It will continue to be of importance after 1963 and I would hope that we could continue to use the station after that time. As I indicated earlier, however, we would be prepared to withdraw from the station should this prove politically necessary. Sincerely, Roswell L. Gilpatric 1 * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files:FRC 67 A 4564, South Africa Rep. 1963, 383.8-676. No classification marking. 1 Printed from a copy that indicates Gilpatric signed the original. 403. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa 403. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa Source Washington, April 23, 1963, 7:25 p.m. 70. Urtel 95. 1 In absence Ambassador Naude Counselor Dunn called into Department for discussion points raised reftel. Department officer told him Louw speech based on two erroneous pieces information. Emphasized 1) our hope Louw doesn't attribute economic interest as motivating factor our policy vis-à-vis new African states which of course untrue and 2) fact Governor Williams did not address conference but simply attended in role of spectator as he might any representative American group discussing Africa. At conclusion of conversation, during which points contained circular telegram 1778 2 were summarized, Dunn was asked to report above to his government. He agreed to do so but commented it will probably whet Louw's appetite as he is spoiling for a good fight. Decision call in Dunn motivated in part by his visit to Department yesterday apparently on SAG instructions to protest remarks attributed to Governor Williams at Maryland University Symposium April 20th. Department officer gave Dunn copy of Maryland speech and noted it contained nothing which had not been said on other occasions by US officials. Fact press item re Williams speech at Maryland not entirely accurate was also cited. After reading text Dunn acknowledged speech not controversial. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 S AFR. Confidential. Drafted by Hall and approved by MacKnight. Repeated to Pretoria and USUN and by pouch to Johannesburg, Salisbury, and Durban. 1 Telegram 95, April 23, reported a speech by Foreign Minister Louw that spoke of the dramatic increase in power of the Afro-Asian bloc in the United Nations, and declared that this bloc was getting some support from Western countries that were more concerned about export markets in new African countries than about the fate of their fellow whites in South Africa. (Ibid.) 2 Not printed. 404. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State 404. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State Source Cape Town, May 14, 1963, 2 p.m. 140. Reference: Embassy telegram 115. 1 I took advantage of Foreign Minister Louw's absence from country to request interview with Prime Minister Verwoerd in his capacity as Acting Foreign Minister. This took place yesterday afternoon and lasted more than an hour. I first told him of my concern re Bantu laws amendment bill. This bill was so long and complicated that our Embassy had made an analysis of it. It would appear clearly from this analysis that all Bantus outside Bantustans of which there must be some six to seven million would in future be deprived of all their present rights to permanent residence in such areas. They would moreover be entirely subject to decisions of Ministry of Bantu Administration and lower officials and these decisions could not be appealed to Courts. I was therefore leaving him a copy of our analysis in hope that he would have it examined and let us know if it is wrong in any material respect. If not I thought he should know that reaction of US and world opinion in learning of harshness of the terms of this law would be alarmingly strong and would more than negate favorable aspects of Bantustan program with which his Government was moving forward in Transkei. Prime Minister said he would not go over our analysis now but would give me some background on subject. He began with consolidation of previous Bantu administration laws made in 1945 and talked at considerable length about his own experience as Minister of Native Affairs (1950-1958). He described misunderstanding by outside world of actions he had taken as Minister to bring Missionary Schools under Government control. This was done however because he had found that under previous system more and more money was being spent annually by Government on same number of Bantu students. As result of steps he had taken this situation was corrected although Missionaries disliked it and it was widely misunderstood abroad. In case of present amendment he said that actually these amendments would go a long way in removing certain frictions. Nevertheless he recognized that certain clauses did present “something new” but did not believe that these clauses went so far as to nullify all favorable aspects of the legislation. At conclusion this discussion he promised to have our analysis examined by appropriate officials and I again emphasized strong reaction such extreme legislation would have on US and world opinion. Comment : During discussion this subject Prime Minister exercised all his charm and powers of persuasion on me. While I cannot hope that our analysis and my presentation will dissuade him from going ahead with this legislation, they will at least serve to warn him of our strong reactions to this inhumane measure. Analysis handed him is rearranged version of that transmitted Embassy telegram 115 except for deletion of our own comments and slight softening certain wording without however altering meaning. Satterthwaite * Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-5 S AFR. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Pretoria and USUN. 1 Telegram 115 from Cape Town, May 2, analyzed the most significant points in the 125-page draft Bantu laws amendment bill. (Ibid.) 405. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State 405. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State Source Cape Town, June 10, 1963, 4 p.m. 171. Reference: Embassy telegrams 142, 145 and 170. 1 In view implied threats made by Prime Minister in my conversation with him May 13, aide-memoire handed me June 7 by Foreign Secretary Jooste on subject our multi-racial July 4 receptions is surprisingly moderate. Possibly SAG after considering problem has decided react moderately rather than violently to our proposed receptions. For example Jooste indicated SAG not concerned about possibility our inadvertently inviting subversive guests. Aide-memoire's last paragraph is particularly intriguing. Only time will tell whether our diplomatic reception will be completely or partially boycotted by SAG and whether government will in fact take steps prevent multi-racial receptions in future. Prime Minister indicated this might depend on instructions Sir Hugh Stephenson, new British Ambassador, may have received. Latter arrived June 6 and pre-sents credentials today. I will inquire earliest opportunity whether either Prime Minister or Foreign Minister has discussed this question with him. In view fact AG knows we are carrying out our plans hold multi-racial receptions we do not necessarily have to answer June 7 aide-memoire. I recommend however that as matter of courtesy I hand Jooste aide-memoire along following lines: “My government has carefully considered views of your government set forth in aide-memoire which you handed me June 7 from which it is clear that our two governments are confronted with a difference of opinion on the subject of multi-racial receptions in celebration of our Independence Day which seems irreconcilable at this time. As you know, my government has decided, in the light of its convictions and practices on the question of official multi-racial entertaining (which conform with those of practically all other countries of the world) that our “customs and conventions rather than yours should henceforth be observed by the American Embassy and consulates in South Africa with regard to the celebration of our Independence Day.” In delivering this aide-memoire I would point out orally that our plans to hold a diplomatic reception on the morning of July 4 would seem to relieve the SAG of the difficulty of being “a party to a deliberate breach of the customs and conventions of this country by the Embassy of the United States” and that it is in fact for this very reason that we are giving such a reception. 2 Satterthwaite * Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17-4 US-S AFR. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Pretoria, London, Durban, Johannesburg, and Port Elizabeth. 1 Telegram 142, May 14; telegram 145, May 16; and telegram 170, June 8, are all ibid. 2 On June 11, the Department of State cabled Satterthwaite that his proposed aide-memoire was approved. (Telegram 107 to Cape Town; ibid.) On July 5, the Ambassador reported that multi-racial 4th of July receptions had been held as planned at all posts in South Africa, with no unpleasant incidents, good attendance, and highly favorable reactions in various quarters. He noted, however, that the South African Government had sent no representative to his morning reception in Pretoria. (Telegram 25 from Pretoria; ibid.) 406. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) 406. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) Source Washington, June 15, 1963. Mennen Williams' memorandum to me of June 12 on U.S. policy toward South Africa 1 raises again some far-reaching issues which ought to be considered within a broader framework of policy than that relating to the attitudes of the independent states of Africa. At the heart of the issue is how we relate ourselves to those countries whose internal arrangements and practices are not only foreign to our own way of thinking but, in many cases, repugnant to us. Let us accept the general notion that the United States should use its influence steadily and persistently in the direction of the principles inscribed in the United Nations Charter as well as in our own basic commitments to constitutional processes, human rights, etc. It is another question, it seems to me, to extend such influence into the field of sanctions and into actions which, if consistently and conscientiously applied, would interrupt our relations with perhaps half of the existing community of states. Also involved is the position in which we would be if other states undertook to apply sanctions against us because of practices of our own to which they take the strongest exception. It is true that we have the strongest objections to apartheid in the Union of South Africa; we have said so repeatedly and have asserted our view to the point where our relations with the Union of South Africa are in a continuing state of tension. But I believe it is worth reminding ourselves that there are other states where obnoxious practices of one sort or another exist—and in some of them in the most exaggerated form. I have in mind Bulgaria, Burma, China, Czechoslovakia, Ghana, Haiti, Hungary, Indonesia, Korea, Laos, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Spain, Turkey, USSR, the UAR, Viet-Nam, and Yugoslavia. I have not listed some of the smaller African states whose internal practices reflect varying degrees of totalitarianism nor all of the Arab states whose attitudes in religious minorities or constitutional principles leave much to be desired. The question, it seems to me, is whether we ourselves precipitate sharp crises in our relations with other states over such issues or whether we try to maintain the structure of international relations in order to be able to work doggedly and persistently toward the decent world community which is our main objective. I will admit that apartheid presents a case of unusual difficulty but I would not put it ahead of the violations of human rights within the communist bloc or in certain countries governed on an authoritarian basis with which we have correct and sometimes even friendly relations. I would draw a sharp distinction between our deep concern with respect to racial discrimination in the United States and the way in which we crusade on that very issue outside the United States. The United States is our responsibility; our failures are our failures; we live under a constitutional system in which we can do something about it. But no one has elected us to undertake such responsibilities in other countries. The President has reminded us that we are not interested in a Pax Americana. It seems to me, a fortiori, that we are not the self-elected gendarmes for the political and social problems of other states. It would be hard to find a single state with which we have relations where it is not necessary for us to try to develop good relations despite important differences in points of view or in action. Specifically with regard to the Union of South Africa, I have felt that we cannot compromise our own attitudes toward apartheid, that we must use our influence wherever possible to modify their position on that matter, but that we must then also try to sustain good relations in other respects despite the severity of our differences on that particular issue. It has seemed to me, therefore, logical that we should not assist the Union of South Africa with means of enforcing its apartheid policy but that we should assist them in playing the kind of role which they have already played in two World Wars and which now is a part of a total confrontation affecting the life and death of our own nation. A proposal for us to embark upon sanctions against the Union of South Africa must, it seems to me, be a part of a package of proposals for sanctions against other states in other situations where different but obnoxious situations obtain. And such proposals should include some concept of priorities—that is, what are the situations which cause us the deepest concern? I have no objection to the most intensive study of apartheid or other situations causing us concern. But I do think that we must give careful thought to the broader questions of 1) how we relate ourselves to the other 94% of the world's peoples whom we can influence but cannot control, and 2) where the interests of the American people lie with regard to actions designed to require someone else to act as we would like to have them act. 2 Dean Rusk 3 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Africa. Secret. Also sent to Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs Johnson, Williams, Tyler, and Rostow. 1 Williams' memorandum stated that it was time to review U.S. arms supply policy toward South Africa and argued that the United States should be thinking in terms of a total arms embargo. He noted that the current partial arms embargo policy was equivocal, was not an effective pressure on the South Africans, and was considered inadequate by the African countries and by many in the United States who were concerned about racial discrimination. Williams pointed out that a total arms embargo would fall far short of the complete sanctions already recommended by the General Assembly, and argued that this was the only way the United States could convince both world and domestic opinion that it meant business in its disapproval of apartheid. (Ibid.) 2 On July 12, Williams sent a follow-up memorandum to Rusk arguing that a complete arms ban was the least that the United States could do to maintain its influence with the Africans and its ability to prevent more radical and violent action on their part. He admitted that an arms ban might jeopardize the use of certain tracking and naval facilities in South Africa, but argued that this would be a calculated risk and relatively small in comparison to what else might be lost. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Williams Records, GMW Chron File) 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 407. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy 407. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy Source Washington, July 13, 1963. SUBJECT Missile Tracking Station in South Africa Finding the official comments on our South African holdings somewhat vague, I made some inquiries and discovered that while nothing we have there is vital, there is a close relation between the South African missile tracking station and our satellite photography. This station is a part of the system of observation of these satellites, and while the program would not be interrupted if we should lose it, prudence would dictate certain additional technical developments to permit effective observation of the satellites, and the total cost of replacement is estimated to be on the order of $50 million. In the context of the importance of satellite photography as a whole, $50 million is not an enormous amount of money, and undoubtedly some part of this sum will be paid out even if we keep the missile tracking station in South Africa because of a constant desire to refine and improve this vital system of information gathering. Finally, there is a good deal of reason to doubt that we would lose the missile tracking station automatically even if we take a stiff line on arms shipment. Still, I thought you would wish to know the order of magnitude of the replacement cost that we might face. I myself remain quite favorable to the Black African position, in spite of this possible dollar cost. McG. B. 1 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, South Africa, 7/13/63-7/31/63. Secret. 1 Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials. 408. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Kennedy 408. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Kennedy Source Washington, July 16, 1963. SUBJECT Next Steps with South Africa re Security Council Meeting Following is a suggested list of next steps to be taken to carry out the policy recommendations concerning South Africa contained in my July 13 memorandum. 1 Those recommendations envisage frank discussions with South Africa, with the African leaders and with the United Kingdom and France, looking toward U.S. support for and including, if necessary, co-sponsorship of a Security Council resolution critical of South Africa's racial policies. 1. The Secretary would call in the South African Ambassador this week and outline our position along the following lines (our Embassy in Pretoria and USUN could make similar demarches to South African officials shortly thereafter): (a) Reiteration of our basic opposition to apartheid. (b) Difficulties we foresee in the Security Council (Addis Ababa resolution calling for sanctions and expulsion). (c) Statement of our intention to oppose expulsion and mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII. (d) Description of the resolution we intend to initiate or support in the Security Council: (1) a reaffirmation of our strong opposition to apartheid; (2) a recommendation that the Secretary-General appoint a high-level special representative (a former Prime Minister, a past President of the General Assembly, or someone of like stature) [to] discuss with the South Africans how their racial policies could be brought into conformity with the U.N. Charter; and (3) a call on member states to refrain from supplying arms which could be used to facilitate the enforcement of apartheid. (e) Indication that the resolution we have in mind would do no more than have the Security Council “codify” in a recommendatory (Chapter VI) resolution our present arms policy vis-à-vis South Africa. (f) A statement that we intend unilaterally to stop further arms supplies to South Africa from the United States, but we are not yet saying so publicly. (In connection with a possible unilateral declaration by the United States adopting a total arms embargo, we should keep open the timing of any announcement, subject to Ambassador Stevenson's recommendations in light of the tactical negotiating situation in New York.) (g) Urge South Africa, in order to help us moderate the actions of the Security Council, to indicate publicly its intention to cooperate with any Secretary-General's representative. 2. The United Kingdom and France . We would inform the United Kingdom and France in New York as soon as possible of the President's decision along the lines of (1.) above. The United Kingdom would also be informed in Washington. This would be a sequel to the preliminary discussions in Europe completed recently by Ambassador Stevenson and Assistant Secretary Cleveland. 3. Norway . Special early consultations along the lines of (1.) above are necessary with the Norwegians who are anxious to avoid political and economic sanctions but are ready to support a total arms embargo provision in a Security Council resolution. 4. The Africans . On Wednesday, July 17, after Foreign Minister Slim has briefed the representatives of the other African countries designated to present Africa's case to the Security Council (Liberia, Madagascar, Sierra Leone) we should pursue our discussions with him in New York along the following lines: (a) We, too, would like to avoid a clash between ourselves and the Africans in the Security Council and we are prepared (as the Secretary and Assistant Secretary Cleveland indicated to Mongi Slim in Washington) to work with him in an effort to develop a resolution that will command general support in the Council. (b) We are opposed to apartheid but at the same time we cannot support expulsion or mandatory sanctions. (c) We will be in a better position to take effective measures provided they are non-mandatory and avoid being put into the Chapter VII category. If the Africans agree that the arms embargo paragraph in the Security Council resolution is not total but partial and within Chapter VI of the Charter, we would be willing to announce at an appropriate time a halt in all arms shipments to South Africa. (d) Depending on the circumstances, USUN might indicate to Foreign Minister Slim the kind of resolution we could support (1(d). It would also be advisable to have USUN make the above points to the other three African special representatives and the African members of the Security Council (Ghana, Morocco). 5. Ambassador Stevenson and other Members of the Council. As soon as Ambassador Stevenson returns (July 18), we will brief him on the status of the above consultations. At a later stage, he would broaden our consultations to include other members of the Security Council (except the USSR). George W. Ball * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, South Africa. Confidential. 1 Not printed. 409. Memorandum of Conversation 409. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, July 17, 1963, 3 p.m. SUBJECT South Africa and the Security Council Meeting PARTICIPANTS The Secretary W.C. Naude, Ambassador of the Republic of South Africa Mr. Pieter H.J.J. van Vuuren, First Secretary, South African Embassy Mr. Waldemar B. Campbell, AFE The Secretary began by stating that he was not responding primarily to the letter from Mr. Louw—that would take considerable study—and continued by saying we are greatly concerned about the Security Council meeting, and others have been sounding us out. A rough time was ahead. The basis of our position in the Security Council meeting will be our opposition to apartheid as a political doctrine. We anticipate a very great controversy in the Council. The Soviet Union will make the most of its opportunity to develop divisions within the free world and to be the champion of the colored races—the same old game. Basic to the United States' policy is the intention to oppose expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations, and mandatory sanctions under Chapter 7. We will be under enormous pressure but do not intend to give in. The Secretary said he did not know what was going to come out of this situation, but he imagined that there might be a resolution which we could support that would oppose apartheid and suggest the appointment by the Secretary General of a high-level special representative to discuss with the South African Government any prospect of a solution more generally acceptable to peoples throughout the world and more in accord with the UN Charter. The Secretary said he was not debating the merits of this proposal, only indicating the possible direction that a high-level rapporteur might take. Also, there might be a recommendation under Chapter 6 against the export of arms to South Africa which could be used to facilitate the enforcement of apartheid. Our present expectation is that after 1963 we might have to refrain from sending any arms to South Africa. This is not finally decided, nor when we might make this public. It would not be part of the Security Council resolution. The Secretary went on to say he did not know the end of the trail, where we are heading, and wished that the Ambassador could help him in that respect. Ambassador Naude expressed appreciation at this opportunity and said it was ironical that ten years ago we were fighting together on the same side, and now South Africa will not even be supplied with arms to use against a common enemy. He did not know how his people would feel—he was greatly disturbed. The Secretary reminded the Ambassador that more than once he had assured the latter of the American anxiety to cooperate with South Africa as much as possible. But the United States point of view must include its strategic interests and the world situation. He expressed the hope that the Ambassador would pass on to his government that the South African problem was a heavy burden to the United States and was creating problems for its strategic interests around the world with respect to facilities, postures, the cooperation of armed forces. This was the direct cause of a situation that was admittedly ironic and also tragic. Ambassador Naude then said certainly, South Africa would have to face up to the situation that now the United States' strategic interests elsewhere were more important than those in South Africa. The Secretary replied that he had hoped we would not come to this situation, but our Joint Chiefs of Staff were concerned about our over-all strategic interests, considering the adverse effect of the South African situation. Ambassador Naude said that the South Africans in the past had stood with the United States when the chips were down. He expressed a desire to make a few comments about American strategic interests with respect to South Africa. He had heard a military expert describe the importance of Indonesia and Cuba to the Communists because they lie in narrow seas connecting larger bodies of water such as the Indian Ocean and the Pacific. The same was true of South Africa—it was at a point where two great oceans meet. The South African military effort was aimed at bolstering South Africa's capabilities there. Another important aspect of the strategic situation was the important resources of South Africa. He expressed certainty that the Chiefs of Staff were familiar with South Africa's many strategic minerals, but he also wanted to call the Secretary's attention to the importance of South Africa's gold production, with particular reference to the U.S. Government's action yesterday raising the bank rate. It was of both strategic and economic importance to the United States and its allies that the gold production of South Africa was in the hands of a friendly country. The Ambassador then referred to Mr. Harlan Cleveland's figure of speech about a light at the end of the tunnel. He said that he felt there was still some degree of misunderstanding in the United States about South Africa's situation. It was one of survival, not prejudice. Apartheid envisaged the eventual disappearance of racial discrimination. This would not come tomorrow, but this did not mean that it would take 100 years either. Discrimination would come to an end, but right now it was in the interests of both sides. The Secretary asked if that concept of the disappearance of discrimination was in Mr. Louw's letter, and the Ambassador assured him that it was. The Ambassador said that South Africa only needed some help in holding the line. It needed time. The United States had a tremendous responsibility, as well as influence, in this situation. The Secretary interjected that our influence in other capitals of the world was about the same as in Pretoria. The Ambassador proceeded to develop the point that the United States was to a large degree responsible for releasing revolutionary forces in the world. He expressed the view that the goal of a great power should be to play down tensions and try to get people to talk together, but the United States without even opening its mouth had released dangerous forces in the world. The Secretary wondered if these forces were not deeply rooted in the nature of man. He wondered if this discourse had not been going on for 2,000 years. Did not man, like most animals, not like to be pushed around too much? The Ambassador indicated that the Secretary had used this same point with him before. The Secretary then said that these troubles were popping up all over the world because of a basic tendency in man's nature. The South African Ambassador still adhered to his argument that the United States had released great forces of a revolutionary nature. He pointed out that Israel was a very basic part of U.S. policy despite its irritation to the Arab world. All South Africa asked, he said, was that it should be treated like Israel; that it was a little nation that needed similar support for survival. The American solution for its own racial problems was not one that could be applied beneficially for South Africa. The Secretary said that he was not suggesting that a solution practical for the United States should be applied to South Africa. He understood there were about 3-1/2 million whites in South Africa. Did not their survival in a sea of blacks depend on a policy of accommodation with them? The South African Ambassador replied that the accommodation could only be made along the lines of the South African system of apartheid. South Africa was a Western nation which had to be preserved among African nations. South Africa could maintain itself except for the attitude of the outside world. The difficulties had largely come in the last ten years, particularly because of the United Nations. He admitted that the South African Government recently had given itself extreme powers of repression, but he said this was natural considering the extreme threats that were coming from other parts of Africa. The United States should not make these difficulties of South Africa even worse. The South African Ambassador referred to the new Transkei state as an indication of the aim of South African policy. In the last two or three weeks Prime Minister Verwoerd had stated that the Transkei was just one of several Bantu nations which would emerge, that the Transkei was only the first step. South Africa hoped to make a breakthrough with respect to its relations with other African states by means of this policy of setting up Bantustans, but UN events which the Secretary had foreshadowed would make the implementation of this Bantustan policy even more difficult. Regarding suggestions that South Africa should make small adjustments of policy, the Ambassador said Foreign Minister Louw maintained that South Africa could not be flexible regarding its basic policy. The Ambassador said that the United States and Russia could not be flexible either about the essentials of their policy. If South Africa made modifications in basic policy, all racial groups would suffer. Flexibility had to be found in other ways such as South Africa's withdrawal from the Economic Commission for Africa. This was something South Africa could do. United States spokesmen have suggested that South Africa's policies were preparing the way for a Communist takeover in Africa. The South African Ambassador said he had just been reading Chernov's (sp?) book The Soviet View of Africa and found the aims of its policy expressed in this book shocking. Only in the last hour he had found that in South Africa there was an organization financed by the Chinese Communists. Ambassador Naude said that if a horizontal adjustment of South African society were made (by this he meant the opposite of vertical apartheid, the suppression of racial groups), the whites would be swamped and southern Africa would be in a more chaotic condition than the Congo had been. This would have grave consequences for American strategic interests. The white group in South Africa was only a handful but it was advanced compared with the people around it. It would take a great deal of power to keep the situation under control if horizontal adjustments were made. A South African leading newspaper repeatedly has said recently that 5 million non-Africans in South Africa (whites, Coloureds and Indians) would not accept the rule of a non-Western majority. There would be resistance and bloodshed. It was not pleasant for him, the Ambassador said to point this out, but presumably the United States would have to be the power to enforce order in this chaotic situation. The Ambassador repeated the intention of ending all discrimination in South Africa. He said that his country realized that in this day and age it was not possible to continue the old practices. He closed with an anecdote about John Adams telling a Livingston that our Puritan forefathers had had to hang their Quakers because they could not afford agitators in their midst while they were threatened by Indians. The Secretary mentioned that he would have to end the interview because of the President's press conference, but there had been a new note he had not heard before in the Ambassador's remarks, and the Secretary expressed a desire to have a two-hour talk with the Ambassador this week—not the following day because of the pressure of other business, but Friday or Saturday morning. He suggested that the two countries need to discuss the possibility of some breathtaking invention which might salvage the interests of both South Africa and the United States. The Ambassador expressed his readiness to carry on a further discussion. 1 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 S AFR. Confidential. Drafted by Campbell and approved in S on August 6. 1 See Document 414 . 410. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk 410. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk Source Washington, July 17, 1963. The President has read and approved your memorandum of July 16th 1 on next steps with South Africa re Security Council meeting, subject to the following comments: The President thinks the statement in paragraph 1(f) should be reframed as follows: It is our current expectation that we will wish to stop further arms shipments to South Africa after the end of 1963, but we have not yet decided when to make this intention public. Our discussion with the South Africans should be in the context of our conviction that the course we are adopting represents the minimum changes necessary if we are to be able to assist in preventing much less satisfactory results, from South Africa's own point of view. It should be emphasized that we intend to oppose Chapter VII measures and that our own suspension of arms shipments will not be of critical importance to South Africa since we are not a prime source for South Africa in this field at present. The President wishes it made clear that in our judgment it would be best for both sides to maintain our existing cooperation in other fields. McGeorge Bundy 2 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, South Africa. Confidential. 1 Document 408 . 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 411. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy 411. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Source Washington, August 2, 1963. 1. Guidance for Governor Stevenson on a US position on the South African issue in the Security Council went to New York last night on a provisional basis pending your approval. It includes a recommended position (Tab A) and draft language for Stevenson's speech (Tab B) 1 scheduled for 11:30 this morning but postponable for an hour or so if necessary. 2. It is not proposed that we initiate a resolution but that we propose modification of an African resolution with regard to arms embargo. Our position goes beyond what you have previously approved in this important respect: it supports a recommendatory (not mandatory) total arms embargo but with a qualification—a phrase which explicitly says that the embargo is “without prejudice to requirements which may arise for maintaining international peace.” If the Africans refuse to accept this language we would fall back to accepting unqualified language but in voting would make explicit our reservation on arms for “maintaining international peace.” 3. State believes that Africans have eight votes for such a permissive total arms embargo, that France will abstain on any such resolution, and that the British will probably go along with us. 4. Since the issue will not come to a vote until next week the immediate problem is to clear draft language for Governor Stevenson's speech today i.e., a public announcement that we will end sale of military equipment to South Africa this calendar year reserving the right to interpret this in light of requirements for “maintenance of international peace and security” if “the interests of the world community require the provision of equipment for use in the common defense effort.” 2 William H. Brubeck 3 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, South Africa. No classification marking. 1 Neither Tab A nor Tab B is attached to the source text. 2 On August 2, Ambassador Stevenson told the U.N. Security Council that the U.S. Government expected to end the sale of all military equipment to South Africa by the end of the calendar year, although he noted that there were existing contracts to supply limited quantities of strategic equipment for defense against external threats, such as air-to-air missiles and torpedoes for submarines, that must be honored. Stevenson added that the United States reserved the right in the future to interpret this policy in the light of requirements for assuring the maintenance of international peace and security. For text of his remarks, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 683-689. 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 412. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy 412. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Source Washington, August 7, 1963. SUBJECT South African Resolution at the United Nations The attached State Department recommendation 1 goes somewhat beyond your position as of last week but it is probably the best we can do. To organize enough votes to abstain it to death would require your personal intervention with the Venezuelans, Norwegians and possibly the Brazilians. Nothing in the resolution is so bad as to justify this or the even more drastic alternative of casting our first veto. Specifically we would abstain on the whole resolution unless the economic boycott provision is eliminated (which it will almost surely be). We would abstain on some rhetoric in the preamble that is inferentially critical of countries that have previously supplied arms. And we would carefully explain our understanding of the vote—that this is not Chapter 7 (mandatory) action; and that we reserve the right to ship arms for the common defense. 2 WB * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, South Africa, 8/7/63-8/12/63. Confidential. 1 Attached to the source text is an August 6 memorandum from Acting Secretary Ball to the President stating that the resolution before the U.N. Security Council was more contentious than the Department believed was useful or effective, but recommending that, with one amendment, the United States should vote yes on it. Ball proposed that the U.S. Delegation be instructed to try hard to eliminate the recommendation for a boycott of all South African goods. If the boycott feature was eliminated, it should vote affirmatively on the resolution as a whole. If it was not eliminated, the United States should abstain. Attached to Ball's memorandum is a note dated August 7 from Brubeck to Bromley Smith that reads: “The President has approved this and State has been notified.” 2 On August 7, Ambassador Yost asked for a separate vote on the paragraph of the draft resolution calling for a boycott on South African goods. The paragraph failed to receive the necessary 7 votes for adoption, failing by a vote of 5 to 0 with 6 abstentions (including the United States, the United Kingdom, and France). The vote on the amended resolution as a whole was 9 to 0, with 2 abstentions (the United Kingdom and France). For text of Security Council Resolution 181 (1963), “The Situation in South Africa Is Seriously Disturbing International Peace and Security,” see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 689-690. 413. Research Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk 413. Research Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk Source Washington, August 12, 1963. SUBJECT US and South African Economic Leverage on Each Other 1 On September 12, a copy was sent to McGeorge Bundy under cover of a memorandum from Brubeck calling it an excellent paper worth the President's weekend reading, which showed pretty convincingly that if the United States were to get into any economic reprisal situation with South Africa, the South Africans would have much the best of it. (Ibid., Brubeck Series, South Africa, South African Arms Embargo) RAF-30 The subject of sanctions against the Republic of South Africa is as complex as it is topical. This paper presents one segment of that subject. It examines a range of possible unilateral US economic measures towards South Africa and estimates their immediate economic impact both on South Africa and on the US. It does not attempt to calculate the impact of multilateral sanctions nor the psychological-political repercussions in South Africa of economic deprivations. Abstract In general, any feasible US economic sanctions would have little economic impact on South Africa. Among large-scale South African exports, only chrome ore and rock lobstertails depend overwhelmingly on the US market; US purchases of these items account for only about eight percent and one percent of South African exports to the world, respectively. Among South African imports from the US, there appear to be no critical items which South Africa could not do without, although South Africa would suffer temporary inconvenience in shifting to substitute items or alternate sources of supply, especially for spare parts for existing stocks of American machinery and vehicles. South Africa, on the other hand, has some economic leverage on the US. US assets in South Africa are probably at least five times greater than South African assets in the US. The international standing of the US dollar and, by extension, the stability of the integrated Western monetary system, is to a degree dependent on the orderly marketing of gold. South Africa accounts for about 65 percent of Free World gold production, and it could encourage upward pressure on free market gold by withholding sales. This might induce sudden heavy demands on US gold reserves. Yet symbolic US economic sanctions might have important political repercussions within South Africa. What these might be—reinforcement of apartheid and go-it-alone policies, encouragement of non-white resistance, or a change in direction towards non-racialism—depend on internal South African dynamics. A Departmental strategic study currently under way will attempt the latest and most systematic analysis of this fundamental aspect of the problem. [Here follows the body of the paper.] * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, South Africa, 8/7/63-8/12/63. Secret; No Foreign Dissem/Controlled Dissem. No drafting information appears on the source text. A marginal notation reads: “(Taken from Pres. weekend reading dtd 9/14/63, Tab [illegible]).” 1 For a description of related studies which include the psychological-political dimension and the impact of multilateral sanctions, see the Appendix to this paper. [Footnote in the source text. The Appendix is not printed.] 414. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa 414. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa Source Washington, August 28, 1963, 3:39 p.m. 248. Following summary for information only and contents should not be disclosed to foreign officials. It is uncleared and subject to amendment upon review of memcon. 1 Secretary received Amb Naude Aug 26 for continuation Bantustan talks. Amb said he leaving that evening for consultation Pretoria. According Naude his govt envisages establishment of eight to ten states within confines of the Republic. They would be linked through a confederation or federation. Would be fully independent and doubtless members of UN. Some controls over foreign policy and defense would be retained for a time by the SAG. Secretary inquired as to discourse now going on between SAG and non-white leaders. Naude gave indirect answer saying that efforts to create Transkei native state require a great deal of consultation with Blacks. Asked about disparities between land allocated to Whites and Blacks Naude said much of land occupied by Bantu is far better than that of many Whites but SAG is committed to make more land available to Bantu. Secretary asked about measures SAG could take for more fruitful discussion pressing problems. Might begin he commented by liberalizing Bantu Education Act and the pass laws. Naude replied such laws and other forms discrimination which Americans dislike will pass away. Some control over freedom movement necessary prevent overcrowding of cities and to save primitive Bantu from being deAfricanized. Discrimination will disappear with creation native states. In response question if there wouldn't still be considerable admixture of people Amb acknowledged urban Bantu present continuing difficulty but Bantustans will offer counter attractions and Black flood into cities will end. Naude complained that many US officials speak of their desire keep a US-South African dialogue going but dialogues are difficult to maintain when South Africa is whipped publicly. Secretary replied he would be delighted to have something to support. SAG should seek position its friends could defend. We don't expect overnight changes but it is very important SAG find way to demonstrate both to world and Bantu there is something worthwhile to discuss. Secretary suggested starting with SWA. Here much could be done. Naude said Odendaal Report will be released before UNGA meeting. The report will be a starting point. Secretary felt SAG has view of Territory entirely different from rest of UN. He asked why SAG doesn't take initiative and institute reforms instead of waiting for others to force action. Naude responded that every time he suggests some course of action his govt replied “Wait for the Odendaal Report.” A bold solution in the Territory could be most important the Secretary said and he then spoke of necessity that SAG prepare for coming ICJ decision in SWA case. Amb said he appreciated Secretary's efforts find solution and he would carry Secretary's message on SWA to Pretoria. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 BAS. Confidential. Drafted by Hall on August 27, cleared by MacKnight and Brown, and approved by Hilliker. Repeated to USUN and London. 1 The memorandum of conversation is ibid., POL S AFR. 415. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk 415. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk Source Washington, September 23, 1963. The President has approved the Secretary of State's recommendation of August 28 1 to continue after the end of this year to license the sale of spare parts of C-130s sold to the South African Government. With respect to possible sale of submarines to South Africa the President has approved recommendation B of the joint State-Defense memorandum of September 16 2 but with these specific limitations: (a) It should be made clear to the South Africans that any informal discussions held during the balance of this year are to be strictly confidential and involve no implied commitment to sell, and, (b) The US can make no decision before the end of this year regarding sales and any eventual decision will be taken in the light of circumstances at the time the question is considered, under our policy stated in the UN Security Council in August. McGeorge Bundy * Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12-5 S AFR. Secret. Also sent to Secretary of Defense McNamara. 1 Acting Secretary Ball's August 28 memorandum recommended that the U.S. Government approve requests received after the end of 1963 to license the sale of spare parts for the C-130's. He noted that the U.S. Government had approved the contract between Lockheed and the South African Government knowing that it contained the clause providing for the supply of spare parts to maintain the aircraft so long as five were in operation (Ibid.) 2 On September 16, Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara recommended quietly exploring the sale of submarines to South Africa on preliminary basis. (Ibid.) 416. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 416. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Source Washington, September 27, 1963, 8:03 p.m. 866. South West Africa. Dept believes our objective for forthcoming Committee IV and Plenary discussion SWAfrica should be to continue to avoid any GA action (e.g. revocation of Mandate, sanctions) which would prejudice ICJ case and thereby reduce likelihood of eventual solution based on rule of law. Such unilateral “political” action would have little or no chance of changing SAG's policies re territory, whereas action based upon ICJ decision would offer some hope. Since African Heads of State Conference as well as Committee of 24 refrained from urging immediate revocation of Mandate (former emphasized importance of ICJ case), Dept has been cautiously optimistic that outcome of 18th GA consideration this item might be adoption of a res along lines May 10, 1963 Committee of 24 resolution (which we supported despite reservation). 1 However, ICJ granting SAG delay until Jan 10, 64 to present its counter-memorial (originally due Sept 30) may heighten African impatience with Court proceeding and increase danger of unilateral action by 18th GA, e.g. revocation Mandate or sanctions. While we encouraged by opinion of Yomekpe (Ghana) as reported USUN's 946, 2 that Africans committed await ICJ decision before supporting UN action re status of territory, we wonder whether when he made these remarks he knew of delay ICJ case. Dept requests Mission's estimate as to how issue likely develop in Committee IV, as well as views on best means prevent undesirable action. We suggest you discuss problem with Gross, since if ICJ case still to be used as means forestall precipitate action he (and his clients) in best position dampen down African impatience. Suggest you also discuss with UKUN. Views of USUN and Emb Pretoria requested on advisability our disclosing during Committee IV debate our diplomatic efforts vis-à-vis SAG on SWAfrica. Such disclosure would show we have followed up our UN speeches with quiet diplomatic efforts and might take some steam out of calls for severance diplomatic relations. On other hand, it would tend imply US has more influence with SAG this issue than is actually the case, and public disclosure our demarches might reduce SAG's receptivity to future private representations on SWAfrica. In any case, we would not make such a statement without consulting UK, our chief partner in this diplomatic exercise. In line with Ambassador's March 22 talk with Louw it would also seem necessary, subject to Embassy Pretoria's views, inform SAG our intention make such a statement. We would anticipate such statement would be couched in general terms, without giving text of Ambassador's oral or written presentation, along lines USG undertook strenuous diplomatic campaign in 1963 to seek to induce SAG to (1) take a cooperative attitude toward UN presence and implementation res 1805; and (2) take steps soonest to adjust its administration of Territory to conform with Mandate and SAG's international obligations. If we decide proceed with such a statement, it likely other countries who, at our urging, joined us in representations to SAG (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Ireland, Italy, Japan, UK and probably Austria, Greece, New Zealand and Venezuela) would disclose in debate the steps they took. 3 Ball * Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL-19 SW AFR/UN. Confidential. Drafted by Parker on September 26; cleared by Strong, Streeter in draft, Friedman, and Buffum; and approved by Wallner. Also sent to Pretoria and repeated to London. 1 See footnote 3, Document 400 . 2 Dated September 24. (Department of State, Central Files, UN 10) 3 On November 13, by a vote of 82 to 6 with 16 abstentions, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution 1899 (XVIII), “The Question of South West Africa.” The United States voted against the resolution after unsuccessfully attempting to eliminate language calling South West Africa “a serious threat to international peace and security” and language calling for an oil embargo. For text of the resolution, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 705-708. 417. Memorandum of Conversation 417. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, October 4, 1963, 10:30 a.m. SUBJECT South Africa participants United States The President William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary European Affairs Thomas M. Judd, EUR/BNA UK Lord Home, Foreign Secretary Sir David Ormsby Gore, Ambassador to the U.S. Oliver Wright, Foreign Office Lord Home said that an idea was being put forward at the UN for “strategic sanctions” against South Africa. The UK was opposed to the application of sanctions except when there was a threat to peace. The trouble with Security Council resolutions was that they were mandatory. The UK would accordingly have to veto any “strategic sanctions” resolution as it was unlikely that enough abstentions could be obtained. Ambassador Stevenson had indicated, Lord Home said, that the U.S. might go along with some selective sanctions. The President replied that we had gone along on the arms embargo. We would not go beyond that and would not support sanctions. The question was how best to stop them. He thought that the British should not be too disturbed at the idea of casting a veto. * Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL-1 S AFR. Confidential. Drafted by Judd and approved by the White House on October 15. The conversation took place at the White House. The source text is labeled “4 of 6 parts.” 418. Memorandum of Conversation 418. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, October 18, 1963. PARTICIPANTS Secretary Rusk H.E. G.P. Jooste, Head of UN Delegation and Secretary of Department of Foreign Affairs of South Africa H.E. Dr. Willem C. Naude, Ambassador of South Africa Mr. Jooste and Ambassador Naude asked to see me alone for a few minutes after a conversation covered by another memorandum. 1 Mr. Jooste told me in great confidence that the South African Government is most seriously and urgently considering withdrawal from the United Nations. He said that they had in mind three elements: (a) South Africa's own national interest in the face of repeated and almost unanimous condemnations and repetitions of embarrassments and harassments in the United Nations and its component organs; (b) withdrawal from the United Nations might serve to reduce difficulties for certain countries with whom South Africa has had long and friendly ties and (c) South African withdrawal from the United Nations might indeed be of some assistance to the United Nations itself since it would continue to have an important role to play and might not be damaged by a continuation of the present situation. I told Mr. Jooste that this was a matter of such seriousness that I would not wish to comment off the cuff; that I would not wish to give any views of our Government off the cuff, but that I would make the following preliminary comments: (a) that the South African Government might wish to consider carefully the reasons for its withdrawal and examine realistically whether the purposes to be achieved would in fact be achieved by withdrawal. For example, the withdrawal of South Africa would not cause the South African issue to disappear from the United Nations agenda; (b) I could tell him straightaway that the United States would not wish to ask South Africa to withdraw in order to make things easier in the United Nations for the United States. Although it is true that we have had many painful situations confronting us in the United Nations because of the South African problem, we felt that these were problems inherent in the situation itself and that under no circumstances would we suggest their withdrawal to ease our own situation; (c) I added that I was quite sure in my own mind that they should not give weight to their withdrawal as a means of assisting the United Nations. Indeed, although I know of no way in which the question could be posed, it would be my impression that if the question of South African withdrawal were put to the membership of the United Nations, there would be a large majority indicating that they should not do so. I noted that the earlier effort to expel or suspend South Africa had gathered no substantial support and was now in my judgment a thing of the past; (d) on the question of any comment which we might have to make with respect to South Africa's own interests, I felt that that was a matter in which I would not wish to speak without further consideration since no such comments should be made irresponsibly. I told him that if we had anything further to say, we would try to do so in the next very few days. Dean Rusk 2 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, South Africa, 9/30/63-10/29/63. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Rusk. 1 Not printed. 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 419. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy 419. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Source Washington, October 23, 1963. There is a good chance that the South African issue and, perhaps, the Portuguese-Africa issue will be up again in the UN Security Council in November. One of the hard-to-measure factors we will face, as we did in August, is how strong African opinion is on these issues and, therefore, how tough a political issue it really is for us with the Africans. On this score, the attached analysis 1 of African reaction to our performance in August (based in part on a thoro canvass of our African posts) suggests that the factor of African reaction may be less important than is sometimes claimed. There was very little evidence, in the African press, in statements to our Embassies, or in other forms of any great African concern with the UN performance. In fact our status in Africa probably improved because of our vote on the South African resolution and because the Portuguese agreed to talk to the Africans after the Ball mission to Lisbon. (Note particularly paragraphs 3, 8, 11 and 13 of the attached.) William H. Brubeck 2 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Africa. Confidential. A marginal notation reads: “(Taken from Pres. week-end reading dtd 10/26/63, Tab 4).” 1 Current Intelligence Memorandum attached to the source text, but not printed. 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 420. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 420. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Source Washington, November 1, 1963. SUBJECT Rostow's South Africa Study 1 This is still a working draft, not a final product, but it is a surprisingly solid and objective study worth selective reading. It is not, however, very relevant to our current problem about how to handle the South African issue in the UN Security Council this month, on which the Secretary of State will be sending over a paper Monday. He will propose, in effect, that we hold the line at our position of the August Security Council, with no significant new concessions to the Africans. There is a debate going on within State over proposed action to stop US Government loans and credits to South Africa and even warn US private investors against the economic risk of investment in South Africa. These proposals will probably not mature for a while but the economic sections of the attached study take on particular interest apropos of the general question of what further steps we might take, like our August arms embargo, to pressure the South Africans and help the Black Africans. The heart of the attached study is a “long range proposal” (210-231) which picks up a remark of Prime Minister Verwoerd's and develops from it a scheme for a set of modest reforms by the South African Government in return for which the US and UK would give categorical support to the South African Government politically. While the reforms are modest and gradual, they are basic because the South African Government would have openly to scrap apartheid—a complete admission of defeat for its present policy. What is particularly interesting about this proposal is that within the US Government support for it ranges from the liberal, pro-Black Africans (such as the authors of this piece) to Ambassador Satterthwaite and the CAS in South Africa. (The latter of whom is as far to the right as any one in the US Government on the subject of South Africa.) The scheme may, therefore, be a starter in two ways—first as a serious proposal to the South Africans and second, if they refuse it, as a public US gambit which would seriously split Verwoerd's near-monolithic present white support. The second point might be important, because the complaint of South African liberal whites now is that, by being so militantly hostile, the Western powers are driving even liberal white South Africans into the Verwoerd camp. In any event, even if it has practical interest, there's serious doubt whether South Africa is yet ripe for such a proposal. Other items of interest in the paper: 1. A reminder of how dismal is South Africa's basic record as an allegedly staunch ally of the West (200-202). 2. An excellent survey of the South African economy (A-1 to A-14); of the possible effect of economic sanctions (A-15 to A-20); and of US investment (203-6). For example, in spite of all the political noise, South African trade with a number of Black African countries is actually increasing—including Ghana! And the Chicoms and Eastern Europeans still do some business with South Africa. 3. A lot of work needs doing with the economic data, in terms of its relevance to sanctions, pressures, economic reprisals, etc. in the future international quarrel over South Africa. However, it is interesting to note how vulnerable the South African economy apparently is—for example, the sharp outflow of private capital and the $1.4 billion decline in stock values after the Sharpeville riot (March 1960) and the withdrawal from the Commonwealth (May 1961). (Pages A-3 to A-4) 2 William H. Brubeck 3 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, South Africa. No classification marking. A handwritten notation reads: “(Included in Pres. week-end reading dtd 11/2-3/63).” 1 Attached to the source text, but not printed, is an intermediate draft of a paper entitled “South Africa, Department of State, National Strategy Series” prepared by William R. Duggan of the Policy Planning Council and Waldemar B. Campbell of the Bureau of African Affairs. 2 On October 29, Rostow sent a copy of the South Africa paper to President Kennedy under cover of a memorandum stating that he believed that the President would want to examine this intermediate draft report on South Africa over the weekend and noting that the imminent debate on South Africa in the United Nations would make the document useful for him to know, since it was certain to play a role in the formulation of U.S. policy in New York. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, South Africa) 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 421. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy 421. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy Source Washington, November 6, 1963. SUBJECT Security Council Meeting on South Africa Enclosed is a paper 1 which describes the approach we plan to take in the forthcoming Security Council meeting on the problem of apartheid in South Africa. This policy has been developed in close consultation with Ambassador Stevenson. We propose to continue opposing mandatory sanctions and to indicate clearly the limits of UN measures which we think appropriate to deal with the problem. At the same time, in order to show our continuing concern about apartheid and to help deflect support from a more radical resolution, we would be prepared to interpret our existing policy on arms restrictions to include an embargo on materials used primarily in the production of arms and ammunition. The Norwegians have developed such a proposition; Governor Stevenson will be working with them and other Council members to obtain a resolution satisfactory to us. In addition, we would be prepared to accept a suitable version of an expert committee to study the South African problem. Dean Rusk * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, South Africa. Confidential. 1 Attached to the source text, but not printed. 422. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk 422. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk Source Washington, November 7, 1963. I agree with your proposed course of action on South Africa in the Security Council and share strongly your view that, having made a major concession in August, we cannot get in the position of having to make substantial new concessions on this issue every few months. I think it important, therefore, that in announcing our willingness to apply the arms embargo to “materials for the production of military equipment” we make it very clear that we regard this as merely part of the position we voluntarily took in August and that the August resolution should be given a more reasonable further term to do its work. 1 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, South Africa. Confidential. 1 Printed from an unsigned copy that indicates the President signed the original. 423. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy 423. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy Source Washington, November 19, 1963. SUBJECT South African Submarine Sales You will recall that in September you authorized exploratory technical talks regarding South Africa's interest in a $90-130 million purchase of submarines with the clear understanding that the talks would involve no express or implied commitment on the part of the U.S. to sell and that, in any event, no decision would be made before the end of this year. As a result of a first round in South Africa, State and Defense are now considering a South African proposal for another round of exploratory talks here in the near future. The prospective value of sale, however, is now down to about $38 million due to South Africa's preference for a smaller, cheaper submarine which the Navy got ELCO to design expressly to meet South African needs. South Africa also has indicated interest in some other military purchases, of which the only plausible one seems to be a $ 35-40 million air defense system for their Simonstown Naval Base. You will recall that in the Security Council debate in August we announced termination of all military sales to South Africa by the end of this year but reserved the right of possible future sales where required for “the common defense.” With the South African issue becoming steadily more difficult internationally, we now have two problems: 1. Given its political difficulties and its sharply reduced balance of payments value, should we continue to explore the submarine sale? 2. In order to retrieve some balance of payments value, should we not only continue submarine talks, but also entertain some additional South African requests such as the Simonstown air defense system? State and Defense now have these questions under review. WB * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, South Africa. Confidential. 424. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 424. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Source Washington, November 26, 1963. SUBJECT South Africa in the Security Council 1. The UN Security Council will begin debate tomorrow and probably continue through the latter part of next week on the South African issue. In addition to the usual condemnation of apartheid, the debate will come down to a fight over the African proposal for an oil embargo against South Africa (South Africa is totally dependent on imports for POL, $90-100 million per year—we are one supplier). 2. President Kennedy had approved a US position opposing any such embargo or other mandatory sanctions. However, in addition to the policy we voluntarily announced during the August Security Council debate (terminating all arms shipments to South Africa at the end of the year but reserving the right to future sales for cold war defense) he approved a further commitment at this time to embargo a specifically enumerated list of items for the manufacture of arms. 3. Four of the five abstentions necessary to kill a sanctions resolution are in hand (US, UK, France and Norway) and the UK is prepared to veto if necessary. We are pressing Brazil and Venezuela to get one of them as a fifth abstainer, and thus avoid the need for veto. However, we are not having much luck. 4. In view of the general African concern over the civil rights significance of President Kennedy's assassination, 1 and African uncertainty both as to President Johnson's civil rights position and his position on African issues, I think this South African debate is important: (a) He should if necessary personally communicate with Betancourt to obtain the fifth abstention and thus avoid a veto (even a British one) on apartheid as the first Security Council action during the Johnson Administration. (b) Either by his own statement if the occasion is available in the next few days (e.g. new conference) or more probably in Stevenson's speech in the Security Council, 2 President Johnson should be personally and in his own words recorded on the apartheid issue. (c) Our proposed voluntary ban on shipment of items for manufacture of arms, which President Kennedy had intended to present as simply an implicit part of our August arms embargo, should be presented as an explicit extension of US policy on South Africa by President Johnson, in his own right. These are actions which will be very effective at the UN and in Africa and which pose no countervailing difficulty for President Johnson to do. 3 WB * Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Aides File. Confidential. 1 President Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas, Texas, on November 22. 2 On December 4, Ambassador Stevenson spoke before the Security Council and appealed to South Africa to abandon its policy of apartheid. The Ambassador urged the Council to help bring about a peaceful evolution in South Africa toward a free and just society, and to make recommendations to member states which would diminish the chance that international tensions over apartheid might lead to a major explosion. He said that the United States would support the Norwegian draft resolution before the Security Council, which contained valuable proposals along these lines, including its provision that states should cease providing to South Africa equipment and materials for the production and maintenance of arms and munitions. For text of his remarks, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 694-698. 3 On December 4, the Norwegian draft resolution, which did not call for an oil embargo against South Africa, was adopted unanimously by the Security Council. For text of Security Council Resolution 182 (1963), see ibid., pp. 698-700. 425. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 425. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Source Washington, December 5, 1963. Some weeks ago the African Bureau appointed Ulrich Haynes, a young Negro, as Desk Officer for Southwest Africa and the High Commission Territories. They have now scheduled him for a trip to the Hicom Territories and we are getting into a first-class fight with South Africa over the matter. The South Africans first objected to any visa, then after several exchanges, have now offered grudgingly minimum physical transit rights through South Africa to the Hicom Territories. Secretary Rusk has called the South Africans in and taken a very tough line on our claim to normal diplomatic treatment for Negro officers. However, Verwoerd is apparently making the decisions himself and we may reach an impasse. Specifically we are demanding a visa to permit 3 days consultation with our Embassy in Pretoria and travel by auto to the Hicom Territories. We are awaiting a Verwoerd reply. Meanwhile the South African Foreign Office has informed us that their real objection is to Haynes' assignment to the Southwest Africa desk (which, for their part, reflects their view of Southwest Africa as part of South Africa). 1 Unless the South Africans back down, given the position the Secretary has taken, we may find ourselves in a minor diplomatic war—bringing home the Ambassador and leaving the First Secretary in charge or similar actions. And, since it seems to me evident that AF really wanted to test this one, it may well become a public issue of some news interest. It is obviously a parallel to the Arab boycott of Jews, and even (with regard to access rights to the High Commission Territories via South Africa) a faint parallel to Berlin—all this and civil rights too. We are now waiting for the South African Foreign Office to get a reply from Verwoerd on our demand for normal diplomatic treatment. This may come up, therefore, while I am away next week. WB * Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, South Africa, Vol. 2. Confidential. A copy was sent to Belk. 1 Attached to the source text is telegram 694 from Pretoria, December 5, reporting Ambassador Satterthwaite's meeting with Under Secretary Sole of the South African Foreign Office. Ambassador Satterthwaite presented the minimum U.S. requirements in the Haynes case, and Sole claimed that the South African Government's real objection was to the fact that Haynes was also the Desk Officer for South West Africa. (Department of State, Central Files, ORG 7 AF) 426. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa 426. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa Source Washington, December 10, 1963, 6:14 p.m. 730. Embtel 707. 1 You may inform Acting Secretary Uys or appropriate FonOff official of following: 1. that the seven day transit visa with multiple entry as set forth reftel meets needs Haynes official trip. 2. Department pleased abandonment attempted restrictions on full rights of our diplomatic agents re entry, free transit and customary privileges and immunities for conduct business with High Commission Territories and offices at Pretoria and Mafeking. Request Embassy forward copy of South African laws and regulations on transit and visitors visas with any comments Embassy has on this case as precedent. South African Embassy Counselor here previously informed Department that normal transit visa limited three days. Please clarify the meaning of sentence in reftel. “His visa would be amended at Jan Smuts if necessary.” Haynes passport is stamped with diplomatic transit visa without any indication of time limit. 2 Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, ORG 7 AF. Confidential. Drafted by Hooper, cleared by Cahn, and approved by Hooper. Also sent to Nairobi for Williams. 1 Telegram 707, December 7, reported that the South African Government was prepared to issue Haynes a transit visa in accordance with international practice and had expressed the hope that the United States would cooperate by using an Embassy plane. (Ibid.) 2 On December 30, Satterthwaite reported that Haynes' visit to the High Commission Territories had concluded successfully and without incident. (Telegram 769; ibid.) Index Index Abbas, Ferhat, 21 [ Pg. 21 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] , 47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 37 ] Abdiyyah (Libya), 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 103 ] Abdirascid, Ali Shermarche, 431 [ Pg. 431 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 446-454, 457 [ Pg. 457 is part of Doc. 290 ] , 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 292 ] Abdullah, Moulay, 37 n [ Pg. 37 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31 ] Abrams, Eugene, 402 n [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 404 [ Pg. 404 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 406 n [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 262 and Doc. 263 ] Abscir, Gen., 441 n [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 279 ] Acheson, Dean, 559 [ Pg. 559 includes portions of Doc. 358 and Doc. 359 ] Achilles, Theodore C., 110 [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] -111 [ Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] Acly, Robert A., 512 n [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] Adams, Theo C., 41 n [ Pg. 41 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34 ] , 244 n [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] Addis Ababa Conference of African Chiefs of State, 569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 366 ] Aden, 482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 305 ] Adomakah (Ghana), 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 247 ] Adoula, Cyrille, 552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 355 ] , 569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 366 ] Africa, North. See North Africa; individual countries . Africa region ( see also individual countries ), 281 [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 187 ] -283 [ Pg. 283 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] , 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 225 ] Addis Ababa Conference of African Chiefs of State, 569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 366 ] African alliances, 329 [ Pg. 329 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] African radicalism, 320 [ Pg. 320 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210 ] -322 [ Pg. 322 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211 ] African unity, 410 [ Pg. 410 is part of Doc. 264 ] -411 [ Pg. 411 includes portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265 ] Algeria independence conflict position, 49arms control policy, 285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] -287 [ Pg. 287 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] , 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 197 ] -298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 305atomic-free zone issue, 174 [ Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 191 ] -287 [ Pg. 287 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] , 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 219 ] Belgian colonies, 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 195 ] British colonies, 284 [ Pg. 284 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] -285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] , 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 219 ] British position, 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 194 ] -294 [ Pg. 294 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] , 307 [ Pg. 307 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] Casablanca Conference, 345 [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 225 ] -346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 225 ] Decade of Development, 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 201 ] -305 [ Pg. 305 includes portions of Doc. 201 and Doc. 202 ] decolonization, 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 219 ] Department of Defense position, 546 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 351 ] Development Assistance Committee (DAC), 295 [ Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 196 ] Economic Council for Africa (ECA), 503 [ Pg. 503 is part of Doc. 318 ] -504 [ Pg. 504 is part of Doc. 318 ] Ellender remark, 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 213 ] European minorities, 328 [ Pg. 328 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] French position, 290 [ Pg. 290 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194 ] -294 [ Pg. 294 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] , 307 [ Pg. 307 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] Galvao hijacking, 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 222 ] Guinea position, 410 [ Pg. 410 is part of Doc. 264 ] -411 [ Pg. 411 includes portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265 ] Joint Chiefs of Staff position, 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 316 ] -500 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 316 ] Kennedy civil rights message to Africa, 337 [ Pg. 337 includes portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] -338 [ Pg. 338 includes portions of Doc. 221 and Doc. 222 ] leaders, U.S. appraisal of, 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 219 ] -334 [ Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] Military Air Transport Service routes, 300 [ Pg. 300 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] -302 [ Pg. 302 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] -337 [ Pg. 337 includes portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] Monrovia conference, 287 [ Pg. 287 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] -288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 192 ] National Intelligence Estimates, 284 [ Pg. 284 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] -285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] , 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 198 ] -300 [ Pg. 300 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] , 320 [ Pg. 320 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210 ] -322 [ Pg. 322 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211 ] Organization of African Unity, 332 [ Pg. 332 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219 ] -334 [ Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 316 ] Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa, 329 [ Pg. 329 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] Pan-Africanism, 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 198 ] -300 [ Pg. 300 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] Peace Corps program, 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 213 ] -326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 214 ] Portuguese colonies, see Portuguese colonial Africa Portuguese position, 583 [ Pg. 583 is part of Doc. 373 ] -584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 373 ] Portuguese relations, 654racism ( see also apartheid and racial policies under South Africa ), 333regional alliances, 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 198 ] -300 [ Pg. 300 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] , 312 [ Pg. 312 is part of Doc. 205 ] South Africa issue, 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 222 ] South African boycott, 334 [ Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] Soviet bloc military assistance, 305 [ Pg. 305 includes portions of Doc. 201 and Doc. 202 ] Soviet civil aviation routes, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] -318 [ Pg. 318 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211 ] -323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 335 [ Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 220 ] Soviet military assistance, 542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 348 ] Soviet position, 642 [ Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 409 ] Spanish colonies, 285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] Summit Conference of Independent African States, 332 [ Pg. 332 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219 ] -333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 219 ] Tananarive Conference, 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 225 ] UN and, 292 [ Pg. 292 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] -293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 324 [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 316 ] U.S. assistance to African nationalists, 543 [ Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 349 ] -545 [ Pg. 545 includes portions of Doc. 350 and Doc. 351 ] , 547 [ Pg. 547 is part of Doc. 352 ] , 552 n [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 355 ] , 559 [ Pg. 559 includes portions of Doc. 358 and Doc. 359 ] , 560 [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360 ] -562 [ Pg. 562 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361 ] , 567 [ Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 363 , Doc. 364 , and Doc. 365 ] -568 [ Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 365 and Doc. 366 ] U.S. civil aviation policy, 316 [ Pg. 316 is part of Doc. 207 ] -318 [ Pg. 318 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] U.S. economic assistance, 294 [ Pg. 294 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] -296 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 303 [ Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] -305 [ Pg. 305 includes portions of Doc. 201 and Doc. 202 ] , 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 213 ] -326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 214 ] , 329 [ Pg. 329 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] -330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 259 ] U.S. Ghana policy, position on, 361 [ Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 236 ] U.S. military assistance, 283 [ Pg. 283 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] -284 [ Pg. 284 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] , 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 311 [ Pg. 311 is part of Doc. 205 ] -313 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 205 ] , 327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 215 ] -328 [ Pg. 328 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] U.S. military operations policy, 307 [ Pg. 307 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] -308 [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 209 ] -320 [ Pg. 320 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210 ] U.S. position, 331 [ Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 218 ] -332 [ Pg. 332 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 510 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 321 ] , 542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 348 ] , 563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 361 ] U.S. relations, 287 [ Pg. 287 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] -288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 302 [ Pg. 302 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] -303 [ Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] , 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 213 ] -326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 214 ] , 328 [ Pg. 328 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] -329 [ Pg. 329 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] , 604 [ Pg. 604 is part of Doc. 386 ] Western aid, 324 [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 212 ] Williams' Africa for Africans statement, 347 n [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 225 ] Agence France Presse (AFP), 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 268 ] -423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 268 ] Agency for International Development (AID), 406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 262 and Doc. 263 ] -409 [ Pg. 409 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] Aklilou Habtewold, 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 281 ] Alcoa Aluminum, 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 223 ] Alexander, Gen., 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 230 ] -353 [ Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 230 ] , 358 n [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 234 ] Algeria ( see also Morocco-Algeria border conflict), 2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 560 [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360 ] armed forces, 83 [ Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 79 ] , 133 [ Pg. 133 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] Bizerte crisis, 62 [ Pg. 62 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] -63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 46 ] China, People's Republic of, relations, 30 [ Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] Cuban military assistance, 24 [ Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 26 [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 29 n [ Pg. 29 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] , 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 26 ] -33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 35 n [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 89 ] -133 [ Pg. 133 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] Cuban relations, 11 [ Pg. 11 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 104 [ Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 72 ] -107 [ Pg. 107 includes portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73 ] , 108 [ Pg. 108 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] , 110 n [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 124 n [ Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 128 n [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 132economic situation, 10 [ Pg. 10 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 108 [ Pg. 108 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] -109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] -112 [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] -127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 134 [ Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 90 ] European minority, 108 [ Pg. 108 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] -109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 74 ] foreign policy, 110 [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 134 [ Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 90 ] -135 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 90 ] French economic assistance, 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] -112 [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 124 [ Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 85 ] -125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 134 [ Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 90 ] French military assistance, 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 57 ] , 83 n [ Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 100 n [ Pg. 100 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 70 ] French relations, 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 102 [ Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 71 ] -103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] -112 [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 114 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 121 [ Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 131 n [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 134 [ Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 90 ] independence conflict, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] -2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 37 ] African states position, 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 37 ] Algiers military officers' revolt, 59 n [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 43 ] Asian states position, 49cease-fire, 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 90 n [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 62 ] European minority, 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 51 ] -72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 87 n [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 89 [ Pg. 89 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] French-Algerian negotiations, 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 35 ] -45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 56 [ Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41 ] , 56 n [ Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41 ] , 57 [ Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] , 62 [ Pg. 62 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] -64 [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47 ] , 66 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 48 ] , 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 51 ] -73 [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] , 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 53 ] French army loyalty, 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 43 ] French blockade, 60 [ Pg. 60 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] French position, 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 40 ] -56 [ Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41 ] , 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 43 ] -60 [ Pg. 60 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] , 62 [ Pg. 62 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] -66 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 48 ] , 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 51 ] -71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 54 ] , 79 n [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 80 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 62 ] French relations, 125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 85 ] Iraqi role, 73 [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] Joint Chiefs of Staff appraisal, 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 50 ] Lebanese role, 73 [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] Moroccan position, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 51 ] -73 [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] , 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 63 ] NATO role, 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 44 ] November demonstrations, 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 51 ] Organization Armee Secrete, 94 [ Pg. 94 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] -95 [ Pg. 95 includes portions of Doc. 65 and Doc. 66 ] partition, 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 51 ] -72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 57 ] Sahara sovereignty issue, 62 [ Pg. 62 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] -65 [ Pg. 65 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 54 ] Senegalese role, 73 [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] Swiss role, 62 [ Pg. 62 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] -65 [ Pg. 65 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] territory borders issue, 62 [ Pg. 62 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] -64 [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47 ] Tunisia, rebel bases, 60 [ Pg. 60 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] Tunisian position, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 249 [ Pg. 249 includes portions of Doc. 164 and Doc. 165 ] U.N. role, 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 54 ] -78 [ Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55 ] U.S.-Algerian relations, 74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 52 ] -75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 78 [ Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55 ] -80 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 84 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 59 ] -90 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 61 ] U.S. position, 5 [ Pg. 5 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 37 ] -53 [ Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] , 56 [ Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41 ] -57 [ Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] , 66 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 48 ] -67 [ Pg. 67 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 51 ] -73 [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] , 84 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 59 ] -87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 59 ] Joint Chiefs of Staff appraisal, 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 81 n [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 57 ] Kabylie rebellion, 128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 134 [ Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 90 ] Libyan military stocks, 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 34 ] Moroccan relations, 98 [ Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] Mouvement Nationaliste Algerienne, 57 n [ Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] nationalization, 126 [ Pg. 126 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] , 134 n [ Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 90 ] uclear testing in the Sahara, 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 134 [ Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 90 ] Organization Armee Secrete, 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 94 [ Pg. 94 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] -94 [ Pg. 94 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] Peace Corps program, 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 81 ] -122 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 83 ] political situation, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 34 [ Pg. 34 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] , 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 35 ] -48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 57 n [ Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] , 66 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 48 ] , 94 [ Pg. 94 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] -95 [ Pg. 95 includes portions of Doc. 65 and Doc. 66 ] , 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 67 ] -99 [ Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] , 102 n [ Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 104 [ Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] -112 [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] , 133 [ Pg. 133 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] -134 [ Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 90 ] Portuguese position, 582 [ Pg. 582 is part of Doc. 373 ] Soviet bloc relations, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 10 [ Pg. 10 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] , 115 [ Pg. 115 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] Soviet economic assistance, 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] Soviet military assistance, 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 30 [ Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 100 n [ Pg. 100 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 70 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 89 ] -133 [ Pg. 133 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] , 206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] Soviet relations, 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] -129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 134 [ Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 90 ] UN relief aid, 96 [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. 66 ] United Arab Republic economic assistance, 115 [ Pg. 115 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] United Arab Republic military assistance, 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 24 [ Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 26 [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 30 [ Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 26 ] -33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 115 [ Pg. 115 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 89 ] -133 [ Pg. 133 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] United Arab Republic relations, 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 135 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 90 ] U.S. economic assistance, 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 52 ] -76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 59 ] -86 [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 95 [ Pg. 95 includes portions of Doc. 65 and Doc. 66 ] -96 [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] -100 [ Pg. 100 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] , 102 [ Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 71 ] -108 [ Pg. 108 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] -115 [ Pg. 115 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] -122 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 131 n [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 217 ] U.S. military assistance, 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 57 ] -83 [ Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 86 [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. 59 ] -87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 100 [ Pg. 100 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] -101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 70 ] , 114 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 81 ] U.S. relations, 11 [ Pg. 11 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 14 ] -21 [ Pg. 21 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] , 24 [ Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 28 [ Pg. 28 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23 ] -29 [ Pg. 29 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] , 35 n [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 36 [ Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] -37 [ Pg. 37 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 37 ] -53 [ Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] , 56 [ Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41 ] , 58 n [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 67 [ Pg. 67 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] -68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 84 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 59 ] -90 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 64 ] -94 [ Pg. 94 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] , 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 67 ] -99 [ Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] , 124 [ Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 85 ] -133 [ Pg. 133 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] U.S. trade relations, 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 81 ] Ali Sabri, 30 [ Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] Allen, Arthur B., 40 n [ Pg. 40 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 428 n [ Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 271 and Doc. 272 ] , 429 n [ Pg. 429 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] Alphand, Herve, 12 [ Pg. 12 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 35 ] -45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 54 [ Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40 ] -55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 60 [ Pg. 60 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] -61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 80 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 403 [ Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 261 ] Aluminum Ltd., 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 223 ] Amer, Abdel Hakim, 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 84 ] Amory, Robert, 272 n [ Pg. 272 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] Angola, 106 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] , 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 195 ] -294 [ Pg. 294 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] , 329 [ Pg. 329 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] , 491 [ Pg. 491 is part of Doc. 311 ] -492 [ Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312 ] Acheson memorandum, 559 [ Pg. 559 includes portions of Doc. 358 and Doc. 359 ] Angolan Nationalist Movement (MPLA), 551 [ Pg. 551 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] -552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 355 ] , 561 [ Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 360 ] Azores base issue, 493 [ Pg. 493 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] , 497 [ Pg. 497 is part of Doc. 315 ] -498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 316 ] , 545 [ Pg. 545 includes portions of Doc. 350 and Doc. 351 ] -546 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 351 ] , 548 [ Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 353 ] -549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 353 ] , 556 [ Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 357 and Doc. 358 ] , 558 [ Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 358 ] -559 [ Pg. 559 includes portions of Doc. 358 and Doc. 359 ] , 570 [ Pg. 570 is part of Doc. 366 ] , 573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 367 ] , 576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 369 ] , 579 [ Pg. 579 includes portions of Doc. 371 and Doc. 372 ] Bakong tribe, 584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 373 ] British position, 541 n [ Pg. 541 is part of Doc. 347 ] Congo relations, 551 [ Pg. 551 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] -552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 355 ] , 553 [ Pg. 553 is part of Doc. 356 ] , 569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 366 ] French position, 541 n [ Pg. 541 is part of Doc. 347 ] Government of the Republic of Angola in Exile, 580 [ Pg. 580 is part of Doc. 372 ] insurgency movement, 579 [ Pg. 579 includes portions of Doc. 371 and Doc. 372 ] -580 [ Pg. 580 is part of Doc. 372 ] North Atlantic Council, 542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 348 ] -543 [ Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 349 ] Organization of African Unity position, 580political situation, 543 [ Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 349 ] , 551 [ Pg. 551 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] -552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 355 ] , 553 [ Pg. 553 is part of Doc. 356 ] , 561 [ Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 360 ] , 579 [ Pg. 579 includes portions of Doc. 371 and Doc. 372 ] -580 [ Pg. 580 is part of Doc. 372 ] Portuguese position, 548 [ Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 353 ] -549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 353 ] , 550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 354 ] , 583 [ Pg. 583 is part of Doc. 373 ] Roberto insurgency, 553 [ Pg. 553 is part of Doc. 356 ] -554 [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 356 ] Union des Populations d'Angola (UPA), 543 [ Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 349 ] -544 [ Pg. 544 includes portions of Doc. 349 and Doc. 350 ] United Nations, 550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 354 ] , 564 [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 362 ] -567 [ Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 363 , Doc. 364 , and Doc. 365 ] , 570 [ Pg. 570 is part of Doc. 366 ] -572 [ Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 366 ] U.S. assistance to nationalists, 543 [ Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 349 ] -545 [ Pg. 545 includes portions of Doc. 350 and Doc. 351 ] , 547 [ Pg. 547 is part of Doc. 352 ] , 552 n [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 355 ] , 559 [ Pg. 559 includes portions of Doc. 358 and Doc. 359 ] , 567 [ Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 363 , Doc. 364 , and Doc. 365 ] -568 [ Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 365 and Doc. 366 ] U.S. economic assistance, 558 [ Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 358 ] U.S. financial support of Holden Roberto, 543 [ Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 349 ] -545 [ Pg. 545 includes portions of Doc. 350 and Doc. 351 ] , 547 [ Pg. 547 is part of Doc. 352 ] , 552 n [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 355 ] , 561 [ Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 360 ] U.S. policy in the UN, 541 [ Pg. 541 is part of Doc. 347 ] , 555 [ Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 357 ] -556 [ Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 357 and Doc. 358 ] , 564 [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 362 ] -567 [ Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 363 , Doc. 364 , and Doc. 365 ] U.S. weapons, Portuguese use of, 548 [ Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 353 ] -549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 353 ] , 551 [ Pg. 551 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] , 557 [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 358 ] , 573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 367 ] , 576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 369 ] Angolan Nationalist Movement (MPLA), 551 [ Pg. 551 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] -552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 355 ] , 561 [ Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 360 ] Apartheid and racial policies, South Africa, 501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 317 ] , 587 [ Pg. 587 is part of Doc. 375 ] -588 [ Pg. 588 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376 ] , 591 n [ Pg. 591 is part of Doc. 378 ] , 593 [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 379 ] , 599 [ Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 384 ] -600 [ Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 384 ] , 606 [ Pg. 606 is part of Doc. 387 ] , 609 n [ Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 390 ] , 614 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 393 ] -616 [ Pg. 616 is part of Doc. 393 ] , 620 [ Pg. 620 includes portions of Doc. 396 and Doc. 397 ] -623 [ Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 398 ] , 631 [ Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 404 ] -635 [ Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 406 ] , 640 [ Pg. 640 is part of Doc. 409 ] -642 [ Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 409 ] , 655 [ Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 420 ] , 659 n [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 424 ] Armstrong, Oscar V., 539 n [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. 346 ] Ascension Island, 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 209 ] -320 [ Pg. 320 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210 ] Ashanti tribe, 354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 231 ] Atomic-free zone issue, 174 [ Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 191 ] -287 [ Pg. 287 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] , 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 219 ] Attwood, William H., 392 n [ Pg. 392 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] , 394 n [ Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 257 ] , 398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 257 ] , 407 [ Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 263 ] , 411 [ Pg. 411 includes portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 267 ] , 420 n [ Pg. 420 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] Australia, 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 346 ] Azikiwe, 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 222 ] Badeau, John S., 25 n [ Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 19 and Doc. 20 ] , 30 [ Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] Bakong tribe, 584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 373 ] Balafrej, Ahmed, 12 [ Pg. 12 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 26 [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 38 [ Pg. 38 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] , 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 124 ] , 195 [ Pg. 195 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] -196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 199 n [ Pg. 199 includes portions of Doc. 128 and Doc. 129 ] , 205 [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] -206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] , 208 [ Pg. 208 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] -209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 148 ] , 228 n [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 150 ] Balewa, Abubakar Tafawa, 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 366 ] Ball, George W., 3 n [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 27 [ Pg. 27 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] -29 [ Pg. 29 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] , 65 n [ Pg. 65 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 73 n [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] , 77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 54 ] , 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 93 n [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 107 [ Pg. 107 includes portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73 ] -108 [ Pg. 108 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] , 123 n [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 214 n [ Pg. 214 includes portions of Doc. 139 and Doc. 140 ] , 215 [ Pg. 215 includes portions of Doc. 140 and Doc. 141 ] -216 [ Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] , 248 n [ Pg. 248 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] , 260 n [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] , 263 n [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 264 n [ Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] , 348 [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 229 ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 232 ] -356 [ Pg. 356 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 362 [ Pg. 362 is part of Doc. 237 ] , 392 [ Pg. 392 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] , 394 n [ Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] , 520 n [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 331 ] , 521 n [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 332 ] , 555 n [ Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 357 ] , 560 n [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360 ] , 565 [ Pg. 565 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] -567 [ Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 363 , Doc. 364 , and Doc. 365 ] , 577 [ Pg. 577 is part of Doc. 370 ] -579 [ Pg. 579 includes portions of Doc. 371 and Doc. 372 ] , 582 [ Pg. 582 is part of Doc. 373 ] , 629 [ Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 402 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 is part of Doc. 408 ] -638 [ Pg. 638 is part of Doc. 408 ] , 645 n [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 412 ] Banda, Hastings K., 508 [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 320 ] -509 [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] , 516 [ Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 327 and Doc. 328 ] , 525 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 336 ] -526 [ Pg. 526 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] , 538 [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] Bangoura, Karim, 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 267 ] Bantustans policy, 620 [ Pg. 620 includes portions of Doc. 396 and Doc. 397 ] -621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 397 ] , 623 [ Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 398 ] , 631 [ Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 404 ] -632 [ Pg. 632 includes portions of Doc. 404 and Doc. 405 ] , 641 [ Pg. 641 is part of Doc. 409 ] -642 [ Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 409 ] , 647 [ Pg. 647 includes portions of Doc. 413 and Doc. 414 ] -648 [ Pg. 648 is part of Doc. 414 ] Basutoland, 303 [ Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] Batista, Fulgencio, 125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 85 ] Battle, Lucius D., 173 n [ Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] , 178 n [ Pg. 178 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] , 184 n [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 305 n [ Pg. 305 includes portions of Doc. 201 and Doc. 202 ] , 373 n [ Pg. 373 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] , 431 n [ Pg. 431 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 516 [ Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 327 and Doc. 328 ] -518 [ Pg. 518 includes portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329 ] , 555 n [ Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 357 ] , 559 [ Pg. 559 includes portions of Doc. 358 and Doc. 359 ] -560 [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360 ] , 612 [ Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 392 ] -613 [ Pg. 613 includes portions of Doc. 392 and Doc. 393 ] Baxter, William O., 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 131 ] Bechuanaland, 623 [ Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 398 ] Beigel, Edgar J., 542 n [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 348 ] Belgium, 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 195 ] -294 [ Pg. 294 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] , 345 [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 225 ] Belk, Samuel H., 302 [ Pg. 302 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] -303 [ Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] , 359 n [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 235 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267 ] -420 [ Pg. 420 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] , 545 [ Pg. 545 includes portions of Doc. 350 and Doc. 351 ] -546 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 351 ] , 550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 354 ] -551 [ Pg. 551 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] , 553 [ Pg. 553 is part of Doc. 356 ] -554 [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 356 ] , 590 n [ Pg. 590 is part of Doc. 377 ] Belkhair, Yunis Abdel Nabi, 140 [ Pg. 140 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] -142 [ Pg. 142 includes portions of Doc. 95 , Doc. 96 , and Doc. 97 ] Bell, David E., 162 n [ Pg. 162 includes portions of Doc. 108 and Doc. 109 ] , 173 n [ Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] , 219 n [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 221 [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 145 ] -222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 318 n [ Pg. 318 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] , 343 n [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 224 ] , 394 n [ Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] Bell, Jack, 290 [ Pg. 290 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194 ] Ben Bella, Ahmed, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 11 [ Pg. 11 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 12 ] -17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 18 n [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] -24 [ Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 26 [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 28 [ Pg. 28 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23 ] -29 [ Pg. 29 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] , 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 34 [ Pg. 34 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] , 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 67 ] -99 [ Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] , 102 [ Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 71 ] -107 [ Pg. 107 includes portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73 ] , 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 114 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 78 ] -115 [ Pg. 115 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] , 121 [ Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 82 ] -123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] -134 [ Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 90 ] , 235 n [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 222 ] , 569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 366 ] , 582 [ Pg. 582 is part of Doc. 373 ] Ben Geleil, 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 107 ] Bengelloun, Ali, 15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 37 [ Pg. 37 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31 ] -38 [ Pg. 38 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] , 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 63 ] Ben Khedda, Benyoussef, 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 60 ] -89 [ Pg. 89 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 99 n [ Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] Ben Salah, 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 182 ] Berard, Armand, 255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] Bergesen, Alf, 442 n [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 280 ] , 445 n [ Pg. 445 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] , 513 n [ Pg. 513 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325 ] Bernades, Carlos Alfredo, 535 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 342 ] Bingham, Jonathan B., 515 [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 326 and Doc. 327 ] , 626 [ Pg. 626 is part of Doc. 400 ] Bizerte crisis, 62 [ Pg. 62 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] -63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 includes portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] -252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 169 ] -272 [ Pg. 272 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] Black, Eugene, 348 [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 226 ] -350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 228 ] Blake, J.J., 331 n [ Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 218 ] Bohlen, Charles E., 173 n [ Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] , 175 n [ Pg. 175 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] Boke Bauxite Mine, 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 223 ] -342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 223 ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 is part of Doc. 256 ] -396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 256 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 259 ] Bonsal, Phillip W., 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 51 ] -73 [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] , 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 99 n [ Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] , 178 n [ Pg. 178 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 119 ] , 184 [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 120 ] -186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 121 ] , 188 [ Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 122 ] -189 [ Pg. 189 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] , 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 124 ] , 194 n [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 125 ] , 199 n [ Pg. 199 includes portions of Doc. 128 and Doc. 129 ] , 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 131 ] -202 [ Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 203 n [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] , 205 [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] -206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] , 208 [ Pg. 208 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] -210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 137 ] Botha, Pieter Willem, 618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 395 ] , 627 [ Pg. 627 includes portions of Doc. 400 and Doc. 401 ] Botsio, Kojo, 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 245 ] Boumedienne, Col. Houari, 36 [ Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 104 [ Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] Bourguiba, Habib, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] , 26 [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 54 [ Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40 ] -55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 56 n [ Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 161 ] -249 [ Pg. 249 includes portions of Doc. 164 and Doc. 165 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 171 ] -258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 260 [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] -261 [ Pg. 261 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 179 ] -270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 271 n [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 182 ] -274 [ Pg. 274 includes portions of Doc. 182 and Doc. 183 ] , 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 194 ] Bourguiba, Habib, Jr., 77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 54 ] , 251 n [ Pg. 251 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 176 ] Boussouf (Algeria), 66 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 48 ] Bowles, Chester B., 3 n [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 189 n [ Pg. 189 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] , 289 [ Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 193 ] -290 [ Pg. 290 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194 ] , 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 303 [ Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] -305 [ Pg. 305 includes portions of Doc. 201 and Doc. 202 ] , 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 223 ] -342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 223 ] , 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 229 ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 358 n [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] -437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 276 ] , 438 n [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] , 546 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 351 ] , 588 [ Pg. 588 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376 ] -589 [ Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 376 ] , 591 [ Pg. 591 is part of Doc. 378 ] -592 [ Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 378 ] , 596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 382 ] -598 [ Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] , 603 [ Pg. 603 is part of Doc. 386 ] -605 [ Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 386 and Doc. 387 ] , 607 n [ Pg. 607 includes portions of Doc. 388 and Doc. 389 ] , 608 n [ Pg. 608 includes portions of Doc. 389 and Doc. 390 ] , 629 [ Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 402 ] Brazil, 535 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 342 ] , 571 [ Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 366 ] Breitweiser, Maj. Gen. Robert A., 284 n [ Pg. 284 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] British Guinea, 577 [ Pg. 577 is part of Doc. 370 ] Bronez (DOD), 175 n [ Pg. 175 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] , 598 n [ Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] , 617 n [ Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 394 ] Brown, Harold, 588 [ Pg. 588 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376 ] Brown, L. Dean, 57 n [ Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] , 65 n [ Pg. 65 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 67 n [ Pg. 67 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 73 n [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] , 136 n [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 175 n [ Pg. 175 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] , 245 n [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 248 n [ Pg. 248 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] , 264 n [ Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] , 279 n [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 501 n [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 317 ] , 542 n [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 348 ] , 551 n [ Pg. 551 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] , 647 n [ Pg. 647 includes portions of Doc. 413 and Doc. 414 ] Brown, Theodore E., 326 n [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 214 ] Brubeck, William H., 389 [ Pg. 389 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] -390 [ Pg. 390 includes portions of Doc. 252 and Doc. 253 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 291 ] -460 [ Pg. 460 includes portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] , 474 n [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 299 and Doc. 300 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] -481 [ Pg. 481 includes portions of Doc. 303 and Doc. 304 ] , 505 [ Pg. 505 is part of Doc. 319 ] -507 [ Pg. 507 is part of Doc. 319 ] , 525 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 336 ] -526 [ Pg. 526 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] , 527 n [ Pg. 527 includes portions of Doc. 337 and Doc. 338 ] , 536 n [ Pg. 536 includes portions of Doc. 343 and Doc. 344 ] , 551 n [ Pg. 551 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] , 573 n [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 367 ] , 576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 369 ] , 577 n [ Pg. 577 is part of Doc. 370 ] , 578 n [ Pg. 578 includes portions of Doc. 370 and Doc. 371 ] , 605 n [ Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 386 and Doc. 387 ] , 608 n [ Pg. 608 includes portions of Doc. 389 and Doc. 390 ] , 644 [ Pg. 644 is part of Doc. 411 ] -645 [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 412 ] , 646 n [ Pg. 646 is part of Doc. 413 ] , 653 [ Pg. 653 includes portions of Doc. 418 and Doc. 419 ] -660 [ Pg. 660 is part of Doc. 425 ] Bruce, David K.E., 361 [ Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 524 n [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 335 ] Buckle, John F., 432 n [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 275 ] , 435 n [ Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] , 438 n [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 277 ] Buffum, William B., 37 n [ Pg. 37 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31 ] , 65 n [ Pg. 65 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 519 n [ Pg. 519 includes portions of Doc. 329 and Doc. 330 ] , 533 n [ Pg. 533 includes portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341 ] , 534 n [ Pg. 534 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] , 564 n [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 362 ] , 649 n [ Pg. 649 includes portions of Doc. 415 and Doc. 416 ] Bui River dam project, 357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 247 ] Bulgaria, 115 [ Pg. 115 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] Bundy, McGeorge, 11 n [ Pg. 11 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 17 n [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 19 n [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] -24 [ Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 27 n [ Pg. 27 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] , 28 n [ Pg. 28 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23 ] , 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 27 ] -34 [ Pg. 34 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] , 36 [ Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] -37 [ Pg. 37 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31 ] , 56 [ Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41 ] -57 [ Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] , 70 n [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 73 n [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] , 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 95 [ Pg. 95 includes portions of Doc. 65 and Doc. 66 ] -97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] -100 [ Pg. 100 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] , 102 n [ Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 115 n [ Pg. 115 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] -129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 149 n [ Pg. 149 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] , 151 [ Pg. 151 is part of Doc. 102 ] -153 [ Pg. 153 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 178 n [ Pg. 178 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] , 179 n [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 182 n [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 119 ] , 197 n [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 198 n [ Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] , 199 [ Pg. 199 includes portions of Doc. 128 and Doc. 129 ] -200 [ Pg. 200 includes portions of Doc. 129 and Doc. 130 ] , 216 n [ Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] , 218 n [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 143 ] , 219 n [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 239 [ Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 290 [ Pg. 290 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194 ] -292 [ Pg. 292 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] , 301 n [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 199 ] , 302 n [ Pg. 302 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] , 305 n [ Pg. 305 includes portions of Doc. 201 and Doc. 202 ] , 310 n [ Pg. 310 includes portions of Doc. 204 and Doc. 205 ] , 317 n [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 318 n [ Pg. 318 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 209 ] -320 [ Pg. 320 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210 ] , 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 213 ] , 337 [ Pg. 337 includes portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] , 354 n [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 365 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 239 ] -368 [ Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 369 n [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 240 ] , 373 n [ Pg. 373 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] , 390 n [ Pg. 390 includes portions of Doc. 252 and Doc. 253 ] , 431 n [ Pg. 431 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 291 ] -460 [ Pg. 460 includes portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] , 469 n [ Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298 ] , 474 n [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 299 and Doc. 300 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] -481 [ Pg. 481 includes portions of Doc. 303 and Doc. 304 ] , 491 n [ Pg. 491 is part of Doc. 311 ] , 503 [ Pg. 503 is part of Doc. 318 ] -507 [ Pg. 507 is part of Doc. 319 ] , 516 [ Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 327 and Doc. 328 ] -518 [ Pg. 518 includes portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329 ] , 525 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 336 ] -526 [ Pg. 526 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] , 527 n [ Pg. 527 includes portions of Doc. 337 and Doc. 338 ] , 543 [ Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 349 ] -546 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 351 ] , 548 [ Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 353 ] -549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 353 ] , 574 n [ Pg. 574 is part of Doc. 368 ] , 576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 369 ] , 595 [ Pg. 595 includes portions of Doc. 381 and Doc. 382 ] -596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 382 ] , 603 [ Pg. 603 is part of Doc. 386 ] -605 [ Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 386 and Doc. 387 ] , 607 [ Pg. 607 includes portions of Doc. 388 and Doc. 389 ] -608 [ Pg. 608 includes portions of Doc. 389 and Doc. 390 ] , 612 [ Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 392 ] -613 [ Pg. 613 includes portions of Doc. 392 and Doc. 393 ] , 636 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 407 ] -638 [ Pg. 638 is part of Doc. 408 ] , 643 [ Pg. 643 includes portions of Doc. 409 and Doc. 410 ] , 646 n [ Pg. 646 is part of Doc. 413 ] , 649 [ Pg. 649 includes portions of Doc. 415 and Doc. 416 ] , 654 [ Pg. 654 includes portions of Doc. 419 and Doc. 420 ] -656 [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 420 and Doc. 421 ] , 658 [ Pg. 658 includes portions of Doc. 423 and Doc. 424 ] -660 [ Pg. 660 is part of Doc. 425 ] Bundy, William P., 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 81 n [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 57 ] , 185 n [ Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. 147 and Doc. 148 ] , 491 n [ Pg. 491 is part of Doc. 311 ] , 578 [ Pg. 578 includes portions of Doc. 370 and Doc. 371 ] , 608 n [ Pg. 608 includes portions of Doc. 389 and Doc. 390 ] Burdett, William C., Jr., 287 n [ Pg. 287 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] , 501 n [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 317 ] , 509 n [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] , 521 n [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 332 ] , 522 n [ Pg. 522 includes portions of Doc. 332 and Doc. 333 ] , 523 n [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 334 ] , 534 n [ Pg. 534 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] , 568 n [ Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 365 and Doc. 366 ] , 574 n [ Pg. 574 is part of Doc. 368 ] Burke, Adm. Arleigh A., 455 n [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 288 ] Burris, Col. Howard L., 372 [ Pg. 372 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] -373 [ Pg. 373 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] Burundi, 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 217 ] Butler, R.A., 524 n [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 335 ] , 527 [ Pg. 527 includes portions of Doc. 337 and Doc. 338 ] , 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 338 ] Cahn, Jean Beverly, 661 n [ Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 426 ] Calhoun, Chad, 357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 233 ] -358 [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 247 ] , 384 [ Pg. 384 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] -386 [ Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] Camerouns, 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 213 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 217 ] Campbell, Waldemar, 624 [ Pg. 624 includes portions of Doc. 398 and Doc. 399 ] -625 [ Pg. 625 includes portions of Doc. 399 and Doc. 400 ] , 639 n [ Pg. 639 is part of Doc. 409 ] Canada, 311 [ Pg. 311 is part of Doc. 205 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 227 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 301 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 346 ] Canton, Col., 27 [ Pg. 27 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] , 235 n [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] Carr, Harry L., 144 n [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 149 n [ Pg. 149 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] Casablanca Conference, 345 [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 225 ] -346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 225 ] Castro, Fidel, 11 [ Pg. 11 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 26 [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 104 [ Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 106 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 88 ] Central African Federation. See Rhodesia-Nyasaland Federation. Central African Republic, 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 217 ] Central Intelligence Agency, 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 98 [ Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] -99 [ Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] Ceuta and Melilla, 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 27 ] Ceylon, 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 169 ] Chad, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] -315 [ Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] , 317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 217 ] Challe, Gen., 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 43 ] -61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 44 ] Chanderli, Abelkader, 67 [ Pg. 67 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 54 ] , 90 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 61 ] Chapin, William A., 524 n [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 335 ] Chase, Robert W., 4 n [ Pg. 4 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] , 52 n [ Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 57 n [ Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] , 243 n [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 244 n [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 245 n [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 246 n [ Pg. 246 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 248 n [ Pg. 248 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] Chayes, Abram, 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 229 ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 357 n [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 362 [ Pg. 362 is part of Doc. 237 ] , 370 [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 240 ] , 394 n [ Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] , 574 n [ Pg. 574 is part of Doc. 368 ] China, People's Republic of, 30 [ Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] Chisimaio Port, 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 275 ] , 440 [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 283 ] , 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 287 ] Cleveland, Harlan, 251 [ Pg. 251 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] , 253 n [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 255 n [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] , 343 n [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 224 ] , 501 n [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 317 ] , 519 n [ Pg. 519 includes portions of Doc. 329 and Doc. 330 ] , 534 n [ Pg. 534 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] , 541 n [ Pg. 541 is part of Doc. 347 ] , 564 n [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 362 ] , 568 n [ Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 365 and Doc. 366 ] , 570 [ Pg. 570 is part of Doc. 366 ] , 571 [ Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 366 ] , 574 n [ Pg. 574 is part of Doc. 368 ] , 577 [ Pg. 577 is part of Doc. 370 ] -578 [ Pg. 578 includes portions of Doc. 370 and Doc. 371 ] , 640 [ Pg. 640 is part of Doc. 409 ] Clifton, Maj. Gen. Chester V., 14 [ Pg. 14 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] Cline, Ray S., 491 n [ Pg. 491 is part of Doc. 311 ] Coffin, Frank M., 348 n [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286 ] , 453 [ Pg. 453 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] Cole, Temple G., 443 n [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 281 ] Collopy, Walter F.X., 1 n [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 60 n [ Pg. 60 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] , 245 n [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 542 n [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 348 ] Congo, 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 303 [ Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] , 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 213 ] , 328 [ Pg. 328 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] -329 [ Pg. 329 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] Angolan relations, 507 [ Pg. 507 is part of Doc. 319 ] , 551 [ Pg. 551 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] -552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 355 ] , 553 [ Pg. 553 is part of Doc. 356 ] , 569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 366 ] Ethiopia, 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 281 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 includes portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] Ghana, 345 [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 225 ] -347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 225 ] Guinea, 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 268 ] Nyasaland, 508 [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 320 ] -509 [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] political situation, 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 225 ] Tunisian troops, airlift, 253 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 168 ] UN role, 509 [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] U.S. economic assistance, 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 217 ] U.S. policy in the UN, 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 224 ] Congress, U.S., Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 273 n [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 182 ] Connett, William B., 30 n [ Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] Conroy, E. Dennis, 525 n [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 336 ] Conseil de l'Entente countries, 312 [ Pg. 312 is part of Doc. 205 ] -313 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 205 ] Conte, Seydou, 394 n [ Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 is part of Doc. 256 ] , 405 [ Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 262 ] -406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 262 and Doc. 263 ] , 415 [ Pg. 415 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] -418 [ Pg. 418 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267 ] Convention Peoples' Party (CPP), 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 379 [ Pg. 379 includes portions of Doc. 246 and Doc. 247 ] Cook, Philip R., 613 n [ Pg. 613 includes portions of Doc. 392 and Doc. 393 ] Coote, Wendell B., 538 n [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] Counihan, Capt. John L., 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 119 ] -183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 119 ] Couve de Murville, Maurice, 67 n [ Pg. 67 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 79 n [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 80 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 96 n [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 253 n [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 169 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 171 ] -259 [ Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] Cox, Capt., 204 [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] Crowe, Philip K., 586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 374 ] Cuba, 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 380 [ Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 247 ] , 382 [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 247 ] , 414 [ Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 265 ] , 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 268 ] Algeria, military assistance to, 24 [ Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 26 [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 29 n [ Pg. 29 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] , 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 26 ] -33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 35 n [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 89 ] -133 [ Pg. 133 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] Algerian relations, 11 [ Pg. 11 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 72 ] -108 [ Pg. 108 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] , 110 n [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 124 n [ Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 128 n [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 89 ] Ghanaian position, 380 n [ Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 247 ] U.S. position, 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 72 ] -107 [ Pg. 107 includes portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 414 [ Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 265 ] , 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 268 ] Cummings, Cmdr. H.A., 331 n [ Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 218 ] Czechoslovakia, 106 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] , 323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 247 ] , 431 [ Pg. 431 is part of Doc. 274 ] Daddah, Moktar Ould, 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 111 ] Dahlab, Saad, 67 n [ Pg. 67 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 68 n [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 67 ] Dahomey, 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 244 ] , 553 [ Pg. 553 is part of Doc. 356 ] Damao, 553 [ Pg. 553 is part of Doc. 356 ] Davies, Rodger P., 4 n [ Pg. 4 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] , 22 n [ Pg. 22 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 88 n [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 60 ] Davis, William B., 13 n [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 385 n [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 249 ] , 388 n [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 251 ] De Gaulle, Charles, 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 56 n [ Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41 ] , 59 n [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 61 n [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 46 ] -66 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 48 ] , 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 51 ] -71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 169 ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] -260 [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] , 266 n [ Pg. 266 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] , 290 [ Pg. 290 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194 ] -294 [ Pg. 294 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] , 403 [ Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 268 ] De Mattos, Norton, 542 n [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 348 ] Dean, John Gunther, 420 n [ Pg. 420 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] Decade of Development, 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 201 ] -305 [ Pg. 305 includes portions of Doc. 201 and Doc. 202 ] Decker, Gen. George R., 69 n [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 50 ] Deming, Olcott H., 87 n [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 512 n [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] , 513 n [ Pg. 513 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325 ] , 514 n [ Pg. 514 includes portions of Doc. 325 and Doc. 326 ] , 515 n [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 326 and Doc. 327 ] , 607 n [ Pg. 607 includes portions of Doc. 388 and Doc. 389 ] , 610 n [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 391 ] , 617 n [ Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 394 ] Department of Defense position on Africa region, 546 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 351 ] Development Assistance Committee (DAC), 295 [ Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 196 ] Diakite, Moussa, 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 261 ] -404 [ Pg. 404 is part of Doc. 261 ] Diefenbaker, John G., 349 [ Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 227 ] Dillon, C. Douglas, 282 n [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 188 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 240 ] Diu, 553 [ Pg. 553 is part of Doc. 356 ] Donahue, Richard, 466 [ Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296 ] Dorman, John, 268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 179 ] -269 [ Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 179 ] Dorros, Leon G., 40 n [ Pg. 40 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 383 n [ Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] Dorticos, Osvaldo, 106 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 72 ] Duggan, William R., 491 n [ Pg. 491 is part of Doc. 311 ] Duke, Angier Biddle, 343 n [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 224 ] Dulles, Allen W., 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 43 ] -60 [ Pg. 60 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] , 392 [ Pg. 392 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] Dumont, Donald, 357 n [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 397 n [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 257 ] , 401 n [ Pg. 401 is part of Doc. 260 ] , 402 n [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 541 n [ Pg. 541 is part of Doc. 347 ] Dungan, Ralph, 95 n [ Pg. 95 includes portions of Doc. 65 and Doc. 66 ] , 99 n [ Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] , 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 111 ] -169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 173 n [ Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] , 272 n [ Pg. 272 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] , 329 [ Pg. 329 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] -330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 550 n [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 354 ] , 553 [ Pg. 553 is part of Doc. 356 ] -554 [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 356 ] Dunham, Chester G., 511 n [ Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] , 513 n [ Pg. 513 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325 ] , 515 n [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 326 and Doc. 327 ] , 523 n [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 334 ] , 525 n [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 336 ] Dunn (South Africa), 630 [ Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 403 ] DuPont, John M., 538 n [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] DuPont (Southern Rhodesia), 526 [ Pg. 526 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] -527 [ Pg. 527 includes portions of Doc. 337 and Doc. 338 ] Durnan, James J., 610 n [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 391 ] , 617 n [ Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 394 ] Dutton, Frederick G., 184 n [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 120 ] Easum, Donald B., 242 n [ Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 158 ] Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), 503 [ Pg. 503 is part of Doc. 318 ] -504 [ Pg. 504 is part of Doc. 318 ] Economic Council for Africa (ECA), 503 [ Pg. 503 is part of Doc. 318 ] -504 [ Pg. 504 is part of Doc. 318 ] Edusel, Krobo, 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 245 ] Egypt. See United Arab Republic . Eisenberg, Robert, 341 n [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 223 ] Eisenhower, Dwight D., 180 [ Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 301 ] Elbrick, C. Burke, 541 n [ Pg. 541 is part of Doc. 347 ] , 542 n [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 348 ] , 549 n [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 353 ] , 552 n [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 355 ] Elizabeth II, Queen, 365 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 239 ] Ellender, Allen J., 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 213 ] Ellis, Harry H., 274 n [ Pg. 274 includes portions of Doc. 182 and Doc. 183 ] Entente countries, 312 [ Pg. 312 is part of Doc. 205 ] -313 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 205 ] Eritrea, 445 [ Pg. 445 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] -446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] Ethiopia, 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 213 ] , 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 222 ] , 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 includes portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] British economic assistance, 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 275 ] Congo, 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 281 ] Eritrea, 445 [ Pg. 445 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] -446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] Haile Selassie I University, 435 [ Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] Kagnew military facilities, 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 281 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 283 ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 299 and Doc. 300 ] , 487 [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 309 ] Ogaden region issue, 469 [ Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298 ] -473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] Peace Corps program, 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 297 ] political situation, 425 [ Pg. 425 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] -429 [ Pg. 429 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] , 488 [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 309 ] -489 [ Pg. 489 is part of Doc. 309 ] Portuguese colonial Africa, 469 [ Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298 ] Portuguese relations, 469 [ Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298 ] , 569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 366 ] Somalia border dispute, 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 281 ] , 445 n [ Pg. 445 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 283 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 291 ] -460 [ Pg. 460 includes portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 297 ] -469 [ Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 301 ] South Africa, 469 [ Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298 ] UN and, 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 298 ] U.S. economic assistance, 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 275 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 276 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 300 ] -477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 301 ] U.S. military assistance, 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 275 ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] -437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 276 ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] -440 [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279 ] , 442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 280 ] -445 [ Pg. 445 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 299 and Doc. 300 ] -475 [ Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 300 ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 301 ] U.S. military assistance to Somalia and, 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 281 ] -445 [ Pg. 445 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] , 456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 289 ] , 463 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 294 ] -465 [ Pg. 465 includes portions of Doc. 294 and Doc. 295 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 302 ] -480 [ Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] U.S. military facilities, 428 [ Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 271 and Doc. 272 ] -429 [ Pg. 429 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] , 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 316 ] U.S. policy paper, 486 [ Pg. 486 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] -489 [ Pg. 489 is part of Doc. 309 ] U.S. relations, 427 [ Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 271 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 includes portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] , 463 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 294 ] -464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 294 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] -469 [ Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298 ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301 ] -480 [ Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 301 and Doc. 302 ] -480 [ Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] , 486 [ Pg. 486 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] -488 [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 309 ] European minorities ( see also apartheid and racial policies under South Africa ), 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 51 ] -72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 87 n [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 89 [ Pg. 89 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 108 [ Pg. 108 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] -109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 328 [ Pg. 328 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] Ewe tribe, 354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 231 ] Export-Import Bank, 348 [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 380 [ Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 247 ] Farmer, James L., 326 n [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 214 ] Fay, Paul B., Jr., 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 119 ] -183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 119 ] Faysal, Prince, 25 [ Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 19 and Doc. 20 ] , 34 [ Pg. 34 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] Fekni, Mohieddine, 138 n [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 103 ] -157 [ Pg. 157 includes portions of Doc. 105 and Doc. 106 ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 107 ] -160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 107 ] Ferguson, C. Vaughan, 287 n [ Pg. 287 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] , 310 [ Pg. 310 includes portions of Doc. 204 and Doc. 205 ] , 341 n [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 223 ] , 357 n [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 360 n [ Pg. 360 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] , 401 n [ Pg. 401 is part of Doc. 260 ] , 511 n [ Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] , 551 n [ Pg. 551 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] Ferguson, John H., 17 n [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 27 [ Pg. 27 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] , 28 n [ Pg. 28 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23 ] , 34 [ Pg. 34 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] , 35 n [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 37 n [ Pg. 37 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31 ] , 212 n [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 214 n [ Pg. 214 includes portions of Doc. 139 and Doc. 140 ] , 218 n [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 143 ] , 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 147 ] -224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. 147 and Doc. 148 ] , 229 n [ Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] , 240 [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 157 ] Field, Winston J., 526 [ Pg. 526 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] -528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 338 ] , 530 n [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 339 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 346 ] Finletter, Thomas, 543 [ Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 349 ] FitzGerald, Dennis A., 322 n [ Pg. 322 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211 ] , 394 n [ Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] Fluker, J. Robert, 394 n [ Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] Force Publique, 345 [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 225 ] Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 273 n [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 182 ] Fort Ajuda, 553 [ Pg. 553 is part of Doc. 356 ] Foulon, Robert C., 360 n [ Pg. 360 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] , 495 n [ Pg. 495 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] Fourie, Bernardus Gerhardus, 627 [ Pg. 627 includes portions of Doc. 400 and Doc. 401 ] Fowler, Henry, 491 n [ Pg. 491 is part of Doc. 311 ] France, 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 35 ] Africa colonial policy, 64 [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47 ] Africa region, 290 [ Pg. 290 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194 ] -294 [ Pg. 294 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] , 307 [ Pg. 307 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] Algeria ( see also independence conflict under Algeria ) economic assistance, 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] -112 [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 84 ] -125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 134 [ Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 90 ] French-Algeria referendum, 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 36 ] invasion scare, 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 43 ] -60 [ Pg. 60 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] military assistance, 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 57 ] , 83 n [ Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 100 n [ Pg. 100 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] , 101 relations, 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 102 [ Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 71 ] -103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] -112 [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 114 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 121 [ Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 131 n [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 134 [ Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 90 ] Angola, 541 n [ Pg. 541 is part of Doc. 347 ] Bizerte crisis, 4 [ Pg. 4 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] , 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 includes portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] -252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 169 ] -272 [ Pg. 272 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] Congo, 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 195 ] Egyptian relations, 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 35 ] French Somaliland, 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 275 ] Guinea, 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 223 ] Guinean relations, 403 [ Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 266 ] -418 [ Pg. 418 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267 ] , 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 268 ] Konkoure River dam project, 342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 223 ] Mali, economic assistance to, 321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 210 ] Morocco: economic assistance, 2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 228 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 149 ] military assistance, 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 26 [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 30 [ Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 43 n [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 204 [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 148 ] -227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 148 ] relations, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 154 ] North Africa, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] -2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 5 [ Pg. 5 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 74political situation, 59 n [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 43 ] Portuguese colonial Africa, 571 [ Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 366 ] Sahara sovereignty issue, 62 [ Pg. 62 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] -66 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 48 ] Senegal, 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 195 ] Tunisia: Bizerte crisis, 4 [ Pg. 4 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] , 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 includes portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] -252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 169 ] -272 [ Pg. 272 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] economic and military assistance, 2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 184 ] relations, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 247 [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] , 278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 185 ] United Nations, 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 195 ] U.S. economic assistance, 290 [ Pg. 290 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194 ] -294 [ Pg. 294 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] U.S. relations, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] -2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 35 ] -45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 53 [ Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] , 60 [ Pg. 60 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] -61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 61 n [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47 ] -65 [ Pg. 65 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 67 n [ Pg. 67 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 80 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 95 [ Pg. 95 includes portions of Doc. 65 and Doc. 66 ] , 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 268 ] Franco, Generalissimo Francisco, 571 [ Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 366 ] Fredericks, J. Wayne, 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] -4 [ Pg. 4 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] , 30 n [ Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 65 n [ Pg. 65 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 73 n [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] , 88 n [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 123 n [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 229 n [ Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] , 236 n [ Pg. 236 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 245 n [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 255 n [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] , 263 n [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 264 n [ Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] , 388 n [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 251 ] , 467 n [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] , 509 n [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] , 513 n [ Pg. 513 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325 ] , 525 n [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 336 ] , 542 n [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 348 ] , 564 n [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 362 ] , 594 n [ Pg. 594 includes portions of Doc. 380 and Doc. 381 ] , 598 n [ Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] , 605 n [ Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 386 and Doc. 387 ] , 607 n [ Pg. 607 includes portions of Doc. 388 and Doc. 389 ] , 608 n [ Pg. 608 includes portions of Doc. 389 and Doc. 390 ] , 610 n [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 391 ] , 617 n [ Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 394 ] , 623 [ Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 398 ] -624 [ Pg. 624 includes portions of Doc. 398 and Doc. 399 ] French Somaliland, 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 275 ] Freund, Richard B., 360 n [ Pg. 360 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] Friedman, Richard, 519 n [ Pg. 519 includes portions of Doc. 329 and Doc. 330 ] , 533 n [ Pg. 533 includes portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341 ] , 649 n [ Pg. 649 includes portions of Doc. 415 and Doc. 416 ] Furnas, Howard E., 522 n [ Pg. 522 includes portions of Doc. 332 and Doc. 333 ] , 523 n [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 334 ] Gabon, 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 217 ] Galanto, Fred J., 462 n [ Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 293 ] , 473 n [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] , 482 n [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 305 ] , 484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 307 ] , 490 n [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 310 ] Galvao, Henrique, 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 222 ] Galvao hijacking, 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 222 ] Gardner, Richard N., 533 n [ Pg. 533 includes portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341 ] Gathright, Wreathram E., 608 n [ Pg. 608 includes portions of Doc. 389 and Doc. 390 ] Gavin, James M., 58 n [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47 ] -65 [ Pg. 65 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 67 n [ Pg. 67 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 75 n [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 79 n [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 80 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] , 266 n [ Pg. 266 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] , 271 n [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181 ] , 272 n [ Pg. 272 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] Gbedemah, Komla Agbeli, 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 224 ] -344 [ Pg. 344 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225 ] , 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 228 ] , 352 n [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 230 ] , 358 n [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 363 n [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 245 ] Gebelt, Stephen G., 386 n [ Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] , 388 n [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 251 ] Geren, Paul, 523 n [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 334 ] Germany, Federal Republic of: Ghana, economic assistance to, 361 [ Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 239 ] Somalia, military assistance to, 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 294 ] , 483 n [ Pg. 483 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] , 485 [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 308 ] -486 [ Pg. 486 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] Getsinger, Norman, 27 n [ Pg. 27 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] , 28 n [ Pg. 28 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23 ] Ghana, 168 [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 213 ] , 535 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 342 ] African radicalism, 320 [ Pg. 320 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210 ] -322 [ Pg. 322 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211 ] aluminum projects, 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 223 ] -342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 223 ] armed forces, 358 n [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 234 ] Ashanti tribe, 354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 231 ] British gold mines subsidy, 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 225 ] British military assistance, 311 [ Pg. 311 is part of Doc. 205 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 245 ] British position, 353 [ Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 230 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 239 ] British relations, 365 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 245 ] Bui River dam project, 357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 247 ] Canadian military assistance, 311 [ Pg. 311 is part of Doc. 205 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 245 ] Communist influence, suppression of, 308 [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] -314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] Congo, 345 [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 225 ] -347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 245 ] -376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 245 ] Convention Peoples' Party (CPP), 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 379 [ Pg. 379 includes portions of Doc. 246 and Doc. 247 ] Cuba, 380 n [ Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 247 ] economic situation, 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 364 [ Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 372 [ Pg. 372 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] -373 [ Pg. 373 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 245 ] -377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 247 ] , 391 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 253 ] Ewe tribe, 354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 231 ] Export-Import Bank and, 348 [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 380foreign policy, 348 n [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 373 [ Pg. 373 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] -374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 244 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 391 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 253 ] German economic assistance, 361 [ Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 239 ] Ghana Trade Unions Congress, 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 245 ] International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and, 348 [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 226 ] -350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 228 ] medical school project, 380 [ Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 247 ] nuclear tests, position, 366 [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 386 n [ Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] Nyasaland position, 509 [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] Nydell case, 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 249 ] , 386 n [ Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 250 ] Pakistani military assistance, 311 [ Pg. 311 is part of Doc. 205 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 245 ] Peace Corps program, 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 204 ] political situation, 348 n [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 230 ] , 354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 358 n [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 235 ] -360 [ Pg. 360 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] , 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 238 ] -364 [ Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 239 ] -367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 245 ] -376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 378 [ Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 246 ] -379 [ Pg. 379 includes portions of Doc. 246 and Doc. 247 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 247 ] -384 [ Pg. 384 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] , 390 [ Pg. 390 includes portions of Doc. 252 and Doc. 253 ] -391 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 253 ] Rhodesia, Southern, 533 [ Pg. 533 includes portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341 ] -534 [ Pg. 534 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] South African economic relations, 655 [ Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 420 ] Soviet bloc relations, 364 [ Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 247 ] , 382 [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 247 ] -383 [ Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] Soviet economic assistance, 357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 245 ] Soviet military assistance, 348 n [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 230 ] -353 [ Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 230 ] Soviet relations, 308 [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] -309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 204 ] , 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 348 n [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 230 ] , 361 [ Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 365 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 239 ] -366 [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 247 ] United Nations, 345 [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 225 ] -346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] , 390 [ Pg. 390 includes portions of Doc. 252 and Doc. 253 ] U.S. economic assistance, 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 223 ] -342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 223 ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 232 ] -356 [ Pg. 356 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 358 n [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 380 [ Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 247 ] , 382 [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 247 ] U.S. military assistance, 312 [ Pg. 312 is part of Doc. 205 ] -313 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 205 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 245 ] U.S. relations, 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 224 ] -347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 227 ] , 371 [ Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 241 and Doc. 242 ] -372 [ Pg. 372 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 382 [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 247 ] , 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 249 ] -391 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 253 ] Volta River Hydroelectric (VALCO) project, 311 [ Pg. 311 is part of Doc. 205 ] , 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 223 ] -342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 223 ] , 343 n [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 224 ] , 348 [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 226 ] -351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 229 ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 233 ] -362 [ Pg. 362 is part of Doc. 237 ] , 364 [ Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 238 ] -374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 244 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 380 [ Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 247 ] -382 [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 247 ] , 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 249 ] , 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 251 ] -391 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 253 ] Ghana Trade Unions Congress, 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 245 ] Gilpatric, Roswell L., 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 178 [ Pg. 178 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] -180 [ Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 214 [ Pg. 214 includes portions of Doc. 139 and Doc. 140 ] -216 [ Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] , 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 148 ] , 228 n [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 262 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 175 ] , 289 [ Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 193 ] -290 [ Pg. 290 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194 ] , 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 318 n [ Pg. 318 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] , 588 [ Pg. 588 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376 ] -589 [ Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 376 ] , 591 [ Pg. 591 is part of Doc. 378 ] -592 [ Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 378 ] , 595 [ Pg. 595 includes portions of Doc. 381 and Doc. 382 ] -598 [ Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] , 601 [ Pg. 601 includes portions of Doc. 384 and Doc. 385 ] -602 [ Pg. 602 is part of Doc. 385 ] , 605 [ Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 386 and Doc. 387 ] , 607 n [ Pg. 607 includes portions of Doc. 388 and Doc. 389 ] , 608 [ Pg. 608 includes portions of Doc. 389 and Doc. 390 ] , 629 [ Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 402 ] Gizenga, Antoine, 294 [ Pg. 294 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 508 [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 320 ] Glenn, Edmund S., 224 n [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. 147 and Doc. 148 ] , 292 n [ Pg. 292 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] Goa, 553 [ Pg. 553 is part of Doc. 356 ] Godley, G. McMurtrie, II, 443 n [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 281 ] Goldstein, Gerald, 524 n [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 335 ] Gonzalez, Raymond E., 110 n [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] Goodpaster, Brig. Gen. Andrew J., 53 n [ Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] Gookin, Richard J., 144 n [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] Gordon, Kermit, 231 n [ Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] Gordon, Marcus, 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 275 ] -434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 275 ] Gore, Albert, 365 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 239 ] Greene, Fred, 331 n [ Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 218 ] Greenhill, Denis A., 251 [ Pg. 251 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] , 535 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 342 ] Gromyko, Andrei, 345 [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 225 ] Guedira, Agzic, 208 [ Pg. 208 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] , 240 [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 157 ] -241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 157 ] Guellal, Cherif, 11 n [ Pg. 11 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 15 ] -21 [ Pg. 21 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] , 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 84 ] -128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 129 n [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 87 ] Guevara, Ernesto (Che), 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 85 ] Gullion, Edmund A., 552 n [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 355 ] Guinea, 168 [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 195 ] Africa region, 410 [ Pg. 410 is part of Doc. 264 ] -411 [ Pg. 411 includes portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265 ] African radicalism, 320 [ Pg. 320 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210 ] -322 [ Pg. 322 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211 ] aluminum projects, 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 223 ] -342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 223 ] Boke Bauxite Mine, 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 223 ] -342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 223 ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 is part of Doc. 256 ] -396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 256 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 259 ] Communist influence, suppression of, 308 [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] -314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] Congo, 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 268 ] economic situation, 403 [ Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 412 [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 265 ] -413 [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 265 ] , 416 [ Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 266 ] -417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 266 ] education, 414 [ Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 265 ] French relations, 403 [ Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 266 ] -418 [ Pg. 418 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267 ] , 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 268 ] gold reserves, 403 [ Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 261 ] health and sanitation, 414 [ Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 265 ] International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and, 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 255 ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 is part of Doc. 256 ] International Monetary Fund and, 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 261 ] -403 [ Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 261 ] Kinkon dam project, 395 [ Pg. 395 is part of Doc. 256 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 257 ] -398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 257 ] Konkoure River dam project, 342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 223 ] , 392 [ Pg. 392 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] -395 [ Pg. 395 is part of Doc. 256 ] , 398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 257 ] -400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 259 ] , 413 [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 265 ] Nyasaland, 509 [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] Peace Corps program, 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 255 ] , 394 n [ Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] , 398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 257 ] , 414 [ Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 265 ] political situation, 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 204 ] , 311 [ Pg. 311 is part of Doc. 205 ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 is part of Doc. 260 ] Portuguese colonial Africa, position on, 581soap and oil products, 412 [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 265 ] -414 [ Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 265 ] Souapti dam project, 395 [ Pg. 395 is part of Doc. 256 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 257 ] -398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 257 ] Soviet bloc relations, 321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 405 [ Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 262 ] , 416 [ Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 266 ] -417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 266 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 267 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] Soviet civil aviation routes, 315 [ Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] , 323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 211 ] Soviet economic assistance, 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 255 ] -394 [ Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] , 416 [ Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 266 ] -417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 266 ] Soviet relations, 308 [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] -309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 204 ] , 311 [ Pg. 311 is part of Doc. 205 ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 is part of Doc. 260 ] , 413 [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 265 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 267 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 268 ] -423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 268 ] U.S. agricultural commodities assistance, 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 256 ] , 406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 262 and Doc. 263 ] -409 [ Pg. 409 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] , 412 [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 265 ] , 420 [ Pg. 420 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] U.S. economic assistance, 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 204 ] -310 [ Pg. 310 includes portions of Doc. 204 and Doc. 205 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 223 ] -342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 223 ] , 392 [ Pg. 392 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] -400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 259 ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 261 ] -409 [ Pg. 409 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] , 412 [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 265 ] -415 [ Pg. 415 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] , 417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 266 ] -418 [ Pg. 418 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267 ] , 420 n [ Pg. 420 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 269 ] U.S. military assistance, 312 [ Pg. 312 is part of Doc. 205 ] -313 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 205 ] U.S. relations, 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 222 ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] -396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 256 ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 261 ] -405 [ Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 262 ] , 409 [ Pg. 409 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] -423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 268 ] Guiringaud (France), 272 [ Pg. 272 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] Habib, Philip C., 394 n [ Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] , 399 n [ Pg. 399 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] Hackler, Windsor G., 445 n [ Pg. 445 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] Hadj, Messali, 57 n [ Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] Hadsel, Fred L., 41 n [ Pg. 41 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34 ] Haile, Menassie, 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 302 ] Haile Selassie, Emperor, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 18 n [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] , 25 [ Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 19 and Doc. 20 ] -26 [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 28 n [ Pg. 28 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23 ] , 30 [ Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] -32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 36 [ Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 38 [ Pg. 38 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] -39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 219 ] , 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 222 ] , 426 [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 271 ] -428 [ Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 271 and Doc. 272 ] , 437 n [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 276 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 281 ] , 445 n [ Pg. 445 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 283 ] -448 [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] , 465 n [ Pg. 465 includes portions of Doc. 294 and Doc. 295 ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301 ] -480 [ Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] , 571 [ Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 366 ] Haile-Selassie, Ras Imru, 427 [ Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 271 ] , 429 [ Pg. 429 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] Halaby, Najeeb E., 317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 318 n [ Pg. 318 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] Hall, Pierson M., 401 n [ Pg. 401 is part of Doc. 260 ] , 630 n [ Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 403 ] , 647 n [ Pg. 647 includes portions of Doc. 413 and Doc. 414 ] Halm, W., 349 n [ Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 227 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 247 ] Hamilton, Fowler, 440 n [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279 ] Hammarskjold, Dag, 345 [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 225 ] Handley, William J., 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 25 ] Hansen, Kenneth, 466 [ Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296 ] Hare, Raymond A., 4 n [ Pg. 4 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] , 51 n [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 52 n [ Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 162 n [ Pg. 162 includes portions of Doc. 108 and Doc. 109 ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 374 ] Harriman, W. Averell, 56 n [ Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 107 ] , 633 [ Pg. 633 includes portions of Doc. 405 and Doc. 406 ] -635 [ Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 406 ] Harrison (AID), 443 n [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 281 ] , 445 n [ Pg. 445 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] Hartley, Virginia F., 167 n [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 111 ] Hartman, Arthur A., 303 n [ Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] , 565 n [ Pg. 565 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] Hassan II, King, 4 [ Pg. 4 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] , 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 11 [ Pg. 11 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 12 ] -17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] -24 [ Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 26 [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] -28 [ Pg. 28 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23 ] , 30 [ Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] -34 [ Pg. 34 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] , 37 n [ Pg. 37 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] -43 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 98 [ Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] -99 [ Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] , 133 [ Pg. 133 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] -166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 119 ] -183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 119 ] , 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 124 ] , 195 [ Pg. 195 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] , 198 n [ Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] , 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 131 ] -203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] , 205 [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] -206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] , 208 [ Pg. 208 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] -210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 147 ] -227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 148 ] , 228 n [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 235 n [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] , 240 [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 157 ] -241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 361 [ Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 236 ] Hassan-Ferhat agreement of 1961, 21 [ Pg. 21 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] Haynes, Ulrich, 21 n [ Pg. 21 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] , 660 [ Pg. 660 is part of Doc. 425 ] -661 [ Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 426 ] Heffner, Frank K., 21 n [ Pg. 21 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] , 22 n [ Pg. 22 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 41 n [ Pg. 41 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34 ] , 279 n [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 482 n [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 305 ] , 485 n [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 308 ] Height, Dorothy, 326 n [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 214 ] Heintges, Maj. Gen. John A., 149 [ Pg. 149 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] Helms, Richard, 491 n [ Pg. 491 is part of Doc. 311 ] Hennes, Richard V., 533 n [ Pg. 533 includes portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341 ] , 534 n [ Pg. 534 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] , 598 n [ Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] , 608 n [ Pg. 608 includes portions of Doc. 389 and Doc. 390 ] Herter, Christian A., 44 n [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 35 ] Herz, Martin F., 73 n [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] , 287 n [ Pg. 287 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] , 360 n [ Pg. 360 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] , 590 n [ Pg. 590 is part of Doc. 377 ] High, George B., 567 n [ Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 363 , Doc. 364 , and Doc. 365 ] , 622 n [ Pg. 622 includes portions of Doc. 397 and Doc. 398 ] Hilliker, Grant G., 18 n [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 236 n [ Pg. 236 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 279 n [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 647 n [ Pg. 647 includes portions of Doc. 413 and Doc. 414 ] Hilsman, Roger, Jr., 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] -315 [ Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] , 354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 358 n [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 431 [ Pg. 431 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 543 [ Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 349 ] -544 [ Pg. 544 includes portions of Doc. 349 and Doc. 350 ] , 547 [ Pg. 547 is part of Doc. 352 ] Hinman, Carroll S., 149 n [ Pg. 149 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] , 236 n [ Pg. 236 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] Home, Lord, 251 [ Pg. 251 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] , 520 [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 331 ] -522 [ Pg. 522 includes portions of Doc. 332 and Doc. 333 ] , 577 [ Pg. 577 is part of Doc. 370 ] , 651 [ Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 416 and Doc. 417 ] Hooper, Peter, Jr., 12 n [ Pg. 12 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 13 n [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 15 n [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 26 n [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 30 n [ Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 34 n [ Pg. 34 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] , 80 n [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 84 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 59 ] -87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 89 n [ Pg. 89 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 93 n [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 105 n [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 131 n [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 661 n [ Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 426 ] Horn of Africa region ( see also individual countries ), 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 222 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 271 and Doc. 272 ] , 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 275 ] -433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 275 ] British-Italian-U.S. trilateral talks, 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 275 ] -435 [ Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] British position, 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 275 ] -435 [ Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] Italian position, 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 275 ] Soviet bloc influence, 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 291 ] United Nations and, 459 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 291 ] -461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 292 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 298 ] Houphouet-Boigny, Felix, 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 370 [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 240 ] , 569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 366 ] , 585 [ Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 373 ] Hourani (Tunisia), 244 [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 273 n [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 182 ] Hughes, Thomas L., 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 579 [ Pg. 579 includes portions of Doc. 371 and Doc. 372 ] -580 [ Pg. 580 is part of Doc. 372 ] , 646 [ Pg. 646 is part of Doc. 413 ] -647 [ Pg. 647 includes portions of Doc. 413 and Doc. 414 ] Hunt, Thomas J., 440 n [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279 ] , 617 n [ Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 394 ] Hussein, King, 34 [ Pg. 34 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] Hutchinson, Edmond C., 149 n [ Pg. 149 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] , 218 n [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 143 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 402 n [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 404 [ Pg. 404 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 406 n [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 262 and Doc. 263 ] , 435 n [ Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] , 438 n [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 307 ] Ibrahim, Sid Moulay Abdullah, 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 116 ] Idris I, King, 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 142 [ Pg. 142 includes portions of Doc. 95 , Doc. 96 , and Doc. 97 ] Imhof, Johannes V., 22 n [ Pg. 22 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 44 n [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 73 n [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] , 88 n [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 93 n [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 270 n [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 271 n [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181 ] India, 34 [ Pg. 34 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] Indonesia, 168 [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 111 ] International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 348 [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 226 ] -350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 228 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 255 ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 is part of Doc. 256 ] , 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 287 ] International Monetary Fund (IMF), 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 261 ] -403 [ Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 604 [ Pg. 604 is part of Doc. 386 ] , 606 [ Pg. 606 is part of Doc. 387 ] , 615 [ Pg. 615 is part of Doc. 393 ] Iraq, 73 [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] , 619 [ Pg. 619 includes portions of Doc. 395 and Doc. 396 ] Israel, 145 [ Pg. 145 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] Issa, Abdullah, 473 n [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] , 490 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 310 ] Italy: Horn of Africa region, position, 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 275 ] Libyan relations, 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5 ] Somalia, military assistance to, 431 [ Pg. 431 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 275 ] -434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 275 ] , 440 [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279 ] , 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 288 ] , 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 294 ] , 483 n [ Pg. 483 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] , 485 [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 308 ] -486 [ Pg. 486 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] Somalian relations, 459 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 291 ] Ivory Coast, 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 370 [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 240 ] , 569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 366 ] , 585 [ Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 373 ] Jackson, Robert, 365 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 239 ] Jacobssen, Per, 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 261 ] Johnson, Lyndon B., 144 [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 222 ] , 372 [ Pg. 372 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] -373 [ Pg. 373 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] , 659 [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 424 ] Johnson, U. Alexis, 3 n [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 73 n [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] , 78 [ Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55 ] -79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 173 n [ Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] , 221 [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 239 [ Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 263 n [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 307 [ Pg. 307 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] -309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 204 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 209 ] -320 [ Pg. 320 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210 ] , 327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 215 ] -328 [ Pg. 328 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] , 394 n [ Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] , 491 n [ Pg. 491 is part of Doc. 311 ] , 496 [ Pg. 496 includes portions of Doc. 314 and Doc. 315 ] -497 [ Pg. 497 is part of Doc. 315 ] , 544 [ Pg. 544 includes portions of Doc. 349 and Doc. 350 ] -547 [ Pg. 547 is part of Doc. 352 ] , 551 n [ Pg. 551 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] , 633 n [ Pg. 633 includes portions of Doc. 405 and Doc. 406 ] Joint Chiefs of Staff, 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 57 ] -83 [ Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 115 [ Pg. 115 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] -117 [ Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 97 ] -144 [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 146 [ Pg. 146 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] -149 [ Pg. 149 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] , 180 [ Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 118 ] -181 [ Pg. 181 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 121 ] , 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 138 ] -212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 262 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 175 ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] -287 [ Pg. 287 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] , 300 [ Pg. 300 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] -302 [ Pg. 302 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] , 308 [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] -314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 209 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] -337 [ Pg. 337 includes portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] , 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 316 ] -500 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 316 ] , 640 [ Pg. 640 is part of Doc. 409 ] Jones, John Wesley, 37 n [ Pg. 37 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31 ] , 136 n [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 144 [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 145 n [ Pg. 145 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] , 152 [ Pg. 152 is part of Doc. 102 ] Jones, William B., 467 n [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] Jooste, G.P., 609 n [ Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 390 ] , 618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 395 ] , 625 [ Pg. 625 includes portions of Doc. 399 and Doc. 400 ] -627 [ Pg. 627 includes portions of Doc. 400 and Doc. 401 ] , 632 [ Pg. 632 includes portions of Doc. 404 and Doc. 405 ] , 652 [ Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 417 and Doc. 418 ] -653 [ Pg. 653 includes portions of Doc. 418 and Doc. 419 ] Jordan, 34 [ Pg. 34 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] Joxe, Louis, 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 57 [ Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47 ] , 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 51 ] Judd, Thomas M., 463 n [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 294 ] , 473 n [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] , 534 n [ Pg. 534 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] , 536 n [ Pg. 536 includes portions of Doc. 343 and Doc. 344 ] , 651 n [ Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 416 and Doc. 417 ] Junkermann, Col. Howard C., 100 n [ Pg. 100 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 70 ] , 137 n [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 144 n [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 145 n [ Pg. 145 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] , 159 n [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 107 ] , 172 n [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 297 n [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 327 n [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 215 ] , 331 n [ Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 218 ] , 442 n [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 280 ] , 445 n [ Pg. 445 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] , 455 n [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 288 ] Kabylie rebellion, 128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 134 [ Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 90 ] Kagnew military facilities, 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 281 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 283 ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 299 and Doc. 300 ] , 487 [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 309 ] Kaiser, Edgar, 357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 384 [ Pg. 384 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] -386 [ Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] Kaiser Aluminum, 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 223 ] , 350 n [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 228 ] Kaldor, 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 228 ] Kamitatu, Cleophas, 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 225 ] Kasavubu, Joseph, 294 [ Pg. 294 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] , 508 [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 320 ] Kashmir dispute, 34 [ Pg. 34 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] Kassa, Assrate, 467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] -469 [ Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298 ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 301 and Doc. 302 ] Kaunda, Kenneth, 511 [ Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] , 513 [ Pg. 513 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325 ] , 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 328 ] , 526 [ Pg. 526 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] , 527 [ Pg. 527 includes portions of Doc. 337 and Doc. 338 ] Kaysen, Carl, 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 14 ] -20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 214 n [ Pg. 214 includes portions of Doc. 139 and Doc. 140 ] , 272 [ Pg. 272 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] -274 [ Pg. 274 includes portions of Doc. 182 and Doc. 183 ] , 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 214 ] , 337 [ Pg. 337 includes portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] , 379 [ Pg. 379 includes portions of Doc. 246 and Doc. 247 ] -386 [ Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] , 491 n [ Pg. 491 is part of Doc. 311 ] , 555 n [ Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 357 ] , 628 n [ Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 401 ] Keita, Modibo, 28 n [ Pg. 28 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23 ] , 30 [ Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] -32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 36 [ Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] Kellermann, Henry J., 512 n [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] Kennedy, Edward M., 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 224 ] Kennedy, John F., 165 [ Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] -166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 612 [ Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 392 ] -613 [ Pg. 613 includes portions of Doc. 392 and Doc. 393 ] Africa region, 132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 281 [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 187 ] -283 [ Pg. 283 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] , 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 194 ] -294 [ Pg. 294 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] , 302 [ Pg. 302 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] , 310 [ Pg. 310 includes portions of Doc. 204 and Doc. 205 ] , 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 213 ] , 329 [ Pg. 329 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] -330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 337 [ Pg. 337 includes portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] -340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 222 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 225 ] -347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 250 ] , 409 [ Pg. 409 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] -410 [ Pg. 410 is part of Doc. 264 ] , 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 469 [ Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298 ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 344 ] , 563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 361 ] Algeria, 11 [ Pg. 11 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 36 [ Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] -37 [ Pg. 37 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 60 ] -89 [ Pg. 89 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 64 ] -94 [ Pg. 94 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] , 96 n [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 102 [ Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 71 ] -107 [ Pg. 107 includes portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 77 ] -115 [ Pg. 115 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] , 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 81 ] -127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 129 n [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 88 ] -133 [ Pg. 133 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 154 ] , 560 [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360 ] Algerian independence conflict, 53 [ Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] -54 [ Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40 ] , 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 43 ] -61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 68 n [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 51 ] -73 [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] , 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 60 ] -89 [ Pg. 89 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 62 ] Angola, 106 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 548 [ Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 353 ] -549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 353 ] , 555 [ Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 357 ] -556 [ Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 357 and Doc. 358 ] , 559 [ Pg. 559 includes portions of Doc. 358 and Doc. 359 ] Azores base issue, 559 [ Pg. 559 includes portions of Doc. 358 and Doc. 359 ] , 576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 369 ] balance of payments, 404 [ Pg. 404 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 414civil rights message to Africa, 337 [ Pg. 337 includes portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] -338 [ Pg. 338 includes portions of Doc. 221 and Doc. 222 ] colonialism, 106 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 72 ] Congo, 106 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 410 [ Pg. 410 is part of Doc. 264 ] Cuba, 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 72 ] -107 [ Pg. 107 includes portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 414 [ Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 265 ] , 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 268 ] Cuban-Algerian relations, 125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 85 ] defense budget, 180disarmament, 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 113 ] Ethiopia, 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 285 ] , 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 287 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] -469 [ Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298 ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301 ] -480 [ Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] foreign aid, 415 [ Pg. 415 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] France, 60 [ Pg. 60 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] -61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 414 [ Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 265 ] -415 [ Pg. 415 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] Ghana, 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 224 ] -349 [ Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 227 ] , 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 229 ] -356 [ Pg. 356 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 234 ] -360 [ Pg. 360 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] , 362 [ Pg. 362 is part of Doc. 237 ] , 365 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 239 ] -374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 244 ] , 379 [ Pg. 379 includes portions of Doc. 246 and Doc. 247 ] -386 [ Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] , 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 251 ] -391 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 253 ] Guinea, 394 [ Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 257 ] -405 [ Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 262 ] , 409 [ Pg. 409 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] -424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 269 ] Horn of Africa region, 425 [ Pg. 425 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 includes portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] -461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 292 ] Kashmir dispute, 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 285 ] Latin America, 410 [ Pg. 410 is part of Doc. 264 ] Libya, 138 n [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 94 ] -140 [ Pg. 140 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] , 142 [ Pg. 142 includes portions of Doc. 95 , Doc. 96 , and Doc. 97 ] -145 [ Pg. 145 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] , 157 [ Pg. 157 includes portions of Doc. 105 and Doc. 106 ] -160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 107 ] Mauritania, 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 124 ] Morocco, 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 108 ] -162 [ Pg. 162 includes portions of Doc. 108 and Doc. 109 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 112 ] -171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 116 ] -178 [ Pg. 178 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 119 ] -183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 119 ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 122 ] -189 [ Pg. 189 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] , 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 124 ] , 195 [ Pg. 195 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 127 ] -198 [ Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] , 202 [ Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 132 ] -205 [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] -214 [ Pg. 214 includes portions of Doc. 139 and Doc. 140 ] , 218 n [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 143 ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 146 ] -237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 154 ] Morocco-Algeria border conflict, 10 [ Pg. 10 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] -11 [ Pg. 11 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 12 ] -17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] -31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 340 n [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 222 ] uclear testing, 576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 369 ] Nyasaland, 508 [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 320 ] -509 [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] , 538 [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] Pax Americana, 634 [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 406 ] Portugal, 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 562 [ Pg. 562 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361 ] -563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 361 ] Portuguese colonial Africa, 493 [ Pg. 493 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] , 546 n [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 351 ] , 547 n [ Pg. 547 is part of Doc. 352 ] , 550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 354 ] -551 [ Pg. 551 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] , 562 [ Pg. 562 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361 ] -563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 361 ] , 568 [ Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 365 and Doc. 366 ] -573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 367 ] , 577 [ Pg. 577 is part of Doc. 370 ] -579 [ Pg. 579 includes portions of Doc. 371 and Doc. 372 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 373 ] -585 [ Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 373 ] racial discrimination, 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 268 ] raw materials prices, 410 [ Pg. 410 is part of Doc. 264 ] Rhodesia, Northern, 512 [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] Rhodesia, Southern, 469 [ Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298 ] , 520 [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 331 ] , 530 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 339 ] , 536 [ Pg. 536 includes portions of Doc. 343 and Doc. 344 ] -538 [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] Rhodesia-Nyasaland Federation, 511 [ Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] , 516 n [ Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 327 and Doc. 328 ] Somalia, 439 [ Pg. 439 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] -440 [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279 ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] -454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 287 ] , 457 [ Pg. 457 is part of Doc. 290 ] , 465 [ Pg. 465 includes portions of Doc. 294 and Doc. 295 ] -466 [ Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] -484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 307 ] South Africa, 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 268 ] -422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 579 [ Pg. 579 includes portions of Doc. 371 and Doc. 372 ] , 593 [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 379 ] , 627 [ Pg. 627 includes portions of Doc. 400 and Doc. 401 ] -628 [ Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 401 ] , 636 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 407 ] -638 [ Pg. 638 is part of Doc. 408 ] , 643 [ Pg. 643 includes portions of Doc. 409 and Doc. 410 ] -645 [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 412 ] , 651 [ Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 416 and Doc. 417 ] -654 [ Pg. 654 includes portions of Doc. 419 and Doc. 420 ] , 656 [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 420 and Doc. 421 ] -659 [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 424 ] South African region, 492 [ Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312 ] -493 [ Pg. 493 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] , 496 [ Pg. 496 includes portions of Doc. 314 and Doc. 315 ] Soviet Union, 414 [ Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 265 ] Tanganyika, 356 [ Pg. 356 is part of Doc. 232 ] Tunisia, 243 n [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 247 [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] -248 [ Pg. 248 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] , 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 259 n [ Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] , 260 n [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 176 ] -264 [ Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] , 275 [ Pg. 275 includes portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] United Arab Republic, 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 154 ] United Nations, 290 [ Pg. 290 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194 ] -293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 195 ] Western hemisphere, 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 72 ] Kennedy, Robert F., 496 [ Pg. 496 includes portions of Doc. 314 and Doc. 315 ] -497 [ Pg. 497 is part of Doc. 315 ] Kenney, George R., 341 n [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 223 ] , 350 n [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 228 ] Kent, Jack H., 456 n [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 289 ] Kent, Robert F., 149 n [ Pg. 149 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] , 386 n [ Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] Kenya, 285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 222 ] -340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 222 ] , 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 275 ] -433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 275 ] Somalia border dispute, 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 285 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 291 ] -459 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 469 [ Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298 ] -470 [ Pg. 470 is part of Doc. 298 ] Kenyatta, Jomo, 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 222 ] Kerr, Peyton, 341 n [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 223 ] , 350 n [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 228 ] Khemisti, Mohammed, 104 n [ Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 124 [ Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 85 ] Kilduff, Malcolm, 137 n [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 92 ] King, Martin Luther, Jr., 326 n [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 214 ] Kinkon dam project, 395 [ Pg. 395 is part of Doc. 256 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 257 ] -398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 257 ] Kitchen, Jeffrey, 218 n [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 143 ] , 308 n [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] , 337 [ Pg. 337 includes portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] , 435 n [ Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] , 438 n [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 568 n [ Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 365 and Doc. 366 ] , 608 n [ Pg. 608 includes portions of Doc. 389 and Doc. 390 ] Knox, M. Gordon, 523 n [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 334 ] Kohler, Foy D., 51 n [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 52 n [ Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 54 n [ Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40 ] , 55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 60 [ Pg. 60 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] -61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 343 n [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 224 ] , 541 n [ Pg. 541 is part of Doc. 347 ] , 542 n [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 348 ] , 546 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 351 ] Komer, Robert W., 10 [ Pg. 10 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] -11 [ Pg. 11 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 14 [ Pg. 14 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] , 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 12 ] -17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 15 ] -21 [ Pg. 21 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] , 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] -26 [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 29 [ Pg. 29 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] -30 [ Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 27 ] -34 [ Pg. 34 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] , 36 [ Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 56 [ Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41 ] -57 [ Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] , 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 51 ] -73 [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] , 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 95 [ Pg. 95 includes portions of Doc. 65 and Doc. 66 ] -97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 102 [ Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 71 ] -104 [ Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 114 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 78 ] -115 [ Pg. 115 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] , 121 [ Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 124 n [ Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 86 ] -131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 131 n [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 142 [ Pg. 142 includes portions of Doc. 95 , Doc. 96 , and Doc. 97 ] -144 [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 157 [ Pg. 157 includes portions of Doc. 105 and Doc. 106 ] -158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 159 n [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 107 ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 122 ] -189 [ Pg. 189 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 127 ] -200 [ Pg. 200 includes portions of Doc. 129 and Doc. 130 ] , 203 n [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] , 204 [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] -205 [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] -214 [ Pg. 214 includes portions of Doc. 139 and Doc. 140 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 143 ] , 223 n [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 147 ] , 228 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 149 ] -229 [ Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] , 235 [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] -236 [ Pg. 236 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] -449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 284 ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286 ] -453 [ Pg. 453 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 includes portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] -461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 292 ] Konkoure River dam project, 342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 223 ] , 392 [ Pg. 392 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] -395 [ Pg. 395 is part of Doc. 256 ] , 398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 257 ] , 399 [ Pg. 399 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] -400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 259 ] , 413 [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 265 ] Korn, David, 65 n [ Pg. 65 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 511 n [ Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] Korry, Edward M., 465 n [ Pg. 465 includes portions of Doc. 294 and Doc. 295 ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301 ] , 478 n [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 301 and Doc. 302 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 366 ] Kraft, Joseph, 110 [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] -111 [ Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] Krim, Belkasem, 66 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 48 ] , 67 n [ Pg. 67 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 68 n [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 49 ] Kuhangua, Jacob, 623 [ Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 398 ] -624 [ Pg. 624 includes portions of Doc. 398 and Doc. 399 ] Kyle, Monte E., 455 n [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 288 ] , 462 n [ Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 293 ] , 465 n [ Pg. 465 includes portions of Doc. 294 and Doc. 295 ] Labouret (France), 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 59 ] Ladgham, Bahi, 255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] -256 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 273 n [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 182 ] Laghzaoui, Mohamed, 98 [ Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] -99 [ Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] Lang, William E., 178 n [ Pg. 178 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] , 185 n [ Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] , 194 n [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 125 ] , 219 n [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 374 ] Latin America, 410 [ Pg. 410 is part of Doc. 264 ] Lebanon, 73 [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] Lebel, Claude, 67 [ Pg. 67 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] -68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 251 n [ Pg. 251 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] LeMay, Gen. Curtis E., 115 n [ Pg. 115 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] Lemnitzer, Gen. Lyman L., 83 [ Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 178 [ Pg. 178 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] -180 [ Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 214 [ Pg. 214 includes portions of Doc. 139 and Doc. 140 ] -215 [ Pg. 215 includes portions of Doc. 140 and Doc. 141 ] , 308 [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] -310 [ Pg. 310 includes portions of Doc. 204 and Doc. 205 ] Lennon, J.H., 525 n [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 336 ] Liban, Mohammed Awale, 466 [ Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296 ] -467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] Liberia, 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 169 ] , 312 [ Pg. 312 is part of Doc. 205 ] , 315 [ Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] , 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 213 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 361 [ Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 541 [ Pg. 541 is part of Doc. 347 ] , 569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 366 ] Libya, 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 37 ] air force, 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 145 [ Pg. 145 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] -149 [ Pg. 149 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] British military assistance, 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 152 [ Pg. 152 is part of Doc. 102 ] British position, 147 [ Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 100 ] foreign policy, 156 [ Pg. 156 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] French attack from Algeria, 136 [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 91 ] Israel, U.S. military assistance to, 145 [ Pg. 145 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] Italian relations, 9oil, 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] , 157 [ Pg. 157 includes portions of Doc. 105 and Doc. 106 ] , 158 n [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 107 ] -160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 107 ] political situation, 143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 97 ] Soviet relations, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] -315 [ Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] United Arab Republic relations, 5 [ Pg. 5 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 142 [ Pg. 142 includes portions of Doc. 95 , Doc. 96 , and Doc. 97 ] United Nations, 145 [ Pg. 145 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] U.S. economic assistance, 138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 144 [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] -145 [ Pg. 145 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] , 149 [ Pg. 149 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] -150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] -159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 107 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 217 ] U.S. military assistance, 140 [ Pg. 140 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] -149 [ Pg. 149 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] , 151 [ Pg. 151 is part of Doc. 102 ] -153 [ Pg. 153 is part of Doc. 102 ] U.S. military facilities, 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 92 ] -138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 146 [ Pg. 146 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 103 ] -160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 107 ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. 147 and Doc. 148 ] , 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 316 ] U.S. relations, 115 [ Pg. 115 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] -116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 79 ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 94 ] -140 [ Pg. 140 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] , 142 [ Pg. 142 includes portions of Doc. 95 , Doc. 96 , and Doc. 97 ] -144 [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 103 ] -155 [ Pg. 155 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 107 ] -160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 107 ] Lightner, E. Allan, 155 n [ Pg. 155 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] Linder, Harold, 348 n [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 232 ] Lindquist, Robert S., 167 n [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 111 ] Lister, Ernest A., 322 n [ Pg. 322 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211 ] Little, Edward S., 105 n [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 453 n [ Pg. 453 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 521 n [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 332 ] , 560 n [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360 ] Loeb, James I., Jr., 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 269 ] Logan, Alan, 399 n [ Pg. 399 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] , 405 n [ Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 262 ] Looram, Matthew J., 538 n [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] Louw, Eric, 598 [ Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] -602 [ Pg. 602 is part of Doc. 385 ] , 605 [ Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 386 and Doc. 387 ] -606 [ Pg. 606 is part of Doc. 387 ] , 609 [ Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 390 ] -611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 391 ] , 620 [ Pg. 620 includes portions of Doc. 396 and Doc. 397 ] -622 [ Pg. 622 includes portions of Doc. 397 and Doc. 398 ] , 625 [ Pg. 625 includes portions of Doc. 399 and Doc. 400 ] -627 [ Pg. 627 includes portions of Doc. 400 and Doc. 401 ] , 630 [ Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 403 ] , 639 [ Pg. 639 is part of Doc. 409 ] , 642 [ Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 409 ] Lumumba, Patrice, 294 [ Pg. 294 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 245 ] Luthuli, Albert John, 612 [ Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 392 ] -613 [ Pg. 613 includes portions of Doc. 392 and Doc. 393 ] Lyon, Cecil, 52 n [ Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 53 n [ Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] , 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 253 n [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 168 ] MacDonald, John W., Jr., 65 n [ Pg. 65 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] MacKnight, Jesse, 137 n [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 519 n [ Pg. 519 includes portions of Doc. 329 and Doc. 330 ] , 524 n [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 335 ] , 525 n [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 336 ] , 630 n [ Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 403 ] , 647 n [ Pg. 647 includes portions of Doc. 413 and Doc. 414 ] Macleod, Iain, 508 [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 320 ] , 509 n [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] , 528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 338 ] Macmillan, Harold, 196 n [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 365 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 239 ] Madagascar, 621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 397 ] Maga, Hubert, 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 244 ] Maghreb. See North Africa. Mahoney, William P., Jr., 382 [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 247 ] , 384 n [ Pg. 384 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] , 385 n [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 249 ] , 386 n [ Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 250 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] -391 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 253 ] Malagasy Republic, 303 [ Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] , 323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 217 ] Mali, 168 [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 239 ] African radicalism, 320 [ Pg. 320 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210 ] -322 [ Pg. 322 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211 ] Communist influence, suppression of, 308 [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] -314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] French economic assistance, 321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 210 ] political situation, 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 204 ] Soviet bloc relations, 321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 210 ] Soviet relations, 308 [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] -309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 204 ] , 315 [ Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] , 323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 211 ] U.S. economic assistance, 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 217 ] U.S. military assistance, 312 [ Pg. 312 is part of Doc. 205 ] -313 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 205 ] Manfull, Melvin L., 88 n [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 196 n [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 248 n [ Pg. 248 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] , 264 n [ Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] , 610 n [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 391 ] Manning, Robert J., 617 n [ Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 394 ] Mansfield, Michael, 125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 85 ] Martin, Edwin M., 348 [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 226 ] -349 [ Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 227 ] , 394 n [ Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] , 605 n [ Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 386 and Doc. 387 ] Marvin, William G., Jr., 15 n [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 11 ] Mathews, Elbert G., 338 n [ Pg. 338 includes portions of Doc. 221 and Doc. 222 ] , 495 n [ Pg. 495 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] , 521 n [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 332 ] , 522 n [ Pg. 522 includes portions of Doc. 332 and Doc. 333 ] , 560 n [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360 ] , 623 [ Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 398 ] Mathieson, Olin, 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 223 ] Mau, Frank A., 54 n [ Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40 ] Maud (UK), 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 313 ] Mauritania, 12 [ Pg. 12 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 111 ] -169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 217 ] Mauritania-Morocco dispute, 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 111 ] -169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 124 ] McBride, Robert H., 1 n [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 52 n [ Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 54 n [ Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40 ] , 57 n [ Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] , 242 n [ Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 287 n [ Pg. 287 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] McClanahan, Grant V., 149 n [ Pg. 149 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] , 154 n [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 155 n [ Pg. 155 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] , 159 n [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 107 ] McClintic, Stephen H., 11 n [ Pg. 11 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 15 n [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 37 n [ Pg. 37 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31 ] , 38 n [ Pg. 38 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] , 167 n [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 172 n [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 175 n [ Pg. 175 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] , 196 n [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 200 n [ Pg. 200 includes portions of Doc. 129 and Doc. 130 ] , 202 n [ Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 206 n [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] , 249 n [ Pg. 249 includes portions of Doc. 164 and Doc. 165 ] , 250 n [ Pg. 250 includes portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] , 255 n [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] McCone, John A., 318 n [ Pg. 318 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 240 ] -370 [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 240 ] , 567 [ Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 363 , Doc. 364 , and Doc. 365 ] McGhee, George C., 80 n [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 87 n [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 88 n [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 89 [ Pg. 89 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] -90 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 110 n [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] , 170 n [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 282 n [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 188 ] , 294 n [ Pg. 294 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] , 318 n [ Pg. 318 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] , 322 n [ Pg. 322 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211 ] , 386 n [ Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] , 491 n [ Pg. 491 is part of Doc. 311 ] , 522 n [ Pg. 522 includes portions of Doc. 332 and Doc. 333 ] , 523 n [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 334 ] , 560 n [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360 ] , 562 n [ Pg. 562 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361 ] McKesson, John A., III, 37 n [ Pg. 37 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31 ] , 159 n [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 107 ] , 538 n [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] , 574 n [ Pg. 574 is part of Doc. 368 ] McMillan, Brockway, 608 [ Pg. 608 includes portions of Doc. 389 and Doc. 390 ] McNamara, Robert S., 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 57 ] -83 [ Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 115 [ Pg. 115 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] -117 [ Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 140 [ Pg. 140 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] -143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 146 [ Pg. 146 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] -149 [ Pg. 149 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] , 151 [ Pg. 151 is part of Doc. 102 ] -153 [ Pg. 153 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 178 n [ Pg. 178 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] , 180 [ Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 118 ] -181 [ Pg. 181 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] -186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 121 ] , 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 138 ] -212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 284 n [ Pg. 284 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] -287 [ Pg. 287 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] , 300 [ Pg. 300 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] -302 [ Pg. 302 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] , 310 n [ Pg. 310 includes portions of Doc. 204 and Doc. 205 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] -337 [ Pg. 337 includes portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] , 370 [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 240 ] , 573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 367 ] McQuade (DOD), 297 n [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 197 ] Meade, Frazier, 22 n [ Pg. 22 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] Meeker, Leonard C., 501 n [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 317 ] , 568 n [ Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 365 and Doc. 366 ] Mekasha, Getachew, 456 n [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 289 ] Melilla and Ceuta, 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 27 ] Meloy, Francis E., Jr., 581 n [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 373 ] Merchant, Livingston T., 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 36 ] Mikoyan, Anastas, 311 [ Pg. 311 is part of Doc. 205 ] Military Air Transport Service routes, 300 [ Pg. 300 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] -302 [ Pg. 302 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] -337 [ Pg. 337 includes portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] Miller, Frederick H., 69 n [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 50 ] Mobutu, Col. Joseph, 552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 355 ] Moffett, James D., 429 n [ Pg. 429 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] Mohammed V, King, 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 162 n [ Pg. 162 includes portions of Doc. 108 and Doc. 109 ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] -166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 168 [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 179 n [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 180 [ Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 118 ] Mokkadem, Sadok, 67 n [ Pg. 67 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] -267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 178 ] Monrovia conference, 287 [ Pg. 287 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] -288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 192 ] Monsma, George N., 534 n [ Pg. 534 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] Morocco ( see also Morocco-Algeria border conflict), 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 361 [ Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 535n [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 342 ] African denuclearization, 174 [ Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 115 ] Algeria independence conflict position, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 51 ] -73 [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] , 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 63 ] Algerian arms buildup, 133 [ Pg. 133 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] Algerian relations, 98 [ Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] Ceuta and Melilla, 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 27 ] foreign policy, 235 n [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] French economic assistance, 2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 228 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 149 ] French military assistance, 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 26 [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 30 [ Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 43 n [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 204 [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 148 ] -227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 148 ] French relations, 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 154 ] Hassan-Ferhat agreement of 1961, 21 [ Pg. 21 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] Mauritania dispute, 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 111 ] -169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 124 ] North African territorial claims, 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 27 ] political situation, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 34 [ Pg. 34 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 202 [ Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 205 [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 235 [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] -236 [ Pg. 236 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] Sahara sovereignty issue, 65 [ Pg. 65 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] Soviet bloc relations, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 4 ] Soviet military assistance, 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 34 ] -43 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 108 ] -163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] -166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 122 ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 199 [ Pg. 199 includes portions of Doc. 128 and Doc. 129 ] -202 [ Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 205 [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] -206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] Soviet relations, 209 n [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 137 ] Spanish enclaves dispute, 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 188 [ Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 122 ] Spanish military assistance, 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 43 n [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 34 ] Spanish relations, 4 [ Pg. 4 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] , 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 188 [ Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 122 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 154 ] Spanish Saharan colonies, 285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] Tangier shipyard proposal, 213territorial claims, 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] U.S. economic assistance, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] -2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 28 n [ Pg. 28 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23 ] , 29 n [ Pg. 29 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] , 30 [ Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 34 ] -43 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 191 [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 123 ] , 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 228 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 233 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 152 ] -235 [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] , 238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 217 ] U.S. military assistance, 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 21 [ Pg. 21 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] -22 [ Pg. 22 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 25 [ Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 19 and Doc. 20 ] -26 [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 28 n [ Pg. 28 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23 ] , 29 n [ Pg. 29 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] , 30 [ Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 26 ] -34 [ Pg. 34 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 34 ] -43 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 109 ] -164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 114 ] -173 [ Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 184 [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 120 ] -189 [ Pg. 189 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] , 191 [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 123 ] -192 [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 123 ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 126 ] -199 [ Pg. 199 includes portions of Doc. 128 and Doc. 129 ] , 204 [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] -210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] -214 [ Pg. 214 includes portions of Doc. 139 and Doc. 140 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 146 ] -224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. 147 and Doc. 148 ] , 228 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 150 ] -233 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 152 ] U.S. military facilities, 2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 112 ] -171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] -186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 121 ] , 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 123 ] -193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 124 ] , 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 131 ] -202 [ Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 138 ] -212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 214 [ Pg. 214 includes portions of Doc. 139 and Doc. 140 ] -221 [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 147 ] -227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 148 ] , 229 [ Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] -231 [ Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] , 238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 155 ] -241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 316 ] U.S. naval bases, 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 119 ] -183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 119 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 125 ] -195 [ Pg. 195 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] -204 [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 210 n [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] -213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 144 ] -221 [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. 147 and Doc. 148 ] -228 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 150 ] U.S. relations, 4 [ Pg. 4 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] , 26 [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] -28 [ Pg. 28 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23 ] , 30 [ Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] -31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 35 n [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 37 n [ Pg. 37 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31 ] , 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 115 [ Pg. 115 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] -116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 79 ] , 184 [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 120 ] -185 [ Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] , 195 [ Pg. 195 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] -196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 202 [ Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 132 ] -203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] , 208 [ Pg. 208 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] -210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 143 ] , 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 147 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] Voice of America facilities, 217 [ Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 142 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] Morocco-Algeria border conflict: Algerian position, 11 [ Pg. 11 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 18 n [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 15 ] -21 [ Pg. 21 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] , 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 88 ] -131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 133 [ Pg. 133 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] Arab League role, 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] cease-fire, 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 37 [ Pg. 37 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31 ] China, People's Republic of, position, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 12 ] Cuban role, 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 34 ] Ethiopian position, 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 32 ] Ethiopian role, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 36 [ Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 38 [ Pg. 38 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] French position, 12 [ Pg. 12 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] -13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 26 [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 43 n [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 34 ] Mali role, 36 [ Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 38 [ Pg. 38 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] Moroccan position, 12 [ Pg. 12 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 21 [ Pg. 21 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] , 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] -24 [ Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 37 [ Pg. 37 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31 ] -38 [ Pg. 38 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] -43 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 34 ] Organization of African Unity role, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 9 ] -15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 14 ] -19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] , 25 [ Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 19 and Doc. 20 ] , 30 [ Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] -32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 38 [ Pg. 38 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] -42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 135 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 90 ] Soviet position, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 12 ] Soviet role, 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 34 ] Spanish position, 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 15 ] Swiss role, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 9 ] UN role, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] , 25 [ Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 19 and Doc. 20 ] , 38 [ Pg. 38 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] United Arab Republic intervention, 36 [ Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 37 [ Pg. 37 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31 ] -38 [ Pg. 38 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] United Arab Republic position, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 25 [ Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 19 and Doc. 20 ] -26 [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] U.S. involvement, allegations of, 14 [ Pg. 14 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] , 16 n [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 15 ] U.S. position, 10 [ Pg. 10 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] -24 [ Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 27 [ Pg. 27 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] -31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 135 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 90 ] , 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 222 ] Yugoslav role, 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 14 ] Mossler, John R., 145 n [ Pg. 145 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] , 149 n [ Pg. 149 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] Mouvement Nationaliste Algerienne, 57 n [ Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] Mozambique, 285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] , 315 [ Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] , 329 [ Pg. 329 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] , 491 [ Pg. 491 is part of Doc. 311 ] , 538 [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] , 545 n [ Pg. 545 includes portions of Doc. 350 and Doc. 351 ] , 553 [ Pg. 553 is part of Doc. 356 ] , 563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 361 ] Mulcahy, Edward W., 524 n [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 335 ] , 530 n [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 339 ] Muller, Willard C., 462 n [ Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 293 ] Munoz Grandes, Agustin, 43 n [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 34 ] Murrow, Edward R., 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 213 ] Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 4 [ Pg. 4 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] -5 [ Pg. 5 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] -24 [ Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 26 [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 30 [ Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 34 [ Pg. 34 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] , 38 [ Pg. 38 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] , 106 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 115 [ Pg. 115 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] , 135 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 90 ] , 227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 148 ] , 235 n [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] National Broadcasting Company (NBC), 550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 354 ] National Intelligence Estimates ( see also Special National Intelligence Estimates ): NIE 60/70-2-61 , 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 198 ] -300 [ Pg. 300 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] NIE 60/70-61 , 284 [ Pg. 284 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] -285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] NIE 60-62 , 320 [ Pg. 320 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210 ] -322 [ Pg. 322 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211 ] NIE 62-2-62 , 108 [ Pg. 108 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] -110 [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] NIE 62-63 , 133 [ Pg. 133 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] -135 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 90 ] NIE 64.1-62 , 378 [ Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 246 ] -379 [ Pg. 379 includes portions of Doc. 246 and Doc. 247 ] National Security Action Memoranda: No. 16 , 281 [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 187 ] No. 33 , 590 [ Pg. 590 is part of Doc. 377 ] No. 34 , 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] No. 60 , 546 n [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 351 ] No. 77 , 548 n [ Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 353 ] No. 89 , 352 n [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 230 ] No. 102 , 189 [ Pg. 189 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] -192 [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 123 ] No. 121 , 198 [ Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] -199 [ Pg. 199 includes portions of Doc. 128 and Doc. 129 ] No. 211 , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 77 ] No. 221 , 122 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 83 ] No. 232 , 231 [ Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] -232 [ Pg. 232 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] No. 244 , 371 [ Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 241 and Doc. 242 ] National Security Council, 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 240 ] -371 [ Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 241 and Doc. 242 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 245 ] -377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 245 ] Naude, Willem C., 587 [ Pg. 587 is part of Doc. 375 ] -588 [ Pg. 588 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376 ] , 619 [ Pg. 619 includes portions of Doc. 395 and Doc. 396 ] -621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 397 ] , 640 [ Pg. 640 is part of Doc. 409 ] -642 [ Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 409 ] , 647 [ Pg. 647 includes portions of Doc. 413 and Doc. 414 ] -648 [ Pg. 648 is part of Doc. 414 ] , 652 [ Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 417 and Doc. 418 ] Neo-Destour party, 276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 184 ] -277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 184 ] Neto, Agostinho, 561 [ Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 360 ] Newman, George, 137 n [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 175 n [ Pg. 175 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] , 206 n [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] , 219 n [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 591 n [ Pg. 591 is part of Doc. 378 ] Newsom, David D., 4 n [ Pg. 4 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] , 11 n [ Pg. 11 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 18 n [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 19 n [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 21 n [ Pg. 21 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] , 22 n [ Pg. 22 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 26 n [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 27 n [ Pg. 27 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] , 28 n [ Pg. 28 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23 ] , 29 n [ Pg. 29 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] , 30 n [ Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 34 n [ Pg. 34 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] , 38 n [ Pg. 38 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] , 40 n [ Pg. 40 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 41 n [ Pg. 41 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34 ] , 107 n [ Pg. 107 includes portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73 ] , 144 n [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 145 n [ Pg. 145 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] , 159 n [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 107 ] , 219 n [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 229 n [ Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] , 236 n [ Pg. 236 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 442 n [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 280 ] , 453 n [ Pg. 453 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 462 n [ Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 293 ] , 469 [ Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298 ] -473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] , 473 n [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] , 478 n [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 301 and Doc. 302 ] , 490 n [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 310 ] Nicosia conference, 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] Niger, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] -315 [ Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] , 317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 361 [ Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 236 ] Nigeria, 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 312 [ Pg. 312 is part of Doc. 205 ] -313 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 205 ] , 315 [ Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] , 329 [ Pg. 329 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] -330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 222 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 346 ] , 569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 366 ] Nitze, Paul H., 140 n [ Pg. 140 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] , 173 n [ Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] , 178 n [ Pg. 178 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] , 239 n [ Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 310 [ Pg. 310 includes portions of Doc. 204 and Doc. 205 ] , 327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 215 ] -328 [ Pg. 328 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] , 343 n [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 224 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 271 and Doc. 272 ] -429 [ Pg. 429 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] , 491 n [ Pg. 491 is part of Doc. 311 ] , 586 n [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 374 ] Nkomo, Joshua, 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 328 ] , 528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 338 ] Nkrumah, Kwame, 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 204 ] , 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 213 ] , 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 219 ] -334 [ Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 224 ] -347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 227 ] , 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 229 ] , 358 n [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 238 ] -364 [ Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 239 ] -367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 371 [ Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 241 and Doc. 242 ] -376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 378 [ Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 246 ] -382 [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 247 ] , 384 [ Pg. 384 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] -387 [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 250 ] , 385 n [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 249 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] -391 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 253 ] , 509 [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] Nkumbula, Harry, 527 [ Pg. 527 includes portions of Doc. 337 and Doc. 338 ] Nogueira, Franco, 549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 353 ] , 562 [ Pg. 562 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361 ] -563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 361 ] , 565 [ Pg. 565 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] -567 [ Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 363 , Doc. 364 , and Doc. 365 ] , 575 [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. 368 ] , 578 n [ Pg. 578 includes portions of Doc. 370 and Doc. 371 ] , 579 [ Pg. 579 includes portions of Doc. 371 and Doc. 372 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 373 ] -585 [ Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 373 ] North Africa ( see also individual countries ), 2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 7 [ Pg. 7 includes portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5 ] -9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5 ] economic situation, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] -2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 7 [ Pg. 7 includes portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5 ] , 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5 ] European relations, 5 [ Pg. 5 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 10 [ Pg. 10 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] French relations, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] -2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 5 [ Pg. 5 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 52 ] Joint Chiefs of Staff position, 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 316 ] -500 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 316 ] Moroccan territorial claims, 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 27 ] nationalism, influence of, 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] Nicosia conference, 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] political situation, 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5 ] Sino-Soviet involvement, 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 36 ] UN role, 4 [ Pg. 4 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] U.S. economic assistance, 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] -4 [ Pg. 4 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] , 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 4 ] -7 [ Pg. 7 includes portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5 ] U.S. military assistance, 4 [ Pg. 4 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] , 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 4 ] U.S. military bases, 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] -4 [ Pg. 4 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] U.S. policy, 5 [ Pg. 5 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] -10 [ Pg. 10 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] North Atlantic Council (NAC), 542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 348 ] -543 [ Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 349 ] North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 316 ] Northern Rhodesia. See Rhodesia, Northern. Norway, 535 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 342 ] , 638 [ Pg. 638 is part of Doc. 408 ] , 656 [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 420 and Doc. 421 ] Nujoma, Samuel, 622 [ Pg. 622 includes portions of Doc. 397 and Doc. 398 ] -624 [ Pg. 624 includes portions of Doc. 398 and Doc. 399 ] Nyasaland ( see also Rhodesia-Nyasaland Federation), 303 [ Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] , 329 [ Pg. 329 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] , 516 [ Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 327 and Doc. 328 ] -517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 328 ] , 525 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 336 ] -526 [ Pg. 526 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] British position, 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 525 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 336 ] Ghanaian position, 509 [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] Guinean position, 509 [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] U.S. economic assistance, 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 525 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 336 ] -526 [ Pg. 526 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] , 538 [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] U.S. relations, 508 [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 320 ] -509 [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] Nydell, Carl C., 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 249 ] , 386 [ Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] Nydell case, 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 249 ] , 386 n [ Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 250 ] Nyerere, Julius, 334 [ Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 553 [ Pg. 553 is part of Doc. 356 ] , 569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 366 ] Oakley, Robert B., 568 n [ Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 365 and Doc. 366 ] Obote, A. Milton, 334 [ Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] O'Donnell, Kenneth, 182 n [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 119 ] Ogaden region. See Ethiopian border dispute under Somalia . Oil, 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] , 157 [ Pg. 157 includes portions of Doc. 105 and Doc. 106 ] , 158 n [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 107 ] -160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 107 ] Olympio, Sylvanus, 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 244 ] O'Mahoney, Joseph E., 463 n [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 294 ] , 482 n [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 305 ] , 485 n [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 308 ] O'Neill, Paul W., Jr., 473 n [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] Organization Armee Secrete, 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 94 [ Pg. 94 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] -95 [ Pg. 95 includes portions of Doc. 65 and Doc. 66 ] Organization of African Unity (OAU), 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 9 ] -15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 332 [ Pg. 332 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219 ] -334 [ Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 488 [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 309 ] , 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 316 ] , 580 [ Pg. 580 is part of Doc. 372 ] Ormsby Gore, David, 519 [ Pg. 519 includes portions of Doc. 329 and Doc. 330 ] , 536 [ Pg. 536 includes portions of Doc. 343 and Doc. 344 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 346 ] Ortiz, Frank V., Jr., 22 n [ Pg. 22 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 41 n [ Pg. 41 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34 ] O'Sheel, Patrick, 401 n [ Pg. 401 is part of Doc. 260 ] Osman, Aden Abdullah, 431 [ Pg. 431 is part of Doc. 274 ] Oufkir, Gen., 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 13 ] Oulashin, Eric E., 462 n [ Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 293 ] Overseas Companies of Portugal lobby, 550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 354 ] , 554 [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 356 ] Owen, Henry, 491 n [ Pg. 491 is part of Doc. 311 ] Packard, Robert F., 598 n [ Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] , 617 n [ Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 394 ] Padberg, Eugene L., 350 n [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 228 ] , 357 n [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 233 ] Pakistan, 34 [ Pg. 34 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] , 311 [ Pg. 311 is part of Doc. 205 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 245 ] Palmer, Joseph, II, 81 n [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 57 ] Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa, 329 [ Pg. 329 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] Pan-Africanism, 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 198 ] -300 [ Pg. 300 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] Parker, Maj. Gen. T.W., 491 n [ Pg. 491 is part of Doc. 311 ] , 519 n [ Pg. 519 includes portions of Doc. 329 and Doc. 330 ] , 649 n [ Pg. 649 includes portions of Doc. 415 and Doc. 416 ] Peace Corps program, 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 81 ] -122 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 204 ] , 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 213 ] -326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 214 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 255 ] , 394 n [ Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] , 398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 257 ] , 414 [ Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 265 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 297 ] , 481 [ Pg. 481 includes portions of Doc. 303 and Doc. 304 ] , 525 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 336 ] -526 [ Pg. 526 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] Pelcovits, Nathan, 253 n [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 168 ] Penfield, James K., 51 n [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 52 n [ Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 136 n [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 161 n [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 162 n [ Pg. 162 includes portions of Doc. 108 and Doc. 109 ] , 167 n [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 287 n [ Pg. 287 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] , 301 n [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 199 ] , 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 223 ] -343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 224 ] , 344 n [ Pg. 344 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 271 and Doc. 272 ] -429 [ Pg. 429 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] , 587 [ Pg. 587 is part of Doc. 375 ] Pereira, Pedro, 550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 354 ] Perkins, Raymond L., 343 n [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 224 ] Pezzullo, Lawrence A., 93 n [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 64 ] Phili, Peter, 618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 395 ] Philippines, 535 n [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 342 ] Picard, Frederick P., III, 509 n [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] Pletcher, Charles H., 514 [ Pg. 514 includes portions of Doc. 325 and Doc. 326 ] Plimpton, Francis T.P., 505 [ Pg. 505 is part of Doc. 319 ] -507 [ Pg. 507 is part of Doc. 319 ] Polansky, Sol, 463 n [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 294 ] Polk, William, 100 [ Pg. 100 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] -101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 70 ] Poole, Peter A., 420 n [ Pg. 420 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] Porson, Sophia, 409 n [ Pg. 409 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] , 411 n [ Pg. 411 includes portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265 ] , 415 n [ Pg. 415 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] Porter, William J., 16 n [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 18 n [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 29 n [ Pg. 29 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] , 35 n [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 37 [ Pg. 37 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31 ] , 43 n [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 99 n [ Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] , 104 n [ Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] -112 [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 114 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 121 [ Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] -127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 86 ] Portugal ( see also Angola ; Mozambique ; Portuguese colonial Africa; Portuguese Guinea ), 106 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 222 ] Africa region, 284 [ Pg. 284 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] -285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] , 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 583 [ Pg. 583 is part of Doc. 373 ] -584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 373 ] , 654 [ Pg. 654 includes portions of Doc. 419 and Doc. 420 ] Algeria, 582 [ Pg. 582 is part of Doc. 373 ] Angola, 548 [ Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 353 ] -549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 353 ] , 550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 354 ] , 583 [ Pg. 583 is part of Doc. 373 ] Angola, use of U.S. weapons, 548 [ Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 353 ] -549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 353 ] , 551 [ Pg. 551 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] , 557 [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 358 ] , 573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 367 ] , 576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 369 ] Azores base issue, 493 [ Pg. 493 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] , 497 [ Pg. 497 is part of Doc. 315 ] -498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 316 ] , 500 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 316 ] , 545 [ Pg. 545 includes portions of Doc. 350 and Doc. 351 ] -546 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 351 ] , 548 [ Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 353 ] -549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 353 ] , 556 [ Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 357 and Doc. 358 ] , 558 [ Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 358 ] -559 [ Pg. 559 includes portions of Doc. 358 and Doc. 359 ] , 570 [ Pg. 570 is part of Doc. 366 ] , 573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 367 ] , 576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 369 ] , 579 [ Pg. 579 includes portions of Doc. 371 and Doc. 372 ] Ethiopian relations, 469 [ Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298 ] , 569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 366 ] National Broadcasting Company film, 550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 354 ] Overseas Companies of Portugal lobby, 550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 354 ] , 554 [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 356 ] UN Economic and Social Council expulsion, 503 [ Pg. 503 is part of Doc. 318 ] -504 [ Pg. 504 is part of Doc. 318 ] UN position, 563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 361 ] , 566 [ Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 363 ] United Arab Republic relations, 569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 366 ] U.S. economic assistance, 558 [ Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 358 ] U.S. military assistance, 548 [ Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 353 ] , 551 [ Pg. 551 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] , 557 [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 358 ] , 576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 369 ] U.S. relations, 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 541 n [ Pg. 541 is part of Doc. 347 ] , 550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 354 ] -551 [ Pg. 551 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] , 554 [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 356 ] , 557 [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 358 ] , 562 [ Pg. 562 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361 ] -563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 361 ] , 565 [ Pg. 565 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] -567 [ Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 363 , Doc. 364 , and Doc. 365 ] , 568 [ Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 365 and Doc. 366 ] , 570 [ Pg. 570 is part of Doc. 366 ] , 576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 369 ] , 578 [ Pg. 578 includes portions of Doc. 370 and Doc. 371 ] -579 [ Pg. 579 includes portions of Doc. 371 and Doc. 372 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 373 ] -585 [ Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 373 ] Portuguese colonial Africa ( see also individual countries ), 284 [ Pg. 284 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] -285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] , 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 328 [ Pg. 328 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] -329 [ Pg. 329 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] , 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 219 ] , 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 469 [ Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298 ] , 491 [ Pg. 491 is part of Doc. 311 ] , 493 [ Pg. 493 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] -497 [ Pg. 497 is part of Doc. 315 ] , 501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 317 ] -502 [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. 317 ] , 538 [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] , 545 n [ Pg. 545 includes portions of Doc. 350 and Doc. 351 ] , 557 [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 358 ] African nations position, 569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 366 ] -571 [ Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 366 ] , 582 [ Pg. 582 is part of Doc. 373 ] Azores base issue, 493 [ Pg. 493 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] , 497 [ Pg. 497 is part of Doc. 315 ] -498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 316 ] , 500 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 316 ] , 545 [ Pg. 545 includes portions of Doc. 350 and Doc. 351 ] -546 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 351 ] , 548 [ Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 353 ] -549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 353 ] , 556 [ Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 357 and Doc. 358 ] , 558 [ Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 358 ] -559 [ Pg. 559 includes portions of Doc. 358 and Doc. 359 ] , 570 [ Pg. 570 is part of Doc. 366 ] , 573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 367 ] , 576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 369 ] , 579 [ Pg. 579 includes portions of Doc. 371 and Doc. 372 ] Brazilian position, 571 [ Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 366 ] British position, 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 313 ] -495 [ Pg. 495 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] , 571 [ Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 366 ] , 577 [ Pg. 577 is part of Doc. 370 ] Department of State Policy Directive, 556 [ Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 357 and Doc. 358 ] -559 [ Pg. 559 includes portions of Doc. 358 and Doc. 359 ] Ethiopian position, 469 [ Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298 ] French position, 571 [ Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 366 ] Guinean position, 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 373 ] Joint Chiefs of Staff position, 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 316 ] -500 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 316 ] Portuguese position, 542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 348 ] , 562 [ Pg. 562 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361 ] -563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 361 ] , 565 [ Pg. 565 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] -567 [ Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 363 , Doc. 364 , and Doc. 365 ] , 579 [ Pg. 579 includes portions of Doc. 371 and Doc. 372 ] -585 [ Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 373 ] Spanish position, 571 [ Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 366 ] United Nations and, 505 [ Pg. 505 is part of Doc. 319 ] -506 [ Pg. 506 is part of Doc. 319 ] , 578 n [ Pg. 578 includes portions of Doc. 370 and Doc. 371 ] , 584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 373 ] -585 [ Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 373 ] U.S. economic assistance, 506 [ Pg. 506 is part of Doc. 319 ] U.S. position, 546 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 351 ] , 551 [ Pg. 551 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] , 553 [ Pg. 553 is part of Doc. 356 ] -554 [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 356 ] , 556 [ Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 357 and Doc. 358 ] -559 [ Pg. 559 includes portions of Doc. 358 and Doc. 359 ] , 568 [ Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 365 and Doc. 366 ] -572 [ Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 366 ] , 573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 367 ] U.S. policy in the UN, 502 [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. 317 ] , 568 [ Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 365 and Doc. 366 ] -576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 369 ] , 585 [ Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 373 ] Portuguese Guinea, 285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] , 545 n [ Pg. 545 includes portions of Doc. 350 and Doc. 351 ] , 553 [ Pg. 553 is part of Doc. 356 ] Post, Richard St. F., 137 n [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 139 n [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 144 n [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 145 n [ Pg. 145 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] , 456 n [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 289 ] , 463 n [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 294 ] , 465 n [ Pg. 465 includes portions of Doc. 294 and Doc. 295 ] Potolichev (USSR), 30 [ Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] Protitch, Dragoslav, 627 [ Pg. 627 includes portions of Doc. 400 and Doc. 401 ] Rahuma, Maj. Tahir, 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 107 ] Ramsey, Henry C., 322 n [ Pg. 322 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211 ] Randall, Clarence B., 362 [ Pg. 362 is part of Doc. 237 ] , 365 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 371 [ Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 241 and Doc. 242 ] -372 [ Pg. 372 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 244 ] Randolph, A. Phillip, 326 n [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 214 ] Read, Benjamin H., 11 n [ Pg. 11 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 36 [ Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] -37 [ Pg. 37 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31 ] , 128 n [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 390 n [ Pg. 390 includes portions of Doc. 252 and Doc. 253 ] , 474 n [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 299 and Doc. 300 ] , 503 [ Pg. 503 is part of Doc. 318 ] -504 [ Pg. 504 is part of Doc. 318 ] Reis, Herbert, 512 n [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] Reynolds Metals, 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 223 ] , 350 n [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 228 ] Rhodesia, Northern, 329 [ Pg. 329 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] , 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 507 [ Pg. 507 is part of Doc. 319 ] , 511 [ Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] -516 [ Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 327 and Doc. 328 ] Rhodesia, Southern, 285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] , 303 [ Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] , 328 [ Pg. 328 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] -329 [ Pg. 329 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] , 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 219 ] , 469 [ Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298 ] , 492 [ Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312 ] British position, 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 513 [ Pg. 513 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325 ] , 520 n [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 331 ] , 528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 338 ] -529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 338 ] , 531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 339 ] , 532 n [ Pg. 532 includes portions of Doc. 339 and Doc. 340 ] , 536 [ Pg. 536 includes portions of Doc. 343 and Doc. 344 ] , 539 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. 346 ] -540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 346 ] Congo, 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 344 ] economic situation, 527 [ Pg. 527 includes portions of Doc. 337 and Doc. 338 ] foreign policy, 526 [ Pg. 526 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] -527 [ Pg. 527 includes portions of Doc. 337 and Doc. 338 ] Ghanaian position, 533 [ Pg. 533 includes portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341 ] -534 [ Pg. 534 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] independence, 528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 338 ] -529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 338 ] , 530 n [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 339 ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 344 ] , 539 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. 346 ] -540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 346 ] political situation, 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 328 ] , 519 [ Pg. 519 includes portions of Doc. 329 and Doc. 330 ] , 521 n [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 332 ] , 522 [ Pg. 522 includes portions of Doc. 332 and Doc. 333 ] , 526 [ Pg. 526 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] , 528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 338 ] , 539 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. 346 ] South Africa relations, 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 344 ] UN position, 528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 338 ] , 530 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 339 ] -533 [ Pg. 533 includes portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341 ] , 535 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 342 ] , 540 n [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 346 ] U.S. economic assistance, 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 217 ] U.S. policy in the UN, 512 [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] -515 [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 326 and Doc. 327 ] , 519 [ Pg. 519 includes portions of Doc. 329 and Doc. 330 ] , 520 n [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 331 ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 includes portions of Doc. 339 and Doc. 340 ] -533 [ Pg. 533 includes portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341 ] U.S. position, 495 n [ Pg. 495 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] , 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 328 ] , 524 [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 335 ] , 527 [ Pg. 527 includes portions of Doc. 337 and Doc. 338 ] -540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 346 ] Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU), 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 328 ] , 519 [ Pg. 519 includes portions of Doc. 329 and Doc. 330 ] , 521 n [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 332 ] , 523 n [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 334 ] Rhodesia-Nyasaland Federation, 491 [ Pg. 491 is part of Doc. 311 ] , 508 [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 320 ] -509 [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] , 527 [ Pg. 527 includes portions of Doc. 337 and Doc. 338 ] -529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 338 ] British position, 516 [ Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 327 and Doc. 328 ] -522 [ Pg. 522 includes portions of Doc. 332 and Doc. 333 ] , 524 [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 335 ] -525 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 336 ] , 527 [ Pg. 527 includes portions of Doc. 337 and Doc. 338 ] , 534 [ Pg. 534 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] -536 [ Pg. 536 includes portions of Doc. 343 and Doc. 344 ] U.S. position, 509 [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] -511 [ Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] , 516 [ Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 327 and Doc. 328 ] -519 [ Pg. 519 includes portions of Doc. 329 and Doc. 330 ] , 534 [ Pg. 534 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] -535 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 342 ] Ribeiro, Amb. (Ghana), 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 251 ] Richards, Arthur H., 437 n [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 276 ] , 445 n [ Pg. 445 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] al-Rida al-Sinusi, Hassan, 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 94 ] -140 [ Pg. 140 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] , 142 [ Pg. 142 includes portions of Doc. 95 , Doc. 96 , and Doc. 97 ] -144 [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] Rives, Lloyd M., 279 n [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 186 ] Roberto, Holden, 543 [ Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 349 ] -544 [ Pg. 544 includes portions of Doc. 349 and Doc. 350 ] , 547 [ Pg. 547 is part of Doc. 352 ] , 551 [ Pg. 551 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] -552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 355 ] , 553 [ Pg. 553 is part of Doc. 356 ] -554 [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 356 ] , 561 [ Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 360 ] , 580 [ Pg. 580 is part of Doc. 372 ] Robinson, Lt. Col. C.C., 331 n [ Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 218 ] , 482 n [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 305 ] , 617 n [ Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 394 ] Root, John F., 1 n [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 3 n [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 53 n [ Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] , 57 n [ Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] , 136 n [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 161 n [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 162 n [ Pg. 162 includes portions of Doc. 108 and Doc. 109 ] , 167 n [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 170 n [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 175 n [ Pg. 175 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] , 206 n [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] , 243 n [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 246 n [ Pg. 246 is part of Doc. 162 ] Ross, Claude G., 383 n [ Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] Rostow, Walt W., 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 100 [ Pg. 100 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] , 290 [ Pg. 290 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194 ] -292 [ Pg. 292 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] , 305 n [ Pg. 305 includes portions of Doc. 201 and Doc. 202 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 230 ] -354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 235 ] -360 [ Pg. 360 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] , 495 n [ Pg. 495 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] , 550 n [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 354 ] , 590 n [ Pg. 590 is part of Doc. 377 ] , 633 n [ Pg. 633 includes portions of Doc. 405 and Doc. 406 ] Rowan, Carl T., 88 n [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 60 ] Rowe, David, 229 n [ Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] Rowen, Henry S., 283 [ Pg. 283 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] -284 [ Pg. 284 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] Ruanda-Urundi, 285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] Rumbold, Algernon, 613 [ Pg. 613 includes portions of Doc. 392 and Doc. 393 ] -615 [ Pg. 615 is part of Doc. 393 ] Rusk, Dean: Africa region, 282 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 188 ] -283 [ Pg. 283 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] , 294 n [ Pg. 294 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] -315 [ Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] , 328 [ Pg. 328 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] -329 [ Pg. 329 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] , 337 [ Pg. 337 includes portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] , 338 [ Pg. 338 includes portions of Doc. 221 and Doc. 222 ] -340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 222 ] Algeria, 47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 37 ] -52 [ Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 110 n [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] , 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 81 ] -120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 81 ] Algerian independence conflict, 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 35 ] -45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 52 n [ Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 78 [ Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55 ] -80 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 56 ] Angola, 542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 348 ] , 542 n [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 348 ] , 544 [ Pg. 544 includes portions of Doc. 349 and Doc. 350 ] -545 [ Pg. 545 includes portions of Doc. 350 and Doc. 351 ] , 547 n [ Pg. 547 is part of Doc. 352 ] , 549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 353 ] , 560 [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360 ] -562 [ Pg. 562 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361 ] , 579 [ Pg. 579 includes portions of Doc. 371 and Doc. 372 ] -581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 373 ] Azores base issue, 559 n [ Pg. 559 includes portions of Doc. 358 and Doc. 359 ] Ethiopia, 486 n [ Pg. 486 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] France, 95 n [ Pg. 95 includes portions of Doc. 65 and Doc. 66 ] Ghana, 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 224 ] -344 [ Pg. 344 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225 ] , 352 n [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 230 ] , 354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 240 ] -371 [ Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 241 and Doc. 242 ] Guinea, 399 [ Pg. 399 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] -401 [ Pg. 401 is part of Doc. 260 ] , 405 [ Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 262 ] -406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 262 and Doc. 263 ] Horn of Africa region, 425 [ Pg. 425 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] Libya, 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 94 ] -140 [ Pg. 140 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] , 145 [ Pg. 145 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] , 156 [ Pg. 156 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] -157 [ Pg. 157 includes portions of Doc. 105 and Doc. 106 ] Morocco, 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 108 ] -162 [ Pg. 162 includes portions of Doc. 108 and Doc. 109 ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] -166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 182 n [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 119 ] , 195 [ Pg. 195 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] -196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 224 n [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. 147 and Doc. 148 ] , 228 n [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 229 n [ Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] , 232 [ Pg. 232 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] -235 [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] Morocco-Algeria border conflict, 12 [ Pg. 12 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] , 30 n [ Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 27 ] North Africa, 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] -4 [ Pg. 4 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] Portuguese colonial Africa, 493 [ Pg. 493 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] , 549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 353 ] , 560 [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360 ] -562 [ Pg. 562 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361 ] , 568 [ Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 365 and Doc. 366 ] -572 [ Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 366 ] , 573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 367 ] , 574 n [ Pg. 574 is part of Doc. 368 ] , 577 [ Pg. 577 is part of Doc. 370 ] -579 [ Pg. 579 includes portions of Doc. 371 and Doc. 372 ] Rhodesia, Southern, 521 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 332 ] -523 [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 334 ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 includes portions of Doc. 339 and Doc. 340 ] -533 [ Pg. 533 includes portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341 ] , 536 [ Pg. 536 includes portions of Doc. 343 and Doc. 344 ] , 539 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. 346 ] -540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 346 ] Somalia, 431 [ Pg. 431 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286 ] , 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 287 ] South Africa, 501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 317 ] , 587 [ Pg. 587 is part of Doc. 375 ] -588 [ Pg. 588 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376 ] , 590 [ Pg. 590 is part of Doc. 377 ] , 594 [ Pg. 594 includes portions of Doc. 380 and Doc. 381 ] , 602 [ Pg. 602 is part of Doc. 385 ] , 606 [ Pg. 606 is part of Doc. 387 ] , 607 n [ Pg. 607 includes portions of Doc. 388 and Doc. 389 ] , 609 [ Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 390 ] -611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 391 ] , 620 [ Pg. 620 includes portions of Doc. 396 and Doc. 397 ] -622 [ Pg. 622 includes portions of Doc. 397 and Doc. 398 ] , 627 [ Pg. 627 includes portions of Doc. 400 and Doc. 401 ] -628 [ Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 401 ] , 633 [ Pg. 633 includes portions of Doc. 405 and Doc. 406 ] -635 [ Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 406 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 is part of Doc. 408 ] , 639 [ Pg. 639 is part of Doc. 409 ] -643 [ Pg. 643 includes portions of Doc. 409 and Doc. 410 ] , 646 [ Pg. 646 is part of Doc. 413 ] -649 [ Pg. 649 includes portions of Doc. 415 and Doc. 416 ] , 652 [ Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 417 and Doc. 418 ] -653 [ Pg. 653 includes portions of Doc. 418 and Doc. 419 ] , 656 [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 420 and Doc. 421 ] -657 [ Pg. 657 includes portions of Doc. 422 and Doc. 423 ] South African region, 496 [ Pg. 496 includes portions of Doc. 314 and Doc. 315 ] -497 [ Pg. 497 is part of Doc. 315 ] Southwest Africa mandate, 619 [ Pg. 619 includes portions of Doc. 395 and Doc. 396 ] -621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 397 ] , 648 [ Pg. 648 is part of Doc. 414 ] Tunisia, 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 159 ] -244 [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 includes portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] -251 [ Pg. 251 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] -261 [ Pg. 261 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 176 ] -264 [ Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] -267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 178 ] , 275 [ Pg. 275 includes portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] , 278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 185 ] Russell, Francis H., 274 n [ Pg. 274 includes portions of Doc. 182 and Doc. 183 ] , 275 n [ Pg. 275 includes portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] , 322 n [ Pg. 322 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211 ] , 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 229 ] , 352 n [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 230 ] , 357 n [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 358 n [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 363 n [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 371 [ Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 241 and Doc. 242 ] Ruwanda, 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 217 ] Sackey-Quaison, Alex, 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 247 ] -382 [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 247 ] Sahara, nuclear testing, 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 134 [ Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 90 ] Sahara sovereignty issue, 62 [ Pg. 62 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] -66 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 48 ] , 77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 54 ] Al-Said, Othman, 136 n [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 145 [ Pg. 145 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] Salazar, Antonio de Oliveira, 550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 354 ] , 571 [ Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 366 ] , 578 [ Pg. 578 includes portions of Doc. 370 and Doc. 371 ] , 579 [ Pg. 579 includes portions of Doc. 371 and Doc. 372 ] , 582 [ Pg. 582 is part of Doc. 373 ] , 583 [ Pg. 583 is part of Doc. 373 ] Salinger, Pierre, 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 213 ] Saltonstall, Everett, 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. 147 and Doc. 148 ] Sandys, Duncan, 361 [ Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 292 ] , 539 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. 346 ] -540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 346 ] Sanger, Richard H., 495 n [ Pg. 495 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] , 519 n [ Pg. 519 includes portions of Doc. 329 and Doc. 330 ] , 619 n [ Pg. 619 includes portions of Doc. 395 and Doc. 396 ] , 620 n [ Pg. 620 includes portions of Doc. 396 and Doc. 397 ] Satterthwaite, Joseph C., 47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 37 ] -52 [ Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 51 n [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 429 [ Pg. 429 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] , 593 [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 379 ] , 595 [ Pg. 595 includes portions of Doc. 381 and Doc. 382 ] , 598 n [ Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] , 601 n [ Pg. 601 includes portions of Doc. 384 and Doc. 385 ] , 604 [ Pg. 604 is part of Doc. 386 ] , 609 n [ Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 390 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 391 ] , 616 [ Pg. 616 is part of Doc. 393 ] , 617 n [ Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 394 ] , 618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 395 ] -619 [ Pg. 619 includes portions of Doc. 395 and Doc. 396 ] , 625 n [ Pg. 625 includes portions of Doc. 399 and Doc. 400 ] , 631 [ Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 404 ] -633 [ Pg. 633 includes portions of Doc. 405 and Doc. 406 ] , 660 n [ Pg. 660 is part of Doc. 425 ] , 661 n [ Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 426 ] Saudi Arabia, 25 [ Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 19 and Doc. 20 ] , 34 [ Pg. 34 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] Saunders, Harold H., 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 51 ] -73 [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] , 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] -100 [ Pg. 100 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] , 198 n [ Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] , 272 [ Pg. 272 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] -274 [ Pg. 274 includes portions of Doc. 182 and Doc. 183 ] Schlesinger, Arthur, 70 n [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 73 n [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] , 260 [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] -261 [ Pg. 261 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 263 n [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 496 [ Pg. 496 includes portions of Doc. 314 and Doc. 315 ] -497 [ Pg. 497 is part of Doc. 315 ] , 560 [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360 ] Schwebel, Stephen M., 501 n [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 317 ] Scott, Joseph W., 547 n [ Pg. 547 is part of Doc. 352 ] Segni, Antonio, 482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 305 ] Seip, Peter A., 53 n [ Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] Senegal, 73 [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] , 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 312 [ Pg. 312 is part of Doc. 205 ] -314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 403 [ Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 261 ] Senghor, Leopold Sedar, 73 [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] Shepard, Capt. Tazewell, 302 n [ Pg. 302 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] Shooshan, Harry, 362 [ Pg. 362 is part of Doc. 237 ] Shriver, Sargent, 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 255 ] , 394 n [ Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 257 ] , 416 [ Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 266 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267 ] -419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 267 ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 301 ] Sierra Leone, 312 [ Pg. 312 is part of Doc. 205 ] , 313 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 205 ] , 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 213 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 361 [ Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 236 ] Simms, John W., 512 n [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] Simonstown British military facility, 614 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 393 ] Sisco, Joseph J., 13 n [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 22 n [ Pg. 22 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 445 n [ Pg. 445 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] , 492 n [ Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312 ] , 501 n [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 317 ] , 522 n [ Pg. 522 includes portions of Doc. 332 and Doc. 333 ] , 534 n [ Pg. 534 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] , 541 n [ Pg. 541 is part of Doc. 347 ] , 564 n [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 362 ] , 568 n [ Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 365 and Doc. 366 ] , 574 n [ Pg. 574 is part of Doc. 368 ] Sithole, Ndabaningi, 530 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 339 ] -532 [ Pg. 532 includes portions of Doc. 339 and Doc. 340 ] Slaoui (Morocco), 231 [ Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] Slater, Warren E., 144 n [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] Slim, Mongi, 53 [ Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] -54 [ Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 185 ] -280 [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 502 [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. 317 ] , 575 [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. 368 ] , 638 [ Pg. 638 is part of Doc. 408 ] Slimane, Maj., 104 [ Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 71 ] Sloan, Frank K., 100 [ Pg. 100 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] -101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 70 ] , 216 n [ Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] , 238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 327 n [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 215 ] , 484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 307 ] Smith, Gen., 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 204 ] Smith, Bromley K., 88 n [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 105 n [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 196 n [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 264 n [ Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] , 318 n [ Pg. 318 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] , 373 n [ Pg. 373 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] , 453 n [ Pg. 453 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 645 n [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 412 ] Smith, James, 317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 207 ] Smuts, Jan, 619 [ Pg. 619 includes portions of Doc. 395 and Doc. 396 ] , 661 [ Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 426 ] Snowden, Henry T., 440 n [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279 ] Sole (South Africa), 660 n [ Pg. 660 is part of Doc. 425 ] Somalia, 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 222 ] British economic assistance, 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 291 ] British military assistance, 431 [ Pg. 431 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 275 ] -435 [ Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] , 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 288 ] British relations, 459 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 292 ] Chisimaio Port, 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 275 ] , 440 [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 283 ] , 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 287 ] Czechoslovakian military assistance, 431 [ Pg. 431 is part of Doc. 274 ] Ethiopian border dispute, 431 [ Pg. 431 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 438 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 277 ] -439 [ Pg. 439 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 283 ] , 450 [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 285 ] -452 [ Pg. 452 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286 ] , 469 [ Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298 ] -473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] German military assistance, 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 294 ] , 483 n [ Pg. 483 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] , 485 [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 308 ] -486 [ Pg. 486 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) relations, 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 287 ] Italian military assistance, 431 [ Pg. 431 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 275 ] -434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 275 ] , 440 [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279 ] , 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 288 ] , 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 294 ] , 483 n [ Pg. 483 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] , 485 [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 308 ] -486 [ Pg. 486 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] Italian relations, 459 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 291 ] Kenya border dispute, 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 285 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 291 ] -459 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 292 ] , 469 [ Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298 ] -470 [ Pg. 470 is part of Doc. 298 ] Ogaden region dispute, see Ethiopian border dispute above Peace Corps program, 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 481 [ Pg. 481 includes portions of Doc. 303 and Doc. 304 ] political situation, 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] Soviet bloc economic and military assistance, 441 n [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 279 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] -474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 299 and Doc. 300 ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] Soviet civil aviation routes, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] , 317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 207 ] Soviet economic assistance, 323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 440 [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279 ] Soviet military assistance, 431 [ Pg. 431 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 is part of Doc. 281 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 283 ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286 ] -453 [ Pg. 453 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 287 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] , 490 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 310 ] Soviet relations, 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 292 ] United Arab Republic military assistance, 444 [ Pg. 444 is part of Doc. 281 ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286 ] United Arab Republic relations, 447 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 283 ] United Nations and, 438 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 298 ] U.S. economic assistance, 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 275 ] -434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 275 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 283 ] -448 [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] , 449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 284 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 285 ] , 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 287 ] , 481 [ Pg. 481 includes portions of Doc. 303 and Doc. 304 ] , 484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 307 ] U.S. military assistance, 429 [ Pg. 429 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] -430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 273 ] , 441 n [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 279 ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 is part of Doc. 281 ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 283 ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286 ] -453 [ Pg. 453 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 287 ] -455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 288 ] , 456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 289 ] -457 [ Pg. 457 is part of Doc. 290 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 292 ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 293 ] , 463 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 294 ] -466 [ Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] -481 [ Pg. 481 includes portions of Doc. 303 and Doc. 304 ] , 484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 307 ] , 485 [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 308 ] -486 [ Pg. 486 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] U.S. military assistance to Ethiopia and, 438 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 440 [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 285 ] -454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 287 ] , 481 [ Pg. 481 includes portions of Doc. 303 and Doc. 304 ] U.S. relations, 439 [ Pg. 439 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] -440 [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279 ] , 442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 280 ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 is part of Doc. 281 ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] -455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 288 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] Western military assistance, 473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] -474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 299 and Doc. 300 ] , 482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 305 ] -483 [ Pg. 483 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] Sosa Rodriguez, Carlos, 535 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 342 ] Souapti dam project, 395 [ Pg. 395 is part of Doc. 256 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 257 ] -398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 257 ] South Africa ( see also Southwest Africa mandate ), 328 [ Pg. 328 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] , 492 [ Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312 ] African nations position, 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 222 ] apartheid and racial policies, 501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 317 ] , 587 [ Pg. 587 is part of Doc. 375 ] -588 [ Pg. 588 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376 ] , 591 n [ Pg. 591 is part of Doc. 378 ] , 593 [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 379 ] , 599 [ Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 384 ] -600 [ Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 384 ] , 606 [ Pg. 606 is part of Doc. 387 ] , 609 n [ Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 390 ] , 614 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 393 ] -616 [ Pg. 616 is part of Doc. 393 ] , 620 [ Pg. 620 includes portions of Doc. 396 and Doc. 397 ] -623 [ Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 398 ] , 631 [ Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 404 ] -635 [ Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 406 ] , 640 [ Pg. 640 is part of Doc. 409 ] -642 [ Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 409 ] , 655 [ Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 420 ] , 659 n [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 424 ] Bantustans policy, 620 [ Pg. 620 includes portions of Doc. 396 and Doc. 397 ] -621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 397 ] , 623 [ Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 398 ] , 631 [ Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 404 ] -632 [ Pg. 632 includes portions of Doc. 404 and Doc. 405 ] , 641 [ Pg. 641 is part of Doc. 409 ] -642 [ Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 409 ] , 647 [ Pg. 647 includes portions of Doc. 413 and Doc. 414 ] -648 [ Pg. 648 is part of Doc. 414 ] British position, 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 613 [ Pg. 613 includes portions of Doc. 392 and Doc. 393 ] -616 [ Pg. 616 is part of Doc. 393 ] , 624 [ Pg. 624 includes portions of Doc. 398 and Doc. 399 ] -625 [ Pg. 625 includes portions of Doc. 399 and Doc. 400 ] , 651 [ Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 416 and Doc. 417 ] -652 [ Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 417 and Doc. 418 ] British policy in the UN, 615 [ Pg. 615 is part of Doc. 393 ] British relations, 614 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 393 ] -615 [ Pg. 615 is part of Doc. 393 ] economic situation, 590 [ Pg. 590 is part of Doc. 377 ] , 640 [ Pg. 640 is part of Doc. 409 ] , 656 [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 420 and Doc. 421 ] Ethiopian position, 469 [ Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298 ] foreign policy, 621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 397 ] Ghanaian economic relations, 655gold production, 616 [ Pg. 616 is part of Doc. 393 ] , 640 [ Pg. 640 is part of Doc. 409 ] , 646 [ Pg. 646 is part of Doc. 413 ] -647 [ Pg. 647 includes portions of Doc. 413 and Doc. 414 ] Haynes visa issue, 660 [ Pg. 660 is part of Doc. 425 ] -661 [ Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 426 ] International Monetary Fund loan, 604 [ Pg. 604 is part of Doc. 386 ] , 606 [ Pg. 606 is part of Doc. 387 ] , 615 [ Pg. 615 is part of Doc. 393 ] Joint Chiefs of Staff position, 640 [ Pg. 640 is part of Doc. 409 ] Luthuli Nobel Peace Prize, 612 [ Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 392 ] -613 [ Pg. 613 includes portions of Doc. 392 and Doc. 393 ] political situation, 614 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 393 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 397 ] , 655 [ Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 420 ] Simonstown British military facility, 614 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 393 ] Southern Rhodesia relations, 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 344 ] Soviet bloc economic relations, 655 [ Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 420 ] Transkei, 641 [ Pg. 641 is part of Doc. 409 ] -642 [ Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 409 ] , 647 [ Pg. 647 includes portions of Doc. 413 and Doc. 414 ] Tunisian position, 502 [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. 317 ] UN and, 501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 317 ] -502 [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. 317 ] , 505 [ Pg. 505 is part of Doc. 319 ] -506 [ Pg. 506 is part of Doc. 319 ] , 621 n [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 397 ] , 630 n [ Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 403 ] , 639 [ Pg. 639 is part of Doc. 409 ] , 645 [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 412 ] , 651 [ Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 416 and Doc. 417 ] -653 [ Pg. 653 includes portions of Doc. 418 and Doc. 419 ] , 658 [ Pg. 658 includes portions of Doc. 423 and Doc. 424 ] -659 [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 424 ] UN Economic and Social Council, expulsion from, 503 [ Pg. 503 is part of Doc. 318 ] -504 [ Pg. 504 is part of Doc. 318 ] U.S. aircraft sales, 597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. 382 and Doc. 383 ] -598 [ Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] , 602 [ Pg. 602 is part of Doc. 385 ] -604 [ Pg. 604 is part of Doc. 386 ] , 606 [ Pg. 606 is part of Doc. 387 ] -607 [ Pg. 607 includes portions of Doc. 388 and Doc. 389 ] , 615 [ Pg. 615 is part of Doc. 393 ] , 649 [ Pg. 649 includes portions of Doc. 415 and Doc. 416 ] U.S. arms embargo, 579 [ Pg. 579 includes portions of Doc. 371 and Doc. 372 ] , 633 [ Pg. 633 includes portions of Doc. 405 and Doc. 406 ] -640 [ Pg. 640 is part of Doc. 409 ] , 644 [ Pg. 644 is part of Doc. 411 ] -645 [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 412 ] , 652 [ Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 417 and Doc. 418 ] , 656 [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 420 and Doc. 421 ] , 659 [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 424 ] U.S. economic assistance, 506 [ Pg. 506 is part of Doc. 319 ] , 507 [ Pg. 507 is part of Doc. 319 ] , 604 [ Pg. 604 is part of Doc. 386 ] U.S. economic relations, 590 [ Pg. 590 is part of Doc. 377 ] , 646 [ Pg. 646 is part of Doc. 413 ] -647 [ Pg. 647 includes portions of Doc. 413 and Doc. 414 ] , 655 [ Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 420 ] U.S. military assistance, 507 [ Pg. 507 is part of Doc. 319 ] U.S. military sales, 579 [ Pg. 579 includes portions of Doc. 371 and Doc. 372 ] U.S. missile and satellite tracking station, 586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 374 ] , 588 [ Pg. 588 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376 ] -589 [ Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 376 ] , 591 [ Pg. 591 is part of Doc. 378 ] -592 [ Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 378 ] , 594 [ Pg. 594 includes portions of Doc. 380 and Doc. 381 ] , 597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. 382 and Doc. 383 ] -598 [ Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] , 601 [ Pg. 601 includes portions of Doc. 384 and Doc. 385 ] -605 [ Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 386 and Doc. 387 ] , 607 [ Pg. 607 includes portions of Doc. 388 and Doc. 389 ] -609 [ Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 390 ] , 615 [ Pg. 615 is part of Doc. 393 ] , 617 [ Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 394 ] -619 [ Pg. 619 includes portions of Doc. 395 and Doc. 396 ] , 629 [ Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 402 ] , 636 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 407 ] U.S. missile sales, 617 [ Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 394 ] , 644 n [ Pg. 644 is part of Doc. 411 ] U.S. multi-racial diplomatic reception, 631 [ Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 404 ] -633 [ Pg. 633 includes portions of Doc. 405 and Doc. 406 ] U.S. naval and maritime interests, 595 [ Pg. 595 includes portions of Doc. 381 and Doc. 382 ] -597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. 382 and Doc. 383 ] U.S. relations, 587 [ Pg. 587 is part of Doc. 375 ] -588 [ Pg. 588 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376 ] , 593 [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 379 ] , 598 [ Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] -601 [ Pg. 601 includes portions of Doc. 384 and Doc. 385 ] , 605 [ Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 386 and Doc. 387 ] -606 [ Pg. 606 is part of Doc. 387 ] , 609 n [ Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 390 ] , 615 [ Pg. 615 is part of Doc. 393 ] -616 [ Pg. 616 is part of Doc. 393 ] , 620 [ Pg. 620 includes portions of Doc. 396 and Doc. 397 ] -622 [ Pg. 622 includes portions of Doc. 397 and Doc. 398 ] , 631 [ Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 404 ] -633 [ Pg. 633 includes portions of Doc. 405 and Doc. 406 ] , 639 [ Pg. 639 is part of Doc. 409 ] -643 [ Pg. 643 includes portions of Doc. 409 and Doc. 410 ] , 660 [ Pg. 660 is part of Doc. 425 ] -661 [ Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 426 ] U.S. submarine sales, 579 [ Pg. 579 includes portions of Doc. 371 and Doc. 372 ] , 627 [ Pg. 627 includes portions of Doc. 400 and Doc. 401 ] -628 [ Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 401 ] , 649 [ Pg. 649 includes portions of Doc. 415 and Doc. 416 ] , 657 [ Pg. 657 includes portions of Doc. 422 and Doc. 423 ] -658 [ Pg. 658 includes portions of Doc. 423 and Doc. 424 ] U.S. policy in the UN, 501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 317 ] -502 [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. 317 ] , 604 [ Pg. 604 is part of Doc. 386 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 391 ] , 616 [ Pg. 616 is part of Doc. 393 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 397 ] -622 [ Pg. 622 includes portions of Doc. 397 and Doc. 398 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 is part of Doc. 408 ] -639 [ Pg. 639 is part of Doc. 409 ] , 643 [ Pg. 643 includes portions of Doc. 409 and Doc. 410 ] -646 [ Pg. 646 is part of Doc. 413 ] , 653 [ Pg. 653 includes portions of Doc. 418 and Doc. 419 ] -655 [ Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 420 ] , 656 [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 420 and Doc. 421 ] -657 [ Pg. 657 includes portions of Doc. 422 and Doc. 423 ] , 658 [ Pg. 658 includes portions of Doc. 423 and Doc. 424 ] -659 [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 424 ] South African region ( see also Portuguese colonial Africa; South West Africa mandate; individual countries), 491 [ Pg. 491 is part of Doc. 311 ] -492 [ Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312 ] , 495 [ Pg. 495 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] -497 [ Pg. 497 is part of Doc. 315 ] British position, 493 [ Pg. 493 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] -495 [ Pg. 495 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] Joint Chiefs of Staff position, 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 316 ] -500 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 316 ] nationalists, 506racial polarization, 491 [ Pg. 491 is part of Doc. 311 ] -492 [ Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312 ] , 495 [ Pg. 495 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] UN and, 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 496 [ Pg. 496 includes portions of Doc. 314 and Doc. 315 ] -497 [ Pg. 497 is part of Doc. 315 ] , 501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 317 ] -502 [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. 317 ] , 505 [ Pg. 505 is part of Doc. 319 ] -506 [ Pg. 506 is part of Doc. 319 ] U.S. policy in the UN, 496 [ Pg. 496 includes portions of Doc. 314 and Doc. 315 ] -497 [ Pg. 497 is part of Doc. 315 ] Southern Rhodesia. See Rhodesia, Southern . Southwest Africa mandate, 495 [ Pg. 495 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] , 591 n [ Pg. 591 is part of Doc. 378 ] , 622 [ Pg. 622 includes portions of Doc. 397 and Doc. 398 ] -624 [ Pg. 624 includes portions of Doc. 398 and Doc. 399 ] , 648 [ Pg. 648 is part of Doc. 414 ] British position, 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 624 [ Pg. 624 includes portions of Doc. 398 and Doc. 399 ] -625 [ Pg. 625 includes portions of Doc. 399 and Doc. 400 ] Southwest Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), 622 [ Pg. 622 includes portions of Doc. 397 and Doc. 398 ] -623 [ Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 398 ] UN and, 622 [ Pg. 622 includes portions of Doc. 397 and Doc. 398 ] -624 [ Pg. 624 includes portions of Doc. 398 and Doc. 399 ] , 625 [ Pg. 625 includes portions of Doc. 399 and Doc. 400 ] -627 [ Pg. 627 includes portions of Doc. 400 and Doc. 401 ] U.S. policy in the UN, 594 [ Pg. 594 includes portions of Doc. 380 and Doc. 381 ] -595 [ Pg. 595 includes portions of Doc. 381 and Doc. 382 ] , 623 [ Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 398 ] -627 [ Pg. 627 includes portions of Doc. 400 and Doc. 401 ] , 649 [ Pg. 649 includes portions of Doc. 415 and Doc. 416 ] -651 [ Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 416 and Doc. 417 ] Southwest Africa Peoples Organization (SWAPO), 622 [ Pg. 622 includes portions of Doc. 397 and Doc. 398 ] -623 [ Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 398 ] Soviet bloc: Africa region military assistance, 305 [ Pg. 305 includes portions of Doc. 201 and Doc. 202 ] Algeria relations, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 10 [ Pg. 10 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] , 115 [ Pg. 115 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] Ghanaian relations, 364 [ Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 247 ] , 382 [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 247 ] -383 [ Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] Guinean relations, 321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 405 [ Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 262 ] , 416 [ Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 266 ] -417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 266 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 267 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] Horn of Africa region influence, 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 291 ] Malian relations, 321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 210 ] North Africa and, 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 36 ] North African relations, 2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] -4 [ Pg. 4 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] , 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5 ] -10 [ Pg. 10 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] Somalia, economic and military assistance to, 441 n [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 279 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] -474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 299 and Doc. 300 ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] South African economic relations, 655 [ Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 420 ] Tunisian relations, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 4 ] Soviet Union ( see also Soviet bloc ): Africa region, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] -318 [ Pg. 318 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] , 585 [ Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 373 ] , 642 [ Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 409 ] civil aviation routes, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] -318 [ Pg. 318 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211 ] -323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 335 [ Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 220 ] military assistance, 542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 348 ] Algeria: economic assistance, 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] military assistance, 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 30 [ Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 100 n [ Pg. 100 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 70 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 89 ] -133 [ Pg. 133 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] , 206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] relations, 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] -129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 134 [ Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 90 ] Bizerte crisis, 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 171 ] Cuba, military assistance, 106 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 72 ] Egypt military assistance, 227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 148 ] Ghana: civil aviation routes, 315 [ Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] , 323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 211 ] economic assistance, 357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 245 ] military assistance, 348 n [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 230 ] -353 [ Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 230 ] relations, 308 [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] -309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 204 ] , 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 348 n [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 230 ] , 361 [ Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 365 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 239 ] -366 [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 247 ] Guinea: civil aviation routes, 315 [ Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] , 323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 211 ] economic assistance, 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 255 ] -394 [ Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] , 416 [ Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 266 ] -417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 266 ] relations, 308 [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] -309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 204 ] , 311 [ Pg. 311 is part of Doc. 205 ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 is part of Doc. 260 ] , 413 [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 265 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 267 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 268 ] -423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 268 ] Libya civil aviation routes, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] -315 [ Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] Mali, 308 [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] -309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 204 ] , 315 [ Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] , 323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 211 ] Morocco, military assistance to, 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 34 ] -43 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 108 ] -163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] -166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 122 ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 199 [ Pg. 199 includes portions of Doc. 128 and Doc. 129 ] -202 [ Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 205 [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] -206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] Morocco-Mauritania dispute, 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 111 ] -168 [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 111 ] Somalia: civil aviation routes, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] , 317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 207 ] economic assistance, 323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 440 [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279 ] military assistance, 431 [ Pg. 431 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 is part of Doc. 281 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 283 ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286 ] -453 [ Pg. 453 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 287 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] , 490 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 310 ] relations, 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 292 ] Tunisia, economic assistance to, 246 [ Pg. 246 is part of Doc. 162 ] UN position, 345 [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 225 ] Spain, 285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] African colonies, 285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] Morocco: enclaves dispute, 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 188 [ Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 122 ] military assistance, 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 43 n [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 34 ] relations, 4 [ Pg. 4 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] , 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 43 n [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 188 [ Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 122 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 154 ] Morocco-Algeria border conflict, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 12 ] Portuguese colonial Africa, 571 [ Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 366 ] Saharan colonies, 285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] U.S. military assistance, 188 [ Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 122 ] U.S. military facilities, 546 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 351 ] U.S. relations, 43 n [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] -186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 121 ] , 188 [ Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 122 ] Spanish Saharan colonies, 285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] Special National Intelligence Estimates ( see also National Intelligence Estimates ), 62 [ Pg. 62 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] SNIE 64.1-61, 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 238 ] -364 [ Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 238 ] SNIE 76.1-61, 425 [ Pg. 425 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] -428 [ Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 271 and Doc. 272 ] Spiers, Ronald I., 287 n [ Pg. 287 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] Springsteen, George S. Jr., 107 [ Pg. 107 includes portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73 ] , 348 [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 226 ] -349 [ Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 227 ] , 357 n [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 394 n [ Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] Stackhouse, Heywood H., 5 [ Pg. 5 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] -7 [ Pg. 7 includes portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5 ] , 22 n [ Pg. 22 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 40 n [ Pg. 40 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 270 n [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 271 n [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181 ] , 274 n [ Pg. 274 includes portions of Doc. 182 and Doc. 183 ] , 278 n [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 185 ] , 279 n [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 186 ] Starrs, Francis R., Jr., 567 n [ Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 363 , Doc. 364 , and Doc. 365 ] Steele, Gen., 144 n [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] Stephenson, Hugh, 632 [ Pg. 632 includes portions of Doc. 404 and Doc. 405 ] Stevens, Roger, 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 275 ] -435 [ Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] , 528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 338 ] , 616 [ Pg. 616 is part of Doc. 393 ] Stevenson, Adlai E., 73 [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] , 77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 54 ] , 90 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 169 ] , 256 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 260 [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] -261 [ Pg. 261 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 264 n [ Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] , 324 [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 344 [ Pg. 344 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225 ] , 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 268 ] -422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 496 [ Pg. 496 includes portions of Doc. 314 and Doc. 315 ] -497 [ Pg. 497 is part of Doc. 315 ] , 521 n [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 332 ] , 528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 338 ] , 556 [ Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 357 and Doc. 358 ] , 559 [ Pg. 559 includes portions of Doc. 358 and Doc. 359 ] -560 [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360 ] , 571 [ Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 366 ] , 573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 367 ] , 576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 369 ] , 578 [ Pg. 578 includes portions of Doc. 370 and Doc. 371 ] , 594 [ Pg. 594 includes portions of Doc. 380 and Doc. 381 ] , 638 [ Pg. 638 is part of Doc. 408 ] , 644 n [ Pg. 644 is part of Doc. 411 ] , 659 n [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 424 ] Stoessel, Walter J., Jr., 52 n [ Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 111 ] -169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 111 ] Stoffel, Albert W., 322 n [ Pg. 322 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211 ] Stoltzfus, William A., 36 n [ Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] Stone, Galen L., 445 n [ Pg. 445 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] , 564 n [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 362 ] Stookey, Robert W., 156 n [ Pg. 156 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] Stout, Charles W., 442 n [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 280 ] , 455 n [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 288 ] , 485 n [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 308 ] Streeter, Richard E., 649 n [ Pg. 649 includes portions of Doc. 415 and Doc. 416 ] Strong, Curtis C., 533 n [ Pg. 533 includes portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341 ] , 649 n [ Pg. 649 includes portions of Doc. 415 and Doc. 416 ] Sudan, 315 [ Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] -316 [ Pg. 316 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 217 ] Summit Conference of Independent African States, 332 [ Pg. 332 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219 ] -333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 219 ] Suwayl, Ali Abu, 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 107 ] Swank, Emory C., 242 n [ Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 521 n [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 332 ] , 610 n [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 391 ] Sweeney, Joseph, 511 n [ Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] , 512 n [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] Switzerland, 62 [ Pg. 62 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] -65 [ Pg. 65 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] Symmes, Harrison M., 41 n [ Pg. 41 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34 ] Syria, 24 [ Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] Takla, Philippe, 73 [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] Tananarive Conference, 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 225 ] Tanassy, Lt. Col. E.G., 331 n [ Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 218 ] Tanganyika, 329 [ Pg. 329 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] -330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 356 [ Pg. 356 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 526 [ Pg. 526 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 346 ] , 553 [ Pg. 553 is part of Doc. 356 ] , 569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 366 ] Tangier shipyard proposal, 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 139 ] Tank, Martin M., 443 n [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 281 ] , 456 n [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 289 ] Tasca, Henry J., 13 n [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 18 n [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 21 n [ Pg. 21 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] , 26 n [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 27 n [ Pg. 27 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] , 28 n [ Pg. 28 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23 ] , 34 n [ Pg. 34 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] , 36 n [ Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 37 n [ Pg. 37 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31 ] , 38 n [ Pg. 38 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] , 40 n [ Pg. 40 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 54 n [ Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40 ] , 56 [ Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41 ] , 73 n [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] , 90 n [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 93 n [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 105 n [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 131 n [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 154 n [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 206 n [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] , 219 n [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 244 n [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 includes portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] -251 [ Pg. 251 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] , 383 n [ Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] , 402 n [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 406 n [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 262 and Doc. 263 ] , 420 [ Pg. 420 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] , 435 n [ Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] , 438 n [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 439 n [ Pg. 439 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] , 442 n [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 280 ] , 445 n [ Pg. 445 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] , 453 n [ Pg. 453 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 462 n [ Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 293 ] , 482 n [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 305 ] , 484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 307 ] , 485 n [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 308 ] , 501 n [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 317 ] , 514 n [ Pg. 514 includes portions of Doc. 325 and Doc. 326 ] , 522 n [ Pg. 522 includes portions of Doc. 332 and Doc. 333 ] , 616 [ Pg. 616 is part of Doc. 393 ] , 623 [ Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 398 ] Telli, Diallo, 420 [ Pg. 420 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] -423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 268 ] Templeton, Payne, 175 n [ Pg. 175 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] Tettegah, John K., 366 [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 245 ] Thacher, Nicholas G., 93 n [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 64 ] Thant, U, 15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] , 25 [ Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 19 and Doc. 20 ] , 145 [ Pg. 145 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] , 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 292 ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 301 ] , 528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 338 ] Thiam, Doudou, 38 [ Pg. 38 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] Togo, 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 361 [ Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 244 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 403 [ Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 261 ] Tombalbaye, Francois, 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 192 ] Toner, Joseph S., 303 n [ Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] Toomey, William D., 343 n [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 224 ] Torbert, Horace G., Jr., 457 [ Pg. 457 is part of Doc. 290 ] , 462 n [ Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 293 ] , 473 n [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] , 484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 307 ] Toumayan, Alec, 420 n [ Pg. 420 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] Toure, Ismail, 394 n [ Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] , 398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 257 ] Toure, Sekou, 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 204 ] -311 [ Pg. 311 is part of Doc. 205 ] , 313 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 205 ] , 321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 382 [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 247 ] , 392 [ Pg. 392 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] , 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 256 ] -398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 257 ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 is part of Doc. 260 ] , 405 [ Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 262 ] -406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 262 and Doc. 263 ] , 409 [ Pg. 409 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] -415 [ Pg. 415 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 267 ] , 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 268 ] -422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 509 [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] , 569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 366 ] Transkei, 641 [ Pg. 641 is part of Doc. 409 ] -642 [ Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 409 ] , 647 [ Pg. 647 includes portions of Doc. 413 and Doc. 414 ] Trimble, William C., 405 n [ Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 262 ] , 406 n [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 262 and Doc. 263 ] , 409 n [ Pg. 409 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] , 411 n [ Pg. 411 includes portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265 ] , 415 n [ Pg. 415 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 267 ] Tron, Rene, 99 n [ Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] Troxel, Oliver L., Jr., 303 n [ Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] , 440 n [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279 ] Tshombe, Moise, 508 [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 320 ] Tubman, William V.S., 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 192 ] Tunisia, 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 361 [ Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 236 ] Algeria independence conflict, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 249 [ Pg. 249 includes portions of Doc. 164 and Doc. 165 ] Algerian military bases, 60 [ Pg. 60 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] Bizerte crisis, 4 [ Pg. 4 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] , 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 includes portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] -252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 169 ] -272 [ Pg. 272 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] Bizerte port military facilities, 262 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 175 ] Congo troops, airlift, 253 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 168 ] economic situation, 269 [ Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 179 ] , 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 184 ] European economic assistance, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 4 ] foreign policy, 246 [ Pg. 246 is part of Doc. 162 ] -247 [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] , 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 194 ] French economic and military assistance, 2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 184 ] French nationals, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] French relations, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 247 [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] , 278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 185 ] Morocco-Mauritania dispute, position, 168 [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 111 ] Neo-Destour party, 276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 184 ] -277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 184 ] political situation, 246 [ Pg. 246 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 179 ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 184 ] -277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 184 ] Sahara sovereignty issue, 65 [ Pg. 65 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] South Africa, 502 [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. 317 ] Soviet bloc relations, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 4 ] Soviet economic assistance, 246 [ Pg. 246 is part of Doc. 162 ] U.S. economic assistance, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] -2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 159 ] -244 [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 246 [ Pg. 246 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 249 [ Pg. 249 includes portions of Doc. 164 and Doc. 165 ] , 272 [ Pg. 272 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] -275 [ Pg. 275 includes portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] , 279 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 186 ] -280 [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 217 ] U.S. military assistance, 242 [ Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 247 [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] -248 [ Pg. 248 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] , 280 [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 186 ] U.S. relations, 4 [ Pg. 4 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] , 67 [ Pg. 67 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] -68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 115 [ Pg. 115 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] -116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 79 ] , 248 [ Pg. 248 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] -249 [ Pg. 249 includes portions of Doc. 164 and Doc. 165 ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 176 ] Turkey, 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 169 ] Tweedy, Bronson, 567 [ Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 363 , Doc. 364 , and Doc. 365 ] Tyler, William R., 65 n [ Pg. 65 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 67 n [ Pg. 67 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 73 n [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] , 78 n [ Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55 ] , 88 n [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 91 n [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 93 n [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 255 n [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] , 263 n [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 264 n [ Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] , 520 n [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 331 ] , 562 n [ Pg. 562 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361 ] , 633 n [ Pg. 633 includes portions of Doc. 405 and Doc. 406 ] Udall, Morris, 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 301 ] Uganda, 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 217 ] Union des Populations d'Angola (UPA), 543 [ Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 349 ] -544 [ Pg. 544 includes portions of Doc. 349 and Doc. 350 ] United Arab Republic, 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 169 ] , 380n [ Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 247 ] Algeria, military assistance to, 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 24 [ Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 26 [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 30 [ Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 26 ] -33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 115 [ Pg. 115 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 89 ] -133 [ Pg. 133 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] Algerian relations, 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 135 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 90 ] Cuba, 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 34 ] Czech military assistance, 106 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 72 ] Libya, 5 [ Pg. 5 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 142 [ Pg. 142 includes portions of Doc. 95 , Doc. 96 , and Doc. 97 ] North Africa, influence in, 4 [ Pg. 4 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] -5 [ Pg. 5 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] Portuguese relations, 569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 366 ] Somalia, military assistance to, 444 [ Pg. 444 is part of Doc. 281 ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286 ] Somalian relations, 447 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 283 ] Soviet civil aviation routes, 323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 211 ] Soviet military assistance, 227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 148 ] U.S. position, 4 [ Pg. 4 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] -5 [ Pg. 5 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 25 [ Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 19 and Doc. 20 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 154 ] United Kingdom: Africa region, 284 [ Pg. 284 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] -285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] , 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 307 [ Pg. 307 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 219 ] Angola, 541 n [ Pg. 541 is part of Doc. 347 ] Azores base issue, 570 [ Pg. 570 is part of Doc. 366 ] Bizerte crisis, 251 [ Pg. 251 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] -252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 167 ] Ethiopia, economic assistance to, 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 275 ] Ghana, 311 [ Pg. 311 is part of Doc. 205 ] , 353 [ Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 230 ] , 365 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 239 ] -366 [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 245 ] -376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 245 ] Ghana gold mines subsidy, 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 225 ] Horn of Africa region, position, 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 275 ] -435 [ Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] Libya, 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 147 [ Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 152 [ Pg. 152 is part of Doc. 102 ] Nyasaland, 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 525 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 336 ] Portuguese colonial Africa, 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 313 ] -495 [ Pg. 495 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] , 571 [ Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 366 ] , 577 [ Pg. 577 is part of Doc. 370 ] Rhodesia-Nyasaland Federation, 516 [ Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 327 and Doc. 328 ] -522 [ Pg. 522 includes portions of Doc. 332 and Doc. 333 ] , 524 [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 335 ] -525 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 336 ] , 527 [ Pg. 527 includes portions of Doc. 337 and Doc. 338 ] , 534 [ Pg. 534 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] -536 [ Pg. 536 includes portions of Doc. 343 and Doc. 344 ] Rhodesia, Southern, 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 513 [ Pg. 513 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325 ] , 520 n [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 331 ] , 528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 338 ] -529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 338 ] , 531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 339 ] , 532 n [ Pg. 532 includes portions of Doc. 339 and Doc. 340 ] , 536 [ Pg. 536 includes portions of Doc. 343 and Doc. 344 ] , 539 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. 346 ] -540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 346 ] Somalia, 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 292 ] Somalia, military assistance to, 431 [ Pg. 431 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 275 ] -435 [ Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] , 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 288 ] Somalia-Kenya border dispute, 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 292 ] South Africa, 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 222 ] , 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 613 [ Pg. 613 includes portions of Doc. 392 and Doc. 393 ] -616 [ Pg. 616 is part of Doc. 393 ] , 624 [ Pg. 624 includes portions of Doc. 398 and Doc. 399 ] -625 [ Pg. 625 includes portions of Doc. 399 and Doc. 400 ] , 651 [ Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 416 and Doc. 417 ] -652 [ Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 417 and Doc. 418 ] Southwest Africa mandate, 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 624 [ Pg. 624 includes portions of Doc. 398 and Doc. 399 ] -625 [ Pg. 625 includes portions of Doc. 399 and Doc. 400 ] U.S. relations, 493 [ Pg. 493 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] -495 [ Pg. 495 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] , 520 [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 331 ] Yemen, 34 [ Pg. 34 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] United Nations: Africa region, 292 [ Pg. 292 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] -293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 324 [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 316 ] Algeria independence conflict, 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 54 ] -78 [ Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55 ] Algeria relief aid, 96 [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. 66 ] Angola, 550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 354 ] , 564 [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 362 ] -567 [ Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 363 , Doc. 364 , and Doc. 365 ] , 570 [ Pg. 570 is part of Doc. 366 ] -572 [ Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 366 ] Angola, U.S. policy, 541 [ Pg. 541 is part of Doc. 347 ] , 555 [ Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 357 ] -556 [ Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 357 and Doc. 358 ] , 564 [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 362 ] -567 [ Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 363 , Doc. 364 , and Doc. 365 ] Bizerte crisis, 250 [ Pg. 250 includes portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] -252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 169 ] -259 [ Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] , 260 n [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] -267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 178 ] Congo, 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 224 ] , 345 [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 225 ] -346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 410 [ Pg. 410 is part of Doc. 264 ] , 509 [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] Cuba, 380 [ Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 247 ] Eritrea, 448 [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] Ethiopia, 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 298 ] French position, 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 195 ] Ghana, 345 [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 225 ] -346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] , 390 [ Pg. 390 includes portions of Doc. 252 and Doc. 253 ] Horn of Africa region, 459 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 291 ] -461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 292 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 298 ] Libya, 145 [ Pg. 145 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] Mauritania membership, 168 [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 111 ] North Africa, 4 [ Pg. 4 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] Portuguese colonial Africa, 502 [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. 317 ] , 505 [ Pg. 505 is part of Doc. 319 ] -506 [ Pg. 506 is part of Doc. 319 ] , 568 [ Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 365 and Doc. 366 ] -576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 369 ] , 578 n [ Pg. 578 includes portions of Doc. 370 and Doc. 371 ] , 584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 373 ] -585 [ Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 373 ] Resolutions: 181 (1963), 645 n [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 412 ] 1593 (XV), 595 n [ Pg. 595 includes portions of Doc. 381 and Doc. 382 ] 1596 (XV), 595 n [ Pg. 595 includes portions of Doc. 381 and Doc. 382 ] 1805 (XVII), 624 n [ Pg. 624 includes portions of Doc. 398 and Doc. 399 ] , 625 [ Pg. 625 includes portions of Doc. 399 and Doc. 400 ] 1760 (XVII), 522 n [ Pg. 522 includes portions of Doc. 332 and Doc. 333 ] 1761 (XVII), 621 n [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 397 ] 1883 (XVIII), 540 n [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 346 ] 1899 (XVIII), 651 n [ Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 416 and Doc. 417 ] S/4722, 345 n [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 225 ] S/5380, 578 n [ Pg. 578 includes portions of Doc. 370 and Doc. 371 ] S/5481, 584 n [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 373 ] Rhodesia, Southern, 512 [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] -515 [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 326 and Doc. 327 ] , 519 [ Pg. 519 includes portions of Doc. 329 and Doc. 330 ] , 520 n [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 331 ] , 528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 338 ] , 530 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 339 ] -533 [ Pg. 533 includes portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341 ] , 535 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 342 ] , 540 n [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 346 ] Somalia, 438 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 298 ] South Africa: British policy, 615 [ Pg. 615 is part of Doc. 393 ] oil embargo, 658 [ Pg. 658 includes portions of Doc. 423 and Doc. 424 ] -659 [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 424 ] U.S. policy, 501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 317 ] -502 [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. 317 ] , 604 [ Pg. 604 is part of Doc. 386 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 391 ] , 616 [ Pg. 616 is part of Doc. 393 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 397 ] -622 [ Pg. 622 includes portions of Doc. 397 and Doc. 398 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 is part of Doc. 408 ] -639 [ Pg. 639 is part of Doc. 409 ] , 643 [ Pg. 643 includes portions of Doc. 409 and Doc. 410 ] -646 [ Pg. 646 is part of Doc. 413 ] , 653 [ Pg. 653 includes portions of Doc. 418 and Doc. 419 ] -655 [ Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 420 ] , 656 [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 420 and Doc. 421 ] -657 [ Pg. 657 includes portions of Doc. 422 and Doc. 423 ] , 658 [ Pg. 658 includes portions of Doc. 423 and Doc. 424 ] -659 [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 424 ] Southwest Africa mandate, 594 [ Pg. 594 includes portions of Doc. 380 and Doc. 381 ] -595 [ Pg. 595 includes portions of Doc. 381 and Doc. 382 ] , 622 [ Pg. 622 includes portions of Doc. 397 and Doc. 398 ] -627 [ Pg. 627 includes portions of Doc. 400 and Doc. 401 ] , 649 [ Pg. 649 includes portions of Doc. 415 and Doc. 416 ] -651 [ Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 416 and Doc. 417 ] Tunisian troops for the Congo, airlift, 253 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 168 ] Upper Volta, 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 361 [ Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 236 ] Uys, Johann Kunz, 661 [ Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 426 ] Valdes, Philip H., 1 n [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 52 n [ Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 54 n [ Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40 ] , 57 n [ Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] , 60 n [ Pg. 60 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] , 246 n [ Pg. 246 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 249 n [ Pg. 249 includes portions of Doc. 164 and Doc. 165 ] Valliere, Raymond A., 206 n [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] Vance, Sheldon B., 551 n [ Pg. 551 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] Veliotes, Nicholas A., 162 n [ Pg. 162 includes portions of Doc. 108 and Doc. 109 ] , 263 n [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 176 ] Venezuela, 535 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 342 ] Verwoerd, Hendrik F., 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 344 ] , 590 [ Pg. 590 is part of Doc. 377 ] , 593 [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 379 ] , 631 [ Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 404 ] -632 [ Pg. 632 includes portions of Doc. 404 and Doc. 405 ] Villard, Henry S., 169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 111 ] Voice of America, 217 [ Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 142 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] Volta River Hydroelectric (VALCO) project, 311 [ Pg. 311 is part of Doc. 205 ] , 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 223 ] -342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 223 ] , 343 n [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 224 ] , 348 [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 226 ] -351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 229 ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 233 ] -362 [ Pg. 362 is part of Doc. 237 ] , 364 [ Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 238 ] -374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 244 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 380 [ Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 247 ] -382 [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 247 ] , 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 249 ] , 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 251 ] -391 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 253 ] Wade, Gen., 184 n [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] , 217 [ Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 142 ] Walker, A.C., 155 n [ Pg. 155 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] , 159 n [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 107 ] Wallner, Woodruff, 65 n [ Pg. 65 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 263 n [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 264 n [ Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] , 512 n [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] , 521 n [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 332 ] , 524 n [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 335 ] , 649 n [ Pg. 649 includes portions of Doc. 415 and Doc. 416 ] Walmsley, Walter N., 58 n [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 264 n [ Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] , 269 n [ Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 179 ] , 270 n [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 272 n [ Pg. 272 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 182 ] Warren, Earl, 159 n [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 107 ] , 221 n [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 463 n [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 294 ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 301 ] , 485 n [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 308 ] Water desalinization, 2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] Wellborn, Alfred T., 551 n [ Pg. 551 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] Welensky, Roy, 513 [ Pg. 513 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325 ] , 530 n [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 339 ] , 536 [ Pg. 536 includes portions of Doc. 343 and Doc. 344 ] -538 [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] Wellons, Alfred E., 514 n [ Pg. 514 includes portions of Doc. 325 and Doc. 326 ] Wheelus Air Base, 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 92 ] -138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 97 ] White, Lee, 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 214 ] White, Reta E., 564 n [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 362 ] Whitehead, Edgar, 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 328 ] , 520 [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 331 ] , 521 n [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 332 ] , 523 [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 334 ] , 524 n [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 335 ] Whitfield, Col. Joe, 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 70 ] , 200 n [ Pg. 200 includes portions of Doc. 129 and Doc. 130 ] , 206 n [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] , 274 n [ Pg. 274 includes portions of Doc. 182 and Doc. 183 ] , 435 n [ Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] , 438 n [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 443 n [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 281 ] , 453 n [ Pg. 453 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 462 n [ Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 293 ] , 463 n [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 294 ] Wiesner, Jerome, 604 [ Pg. 604 is part of Doc. 386 ] -605 [ Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 386 and Doc. 387 ] , 607 [ Pg. 607 includes portions of Doc. 388 and Doc. 389 ] -609 [ Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 390 ] Wight, William L., Jr., 511 n [ Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] , 551 n [ Pg. 551 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] , 594 [ Pg. 594 includes portions of Doc. 380 and Doc. 381 ] -595 [ Pg. 595 includes portions of Doc. 381 and Doc. 382 ] , 598 n [ Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] , 605 n [ Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 386 and Doc. 387 ] , 608 n [ Pg. 608 includes portions of Doc. 389 and Doc. 390 ] Wilkins, Roy, 326 n [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 214 ] Williams, G. Mennen, 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 4 n [ Pg. 4 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] , 12 n [ Pg. 12 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 19 n [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 29 n [ Pg. 29 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] , 41 n [ Pg. 41 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34 ] , 49 n [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 53 n [ Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] , 67 [ Pg. 67 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] -68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 54 ] -80 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 81 n [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 57 ] , 89 [ Pg. 89 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] -90 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 107 [ Pg. 107 includes portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73 ] -108 [ Pg. 108 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] -111 [ Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 86 ] -128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 138 n [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 156 [ Pg. 156 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] -157 [ Pg. 157 includes portions of Doc. 105 and Doc. 106 ] , 159 n [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 107 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 107 ] , 170 n [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 173 n [ Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] , 175 n [ Pg. 175 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 146 ] -223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 147 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 159 ] -244 [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 246 n [ Pg. 246 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 270 n [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 283 [ Pg. 283 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] -284 [ Pg. 284 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] , 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 303 [ Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] -310 [ Pg. 310 includes portions of Doc. 204 and Doc. 205 ] , 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 214 ] , 327 n [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 215 ] , 328 [ Pg. 328 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] -329 [ Pg. 329 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] , 338 [ Pg. 338 includes portions of Doc. 221 and Doc. 222 ] -340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 222 ] , 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 348 n [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 229 ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 379 [ Pg. 379 includes portions of Doc. 246 and Doc. 247 ] , 394 n [ Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] , 406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 262 and Doc. 263 ] , 416 [ Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 266 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 267 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 271 and Doc. 272 ] , 429 n [ Pg. 429 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] , 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 275 ] , 435 n [ Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] , 438 n [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 443 n [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 281 ] , 469 [ Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298 ] -473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] , 490 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 310 ] , 496 [ Pg. 496 includes portions of Doc. 314 and Doc. 315 ] , 509 n [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] , 510 n [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 321 ] , 511 n [ Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] , 523 n [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 334 ] , 530 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 339 ] -533 [ Pg. 533 includes portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341 ] , 534 n [ Pg. 534 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] , 544 n [ Pg. 544 includes portions of Doc. 349 and Doc. 350 ] , 545 n [ Pg. 545 includes portions of Doc. 350 and Doc. 351 ] , 546 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 351 ] , 560 [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360 ] -562 [ Pg. 562 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361 ] , 568 n [ Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 365 and Doc. 366 ] , 574 n [ Pg. 574 is part of Doc. 368 ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 374 ] , 594 [ Pg. 594 includes portions of Doc. 380 and Doc. 381 ] -596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 382 ] , 599 [ Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 384 ] -602 [ Pg. 602 is part of Doc. 385 ] , 612 n [ Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 392 ] , 613 [ Pg. 613 includes portions of Doc. 392 and Doc. 393 ] -616 [ Pg. 616 is part of Doc. 393 ] , 630 [ Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 403 ] , 633 [ Pg. 633 includes portions of Doc. 405 and Doc. 406 ] , 635 n [ Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 406 ] , 661 n [ Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 426 ] Williams, Haydn, 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 197 ] -299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 198 ] Wilson, Harold, 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 338 ] Winfree, Robert M., 598 n [ Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] Witman, William II, 1 n [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 57 n [ Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] , 65 n [ Pg. 65 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 67 n [ Pg. 67 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 73 n [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] , 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 80 n [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 88 n [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] -111 [ Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 137 n [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 154 n [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 155 n [ Pg. 155 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] , 172 n [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 194 n [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 125 ] , 196 n [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 200 n [ Pg. 200 includes portions of Doc. 129 and Doc. 130 ] , 206 n [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] , 217 [ Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 142 ] , 218 n [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 143 ] , 219 n [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 229 n [ Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] , 242 n [ Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 244 n [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 245 n [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 248 n [ Pg. 248 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] , 255 n [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] , 263 n [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 270 n [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 271 n [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181 ] , 274 n [ Pg. 274 includes portions of Doc. 182 and Doc. 183 ] , 287 n [ Pg. 287 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] , 383 n [ Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] , 429 n [ Pg. 429 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] , 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 275 ] , 440 n [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279 ] , 443 n [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 281 ] , 445 n [ Pg. 445 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] , 450 n [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 285 ] , 453 n [ Pg. 453 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 455 n [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 288 ] , 456 n [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 289 ] , 463 n [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 294 ] , 465 n [ Pg. 465 includes portions of Doc. 294 and Doc. 295 ] Wolf, Joseph J., 145 n [ Pg. 145 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] Wolfe, Glenn G., 206 n [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] , 322 n [ Pg. 322 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211 ] , 435 n [ Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] , 438 n [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 485 n [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 308 ] Yates, Sidney, 530 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 339 ] , 531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 339 ] , 566 [ Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 363 ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 374 ] Yazid, Muhammad, 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 14 ] -21 [ Pg. 21 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] , 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] , 36 [ Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] -37 [ Pg. 37 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 57 [ Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] , 67 [ Pg. 67 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 68 n [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 95 [ Pg. 95 includes portions of Doc. 65 and Doc. 66 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 88 ] -133 [ Pg. 133 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] Yemen, 25 [ Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 19 and Doc. 20 ] , 26 [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 29 [ Pg. 29 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] , 34 [ Pg. 34 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] Yifru (Ethiopia), 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 25 ] Yost, Charles W., 78 [ Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55 ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 108 ] -162 [ Pg. 162 includes portions of Doc. 108 and Doc. 109 ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 184 n [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 169 ] -255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] , 512 n [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] , 573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 367 ] , 574 n [ Pg. 574 is part of Doc. 368 ] , 645 n [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 412 ] Youlou, Fulbert, 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 198 ] Young, Whitney M., 326 n [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 214 ] Yount, Col., 69 n [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 50 ] Yugoslavia, 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 14 ] Zanzibar, 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 217 ] Zentar (Morocco), 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 9 ] Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU), 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 328 ] , 519 [ Pg. 519 includes portions of Doc. 329 and Doc. 330 ] , 521 n [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 332 ] , 523 n [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 334 ] Zuckert, Eugene M., 185 [ Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] -186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 121 ] , 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 148 ]