FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1961–1963, VOLUME IX, FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY Foreign Relations of the United States Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State Title page Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963 Volume IX Foreign Economic Policy United States Government Printing Office Washington U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian Bureau of Public Affairs Please visit the Office of the Historian ebooks web page to access updates. Foreign Economic Policy (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume IX) Contents Preface List of Sources List of Abbreviations List of Persons Foreign Economic Policy General Foreign Economic Policy (Documents 1-39) Financial and Monetary Policy (Documents 40-83) Foreign Assistance Policy (Documents 84-177) International Investment and Development Policy (Documents 178-207) Trade and Commercial Policy (Documents 208-295) Economic Defense Policy (Documents 296-334) Strategic Materials and Commodities Policy (Documents 335-365) Index List of Sources List of Sources Unpublished Sources Department of State Central Files: A major source of documentation for this volume was the indexed central files of the Department of State. Many of the documents were selected from the following files: 100.4: Interagency boards and committees 102.7: Department of Commerce 110.12BA: Under Secretary of State Ball 374.800: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 394.41: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 398.00: Conferences on economic, industrial, and social affairs 398.051: U.N. Special Fund 398.10: International financial conferences 398.13: International Monetary Fund 398.14: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 400.0041: Trade relations 400.11: Export trade of the U.S. 400.116: Other administrative measures affecting import trade 400.119: U.S. export controls 411.004: U.S. import tariffs 411.0041: U.S. trade relations 411.006: Other U.S. administrative matters affecting import trade 411.414: U.S. import tariff on the United Kingdom 411.9441: U.S. trade relations with Japan 460.119: U.S. export controls on trade with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union 460.509: COCOM restrictions on trade with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union 611.0041: U.S. trade agreements, treaties, and conventions 611.00431: U.S. economic treaties and agreements, double taxation 611.62A: Political relations between the United States and West Germany 611.9441: U.S. trade agreements, treaties, and conventions with Japan 700.5-MSP: Mutual defense 740.5-MSP: Mutual defense of Europe 800.0000: General economic matters 800.03: Food conditions; Food for Peace 800.235: Sugar 800.2553: Petroleum 811.00: U.S. general economic matters 811.0000: General world economic matters 811.0040: U.S. economic relations with Europe 811.10: U.S. financial and monetary matters 811.11: U.S. taxation 811.112: U.S. taxation income AID 1: General aid policy, plans, and coordination AID (IBRD) 1: Aid, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development AID (IDA): Aid, International Development Association AID (US) 1: General U.S. aid policy, plans, and coordination DEF 6-8 US/NATO: Defense affairs between United States and NATO, mobilization of armed forces DEF 12-5: Defense affairs, procurement, sales DEF 19-3: Military assistance FT 4 US/TEA: U.S. foreign trade agreements, Trade Expansion Act FN 1 US: General U.S. finance policy FN 12: Balance of payments FN 12 US: U.S. balance of payments FN 16 US: U.S. revenue, taxation FT 7: Tariff negotiations FT 7 GATT: Tariff negotiations, GATT FT (EX) US: U.S. foreign trade, export INCO-COTTON: Cotton industry and commodities INCO-POULTRY US: U.S. poultry industry and commodities INCO-WOOL 4: Wool trade agreements INCO-WOOL IT: Wool industry and commodities of Italy INCO-WOOL US: Wool industry and commodities of United States POL 7 US/UK: Political affairs and relations, visits, and meetings between United States and United Kingdom Lot Files: Documents from the central files are supplemented by lot files of the Department, which are decentralized files created by bureaus, offices, divisions, and the Executive Secretariat. A list of the lot files cited or consulted in this volume follows: Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272 Files of Under Secretary of State George W. Ball, 1961-1963. Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366 Chronology of international conferences abroad attended by the President, the Secretary of State, and other U.S. officials in 1961. Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533 Chronology of international conferences abroad attended by the President, the Secretary of State, and other U.S. officials in 1962. Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110 Collection of documentation on international conferences abroad attended by the President, the Secretary of State, and other U.S. officials, May 1961-December 1964. E Files: Lot 64 D 452 Files of the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, 1962-1963, covering economic policy. Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149 Cleared memoranda of Presidential conversations with foreign visitors, 1956-1964, maintained by the Executive Secretariat. Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330 Memoranda of conversation of the Secretary and Under Secretary of State, 1961-1964. S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199 Files of the Policy Planning Council, 1963-1964. S/S Briefing Books: Lot 66 D 219 Various policy briefing books and situation chronologies used by the Secretary and Under Secretaries of State, 1962-1966. S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265 Master set of papers pertaining to National Security Council meetings, including policy papers, position papers, and administrative documents, 1961-1966, maintained by the Executive Secretariat. S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316 Master set of National Security Action Memoranda, 1961-1968. S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95 Administrative and miscellaneous National Security Council documentation, including NSC Records of Action, 1947-1963, maintained by the Executive Secretariat. Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland Record Group 40, Records of the Department of Commerce Office of the Secretary of Commerce Files:FRC 69 A 6828 Executive Secretariat files for 1963-1964. Under Secretary of Commerce Files: FRC 66 A 1971 Files of the Office of Edward Gudeman, Under Secretary of Commerce, 1961-1963. Record Group 59, Records of the Department of State E Files: FRC 71 A 6682, Item 53 Lot 65 D 68: Files containing origins, deliberations, and termination of the Interdepartmental Committee of Under Secretaries for Foreign Economic Policy (ICFEP), 1961-1963. E/CBA/REP Files: FRC 72 A 6248 Lot 70 D 467: Master set of the Department of State classified internal publication Current Economic Developments for 1945-1969, maintained in the Bureau of Economic Affairs. Record Group 286, Records of the Agency for International Development AID Administrator Files: FRC 65 A 481 Executive Secretariat files for 1961-1962. AID Administrator Files: FRC 67 A 1530 Executive Secretariat files for 1962-1964. John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts George W. Ball Papers Transcripts of telephone conversations, 1961-1963. C. Douglas Dillon Papers Myer Feldman Papers Christian A. Herter Papers National Security Files (NSF) Carl Kaysen Series Countries Series Departments and Agencies Series Meetings and Memoranda Series Subjects Series Howard C. Petersen Papers President's Appointment Books President's Office Files Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut Chester A. Bowles Papers Published Sources Documentary Collections and Periodicals U.S. Department of State. American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, 1962, 1963 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office) ————. Department of State Bulletin, 1961, 1962, 1963 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office) U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, 1962, 1963 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office) Memoirs and Secondary Literature Note: The Department of State takes no responsibility for the accuracy of these publications nor does it endorse their interpretations. Ball, George W. The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs (New York: Norton, 1982) Galbraith, John Kenneth. Ambassador's Journal (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969) Horsefield, J. Keith and Margaret G. de Vries. The International Monetary Fund, 1945-1965: Twenty Years of International Monetary Cooperation. 3 volumes. (Washington: International Monetary Fund, 1969) Raucher, Alan R. Paul G. Hoffman: Architect of Foreign Aid (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1985) Rostow, Walt W. Eisenhower, Kennedy and Foreign Aid (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985) ————. View From the Seventh Floor (New York: Harper & Row, 1964) Rusk, Dean, as told to Richard Rusk. As I Saw It (New York: W.W. Norton, 1990) Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965) Sorensen, Theodore C. Kennedy (New York: Harper & Row, 1965) List of Abbreviations List of Abbreviations A, airgram ACEP, Advisory Committee on Export Policy AEC, Atomic Energy Committee AF, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State AID, Agency for International Development ARA, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State B, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs BBC, British Broadcasting Corporation BDSA, Business and Defense Services Administration, Department of Commerce BIP, Bureau of International Programs, Department of Commerce BNA, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State BOB, Bureau of the Budget Busec, series indicator for telegrams to the Mission to the European Communities from the Department of State CA, circular airgram CAP, Common Agricultural Policy CEA, Council of Economic Advisers Cedto, series indicator for telegrams from Paris to the Department of State relating to OECD matters CG, circular airgram; Consultative Group CIA, Central Intelligence Agency COCOM, Coordinating Committee of the Paris Consultative Group (CG) COMIBOL, CMB, Corporacion Minera de Bolivia (Mining Corporation of Bolivia) CP, Contracting Party or Parties CSD, Commodities Division, Office of International Resources, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State CU, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs CY, calendar year D, Democrat; Office of the Deputy Administrator, Agency for International Development DAC, Development Assistance Committee DAG, Development Assistance Group Depcirtel, Department of State circular telegram DLF, Development Loan Fund DM, D mark, Deutschemark DOD, Department of Defense E, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State EA, Office of East Asian Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State Ecbus, series indicator for telegrams from the Mission to the European Communities to the Department of State ECD, Economic Defense Division, Office of International Resources, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State ECONAD, Committee of Economic Advisers (NATO) ECOSOC, United Nations Economic and Social Council ECRB, Export Control Review Board ED, Economic Development Division, Office of International Financial and Development Affairs, Bureau of Economic Affairs EE, East European; Office of Eastern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State EEC, European Economic Community EFTA, European Free Trade Association EMA, European Monetary Agreement E.O., Executive Order EPC, European Political Community EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State; European EXIM, Eximbank, Export-Import Bank EXSEC, Executive Secretariat, Agency for International Development FAC, Office of the Deputy Coordinator for Foreign Assistance, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization, United Nations FAZ, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation FE, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State FN, International Finance Division, Office of International Financial and Development Affairs, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State FODAG, Food and Agriculture Organization, United Nations FonMin, Foreign Minister FonOff, Foreign Office FRB, Federal Reserve Board FRC, Federal Records Center (Washington National Records Center) FRG, Federal Republic of Germany FSD, Fuels Division, Office of International Resources, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State FSE, Fuels and Energy Division, Office of International Resources, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State FY, fiscal year G, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs GA, United Nations General Assembly GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GER, Office of German Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State GNP, gross national product GOI, Government of Iran GOJ, Government of Japan G/PM, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs GRC, Government of the Republic of China GSA, General Services Administration HEW, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare HMG, Her Majesty's Government H.R., House of Representatives H. Rept., House of Representatives Report H. Res., House of Represenatives Resolution IAC, Intelligence Advisory Committee IAIAS, Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences (Costa Rica) IBRD, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ICA, International Cooperation Administration ICAC, International Cotton Advisory Committee ICFEP, Interdepartmental Committee of Under Secretaries on Foreign Economic Policy IDA, International Development Association IDB, Inter-American Development Bank IDD, International Development Decade IDY, International Development Year IL, International List (of embargoed goods) ILO, International Labor Organization, United Nations IMF, International Monetary Fund INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff JCSM, Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum LA, Bureau for Latin America, Agency for International Development LAS, long-range assistance strategy LDC, less developed country M, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs MAAG, Military Assistance Advisory Group MAP, military assistance program MC, memorandum of conversation MDC, Mutual Defense Control Staff, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State MFN, most favored nation MITI, Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Japan MOD, Ministry of Defense MSA, Mutual Security Assistance MSP, Mutual Security Program NAC, National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization NE, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State NEA, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State NESA, Bureau for Near East and South Asia, Agency for International Development NSAM, National Security Action Memorandum NSC, National Security Council O, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration OAS, Organization of American States OC, Office of Communications, Department of State; Operating Committee of the Advisory Committee on Export Policy (ACEP) OCB, Operations Coordinating Board OCDM, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development OEEC, Organization for European Economic Cooperation OEP, Office of Emergency Planning OES, Office of International Economic and Social Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State OFD, Office of International Financial and Development Affairs, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State OFE, Office of International Finance and Economic Analysis, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State OIA, Office of International Affairs, Department of the Treasury OIF, Office of International Finance, Department of the Treasury OPEC, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries OR, Office of International Resources, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State OT, Office of International Trade, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State OTC, Organization for Trade Cooperation P.L., Public Law Polto, series indicator for telegrams from the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State R, Republican RA, Office of European Regional Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State RAF, Royal Air Force REA, Office of Inter-American Regional Economic Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State ResDel, resident delegation RG, Record Group RO, Regional Office RPE, Office of Political-Economic Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State S, Office of the Secretary of State SEATO, Southeast Asian Treaty Organization SONJ, Standard Oil of New Jersey SOV, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State S/P, Policy Planning Council, Department of State S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State SUNFED, Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development SYG, United Nations Secretary-General TA, Trade Agreements Division, Office of International Trade, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State TAC, Interdepartmental Committee on Trade Agreements Tanto, series indicator for telegrams from the United States delegation to the GATT conference in Geneva to the Department of State Toced, series indicator for telegrams to Paris from the Department of State relating to OECD matters Topol, series indicator for telegrams to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations from the Department of State Totan, series indicator for telegrams to the United States delegation to the GATT conference in Geneva from the Department of State TPC, Trade Policy Committee U, Office of the Under Secretary of State UK, United Kingdom UN, United Nations UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development UNDA, United Nations Development Authority UNDD, United Nations Development Decade UNGA, United Nations General Assembly UNSC, United Nations Security Council UNTA, United Nations Technical Assistance Program USDA, United States Department of Agriculture USDel, United States delegation USIA, United States Information Agency USOM, United States Operations Mission USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics UST, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements VOA, Voice of America WHO, World Health Organization WP, working party WST, Office of West Coast Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State List of Persons List of Persons Adenauer, Konrad, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany until October 17, 1963 Alphand, Herve, French Ambassador to the United States Amini, Ali, Prime Minister of Iran, May 5, 1961-July 17, 1962 Asakai, Koichiro, Japanese Ambassador to the United States until April 1963 Ball, George W., Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, January 30-December 3, 1961; thereafter Under Secretary of State Behrman, Jack N., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for International Affairs, March 24-November 4, 1961; Assistant Secretary of Commerce for International Affairs, November 5, 1961-October 1962; thereafter Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Domestic and International Business Bell, David E., Director of the Bureau of the Budget, January 1961-December 1962; Administrator of the Agency for International Development from December 21, 1962 Black, Eugene, President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development until December 31, 1962 Blumenthal, W. Michael, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, April 3, 1961-July 31, 1963; thereafter Deputy Special Representative for Trade Negotiations Bohlen, Charles E., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State until September 4, 1962; Ambassador to France from October 27, 1962 Boutin, Bernard L., Deputy Administrator, General Services Administration, until February 1962; thereafter Administrator Bowles, Chester B., Under Secretary of State, January 25-December 3, 1961; President's Special Representative and Adviser on African, Asian, and Latin American Affairs, Department of State, December 4, 1961-June 9, 1963; Ambassador to India from July 19, 1963 Brubeck, William H., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Executive Secretary, May 14, 1962-July 20, 1963; thereafter National Security Council Staff Bullitt, John C., Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, May 1961-June 1962; thereafter Assistant Secretary Bundy, McGeorge, President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs from January 20, 1961 Bundy, William P., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from January 1961 Carr, James K., Under Secretary of the Interior from January 1961 Carstens, Karl, German Deputy Foreign Minister from 1961 Carver, John A., Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Land Management Chenery, Hollis, Director, Program Review and Coordination Staff, Agency for International Development, from October 1961 Cleveland, Harlan, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs from February 23, 1961 Coffin, Frank M., Managing Director, Development Loan Fund, February-September 1961; thereafter Deputy Administrator, Agency for International Development Cooley, Harold D., Democratic Representative from North Carolina; Chairman of the House Agriculture Committee Coombs, Philip H., Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, March 23, 1961-June 4, 1962 Couve de Murville, Maurice, French Foreign Minister Dale, William B., Director, Bureau of International Programs, Department of Commerce, 1961-1962; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for International Affairs, 1962; U.S. Executive Director, International Monetary Fund, from November 1, 1962 De Gaulle, Charles, President of France Dillon, C. Douglas, Under Secretary of State until January 4, 1961; Secretary of the Treasury from January 21, 1961 Dungan, Ralph A., President's Special Assistant Eisenhower, Dwight D., President of the United States until January 20, 1961 Erhard, Ludwig, Vice Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany until October 17, 1963; thereafter Chancellor Feldman, Myer, President's Deputy Special Counsel Forrestal, Michael V., National Security Council Staff member from January 1961 Fowler, Henry H., Under Secretary of the Treasury from January 1961 Freeman, Orville L., Secretary of Agriculture from January 21, 1961 Fulbright, J. William, Democratic Senator from Arkansas; Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Galbraith, John Kenneth, Ambassador to India, April 18, 1961-July 12, 1963 Gardner, Richard N., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs from April 3, 1961 Gilpatric, Roswell L., Deputy Secretary of Defense from January 24, 1961 Giscard d'Estaing, Valery, French Finance Minister from January 18, 1962 Goldberg, Arthur J., Secretary of Labor, January 21, 1961-September 24, 1962; Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, from October 1, 1962 Graham, John S., Commissioner, Atomic Energy Commission, until 1962 Gudeman, Edward, Under Secretary of Commerce until February 15, 1963 Hamilton, Fowler, Administrator of the Agency for International Development, October 3, 1961-December 7, 1962 Harriman, W. Averell, Ambassador at Large, February 13-December 3, 1961; Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, December 4, 1961-April 3, 1963; thereafter Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Heller, Walter W., Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers from January 1961 Henning, John F., Under Secretary of Labor from September 1962 Herter, Christian A., Secretary of State until January 20, 1961; Special Representative for Trade Negotiations from November 1962 Hodges, Luther H., Secretary of Commerce from January 21, 1961 Hoffman, Paul G., Managing Director of the United Nations Special Fund Home, Lord Alexander Frederick Douglas, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Hood, Viscount Samuel, British Minister to the United States until December 1962; thereafter British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Humphrey, Hubert H., Democratic Senator from Minnesota Jacobsson, Per, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund until May 1963 Johnson, G. Griffith, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs from May 18, 1962 Johnson, Lyndon B., Democratic Senator from Texas until January 20, 1961; Vice President of the United States, January 20, 1961-November 22, 1963; thereafter President Johnson, U. Alexis, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from May 2, 1961 Katzenbach, Nicholas deB., Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, until May 1962; thereafter Deputy Attorney General Kaysen, Carl, President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs from November 1961 Kelly, John M., Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Mineral Resources Kennedy, John F., President of the United States, from January 20, 1961 until his death on November 22, 1963 Kitchen, Jeffrey C., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs from May 16, 1961 Klein, David, National Security Council Staff member from January 1961 Klutznick, Philip H., U.S. Representative to the United Nations Economic and Social Council until December 21, 1962 Kohler, Foy D., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until August 19, 1962; Ambassador to the Soviet Union from September 27, 1962 Komer, Robert W., National Security Council Staff member from January 1961 Labouisse, Henry R., Director of the International Cooperation Administration, February 22-October 6, 1961; Ambassador to Greece from March 7, 1962 Leddy, John M., Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State until April 4, 1961; Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, April 1961-June 1962; U.S. Representative to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development from October 3, 1962 Mansholt, Sicco Leendert, Vice President, European Economic Community Commission Marjolin, Robert, Vice President, European Economic Community Commission Martin, Edwin M., Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs until May 17, 1962; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Martin, William McChesney, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System McCone, John A., Director of Central Intelligence from November 29, 1961 McDermott, Edward A., Deputy Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization until September 22, 1961; Deputy Director, Office of Emergency Planning, September 22, 1961-February 2, 1962; thereafter Director McGhee, George C., Counselor of the Department of State and Chairman, Policy Planning Council, February 16-December 3, 1961; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, December 4, 1961-March 27, 1963; Ambassador to Germany from May 18 1963 McGovern, George, Director, Office of Food for Peace, January 1961-April 1962 McNamara, Robert S., Secretary of Defense from January 21, 1961 Murrow, Edward R., Director of the U.S. Information Agency from March 15, 1961 Nitze, Paul H., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, January 29, 1961-November 29, 1963; thereafter Secretary of the Navy Powell, Sir Richard, Permanent Secretary, British Board of Trade Prado y Ugarteche, Manuel, President of Peru until July 18, 1962 Rathbone, Monroe Jackson, President of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey Reed, James A., Assistant Secretary of the Treasury from February 1962 Reischauer, Edwin O., Ambassador to Japan from April 27, 1961 Reuter, Richard W., Director, Office of Food for Peace, from July 24, 1962 Rey, Jean, European Economic Community Commissioner for External Relations Riddleberger, James W., Director of the International Cooperation Administration until February 22, 1961; Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, February 23-August 1961; Head of U.S. Delegation to Development Assistance Group meeting, July 1961; Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations, August 1961-October 1962; Ambassador to Austria from November 1962 Riley, Paul H., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Materiel Requirements Roosa, Robert V., Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs from January 1961 Rostow, Walt Whitman, Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, January-November 1961; Counselor of the Department of State and Chairman, Policy Planning Council, from November 29, 1961 Rusk, Dean, Secretary of State from January 21, 1961 Schaetzel, J. Robert, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, February 3, 1961-March 26, 1962; Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State, March 27-September 15, 1962; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Schroeder, Gerhard, German Foreign Minister from November 14, 1961 Schweitzer, Pierre-Paul, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund from September 1, 1963 Smith, Bromley, Executive Officer, Operations Coordinating Board, until February 1961; Acting Executive Secretary, National Security Council, June-August 1961; thereafter Executive Secretary Southard, Frank A., Jr., U.S. Executive Director, International Monetary Fund, until November 1, 1962; thereafter Deputy Managing Director, International Monetary Fund Spaak, Paul-Henri, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization until March 5, 1961; Belgian Foreign Minister from April 25, 1961 Stevenson, Adlai E., III, U.S. Representative to the United Nations from January 23, 1961 Symington, Stuart, Democratic Senator from Missouri Takeuchi, Ryuji, Japanese Vice Foreign Minister until April 1963; Ambassador of Japan from April 25, 1963 Taylor, General Maxwell D., President's Military Representative, July 1, 1961-October 1, 1962; thereafter Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Thant, U, Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations, November 3, 1961-November 30, 1962; thereafter Secretary-General Trezise, Philip H., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs from October 9, 1961 Tuthill, John W., U.S. Representative to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, March 6-October 3, 1961; Representative to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, October 4, 1961-October 22, 1962; thereafter Representative to the European Communities Westrick, Ludgar, Office of the Chancellor, German State Secretary White, Lee C., President's Assistant Special Counsel Wirtz, W. Willard, Under Secretary of Labor until September 25, 1962; thereafter Secretary of Labor Woods, George, President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development from January 1, 1963 Wyndham White, Eric, Executive Secretary of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade General Foreign Economic Policy General Foreign Economic Policy 1. Memorandum for the Record Washington, January 19, 1961, 9:45 a.m. Source: Eisenhower Library, Post-Presidential Papers, 1961-1969, John F. Kennedy 1960-1961 (2). No classification marking. Drafted by Wilton B. Persons, Assistant to President Eisenhower. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House. A shorter memorandum of this meeting is in a memorandum from Clark M. Clifford to President Kennedy, January 24. (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, White House Correspondence, 1/61-11/63) 2. Editorial Note 3. Report From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to President Kennedy Washington, March 20, 1961. Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Treasury, 1/61-9/61. Confidential. The unsigned report was transmitted under cover of a March 20 letter from Dillon to the President, in which he added: “I believe we should plan on making a comprehensive public report sometime in May after our first quarter payments statistics have become available.” 4. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy Washington, July 28, 1961. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Ball Committee. No classification marking. In a July 28 memorandum to Secretary Rusk, Ball indicated that he had drafted this memorandum, which he attached for the Secretary's signature. (Department of State, E Files: Lot 65 D 68, Interdepartmental Committee of Under Secretaries on Foreign Economic Policy-Origin) 5. Editorial Note 6. Summary Minutes of Meeting of the Interdepartmental Committee of Under Secretaries on Foreign Economic Policy Washington, October 4, 1961. Source: Department of State, E Files: Lot 65 D 68, Interdepartmental Committee of Under Secretaries on Foreign Economic Policy, Balance of Payments. Official Use Only. 7. Letter From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, February 20, 1962. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 811.10/2-2062. Official Use Only. 8. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to President Kennedy Washington, March 12, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Treasury, 3/12/62. Confidential. 9. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to President Kennedy Washington, April 9, 1962. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 811.10/4-962. For Official Use Only. The date, “9 Apr 62,” was added by hand. A longer memorandum from Frank M. Coffin to Secretaries Rusk and Dillon, April 6, which was transmitted under cover of an April 6 memorandum from Coffin to Secretary Rusk, is ibid. In this covering memorandum, Coffin suggested that the Secretary sign the memorandum printed here and forward it to Secretary Dillon (who had already approved it in draft) so that it could be sent to the President by the close of business April 6. 10. Editorial Note 11. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of the Treasury Dillon Washington, June 22, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, Dillon Papers, Memos to President, 5/62-6/62. No classification marking. 12. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hamilton) to President Kennedy Washington, June 28, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Balance of Payments and Gold, 6/62-3/63. No classification marking. 13. Editorial Note 14. National Security Action Memorandum No. 171 Washington, July 16, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 171. Confidential. Copies were sent to Ball and Fowler Hamilton. According to a memorandum from Charles E. Johnson to the executive secretaries of the Departments of State, Defense, and the Treasury, and the Bureau of the Budget and AID, July 18, 1962, attached to the source text, this NSAM was originally distributed as an unnumbered memorandum to the Cabinet Committee on the Balance of Payments, but it was then decided to include it unchanged in the NSAM series (except for the addition of a subject heading) and given additional distribution. A copy of the original memorandum, July 16, is attached to the source text. 15. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) Washington, July 18, 1962. Source: Department of State, E Files: Lot 64 D 452, Balance of Payments-Procurement. Secret. Drafted by George S. Newman (G/PM) and transmitted through S/S. The date, “7/18/62,” was added by hand. 16. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic Missions Washington, July 19, 1962, 7:48 p.m. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Balance of Payments and Gold, 6/62-9/63. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by George S. Newman on July 19; cleared in E, EUR, FE, ARA, NEA, AF, U, S/S, the Department of Defense, and the White House; and approved by Newman. Repeated to Paris for Stoessel and McGuire and to CINCLANT, CINCARIB, and CINCPAC for the Political Advisers. 17. Report by the Cabinet Committee on Balance of Payments to President Kennedy Washington, July 27, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Balance of Payments, Cabinet Committee, 7/62-2/63. Confidential. The source text bears no drafting information. Transmitted under cover of a July 27 memorandum from Dillon to President Kennedy. 18. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to President Kennedy Washington, October 9, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, Herter Papers, Balance of Payments. Official Use Only (With Confidential Section). Transmitted under cover of a memorandum from Dillon to the President, October 9, which indicated that this report was his fifth to the President on meas-ures taken to reduce the balance-of-payments deficit. Henceforth, Dillon added, the reports would be prepared on the same time schedule as those done by the Bureau of the Budget on international expenditures of federal agencies, and both would be submitted to the President as one integrated quarterly report. Also attached to the source text is a memorandum from Dillon to the members of the Cabinet Committee, October 10, indicating that a copy of the report was attached for their information. 19. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, January 21, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series,NSC Meetings, 1963, No. 508. No classification marking. 20. Memorandum for the Record Washington, February 27, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Balance of Payments and Gold. Top Secret. Drafted by McGeorge Bundy. 21. National Security Action Memorandum No. 225 Washington, February 27, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 225. Confidential. Copies were sent to Bundy, Charles E. Johnson, and Kaysen. 22. Memorandum From President Kennedy to the Cabinet Committee on Balance of Payments Washington, March 2, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Balance of Payments and Gold. Confidential. A Top Secret, Eyes Only memorandum from Kaysen to members of the Cabinet Committee, March 2, indicating that the committee members were to receive the memorandum printed here as well as a copy of Acheson's report to the President on the balance of payments is ibid. Concerning the report, Kaysen noted: “The President requests that you continue to have no discussion of this report with your staff or in any way make its existence known to any other person.” 23. Editorial Note 24. Memorandum for the Record Washington, April 24, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Balance of Payments, Cabinet Committee. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. Attached to an April 17 memorandum from Kaysen to President Kennedy are four papers the President requested for discussion with the Cabinet Committee at the April 18 meeting: Council of Economic Advisers' proposal for an IMF drawing of up to $2 billion from the Fund, Ball's discussion of possible negotiations with the major European countries to raise up to $4 billion from 5-year loans from them, a Department of State examination of the possibility of restricting the sale of foreign currencies in the U.S. market, and a Treasury examination of possible taxes on foreign travel. (Ibid., President's Office Files, Treasury) John C. Bullitt submitted copies of these four papers under cover of an April 17 memorandum to members of the Cabinet Committee on Balance of Payments: Secretary Rusk, Ball, McNamara, David Bell, Christian Herter, Walter Heller, and Kaysen. (Ibid., Herter Papers, Balance of Payments) 25. Memorandum From President Kennedy to the Cabinet Committee on Balance of Payments Washington, April 20, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Treasury, 4/63-6/63. Secret. 26. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy Washington, June 4, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Balance of Payments and Gold. Secret. 27. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, June 7, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Balance of Payments and Gold, 6/62-9/63. Secret. A copy was sent to McGeorge Bundy. 28. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy Washington, July 16, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Treasury, 7/63. Secret. Copies were sent to Rusk and Dillon. 29. Editorial Note 30. Letter From John Kenneth Galbraith to President Kennedy Washington, August 28, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Balance of Payments and Gold. Personal; Secret. Galbraith, who had been succeeded by Chester Bowles as Ambassador to India in July 1963, was serving as a consultant to the White House. 31. Letter From John Kenneth Galbraith to President Kennedy Washington, August 28, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Balance of Payments and Gold. Personal; Secret. 32. Memorandum From John Kenneth Galbraith to President Kennedy Washington, August 28, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Treasury, 8/63-11/63. No classification marking. 33. Memorandum for the Record Washington, September 12, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Balance of Payments and Gold. Secret. A slightly different version, as indicated in footnotes 2-10 below, was prepared as a memorandum from President Kennedy to McNamara, Dillon, Ball, Roosa, Bell, Heller, Gordon, Sorensen, Bundy, Galbraith, Kaysen, and Tobin, September 12. (Department of State, Central Files, E 1 US) This memorandum was apparently not distributed or was recalled after distribution. An undated note by “sw” (presumably Seymour Weiss (U)), attached to this memorandum, reads: “Original copy—to U—returned to Anderson, 2:20 PM, who is eager for our copies to be destroyed. G/PM copy back.” Anderson is presumably Robert Anderson, Staff Assistant in U. A later version of this memorandum is summarized in Document 35. 34. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy Washington, undated. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Balance of Payments and Gold, 8/63-9/63. Top Secret. The source text is undated, but a copy is dated September 18. (Department of State, Central Files, FN 12 US) 35. Editorial Note 36. Draft Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy Washington, September 19, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Balance of Payments and Gold, 8/63-9/63. Top Secret. 37. Memorandum for the Record Washington, September 23, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Balance of Payments and Gold, 8/63-9/63. Top Secret. Drafted by Bundy. 38. National Security Action Memorandum No. 270 Washington, October 29, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Balance of Payments and Gold. Top Secret. 39. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to President Johnson Washington, December 2, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, Dillon Papers, Memos to President, 1963. Limited Official Use. 1. Memorandum for the Record 1. Memorandum for the Record Source Washington, January 19, 1961, 9:45 a.m. [Here follows discussion of seven unrelated issues.] 8. Coordination and Development of Basic Economic, Fiscal and Monetary Policies Senator Kennedy indicated that he and his people had been thoroughly briefed and asked if Secretary Anderson had anything further to give them. Secretary Anderson made a strong recommendation that public statements on matters as delicate as the balance of payments situation should be confined to the President and his Secretary of the Treas-ury only. This would mean that the government would be speaking with one voice and this would be very helpful to an understanding by foreign governments of the United States position. Secretary Anderson further recommended that communications with the Federal Reserve System be kept in the family and particularly in cases where there were differences of opinions. The President referred to the morale effect of separating military families brought about by the recent order made in an effort to alleviate the balance of payments situation. 1 He pointed out that this was done as a quick move to do something concrete to stop the flow of gold and to show our Allies that we meant business. He expressed the hope that further study of this complicated matter would indicate that other and less drastic means could be used for accomplishing this purpose. He stated, however, that the situation could deteriorate to the point where even more radical measures might become necessary but expressed the hope that the Defense Department would minimize as much as possible the effects on dependents of military men. For example, he discussed the possibility of returning a full division to the United States, pointing out that this would require careful preparation before it was done. He also stated that American troops had been sent to Europe originally as an emergency move to give Europe a chance to recover from the devastation of war and that from the point of view of the United States we would be much stronger militarily if we brought some of these troops home and had them located as a central reserve. The President indicated that, in his opinion, the State Department should bring back some dependents but thus far State has been recalcitrant. He pointed out that the soldier does not want to be made the goat in this matter and he felt this reaction was justified. The President also stated that there are several agencies of the government which could pick up some of the burden. Secretary Anderson pointed out that gold erosion is still going on at a rate which we cannot afford—reporting $225 million from January 1, 1961, to January 19, 1961. Senator Kennedy asked if there is any change in the gold balance among our Allies, and Secretary Anderson pointed out that all of our Allies have dollar surpluses—except Japan which has recently changed its reserve ratio. Secretary Anderson emphasized that the key to the gold problem is confidence on the part of other nations in the stability of the dollar and our willingness and ability to handle our fiscal affairs wisely. At this point, the President pointed out that he had had a study made as to the effect of ICA's programs on the outflow of gold and found this to be minimal. 2 Secretary Anderson indicated that the British had been very helpful in the gold situation and had worked with us very closely. He also pointed out that the Treasury Department keeps a “watch officer” on duty 24 hours a day on this particular matter. [Here follows a brief discussion of the Presidential transition process.] * Source: Eisenhower Library, Post-Presidential Papers, 1961-1969, John F. Kennedy 1960-1961 (2). No classification marking. Drafted by Wilton B. Persons, Assistant to President Eisenhower. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House. A shorter memorandum of this meeting is in a memorandum from Clark M. Clifford to President Kennedy, January 24. (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, White House Correspondence, 1/61-11/63) 1 Reference is to the directive issued by President Eisenhower on November 16, 1960. For documentation on the preparation and issuance of this directive, see Foreign Relations , 1958-1960, vol. IV, pp. 135 - 140 2 The ICA study has not been found. 2. Editorial Note 2. Editorial Note On February 6, 1961, President Kennedy sent a special message to Congress outlining measures to ease the crisis in the U.S. balance-of-payments situation. Because of a continuing deficit in the balance of payments, the United States had suffered a gold outflow, which was troublesome, Kennedy emphasized, “not only for us but also for our friends and allies who rely on the dollar to finance a substantial portion of their trade.” He went on to propose both short- and long-term measures to eliminate the deficit and stem the outflow of gold caused by loss of foreign confidence in the dollar. He assigned specific responsibilities to the Departments of the Treasury, State, Defense, Commerce, and Agriculture, the Bureau of the Budget, and the Export-Import Bank to implement his program for export promotion, burdensharing in defense and foreign assistance, and financial restraints and incentives designed to encourage foreign dollar investments. For text of his message, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961 , pages 57-66. The President followed up by directing Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon “to undertake coordinating responsibility for that program and to report to me periodically on the progress achieved, along with any recommendations for additional action deemed necessary on the balance of payments problem. In carrying out this responsibility, you should consult with the heads of other Departments and Agencies concerned.” (Memorandum from Kennedy to Dillon, February 17; Department of State, E Files: Lot 64 D 452, Balance of Payments—Procurement) 3. Report From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to President Kennedy 3. Report From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to President Kennedy Source Washington, March 20, 1961. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ONBALANCE OF PAYMENTS MEASURES In your memorandum of February 17, 1961, 1 you directed me, acting in close cooperation with the Bureau of the Budget, to undertake responsibility for coordinating the program of measures to improve our balance of payments position, and to report to you periodically on the progress achieved. Accordingly, I am submitting this report on the status of measures taken by the several Departments and Agencies to strengthen our balance of payments position. In preparing this report I thought it would be most convenient for you if I referred to each of the measures which you described in your Balance of Payments Message to the Congress on February 6, 1961, 2 in the order in which they appear therein. Some of these measures are ones on which work is actively being pursued but on which definite conclusions have not yet been reached. On the basis of this review I conclude that no additional action on your part regarding the balance of payments problem is necessary at this time. I. Measures to Ease the Short-Term Demand Problem 1. Measures to Improve International Monetary Institutions . Treasury in consultation with the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems is intensively studying such meas-ures. The Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs (Mr. Roosa) is chairing a special ad hoc subcommittee on this problem. Also, the United States Executive Director on the International Monetary Fund 3 is discussing the international aspects of the problem in the Board of Directors of the Fund. My objective is to assure that the Treasury's study, when completed, will reflect the best judgment we can get from within our own government and from other governments. 2. Use of United States Drawing Rights in the International Monetary Fund . We are keeping track of the current situation carefully. I doubt that we will find it desirable to make a drawing on the Fund in the near future. In the meantime, the United States Executive Director in the Fund is continuing to press for the use by other countries of convertible currencies other than the dollar and sterling in their drawings from the Fund. This will help to avoid an increase in foreign country holdings of dollars and sterling due to drawings from the Fund. Your statement of the United States attitude has itself had a great influence in causing other members to view the Fund's total resources as more readily accessible for general use. 3. Special Interest Rates for Dollar Holdings by Foreign Governments and Monetary Authorities . Your message of February 6 outlined two companion measures to retain foreign short-term balances in this country. The first is the plan for using the Treasury's authority under the Second Liberty Bond Act, as amended, to issue securities at special rates of interest for subscription exclusively by foreign governments or monetary authorities. To supplement this plan, and to prevent consequential losses to domestic commercial banks through its adoption, an Administration bill was sent to the Banking and Currency Committees of both branches of Congress on March 14, 1961, which would amend the Federal Reserve Act and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act to exempt from regulation the rates of interest paid by banks on time deposits held in this country by foreign governments or monetary authorities, and certain international institutions. No schedule for hearings on this Bill has yet been set. After action has been taken on the proposed bill, the desirability of special Treasury issues to foreign governments and monetary authorities will be considered in the light of circumstances then obtaining. Finally, an Administration bill to encourage foreign dollar holdings by unifying the tax treatment of income from various types of foreign central banks' earning assets in this country was reported favorably by the Ways and Means Committee of the House on March 6, 1961. It is scheduled for House consideration today. 4. Prohibition on Holding of Gold Abroad by Americans . The following steps are being taken for effective enforcement of the recent Executive Order forbidding the holding of gold abroad by Americans: (1) letters are being sent to the Central Intelligence Agency and other competent agencies requesting that they tap sources available to them for information relating to the illegal holding of gold abroad; and (2) the Bureau of the Mint is establishing a licensing procedure for foreign branches or subsidiaries of United States companies when such branches or subsidiaries are using gold abroad for industrial, professional or artistic purposes. This procedure among other things will require them to report on their stocks of gold. ( The following must be kept strictly confidential .) The National Bank of Switzerland is cooperating in our efforts by asking all commercial banks in Switzerland to notify all American holders of gold accounts that such holdings will be illegal under United States law after June 1, 1961. The Swiss National Bank has itself already refused to undertake or expedite transactions regarded by it as in violation of United States law. Central banks in other countries are taking less decisive but useful actions. Switzerland, however, is probably the principal center for holdings of gold abroad by American nationals. II. Measures to Correct the Basic Payments Deficit and Achieve Longer-Term Equilibrium 1. Action by the Senate to Approve the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) . Favorable action was taken by the Senate on March 16, 1961. The Administration should proceed promptly with ratification of the Convention. 4 It is important that we do this well before April 18, the date of the meeting of the Economic Policy Committee of the OEEC-OECD, which will be an important instrument for the coordination of economic policies of the Atlantic community. 2. Export Promotion . Since February 6, 1961, the Department of Commerce, working through 33 regional export expansion committees has organized and participated in 44 clinics, work shops, and trade meetings for the promotion of exports. A film entitled “Exportunities” is being effectively used in this connection. The Secretary of Commerce and his staff have constantly urged export expansion in their public speeches. Abroad, the first United States foreign trade center is scheduled to open in London on June 26, 1961. Negotiations are progressing for additional foreign trade centers in Southeast Asia, South America, Europe, and Africa. A follow-up procedure has been established to assure that trade opportunities developed by our trade missions abroad will eventuate in as many export orders as possible. 3. Cost and Price Stabilization . The first meeting of the Advisory Committee on Labor and Management Policy is scheduled for March 21, 1961. I hope that this Committee will encourage productivity gains and other measures designed to make American goods competitive in international markets. 4. Export Guarantees and Financing . The Export-Import Bank has made excellent progress in developing a new program of export credit guarantees comparable to those offered by foreign countries. I am sure that the new program will meet the objective of placing our exporters on a basis of full equality with their competitors in other countries. The National Advisory Council approved this program in principle today. I recommend that at your press conference this week you inform the Congress and the public of the principles on which this new program will be based. I will submit a draft statement for your consideration tomorrow. The details of the new program will be worked out after talks with private business interests over the next few weeks. 5. Foreign Travel to the United States . The Department of Commerce is planning a promotional campaign in the United States and abroad. The task group established by your directive of February 17, 1961, to simplify visa and entry procedures 5 has decided to recommend the submission of legislation to establish a new 90-day “tourist” visa classification with authorization to waive such visas on a reciprocal basis. Details of plans and prospects of the Foreign Travel Program are included in a special report by the Secretary of Commerce to you. 6. Agricultural Exports . The Department of Agriculture is studying how to improve the effectiveness of our foreign market development program, particularly in countries which offer the best cash market prospects. I have requested the Secretary of Agriculture for an appraisal of the effects on our cash dollar exports of the various operations under Public Law 480, 6 including barter operations. I will ask that this study be undertaken promptly so as to assist in policy developments with respect to the Food-for-Peace Program. 7. Policy on Economic Assistance . The policy adopted in October 1959 to emphasize procurement from United States sources under Development Loan Fund loans 7 is being implemented so that for the loans and commitments made since that time (apart from those made for covering local currency costs or for foreign development bank financing) only about 14 percent of the disbursements will be made offshore. The International Cooperation Administration reports that a trial period of at least one year will be required to determine the effects of a new procedure adopted last December under which an orderly cessation of commodity procurement in a specified list of industrialized countries was undertaken. At present, waivers are being granted in cases where the new policy would interfere with United States foreign policy objectives. I am asking the Secretary of State to keep me informed on waivers granted under this new policy, indicating the amounts of such waivers and the justification supporting them. As regards ICA cash transfers to foreign governments, efforts to minimize procurement in the countries referred to above are being carried out on a case-by-case basis. Action in accordance with earlier directives has not been taken by DLF or ICA on the establishment of ceilings for offshore expenditures because such ceilings would not be meaningful for FY 1961 and would be premature for FY 1962 since requests for funds for that year are now under review. I believe that ceilings should be adopted as soon as FY 1962 funds are voted and that State Department witnesses should be prepared to make provisional estimates during Congressional hearings. 8. Tariffs, Restrictions and Discriminations Against American Exports . The Department of State is continuing its efforts to obtain the removal by foreign countries of quantitative import restrictions which affect our exports. American Embassies abroad have recently approached the governments of Austria, Colombia, France, and the Netherlands on specific commodity problems. Moreover, during recent visits by representatives of Germany and the United Kingdom, the need to liberalize imports of specific commodities was discussed, and it is likely that some relaxation of these restrictions will be announced in the near future. The problem of gaining concessions for United States agricultural exports continues to be most difficult. Under Secretary Ball, on his current trip to Europe, 8 will talk with officials of certain European Economic Community member states regarding the necessity of safeguarding access of United States agricultural exports to the Community market as well as an opportunity to share in the enlarged consumption of agricultural products within the Community. 9. Promotion of Foreign Investment in the United States . Techniques are being considered for achieving and maintaining a higher degree of liberalization of capital investment in the United States and other foreign countries by European countries with strong reserve positions. The Department of Commerce has also assembled material to enlist the interest of foreigners who may wish to invest in the United States. 10. Abuse of “Tax Havens” . Taxation of American Investment Abroad. The Treasury has under study the question of whether present tax laws may be stimulating in undue amounts the flow of American capital to industrial countries abroad through special preferential treatment. This study is expected to be completed shortly so that recommendations may be included in your April tax message. 11. Increased Contributions by Other Industrialized Countries to the Less Developed Countries and to the Common Defense . The objectives to be sought in this field are under consideration and will be discussed by the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs in his current trip to European capitals and to the meeting of the Development Assistance Group in London, March 27-29, 1961. 12. Reduction of Customs Exemption for Returning American Traveller . The Administration Bill on this subject is currently held up in the House Ways and Means Committee. The State Department has written the Committee stating that there is no reason to expect that enactment of this legislation would provoke foreign retaliation. It is hoped that this information will lead to early favorable Committee action. 13. Centralized Review of Dollar Outlays . The Treasury Department and the Bureau of the Budget have started to consult on procedures for analyzing that part of the appropriation request of Departments and Agencies which will involve dollar expenditures abroad. 14. U.S. Military Expenditures Abroad. The Defense Department reports that action to effect savings has been taken in all of the principal categories in which it has foreign expenditures. These have been implemented by the military services and instructions have been sent to the field. In the case of personal expenditures, new actions are being taken in lieu of the previous order to reduce the number of dependents abroad. Actual results are not yet available, but the estimated savings during CY 1961 are: (1) $65 million in the purchase of equipment, materials and supplies. (2) $25 million in offshore procurement under the Military Assist-ance Program. (3) In the case of personal expenditures of troops and employees overseas, a saving of about $80 million in CY 1961 is hoped for by such actions as: (a) Discouraging the purchase of foreign goods and other expenditures in the local economies. (b) Prohibiting the transportation at Government expense of foreign cars acquired after March 6, 1961. (c) Encouraging savings programs by personnel, particularly through the purchase of United States Savings Bonds in which Defense is cooperating with the Treasury Department. (d) Allowing the duty-free entry of gifts to be reduced from $50 to $10 when the present temporary legislation expires June 30, 1961. No fixed estimates are available of savings in the categories of construction and contractual services. Also, in accord with your message the Defense Department is reviewing savings which might be accomplished in the area of logistic support for our forces, particularly through the combined use of facilities with our allies. Discussions conducted by Ambassador Dowling have begun with the Germans in Bonn. Also under review are increased purchases of newer weapons and weapons systems by those countries financially capable of paying for them. It is estimated that sales to the financially capable countries of Europe will increase in CY 1961 to $230 million from $188 million in CY 1960. Grant aid by the United States to Western Europe (excluding Greece and Turkey) is estimated to decline from $400 million to about $350 million between 1960 and 1961. Since the effectiveness of the directives will in large measure depend upon the way in which they are carried out at subsidiary levels, periodic follow-ups and reviews will be necessary. I find it a matter of disappointment that the Defense Department has been unable to achieve more savings from its direct operations—which so far are estimated at only $170 million for calendar year 1961. With annual outlays of close to $3 billion I would hope that at least $500 million in savings could be found. In particular, I believe that much more than the $65 million estimate could be cut from the almost $1 billion of procurement overseas. Unless we do better I fear that public pressure for the reduction of our forces overseas will again emerge. I intend to meet with Secretary McNamara, David Bell and appropriate Defense officials to see what can be done to achieve greater progress in this area. * Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Treasury, 1/61-9/61. Confidential. The unsigned report was transmitted under cover of a March 20 letter from Dillon to the President, in which he added: “I believe we should plan on making a comprehensive public report sometime in May after our first quarter payments statistics have become available.” 1 See Document 2 . 2 See Document 2 . 3 Frank A. Southard, Jr. 4 President Kennedy ratified the OECD for the United States on March 23. See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961 , pp. 212-213. 5 Not found. 6 P.L. 480 was formally entitled the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act, enacted on July 10, 1954. For text, see 68 Stat. 454. 7 Regarding this policy, see Foreign Relations , 1958-1960, vol. IV, p. 353 . 8 George Ball traveled to Europe March 18-30; see Documents 99 - 102 . 4. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy 4. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy Source Washington, July 28, 1961. SUBJECT Coordination of Foreign Economic Policy On March 12, 1961, at your direction, the Council on Foreign Economic Policy was abolished and its functions transferred to the Secretary of State. 1 On May 26, 1961, in your letter to the Congress transmitting the foreign assistance bill, 2 you reaffirmed this decision and indicated that you expect the Secretary of State to become the focal point of responsibility for coordination of foreign economic policies. You also expect him, in facilitating executive branch coordination of foreign economic policies, to choose whatever mechanisms he finds appropriate, including the formation of interagency working groups. Pursuant to these actions, I have asked the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs to assume, under my direction, responsibility for assuring proper interagency consultation and coordination in this field. He is undertaking to assure that appropriate consultation and coordination is achieved by holding periodic meetings, under his chairmanship, with the Under Secretaries in the interested departments. I am enclosing a letter which he has dispatched to the various participants in this activity outlining the work and procedures of such meetings. 3 This approach constitutes an initial step by this Department to assure that the views of the agencies concerned will be brought to bear early and fully on foreign economic policy matters. Dean Rusk 4 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Ball Committee. No classification marking. In a July 28 memorandum to Secretary Rusk, Ball indicated that he had drafted this memorandum, which he attached for the Secretary's signature. (Department of State, E Files: Lot 65 D 68, Interdepartmental Committee of Under Secretaries on Foreign Economic Policy-Origin) 1 A copy of the White House Press Release, March 17, announcing the immediate termination of 17 interdepartmental committees, is ibid., Interdepartmental Committee of Under Secretaries on Foreign Economic Policy-Agenda, Creation. 2 See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961 , pp. 407-411. 3 Not attached, but a copy of a letter from Ball to Walter W. Heller (and the other members of the Under Secretaries Committee), dated July 31, is in Department of State, E Files: Lot 65 D 68, Interdepartmental Committee of Under Secretaries on Foreign Economic Policy-Origin. 4 Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original. 5. Editorial Note 5. Editorial Note In his letter to the members of the Interdepartmental Committee of Under Secretaries on Foreign Economic Policy, July 31 (see footnote 3, Document 4 ), George Ball proposed regular meetings of the committee every other Wednesday afternoon. He also indicated that the Council of Economic Advisers and the new head of the Agency for International Development would participate. Ball, who served as chairman, designated Joseph D. Coppock as executive secretary. Coppock circulated the planning papers in advance as well as follow up actions. In a memorandum to the members of the Interdepartmental Committee of Under Secretaries on Foreign Economic Policy, July 2, 1962, Coppock attached, among other things, a copy of Ball's July 31, 1961, letter setting forth the functions of the committee, the attendance record of the official members, a list of subjects taken up in the meetings, and Coppock's evaluation of the committee. (Department of State, E Files: Lot 65 D 68, Interdepartmental Committee of Under Secretaries on Foreign Economic Policy-Origin) In a memorandum to Under Secretary of Commerce Edward Gudeman, July 9, 1962, Assistant Secretary of Commerce Jack N. Behrman offered a critique of Coppock's evaluation. Essentially, Behrman argued, Coppock avoided the central question of “whether or not the Committee should be a decision-making body.” Behrman went on to argue that “the Committee should make recommendations on broad foreign economic policies.” (Washington National Records Center, RG 40, Under Secretary of Commerce Files: FRC 66 A 1971, Foreign Economic Policy Meetings (Ball), Miscellaneous Material) This interdepartmental committee met regularly until late June 1962 when it recessed with the expectation of resuming meetings in the fall. The committee remained inactive, however, for 6 months. A background paper on the committee and its future was transmitted under cover of a memorandum from G. Griffith Johnson to George C. McGhee, January 17, 1963. (Department of State, E Files: Lot 65 D 68, Interdepartmental Committee of Under Secretaries on Foreign Economic Policy, Reactivation of Committee) The committee was reactivated in January 1963 and held six more meetings, the last one on May 23, 1963. 6. Summary Minutes of Meeting of the Interdepartmental Committee of Under Secretaries on Foreign Economic Policy 6. Summary Minutes of Meeting of the Interdepartmental Committee of Under Secretaries on Foreign Economic Policy Source Washington, October 4, 1961. [Here follow a list of those attending the meeting and some announcements Ball made concerning the Common Market, textiles, and the next meeting.] II. Discussion Balance of Payments and Related Problems . Mr. Ball introduced the main topic by noting that it cuts across the activities of all the agencies represented, and that our ability to solve this problem will largely determine the extent to which we may be committed to lines which are contrary to those that we wish to pursue at home and abroad. Mr. Fowler then developed the points made in the Treasury paper, “The Balance of Payments and our Foreign Economic Policy.” 1 The basis for balance-of-payments actions is the President's message of February 6, which outlined in broad form U.S. policies for dealing with the problem. Quarterly reports from the various participating agencies have been compiled into one over-all report to the President. An attempt will be made to put the next report, due the latter part of October or first of November, in a form that would be available for widespread official distribution so that all agencies can see what is going on. Treasury expects to initiate a series of small task force meetings on particular phases of the problem and the Secretary will sit down with the two or three Departments or Agencies concerned to discuss what more should be done. This is a device to keep the program moving and up-to-date. Mr. Roosa then discussed the problem of short-term capital movements under conditions of currency convertibility and the measures being taken and considered to deal with this problem. He said that the Vienna negotiations represented substantial progress although they might be less ambitious than some people might hope for. He pointed out that we are limited by what other countries are prepared to accept. In the discussion that followed the Treasury presentation, Mr. Tobin warned that, even though our position may be improving, we must bear in mind that in the next one to three years the balance almost inevitably will worsen because our domestic recovery will cause imports to increase faster than exports. It may be a few years before the measures we are taking now improve our basic position. The important question is whether we are able to protect the dollar from runs during the transition period when things get worse before they get better. On the multilateral aspects of the currency question, he continued, there is a question of how much we should rely on bilateral transactions and how much we should use international organizations like the IMF or the OECD. Mr. Tobin also warned that while implementing the short-term measures, we must keep in mind the long run. We must remember that in the long run if we get back in balance and the UK does also, and if we haven't a new reserve currency, we have the question of the mechanism for supplying liquidity thereafter. Mr. Hansen asked if it isn't possible that we could deal with the short-term problem in ways which we will not like in the long term. In foreign aid, for example, we have gone into the consortium approach and we are thereby setting up trading patterns which are not in our long-term interest. He cited the case of Pakistan and the tying of purchases to countries furnishing aid. Mr. Fowler said that, with the exception of the Buy American meas-ures, he felt all of the short-run actions in the financial field undertaken to contend with the balance-of-payments problem are not only consistent with but promote the kind of liberal foreign economic policy we are committed to. Mr. Coppock observed that the February 6 Message puts a great burden on export expansion and domestic monetary restraint, since devaluation, exchange controls, and new restrictions on imports were ruled out as measures for correcting the payments imbalance. Mr. Gudeman noted what Commerce is doing in the way of export and travel promotion, and called attention to the importance of trade centers abroad such as we have in London. One thing Commerce wants to work on with the State Department is obtaining better Commercial Attaches who will seek out opportunities for American goods rather than just taking care of the material that comes over their desks. In this regard, there will be a meeting of European Commercial Attaches in London soon and we will give them suggestions. Also, we must keep prices down so our goods will be competitive. Mr. Gudeman hopes for modernization of equipment so that manufacturing can be more efficient and prices reduced. We also need to give more attention to research and development, and Mr. Gudeman suggested Treasury might consider tax incentives so more would be spent on research and development. Mr. Fowler suggested that Mr. Gudeman talk with Assistant Secretary Surrey about this. Mr. Gudeman also mentioned the need for export guarantees and lending terms comparable to those offered by Europe so that we can support our exporters. He mentioned particularly lending to finance exports to an American subsidiary abroad for re-export. Mr. Hansen said the Budget Bureau had started a review of military policy statements. A major question this poses for our balance of payments is the movement and placement of troops. He suggested that Treasury might keep in close touch with this. * Source: Department of State, E Files: Lot 65 D 68, Interdepartmental Committee of Under Secretaries on Foreign Economic Policy, Balance of Payments. Official Use Only. 1 Dated September 29. (Ibid.) 7. Letter From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to Secretary of State Rusk 7. Letter From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to Secretary of State Rusk Source Washington, February 20, 1962. Dear Dean : The President spoke to me today and asked what could be done to further tighten up on the balance of payments impact of foreign aid expenditures. I told him of our agreement last week that Assist-ant Secretary Leddy and Mr. Chenery would meet this week to see what could be done to minimize the outflow of dollars for local cost financing. I also told the President of my view which I mentioned in our meeting last week that the over-all balance of payments impact of foreign aid operations, including our contributions to the Inter-American Bank and to the International Development Association, as well as AID and military assistance expenditures, should not exceed a billion dollars annually as compared to last year's level of about $1.2 billion. The President expressed his concern that the figure was running this high and asked that I inform you of his concern and that we jointly furnish him with a progress report by the end of next week which would indicate what could be done to meet or better the billion dollar goal. 1 With best wishes, Sincerely, Douglas * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 811.10/2-2062. Official Use Only. 1 See Document 8 . 8. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to President Kennedy 8. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to President Kennedy Source Washington, March 12, 1962. SUBJECT Fourth Quarterly Report on Balance of Payments 1 I am today submitting to you my Fourth Quarterly Report reviewing the current balance-of-payments situation, and the status of the measures taken to implement your Message to the Congress of February 6, 1961. The Report is being widely distributed to other departments and agencies, the activities and expenditures of which affect our balance of payments. This I am doing so that all may be aware of the current situation and prospects, the need for continued vigilance in holding down overseas expenditures, and the need for even greater efforts to increase our receipts from other countries. The highlights of the Report are the following: 1. Despite a worsening in our “basic accounts” in the second half of 1961, our situation was much improved over 1960, and even more by comparison with 1959. This reflected the improvement in our merchandise trade. As our imports rose with domestic recovery in the last six months, however, the commercially-financed export surplus dropped. A large part of the improvement in our “basic balance” was due to the special, negotiated prepayments of debts owed the United States Government. 2. For 1962, we have assumed that acceleration of European economic activity plus the cumulative effects of our various export promotion measures will raise commercially-financed exports by about $1 billion. On the other hand, increased economic activity at home will probably result in an increase in our imports of about $1.5 billion. Some prepayments of debt owed the United States can be expected, but they will probably fall considerably short of the $700 million received in 1961. However, the offset to our military expenditures in Germany recently worked out with the Federal Republic Government and others which are likely within the coming year should substantially lower our net military expenditures overseas. Taking all these factors into account, our “basic deficit” is likely to be somewhat larger than last year's basic deficit of $600 million. 3. Short-term capital movements continue to be unpredictable, even though last year more of them were “normal” commercial flows and not speculative capital. To the extent that our exports increase, we can expect a portion of the increase to be financed by short-term capital outflows. Such increases can contribute substantially to the over-all deficit as was the case last year. We are hopeful that other temporary outflows, based largely on interest rate differentials, will be reduced in 1962. Such a reduction could easily offset the moderate increase we look for in short-term capital outflows associated with expanding exports, and could lead to an over-all deficit somewhat smaller than that incurred in 1961. 4. In 1961 more foreign private recipients of dollars elected to hold them. This contributed to the sharp drop in our gold losses, as compared with 1960. Probably the most important single reason for this—and possibly the most important single development in this field in the past year—is the intangible but vital degree of international cooperation among monetary authorities which has been developed. A variety of ad hoc measures by different monetary authorities contributed to moderating short-term capital flows, to keeping dollar holdings in private hands and out of official reserves, and hence to reducing demands for gold. The efforts extending through the year to improve international monetary institutions were climaxed by the successful conclusion, early in January 1962, of the new arrangements which will in effect triple the resources of major currencies other than the dollar and sterling available to the International Monetary Fund to meet a request for a drawing by the United States. 5. The arrangements recently worked out with Germany will offset our military expenditures in that country during 1961 and 1962. 2 We intend to seek similar arrangements over the coming year to offset part or all of our defense expenditures in France, Italy and perhaps other industrial European nations with strong economies. During the current year we hope that by these means, plus sales of military goods and serv-ices to other Free World nations, we will be able to offset our defense expenditures by at least $1 billion. 6. For the longer run, export promotion must be given a major role. The variety of measures designed to increase businessmen's awareness of export opportunities, and awareness in foreign markets of what the United States has to offer, has been expanded. The Export-Import Bank-Foreign Credit Insurance Association scheme for export credit insurance is one of the new facilities offered business by Government. It will be appropriate to continue and steadily to improve these measures. Plans for an intensification of our national effort to expand our merchandise trade surplus are being surveyed for presentation in the proposed Balance of Payments Message. 7. It is necessary not to relax our vigilance in holding down United States Government expenditures abroad. In this task Defense, State and AID and other agencies having overseas expenditures are cooperating with the Bureau of the Budget and with us. The two major problems which remain are overseas defense expenditures and the degree of financing of local costs which may be considered necessary in our foreign assistance programs. 8. We will make every effort to minimize the balance-of-payments impact of our overseas defense expenditures by expanding sales of United States military equipment and negotiating other offsetting arrangements with our industrial allies. With respect to the remaining impact, while further savings will undoubtedly be found possible, major reductions in spending will probably become possible only when a significant reduction can be made in the number of United States forces and dependents deployed overseas. The level and composition of overseas deployment of United States forces is under review by Secretary McNamara. 9. The proposed new sugar legislation, if provisions to establish import fees are retained, would contribute approximately $100 million to our balance of payments, on the assumption that the use of the fees for economic assistance under the Alliance for Progress will be tied to United States procurement. 10. The major problem of economic assistance as it affects our balance of payments at the present time is the question of financing the local costs of projects and programs. Largely because of this type of expenditure, AID officials had estimated that commitments of FY 1963 AID funds would result in expenditures abroad of $837 million, as opposed to $647 million resulting from FY 1962 commitments. These estimates are now being revised upwards. Over-all foreign assistance expenditures resulting in an immediate cash outflow from the United States (reflecting also authorizations made before the change in procurement policies) were about $1.3 billion in calendar years 1960 and 1961. This total cannot be allowed to increase and must be reduced to about $1 billion if our foreign assistance operations are to bear their fair share of the burden involved in reaching a balance in our payments. This is of particular importance in the Alliance for Progress, and may be an increasing problem in other areas, particularly in Africa. We have sought a number of ways to minimize the balance-of-payments effects of the local cost financing which AID undertakes. Among these have been the placing of the dollar funds in segregated accounts, to be used only to pay for United States goods and services, and the agreement reached with Nigeria that it would find other means of increasing imports from the United States by an amount at least as great as the United States financing of local costs. While the Nigerian example is interesting, it may not prove possible to implement it in the desired fashion. Segregated accounts may simply result in AID financing of United States exports which would have been made in any event. Senior policy officials of State and AID are currently cooperating with us in exploring other potential methods of minimizing the balance-of-payments impact of local cost financing. I will furnish you with a special report on the results of these studies in the next two weeks. In summary, our position is considerably improved. But we cannot relax our efforts. Further vigilance and ingenuity in holding down expenditures, and further efforts to increase our receipts, are necessary. Douglas Dillon * Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Treasury, 3/12/62. Confidential. 1 The report was attached but is not printed. Dillon also sent the report to Secretary Rusk under cover of a March 15 memorandum, which called particular attention to paragraphs 7 and 10. Dillon added: “I am sure that Fowler Hamilton and the other appropriate officials of the Department of State will cooperate fully in developing promptly new methods of meeting the local cost financing problem.” (Department of State, Central Files, 811.10/3-1562) 2 Regarding these arrangements, see Documents 40 ff. 9. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to President Kennedy 9. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to President Kennedy Source Washington, April 9, 1962. SUBJECT Relation of Foreign Assistance to the Balance of Payments Department of Commerce statistics show that in 1961 total foreign economic aid expenditures (including PL 480 and Ex-Im Bank) were $4.1 billion, of which $1.3 billion was paid directly to foreign countries or international organizations and therefore involved an immediate dollar outflow from the United States. Treasury is of the opinion that steps should be taken to limit this outflow in future years to $1 billion as part of our over-all program to overcome the current U.S. balance of payments deficit. While AID seriously questions whether this can be done without jeopardizing the effectiveness of the foreign aid program, it is prepared to make a serious effort to meet the Treasury goal. As a first step, the Agency is presently attempting in cooperation with Treasury and State to develop possible techniques for achieving this goal. Should this prove impossible without undue risk, in the judgment of AID, a further report will be submitted to you. The $1 billion limit poses a difficult problem in view of the increase in the AID program to almost $3.4 billion out of about $6.2 billion in total foreign economic aid anticipated for programming in FY 1963. Dollar outflow payments from the $6.2 billion are expected under current policies to be about $1.25 billion, of which the AID program will account for roughly $1 billion. Inevitably there will be some delay before any policy change which might be made affecting the FY 1963 program will be reflected in a reduction in actual dollar outflow on an expenditure basis. During 1962 and 1963 expenditures will to a large extent be made from funds programmed in earlier fiscal years, but since these funds have already been committed, we have little or no power now to influence the manner in which they are spent. FY 1963 Program Projections As indicated in the table below, under current policies the composition of payments involving an immediate dollar outflow is shifting away from procurement of commodities from third country sources to direct cash payments to the aid recipient countries. 1960 Expenditures (millions) 1961 Expenditures (millions) FY 1963 Program (millions) Third country procurement 1 673 412 250 Cash grants and local cost financing 108 400 500 Other (mainly contributions to international organizations and overseas operating costs) 470 498 500 Total 1,251 1,310 1,250 Total Foreign Economic Assistance 3,381 4,100 6,200 Payments abroad as a % of total foreign economic assistance 37% 32% 20% The reduction in third country procurement reflects decisions made in 1959 to emphasize U.S. procurement with Development Loan funds and in 1960 to confine ICA procurement to the U.S. and less industrialized countries of the free world. Third country procurement being currently authorized is almost exclusively from the less developed countries themselves. The increase in cash payments to the aid recipient countries is not due to grants for political or security support, which will continue to run at about $100 million annually, but rather to rapidly increasing programs for the financing of local development costs, particularly in Latin America and Africa. It is clear that if the $1 billion limit on dollar outflow is to be achieved, it will have to be by changing the form in which AID supports local costs or possibly by cutting back on our assistance to these areas. Further cuts in third country procurement would impinge primarily on the less developed countries and could adversely affect our development objectives. Other payments, which consist principally of contributions to international organizations and program operating costs, provide little margin for reduction without either lessening our participation in international organizations or substantially reducing over-all programs. Local Cost Financing The local cost financing problem arises from the need to get important projects under way rapidly in Latin America and Africa where there have been no substantial assistance programs that generated local currency in the past. These areas have a high priority need for infrastructure facilities with a large local cost component. In the absence of local currency counterpart, such as can be used for these purposes in the Middle and Far East, it is often necessary to pay out dollars to obtain the local currency needed for getting the projects started without undue delay. We must be careful not to take action which would unduly restrict our freedom of operation in these areas or uneconomically force a substitution of less efficient projects and techniques making relatively intensive use of imported capital equipment for more efficient projects and techniques making relatively intensive use of local resources. The need is for a mechanism enabling us to stimulate the most appropriate approaches to development while at the same time minimizing the advance pay out of untied dollars. Possibilities now being studied include: (1) Concentrating U.S. aid on projects with a high foreign exchange rather than local cost component when a country's total program consists of both types of projects; (2) Where dollar financing of local costs is necessary, restricting it to the additional import demand which can be expected to result from the development program in question; (3) Agreements, such as that recently made with Nigeria, requiring the developing country to increase its imports from the U.S. by the full amount of dollar aid received; (4) Financing local costs to the extent possible by a commitment of funds to be drawn upon through the procurement authorization system or some similar device for maximizing U.S. procurement and avoiding an initial transfer of funds into foreign hands; and (5) Arrangements, such as segregated accounts, for tying dollars tendered for local cost financing to U.S. procurement when circumstances necessitate an initial transfer of funds to the foreign government or its central bank. Tying foreign aid to U.S. procurement should not be regarded as a permanent policy. It is expected to continue at least at its present level while our over all payments situation is in deficit and until we can persuade other donor countries to increase their aid efforts. We are currently stressing with these countries that assistance extended by balance of payments surplus countries should be on an untied basis, and we must ourselves be prepared to shift to that basis once our deficit is overcome. Dean Rusk 2 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 811.10/4-962. For Official Use Only. The date, “9 Apr 62,” was added by hand. A longer memorandum from Frank M. Coffin to Secretaries Rusk and Dillon, April 6, which was transmitted under cover of an April 6 memorandum from Coffin to Secretary Rusk, is ibid. In this covering memorandum, Coffin suggested that the Secretary sign the memorandum printed here and forward it to Secretary Dillon (who had already approved it in draft) so that it could be sent to the President by the close of business April 6. 1 Commodities procured for import into the aid recipient countries from non-U.S. sources. [Footnote in the source text.] 2 The source text bears no signature by Dillon above his title, which appears on the left-hand side of the page. George Ball's initials appear next to Secretary Rusk's signature. 10. Editorial Note 10. Editorial Note On June 7, 1962, President Kennedy proposed in a memorandum to Secretary of the Treasury Dillon the creation of an inter-Cabinet Committee composed of Dillon (chairman), the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce, and the AID Administrator to work on the balance-of-payments problem. This committee “should come forward with a program perhaps in November with assurances of bringing this problem under control within a reasonable period of time.” Dillon welcomed this suggestion in his memorandum to the President, June 14, and recommended the addition of the Director of the Bureau of the Budget to the group. He thought the committee should operate informally so that it would not interfere with the wider interagency coordination specified in the President's February 17 memorandum to Dillon (see Document 2 ). In a June 15 memorandum to David Bell, McGeorge Bundy agreed with Bell's suggestion to include a member of the Council of Economic Advisers and added that the President had said that George Ball should serve on the committee after Ball mentioned that the Department of State should be represented. In a June 22 memorandum to the President, McGeorge Bundy recommended the addition of Ball and a representative from the Council of Economic Advisers and suggested that the President ask David Bell to be prepared to bring to the new committee proposals for a “gold budget” for use in controlling expenditures that affect the balance of payments. All these memoranda are in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Balance of Payments and Gold, 6/62-3/63. For President Kennedy's tasking for the creation of this committee, see Document 11 . The President's Special Representative for Trade Negotiations was added to the committee in early 1963. (Memorandum from Kaysen to the Cabinet Committee on Balance of Payments, March 14, 1963; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Trade, General, 1/63-7/63) 11. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of the Treasury Dillon 11. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of the Treasury Dillon Source Washington, June 22, 1962. I like the proposals in your memorandum of June 14th 1 on the ways of carrying forward a small inter-Cabinet committee on the balance of payments. I agree with you that the Director of the Bureau of the Budget should be added, and I also believe that we should have representation from the State Department—presumably George Ball—and from the Council of Economic Advisers. I doubt if we would need any further White House representation at this stage. I agree with your view that the group should begin to think hard about broad policy on the balance of payments, but I also want it to be a working committee that will keep a sharp eye on the management of our own disbursements within the Executive Branch. For this purpose I am asking Dave Bell to be prepared to bring to the new committee proposals for what might be called a “gold budget” for use in controlling all federal expenditures that affect the balance of payments. A number of instances in recent weeks have made it clear that our Executive control in this area is not what it ought to be, and I think the basic budgetary process provides an excellent analogy to the sort of thing we now need in the balance of payments field. Would you chair the committee and arrange for its frequent meeting. 2 John F. Kennedy * Source: Kennedy Library, Dillon Papers, Memos to President, 5/62-6/62. No classification marking. 1 See Document 10 . 2 This postscript was added in the President's handwriting. 12. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hamilton) to President Kennedy 12. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hamilton) to President Kennedy Source Washington, June 28, 1962. SUBJECT A.I.D. Actions Affecting the U.S. Balance of Payments In accordance with your memorandum of June 20, 1 responsible officials of A.I.D. have reviewed with Carl Kaysen all proposed A.I.D. actions that affect the U.S. balance of payments. It is estimated that of a total proposed commitment of funds of $493 million for the remainder of fiscal year 1962, less than $3 million will be used for procurement from non-U.S. sources. A statement covering each of these actions has been transmitted to the White House. 2 After reviewing these actions, Mr. Kaysen stated that there was no objection to A.I.D. proceeding with these commitments. Subject to your approval, I suggest that in the future A.I.D. submit to you on a weekly basis all proposed actions to commit funds that may result in procurement from non-U.S. sources in the amount of one million dollars or more so that you may pass upon the proposed action. This agency will also advise you every two weeks of the total funds committed and the portion expected to be expended outside the United States. 3 Fowler Hamilton * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Balance of Payments and Gold, 6/62-3/63. No classification marking. 1 See footnote 3, Document 144 . 2 A six-page list of AID actions affecting the U.S. balance of payments, undated, was transmitted under cover of a June 27 memorandum from Holis B. Chenery to Kaysen. (Washington National Records Center, RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 65 A 481, Development Financing,FY 1962) 3 In a July 2 memorandum to Hamilton, President Kennedy replied that the AID reporting scheme proposed in Hamilton's June 28 memorandum was “satisfactory as far as it goes,” but he requested that “you also add each proposed commitment of $2-1/2 million or more whether or not it may result in expenditures of dollars outside the United States.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Balance of Payments and Gold, 6/62-3/63) 13. Editorial Note 13. Editorial Note In a memorandum to the Secretaries of the Military Departments, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Assistant Secretaries of Defense, and the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, July 10, 1962, Secretary of Defense McNamara submitted a list of projects and actions to try to reduce to $1 billion the net adverse dollar balance entering the U.S. balance of payments. He further indicated that this dollar objective was “to be achieved without reducing our military power abroad.” The action list, known as Revised Project Eight, incorporated into a single project all previous projects relating to U.S. defense expenditures and receipts entering the international balance of payments. It assigned the office responsible for submission of the replies and indicated the tentative due date for submission. In addition, McNamara submitted a Project Eight Action List for prior projects that had been approved with the office assigned responsibility for implementation. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 171) For a more general summary of these lists of projects and actions, see Document 15 . Both McNamara's July 10 memorandum and the attached eight-page Revised Project Eight List and one-page Project Eight Action List, are in the Supplement. 14. National Security Action Memorandum No. 171 14. National Security Action Memorandum No. 171 Source Washington, July 16, 1962. MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Treasury The Director, Bureau of the Budget SUBJECT “Department of Defense Actions to Reduce Its Overseas Expenditures” 1. I have reviewed the proposed actions of the Department of Defense directed toward reducing its overseas expenditures (see attached memorandum from the Secretary of Defense). 1 Subject to the qualifications set forth below, I approve these actions as interim meas-ures, until the Cabinet Committee recommends and I approve guidance for reducing government overseas expenditures in all departments. 2. In certain countries, the actions proposed by the Defense Department may result in a need for compensating increases in aid. This appears especially likely to be the case in Korea, South Vietnam, and the Republic of China, countries whose foreign exchange requirements we, in essence, underwrite. In certain other countries, including Iceland, the Philippines, and Japan, which are not now major recipients of aid, the impact of reductions in U.S. military expenditures may also create demands for aid. The economic situation of these countries and our policy interests in them are such that we cannot simply ignore the possibility that savings on military account will be cancelled or substantially offset by increased expenditures on aid account. 3. Accordingly, I request that the Committee arrange for timely consideration of the interrelations among Defense and AID overseas expenditures in these and similar cases. Any final decision to reduce one of the categories of expenditures should be made only after full consideration of its probable impact on the other, as well as its budgetary costs. Issues which cannot be resolved by the Committee should be referred to me. John F. Kennedy 2 Note: The attachment to the original memorandum, a memorandum from the Secretary of Defense dated July 10, 1962, subject: “Revised Project List—List of Projects and Actions for Reducing Defense Expenditures Entering the International Balance of Payments”, has been given separate distribution to the affected agencies and is not attached. It is, however, included by reference. * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 171. Confidential. Copies were sent to Ball and Fowler Hamilton. According to a memorandum from Charles E. Johnson to the executive secretaries of the Departments of State, Defense, and the Treasury, and the Bureau of the Budget and AID, July 18, 1962, attached to the source text, this NSAM was originally distributed as an unnumbered memorandum to the Cabinet Committee on the Balance of Payments, but it was then decided to include it unchanged in the NSAM series (except for the addition of a subject heading) and given additional distribution. A copy of the original memorandum, July 16, is attached to the source text. 1 Reference is to McNamara's July 10 memorandum; see Document 13 . 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 15. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) 15. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) Source Washington, July 18, 1962. SUBJECT Presidential Memorandum of July 16 to Members of Cabinet Committee on Balance of Payments 1 The Defense attachment to the Presidential memorandum 2 was discussed at a meeting in my office last Saturday 3 with Defense, AID, White House and BOB representatives. At that time Mr. Hitch 4 elaborated on the scope of the various projects contained in the list. He pointed out that these were still in the study stage and that final procurement actions would not be taken until the completion of these studies. However, in some cases partial steps are being taken in some of these areas that should result in an early decrease of overseas expenditures by Defense. During our discussions, the impact of reduced Defense expenditures in certain countries in terms of possible increased aid requirements was explored. In addition to the countries mentioned in the President's memorandum, there also may be problems with respect to Greece, Turkey and Pakistan. However, the precise impact on AID cannot be determined until we know more specifically the nature and extent of Defense's proposals to reduce expenditures in those countries. In addition to the AID considerations, the implementation of certain of the projects proposed by Defense will have significant political repercussions. Most obvious are those projects relating to force reductions in overseas areas. In some cases the withdrawals are rather small and should not present any unmanageable political problems. On the other hand, the projects to reduce our Army forces in Europe by 44,000 and the withdrawal of the one squadron in Iceland present extremely serious political problems in terms of our security objectives. Additional political repercussions will arise from the economic impact in overseas areas of a number of Defense projects should they be implemented, e.g. returning a major portion of petroleum procurement to the U.S., reducing hiring of foreign nationals. The seriousness of this impact, however, cannot be judged until we have more precise information on the magnitude and nature of these reductions. Furthermore, a number of the suggested actions would put such activities as PX and commissaries in direct competition with the local economy to a greater degree than is presently the case, and we can probably expect local reaction to a move of this type. The degree to which we can take such actions would have to be carefully reviewed in light of agreements and understandings we have with the host countries with respect to the basing of our forces in their territory. The Defense Study program does not provide explicitly for estimates of the amounts of compensating aid that might be necessary as a result of the impact on individual countries of the suggested actions. The net benefit to our balance of payments depends on this, and on the amount by which curtailment of dollar expenditures in each of the various countries can be expected to result in reduced purchases from the U.S. by all countries. Studies to establish a basis for reasoned judgments on both scores must precede decisions on the various proposed policies. It must also be recognized that procurement policies tailored to these considerations would probably be discriminatory, in an absolute sense, as between countries. This, also, could be productive of diplomatic frictions. I believe it is important to alert Defense to the fact that, unless reductions are carefully and selectively applied, it may well result in the development of a political atmosphere in a number of countries which will make it extremely difficult for us to negotiate for the various Defense arrangements and facilities that Defense itself considers extremely important to have in order to maintain an effective combat posture. Nevertheless, I believe that the studies outlined by Defense are justified and should be undertaken. However, I think it extremely important that the Department of State be fully consulted on these studies and that, in those instances, where we believe there will be serious adverse political effects the issue should be placed before the Cabinet Committee prior to any implementation by the Department of Defense. * Source: Department of State, E Files: Lot 64 D 452, Balance of Payments-Procurement. Secret. Drafted by George S. Newman (G/PM) and transmitted through S/S. The date, “7/18/62,” was added by hand. 1 Document 14 . 2 Reference is to McNamara's July 10 memorandum; see Document 13 . 3 July 14. 4 Presumably Charles J. Hitch, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). 16. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic Missions 16. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic Missions Source Washington, July 19, 1962, 7:48 p.m. 98. With regard to recent announcements by SecDef concerning efforts to reduce U.S. defense expenditures abroad, the following is provided for your guidance in response any official or public queries. Defense, under Presidential instructions and as part Government-wide program to lower balance of payments deficit by reducing foreign exchange expenditures, has initiated a number of study projects towards this goal and which would at the same time not repeat not impair U.S. combat effectiveness abroad. These studies, scope of which has been made public, will cover U.S. military operations worldwide. They will involve overseas procurement of supplies and services for U.S. Forces, construction programs, expenditures by U.S. military personnel and their dependents abroad, use of foreign labor whether by direct or contract hire, review of overseas procurement for MAP, etc. To date, SecDef has issued instructions on overseas procurement of supplies and services for use by U.S. military forces abroad. These require purchase from U.S. sources if contract does not exceed $10,000 or if delivered cost is estimated to be not more than 50% greater than the cost from foreign sources. If contract is over $10,000 and cost differential exceeds 50%, procurement action must be referred to SecDef to determine whether it should be awarded to U.S. sources. Directive exempts all procurement from indigenous sources which is undertaken pursuant to a treaty or executive agreement and excludes purchases for overseas construction, petroleum, MAP, and non-appropriated funds which are covered by separate directive. Programs under excluded categories are now under study. Also SecDef has directed that all proposed purchases abroad for Defense purposes for use in U.S. under existing “Buy American Act” regulations will be referred to SecDef to determine whether exception to normal procedures would be in national interest. It is important to emphasize that other specific Defense actions within this over-all policy are in the study stage preliminary to decisions which will be made in the future. FYI. Department is coordinating closely with Defense on study projects and implementing procurement directives. Both agencies recognize political and economic ramifications involved. Where military commands, MAAGs, or missions are located in your country and are undertaking reviews on overseas procurement pursuant to Defense directives, all posts should work closely with those organizations in this activity. Political and economic implications which may result from implementing projects should be brought to the attention of military commanders. Posts should similarly advise Department of specific problems they foresee as a result of assessments by posts and overseas Defense organizations. End FYI. Rusk * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Balance of Payments and Gold, 6/62-9/63. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by George S. Newman on July 19; cleared in E, EUR, FE, ARA, NEA, AF, U, S/S, the Department of Defense, and the White House; and approved by Newman. Repeated to Paris for Stoessel and McGuire and to CINCLANT, CINCARIB, and CINCPAC for the Political Advisers. 17. Report by the Cabinet Committee on Balance of Payments to President Kennedy 17. Report by the Cabinet Committee on Balance of Payments to President Kennedy Source Washington, July 27, 1962. The Committee has reviewed recent developments in the payments situation of the United States; the measures proposed by the Department of Defense and the Agency for International Development to curtail net overseas dollar expenditures; and the proposals of the Budget Bureau for establishing a control system for international transactions of Federal agencies. It submits the following report and recommendations for your approval. Balance of Payments Situation For the first half of 1962 the over-all deficit in our balance of payments has run at an annual rate of about $1-1/2 billion. This represents a very substantial improvement over the deficits of $2.46 billion in 1961 and $3.9 billion in 1960. The improvement in 1962 has been due largely to smaller out-flows of short-term capital and certain nonrecurring factors, such as one-time military payments by Germany. Nevertheless, our exports have continued to grow and the increase in our imports has been smaller than expected. The worsening of our basic deficit—the balance on all transactions except short-term capital and unrecorded transactions—has so far in 1962 not been as bad as had been anticipated. Subtracting one-time receipts in both 1961 (the German debt prepayment) and 1962 (debt prepayments and German military procurement funds), the basic deficit in the first half of 1962 seems likely to amount to an annual rate of about $1.4 billion, as compared with $1.1 billion for all of 1961. This deterioration in the basic deficit was relatively slight taking into account the fact that in response to rising domestic economic activity our imports during the first half of 1962 were running at a level some $1.4 billion higher, annual rate, than imports for 1961 as a whole. For the rest of 1962 we may expect that only a small further increase in imports is likely to take place. Despite improvement in our over-all deficit, we are continuing to lose gold at a substantial rate. Gold losses during the first half of 1962 amounted to $420 million compared with $857 million for all of 1961. In other words, whereas in 1961 only about one-third of our over-all deficit was reflected in a gold loss, so far in 1962 almost 60 percent of our deficit has been reflected in a gold loss. These continued gold losses raise the question of confidence in the dollar—of continued willingness of foreign monetary authorities to increase their dollar holdings. They strongly underline the importance of action to eliminate the deficit in our balance of payments at the earliest possible moment. Measures Adopted by the Department of Defense The Committee has reviewed the projects being developed by the Department of Defense (Annex A) 1 which you have approved on an interim basis as indicated in your memorandum of July 16. 2 In that memorandum you asked that “the Committee arrange for timely consideration of the interrelations among Defense and AID overseas expenditures” and stated your view that “any final decision to reduce one of the categories of expenditures should be made only after full consideration of its probable impact on the other, as well as its budgetary costs.” In order to carry out these provisions the Secretary of Defense has agreed to keep the appropriate agencies informed of the development of the projects outlined in Annex A and, in particular, to identify at an early stage, in consultation with such agencies, any project which appears likely (1) to necessitate a substantial increase in United States budget costs; (2) to have an impact of such magnitude on the economy of a foreign nation or nations as to call for consideration of increased United States aid as compensation; (3) to result in large-scale reductions in United States expenditures in countries such as the Federal Republic of Germany where a full offset agreement exists; or (4) to result in a reduction of such magnitude in the foreign exchange resources of a foreign nation or nations as to create the likelihood of such nations adopting new restrictions affecting commercial imports (including those from the United States) or to affect the ability of this Government to negotiate steps toward reducing existing restraints (in both the tariff and nontariff fields) affecting commercial imports; or (5) to involve other significant foreign policy considerations. The Committee will be informed of any disagreements between agencies and, as directed in your memorandum of July 16, those disagreements which the Committee cannot resolve will be referred to you. In accordance with the foregoing paragraph, the Committee has arranged for a Defense-AID working group (including State with respect to the Military Assistance Program) to appraise the effects of Defense actions under Annex A on AID interests in less developed countries, particularly Korea, Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines and Latin America. The Committee agrees that a reduction in the net defense expenditures to the level of $1.6 billion per year appears attainable in FY 1963, largely through military offset arrangements and increased sales of United States military goods and services. The Departments of State, Treasury and Defense are continuing to pursue military offset negotiations and military equipment sales promotion as a matter of high priority. Further reductions in later years should be possible as the projects in Annex A are developed and implemented. Study of the Buy-American Act 3 The Committee has requested the Bureau of the Budget to submit at an early date for the Committee's consideration the results of the Bureau's survey of the current effects of the Buy-American Act on procurement overseas by United States Government agencies for use within the United States. Recommendations as to appropriate revisions will be made after receipt of this information. Meanwhile, the Secretary of Defense will keep Defense purchases under the Buy-American Act under his personal review. Aid and the Balance of Payments The Committee has reviewed in a preliminary form, and approves the general direction of, AID's program for minimizing the effect of economic assistance on the balance of payments. The Committee agrees that a reduction in foreign assistance payments to foreign countries and international organizations to below $1 billion and in AID's part of the total to below $800 million appears attainable in FY 1963 largely because of the tightening in AID procurement policies more than a year and a half ago. Present AID estimates for FY 1963 are shown in the tables attached as Annex B. 4 Since AID has not yet completed its study of all possibilities for reduction in offshore procurement and cash transfers, the Committee is not yet in a position to concur in the figures contained in these tables or cited below. AID's program contains the following major elements: 1. The policy that all goods and services procured with Development Loan funds be obtained from the United States, except as waived by the Administrator or his Deputy, will be continued. 2. The policy of prohibiting procurement in the other industrialized countries with grant funds, except for minor amounts approved by the Administrator or his Deputy, will be continued. AID has estimated that FY 1963 obligations for procurement in the less developed countries with grant funds will be about $225 million. At your request, AID is now eval-uating the procurement which takes place in the less developed countries. 3. Where local financial mechanisms can be adapted without seriously jeopardizing the program, it will henceforth be AID's policy that cash transfers, including those for local currency purchases which exceed $250,000 per country per year, shall be placed in a restricted deposit account in the Treasury which can be drawn upon by the recipient country only to finance purchases from the United States, subject to exceptions made by the Administrator or his Deputy. General arrangements for the establishment of these restricted deposit accounts, as well as the method of treating them in the published official balance of payments of the United States, have been agreed upon by the AID agency, the Treasury Department, the Bureau of the Budget and the Department of Commerce. AID has estimated that about $320 million would be obligated for deposit in such accounts in FY 1963 and that FY 1963 obligations for cash transfers and local currency purchases outside the restricted account procedure will total about $275 million. At your request, it is reviewing this estimate with a view to further reductions. Certain situations, such as Laos, Jordan and Vietnam (which has just been approved although it was not included in the above estimates), will not be amenable or fully amenable to the restricted account procedure. Contributions to International Organizations The Committee will shortly review, from the point of view of our balance of payments, proposals for United States contributions in calendar year 1963 to the International Development Association, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Social Progress Trust Fund and the United Nations. Priorities in Foreign Negotiations United States objectives with respect to the other industrialized countries of the Free World include (a) arrangements for offsetting the dollar costs of United States military expenditures in such countries; and (b) an increase in, and improvement in the terms of, development assist-ance from other industrialized countries to the developing areas. Both these objectives are important to our foreign economic policy. However, it should be understood that under present circumstances military offset arrangements enjoy a clear priority over increased development assist-ance because of the immediate and direct benefits which this objective can bring to our balance of payments. Appropriate United States missions should be instructed accordingly. 5 Control System for International Transactions of Federal Agencies The Committee has reviewed the proposals of the Bureau of the Budget for the institution of a process designed to insure continued scrutiny and control of government outlays involving dollar expenditures overseas. The Committee recommends that you approve the memorandum to you on this subject submitted by the Bureau of the Budget, the text of which is contained in Annex C. It is understood that this procedure, which involves quarterly reports to the Bureau of the Budget by all agencies having overseas expenditures in excess of $1 million per year, will be reviewed as experience is gained in its administration. * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Balance of Payments, Cabinet Committee, 7/62-2/63. Confidential. The source text bears no drafting information. Transmitted under cover of a July 27 memorandum from Dillon to President Kennedy. 1 Presumably McNamara's July 10 memorandum, which is not attached; see Document 13 . 2 See Document 14 . 3 Reference is to Title III of an appropriations bill for the Treasury and Post Office Departments, approved March 3, 1933. (41 USC 10a et seq.) 4 Neither Annex B nor C is printed. 5 These instructions were sent in telegram 811 to Paris for USRO and to Bonn, Rome, and Brussels, August 8. (Department of State, Central Files, 811.10/8-862) 18. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to President Kennedy 18. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to President Kennedy Source Washington, October 9, 1962. SUBJECT Report on Measures to Improve the Balance of Payments The two principal lines of attack on the balance of payments deficit consist of measures to curtail the outflow of dollars stemming from the activities of government itself, and measures to increase our export receipts. The measures adopted over the past two years have contributed to the improvement to date in those areas. The importance of actions to reduce government expenditures abroad relates not only to their direct contribution to the improvement in the balance of payments, but also to their effect in demonstrating to the American public that the Federal Government is carrying its full weight in meeting the problem. Reducing Government Expenditures Abroad At your direction I am chairing a Cabinet Committee on the Balance of Payments. The regular meetings of this Committee are providing the focal point for discussion and resolution of major policy issues in this field. In addition to its own reports to you, the Committee has reviewed this report and the first quarterly report to you from the Director of the Bureau of the Budget which is discussed below. The most important recent action in this area is the new Defense program for reducing expenditures entering the balance of payments. More significant savings may result from this program than from previous efforts by that Department to reduce expenditures, because of the basic change in the level of additional budgetary costs considered “acceptable” in order to effect balance of payments savings. The second most significant government expenditure affecting the balance of payments is foreign economic assistance. Procedures for seeking to insure minimum adverse effects on the balance of payments of cash transfers to aid recipients, primarily for the financing of local currency costs of projects, have now been agreed upon. The magnitude and importance for the balance of payments of other government expenditures abroad will be assessed and controlled through the new control system for foreign exchange expenditures of Federal agencies which the Bureau of the Budget has instituted with your approval. Though the potential savings in the expenditures of other Government departments and agencies will be relatively minor by comparison with Defense and AID expenditures, they will nevertheless be important collectively. Begin Confidential Reduction of Military Expenditures Abroad Secretary McNamara is proceeding, pursuant to your interim approval, with the development under Defense Project Eight of a series of actions aimed at helping to reduce the net adverse effect of defense expenditures on the balance of payments to the level of $1.6 billion in fiscal year 1963, and to not more than $1 billion in fiscal year 1966. This compares with a level of $2.6 billion in fiscal year 1961. The agreement reached with Germany last October to offset U.S. military expenditures in that country during 1961 and 1962 is expected to yield about $1 billion during the current calendar year (including reclassification of the German account). This agreement was extended to cover calendar years 1963 and 1964 in a “Memorandum of Understanding” dated 14 September 1962. Negotiations have also been undertaken with France for an offset arrangement for U.S. expenditures there, but French officials have stated that major increases in purchases from the U.S. will not occur, as long as the U.S. remains unwilling to sell equipment in the nuclear and missile fields. Negotiations for an offset arrangement with Italy resulted in an Understanding, reached on 19 September 1962, that Italy will place initial orders for military equipment, approximating $100 million, with the U.S. Department of Defense within 30 days and that the U.S. will guarantee the availability of $100 million in credit assistance repayable over five years. On July 16, Secretary McNamara announced a tightening of restrictions on overseas procurement. 1 With respect to purchases for use overseas, the degree of preference accorded U.S. suppliers over foreign suppliers was increased from 25 percent to at least 50 percent. With respect to purchases for use in the United States, there is established a procedure for reviewing every proposed foreign purchase to consider whether it should be returned to the U.S. All new overseas construction planned for FY 1963 is being reviewed with a view to reducing foreign exchange costs by 66 percent. In addition, a review of base requirements from last January through June 30, 1962 led to decisions to reduce or close 46 overseas bases and facilities. End Confidential Begin Official Use Only Economic Assistance Programs Secretary Rusk has agreed with our target of reducing to $1 billion annually the portion of economic aid expenditures which is paid to foreigners. He has also issued instructions to explore the possibilities of a further reduction, in line with your desire. Of the total $1,250 million of such outpayments which was expected in FY 1963, about $500 million comprised contributions to international organizations and overseas operating costs of the aid program. The former item, at least, is not subject to much compression, but we are examining possible means of delaying the balance of payments impact. Third country commodity procurement by AID has already been sharply reduced, from 56 percent of total commodity procurement in FY 1961 to 36 percent of a much smaller total in FY 1962. The drop in procurement in the nineteen industrialized countries, from which procurement is now generally prohibited, was even sharper, from $495 million (47 percent) in FY 1961 to $139 million (17 percent) in FY 1962. We have been most concerned about the prospect of rising cash transfers to aid recipients, especially for local costs of development programs in Latin America and Africa. Some increase in this type of expend-iture is an inevitable result of the Alliance for Progress program and of the new role thrust on the U.S. in Africa. One way of reducing to some extent the balance of payments impact of this type of expenditure is to limit the ultimate use of the dollars involved to U.S. exports of goods and services. General arrangements for the establishment for this purpose of restricted accounts in the Treasury, and for the treatment of these transactions in our balance of payments presentations, have been agreed upon by AID, Treasury, Commerce and Budget. Furthermore, in accordance with your request, AID Administrator Hamilton is submitting to you weekly reports of proposed program actions involving (1) a probable dollar outflow of $1 million or more, and (2) dollar financing of $2.5 million or more, whether or not a dollar outflow is expected, and semi-monthly reports on actions taken. Other Government Expenditures The Bureau of the Budget has now instituted, after discussion with other agencies, review by the Cabinet Committee on the Balance of Payments, and approval by you, a Government-wide control system for international transactions of Federal agencies. This system submits to a separate process of periodic review, comparable to that of the regular budget process, anticipated expenditures abroad of most Federal agencies. The first report has been forwarded to you by Budget Director Bell. Increasing our Receipts from Abroad In the longer run we can succeed in building the kind of international economy in which we want to live, not by restrictive measures, but only by fostering an expanding world economy which provides greater opportunities for us as well as others and by competing effectively within this system. A most basic aspect of this is our export promotion drive. Domestic Policies Price stability and an efficient, modern industry—able to compete successfully in world markets in terms of new products, delivery schedules, and quality as well as price—are the essential underpinnings of a larger trade balance. Our ultimate success in this area will reflect the performance of our whole economy—labor, business, and agriculture alike—over the months and years ahead, rather than any dramatic single action by the Government. Government does, however, have a responsibility for helping to create an environment conducive to rapid growth within a context of stable prices. One important recent action in this connection was the Treasury Department announcement on July 12 of a fundamental reform in the tax treatment of depreciation. 2 According to Treasury estimates, the new guidelines will be reflected in additional depreciation writeoffs approaching $3.4 billion in the first year. A companion measure—a tax credit equivalent to seven percent of new investment in equipment—is incorporated in the tax bill which has now been passed by the Congress. Together with the depreciation reform, this measure will provide tax treatment for investment in new equipment in the United States more nearly comparable to that provided in other industrialized countries. Productivity gains since early 1961 have been gratifyingly large, although a large part of the improvement was admittedly cyclical. Meanwhile, wage increases have generally been moderate and unit labor costs in manufacturing are now lower than they were in 1959, at a comparable stage of economic recovery. The past three years have represented an exceptional period of industrial price stability during the postwar period. Trade Promotion These domestic developments provide a basis for continued U.S. export competitiveness. But even the best mouse trap doesn't sell itself in today's world. Our second major line of attack, therefore, has been the active promotional efforts which are necessary if we are to maintain or increase the U.S. share of total world exports. On July 17, Mr. Draper Daniels entered on duty in the Department of Commerce as National Export Coordinator, charged with giving increased impetus to all our varied programs. The program of export credit insurance begun on February 3 has met with a favorable reception. By the end of June the Foreign Credit Insurance Association, which now has 71 member companies, had issued 685 policies covering $331 million of anticipated exports during the policy year. On July 2, FCIA broadened the cover to include, at the option of the exporter, protection from the date he accepts the sales order. On July 16, FCIA and the Export-Import Bank announced the availability of policies to cover export credits with terms up to 5 years. 3 Together with the earlier system of guarantees to commercial banks on medium-term export sales, American exporters now have credit facilities more nearly equal to those anywhere in the world. The Department of Commerce has continued its efforts to stimulate business interest in exports. The National Export Expansion Council, its 33 associated Regional Councils, the President's “E” Export Award, the transformation of the Foreign Commerce Weekly into the new International Commerce weekly news magazine, and the continued expansion of existing Foreign Service and Commerce assistance to businessmen, have all contributed to a marked increase in interest in exporting. This interest has been demonstrated by increased demands for services from the Commerce Department and its field offices throughout the United States, increased business purchases from Commerce of trade lists, World Trade Directory reports, and trade contact surveys, and the borrowing by businessmen of almost twice as many commodity, economic and industry reports, submitted from Foreign Service posts around the world, as in the first six months of last year. State and Commerce have actively sought to interest foreign buyers through participation in trade fairs, trade centers and trade missions as well as by more traditional trade opportunity information programs. During the half year, more than 2.3 million people visited U.S. exhibitions in six international trade fairs on four continents. Two trade centers, which are permanent marketing sites, have been opened in London and Bangkok. A third will open shortly in Frankfurt. Continued U.S. representations to foreign countries have contributed to the removal of most unjustifiable quantitative restrictions on imports of U.S. industrial products. Quantitative restrictions against agricultural products remain a problem, but our efforts have secured some degree of liberalization in a number of Western European countries and Japan. The United States and the other countries with whom we negotiated tariff concessions at the Geneva tariff conference took the necessary legal actions to begin bringing these concessions into effect July 1, 1962 or shortly thereafter. Congress has now completed action on the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, giving you substantially the authority you requested. Promotion of Foreign Travel to the United States Offices of the United States Travel Service have been established in eight foreign cities, and its personnel are working in 30 foreign countries. Visa procedures have been greatly simplified. A major additional step, which recently has been announced, is the waiver of personal appearances in most countries. The Travel Service has been working with U.S. communities to seek to insure that travelers to the United States receive a more cordial welcome. Based on data for the first six months, the number of overseas visitors to the United States increased 18 percent over last year. During the same period, the number of visitors from countries in which the Travel Service has mounted a promotional effort rose 21 percent. U.S. tourist travel to other countries has also been increasing, however, with the result that the “travel deficit” is still growing rather than declining. Nevertheless, sample Customs data for the first seven months of this year indicate that, if the trend continues for the balance of the year, the reduced exemptions will cause American tourists to buy perhaps $90 million less abroad than they otherwise would have. Promotion of Foreign Investment in the United States To reduce our long-term net capital outflow, we have sought to increase the attractiveness of foreign investment in the United States, to reduce certain tax incentives which presently favor American investment abroad, and to continue our long-standing efforts to persuade the Europeans to adopt measures to make capital outflows more possible. In essence, we have sought liberalization by Europe rather than restrictive action by the United States. Continuing efforts to find foreign capital sources interested in investment in the U.S. have resulted in several small new European direct investments. Commerce is continuing to seek foreign enterprises interested in establishing operations in the United States, with modestly growing interest from abroad. This activity is particularly keyed in with the ARA program of assistance to labor surplus areas. We have also sought to impress upon our European friends the importance of developing European capital markets and of opening them up to permit a freer flow of capital to the U.S. and to the less developed countries. I made this the theme of my talk to the American Bankers Association conference in Rome in May. Although we would not wish for, or expect, the United States to cease to be a supplier of capital to the world, it would be of benefit to both ourselves and to borrowers if European capital markets were expanded so that it would not be necessary for so many borrowers to look only to the United States market as is now the case. In recent months, significant relaxations of capital restrictions have been made by France, Austria and Spain. The Role of Other Countries In recent years other countries have assumed a greater degree of international financial responsibility. The most dramatic results for our balance of payments have been the military offset arrangements already discussed, and the large prepayments of debts owed the U.S. Government by European countries in surplus positions. Of a longer range character are the measures to induce other countries to extend more financing to less-developed countries, and measures of international cooperation among monetary authorities. Debt Prepayments Because they provide maximum balance-of-payments assistance during the period before our long-run measures achieve their full effects, we have given high priority to securing advance repayments of obligations owed the U.S. Government by countries in substantial surplus positions. France and Sweden have now joined the list of countries that made special debt prepayments last year—the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, and Italy—and Italy made a substantial additional prepayment in July. Total special receipts from these sources in the second and third quarters amounted to almost $550 million. Economic Assistance The first Annual Review of the economic assistance programs of the members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD subjected these programs to searching examination. The Review offered another opportunity for the U.S. to press other DAC members to increase the level of their programs, and to liberalize the terms and conditions on which it is made available. The Chairman's Report on the Annual Aid Review was considered by DAC on July 25-26, and by the OECD Council July 31. 4 Norway has joined the group of aid donors which, as members of DAC, are committed to increasing the size and effectiveness of their aid programs. Norwegian accession raised total DAC membership to 11 countries plus the EEC. The Report of the Chairman of DAC on the Annual Aid Review was considered by DAC and the OECD Council in July, and has been released to the public. It noted that the total flow of official funds from DAC members to less-developed countries increased by 22 percent in 1961. Considering only grants, gross loans of over 5 years maturity, and contributions to international organizations, “aid” extended by other DAC members rose 26 percent to $2.5 billion; that by the U.S. on the same basis rose 27 percent to $3.9 billion. This Report also indicates a continued improvement in the terms on which the United States and several other DAC countries are providing their official assistance. We have also been pressing for the formation of “coordinating groups” to consider the development programs of specific aid recipient countries. In addition to the long-standing “consortia” for India and Pakistan, the IBRD has formed “consultative committees” for Nigeria and Tunisia. Plans are well advanced for “consortia” under OECD auspices on behalf of Greece and Turkey. DAC has held two meetings on Colombia, with IBRD and OAS participation, to develop support for an IBRD “consultative group” to finance the Colombian development plan. DAC “coordinating groups” have met on Thailand and East Africa, and there have been several meetings of DAC members to discuss Latin American development problems. A similar group on Viet Nam has been set up outside of DAC. It appears likely that some grouping will be organized for Iran, probably under either IBRD or DAC auspices. Such detailed discussions offer the best type of forum in which to urge other donors, where appropriate, to increase their aid, lengthen the terms of their loans, and lower interest rates. International Monetary Cooperation Cooperative arrangements between the United States and European monetary authorities have been continued and strengthened during 1962. Notable among the actions during this period is the entry of the Federal Reserve System into the exchange stabilization field to supplement the resources of the Treasury's Exchange Stabilization Fund. In the case of several countries, a part of the foreign currencies obtained by the United States through these swap arrangements have already been utilized to limit increases in their dollar reserves and thereby forestall or reduce additional demands which would have been made on our gold holdings. Although this type of operation does not directly affect the deficit in our balance of payments in a statistical sense, it helps by reducing gold outflows to maintain confidence in the dollar and reduce speculative short-term outflows of capital that have an adverse effect on our balance. In addition, forward exchange operations of the sort initiated last year have been continued by the Treasury. These operations are primarily designed to keep forward exchange rates from moving out of line with their interest rate parities and thereby make it unprofitable for short-term capital to flow abroad because of higher foreign interest rates. Cooperative arrangements among central banks of the so-called Basle group have contributed to the stability of the price of gold in the London market. Growing nervousness in the exchange markets in late June and July led to pressure on the gold market, which was reversed after your press conference on July 23. 5 Among the longer range actions in this area is the increase in the resources to become available to us through the International Monetary Fund. The Congress has now passed both the authorizing legislation and the appropriation necessary for U.S. participation in the arrangements which were agreed to last year. Douglas Dillon * Source: Kennedy Library, Herter Papers, Balance of Payments. Official Use Only (With Confidential Section). Transmitted under cover of a memorandum from Dillon to the President, October 9, which indicated that this report was his fifth to the President on meas-ures taken to reduce the balance-of-payments deficit. Henceforth, Dillon added, the reports would be prepared on the same time schedule as those done by the Bureau of the Budget on international expenditures of federal agencies, and both would be submitted to the President as one integrated quarterly report. Also attached to the source text is a memorandum from Dillon to the members of the Cabinet Committee, October 10, indicating that a copy of the report was attached for their information. 1 See Document 16 . 2 Not further identified. 3 Not further identified. 4 Regarding the July 25-26 meeting of the DAC, see Document 149 . The July 31 meeting of the OECD Council has not been further identified. 5 For the transcript, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962 , pp. 568-576. 19. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 19. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Source Washington, January 21, 1963. SUBJECT Observation on the Balance of Payments for the President's Discussion with the NSC Tomorrow It is most unlikely that we can achieve the goal of balance in our international accounts by the end of 1963. In fact, 1965 looks like the earliest realistic target year, and that may be optimistic. We have cut the proportion of government grants and loans which result in dollar outflows from about 36% in calendar year 1960 to about 24% for last year, and we expect to get it below 20% in the next year. It will be difficult to cut it any further. We are still reducing net military expenditures abroad, mostly by increasing use of offset arrangements with our NATO Allies. We also propose to negotiate offset arrangements with Spain and Japan. Here, as in the loans and grants fields, we are running into diminishing returns. Nonetheless, the importance of maintaining these efforts is great. Ultimately we must look for a solution to the balance of payments problem in a substantial increase in our exports, unless we are to make fundamental changes in our foreign commitments. This is mainly a matter of domestic economic policy, in keeping our products competitive in world markets in terms of price and quality. However, it also depends on conscious effort, both in trade negotiations and export promotion. We are expanding export promotion programs for this purpose. It is clear that the importance of monetary arrangements which serve to defend the dollar will remain 1 through the next several years, and that we can count on Treasury's continued ingenious efforts to deal with this problem. But we must not look on it as a technical monetary problem alone, but also as an important problem of foreign policy in which joint action among the leading Western nations in a variety of ways will continue to be of the greatest importance. C.K. 2 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series,NSC Meetings, 1963, No. 508. No classification marking. 1 The word “important” has been crossed out at this point. 2 Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials. 20. Memorandum for the Record 20. Memorandum for the Record Source Washington, February 27, 1963. Meeting between the President and Mr. Dean Acheson, February 26, 1963, 11 AM, on Balance of Payments 1 PRESENT The President Mr. Dean Acheson Mr. McGeorge Bundy The President began by pointing out that we are facing the same problem that had been developing since 1957, and asked Mr. Acheson whether earlier action by the last Administration could not have improved matters. Mr. Acheson said he thought that if the Eisenhower Administration had undertaken the measures which had been developed in the last two years, they could have cut the annual deficit in half to about $2 billion. Mr. Acheson further remarked that the optimistic hopes of the Kennedy Treasury would have been right if exports had held up as hoped. The President asked about the problem of capital outflow, and expressed his feeling that it was really not sensible for Henry Ford to be able to lay hands on $300 million of America's gold reserve by a single private decision. Mr. Acheson expressed agreement, and said that one way of limiting capital outflow might be to put a tax on it. The President asked whether we might not have a law similar to that in Switzerland, and Mr. Acheson replied that most such laws were easily avoided when it was a capital flight that is intended, but he repeated that taxes might limit investment. On this same problem of investment, Mr. Acheson noted that our foreign investments have been about equal to our net outflow of dollars, and he remarked that if costs should continue to rise in Europe and if they can be held in line in this country, this foreign investment flow might be cut down and perhaps even reversed. The President noted, and Mr. Acheson agreed, that on the other hand we could expect to take some losses on agricultural exports. The President asked Mr. Acheson about the possibility of raising interest rates to hold money here, and Mr. Acheson remarked that this would hold short-term money but that such action would run the risk of slowing down economic growth in the US, and he indicated that he would not welcome this particular move at present. Turning to his basic proposals, Mr. Acheson remarked that the whole object was to get a period of time in which it would not be necessary to use small expedients with troublesome side effects. If things went well during this period of time, no more drastic action would be needed, and if not, there would be time to note the trend and take other measures. Mr. Acheson said that over a similar period of time he thought that we would get a clear notion of what the Europeans will and will not do in such fields as military strategy and deployment, and that if they would not 2 meet our standards, we could make careful plans for appropriate rearrangement of our own commitments. The President expressed his concern at the possibility that he might be forced to make major political or military adjustments for balance of payments reasons at a time when tourists alone represented a billion dollar drain—since tourists contributed nothing of major significance to the national interest. Mr. Acheson continued with a description of his basic plan, remarking that most of the borrowing should be done in France and Germany, and he expressed his belief that both the French and the Germans would be willing in fact to cooperate. In his view a persuasive argument could be made that the United States was facing these difficulties not because things are going badly, but because they are going well, and that the proposed program is in their interest as well as in ours. Mr. Acheson believed that the French would enjoy being able to cooperate in this particular field, and he did not expect that General De Gaulle would attempt to use the monetary weapon for his quite different political purposes. In response to a question from Mr. Bundy, Mr. Acheson remarked that he believed the ten billion dollar figure was adequate in size, and the balance of its distribution among the different categories was satisfactory. He was not troubled by the prospect of reduction in the gold balance, since he believed that in any long-term rearrangement of international monetary practices, there would have to be a reduction in gold holdings in any case. He believed that the gold cover requirement which could be waived if necessary by the Federal Reserve was not a serious obstacle if carefully approached. The President remarked on the difficulty of getting State and Treas-ury together. Mr. Acheson repeated that one difficulty was that the Secretary of State expressed his own lack of interest and concern, while Mr. Ball took a breezy attitude which was very frightening to Mr. Roosa. The President indicated his understanding of this difficulty but said that we should not leave this matter simply to the bankers. Mr. Acheson agreed, but he remarked that now Mr. Roosa was deeply concerned and that indeed his own proposal was one which had been put to him first by Mr. Roosa himself. There was a brief discussion of devaluation in which the President remarked that his own view had been that one difficulty in devaluation was that others would promptly follow suit, and the second difficulty was that dollars would not be held with great confidence thereafter. Mr. Acheson indicated his own view that devaluation was neither a great terror nor an immediate answer to the problem. A better answer would be selective revaluation of unusually strong currencies, but this was not currently likely. The President and Mr. Acheson exchanged with good cheer the thought that it would be pleasant to close down one or two bases in Spain and to discourage the Spaniards from supposing that they could draw gold and hold us up on the military front, both at the same time. It was agreed that Mr. Acheson would talk privately with Secretary Dillon very soon and that at the end of the week there would be a meeting for discussion of the Acheson report 3 among a small group of very senior officers of government. McGeorge Bundy 4 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Balance of Payments and Gold. Top Secret. Drafted by McGeorge Bundy. 1 At an NSC Executive Committee meeting on February 5, the President asked Acheson “to look at our balance of payments problem, consulting with Treasury, Defense, State, and Governor Herter.” A summary record of that NSC meeting is printed in vol. XIII, pp. 173 - 179 . 2 The word “not” has been inserted by hand. 3 Entitled “Recommendations Relating to United States International Payments Problems,” dated February 25. (Kennedy Library, Herter Papers, Balance of Payments) 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 21. National Security Action Memorandum No. 225 21. National Security Action Memorandum No. 225 Source Washington, February 27, 1963. TO The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Treasury The Administrator, Agency for International Development The Director of Central Intelligence 1. The deficit in our balance of payments and the problems associated with it continue to be major problems which influence national security policy along a broad front. The prospects that they will cease to do so in the immediate future are not bright. I think we must, therefore, make sure that financial elements in our relations with other countries are given a proper weight in any transactions we have with them. Conversely, we must be sure that any financial transactions and arrangements we make with other countries tie in with our broader foreign policy needs. 2. I therefore request that the Secretary of State, in exercising his coordinating responsibilities for all our dealings with other countries, give special attention to this point. He should see that the Secretary of the Treasury is informed in a timely way of significant forthcoming negotiations or renegotiations on any topic involving those foreign countries with which our financial relations are particularly important. I request the Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of AID and, in those cases in which he is concerned, the Director of Central Intelligence, to review the arrangements for keeping the Secretary of State informed on those negotiations on which they have the primary action responsibility so that he can perform this task effectively. The Secretary of the Treasury, in turn, will provide the Secretary of State, and others concerned, his estimate of our financial interests and financial possibilities in any such negotiations. 3. In the same way, I request the Secretary of the Treasury to notify the Secretary of State and, where appropriate, the Secretary of Defense and the Director of AID in advance of any financial negotiations involving other countries which might have an impact on our general relations with them. 4. I direct particular attention at this time to any negotiations involving the following countries because of the importance of their gold and dollar holdings or of their commercial transactions with us: Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. John F. Kennedy 1 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 225. Confidential. Copies were sent to Bundy, Charles E. Johnson, and Kaysen. 1 Printed from a copy that indicates Kennedy signed the original. 22. Memorandum From President Kennedy to the Cabinet Committee on Balance of Payments 22. Memorandum From President Kennedy to the Cabinet Committee on Balance of Payments Source Washington, March 2, 1963. 1. It appears that we can no longer look forward to achieving a balance in our international accounts in the next year. Secretary of the Treas-ury Dillon's last report (February 13) to me on measures to improve the balance of payments and the attached gold budget 1 make clear that further substantial savings on the Federal accounts are unlikely to be achieved without program changes. I would therefore like you to survey the alternative courses of action open to us, as we look at this problem for the next several years ahead. If we simply go forward with existing measures, how long will it be before we can expect with confidence to bring our accounts into balance? If this is our program, can we expect to finance the deficits in the interim by the methods we are now using? If we cannot be comfortable with the answers to these questions, what alternative possibilities exist: (a) for bringing our accounts into balance in a shorter period of time and (b) for financing our deficits until we can bring them into balance? 2. Under (a), I would like an examination of what cutbacks in AID programs and Defense deployments would be necessary to make a significant reduction in the government's share of the external deficit. I would also like an examination of measures that could be taken in the private sector to reduce outflows, especially private foreign investment abroad, and the expenditures of U.S. tourists. Are there any further measures that could be taken to stimulate exports, including possibly differential tax treatment of export income, which we would be wise to take? What are the possibilities of using monetary policy to further restrain or even reverse the flow of funds abroad? What would the domestic consequences of such policies be? 3. In addition to this examination of what we can do to reduce the deficit, I want to be sure we have considered thoroughly all the means available to us for financing our external deficit until we can bring our accounts into balance. Further, are we doing enough to deal with the problem of persuading the major European nations to hold the dollars they now have? In this connection, I would like a reconsideration of the proposals examined by Treasury, State and the Council of Economic Advisers last September, 2 in the light of our new and more somber expectations. 4. I would like your survey of these alternative possibilities, their likely effectiveness in dealing with our balance of payments problems, and their costs in terms of our other policy alternatives by the end of March. It seems to me that at that time we must confront the decisions that are necessary to prepare ourselves for the long pull in dealing with this persistent problem. John Kennedy * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Balance of Payments and Gold. Confidential. A Top Secret, Eyes Only memorandum from Kaysen to members of the Cabinet Committee, March 2, indicating that the committee members were to receive the memorandum printed here as well as a copy of Acheson's report to the President on the balance of payments is ibid. Concerning the report, Kaysen noted: “The President requests that you continue to have no discussion of this report with your staff or in any way make its existence known to any other person.” 1 Not printed. (Kennedy Library, Herter Papers, Balance of Payments) 2 Not further identified. 23. Editorial Note 23. Editorial Note Under cover of a memorandum to President Kennedy, April 5, 1963, Secretary of the Treasury Dillon submitted a 31-page report prepared by the Cabinet Committee on Balance of Payments, which reexamined the problem of balance of payments. (Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Treasury, Balance of Payments) Kaysen summarized this report in an April 6 memorandum to the President. (Ibid., National Security Files, Subjects Series, Balance of Payments and Gold) In a memorandum to the Cabinet Committee on Balance of Payments, April 10, President Kennedy announced a meeting on Thursday, April 18, at 10 a.m. to discuss thoroughly the alternative proposals for further actions to reduce or finance the anticipated balance-of-payments deficit over the next 2 years. He proposed that those who had put forward proposals on which there was not general agreement should be prepared to explain and defend them at the meeting, and he indicated specific items that the Department of State, Council of Economic Advisers, and Department of the Treasury should be prepared to discuss. He also indicated he was ready to explore other options raised in the Cabinet Committee's report. (Ibid.) For a record of the April 18 meeting, see Document 24 . 24. Memorandum for the Record 24. Memorandum for the Record Source Washington, April 24, 1963. SUBJECT Meeting with the President, April 18, 1963, 10:00 A.M., to 12 Noon—Balance of Payments The President opened the meeting by asking Secretary Dillon what was the basis for the assumption that our balance of payments would be in good shape in 1965. He referred to the different view that Mr. Acheson's paper suggested. 1 Secretary Dillon responded that it was the general opinion that there would be a substantial improvement in evidence by 1965 or perhaps late 1964, although it was not expected that our accounts would be in balance by then. This opinion had been expressed in the Brookings report. 2 It was shared by the staff of the IMF, the IMF officers and most of the important European central bankers with whom he was in touch. Secretary Dillon then listed the major developments which were prospectively favorable. As far as trade went, European prices could be expected to increase relative to those of the U.S. The possibilities of the continued squeezing of European business profits between rising costs and less rapidly rising prices were about exhausted, and this and other forces would continue to drive European prices up. We could also expect improvements in the investment account. Much of the U.S. investment in Western Europe has been a one-time matter in response to the new political stability in Western Europe and the reappearance of convertibility for European currencies. This was already beginning to decline. Further, higher rate of economic activity in the U.S. would make investment here more attractive. On the other side of the ledger, income from assets held abroad was rising and would continue to rise. Each of the years 1961 and 1962 had shown a $300 million increase in net income from foreign investments over its predecessors. The basic deficit which had been less than a billion dollars in 1961 and was a little over a billion dollars in 1962 could thus be expected to decline. On the other hand, short term capital movements were unpredictable and still presented a problem. Our out-flows on short term capital account had been $2 billion in 1961 and $1.7 billion by last year. Here the question of interest rates was important, but even in the short-term accounts there were countervailing factors. For instance, there had been in the last year a return of flight capital to Europe, much of which was probably concealed in the “errors and omissions” category. It was Secretary Dillon's judgment that this too was coming to an end. These optimistic forecasts were based on the assumption that U.S. foreign expenditures in the military and foreign aid fields continued to be held down. In sum, daylight some time in the period 1965-66-67 was perfectly visible, and accordingly there was no reason for drastic actions now which would upset the dollar and have an adverse reaction on the whole international payments situation. On the other hand, if by the end of 1964 progress was not in accord-ance with expectations, we would have another look at the problem. It had clearly been a mistake to fix on 1963 as a definite target year in which balance would come. The President then turned to Secretary Ball and asked him to summarize the State Department paper on restricting the access to our capital market for foreign security quotations. 3 Secretary Ball opened by saying that the notion of restricting foreign security sales was not one in which he saw any positive merit. For example, he thought it should be much lower on the priority list than either an IMF drawing or a political negotiation for substantial government loans. However, if these are not possible, then the proposal should be given serious consideration. Secretary Ball reviewed the factual situation as set forth in his memorandum, with emphasis on the increasing use of the U.S. market, especially by Canadians. It was clear that we could not make a blanket prohibition and would have to find some way of dealing with genuine Japanese and Canadian needs. What was needed was some machinery for selective control. In his judgment, this could be accomplished without legislation; and simultaneously, informal talks could be had with the Canadians on what their needs were, but rigorous standards applied to the Europeans. On this basis he thought we might save something between $400-$600 million annually on the investment account. Secretary Ball noted that the next Finance Minister of Canada, Walter Gordon, was in favor of “buying back Canada” and therefore might well be sympathetic to the program. He was confident that if we had the control machinery to back up our position, we could come to an understanding with the Canadians. While he recognized the dangers of any restrictive action, Secretary Ball gave his judgment that it would be much better to restrict foreign securities flotation than to make any large troop redeployments or to impose regressive taxes on tourism. Responding to the President's question, he said that foreign securities sales amounted to about ten per cent of total flotations in our markets. Secretary Dillon, responding to the President's request for criticism of the proposal, made two chief points. First, he does not share the State Department estimate of the savings the proposed measure would yield. Second, the risk that any restriction would provoke a general capital flight was simply not worth taking. He then went on to develop his points in further detail. Most of the potential yield was in Canada. Canadian loans last year were exceptional in volume and character, and he did not expect they would be repeated on a similar scale. If we restricted Canadian borrowing, there would be an adverse affect on U.S. exports to Canada, since Canada itself had anything but an easy balance of payments situation and we were their major supplier. Further, the Canadians did not demand gold, but held their dollar balances cheerfully. The Japanese situation was similar. As for the rest, other than Canada and Japan, there was little in it. With respect to international institutions, we already had controls. Last year's European borrowings of $200 million will decline. Secretary Dillon has already made informal representations to some European governments and he will make further representations. Of the rest, Israel took $50 million, and thus would be politically difficult to cut down. Australia and New Zealand, which had taken $80 or $90 million last year were already reaching the limitation of their capacity to carry external debt. Further, the New York insurance companies who were the chief buyers of this kind of security were nearing their own limitations on further holdings. In sum, the whole enterprise would yield at most $200 million a year. Since he thought the chances were 100 to 1 that this activity would trigger a mass capital out-flow in which we could lose $1 or $2 billion in assets, and in turn force us to an IMF drawing with all that it implies, he could not see why we should consider it seriously. Further, there was a legal problem. We might need a proclamation of a new emergency which in itself would have an effect on confidence. The classification of our allies as “enemies” to be dealt with under the Trading With the Enemy Act was troublesome. Secretary Dillon then asked Chairman Martin for his view. Chairman Martin talked about the evanescent character of business confidence. We were facing the real possibility of a crisis. While he did not want to be a Cassandra, he thought it was necessary to warn of what could happen. Liberal policies in trade and in investment matters have been our tradition. We should have the strength and the courage to follow them. If that tradition were impaired, we would start undermining the entire fabric of our liberal policy and all that goes with it, and the confidence which rests on that policy. His own experience with operating voluntary credit controls during the Korean War made him aware of the great difficulties that the operation of a Capital Issues Committee would involve. If this were a dramatic move which added to our resources, Chairman Martin could see some argument for it. But since the forces of the market are working with us we should cooperate rather than oppose them. We should not show the white feather unless we are against the wall. The President asked what happens when our gold reserves get down to $13 billion. Of course we can suspend the reserve requirement but what effect will that have on confidence? Chairman Martin said that we had to hold clearly to our 1961 policy statement: no embargo on gold movements; no direct controls. There was virtue in maintaining a strong line; as soon as we weaken foreign speculators and central banks would doubt our determination and confidence would drop. Liberal trade policies were, after all, our ultimate goal. If foreign countries had different trade and investment policies, we should not by any means follow their bad example. If necessary, we may have to take the risks of putting deflationary pressure on the economy through monetary policies. But since the favorable forces of expansion were operating to make investment in the U.S. more attractive, it seemed unwise to interfere with them by imposing direct controls. In sum, we should hold the line on our liberal policies. We need the courage and guts to stick to our policy and not allow ourselves to be put on the defensive. At this point, the President asked Secretary Ball for his comments. Secretary Ball said that his chief difference with the Secretary of the Treasury was with respect to the amount of risk we should be prepared to accept. He shared Secretary Dillon's assumptions as to the favorable outlook for the future. However, we need a prudent policy which guards against the possibility of a worse outcome. It is clear that we have been too optimistic since 1961. If we are forced to take measures to defend the dollar under pressure it will be dangerous from the point of view of the national interest. We need to act now so as to provide a greater margin within which we can rely on the long range forces to improve our position. Further, we had to look to the future of the international payments system, especially in relation to the situation when we move into surplus. An American surplus might well aggravate liquidity problems. As far as the issue of confidence and leadership went, he thought that departure from the strict fidelity to free capital movement was much less of a threat than the possibility that we might deflate our domestic economy. Secretary Ball stressed that he was not in any way suggesting restriction on foreign flotations in the U.S. as a matter of first priority, and repeated his concern that the policies advocated by the Secretary of the Treasury involved an unnecessarily large measure of risk. Secretary Dillon agreed that the margin on which we were operating was narrow. However, it was he and the Treasury who were conservative, and Secretary Ball's proposal which was reckless. He and Secretary Ball, however, agreed that the issue was really one of priority. In his view once we start down the road of exchange controls and the like, it would be very difficult to stop and the effects on confidence would be clear. The President then turned to the question of a possible drawing on the IMF. He read from paragraph A. of the Council paper 4 and noted the assumptions contained therein that we would face a gross deficit of $6 billion in the period 1963-64 and that we had to manage our affairs so that we financed no more than $1 billion of this deficit each year through gold losses. Secretary Dillon commented that the figure of $6 billion was inaccurate. We proposed to reduce the out-flow as the Cabinet Committee paper showed, so that the deficit was in fact less than that. If we were successful in reducing the out-flow we could finance the deficits on the present basis for as long a period in the future as necessary. He called on Under Secretary Roosa to comment on this point. Secretary Roosa defined our problem as that of any other borrower—how to keep our credit standing good. This meant primarily two things. First, general confidence in our financial policy and second, clear evidence that the government is doing a comprehensive job in reducing unnecessary expenditures abroad. While he professed no expertise in these matters, Secretary Roosa thought it was highly desirable that if there was any excess fat in our military abroad, we should trim it off. This would have a favorable effect on the opinion of the European financial community. A reduction in tourist expenditures would likewise have a favorable effect on the European financial community. The President asked if this would also be true of U.S. foreign investment. Secretary Roosa replied that it would, but this was a matter on which the Europeans will be taking action. He then stressed the importance of interest rates and quoted Van Lennep (the Director General of the Dutch Ministry of Finance and the Chairman of Working Party #3) to the effect that a half percent rise in the U.S. short rates would be a very important demonstration of our determination to deal with the balance of payments problems. Secretary Roosa went on to talk about the difficulties of estimating what gold sales would be and how undependable the figure was on the distribution of deficits and surpluses in Europe. The Swedes, for example, had just told him that they were willing to hold their dollar balances without asking for gold, and as long as confidence in our policy existed, it was clear they would continue to do so. The President asked Secretary Roosa what was his estimate of the gold loss for 1963-64. Secretary Roosa responded that he thought it would be of the same order of magnitude as in the last two years—about $850 million per year or perhaps less. However, he did not wish to promise that the figure would not exceed this, because there were so many variables involved. He reported on his recent favorable discussions with the French, but pointed out that a change in French political attitudes in respect to financial questions might lead to a change in French behavior and a corresponding increase in our loss of gold. Nonetheless, we could sustain gold losses up to $1 billion per year with no strongly adverse effects. Secretary Roosa stressed the crucial importance of avoiding in any way the suggestion that we had lost our nerve. He said that the efforts of the last two years have saved us at least $3 billion in gold in a direct sense. If we had lost the extra $3 billion we would have in fact lost much more because of the alarm that this would have created. Secretary Dillon observed that the program of action that the Committee was presenting to the President would take effect primarily in Calendar year 1964 because of the lags involved. The same thing would be true of the change in monetary policy which was proposed for the fall of 1963. Thus his estimate was that while the gold loss would be between $800 million and $1 billion in 1963, it would drop off to something between $500 million and $600 million in 1964. The President returned to the question of an IMF drawing. Secretary Roosa said we should certainly bear the possibility in mind but at present he would like to save it. We have already worked out the arrangements with Per Jacobsson of the IMF for making a drawing. His own soundings in Europe on the advisability of a drawing were still producing negative results. It would take more time to prepare the Europeans. The Italians, in particular, have bluntly warned us against making a drawing on the grounds that it would shock Europe if the U.S. and UK drew at the same time. All the Europeans expected the UK would be forced to draw. Secretary Dillon distinguished between the notion of any large drawing either up to our gold tranche of approximately $1 billion or up to our first credit tranche of approximately another $1 billion, and the idea of an ice-breaking small technical drawing in relation to Canadian repayment. He was strongly against a big drawing. The Council's analysis of the resources of the Fund was incorrect. The UK must draw and will probably draw $1 billion since the Fund's assets are $2.2 billion in gold and $1.2 billion in hard European currencies. The reserves of hard currencies after a UK drawing would be small. The Fund could sell some gold but if we came in for a drawing on top of a British drawing the Fund would have to sell substantial amounts of gold or activate special borrowing arrangements. If so, our whole financial program would have to be examined at greater detail under the terms of the special arrangements. If the Fund sold gold in any substantial amounts, it would almost certainly ask for the return of the $800 million in Fund gold on deposit with the U.S. This would cancel the gain to us of the drawing. The Canadian situation has changed and the Canadians are not planning to make any repayment this year except for $25 million in gold. Therefore, the occasion for a technical drawing will not present itself now. However, if the British make a drawing we could then examine the situation and see whether a technical drawing was possible. None of this, of course, was a substitute for the action program. In this respect Secretary Dillon called attention to the fact that the $6 billion in the Council memo assumed that there was no action program. Chairman Heller reminded the group that our basic goal was not merely to save gold, but to do it in a way that kept domestic expansion going and our liberal international policies intact as well. We are all assuming that what we are faced with is a transitional problem rather than a permanent one. In this case it is wise to take the easy measures first and to be sure that the more distasteful measures are available and arranged in order of priority. In his view there was no easier way to get $1 to $2 billion additional in foreign resources than to make a drawing on the IMF, at least up to our gold tranche. His analysis of the IMF reserves was different than the Treasury's. There was $4.4 billion in gold and hard currency: $1 billion drawn by the UK and $1 billion drawn by the U.S. would still leave $2.4 billion in ready IMF reserves in addition to the $3 billion which the standby agreement would provide if necessary. Thus both we and the UK could draw and still leave an emergency reserve of nearly $5.5 billion. The President asked what advantage there would be in an IMF drawing. Secretary Dillon interrupted to remark again on the futility of drawing $1 billion if the result was that the IMF withdrew its deposit with the U.S. of $800 million in gold. Chairman Heller responded that this was an unrealistic view. Per Jacobsson favored active use of the Fund, and he would not act so as stand in the way of it. Secretary Dillon said that a technical drawing on the Fund was acceptable. Any big drawing, however, must wait on the actions of the UK. In the meantime we must continue to talk to the Europeans and the New York financial community to prepare them for the possibility of drawing. After all, we could not take actions which would lead to headlines of the “U.S. Admits Bankruptcy; Goes to IMF” sort. Chairman Heller pointed out that we could draw European currency and at the same time the Fund could sell gold to the Europeans. This would have the double advantage of increasing our supply of European currencies at the same time that their hunger for gold was appeased. Secretary Roosa responded that the IMF does not think that their present gold stock is large. Furthermore, since they don't expect any further payments in gold they want to hang on to their present holdings. He again raised the question of what must sooner or later happen to the $800 million in gold that the Fund has on deposit with the U.S. Mr. Tobin pointed out that it is hard to believe that the IMF would be acting against us at the same moment that we make a drawing. This simply was not sensible. Further, he was not proposing that the U.S. draw $1 billion all at once, but rather that we make drawings over a period of time, in installments which would total between $1 and $2 billion in the course of the next two years. The President asked Mr. Tobin whether he was in favor of a drawing. Mr. Tobin responded yes, of course. Our ability to make use of the Fund in a technical way as we did in the past is now at an end because the Fund's holdings of dollars are up to its limit. Drawings in small amounts as a regular routine matter would simply represent a continuation of our past policies in the new technical situation. Mr. Jacobsson and Secretary Dillon could make it perfectly clear to the financial community what was happening, and the whole operation could be carried on in a way that would not shake confidence any more than it has done in the past. The President then moved to the question of political loans. He asked Secretary Roosa what the prospects were for funding existing dollar holdings and for additional five-year loans along the lines suggested in Secretary Ball's paper. Was there a parliamentary problem? Secretary Ball interrupted to remark that the proposal envisioned financing that would be done by central banks and not through government budgets. The basic question, however, was the necessity for a political decision by governments to ask their central banks to go beyond existing practices with respect to financing U.S. deficits. He said this was something which we obviously would start with the Germans and then the Italians. He sketched the plan further, along the lines of his paper. Secretary Dillon pointed out that in his judgment it would be very difficult to achieve these arrangements, and further, with all the difficulty, it would accomplish nothing beyond what we already have done. The present two year loans will be rolled over and renewed as long as necessary. In fact, the amounts we now have outstanding and the agreements for further amounts up to our needs go to the full extent of the future surpluses of the Germans, Italians, French and Belgians. Thus the $1.2 billion mentioned in the Cabinet Committee paper as the available magnitude of financing of this nature does not accurately reflect the maximum amount that will in fact be available. Secretary Ball noted that the Treasury was addressing itself to the easy case of the financing which would be available if the U.S. balance of payments was moving in a favorable way. The problem was, however, what would happen if we did not do well. It was in these circumstances that advance agreement was important and it was precisely in these circumstances that the arrangements we now have might prove unreliable. Secretary Dillon responded that it would undoubtedly be desirable to get the kind of commitments of which Mr. Ball had spoken, but he did not think it possible. We now have oral, informal understandings. Any formal contracts were much more difficult to achieve, and if achieved, they would probably involve much harder terms. The Bundesbank was at least as independent as the Federal Reserve System. (Laughter.) Secretary Roosa noted that the Bundesbank and the subsidiary of the Italian central bank which deals with foreign exchange have full authority in the foreign fields and are not subject to instruction by the government. In particular, the head of the Italian activity was independent of the government. He had pointed out to Mr. Roosa in conversation that he was satisfied with the present arrangements, but if the politicians got into it there would be no money. The President asked whether it was clearly the Treasury's position that we could not go in any formal way beyond what we now have in either standstill understanding and lines of credit? Under Secretary Roosa responded affirmatively. The President asked whether this statement applied to 5 year loans. Under Secretary Roosa responded that we could edge up toward 5 year loans slowly and in one country at a time, but we could not get there in one or a few large leaps. Secretary Ball called attention to page 5 of the Cabinet Committee report and stated again that this was a good financing scheme if things went well. What if they did not? Messrs. Dillon and Roosa said we would call on the IMF. Chairman Heller remarked that they pictured this as an extreme emergency measure. What was in between the emergency measure and the favorable situation anticipated in the Cabinet Committee report? Roosa responded that what we are now doing can handle such a situation. Secretary Ball asked what would happen if in the middle of 1964 the situation was no better than it is now. Wouldn't it then be harder to try to make any new arrangements? Wouldn't it be more difficult to go to the Fund then than it is now? We have been talking about a great catastrophe, but this is unlikely. What is likely is the continuation of our past experience of over-optimism and failure to be able to take measures unilaterally which meet the deficit in the next short period. Secretary Dillon said that world opinion was favorable to the United States. We had either to take advantage of this and continue what we are doing or immediately do a handful of major operations at the risk of changing the favorable opinion abroad. The President observed that this was precisely the central point. He then referred to the very difficult experiences of the fall of 1960 and asked whether the fall of 1964 and the discussion incident to another campaign might not bring a similar experience. Do we have the groundwork laid in the London gold market to avoid this? Secretary Dillon responded affirmatively. In 1960 we were totally unprepared to deal with gold speculation. We now have an understanding with all the major countries, and we could and would keep prices in the London gold market down so that another speculative burst like that of the fall of 1960 will not recur. The President then asked Secretary McNamara what his plans were with respect to Defense outlays on foreign account. What was the present situation and what did he have in mind? Secretary McNamara responded that as of FY 1963 he expected to be losing about $1.6 to $1.7 billion on foreign account. With present programs, and on the assumptions that the Germans continue to buy about $600 million a year under the offset agreement, this figure would be constant for the next two or three years. However, he was doubtful whether in fact the Germans would continue to purchase at this rate for more than another year, and we must be prepared to meet the contingency of decreased income from that source. The only way to improve our position was to reduce troop deployments. It was his judgment that this can be done without reducing our effective military strength; the problem was largely political rather than military. In response to the President's question, he said that half of the expenditures were for NATO; the other half all around the rest of the world with Japan being one of the major areas. The President asked how we could put the political issue to the Europeans. He then referred to the conversations that he, the Secretary of Defense and the Chiefs had had on troop deployments in December. Secretary McNamara responded that it was not the time to raise the issue that was then discussed. What we can do now is thin out our deployments in Europe in terms of troops per combat unit, without reducing the number or strength of our combat units. Thus we would reduce the supporting forces and accompanying dependents. On this basis he expects to be able to reduce the annual rate of net foreign outlays by $300-$400 million below the current one by the end of Calendar year 1964. These reductions will take place mainly in the UK, Germany, France, Spain and Japan. The President then asked Mr. Bell about AID's plans. Mr. Bell responded that in the same period their net outlays would be reduced to an annual rate of $500 million or below. The President turned to the question of the future growth in our export trade. What were the prospects for agriculture and for exports of aircraft? Secretary Dillon commented on our cotton sales, and the loss in market share over the last several years due to a poor pricing method which had made us the residual supplier. The Department of Agriculture was now moving to selling on an auction basis, in an attempt to get back to our previous position of 5 million bales from our present sales of 4 million bales per year. The President asked whether this was enough and what the broader prospects for agricultural trade were. Governor Herter spoke of the Japanese commitments to increase their imports of U.S. agricultural products as the only cheery note in an otherwise not very encouraging picture of the agricultural scene. In response to the President's question, Secretary Ball said that the change in cotton marketing practices would go into effect this year. The President remarked that the Treasury has certainly done an excellent job to date. As far as the weapons we had against adversity, they seem to boil down chiefly to a change in interest rate with the difficulties that this might bring for the domestic economy and Chairman Heller. The President remarked that we seem to be faced with a screwy system, in which we had to squeeze important public activities in the spheres of defense and aid in order to let the private activities of tourism and foreign investment go forward untouched. However, that was how life was, and how the system operated. Secretary Dillon observed that it was important for us to organize a promotional campaign for Americans to see America first, and for more foreign travel in the United States. There was then an exchange between Secretary Ball and Secretary Dillon on the relative merits of restricting tourist expenditures and the flow of investment capital. Ball thought the former an undesirable and regressive policy which no Democratic administration should undertake. Secretary Dillon considered that restriction of tourism, especially by taxes, would be much less a blow to confidence and therefore much more desirable than restrictions on the sale of foreign securities. The President observed that the Treasury was very skillful in shooting down, every three months or so, the balloons which other departments had floated. Secretary Dillon observed that this reflected the Treasury's realism, its understanding that there were no panaceas and its cool assessment of the facts. As for the reductions in defense expenditures which must form the major part of our forward program, he considered that selling the Europeans on it would not be difficult. The President asked what else we had beyond the reductions in defense and aid expenditures abroad and the possibility of raising interest rates later in the year. What about a tax on the use of capital markets by foreigners? Secretary Roosa indicated that the Treasury was exploring this possibility but was encountering many difficult technical problems. Secretary Dillon said that a tax did not have the selectivity of the kind of control system which Secretary Ball had proposed. In his judgment, if we do anything to restrict foreign securities sales, controls are better than taxes. He added a last word on the need for a citizens committee to promote foreign investment in the United States and said that he would send a proposal along to the President on this. Secretary Hodges spoke of the need for being tough abroad and for pushing in a number of areas including more competitive agricultural prices, the reduction of petroleum imports, a general export drive, providing tax advantages to importers, an examination of what could be done to implement a revised Webb-Pomerene Act, 5 and what impact a change in our ocean shipping rate policies would have on the competitiveness of domestic production against certain imports such as Canadian lumber. In response to the President's request, Secretary Hodges promised a memorandum on this last point. 6 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Balance of Payments, Cabinet Committee. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. Attached to an April 17 memorandum from Kaysen to President Kennedy are four papers the President requested for discussion with the Cabinet Committee at the April 18 meeting: Council of Economic Advisers' proposal for an IMF drawing of up to $2 billion from the Fund, Ball's discussion of possible negotiations with the major European countries to raise up to $4 billion from 5-year loans from them, a Department of State examination of the possibility of restricting the sale of foreign currencies in the U.S. market, and a Treasury examination of possible taxes on foreign travel. (Ibid., President's Office Files, Treasury) John C. Bullitt submitted copies of these four papers under cover of an April 17 memorandum to members of the Cabinet Committee on Balance of Payments: Secretary Rusk, Ball, McNamara, David Bell, Christian Herter, Walter Heller, and Kaysen. (Ibid., Herter Papers, Balance of Payments) 1 See footnote 3, Document 20 . 2 Not further identified. 3 Not further identified. 4 Not further identified. 5 The Webb-Pomerene Act was a law to promote the export trade; P.L. 65-126, approved April 10, 1918. (40 Stat. 516) 6 Hodges' undated memorandum to the President, transmitted under cover of an April 19 memorandum from Hodges to the President, urged the Cabinet Committee to conduct the studies it recommended in its April 6 report (see Document 23 ), particularly those that would lead to increased U.S. exports and decreased imports. He suggested that these studies might cover ocean shipping rates, agricultural support policy, petroleum policy, rapid depreciation based on export sales, and anti-trust legislation. (Washington National Records Center, RG 40, Secretary of Commerce Files: FRC 69 A 6828, Balance of Payments) 25. Memorandum From President Kennedy to the Cabinet Committee on Balance of Payments 25. Memorandum From President Kennedy to the Cabinet Committee on Balance of Payments Source Washington, April 20, 1963. 1. In the light of your meeting with me on April 18, I would like to have put into effect the program for immediate action to reduce the balance of payments deficit outlined in your memorandum to me of April 6. 1 Specifically: a. Defense . Secretary McNamara should proceed to develop recommendations for submission to me, after consultation with the Department of State, before July 1 on specific actions which can be completed by end CY 1964 with the target of a gross reduction in the annual rate of dollar expenditures abroad of between $300-$400 million below FY 1963 level. b. AID . Administrator Bell should take action to further reduce AID expenditures that result in payments of dollars abroad with the target of keeping these expenditures to $500 million or less in FY 1965. c. Gold Budget . Budget Director Gordon should carry forward the screening and readjustment of expenditures abroad by other Federal departments and agencies to achieve the indicated annual saving of $50-$75 million per year. d. Agriculture . Secretary Freeman should take steps to achieve savings of $35 million per year, in addition to those included within the “gold budget” review, through administration of PL 480 programs. I want to be able to announce the implementation of this action program around July 1 in a special statement on our balance of payments effort. 2. In addition, the Treasury should continue to take action to finance as much as possible of the balance of payments deficit, and minimize the drain on our gold stock, along lines that have already been initiated. 3. It is my understanding that monetary policy and debt management will continue on present lines and, barring unexpected developments, that it is not now contemplated that any positive action will be taken to increase short-term interest rates until the tax bill is passed. There thus will be a further opportunity for discussion of this issue later this summer. Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve and Treasury will press other countries (particularly Canada) to lower their short-term rates as appropriate. 4. Action should also proceed, with a view to completion for announcement around July 1 with the immediate action program if possible, on the following: a. White House Conference on Export Promotion . Secretary Hodges, in consultation with Secretary Dillon and Mr. Feldman of my staff, should prepare a plan of organization and working program for a White House Conference of Business Leaders on Exports to take place in the autumn of 1963. b. Citizens Committee to Promote Investment in America . Secretary Dillon, in consultation with Under Secretary Ball, should prepare an organization plan and working program for a representative group of financial leaders to promote investment by foreigners in the United States. c. Tourism . The Secretaries of Agriculture, Commerce and Interior, in consultation with the Balance of Payments Committee, should prepare plans for a “See America Now” program to promote tourist travel in the United States by Americans as well as foreigners. d. Coastwise and Ocean Shipping . Secretary Hodges, in consultation with the Balance of Payments Committee, should study and report to me on the costs of coastwise and ocean shipping as these affect our ability to compete with foreign products in the United States and abroad, and should prepare a program of recommended action. e. Other . The Committee should see to it that other studies mentioned in part V of the report of April 6 are completed promptly and the results reported to me. 5. In order to improve the usefulness of the International Monetary Fund to the United States, the Treasury should take appropriate action to prepare public opinion, both here and abroad for the possibility of a technical drawing. The possibility of such a drawing should be kept under close review. 6. In addition, the Long Range International Payments Committee, while continuing its other studies of various proposals for increasing liquidity and reforming the monetary system, should consider possibilities for enlarging member quotas in the International Monetary Fund. 7. Since in my view the balance of payments will remain one of the major constraints on a wide range of government actions in both foreign and domestic policy, I wish the Committee to continue to keep developments under review, and inform me as the need for further action arises. John F. Kennedy 2 * Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Treasury, 4/63-6/63. Secret. 1 See Document 23 . 2 Printed from a copy that indicates Kennedy signed the original. 26. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy 26. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy Source Washington, June 4, 1963. SUBJECT Planned Redeployment from Europe of Selected Army and Air Force Units My purpose is to inform you of certain planned redeployments of Army and Air Force units from Europe. These redeployments have been programmed for some time and, hence, are distinct from the balance of payments actions I will recommend to you by 1 July 63. However, the projected balance of payments savings resulting from these redeployments will be reflected therein. During the Berlin crisis the Army's strength in Europe increased from 228,700 to 273,400. During FY '63 we reduced this peak figure to 256,000. During FY ‘64 we are programming a further reduction to 240,000, though in view of your forthcoming trip Secretary Rusk and I have agreed that we should limit withdrawals in the first quarter of FY ‘64 to the non-combat troops only (9,700). In the case of the Air Force in NATO Europe, Air Force strength increased from 21 to 32 tactical fighter squadrons during the Berlin crisis, including a number of Air National Guard squadrons. Because the immediate return of all the additional squadrons would have caused an unnecessarily sharp reduction, we activated the 366th Wing of four Regular Air Force squadrons using ANG F-84 aircraft and equipment. We also planned to deploy three additional squadrons to obtain a total of 28 squadrons. Subsequently, the JCS recommended and I approved the retention of the additional squadrons in the CONUS and the earmarking of Strike Command squadrons for rapid deployment to Europe for possible air superiority operations in the Berlin Air Corridors. With respect to the 366th Wing, we find that is of marginal value. The obsolescent equipment, lack of war consumables and of modern ordnance restrict the operational value of this wing. Based on August 62 and April 63 recommendations of the JCS I approved in April the return of the wing to the CONUS in the first quarter, FY ‘64, for conversion to modern F-4C aircraft and directed that the four bases in France be kept as dispersed operating bases. We then notified the appropriate Congressmen and the press of this move. As for the political implications of these actions, Secretary Rusk and I believe that the chief concern is the danger of giving to the Europeans any basis for suspicion that these actions somehow are part of a larger pattern and that De Gaulle is right in his claim that the U.S. will pull out of Europe. We recognize that we cannot afford to take any steps which would cause apprehension in Europe of a U.S. withdrawal. We believe, however, that the nature of these actions is such as to incur little risk of stimulating European fears. The withdrawal of the F-84 Wing and the reduction of Army non-combat troops represent the next-to-last installment of the gradual phase-out of the Berlin build-up which has been in progress since the summer of 1962. The last installment, the decision for withdrawal of which has been deferred until after your trip to Europe, consists of ground combat troops (one armored cavalry regiment, two medium tank battalions and three artillery battalions). Yet, even with their return, as we noted above, the Army in Europe will still be above its pre-Berlin crisis strength and its capabilities have been greatly increased through modernization, reorganization, and prepositioning equipment. Careful and objective exploitation of these favorable elements will permit us to minimize the danger of untoward political developments and Secretary Rusk and I are concerting our efforts to this end. As you know, other redeployments are currently under study pursuant to your directive of April 20 to the Cabinet Committee on Balance of Payments. 1 I will forward these proposals when prepared after appropriate consultation with Secretary Rusk. Secretary Rusk concurs. Robert S. McNamara * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Balance of Payments and Gold. Secret. 1 See Document 25 . 27. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Secretary of Defense McNamara 27. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Secretary of Defense McNamara Source Washington, June 7, 1963. Dear Bob : It might be useful, at some point in the near future, for the two of us to discuss with the President the subject of troop withdrawals from Europe. 1 Study of the potential political effects convinces me that, other than limited adjustments dictated by organizational or other technical considerations, there should be no further withdrawals of our troops from Europe pending conclusion of the present special Stikker NATO force review, and beyond that, until or unless we are convinced that such withdrawals would, in balance, benefit our security position. Several issues are involved: First, in the current European political climate, US reductions would raise the fear among Europeans that more cuts would follow, as a part of a pattern of US withdrawal from Europe. DeGaulle's hand would be strengthened. As a result, the immense American political influence over a delicate and vitally important complex, which it has been possible for us to exercise largely because of our major troop presence in Europe, would be weakened. Second, I am not persuaded that it would be wise to alleviate our balance of payments problem through troop withdrawals, certainly not before all other avenues for easing the problem have been exhausted. Third, a major withdrawal would force us to accept what is essentially a nuclear trip-wire posture in Europe since our involvement in two world wars in the last half century demonstrates that in a world-wide crisis complete disassociation from Europe is entirely infeasible. Allied progress toward a balanced strategy and force structure in Europe would stop and instead the Europeans would probably cut back their own non-nuclear forces. Although I share your concern that the US 7th Army, fully equipped and trained to fight, has very weak allied forces on both flanks, I believe we must first assure ourselves that further strengthening of these flanks cannot be realized before we seek other solutions. To do otherwise would involve our accepting a dangerously lowered nuclear threshold, with higher risks of political collapse or nuclear war. Berlin, especially, would become more hazardous. Fourth, US force deployments in Central Europe have contributed immensely to the creation of a military environment conducive to the development and maintenance of German political and military stability. Particularly with the transfer of government about to take place in Germany, we cannot risk the reduction in our influence over German affairs which would result from a major withdrawal of US forces. Finally, it seems to me that no substantial withdrawal should be carried out or even planned before completion of the new NATO planning exercise aimed at mutually relating the strategy, the forces, and the budg-ets within the Alliance. In the wake of a series of major US actions affecting European security, taken without what Europeans regard as adequate consultation, a unilateral change in our forces in Europe could be disastrous to the cohesion of the Alliance. While, as I said, I do not rule out limited force readjustments for logistical streamlining or other technical reasons, any readjustment must be carefully handled if we are to avoid serious political damage. Therefore, I would hope there can be full participation from the outset by us in any discussions of proposed change in existing US military deployment in Europe. In the discussion with the President, it might be useful to broaden the participation to include other members of the Cabinet or the NSC. In any event, I am sending a copy of this letter to McGeorge Bundy for his information. With warm regards, Sincerely, Dean 2 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Balance of Payments and Gold, 6/62-9/63. Secret. A copy was sent to McGeorge Bundy. 1 Secretaries Rusk and McNamara met on July 15 to discuss this question before meeting with the President. A memorandum of their conversation is in Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. 2 Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original. 28. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy 28. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy Source Washington, July 16, 1963. SUBJECT Reduction in Department of Defense Expenditures Entering the International Balance of Payments This is in reply to your Memorandum for the Cabinet Committee on Balance of Payments, dated April 20, 1963, 1 which requested, in part, that after consultation with the State Department, I recommend specific actions, capable of completion by the end of Calendar Year 1964, which would achieve a gross reduction in the annual rate of Department of Defense expenditures abroad of between $300-400 million below the FY 1963 level. Department of Defense Expenditures Overseas In the absence of action along the lines recommended and discussed below, Department of Defense expenditures entering the international balance of payments during FY's 1963-66 are estimated as follows: ($ Millions) FY 1963 $2,739 FY 1964 2,686 FY 1965 2,700 FY 1966 2,698 These estimates are based on the currently planned deployment of our military forces and the continuation of all current Department of Defense programs designed to reduce expenditures overseas. They also reflect a moderate increase in price and wage levels overseas anticipated for this time period. As you know, I have made a concerted effort during the past two years to reduce the net adverse balance of Department of Defense transactions entering the international balance of payments. During the period FY 1961-63, the net Department of Defense adverse balance, i.e., gross expenditures overseas less receipts, was reduced by approximately $850 million—from $2,334 million to $1,477 million. This reduction was achieved by holding our expenditures relatively constant despite increased international tension and inflation abroad, and by increasing receipts. With respect to these greater receipts, Germany and Italy have agreed to offset all or part of our defense expenditures in these countries by increased spending for U.S. military goods and services. Our efforts to increase sales of U.S. military equipment to other allied countries will continue to be pressed. However, we believe that the $1 billion of annual receipts projected for the period FY 1964-66 are a realistic maximum. Guidelines for Developing the Actions Proposed Herein Further actions to reduce Department of Defense expenditures overseas, as outlined in Attachment A, 2 are based on the following: 1. U.S. commitments of effective military forces will continue to be met. 2. A gradually increasing capability of the Armed Forces to deploy rapidly will permit some reduction in other forces permanently in-place overseas. 3. Our increased strategic missile capability will permit, by the middle of CY 1964, somewhat less reliance on overseas based manned bombers. Summary of Recommended Actions The actions affecting our present deployments in Europe are: 1. The consolidation on four bases and some reduction (from 103 aircraft to 80) in our present B-47 Reflex posture by July 1, 1964. 2. The transfer of the aircraft of two U.S. air defense squadrons in Spain to the Spanish Government by January 1, 1965. 3. The return of the F-102 air defense squadron from Iceland by July 1, 1964 (subject to the concurrence of Iceland's government). 4. The use of increased MATS capabilities to permit the return of 32 C-130 aircraft from France by April 1, 1964. 5. A reduction in the Army Line of Communications (LOC) in Europe predicated on some reductions in theater reserve stocks, relocation of issue stocks and placing in standby status certain facilities in Western France. In the Pacific, the more important redeployment actions recommended are: 1. The elimination of the obsolescent B-57 wing in Japan 6 months earlier than programmed (i.e., July 1, 1964). The 12th Tactical Fighter Wing (F-4C aircraft) now programmed to deploy to Japan upon the phase out of the B-57 wing would be retained in the U.S. to increase our capability to respond to contingencies elsewhere in the world. 2. The return to the U.S. of 16 C-124 transports from Japan and 16 C-130 transports from Okinawa by October 1, 1964, using our increased airlift capabilities to meet much of the Pacific logistics requirements, reduced by the redeployments. 3. The return to the U.S. from Japan of the 66 F-102 aircraft (20 of which are presently programmed to be removed by July 1, 1964). Such a move is made possible by utilizing in the air defense of Japan the increased capabilities of the Japanese Air Self Defense Force, and the increased capabilities of the USAF to rapidly deploy F-4C aircraft to Japan during the periods of tension or at the outset of hostilities for air defense missions. In addition, I recommend a series of actions which would produce foreign exchange savings in such areas as contractual services, petroleum procurement and construction. We also anticipate that savings will be achieved through better personnel management. All of these actions are discussed in greater detail in Attachment A. Effect of Recommended Actions My recommended actions would achieve in CY 1965 and FY 1966 a reduction in overseas expenditures of approximately $300 million below the FY 1963 level as follows: ($ Millions) Current Estimate Revised Estimate Under Proposed Actions 3 FY 1963 $2,739 $2,739 FY 1964 2,686 2,671 FY 1965 2,700 2,506 FY 1966 2,698 2,434 Although the redeployments of Air Force units reduce our forward deployed forces, they would have a desirable effect on our capabilities to respond to contingencies anywhere in the world. A smaller portion of our forces would be engaged in substituting for allied self-defense forces, more would be available for concentrated use as conditions may dictate, and a smaller number would be deployed on the more vulnerable forward bases. The actions relating to Japan go beyond the specific recommendation contained in Mr. Gilpatric's memorandum to you of February 8, 1963 relating to U.S./Japanese Defense Relationships. 4 They involve a considerable withdrawal of aircraft from Japan. However, they are militarily desirable, apart from gold flow considerations, in the sense that they increase our reaction capability elsewhere. In addition, they emphasize for the Japanese our belief that Japan must depend more on its own self-defense capabilities in the future. In this connection I have been disappointed by the current level of Japan's defense expenditures. I believe the minor adjustments of Army strength in Europe are desirable, gold flow considerations notwithstanding, in the interests of better organization and management of our resources. This applies particularly to the reorganization and streamlining of the Army Line of Communications (LOC) in France. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff state: "The reduction in the Army LOC in Europe could have an adverse impact on the Army combat capability. Three areas of principal concern are the ability of the Army to respond quickly to an emergency in Europe after the cuts are made, the concentration of stocks in the forward area, and the extremely important politico-military implications of placing a part of the LOC in Western France on standby and reducing war reserve levels to 90 days. I believe this adverse impact can be minimized by cooperative logistics agreements in the form of joint depot utilization in Western France, by maintaining a capability in CONUS and Europe for rapid expansion in an emergency and by insuring that adequate airlift and sealift are available for a rapid reconstitution of the LOC.” The possible termination of the Caribou program in Canada has been under review for some time. The FY 1963 procurement was undertaken in part to retain the option of using that aircraft if no more desirable alternative developed in the future while at the same time permitting some continued improvement in Army capability. Continuing study of this matter has led to the conclusion that the 157 Caribou on hand and on order as of June 30, 1963 will be adequate to meet our requirements in view of the availability of C-130E's. During your meeting with Prime Minister Pearson on 10-11 May 1963, you indicated that we were then reviewing our requirement for the Caribou. You will, of course, remember that we are committed to consult with the Canadian Government before any termination notice is announced. When I met on June 6 with Mr. Drury, the Canadian Minister of Defense Production, I told him that Caribou would have to compete on its own merits against other alternative solutions to the Army's air transport problem. Thus, termination of Caribou procurement will not surprise the Canadian Government even though it will undoubtedly be disappointing. I have consulted with the Joint Chiefs of Staff with regard to the military acceptability of the foregoing measures. While recognizing the compelling economic issues inherent in the current balance of payments problem, they point out that “most of the measures designed to control gold outflow work against the military desideratum of maintaining a forward strategic posture based upon the deployment of substantial military forces in sensitive strategic areas overseas. The actions recommended in this memorandum which entail bringing home Air Force units will, in varying degrees, increase the reaction time of our military response, particularly in the areas of the Western Pacific. The proposed reduction in the B-47 forces overseas [a reduction of 23 aircraft for a period of a few months] 5 will occasion a readjustment of strategic nuclear targeting and, for a limited time, will reduce the weight of our nuclear attack. Also, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have expressed concern over the effect on base rights in Iceland, Spain, and Japan of a reduction of U.S. garrisons there unless such reductions are preceded by careful bilateral negotiations. However, if the contribution of these actions to the solution of the balance of payments problem is considered to outweigh the military risk involved, then the Joint Chiefs of Staff accept the proposals.” Consideration of Additional Actions In arriving at these recommendations I have considered a number of other alternatives. These actions included possible redeployments of additional U.S. forces now in Europe and the Pacific, changes in depend-ents policies, early termination of the SAC Reflex posture in Europe, and a further reduction in overseas petroleum procurement. In the course of preliminary discussions, the Department of State expressed concern over the possible adverse political and economic repercussions of substantial redeployments or a significant curtailment of petroleum procurement overseas. To cite one example of these political constraints, we estimated earlier this year that approximately $20 million of our FY 1964 requirement for aviation gasoline normally procured in the Caribbean area could have been returned to the U.S. by restricting bids to U.S. sources. The added cost of this action would have been only $322,000. When weighed against the fact that other procurements for use overseas are being returned to the U.S. at premium differentials up to 50%, this proposal was very attractive from the budgetary standpoint, and was militarily sound. However, in view of the State Department objections, the procurement of the first half of our FY 1964 requirement was not restricted to U.S. sources. In addition to the actions recommended herein, I am investigating the following areas which may result in additional savings over those now projected: 1. A review of personnel requirements for DOD communications activities overseas. My preliminary review indicates that some reductions in this area may be desirable. 2. A review of overseas headquarters with a view to streamlining and/or consolidating them. 3. A joint review with the State Department of our over-all force posture in Korea. 4. A review of the Air Force tactical maintenance concept with a view to establishing such maintenance in rearward areas, thus increasing our capabilities for non-nuclear conflict while reducing overseas costs. 5. A review of the possible redeployment of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing from Japan to Okinawa and a review of the redeployment of the F-105 TFW from Kadena, Okinawa, to Guam. 6. A review of certain of our forces committed to NATO and deployed overseas, keeping in mind the possibility of redeploying some forces to the United States and in turn demonstrating frequently our ability to deploy to Europe in support of NATO commitments. Other Possible Savings I believe that savings of any substantial magnitude over those herein recommended or being reviewed could be accomplished at this time only through: (1) substantial redeployments to the U.S. or other dollar areas, and/or (2) significant reductions in the dependents authorized overseas. Recommendation I recommend your approval of the actions proposed in Attachment A. I have discussed these actions with Secretary Rusk and he concurs in them, subject to review of the detailed plans for their implementation. Secretary Rusk stresses the necessity for a carefully coordinated information and consultation procedure to ensure that: 1. These actions not be presented as a “package” implying U.S. withdrawal from its commitment to maintain the integrity and freedom of the Free World. 2. The specific countries involved in the proposed redeployments understand our reasons and be given no basis for believing that the program is forced upon us by our balance of payments position. These conditions are, of course, entirely acceptable to me. Robert S. McNamara * Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Treasury, 7/63. Secret. Copies were sent to Rusk and Dillon. 1 Document 25 . 2 Not found. 3 Attachment B provides a detailed analysis of U.S. defense expenditures overseas. [Footnote in the source text. Attachment B has not been found.] 4 Scheduled for publication in volume XXII . 5 Brackets in the source text. 29. Editorial Note 29. Editorial Note On July 18, 1963, President Kennedy sent a special message to Congress on the balance of payments. The President cited the improvement in balance-of-payments deficit and other signs of progress. He believed that further administrative and legislative measures were required, however, to make “inroads into the hard core of our continuing payments deficit,” and he especially reemphasized “the necessity of improving this Nation's over-all long-range economic performance—including increased investment and modernization for greater productivity and profits, continued cost and price stability and full employment and faster growth.” President Kennedy then expounded on immediate measures to reduce the deficit and to defend the U.S. gold reserves in the following areas: export expansion, tourism, federal expenditures abroad, and short- and long-term capital flows. Concerning the latter, he urged Congress to enact an “Interest Equalization Tax” that would increase the cost of borrowing to foreigners. Immediate measures in other areas proposed by the President included investment by foreign savers in the securities of U.S. private companies, special government transactions (such as prepayment of debt by foreign countries and advance payments on military purchases), gold sales and increased dollar holdings, a standby arrangement to draw on dollars in the International Monetary Fund, and informal credit arrangements with the central banks of industrialized nations. Full implementation of his proposed program of action, the President concluded, would realize gains of about $2 billion, which “will give us the time our basic long-term program needs to improve our international competitive position, and increase the attention for investment in the United States.” For text of the message, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963 , pages 574-584. Regarding guidance to certain U.S. posts about the message, see Document 76 . 30. Letter From John Kenneth Galbraith to President Kennedy 30. Letter From John Kenneth Galbraith to President Kennedy Source Washington, August 28, 1963. Dear Mr. President : This is the first of two papers that I am sending you on the balance of payments problem. 1. The companion paper is concerned with problems and remedies. 1 This deals with the more serious question, as I measure matters, of how to handle the problem. There is at present no mechanism for enforcing the continuing action on the wide front that the problem requires. Since I must speak frankly about persons and departments, I plead that this particular memorandum be held in strict confidence. 2. The heart of the matter is that for everyone concerned with the balance of payments problem it is subordinate to another concern. For the Council of Economic Advisers, it is subordinate to the domestic economy. Tobin, although his views were not typical, was perilously close to the conclusion that there is no problem at all. Other members, in fighting off measures which were considered, in my view quite correctly, to have a bad domestic impact, failed to develop a solidly affirmative position. All economists unduly emphasize international liquidity, which is a fashionable conversation piece of the economists' union. The State Department, though it suffers from the effect of a weak balance of payments position on its bargaining position, is primarily concerned with protecting trade, troops and aid. The Commerce Department views the trade balance largely as an opportunity to get more money for trade promotion and foreign tourist travel. These are negligible in their possibilities. The Treasury has responsibility for the problem as a whole, but until recently its sacred cow has been the capital market. Even now, the checking of long-term capital outflows, and the stopping of avenues of escape around the proposed tax, is being handled in a highly unwilling way. The picture is not entirely black. Bob McNamara has made a loyal and substantial effort to ease the problem. On the dollar-saving side, his is the only area of substantial achievement. Now as to remedies. Something over a year ago I urged you to set up a Cabinet Committee to have jurisdiction over this problem and to be responsible for its solution. 2 This hasn't worked. It has been a place where those responsible have sought to shift the buck. There is no further hope for action here. I gather you have been sufficiently pressed as regards the Treasury and Dillon. The Treasury hasn't done well. It waited too long on long-term capital movements. It is subject to the banker syndrome, which is to foresee disaster but prefer inaction. However, the Treasury cannot exercise real jurisdiction over the other Government Departments. The latter will always find it easier to organize against Dillon than to follow his lead. An appeal to you is inherent in the situation, so the problem comes to your office in any case. Accordingly, I see no alternative to better organization of the Executive Office for continuing pressure and action. This means, I believe, that you must have someone of stature, fully seized of the seriousness of the problem, who will do in this critical matter what Bundy does for you on foreign policy and Sorensen on domestic policy. (You might reflect that nothing in the areas they so competently now cover is as important as the balance of payments, yet neither can function with real confidence on this issue.) Such a solution will cause sadness in the Treasury and the Council of Economic Advisers. But every President since Roosevelt has had to have an economist or economic figure who was his man to help him in combatting the excessive parochialism of departmental policy. (Currie served Roosevelt in this way, David Bell so served Truman, and Randall and Gabriel Hauge so served Eisenhower.) The man is all-important. Carl Kaysen, who is perhaps the ablest all-around economist in the country, is unfortunately susceptible to the economists' union. As a result, he is overly impressed by the international liquidity escapism. In any case, you need someone full time. I suggest that, whatever the implications, you attach Charles Hitch to the White House Office for nine months for this job. He is highly intelligent, has a pragmatic view of the issue, takes it seriously, and you can rely completely on his judgment. He would act largely through you, but he would command respect as your adviser. This need not be a permanent assignment. He need stay only until the present bleeding is decisively reversed. As I argue in the accompanying memorandum, the present trend can be reversed. It is this, as well as the urgency of doing so, that leads me to urge that the powers of the President be decisively engaged. Yours faithfully, John Kenneth Galbraith 3 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Balance of Payments and Gold. Personal; Secret. Galbraith, who had been succeeded by Chester Bowles as Ambassador to India in July 1963, was serving as a consultant to the White House. 1 Reference presumably is to Documents 31 and 32 . 2 Not further identified. 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 31. Letter From John Kenneth Galbraith to President Kennedy 31. Letter From John Kenneth Galbraith to President Kennedy Source Washington, August 28, 1963. Dear Mr. President : I am submitting herewith the report on the balance of payments which you requested. 1 While I realize you are not without reading material, I venture to urge your attention for the document as a whole. The report takes an unsanguine view of the prospect. There is no solid reason for expecting the situation to improve. The consequences of unabated drain, which unhappily must be assumed, will be manifold and grave. In the report, I examine at some length the nature and shortcomings of past action. By its nature this involves a good deal of second-guessing and hindsight. I would hope this would not be thought critical of individuals. It is important to see why, through errors of optimism and the desire to contract out of difficult action, we have erred in handling this problem in the past. The heart of the strategy I propose is to suspend capital exports for a minimum period of six to nine months, with possible extension. This is imperative and requires supplementing recent Treasury action by stronger executive measures. The existing steps are not sufficient for the task. The present course of trade negotiation is sadly inconsistent with our balance of payments position. I recommend as the next step the effective postponement of the existing negotiations with the Common Market Countries. I would personally like to go much farther for I do not believe that we have sufficiently reconciled our trade policy with our balance of payments position. However, I am restrained by the lack of public or even governmental preparation for such a reversal. Further, I urge certain steps on tourist travel, military deployment, and the deeper tying of aid. None of these, the military proposals excepted, will have a very prompt yield. All will be important in the slightly longer run. The person who comments responsibly on the payments problem is like the herald who brings bad news: He is a figure for popular execution, and in this case each department will have its own gibbet. There are, indeed, grave difficulties with everything here urged. I hope these will not be considered decisive for they must now be measured against the alternative courses of action, which are few and worse, and the consequences of inaction, which would be worse yet. Yours faithfully, John Kenneth Galbraith 2 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Balance of Payments and Gold. Personal; Secret. 1 Document 32 . The President's request has not been further identified. 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.2 32. Memorandum From John Kenneth Galbraith to President Kennedy 32. Memorandum From John Kenneth Galbraith to President Kennedy Source Washington, August 28, 1963. THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS I have now reviewed the papers on the balance of payments 1 and have talked at some length with those principally concerned. The following assessment is divided into three parts: the problem; the past and present efforts to deal with it which I feel to be seriously defective; and the action we should now take. We are, I fear, faced with the need for serious and difficult steps more than a little occasioned by the reluctance and postponement of the past. Those who now urge further postponement may wish to recall that the steps we now face could have been avoided by lesser but more timely action in the past. Further delay will mean yet more severe measures. Delay will mean continued accumulation in foreign hands of dollar assets convertible into gold or the conversion of these assets into gold. Gold withdrawals at any time during the next 14 months could occur with damaging political effect on the Administration. It might be promoted for political purposes. We are taking unacceptable risks as long as the imbalance continues. There are more deep-seated costs. You have heard sufficiently of the restraints that the payments weakness imposes on domestic employment policy. It is also notably undermining our foreign policy. Bargaining strength is far more intimately related to the balance of payments than to any other factor. Our troubles this past year with our European allies, France in particular, are not because we are militarily weaker or have less eloquent negotiators than in the past. It is because we are financially weak and our allies have become strong and more than a trifle arrogant as a result. If the weakness continues we will be able to keep our military and economic aid commitments only by borrowing. In consequence we will have the economic and political weakness of a debtor nation. It will soon be noticed that our foreign policy lacks the power, certainty and confidence of the past. This will also have domestic political overtones, for the weakness will be attributed one way or another to the Administration. There is a feeling among some in the Administration that if the worst came to the ultimate worst these various consequences could be eliminated by devaluation. (Dr. Tobin has influentially taken this position.) So, though it cannot be mentioned, we have an ace in the hole. We have not. Prior to any decision to devalue in our system of checks, news leaks and balances there would be vast press disturbance, huge gold outflows, and deep suspicion of the competence of those concerned, all with the most disastrous political effects. And economists, even the men of reputation, persist in thinking of devaluation (or floating exchange rates) in terms of a small country vis-a-vis the United States. In fact, the devaluation by the United States would bring prompt and immediate devaluation by every other country, including currencies as hard as the Swiss Franc. All this would promptly restore the previous exchange and trading relationships, the previous imbalance, and the previous dependence on external credits. In turning to measures, we must see first (a) why past action has not worked and (b) what prospective action is needed. For purposes not of criticism but of analysis, it is especially important that we see the defects of past action. Shortcomings of Past Action Much useful work has been done on the balance of payments problem. Both the underlying problem and the possible course of action have been considerably clarified in the last two and one-half years. However, our attitude toward the problem has been seriously defective for the following reasons: 1. We have naturally sought to maintain confidence in the dollar. Accordingly, we have been perpetually optimistic about the prospects for turning the balance in our favor. In the course of persuading others, we have repeatedly persuaded ourselves that all would soon be well. Each remedial step—to tie aid, reduce dollar outlays for defense, stimulate trade and tourist travel, and (more recently) to control access to the domestic capital market—has been presented as a total remedy. This optimism has then become the basis of policy until it was evident that something more was needed. There have been so many optimistic forecasts that none would now be taken seriously. This is not good public procedure. 2. We have attached great hopes to policies that were never capable of supplying a solution. And we have seized with inordinate enthusiasm on any available trend in the right direction. There was no chance whatever that increased foreign travel in the United States would have an important effect on the travel account or that Government-sponsored trade promotion activities abroad would importantly affect sales within the lifetime of this Administration. These steps may be useful but the changes they work can only be exceedingly gradual. Recently it has become the cliche, supported by the Brookings study, 2 that European prices are rising more rapidly than our own. This will be the fundamental corrective. This is unduly optimistic. One of the prime accomplishments of this Administration has been to obtain a measure of control over wages and prices. But there is no real indication that our control is better than that of our European competitors. At any time our prices could go up. And it seems certain that the Common Market governments can bring theirs under greater control if they must. At this moment, in fact, there are indications of adverse movements on our side. Accordingly, it is silly and dangerous to pin our policy, as we are now doing, to so slight a prospect. 3. The balance of payments has fallen afoul of the interests and concerns of individual Departments. The Council of Economic Advisers, in my view quite properly, have considered the balance of payments subordinate to the performance of the domestic economy. The State Department has considered it subordinate to troop strength, trade, and aid. The Treasury Department has until recently considered it subordinate to the maintenance of free capital markets. If all of these interests are protected (I exclude Defense, which has made a serious effort to cut down on its overseas outlays), there is precious little that can be done about the payments balance. Someone's ox must be gored. 4. The liquidity problem has been used as an escape hatch by the economists. International reserves are unquestionably inadequate. As we make our balance of payments better, that of others will become worse. But more international reserves are not a basic remedy; they only extend the time we have to correct our imbalance. Moreover, as responsibility is now assumed in the world, the negotiation of improved reserve mechanism is only possible when the United States is acting out of generosity and not out of need. The European countries do not see their responsibilities as do we; they will not respond if we are the supplicants. They will, however, be more cooperative when they must. 5. Finally, in dealing with this problem we have had an erroneous view of the national interest. It has been said that trade, aid, and military outlays must not be touched because this would jeopardize the fundamental security of the United States. We have yet to realize how much the payments balance is already jeopardizing our position. A weak balance of payments is undermining our role as the leader of the Western Alliance, making it safe for difficult politicians to thumb their nose at us, weakening our hand on trade negotiation, and making us petitioners on currency matters. This is what is fragmenting the Alliance; by not needing to stick with us each can go off in his own direction. The Alliance would be in far better shape with fewer American troops and a strong American payments balance than a large American soldiery in Europe for which we have to beg from the French or the Germans. I turn now to action. Three considerations should control our further steps in this field, as follows: 1. The time for purely cosmetic action is past. Hereafter, action must be considered and real. Anything that now smacks of toying with the problem will be damaging to confidence. Nor can we afford to waste more time. 2. It can no longer be held against a measure that it hurts—or that it is inconsistent with existing policy. Everything henceforth will hurt. All untaken action will interfere with some existing policy. Otherwise the action would have been taken. 3. We should bear in mind that determined action in this field may bring far quicker response than we imagine. Germany, France and Italy got out of a seemingly hopeless balance of payments position with amazing speed. Britain has been in trouble at least five times since World War II; each time when she has cranked herself up to determined action (which as with us was what required the effort), the situation was quickly remedied. The Canadians were in bad shape a year ago; a strong move brought quick results. It should be the same, given serious action, with us. This point is important because strong surgical action may do less damage to military, trade, aid, and other important things, including our domestic political situation, than the continuing erosion of half-hearted measures that are not really corrective. There are five steps in decreasing order of importance which should be a part of the program of what might be called decisive reversal. These are: 1. A moratorium on long-term capital outflow; 2. Appropriate tariff action; 3. Modernized military deployment; 4. Restraint on tourist travel; and 5. Deep tying of aid. I comment on each in turn. Long-Term Capital Movements Control of long-term capital outflows is the first essential in a balance of payments strategy. It is the least damaging attack on the balance of payments. It means that savings which hitherto have been flowing into foreign investment will now seek domestic use. This will keep our long-term interest rates low, with supporting effect on domestic economy and employment. It has some differential effect on our productivity. Since other countries, including Switzerland, maintain full convertibility while keeping formal or informal restraint on long-term capital movements, there should be no serious loss of international confidence from this moratorium. The way has now been paved for control by the interest equalization tax and the attendant uncertainty which has brought long-term capital outflow to a temporary halt. However, it is not at all certain that at present rates the levy will be an effective deterrent. Either passage or non-passage of the legislation could bring a renewed outflow. Nor does the levy touch direct investment. We should have a six-months' moratorium on both. Long-term capital movements are a withdrawal of available surplus; this surplus by definition we do not have. Accordingly, I would urge that even after the passage of the tax (or its rejection) the market be kept closed for at least nine months. The portfolio and issues market could be closed to specifically foreign borrowers under Section 5 (b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917. Steps should also be taken to see that there is no evasion by way of long-term bank loans. By (say) next July we might have another look to see what relaxation we could afford, subject to the restraining effect of the tax. Immediately, the 500 largest American corporations plus any others indicated as operating abroad should be circularized by the Treasury with the request that they (a) defer any new direct investment abroad and (b) notify the Treasury of present commitments. If this does not work, stronger steps should be taken under existing law as above. Direct investment is a large item in the Western European countries and if savings are to be appreciable it must be included. Without hurting Canada or the Underdeveloped Countries, for which there would be exceptions, a half to three quarters of a billion (net) of last year's $2.2 billion deficit could have been covered by suspension of long-term outflow. For this year there would have been a proportionately rather larger saving out of the larger deficit. Trade While it is official doctrine in Washington that the trade balance is moving in our favor, in fact the prospect is unfavorable. We have had no gains in the last three years; the merchandise balance has in fact fallen from $5.4 billion in 1961 to $4.1 billion in the first quarter of this year. This is a surplus, as the papers on the subject stress ad nauseum. But our past position has only been strong because this balance on commerical account was relatively much more favorable than now. As noted, this is no reliable assurance that our wage-price situation will continue more to our advantage than that of our European competitors. There is the absolute certainty as things now stand of adverse movements in our tariff position. Specifically, under the Treaty of Rome it is the unweighted average of tariffs that is being lowered around the Community. This means that we will get tariff reductions in those markets to which we do not now ship goods; we will get tariff increases in our established markets. Since it takes time to develop imports, the damage will considerably exceed the benefit. Meanwhile, the elimination of internal tariffs means that American machinery and equipment and other manufactured products will be subject to the increased competition of tariff-free products from other countries within the Common Market. This adds up in the years ahead to an adverse movement of some magnitude. Reaction to this matter so far has combined hope with incantation. The papers say the adverse movement must be offset by muscular and masculine bargaining during the Kennedy round. This is self-delusion. Tariffs are in fact being raised against us. We can get them back down only by equal concessions on our side. Our payments balance weakens our hand on tariff bargaining as elsewhere. So present trends will leave us at a real disadvantage. But it is worse than that. We shall be reducing tariffs primarily on European consumers goods which are responsive both to lower prices and high incomes in this market. We shall be offering concessions at least in considerable part on machinery and equipment which, in the view of qualified observers, are procured in the United States less because of their price advantage than because of their technological superiority. In any case, we do know that consumers goods are generally more responsive to tariffs and price reductions than capital goods. The hard truth is that traditional trade policy is now at odds with the balance of payments problem and no semantic obfuscation can cancel the fact. We should not be surprised. The existing policy was born in reaction to the incongruity of high tariffs in a creditor which had no unilateral transfers abroad. It accommodated the need of foreign countries to make large payments to the United States. The policy remains; the situation has been reversed. If we are going ahead with the Kennedy round we must expect it to worsen the payments balance. We have come very far down a very dubious path. The historic method of correcting a payments balance has been to raise tariffs and raise domestic prices. It is probably the best method of accomplishing the result—and one that is most consistent with a free price system and minimum controls. Present policy is to go in exactly the opposite direction. We are planning action that makes our balance of payments action more perilous. There are also interesting questions of priority. Are we to expand our imports of luxury automobiles, fine woolens, and other expensive European products at the same time as we limit travel freedom or redeploy troops? The issue is eased by the time-consuming character of the negotiations. It will be some months before they begin and a considerable period thereafter before there are any cuts. This quiet but calculated delay can hold off adverse effects for some time. This I recommend as a minimum. It would limit the damage by unveiling a tariff round that must weaken us beyond what is inherent in the forming of the Common Market. There is a strong case for suggesting that we should go in the opposite direction. Tariffs are being raised against us in Europe. We need to cut back on imports of consumer products. The logic of this situation is an offsetting surcharge on manufactured products from the Common Market Countries as the best way of getting our balance of payments turned around. Even from the viewpoint of the proponent of liberal trade, this might be the best way of righting our position promptly and with minimum damage. The long erosion of lesser measures could be worse. There would, presumably, be some retaliation by the Common Market Countries. But our farm exports to the Common Market Countries, grain especially, are on a residual basis and retribution would hurt the exporter. Machinery and equipment exports are related to the technological situation and retribution here would also hurt the buyer. However, a step of this kind is probably beyond the range of present attitudes. The psychological turn-around would be very great. Defense Outlays Abroad I am impressed by the efforts that the Defense Department has made to cut its expenditures abroad. I am persuaded that no further efforts should be made in this direction which seem to discriminate against military personnel. Limitation on travel by dependents and limitation on personal expenditures by the military abroad, particularly so long as nothing is done about expenditures of tourists and wealthy American residents abroad, is palpably discriminatory. I would urge, however, that continuing and forceful attention be given to a more modern deployment of troops. It is much more important to our position to have a strong balance of payments than to have any given number of divisions in Europe. Modern airlift capacity gives us a choice which we did not have 10 years ago as to whether troops are stationed in forward positions in Europe or in the zone of the interior of the United States. We should increasingly exercise the option in behalf of stateside locations. This is not withdrawal or redeployment; rather it is an accommodation to the mobility of the modern force. Long-range combat aircraft are providing much the same opportunities for the Air Force. Our terminology should reflect this fact. The semantics are important. We should speak not of redeployment but of (say) multiple-base operations. Gains from this source will take time to realize but are obviously important. Tourist Travel Much attention has been paid in recent discussion to the increasing outlays for travel from $1.0 billion in 1954 to twice that amount this year, with another $400 million on foreign flag carriers. There is no chance of appreciable offset from foreign travel in the United States—American expenditure increases $100,000,000 a year, while foreign expenditure goes up $35,000,000. Nor is there relief from the Travel America program. Both are useful but have their principal quantitative effect on the volume of wishful thinking. To control tourist travel means to control the movement of people, with attendant political and administrative difficulty and annoyance. A tax on passports would be highly regressive. A per diem tax on days spent abroad would have a particularly adverse effect on students, artists and writers, who have the best of reasons for foreign residence. However, it would be possible to have people declare expenditures abroad on their income tax and subject outlays so declared to a surtax. This latter would be little more subject to abuse than the deductions presently allowed under the income tax. Control could be exercised in various ways, including certified and attested exchanges of money. It would exempt the low-income traveler—the person who spent less than say $750 abroad. It would reach the higher-spending traveler and would also be a device for guiding traffic to American flag carriers were purchases of tickets on such carriers excluded from the tax. This would require new legislation. We should start work on the tax, but defer a final decision until the beginning of the next legislative year. The amounts involved are difficult to estimate. Perhaps we would do well if we checked the present increase. Deep Tying of Aid As a last step, and one with longer run implications, we must begin to extend aid-tying to include dollars which, in the absence of such assist-ance, would have to be spent in the United States. There is always danger of using aid for purchases that must come from the United States market and free dollars earned in American trade somewhere else. In the past, I have urged, unsuccessfully, that countries like India agree as a quid pro quo to direct an increasing proportion of their free dollar purchases to the United States. This proposal has run afoul of the liberal trade-at-any-price policy. I am now inclined to think it insufficient. Instead, we should move toward a policy of partial financing. Both project and non-project assistance abroad would be covered not 100% of dollar requirements but some specified percentage of the total. The aid, though of an equal total, would be spread over a large number of projects and purchases. Countries thus would have an inducement to direct purchases now going to other countries to the United Sates and to use dollars for this purpose. Our aid would thus become a direct inducement to dollar trade; our aid, if you will, becomes a massive but quite legitimate subsidy to our dollar trade. Other developed countries that object have the option of effecting similar arrangements. This would not bring any short-run change. It would take the balance of payments problem out of the aid program in the longer run. My judgment on this particular recommendation is not final, pending a study now being undertaken by David Bell. 3 Conclusion The foregoing program is not agreeable. But I would not judge there is any part which I now propose that is insuperably difficult. I would urge that we take a decision on four matters—the moratorium on capital exports, the administrative delay on the Kennedy round, the further military program, and the deep tying of aid—at this time. The tourist expenditure tax should be ready if the prospect still seems grim when Congress assembles. We have time on this before the next travel season. The temporary surcharge on imported consumers' goods is a drastic turn-around in policy. I have an uneasy feeling that it will still be necessary in the end, the consequences notwithstanding. Those who are troubled by it should not go too far out on the limb for, by historical standards, it is the most commonplace as well as the most certain of all the remedies available. * Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Treasury, 8/63-11/63. No classification marking. 1 Not further identified. 2 Not further identified. 3 A draft memorandum from Bell to the President, October 29, prepared by Francis Bator (AID/AA/PC), comments on Galbraith's supertying proposals, but on an attached note from Frederick Simmons (AID/EXSEC) to Bell, October 30, appears the handwritten notation, “Not sent. Can now be filed. DB 2/7”. (Washington National Records Center, RG 286, AID Administrator Files, FRC 67 A 1530, Balance of Payments, FY 1964) 33. Memorandum for the Record 33. Memorandum for the Record Source Washington, September 12, 1963. I found our discussions of September 11 1 helpful, and I think we must continue to give this problem our urgent attention. As a result of yesterday's discussion I wish to make the following assignments for action and further study: 1. The Department of Defense, after discussion with the Department of State, to bring forward recommendations for further savings of overseas expenditures, without diminishing our effective military strength. 2. The Treasury to examine ways of further slowing 2 the outflow of capital including, a. Broadening the interest equalization tax to cover bank loans; b. Increasing efforts to dissuade American investors from committing funds abroad, 3 including both large-scale direct investment and large-scale purchases of foreign securities, regardless of enactment of the interest equalization tax. c. Discussing with the Western European finance ministers and central bankers at the Bank-Fund Meeting the possibilities of their taking action to slow direct U.S. investment in Europe. 4 3. The Treasury 5 to prepare contingency plans for all actions, including direct controls on capital movements, which might be necessary in three 6 sets of circumstances: (a) if the interest equalization tax fails of enactment; (b) if the balance of payments fails to show adequate improvement during the early months of 1964; (c) if there should be a serious balance of payments crisis. 7 In preparing the plans for the third 8 contingency it may be desirable to consider what can now be done by administrative action, and to examine the possible desirability and feasibility of requests for new legislative authority concerning capital movements, suspension of the gold cover, and the like. 4. The Treasury, in consultation with the Council of Economic Advisers and the Bureau of the Budget, to prepare tax proposals for possible presentation to the next session of the Congress which will: (a) limit tourists' expenditures overseas; (b) provide incentives for increased repatriation of foreign earnings and decreased direct investment in Western Europe by American firms; (c) encourage increased exports. On the third item in particular, the Treasury should consult with the Department of State and Department of Commerce 9 as well. 5. The Department of State, in consultation with the Office of the Special Trade Representative and the Department of Commerce, 10 to examine the nature and timing of the probable effects of the Kennedy round negotiations on our export earnings. In connection with this, they should also examine the possibility of emergency use of temporary countervailing duties as a balance of payments measure along the lines of the Canadian action last spring. 11 6. The Agency for International Development to prepare an evaluation of Ambassador Galbraith's proposal for super-tying of aid. 12 7. The consultants involved—Professors Galbraith, Tobin and Kaysen—to reflect further on our discussion and give me in writing any additional views they have. 8. I should like the papers called for at the earliest possible dates in each case, and I expect to renew our discussion when enough of them are available. The usual caution about holding these discussions within the smallest possible circle applies. John F. Kennedy * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Balance of Payments and Gold. Secret. A slightly different version, as indicated in footnotes 2-10 below, was prepared as a memorandum from President Kennedy to McNamara, Dillon, Ball, Roosa, Bell, Heller, Gordon, Sorensen, Bundy, Galbraith, Kaysen, and Tobin, September 12. (Department of State, Central Files, E 1 US) This memorandum was apparently not distributed or was recalled after distribution. An undated note by “sw” (presumably Seymour Weiss (U)), attached to this memorandum, reads: “Original copy—to U—returned to Anderson, 2:20 PM, who is eager for our copies to be destroyed. G/PM copy back.” Anderson is presumably Robert Anderson, Staff Assistant in U. A later version of this memorandum is summarized in Document 35 . 1 No record of these discussions has been found. 2 The President's September 12 memorandum (see the source note above) uses the words “limiting further” instead of “further slowing.” 3 The President's memorandum does not include the rest of this sentence. 4 The President's memorandum uses the word “limit” instead of “slow” and adds the following sentence: “Unless I hear convincing argument to the contrary, the Secretary and Under Secretary are to indicate our strong interest in effecting such a limitation.” 5 The President's memorandum at this point adds the following: “in consultation with the Council of Economic Advisers and the Bureau of the Budget.” 6 Here the President's memorandum reads: “two”. 7 The President's memorandum contained no item (c). Item (b) in that memorandum reads: “if there is a serious balance-of-payments crisis in the first half of 1964.” 8 The President's memorandum reads here: “second.” 9 The President's memorandum does not include the words “and Department of Commerce.” 10 The President's memorandum does not include the words “and the Department of Commerce.” 11 Reference is to surcharges imposed on imports, which the Canadian Government announced on June 24, 1962. These were gradually removed in the following months, the last one on April 1, 1963. 12 See footnote 3, Document 32 . 34. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy 34. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy Source Washington, undated. SUBJECT Department of Defense Proposals for Further Reductions in Balance of Payments Drain 1. Secretary McNamara has submitted his memorandum to you dealing with reduction in DOD expenditures entering the balance of payments. 1 The reduction proposed totalling approximately $380 million in FY '66 would be additive to those previously coordinated with the Department of State and subsequently approved by you on July 16, 1963. 2 2. It is my considered judgment that a significant proportion of these additional proposed reductions can be effectuated with some, but not undue, foreign policy risks. Since I share with you and Secretary McNamara the view that corrective action must be taken to alleviate our current gold and dollar deficit, I am prepared to concur in these proposals and to join Secretary McNamara in recommending your approval of them. These would include: a. Return of B-47 aircraft from the UK and Spain $37 b. Reduction in US military headquarters abroad 5 c. Reduction in foreign procurement of goods and services 103 d. Cancellation of the activation of one squadron of reconnaissance aircraft for Japan 25 Total 170 In connection with these items I have requested that when the Department of Defense has developed specific, detailed, country proposals, they be submitted to the Department of State so that the timing and tactics of their implementation may be carefully coordinated. 3. With regard to the remainder of the proposals, specifically those involving major redeployments of aircraft from Europe back to the US, substantial reductions in our ground forces in Europe, withdrawal of our two divisions from Korea, a reduction in foreign procured POL, particularly from Venezuela (all of which would realize a net balance of payments savings of approximately $210 million), I have concluded that our basic national security posture and foreign policy interests would be so seriously jeopardized through their acceptance that I recommend that they not be approved. 4. In brief summary, my reasons are as follows: a. Whether or not the military risks involved are deemed acceptable, the magnitude and nature of the adjustments will raise immense political problems which no amount of effectively devised and assiduously implemented diplomacy and public relations will be able to contravene. b. Our European Allies, some of whom are critically examining our every move for signs that the recent initiation of East-West negotiations is in fact to be at the expense of our commitment to the Western Alliance, will read into the major adjustments a first step in US disengagment from Europe. Particularly if the Soviet Union, independent of our actions, effects certain force withdrawals from the Satellites (this is predicted in some quarters) the notion of US-USSR collusion will be even more difficult to confront. Whatever intrinsic military strength and protection is provided by the US forces stationed in Europe, the major significance of this deployment has always been associated with the symbolic, but nevertheless real and unequivocal commitment of the US to involvement in any future aggression in Europe. Though large forces would remain after this withdrawal, the magnitude and nature of the proposed reductions (over 50% of US air forces, 15% of US ground forces amounting to 100,000 US military personnel and dependents would be withdrawn from Europe alone) coming at this time, would prove to many that this was the forerunner of future additional withdrawals, perhaps based upon explicit or implicit agreement with the Soviet Union. It would confirm the De Gaulle thesis that Europe, in the last analysis, cannot rely for its security upon alliance with the U.S. Moreover, recalling the violent FRG reaction to the projected reduction of 600 men in the Berlin garrison, as sweeping a series of force adjustments as proposed in the DOD memorandum, can be expected to ignite anew German doubts and suspicions with dangerously unpredictable consequences. Even if technical military arguments can be adduced to support the moves, such as the longer range of the F4C aircraft, they will not be politically persuasive . There are, in addition, two special circumstances connected to the European force adjustments which require separate consideration: (1) With regard to the aircraft withdrawals, it is possible that SACEUR and our Allies would consider redeployment back to the US as inconsistent with the effective fulfillment of the commitment of these forces to NATO. Should this eventuate, it would represent the first time in the history of the alliance that the US abrogated its previous commitment to meet specified NATO force requirements. (2) With regard to the 30,000 ground troop removal, as well as with regard to the aircraft redeployment, the US would be accepting a degradation in its capacity to respond immediately with fully effective forces to an enemy attack unless it was preceded by a considerable period of warning and mobilization time. While such an adjustment may or may not eventually prove to be militarily advisable, it represents a significant shift in our past position vis-a-vis our allies. It represents at least partial acceptance of a need for greater reliance on nuclear weapons, a view the US has consistently fought, and thus warrants very careful study before adoption as US policy. Indeed, if adopted on the basis of what appears to be a fiscal rather than military motivation, it may well prove doubly unsettling to our allies. It could, moreover, lead to increased pressure on their part for more nuclear weapons. c. In the Far East, removal of additional fighter aircraft will compound the delicate negotiating problem we are already seized with in relation to the previously proposed aircraft reductions. However, the additional number of aircraft to be removed (from Japan and the Philippines) are relatively so limited in number that the problems involved should be politically manageable. The same cannot be said for the Korean proposal. The present junta government in Korea contains untrustworthy elements some of which may be pro-Communist, and we would find it hard to maintain the UN command, and its authority, if we withdrew our divisions. Military rule has introduced factionalism into the ROK command. The UN command is needed to moderate that factionalism; we dare not increase the risk that important elements of the ROK armed forces may fall into armed conflict against each other. Moreover, we must be able to use fullest possible United States influence to prevent ROK forces from being used to perpetuate military rule if it becomes apparent that the populace would revolt rather than accept it. Our two divisions and the United Nations command give us opportunities for exercise of control at the 38th parallel we cannot afford to surrender. Otherwise the present or prospective ROK leadership might, advertently or inadvertently, get into a border clash with the Communists. Alternately, a tempting opportunity might be presented to North Korea if ROK forces fell to fighting each other or the civil populace. In either situation, especially if accompanied by indications of possible Chinese Communist intervention, we might well, [2 lines of source text not declassified]risk their being overrun while we tried to evaluate what might be an obscure situation. Moreover, [ 2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] our position in Japan (given Japanese aversion to nuclear weapons, this policy adjustment could trigger a major reassessment of Japanese policy toward the US), the Far East in general and other areas of the world populated by the colored races, could be substantially undermined. The Department recently made a thorough study of the proposal to remove the two US divisions from Korea, summarizing its analysis and conclusions in a letter to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I commend this document to your attention as a means of gaining a full appreciation of the complex series of issues which the proposal raises. (Attachment A) 3 d. I have similarly taken exception to that portion of the proposed DOD reduction in procurement of foreign POL which would probably fall within the Caribbean, specifically on Venezuela. It will take full measure of our very best efforts to forestall the political instability, which typifies the Venezuelan problem, from turning into complete chaos. A reduction in revenues from US purchases of Venezuelan oil exports is bound to be highly destructive of the accomplishment of our objectives. e. Moreover, the magnitude of balance of payments savings which would be realized from effecting these decisive retractions in our military power, particularly in Europe and the Far East, would represent less than 1/10th of the annual current gold and dollar deficit. In the case of Korea, for example, the military budget savings would be almost fully offset and the gold savings partly nullified by requirement for additional US foreign aid without which the Korean economy could not survive. In the context of sharply constricted aid appropriations this could become an acute crisis. Thus, in this as well as other areas the risks involved are out of all proportions to the prospective savings. 5. Recognizing that there is no easy solution to the difficult balance of payments problem which we currently confront, I would far rather accept the adverse foreign policy consequences of taking certain actions in the non-security, fiscal and monetary fields. These actions which have been previously studied by the Balance of Payments Committee would at least have the virtue of making a far more substantial dent in the existing problem. Accordingly, I have instructed my staff to prepare detailed programs for pursuing our balance of payments savings operations in these areas, along with a time schedule for implementation. I would propose to provide this for your consideration within thirty days, as an alternative to acceptance of those portions of the DOD proposal which I have discussed in paragraph 4. above. Also, though my preliminary review has cast doubt upon the utility of removing one of the two divisions from Korea, I would be prepared to join in a thorough State-Defense study of the advantages and disadvantages of taking such an action. Since the balance of payments savings to the US Government of removing our forces from Korea is likely to be relatively negligible (as noted previously) the delay occasioned by a careful examination of the security policy implications of a one division withdrawal would not adversely prejudice our efforts to rectify the balance of payments imbalance. 6. Pending submission of the fiscal and monetary program proposals referred to in paragraph 5. above, I feel I would be derelict in my responsibility to you if I did not advise you that, in my considered judgment, the implementation of the DOD proposals alluded to in paragraph 4. above would be the gravest sort of mistake, fraught with adverse political and psychological consequences, perhaps out of all proportion to the intrinsic military significance, but, nevertheless, carrying a real danger of jeopardizing our entire existing national security posture. Dean Rusk 4 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Balance of Payments and Gold, 8/63-9/63. Top Secret. The source text is undated, but a copy is dated September 18. (Department of State, Central Files, FN 12 US) 1 See Document 28 . 2 The President's approval has not been further identified. 3 Not attached and not found. 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 35. Editorial Note 35. Editorial Note On September 19, 1963, President Kennedy sent a memorandum to Secretaries Dillon and McNamara, Ball, Roosa, Bell, Heller, Gordon, Sorensen, Bundy, Galbraith, Kaysen, and Tobin. This was an abbreviated version of the President's memorandum for the record, Document 33 . The September 19 version essentially reproduced paragraphs 1 and 2 ending with the word “capital”. Paragraphs 2a, 2b, 2c, and 2d were omitted entirely. Paragraph 3 was revised as follows: “The Treasury, in consultation with the Council of Economic Advisers and the Bureau of the Budget, to prepare tax proposals for possible presentation to the next session of the Congress on a number of topics, including the encouragement of increased exports. On increased exports, the Treasury should consult with the Department of State and the Department of Commerce.” Paragraph 5 in the September 19 memorandum ended with the word “earnings.” The second sentence of this paragraph in the President's memorandum for the record was omitted entirely. Paragraphs 6-8 were identical to those in the memorandum for the record, and a ninth paragraph was added as follows: “A more detailed record of the meeting and of my views is available in Mr. Bundy's office to those who participated in the discussion of September 11.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Balance of Payments and Gold) 36. Draft Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy 36. Draft Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy Source Washington, September 19, 1963. SUBJECT Reduction in Department of Defense Expenditures Entering the International Balance of Payments On July 16 you approved a series of actions designed to reduce annual military expenditures abroad by $305 million between FY 63 and FY 66. 1 At that time you asked that we consider additional actions to achieve further reductions. It is the purpose of this memorandum to list a series of moves which, if approved, will reduce annual military expenditures abroad by an additional $339 million. The total reduction in annual expenditures, between FY 63 and FY 66, will then amount to $644 million as shown in the table below. Original Plan ($ million) Revision of 7/16/63 Revision of 9/19/63 FY 63 $2,739 $2,739 }$305 $2,739 }$644 64 2,686 2,671 2,671 65 2,700 2,506 2,376 66 2,698 2,434 2,095 Total reduction ($305) Total reduction ($644) To achieve the further annual reduction of $339 million, it will be necessary to: Action Estimated Annual Foreign Ex. Saving 2 ($ million) 1. Return the 80 B-47 a/c from Europe to the U.S. by 4/1/65, fifteen months earlier than planned. By that date the U.S. missile force will be about three times what it is today a. From Spain to the U.S.: 40 B-47 a/c $16.0 b. From the U.K. to the U.S.: 40 B-47 a/c 21.3 2. Plan “multi-base” operations for selected fighter squadrons. The home bases of such squadrons would be transferred from the theaters to the U.S. Periodic “movement exercises” will be scheduled during which the squadrons will move from their home bases in the U.S. to their “forward bases” in the theaters. a. From France to the U.S.: 3 squadrons (48 a/c) 20.6 b. From Germany to the U.S.: 4 squadrons (135 a/c) 21.7 c. From the U.K. to the U.S.: 7 squadrons (168 a/c) 32.4 d. From Japan to the U.S.: 1 squadron (18 a/c) 24.8 3. Reduce U.S. and Korean forces in Korea as recommended by the Chiefs (see Appendix A) and adjust MAP accordingly. 65.0 4. Reduce U.S. Army logistical forces in Europe by an additional 30,000 (15,000 by 7/1/64 and 15,000 more by 7/1/65). Do so by such means as reorganizing depots on functional lines and returning to the U.S. units required in Europe primarily for post-M-Day operations. USA- REUR's strength would then total approximately 205,000. 45.0 5. Reduce by 15% U.S. personnel in U.S. military headquarters abroad. 5.0 6. Reduce foreign procurement of goods and serv-ices as follows: a. Cut employment of foreign nationals by an additional 10% to a total of approximately 180,000 personnel. 40.0 b. Cut the foreign exchange cost of construction to $70 million in FY 66. 15.0 c. Reduce the foreign exchange cost of contractual services by an additional 4%. 15.0 d. Reduce the foreign exchange cost of petroleum to $200 million, an additional reduction of 15-20%. 35.0 e. Miscellaneous reductions. 18.0 Total Annual Saving FY 67 and Beyond $374.8 3 Less: Amount Not Applicable to FY 66 35.1 Estimated Saving in FY 66 $339.7 A summary of U.S. Defense Expenditures and Receipts Entering the International Balance of Payments, after taking account of the proposed actions, is presented in Table 1. The current and proposed deployments of U.S. Air Force fighter aircraft in Europe and the Pacific are shown in Table 2. 4 I do not believe the proposed force redeployments will weaken significantly our ability to respond to Communist aggression. The increase in the procurement of Army equipment, airlift aircraft, and fighter aircraft, and the increase in the ferry range of such aircraft have greatly increased our ability to deploy both air and ground forces from the U.S. to theaters of operation within a period of strategic warning. In order to demonstrate the increased mobility of our forces, we expect to conduct in October a strategic mobility exercise (”BIG LIFT”) involving the deployment to Europe of an armored division and a composite air strike force. The armored division and support unit personnel will exercise with equipment already prepositioned in Europe and participate in a NATO sponsored field training exercise. The exercise will serve to test our system and to demonstrate dramatically our redeployment capabilities to our Allies and to the Soviets. We would expect periodically to undertake similar movements to the Far East. I anticipate that by the end of FY 65 we will be able to move over 200 combat-ready tactical fighters to Europe in three days. I have consulted the Joint Chiefs of Staff with regard to the military acceptability of these measures. Their views are as follows: 5 I recommend that you approve actions 1 through 6, and that the Secretaries of State and Defense be directed to develop and implement detailed plans for carrying out the program. R McN * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Balance of Payments and Gold, 8/63-9/63. Top Secret. 1 See Document 28 . The President's approval of the recommendations has not been further identified. 2 Next to the figures in items 1 a and b, 2 d, 4, and 6 a-c and e below is a handwritten “n” for “no.” These markings do not agree in every case with the decisions detailed in the memorandum for the record, Document 37 . 3 Next to this figure is a handwritten “$170.0 n.” 4 For Tables 1 and 2, see the Supplement. 5 The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not included in this draft memorandum. 37. Memorandum for the Record 37. Memorandum for the Record Source Washington, September 23, 1963. SUBJECT Meeting on Defense proposals for further reductions in balance of payments drain, September 19, 1963, 4 PM PRESENT The President, Secretaries Rusk, McNamara, Ball and Gilpatric, Mr. Bundy The President approved the Defense Department's proposals stated in the Secretary of Defense's draft memorandum of September 19, 1 but with the exception of those items which were disapproved by the Secretary of State, and with the restoration of $20 million in foreign exchange petroleum costs which the Secretary of Defense undertook to save in another area than that of Venezuela. The reductions approved therefore total $190 million and include items 1, 2d, 5 and 6 in the Secretary of Defense's memorandum. It was agreed that the Department of Defense would develop specific, detailed, country proposals for these reductions and that they would be submitted to the Department of State so that the timing and tactics of their implementation would be carefully coordinated between the two Departments. The President also indicated his desire that a political base be established which would make it possible at some later stage to reconsider the disapproved actions, and he particularly indicated his desire to be in a position to approve actions 2a and 2c. He did not indicate that he would expect to approve item 3 at any time in the near future, but he agreed to further review of this matter. Because of the sensitivity of this topic, only the most limited distribution of this memorandum is being made in a single copy to each officer present, but the Departments may use the first two paragraphs of this record in communicating necessary information to others as to present discussions. Pending the development of a strong plan for the establishment of the necessary political base, knowledge of the President's further desires should not be communicated except on the most urgent need-to-know basis, and in no case in writing. McGeorge Bundy * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Balance of Payments and Gold, 8/63-9/63. Top Secret. Drafted by Bundy. 1 Document 36 . 38. National Security Action Memorandum No. 270 38. National Security Action Memorandum No. 270 Source Washington, October 29, 1963. TO The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff SUBJECT Meeting with the President, Thursday, October 24, 10:30 a.m., in the Cabinet Room, on European Matters 1. Based on Secretary Gilpatric's summary of recent Presidential decisions concerning the redeployment of US military forces from Europe and the schedule for implementing the approved actions, the President reaffirmed that: a. Possible redeployments of US forces under consideration within the government should not be discussed publicly nor with our allies until a decision has been made and a politico-military plan for action approved. Following these steps, we should consult as appropriate with our allies before any public announcement is made, and then proceed with our intended actions. Wherever possible, action of low visibility should be taken without public announcement. b. The United States will maintain in Germany ground forces equivalent to six divisions as long as they are required, and this policy is to be reaffirmed by Secretary Rusk in Frankfurt. 1 2. The following actions were approved by the President, to take place under the above guidelines. (1) The three C-130 squadrons permanently stationed in France will be returned as scheduled; two squadrons will be maintained in France on rotation. (2) US Army lines of communication forces in France will be reduced by approximately 5400 as scheduled. (3) The inactivation of the Lacrosse and 280mm gun battalions will proceed as scheduled. (4) A plan for the further reorganization of the Army's European logistics forces, entailing an additional reduction of about 30,000 personnel over the next two calendar years, will be developed by the Department of the Army for review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. (5) The specific 10% reduction in headquarters staff of 7th Army and USAREUR and the over-all 15% reduction worldwide in headquarters staffs (which may involve further adjustments in Headquarters, 7th Army, and USAREUR) will go forward as scheduled. (6) The President approved the return to the United States, commencing early in 1964 and to be completed within FY 1964 with the minimum explanation practicable, the six Berlin “Roundout” units consisting of three artillery battalions, two armored battalions, and one cavalry regiment, with its support units. The schedule of this action and the manner of disclosure to the FRG were left for later decision by the President. (7) The redeployment of the second Long Thrust battle group will not be discussed until January, although planning should go forward for its probable return to the United States in early spring. (8) B-47 units will be withdrawn from Spain and the United Kingdom as scheduled by the spring of 1965. The President reaffirmed this decision after being informed that although the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended against this action the Deputy Secretary and the Secretary of Defense strongly supported it. (9) The President approved in principle the proposal to withdraw three fighter squadrons from France and seven fighter squadrons from the UK by the end of FY 1966. Defense should urgently prepare, in connection with State, a plan of action to carry this out, with an estimate of the political and military problems (including the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) involved for final approval of the President before any implementation. 3. On the basis of the above guidelines and decisions, section IV of Secretary Rusk's draft speech for Frankfurt on 27 October was reviewed and appropriate modifications were made. The President approved the attached revised draft. 2 4. At the conclusion of the meeting, the President set forth the following rationale for use by US officials publicly, with the guidance that it should be used only as required, and only in such detail as is necessary. a. The United States intends to keep the equivalent of six divisions in Europe as long as they are required. The United States will continue to meet its NATO commitment. b. Operation Big Lift should be viewed as an example of our ability to add rapidly additional forces to Europe. Were it a replacement division, it would use the equipment of one of the divisions now in place. Instead, it is using one of the two division sets of equipment prestocked in Europe. In reality, the US thus will have over seven divisions in Europe over the next month or more. McGeorge Bundy * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Balance of Payments and Gold. Top Secret. 1 Reference is to Secretary Rusk's visit to Frankfurt, Germany, to dedicate a memorial to General George C. Marshall on October 27. 2 Not attached. Text of Secretary Rusk's address is in Department of State Bulletin , November 11, 1963, pp. 726-731. 39. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to President Johnson 39. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to President Johnson Source Washington, December 2, 1963. SUBJECT Report on the Balance of Payments At the time of the inauguration, the dollar was under heavy pressure as a result of three successive years of heavy balance of payments deficits and the heavy gold losses which occurred in the fall of 1960 and continued during the first three weeks of 1961. We were faced with two necessities, both serious, but one far more acute than the other. The first and most acute necessity was to reestablish confidence in the value of the dollar and thus put an end to the heavy losses of gold. The second necessity was to devise a program that would lead as rapidly as possible to the achievement of balance in our payments. It was recognized from the beginning that this second objective could only be achieved over a period of several years, but it was also recognized that steady and observable progress was necessary if confidence in the dollar was to be maintained. We have had marked success in achieving our first objective, the restoration and maintenance of confidence in the dollar. However, while progress has been made toward our second objective, the achievement of balance in our payments, it has not as yet been adequate, and more rapid and sustained results are now necessary. Fortunately, there are reasonable indications that programs presently underway can bring us the improvement we need. The restoration of confidence in the dollar involved convincing the world of our determination to maintain the gold value of the dollar at $35 an ounce, and to end our payments deficits. In providing protection for the dollar we have created a whole series of new financial tools and mechanisms, designed to offset speculative surges and conserve our gold stock. Among these were: 1. The establishment of close cooperation between the Treasury and Federal Reserve on the one hand, and European Finance Ministries and Central Banks on the other. 2. Currency swap arrangements with foreign Central Banks which now total $2 billion. 3. The informal London gold pool that has prevented undue speculation in gold and served to channel gold to Central Banks in an orderly manner. 4. Medium term, i.e. 2 year, borrowings by the U.S. in foreign currencies to avoid conversion of unwanted dollars into gold. 5. Establishment of the $6 billion borrowing arrangements in connection with the International Monetary Fund, primarily so as to strengthen its ability to defend the dollar against speculative attack. 6. Inauguration of a study by the Group of Ten, i.e. the countries party to the IMF borrowing arrangements, to determine what, if anything, can or should be done to further strengthen the functioning of the international monetary system. Under Secretary Roosa is chairman of this study group which held its first meeting in early November and is expected to report to a meeting of the Ministers of the Ten next summer. I am attaching a fuller description of the Committee's work and objectives, prepared by Mr. Roosa. We have had two programs to improve our balance of payments both contained in Presidential Messages to the Congress, one in February 1961, and the second in July 1963. 1 The February 1961 program involved stress on export expansion, the creation of a new system of export insurance comparable to those in use abroad, the establishment of strict buy-American policies for our foreign aid program and our military forces overseas, the shoring up of short-term interest rates to check outflows of funds, and an attempt to moderate the outflow of direct investment through the removal of tax incentives to investment overseas. Our efforts in the tax field were only about 50 percent successful as Congress refused to adopt our entire tax package. The investment credit and the 1962 depreciation reform were also part of this program since they were designed to improve our competitive position by speeding up modernization of plant and equipment. They have been helpful in this regard but tax incentives to new investment are still somewhat greater overseas than in the United States. By early 1963, it became obvious that the 1961 program was not adequate and that further steps would have to be taken. Our hopes for increased exports had not been realized, the Berlin augmentation of our military forces in Europe had offset the savings made by Defense in their Buy-American program, and Congress had only accepted half of our tax program on direct foreign investment. Consequently, early last spring a study was undertaken of ways and means of further reducing overseas government expenditures. The Treasury also initiated studies of methods of restraining the outflow of portfolio capital which had started to reach alarming proportions. The result was the July message. In this message, the President reiterated the importance of export expansion, suggested a “See America Now” program for 1964 to make travel at home a more appealing alternative to foreign travel, announced that the United States had arranged a standby facility with the IMF for up to one-half billion dollars, announced that the rate of Federal overseas expenditures would be reduced by $1 billion by the end of 1964, and proposed the Interest Equalization Tax. 2 This tax is designed to increase the cost to foreigners of raising money in our markets by 1 percent a year. A new program to stimulate foreign purchases of U.S. securities was also announced. Finally, the Federal Reserve raised the rediscount rate to 3-1/2 percent from 3 percent. This action has brought our short-term interest rates into approximate balance with those abroad and was the culmination of a two-year joint Treasury-Federal Reserve effort to raise short-term interest rates while maintaining the availability of credit and avoiding upward pressure on the long-term rates that are so vital to domestic economic progress. Short-term rates are now about 1-1/4 percent higher than in early 1961, while long-term corporate and municipal rates have changed little, if at all, and mortgage rates have actually declined by an average of 1/2 of 1 percent. Last summer's increase in short-term interest rates and the proposed Interest Equalization Tax brought sharp improvement in our third quarter figures. The third quarter produced the best results of any quarter since 1957. This improvement is being relatively well maintained so far this quarter. Nevertheless, 1963 will show little, if any, improvement over 1962 because of the heavy capital outflows during the first half of the year. For the future it is essential that the $1 billion annual saving in government spending overseas be achieved as scheduled by the end of next year. If at all possible, and I believe it is, the target should be exceeded. It includes $300 million in defense savings overseas which involve numerous redeployments of service and air force combat units. When approving this program, President Kennedy asked Secretary McNamara to develop recommendations for an additional $300 million in savings. This further program has now been under discussion between State and Defense and with the Joint Chiefs for some months. It should soon be possible to reach firm Presidential decisions on this program. Most of the redeployments involved in the July program will take place either late next spring or next fall, so their full effect will not be felt before 1965. Because of the long lead times involved it would be helpful if early decisions could be reached on the additional $300 million program requested by President Kennedy. Redeployments do not involve combat forces in Germany because Germany is currently fully offsetting the dollar cost of our forces in Germany by the purchase of U.S. made military equipment. Present indications are that 1963 balance of payments results will approximate those of 1962—a deficit of about $3.5 billion before accounting for debt prepayments or other special intergovernmental transactions designed to hold down the final total. After all such transactions, 1963 should approximate the $2.4-$2.2 overall level of 1961 and 1962. Assuming enactment of the Interest Equalization Tax and continued vigorous action to hold down dollar expenditures abroad, 1964 should witness a substantial improvement and 1965 could well see the deficit on regular transactions brought down to the neighborhood of $1 billion from the current $3.5 billion. In short, the balance of payments problem is many faceted and requires constant attention on many fronts. However, the combination of the 1961 and 1963 programs, plus such further savings as may prove possible in the defense area, now appear to be adequate to bring very substantial improvement over the course of the next year. The likelihood of these future gains may be foreshadowed by the relative improvement in our gold position that is taking place this year. It now looks as if our 1963 gold loss will only approximate $500 million, compared to $890 million in 1962, $857 million in 1961, and $1,703 million in 1960. Douglas Dillon 3 * Source: Kennedy Library, Dillon Papers, Memos to President, 1963. Limited Official Use. 1 See Documents 2 and 29 . 2 Additional documentation on preparations for legislation for an Interest Equalization Tax is in Washington National Records Center, RG 40, Secretary of Commerce Files: FRC 68 A 5947, Correspondence: Secretary Hodges; and ibid., Treasury Department. 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Dillon signed the original. Financial and Monetary Policy Financial and Monetary Policy 40. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury-Designate Dillon to Secretary of State-Designate Rusk Washington, January 13, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 811.10/1-1361. Confidential. 41. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Secretary of the Treasury Dillon Washington, February 1, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 811.10/2-161. Confidential. Drafted by Myer Rashish (B). 42. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, February 15, 1961. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1832. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the source text, which was prepared on March 22. 43. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, February 16, 1961. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1832. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the source text, which was prepared on March 22. 44. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, April 13, 1961, noon. Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149, January-April 1961. Secret. Drafted by Nora M. Lejins (LS) and approved by B on April 24, S on April 25, and the White House on May 11. The meeting was held at the White House. Chancellor Adenauer and Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano visited Washington April 12-13. For a memorandum of President Kennedy's conversation with Brentano on April 13, on foreign assistance, see Document 104. 45. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, June 16, 1961, 10:15 a.m. Source: Kennedy Library, Dillon Papers, Memoranda of Conversation, 1961. Confidential. Drafted by Donald W. Curtis (Treasury/OIF) on June 20, although the date at the top of the source text is June 19. The source text is stamped, “Approved by the Secretary, June 25 1961.” The meeting was held in the Secretary's office. 46. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy Washington, July 9, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 811.10/7-961. Secret. Drafted by C. Arnold Freshman (EUR/GER) on July 6 and cleared by Tyler and Hillenbrand. Attached to the source text is a July 6 memorandum from Tyler to Secretary Rusk, indicating that the memorandum responded to the President's July 5 request for information on Germany's actions in relation to the U.S. balance-of-payments situation. 47. National Security Action Memorandum No. 81 Washington, August 28, 1961. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Balance of Payments and Gold. Secret. Copies were sent to the Department of State, the Bureau of the Budget, and the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers. 48. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to President Kennedy Washington, August 31, 1961. Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office File, Treasury, 1/61-9/61. Confidential. Transmitted under cover of a memorandum from Dillon to the President, September 1, which reads in part: “Our information regarding the actions of other countries and our talks with them is highly confidential. Therefore, the information in this memorandum should be closely held.” 49. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany Washington, September 12, 1961, 10 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 811.10/9-1261. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Joseph E. O'Mahony (EUR/GER) on September 10; cleared by Freshman, Sullivan (Treasury) and Henry J. Kuss, Jr. (DOD/ISA) in substance, Sidney Schmukler (E/OFD) and John C. Renner (EUR/RA) in draft, and David Korn (S/S); and approved by Ball. Repeated to Paris. 50. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State Bonn, September 13, 1961, 6 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 811.10/9-1361. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Paris. 51. Telegram From the Embassy in Austria to the Department of State Vienna, September 18, 1961, 3 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 398.13/9-1861. Confidential. 52. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball) Washington, October 9, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 811.10/10-961. Secret. Drafted by Andrew Stalder (EUR/GER) on October 8 and concurred in by Robert H. Kranich (EUR/RA) and Martin. The date is handwritten on the source text. 53. Editorial Note 54. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Paris, December 13, 1961, 8 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 398.13/12-1361. Confidential; Priority. 55. Editorial Note 56. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy Washington, July 6, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Balance of Payments, General, 7/1/62-7/15/62. Confidential. 57. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers (Heller) to President Kennedy Washington, August 9, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Balance of Payments, International Monetary Agreement, 8/62. No classification marking. 58. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of the Treasury Dillon and the Under Secretary of State (Ball) Washington, August 24, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Treasury, 8/62. Confidential; Limited Distribution. Also sent for information to the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers. Copies were sent to Sorensen, Bundy, Kaysen, and Bell. 59. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon and the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Kennedy Washington, September 12, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Balance of Payments, International Monetary Agreement, 9/62-8/63. Confidential; Limited Distribution. 60. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy Washington, September 18, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Balance of Payments, Bank Fund Meeting. Secret. 61. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to President Kennedy Washington, September 18, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, Dillon Papers, Memos to President, 9/62-10/62. Confidential. Attached to the source text is a memorandum from Evelyn Lincoln to Dillon, September 20, indicating that the President had read Dillon's memorandum and approved his proposal. 62. Editorial Note 63. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to President Kennedy Washington, November 14, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Balance of Payments and Gold, 6/62-3/63. Limited Official Use. 64. Editorial Note 65. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, November 15, 1962. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2181. Confidential. Drafted by Raymond J. Albright (Treasury) on November 16 and approved by Dillon's office on November 21. The conversation was held in Dillon's office. 66. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to President Kennedy Washington, January 16, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Treasury, 1/63-3/63. Confidential. 67. Memorandum From the Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow) to President Kennedy Washington, February 4, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, Dillon Papers, Memos to President, 2/62-3/63. Secret. 68. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to President Kennedy Washington, February 11, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, Dillon Papers, Memos to President, 2/63-3/63. Secret. 69. Letter From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, March 8, 1963. Source: Department of State, Central Files,FN 12 US. Confidential. 70. Letter From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, March 19, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Balance of Payments and Gold, 6/62-6/63. Secret. The source text is a copy sent to McGeorge Bundy by Dillon on March 19. Dillon's covering memorandum reads: “Since the attached letter deals with a matter of considerable importance to our balance of payments, I would appreciate it if you could bring it to the President's attention.” 71. Editorial Note 72. Memorandum of Conversation Bonn, June 24, 1963. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2275. Confidential. Drafted by Robert C. Creel (EUR/GER) on June 24 and approved by S on July 6 and by the White House on July 8. The meeting was held in the Palais Schaumburg. President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk arrived in Bonn on June 23 for a 4-day visit, including a trip to Berlin. 73. Memorandum of Conversation Wiesbaden, June 25, 1963, 6 p.m. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2275. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. Approved by the White House on July 22. The meeting was held at the Von Steuben Hotel. 74. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany Washington, July 11, 1963, 9:48 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files,FN 12 US. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Louis C. Boochever (A/AID) on July 10; cleared by Creel (GER) and Richard H. Davis (EUR) in draft, W. Carter Ide (AID/AA/NESA) and James P. Grant (NEA) in substance, and Walter H. Lubkeman (S/S); and approved by Frederick F. Simmons (AID/EXSEC) for David E. Bell (A/AID). Repeated to Paris (OECD) and New Delhi. 75. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State Bonn, July 13, 1963, 8 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files,FN 12 US. Secret; Priority. Relayed to the Department of Defense. 76. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions Washington, July 17, 1963, 9:51 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files,FN 12 US. Limited Official Use; Operational Immediate. Drafted by F. L. Widman (Treasury/OIA) and Benjamin Caplan (E/OFE), cleared by Roosa and Springsteen, and approved by Caplan. Sent to all NATO capitals except Ankara, Athens, Lisbon, and Reykjavik, and to Bern, Zurich, Buenos Aires, Canberra, Madrid, Manila, Mexico City, Moscow, New Delhi, Rio de Janeiro, Stockholm, Tokyo, and Vienna. 77. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, July 20, 1963, 8:20 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files,FN 16 US. Unclassified. Drafted by F. L. Widman (Treasury), cleared by Creel and Mortimer D. Goldstein (E/OFE), and approved for transmission by Vincent J. Monti (OC/OCT). Also sent to Paris (Embassy and USRO), Bonn, Rome, The Hague, Brussels (Embassy and BUSEC), Ottawa, and Tokyo. Attached to the source text is the typewritten text of the press release issued by the Department of the Treasury. 78. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State Bonn, July 23, 1963, 7 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files,FN 12 US. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Paris and USRO, London, Rome, Brussels (BUSEC), and Bern. 79. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions Washington, July 26, 1963, 10:08 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files,FN 12 US. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Widman (Treasury/OIN), cleared in substance by Goldstein, and approved by Monti. Sent to Tokyo; repeated to Bern, Bonn, Brussels, Canberra, The Hague, London, Ottawa, Paris, Rome, and Zurich; and pouched to Copenhagen, Luxembourg, Madrid, Oslo, Stockholm, and Vienna. 80. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany Washington, July 30, 1963, 9:07 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files,FN 12 US. Confidential; Operational Immediate. Drafted by Henry J. Kuss (Defense) and Robert M. Brandin (EUR/GER) on July 29; cleared by Sullivan (Treasury), Brandin, David Klein (White House), and Grant G. Hilliker (S/S); and approved by Jeffrey C. Kitchen (G/PM). 81. Editorial Note 82. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, September 24, 1963. Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149, July-September 1963. Secret. Drafted by Richard B. Finn (EUR/GER) on September 30 and approved by U on September 30 and the White House on October 4. 83. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Japan Washington, November 20, 1963, 9:07 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files,FN 16 US. Limited Official Use; Priority. Drafted by Martin Y. Hirabayashi (FE/EA/J), cleared by Blaser (Treasury) in substance and Thelma E. Vettel (FE/EA), and approved by Leonard L. Bacon (FE/EA). 40. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury-Designate Dillon to Secretary of State-Designate Rusk 40. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury-Designate Dillon to Secretary of State-Designate Rusk Source Washington, January 13, 1961. Given our present balance-of-payments position 1 it is important that we get as much help as possible from the Germans, as promptly as possible, in the negotiations now under way. Particularly important would be German prepayment of the GARIOA debt, increased military procurement in the U.S. and the removal of restrictions on certain of our agricultural exports. I am reasonably certain that the minimum price we will have to pay for this will be an agreement on our part to recommend legislative action for a limited return program for German vested assets. The attached memoranda, which have been reviewed technically by GER and L/EUR, set forth the background and recommended solution. I hope that we can move forward on this immediately after the 20th and would appreciate your views. Douglas Dillon Attachment SETTLEMENT OF GERMAN VESTED ASSETS The issue of compensating Germany for U.S. seizure of private German assets during World War II has become of major political importance in Germany and a serious irritant in U.S.-German relations. Recent discussions with Germany indicate that the Germans may be prepared to conclude a settlement with the new Administration more favorable than we have hitherto been able to negotiate. The probable elements in this settlement would be: 1. Prepayment to the U.S., immediately, of $600 million of Ger-many's $787 million GARIOA debt. 2. Cancellation of the remaining $187 million of the GARIOA debt in full settlement of the vested assets—a figure about half-way between the previous German request of $200 million and the previous U.S. estimate of $175 million. This cancellation would have to be submitted to the Senate as a treaty amending the GARIOA agreement. 3. Other actions by Germany to help the U.S. balance of payments, including increased German military procurement in the U.S., removal of German restrictions on certain U.S. agricultural exports, and possibly German payment of a part of U.S. military aid to Greece and Turkey. There is no assurance that the Senate would approve a treaty offsetting vested assets against GARIOA since there is strong Congressional sentiment against any return program. Nevertheless mere submission of the treaty would ease German-U.S. relations and the other proposed actions, including the $600 million GARIOA prepayment, would be of great benefit to the U.S. at the present time. The essential details of the long-continuing and complicated vested assets problem, and of the proposed settlement, are set forth in the attached memorandum. 2 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 811.10/1-1361. Confidential. 1 For additional documentation on the balance-of-payments problem, see Documents 1 ff. 2 For text of this paper, “Proposed Settlement of Vested German Assets Problem,” January 10, see the Supplement. 41. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Secretary of the Treasury Dillon 41. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Secretary of the Treasury Dillon Source Washington, February 1, 1961. Dear Doug : I have your memorandum of January 13 and attached memoranda relating to the negotiations with the Germans over actions they might take that would assist our balance of payments position. 1 I have taken note of your recommendation that these negotiations be consummated as quickly as possible and, in particular, that the United States be prepared to reach an agreement to recommend legislative action for a limited return program for vested German assets as a contribution on our part to the satisfactory completion of the present negotiations. I am, of course, anxious to have these negotiations consummated quickly and successfully and would hope to proceed with them as soon as the Germans are in a position to translate their broad interest into specific proposals. I do have substantial reservations with respect to any United States commitment to the provision of compensation for vested German assets. It is my understanding that this commitment would be directly related to the prepayment of the GARIOA debt and that the two items would constitute a separate component of the total package under negotiation. My reservations are briefly as follows: 1. The vested assets question is a highly controversial political issue in the United States and it is questionable whether it is wise or feasible at this time to seek Congressional approval to such a commitment given the past history of the matter. I would be reluctant to endorse a commitment to submit legislation if there were no reasonable assurance that approval for such legislation could be secured. 2. We are under no legal obligation to compensate the Germans for these vested assets. Any act of grace on our part would certainly provoke opposition on the grounds of equity, particularly from Americans with war damage claims against Germany who have not yet succeeded in obtaining legislation to provide for their compensation. In addition, such action would also lead to considerable pressure from the Swiss for the settlement of the Interhandel matter 2 as well as from the Japanese for the settlement of their vested asset problems. 3. Although I regard constructive measures to solve our balance of payments problem as being of the highest importance, it seems to me that the Germans have an obligation to make a contribution to the solution of this problem without the need for any compensatory action on our part. Even if we should prejudice the prepayment of the GARIOA debt by our unwillingness to compensate for the vested assets or to consider the vested assets question as part of a negotiated package, I believe that adherence to this principle would outweigh the relatively minor contribution that the GARIOA debt prepayment would make to a durable solution of our balance of payments situation or to an improvement in confidence in the dollar. 4. Finally, the new measures which the President will outline in his balance of payments message 3 will, I trust, make a substantial contribution to the solution of our present balance of payments problem. In particular, negotiations through multilateral arrangements, such as the OECD, offer a good prospect of obtaining further contributions from our Western allies in a position to make such contributions. I fear that we might well prejudice our position in multilateral negotiations by establishing the precedent of a negotiated settlement involving compensation on our part. George Ball and I would welcome the opportunity of meeting with you at your convenience to review the vested assets question as well as the whole subject of the German negotiations. Sincerely yours, Dean 4 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 811.10/2-161. Confidential. Drafted by Myer Rashish (B). 1 Document 40 . One of the attached memoranda is in the Supplement. 2 Interhandel was a Swiss business concern that claimed shares in the German company, General Aniline and Film Corporation. Several of the latter's plants located in the United States were seized by the U.S. Government during World War II. 3 Reference is to the President's upcoming special message to the Congress on February 6. See Document 2 . 4 Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original. 42. Memorandum of Conversation 42. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, February 15, 1961. MVK M-21 US-UK BILATERAL TALKS Washington, February-March, 1961 US Summary on Financial Matters I Discussions held on February 15 in US Treasury. Participants included Secretary Dillon, Under Secretary Ball, Chairman Martin, FRB, and Mr. Heller, CEA, for US and Sir Frank Lee, Sir Denis Rickett, and Ambassador Caccia for UK. Economic Situation Sir Frank said he hoped these informal discussions would be only the first of a continuing series, particularly because of the relationship of the two reserve currencies. With respect to the UK economic situation, he said 1960 had registered high levels of consumption and investment accompanied by a rise in prices and wages. The outlook for 1961 was for internal demand to continue to rise and there was thus a continued need for restraints to provide leeway for exports, although there may be some easing of the heavy import demand because of past inventory build up. He expressed concern over the UK payments outlook for 1961 but did not feel it would necessarily be a critical period. If there is a reduced inflow of short-term capital in 1961 and a fall in reserves, the UK would not be too concerned provided the trend is toward an improved world payments position. He said the UK welcomed the President's balance of payments statement, 1 and that despite some uncertainty over the future the US and UK should not be deflected from the general purpose of expansion of world trade and the freest possible movement of capital. Mr. Heller noted three aspects of the US economic situation: 1) the current recession, 2) the anemic recovery since 1958, and 3) the slowing down in long-term rate of growth. He noted that the peak was reached in the second quarter of 1960 when GNP reached $506 billion, and that in the first quarter 1961 GNP was close to $500 billion. The US potential, however, is estimated at $545 to $550 billion. Moreover, our rate of growth had declined since 1953. Mr. Heller said that, without taking account of any new programs contemplated by the new Administration, the forecast was for a gradual rise in GNP during 1961. He noted the problems relating to the strong impact of the federal tax system at high levels of economic activity and the various restraints on monetary policy, especially the balance of payments. Secretary Dillon referred to the forecast in the British “Outlook” paper, 2 that US GNP would fall by 3 per cent from the 1960 peak and recover from the second half of 1961 onward, and said that our figures indicated a decline of only slightly more than one per cent. Mr. Heller observed that, again without allowing for special new programs, we foresee an increase in public sector activities and no further substantial softening of the private sector. Balance of Payments Secretary Dillon cited an over-all US payments deficit for 1960 of $3.8 billion, which was the same as for 1959. About $2.3 billion of the 1960 deficit resulted from short-term capital movements primarily in the second half of the year. Some $1.5 million is considered as a basic deficit. The US expected a better export position in 1961. He referred in this connection to the hope that more canned fruit could be sold to the UK. He referred also to the various steps the US was taking to improve its payments position, e.g.,ICA and military procurement, reduction of duty-free allowances for tourists, and possible action with respect to short term export credits and removal of tax incentives for foreign investment. As to the outlook for the US balance of payments, Secretary Dillon said we do not wish to prognosticate but thought there was a good chance the US could approach equilibrium with respect to the basic deficit in three to four years. With regard to the special interest rate arrangements, he said it was not our wish to siphon off a substantial amount of funds from Europe, although there may be a modest movement of funds back to this country. Sir Frank said that the US starts from a good trade position while the UK starts from a bad one. He welcomed the US approach which was aimed at improving the basic deficit without doing “direct and manifest” harm to others. US actions may, however, have a short-term effect on sterling. If sterling does come under strain in 1961, the UK should keep calm, provided the basic trend seems to be in the right direction. He noted that the UK deficit rose from ₤120 million in 1959 to ₤180 million in 1960. The UK payments outlook for 1961 was far from satisfactory. German Payments Surplus and Aid Sir Frank referred to Prime Minister MACMILLAN's meeting with Dr. Adenauer on February 23 3 and asked for US views on how the basic structural imbalance between surplus and deficit countries could be tackled in concert, and also on the possibility of revaluation of the Deutsche Mark. Secretary Dillon said that in our efforts to obtain a greater German contribution we were emphasizing the imbalance in world payments arising from the German surplus. We were pressing for expansion of German military equipment purchases in the US, without a reduction in their purchases elsewhere in Europe. Germany could also help on joint use of military facilities, and by military aid to Greece and Turkey. These contributions could well be made by Germany since it received about $1 billion per annum from foreign military expenditures, of which some $675 million came from the US and $200 million from the UK. Secretary Dillon said we hoped that with German contributions in the military field and by our own actions, US balance of payments on military account could be helped by some $400 million this year, including $100 million in savings on Greek and Turkish aid, $150 million from German purchases of US military equipment, and possibly $100 million by the US buying material here for the use of our forces in Germany. It was entirely up to the Germans whether they wanted to make debt prepayment, but they could not extract from the US a concession on vested assets. Furthermore, this would be a one-time operation and not an approach to our basic deficit. He stressed the need for a substantial continuing German aid program with untied procurement, although the US would probably get back, through purchases of US goods, only a small percentage of the expenditures. Secretary Dillon thought the prospects for any meaningful revaluation of the DM were not good. He understood that at one time the Germans had considered a small adjustment of perhaps 5 per cent, but in his view this would have been inadequate and would have led to speculation. Moreover, it was the Germans' view last year that if they revalued they probably would not have to do other things such as agreeing to the US request for them to increase aid contributions. Sir Frank thought that an “adequate revaluation” would help the situation materially. While he agreed that a prolonged period of discussion and speculation followed by a revaluation of only 5 per cent would be undesirable, he nevertheless thought something in the neighborhood of 10 per cent would be adequate. He said that he did not maintain that revaluation was an alternative to the other things that Germany should do. Secretary Dillon replied that the US places a lower priority on revaluation than the UK. He did not think revaluation was possible before the fall, nor even then that revaluation above 5 per cent was possible. In the US view even 8 or 10 per cent would not be enough. Secretary Dillon thought that the balance of payments measures we were seeking from the Germans were of the most pressing importance, and that we should move ahead with them before doing anything on revaluation. * Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1832. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the source text, which was prepared on March 22. 1 See Document 2 . 2 Not further identified. 3 Adenauer visited London for private talks with Macmillan February 22-23. 43. Memorandum of Conversation 43. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, February 16, 1961. MVK M-22 US-UK BILATERAL TALKS Washington, February-March, 1961 US Summary on Financial Matters II Discussions held on February 16 in US Treasury. Participants included Secretary Dillon, Under Secretary Roosa, Assistant Secretary Martin, Mr. Heller, CEA, Chairman Martin of Federal Reserve Board, for US, and Sir Frank Lee and Mr. Parsons, Bank of England, for UK. German Payments Surplus and Aid (cont'd) Sir Frank referred to the previous day's discussions and said that West Germany was at the heart of the British imbalance. He was skeptical of the ability of getting the Germans to take on enough over the long term to overcome their persistent surplus without revaluation. He noted that the German current account surplus was unlikely to be less than $1 billion in 1961, and even with a $1 billion German aid program, the Germans probably would not commit more than half nor disburse more than one fourth this year. Secretary Dillon said that the US estimated the 1961 German surplus at about the same figure, and that it was vitally important for the Germans to do more in foreign aid and military purchases abroad. However, if the various measures previously mentioned, including a parallel approach by the British on German military purchases, are carried out, we visualize that the German current surplus could be reduced to some $250 million. Secretary Dillon reiterated his view that revaluation was not the answer at this time, and Mr. Heller pointed out US military costs in dollars might increase with the German revaluation. Sir Frank said he hoped to keep the Prime Minister from raising the question of revaluation with the Germans. Other Surplus Countries Secretary Dillon said we have been impressed by the size of the Italian payments surplus, but that it would be difficult to deal with it without first succeeding with the German surplus. He thought under present programs the British and the French were carrying their share of the foreign aid burden and the problem is to get the French to continue. Sir Frank observed that the French surplus also bears watching; the Japanese problem was a unique one that affected all industrialized countries, whereas the German, French and Italian surplus problems related rather more directly to the US and the UK deficit positions. He said that Japan was not extending much aid as distinct from reparations and export credits. Secretary Dillon noted that while there had been success in getting Japan to relax its import restrictions, it had offset this by increasing tariffs. He thought that in view of Japan's interest in Asia, it could be persuaded to increase long term aid to India and Pakistan. Monetary Matters Secretary Dillon noted that for the first time since the 1920's there was convertibility of the major trading currencies. This meant that short term capital flows of the type experienced recently were easier to set off than before, and there was thus a need for much closer cooperation and coordination among the important fiscal and monetary authorities. He noted that the US Treasury was considering the possibility of freeing the interest rate limitations for foreign official balances. The President's message made clear the necessity to maintain US short term interest rates to avoid substantial outflow of short term funds, and at the same time to maintain a different pattern for long term interest rates. He reiterated, however, that it was not the US Government's intention to attract a big return flow of funds from abroad, but rather to stabilize the situation. US Federal Reserve authorities were interested in working out closer contacts with their opposite numbers abroad. Under Secretary Roosa raised questions about techniques that needed to be considered on two points: one was the interest rate affecting the short term flow of funds, the other concerned the judgment of central banks whether to hold such funds in gold or dollars. Chairman Martin said that exploratory discussions on these matters, both bilateral and multilateral, would be invaluable, particularly in the present atmosphere of convertibility. He also pointed out that the Board's monetary policy would be defensive rather than aggressive with respect to foreign funds. Secretary Dillon noted that the OECD would provide a forum for coordination, although it might not be the only forum nor adequate in terms of size. Sir Frank said that the UK was willing to consider anything that might help moderate the speculative movement of short term funds, but saw difficulty because of the great differences in various domestic economies. For example, the UK problem was one of excessive demand, the US the contrary. Mr. Parsons also concurred in the need to explore every conceivable possibility of cooperation in monetary policy. He wondered whether an interest rate of one or two per cent would be sufficient inducement to change the minds of central banks on whether to hold gold or dollars. He, moreover, did not personally favor splitting markets into compartments, with one for central banks and the other for private individuals and commercial banks, when in fact the markets are interrelated. Secretary Dillon remarked that these various mechanisms were not considered as being inherently desirable but rather as defensive measures which have been made necessary because some of our friends have placed undue reliance on monetary policy as opposed to fiscal policy. The US felt the two were, of course, complementary. Secretary Dillon stressed the importance to the free world of coordination with Europe in this area at this time. It was the responsibility of the US to assure confidence abroad by showing that the American economy was under control. Sir Frank accepted the idea that US action in this field was designed to be defensive and not aggressive. * Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1832. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the source text, which was prepared on March 22. 44. Memorandum of Conversation 44. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, April 13, 1961, noon. ADENAUER VISIT Washington, April 12-13, 1961 SUBJECT Balance of Payments Problem PARTICIPANTS United States The President Secretary Rusk Ambassador Dowling Assistant Secretary Kohler Mrs. Lejins (Interpreter) Federal Republic Chancellor Adenauer Foreign Minister von Brentano Ambassador Grewe Dr. Karl Carstens Mr. Weber (Interpreter) The President brought up the problem of the balance of payments. He stated his great concern about the outflow of gold from the country, which had resulted in the Anderson-Dillon mission of last year. 1 Moreover, the matter had been discussed with the Foreign Minister during his February trip to Washington, 2 and Ambassador Dowling had been carrying on talks concerning it in Bonn. The President wanted to make three points perfectly clear: (1) Last year the impression had been created abroad that the United States might withdraw one or two divisions from Western Europe. This was the last thing the United States would do. The President hoped that sufficient adjustments would be made to cope with the situation in other ways, and he was definitely not going to withdraw any divisions from Europe. (2) Last year the impression had been created in Western Germany that the United States felt the burden of maintaining its troops was too heavy from the standpoint of its domestic taxation program and was therefore asking help from Germany. Again the President wanted it to be very clearly understood that the United States was prepared to bear its own international burdens. His only concern was the outflow of gold, as previously indicated. (3) Regarding the outflow of gold, during the past three months the United States has lost 1,200,000,000 DM. The largest amount was lost in January. February and March had shown some improvement. If the rate of the last three months were projected for the entire year, the United States would lose 4 billion DM in 1961. As previously indicated, the President hoped that the loss would not be as great as that, since some improvement was in the making. The President indicated that we were losing gold in three ways: (1) Last year part of the loss had been occasioned by the interest differentials. That, he understood, had been brought to an end. (2) The United States was losing gold because of its troop payments and maintenance abroad. (3) A large outflow of gold was occasioned by United States aid to under-developed countries. Understandably enough the United States was reluctant to diminish its aid efforts in any way or to diminish its troop maintenance abroad. That would be very bad for both the security of the United States and the joint security of the Free World. Therefore the President was very anxious to diminish the outflow of gold so as not to decrease either foreign aid or troop maintenance. He was thus very much interested in seeing that everything possible was done to lessen the outflow of gold resulting from our maintenance of troops in the Federal Republic. The joint utilization of facilities should be a very helpful step. Moreover, he hoped that the purchase of supplies in the United States could be encouraged, since this would be a second very significant step forward. Somehow, the President felt, this matter would have to be brought into balance before the end of the year in order to permit the United States to carry out its commitments on a world-wide basis. The President continued by stating that the United States net deficit each year because of the maintenance of troops, etc., in Germany amounts to 350 million dollars in gold. This constitutes approximately one third of the total gold loss; last year it was one quarter; this year, if the improved trends continue, this sum might possibly constitute one half of the overall gold loss. The President hoped that the Federal Republic would work closely together with the United States to find means of diminishing this deficit. The Chancellor stated that he well understood the United States position and problem in this respect. He understood that the United States had undertaken steps to improving the situation. It had, for example, introduced compulsory savings among the troops in Germany and had banned the sale of German products in the PXs. The Chancellor welcomed these measures. The President indicated that he hoped these matters could be explored further through Ambassador Dowling and Under Secretary Ball. It was necessary to strike a better balance since that would improve the overall situation of the United States. * Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149, January-April 1961. Secret. Drafted by Nora M. Lejins (LS) and approved by B on April 24, S on April 25, and the White House on May 11. The meeting was held at the White House. Chancellor Adenauer and Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano visited Washington April 12-13. For a memorandum of President Kennedy's conversation with Brentano on April 13, on foreign assistance, see Document 104 . 1 Dillon and Anderson visited Bonn November 19-23, 1960. For an account of their visit, see Foreign Relations , 1958-1960, vol. IV, pp. 142 - 147 . 2 Brentano visited Washington February 16-17. A memorandum of his conversation with President Kennedy on February 17 is in Department of State, Central Files, 611.62A/2-1761. The portion of the conversation on Berlin is printed in vol. XIV, pp. 8 - 11 . For text of the joint communique issued on February 17, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, p. 475, or Department of State Bulletin, March 13, 1961, pp. 369-370. 45. Memorandum of Conversation 45. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, June 16, 1961, 10:15 a.m. PARTICIPANTS Mr. Stikker, Secretary General of the NATO Mr. Saint-Mleux, Chief of Cabinet to the Secretary General Secretary Dillon Ambassador Finletter Mr. Sullivan 1 Mr. Tobin, State Department 2 Mr. Curtis SUBJECT International Economic Questions and the NATO Secretary General Stikker indicated that, in addition to discussing many political questions at State, he had also had talks with Mr. Ball on economic matters. He then cited the reference to NATO discussions made in the U.S. aide-memoire to the Germans last February, 3 as well as the role which Secretary General Spaak had played in resolving the earlier problem of U.K. troop costs in Germany, and inquired whether we were intending to bring the NATO into the current U.S.-German balance of payments talks in any way. Secretary Dillon replied that we were not, and that earlier statements suggesting we would had not been well thought out. Explaining the way in which we see this problem, he mentioned that there had been a sharp improvement in the U.S. balance of payments since last winter but said the turn in the cyclical situation here could be expected to create pressure on our balance of payments again. Therefore, there was need to keep on working on this question. The essential problem here was to make our export earnings cover our non-trade international outlays, and the largest of these were our military expenditures abroad. Our outlays for foreign economic aid were less of a burden on our balance of payments because of our policy of tying these expenditures to exports; last year the balance of payments effect of foreign aid had been perhaps $1 billion but in the next year or two we were hoping to reduce this effect to about $500-$700 million per year. With respect to Germany, he said, we felt that their balance of payments surplus was the counterpart of both the U.S. and the U.K. deficits. Action by us alone to correct the situation would merely result in shifting our deficit to the British, and therefore the primary need was for the Germans to take appropriate action. We could not, of course, tell them just what actions they ought to take. Their recent revaluation of the Deutsche mark was directed to this problem, but was not by itself adequate to resolve it. Larger capital exports by Germany were another way of dealing with it, and here he thought that progress was being made. Finally, we had thought one easy way for the Germans to meet this problem would be for them to increase their procurement of military equipment abroad. The Germans had recently reached agreement with the United Kingdom on an increase in such procurement. Our own talks with the Germans were continuing, and were not too satisfactory so far. Independently of these negotiations, he said, it looked as though German military procurement orders from the United States would increase somewhat this year, but this would not be enough. The gap between such German procurement here and our own military expenditures in Germany currently amounted to around $400 million per year. Our own directives designed to minimize the foreign exchange spending of our military might reduce this gap, possibly to something like $200-$250 million. Thus, if we could get the Germans to buy about $200 million more of military equipment from us annually, that would largely solve this problem. We felt this was a reasonable request, in view of the German financial strength and their lack of a large domestic armaments industry, and therefore we were continuing to press them on it. Another subject we were also discussing with the Germans—which he indicated the Ambassador was familiar with—related to possible joint use of various military facilities. He mentioned that, in the earlier stages of our talks with the Germans, they had responded that this was a multilateral matter—why should we pick on them alone? However, when we had taken them up on this and agreed that the problem of their surplus was multilateral in its effects, they seemed to lose interest in multilateral discussions. Thus, we now had no specific intentions of any NATO discussion of this matter. The earlier U.K. case, which the Secretary General had cited, was really quite different in a number of respects. We did of course want all appropriate international organizations to continue the general multilateral pressure on the Germans to do more about their surplus, but we intended to keep our procurement talks with them on a bilateral basis. Ambassador Finletter suggested that the Secretary General might, however, want to consider—when the currently-planned discussion and review of NATO military planning was completed—whether some of the countries with greater financial capability could usefully be asked to provide appropriate military equipment assistance to other NATO countries. The Secretary noted that, during our talks last year with the Germans, we had tried to suggest their extending such military assistance to other NATO countries but had been unsuccessful. If the NATO could, as its review of national military plans proceeded, get the Germans or others to do something along this line, that would certainly be fine. We had come to recognize that there was merit in the German reluctance to provide such military aid on a bilateral basis, and had stopped pressing them on it. Summing up, the Secretary reiterated that, despite what had been said in our February aide-memoire, both we and the Germans preferred to keep our talks on a bilateral basis. However, he was in agreement with the Ambassador's suggestion that an ultimate decision by NATO calling for greater conventional forces might create a problem of military assist-ance programs among NATO countries which would be of a multilateral character. Mr. Sullivan called attention, in this connection, to the great difficulties which had been encountered in arriving at a satisfactory multilateral sharing of the relatively small costs involved in the NATO infrastructure programs. The Ambassador and the Secretary General felt this experience was not necessarily conclusive, and possibly a large multilateral NATO cost-sharing arrangement would be easier. The Secretary General then inquired whether he could assume, similarly, that the United States did not have any idea of pressing in the NATO for establishment of a burden-sharing formula. The Secretary replied that this was correct. Establishment of any such formula was a very difficult and complex matter and would not be feasible—although we had in connection with discussions in the DAG, for example, made reference to the statistics on the relative burdens which are being carried by various countries. In doing so, we had included defense costs along with other considerations—and, in the U.S. case, this of course meant our total military costs, including for example our large expenditures on atomic energy. The Germans, he indicated, had backed away from discussion of formulas after looking at the U.S. figures, and the references made to burden-sharing in our February aide-memoire had been intended only to exert general pressure on them to deal with their balance of payments surplus. The Secretary General mentioned the question of the United Kingdom and the Common Market, indicating he had some doubt whether the British would decide to join on conditions which would be acceptable to the rest of us. In response, the Secretary referred to the impressions Mr. Ball had gained from his conversations. He himself felt there had clearly been a marked change in the U.K. position, but we could not of course be equally certain of a successful outcome. There had not been any change in the U.S. position on this matter. The Secretary General alluded, finally, to the problem of the NATO mission to Greece and Turkey. Only the Italians had so far offered a candidate. The Germans also were willing to, but the British had no interest and he was still looking for a third candidate. It was possible the Netherlands might supply one. The Secretary asked whether Tinbergen might be available. The Secretary General agreed Tinbergen was a very good man, but thought the Netherlands Government might be reluctant to propose him. The Secretary suggested they might perhaps do so if no other candidate were found. Donald W. Curtis 4 * Source: Kennedy Library, Dillon Papers, Memoranda of Conversation, 1961. Confidential. Drafted by Donald W. Curtis (Treasury/OIF) on June 20, although the date at the top of the source text is June 19. The source text is stamped, “Approved by the Secretary, June 25 1961.” The meeting was held in the Secretary's office. 1 presumably Charles A. Sullivan, Special assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury. 2 Irwin M. Tobin (EUR/RA) 3 For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 472-474. 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 46. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy 46. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy Source Washington, July 9, 1961. SUBJECT Recent German Measures Relating to United States Balance of Payments At our meeting yesterday, 1 you asked to be informed about recent measures taken by the Federal Republic of Germany which have had a beneficial effect on the United States balance of payments situation. As you know, our aide-memoire on this subject was transmitted to the Germans on February 17, 1961, at the time of Foreign Minister von Bren-tano's visit to the United States, and I shall recount here pertinent German measures subsequent to the delivery of the aide-memoire. German Foreign Aid Program Since announcing an intention in October 1960 to provide on a continuing basis aid to less-developed countries, the Germans have made significant progress in this area and further substantial progress is expected. An aid program of DM 5 billion ($1.25 billion) for 1961-62 is under way, this amount corresponding to almost 1 percent of the German GNP, a ratio suggested by the United States as an aid target for member countries of the Development Assistance Group (DAG). In recent testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in support of the Act for International Development, Under Secretary Ball commented briefly on the German foreign aid program. Enclosed is an excerpt from Mr. Ball's testimony covering his remarks on this subject. 2 US-German Balance of Payments Discussions In accordance with your instructions, Ambassador Dowling has set in motion arrangements under which joint working groups composed of US and German military experts are meeting to examine (1) German military requirements over the next 5 years, looking to increased procurement in the United States; (2) military logistics facilities which may be available for joint use on a shared-expense, leasing or similar financial arrangement and (3) the possibility of reduction in costs of contractual services for our military establishment in Germany, which now amount to approximately $270 million annually. German military orders in the United States total $208 million for the first six months of 1961, as compared with an average annual level of $225 million for preceding years. The German Defense Ministry has proposed that our Defense Department undertake to handle German military procurement in the United States on a contract basis; if this arrangement can be worked out, we would expect it to pay off in increased procurement. German military procurement includes an order for two battalions of Pershing missiles ($130 million), which the United States has accepted subject to the possibility of changes in NATO force goals or in deployment of NATO weapons which might affect fulfillment of the contract for these missiles. This order replaced a previous contract for Mace missiles. Defense Minister Strauss has stated his willingness to place considerably larger orders in the United States, provided what he characterized as deficiencies in some categories of US military equipment are overcome by joint US/German development. At our request, the JCS is presently examining Strauss' assertions, looking to a discussion with him on this point when he comes to Washington on July 14. 3 Other Recent Financial Actions Undertaken by the Federal Republic As you know, the Germans revalued their deutschemark by approximately 5 percent in March 1961, which among other things will make our exports to Germany more competitive and make German exports more expensive. The German Government prepaid $587 million of its postwar debt to the United States, leaving a balance of $200 million. This increment benefited our liquidity position. Certain US products, notably poultry, were recently liberalized by the German Government for importation, resulting in an immediate increase in the volume of exports of these items to the Federal Republic. This action stemmed from our balance of payments discussions with the Germans. Dean Rusk 4 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 811.10/7-961. Secret. Drafted by C. Arnold Freshman (EUR/GER) on July 6 and cleared by Tyler and Hillenbrand. Attached to the source text is a July 6 memorandum from Tyler to Secretary Rusk, indicating that the memorandum responded to the President's July 5 request for information on Germany's actions in relation to the U.S. balance-of-payments situation. 1 Reference presumably is to a meeting among the President, Secretary Rusk, and Hillenbrand on July 5 at 11:20 a.m. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Books) 2 The enclosure, not printed, is an extract from Ball's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in support of the Act for International Development on June 5. 3 No record of this visit has been found. 4 Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original. 47. National Security Action Memorandum No. 81 47. National Security Action Memorandum No. 81 Source Washington, August 28, 1961. TO Secretary of the Treasury SUBJECT U.S. Gold Position I would like to have as soon as the Treasury has made an analysis an up-to-date study of our gold position. How much we are losing. How this compares to other years. Whether we can look for a better result in the next six months. What should we do about it. I gathered the other day that one of the reasons for the flow of gold was the investment by Americans of dollars in Western Europe. Should I before Congress leaves announce that we are going to put this on a must basis of legislation next year that will make it retroactive to September 1st of this year. Would that help discourage a flow in the next four months? John F. Kennedy 1 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Balance of Payments and Gold. Secret. Copies were sent to the Department of State, the Bureau of the Budget, and the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers. 1 Printed from a copy that indicates Kennedy signed the original. 48. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to President Kennedy 48. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to President Kennedy Source Washington, August 31, 1961. SUBJECT Gold flows I refer to your memorandum on gold, dated August 28, 1961. 1 Our net gold loss this year amounts to $274 million. This may be compared to losses during similar eight-month periods of 1958, 1959 and 1960 that amounted to $1,775 million, $1,013 million and $462 million, respectively. (See table attached.) 2 The important trends are as follows. Heavy gold sales began in 1958 and continued through February of this year. The $5.4 billion loss brought our total gold stock down to $17.4 billion. The combined effects of this Administration's statements with respect to the dollar and our balance of payments, the psychological and real impact of our improved balance of payments, and the cooperative steps taken by the Basle group of central banks, all combined to bring the losses to a halt in March. During July and August, however, we again sustained net losses totaling $72 million. In the absence of the $150 million received from the IMF, the loss would have been greater. The reappearance of net gold sales is significant, and there are distinct possibilities of some further losses in the months ahead. To some extent, of course, we must expect changing economic positions of various countries to lead to gold movements if gold is going to serve as the base for our international monetary system. But the present and foreseeable period may also show some disturbing strains. We are taking steps to reduce the possibility of drains from the three major sources of possible gold demand. Some demand may result from further shifts of the funds received by Britain from its drawing on the Monetary Fund. Additional payments of British debts to Switzerland, which is not a member of the Fund, are scheduled and it is likely that those dollar receipts will be converted into gold. Although our understanding with the British is to the effect that its drawing will not be used in a way that would pose a demand for gold from us, nevertheless disposition of the proceeds to other countries may result in such demand. In this connection, we are emphasizing to the British the nature of our understanding, and attempting to assure that any gold loss will be minimized. Some demand may result from activity in the London gold market. The major part of this week's gold loss represented sales to the Bank of England to offset its losses in the market. We may have further sales to the Bank of England for this same reason. I do not feel that the recent increase in demand for gold on the London market indicates an international judgment that the dollar is in a weakened position against other currencies. Rather the activity appears largely to have reflected an upsurge in private hoarding and speculative demand, owing in good measure to the heightened tensions associated with Berlin and other aspects of the world political situation. However, confidential information indicates that there have been some central bank purchases in that market. By far the largest has been the Bank of Italy. We have sent a representative of the Federal Reserve to Italy to advise them that it would be preferable for them to buy directly from us rather than putting up the price on the London gold market. As a result we now have the assurance that the central bank of Italy will not participate further in the market. Despite this, continued demand on the London market seems likely for the immediate future, in the absence of a notable improvement in the international political situation. We are in close touch with the British regarding this market in order to assure that no rapid price rise occurs to excite speculation. Moreover, we are careful to avoid any public expression of undue concern over the gold situation inasmuch as such concern might in itself stimulate capital flight. The third source of potential demand in the near future lies in short-term capital movements. Some flows of funds from the United States to Britain are now being reported in response to interest rate differentials. Other flows of significant amount have taken place from certain European countries to Switzerland. Such flow of funds may at times tend to lodge in those countries which hold a high proportion of their reserves in the form of gold. In view of the high volatility of short-term capital it is essential that our short-term interest rates do not decline. We will also want to continue to pursue vigorously our own foreign exchange operations which can help to minimize speculation and reduce the attractiveness of moving funds because of differentials in interest rates here and abroad. You will recall the numerous authorizations we have sought from you in order to strengthen our activities in this field. With respect to the balance of payments generally, there has been a deterioration since the first quarter of this year. I do not feel at this point that our gold losses have been related directly to this worsening. However, continuing payments deficits will further increase the liquid dollar holdings of foreign countries. Although private accounts may absorb some portion of such dollar gains, most of the additions are likely to go into official reserves. It is significant that a number of countries have increased the amounts of dollars they are currently willing to hold as a proportion of their total reserves. Nevertheless, further additions may well occasion conversions into gold. In addition, there is always the pervasive influence of such deficits on confidence in the dollar. I will be discussing the general financial situation at the Vienna meetings of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank in September. 3 I am hopeful that the outcome of these meetings will show the determination of the financial representatives of the member governments to cooperate even more and help dampen speculative and hoarding activity. Real progress there toward the plan for standby credit facilities in the International Monetary Fund should help to calm the financial markets. In view of the above considerations, I do not recommend that the Administration take any new action now. But I continue to feel that we must seek active implementation of the various measures which you have already directed. In particular, we should press forward with our efforts to stimulate and encourage our export trade; it is significant that our trade surplus has declined a bit and the recovery of our economy will add to import demand. We should also press forward to gain a more equitable sharing with our allies of economic and military aid. I interpret your reference to legislation to refer to our proposals to eliminate tax deferrals or impose changes respecting “tax haven” corporations. I do not think that a public statement indicating that these changes should apply retroactively to the latter part of this year would help our gold position significantly during the next few months. Such a statement, which would be contrary to our general philosophy about retroactivity in tax proposals, might well be considered an expression of undue concern about the gold situation on our part, and might actually run the risk of accelerating our losses. However, it may well be desirable for you to give strong personal and public support to our proposal to tax foreign “tax haven” corporations when it comes up next January before the Ways and Means Committee. Douglas Dillon * Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office File, Treasury, 1/61-9/61. Confidential. Transmitted under cover of a memorandum from Dillon to the President, September 1, which reads in part: “Our information regarding the actions of other countries and our talks with them is highly confidential. Therefore, the information in this memorandum should be closely held.” 1 Document 47 . 2 Not printed. 3 Regarding U.S. participation in these Vienna meetings, see Documents 50 and 51 . 49. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany 49. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany Source Washington, September 12, 1961, 10 p.m. 662. For Ambassador from Ball. Paris pass USRO Stoessel, McGuire and Riddleberger. Two separate subjects of current interest here are (a) additional “burden-sharing” arrangements with FRG to help alleviate pressures on US balance of payments, especially in regard to foreign exchange drain connected with present as well as increasing US military force level in FRG, and (b) overall magnitude FRG aid for LDC's 1962 and following years. Defense and Treasury extremely anxious transfer to FRG large portion foreign exchange costs involved in stationing US troops in FRG, including foreign exchange costs any American troop build-up there. Present indications are this year's deficit US balance of payments if continues to increase at present rate could approach $3 million. While generally recognized inadvisable take any action this time that might interfere with current negotiations, felt some sort general exploration subject may be called for now. Anticipate renewed efforts after September 17 by US agencies and nearly all LDC's to obtain large-scale developmental assistance for LDC's from FRG. I intend coordinate US approaches this regard primarily through DAG. To provide basis US estimate how much aid FRG may be expected or persuaded render various countries, as well as to assure continued, active and effectual FRG participation aid field, more definite FRG commitments essential. Elections soon will no longer be excuse not facing up to much more substantial budgetary appropriations this purpose. Your comments these subjects urgently requested, including your opinion advisability raising them with Brentano in most general way during FM Washington meeting. Approach on aid, of course, would be made entirely separately from discussion troop costs. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 811.10/9-1261. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Joseph E. O'Mahony (EUR/GER) on September 10; cleared by Freshman, Sullivan (Treasury) and Henry J. Kuss, Jr. (DOD/ISA) in substance, Sidney Schmukler (E/OFD) and John C. Renner (EUR/RA) in draft, and David Korn (S/S); and approved by Ball. Repeated to Paris. 50. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State 50. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State Source Bonn, September 13, 1961, 6 p.m. 607. Paris pass USRO, Stoessel, McGuire and Riddleberger. For Under Secretary Ball. Reference: Deptel 662. 1 I appreciate seriousness of problem in reftel concerning additional pressure on US balance of payment arising from increased US forces level in FRG and the overall magnitude of FRG aid for LDC's in 1962. In view of the uncertainties concerning the exact composition of the next Cabinet and even certain doubts that Adenauer will succeed himself as Chancellor, I believe that raising these two questions with Brentano at the Foreign Ministers meeting would not produce any immediate results. He is bound to give standard answer that nothing can be done until after the elections. On the other hand I believe that question of pressures on US balance of payments in connection with augmentation of US forces should be brought forcefully to his attention, if for no other reason than to get this question “on the record.” FRG has had no formal notification re extent of increase and no conception what this may mean in terms of US financial resources. Level of magnitude of augmentation of US forces will be pre-sented formally to MOD on Friday Sept. 15. When question is raised with Brentano, 2 I recommend that he be requested to transmit these views to his government and be informed that we will raise the questions contained in para 2 of reftel with the FedRep at an early date following the formation of new Cabinet, which will not be established until after new Bundestag convenes on Oct 17. Care should be taken in presentation to avoid assumption that we are reviving issue of troop support costs. Re future FedRep development aid program, several important decisions are now being held in abeyance until formation next Cabinet (see Embtel 594). 3 Most immediate issue is level of commitment authority to be sought in 1962 budget law. According our info, FonOff and EconMin staff level, with concurrence Brentano and Erhard, favor 1962 legal commitment authority for bilateral development loans (KFW fund) in neighborhood DM 2,000 to DM 3,000 million (over and above DM 3.9 billion bilateral loan portion present 1961-1962 program) in order continue forward momentum of program. Finance Ministry, on other hand, is holding out for considerable smaller commitment authority. This issue will have to be resolved fairly soon after formation new Cabinet in order permit 1962 budget planning go forward. Question of 1962 cash appropriations far less important since KFW already has more than enough funds assured to cover expected disbursement level for 1961 and 1962. FedRep bilateral loan commitments for 1961 already exceed DM 5 billion. A second, more important but less immediate, issue is need for FedRep to develop long-term aid program for period beyond 1962 commensurate with its capabilities and responsibilities. I believe we should press for this too but we should allow new Cabinet time to settle down and attend to most urgent questions before doing so. In addition discussing above with Brentano, I suggest it would be highly useful to raise both points with Etzel at Vienna meeting, particularly need for substantial commitment authority in 1962 (see A-304). 4 Dowling * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 811.10/9-1361. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Paris. 1 Document 49 . 2 Secretary Rusk discussed the foreign exchange and other implications of the NATO military buildup with Brentano on September 14. (Memorandum of conversation, September 14; Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1950) 3 Dated September 13. (Ibid., Central Files, 862A.00/9-1361) 4 Dated September 9. (Ibid., 398.14/9-961) 51. Telegram From the Embassy in Austria to the Department of State 51. Telegram From the Embassy in Austria to the Department of State Source Vienna, September 18, 1961, 3 p.m. 497. Monetary Conference from Dillon. Pass White House, Treasury. Have reached understanding with other major industrial countries that group of us would commit ourselves to lend additional resources to IMF to deal with balance of payments pressures which impair or might impair world monetary system. This follows from our initiatives in series bilateral discussions culminating in group meeting yesterday with Ministers and Central Bank Governors of Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden and UK and Managing Director Monetary Fund. General positions individual countries will be indicated in their Wednesday 1 speeches here. Fact that above understanding reached will not be announced until Friday morning when Managing Director will make summing up speech. Over-all amount expected to be five to six billion. Individual commitments, operating procedures, and other details to be negotiated this fall with view to legislative action early in 1962 in [garble]countries where needed. Porter * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 398.13/9-1861. Confidential. 1 September 20. 52. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball) 52. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball) Source Washington, October 9, 1961. SUBJECT US/FRG military balance of payments negotiations The next military balance of payments meeting will be held in Secretary Dillon's office at the Treasury on Monday, October 9 at 4:30 p.m. 1 Participants, in addition to Secretary Dillon and yourself, will be Ambassador Dowling, Deputy Defense Secretary Gilpatric, Mr. Charles Sullivan (Treasury), Mr. Henry Kuss (Defense), and Mr. C. Arnold Freshman (GER). The tactics for dealing with the current military balance of payments negotiations and the prospective additional foreign exchange expenditures involved in the augmentation of US forces in Germany will be considered. In this connection, it may be anticipated that State will be asked to join Treasury and Defense in agreeing to the position incorporated in the Treasury draft of September 29, 1961 (Tab A). 2 In essence, this position contemplates the early expansion of the scope of the current negotiations (underway since April and directed at correcting an existing military payments imbalance) to include consideration of the additional financial problems which will develop in the event that US forces in Germany are augmented. The Ambassador, on the other hand (Bonn's 700 at Tab B), 3 has recommended that the current negotiations be pursued to a conclusion and that the problems associated with a possible augmentation of the US forces be considered separately in a negotiating framework which emphasizes primarily the common defense rather than the balance of payments aspects. The Current Negotiations The current balance of payments negotiations with the FRG have as their objective the conclusion of a multi-element package which will largely offset the present US military payments deficit. A major element of this package is increased German military procurement in the United States. The Embassy has recently estimated, on the basis of discussions held thus far, that the FRG procurement for the period January 1961-March 1962 will be approximately $400-450 million. In its draft, the Treasury notes that the technical level discussions of the various package elements have been slow. While true, it should be noted that this cannot be attributed solely to problems raised by the German negotiators. (Some of these, in connection with a long-term German commitment on procurement, are elaborated upon in a recent Embassy draft on this subject at Tab C.) 4 Lack of rapid progress is as much attributable to delays in Washington guidance on such key points as joint use of facilities, reduction of US war reserves, availability of weapons systems, and use of facilities in third countries. Prospect of US Troop Augmentation in Germany Even assuming that the current negotiations can be successfully concluded, an additional foreign exchange problem of sizeable dimensions will arise if US forces in Germany are augmented. In anticipation of this the Ambassador has made certain recommendations for raising this problem with the FRG. From the summary of his recommendations and the summary of the Treasury-Defense position below, it appears that there is agreement on the objective but not on the tactics. The Ambassador's Recommendations Ambassador Dowling has recommended that the current balance of payments negotiations be actively pursued to a conclusion. He favors early resort to a new, separate approach to the FRG to discuss the financial implications of augmentation of US forces in Germany. The Ambassador's recommendations are based on the following considerations: 1. We stand a better chance of securing increased German efforts if the problem of troop augmentation costs is considered in a framework of joint US/FRG military efforts for the common defense rather than purely as a balance of payments problem; 2. The scope or objectives of the current balance of payments negotiations are not such as to permit sole reliance on them as a vehicle for increasing German contributions to the level required by augmentation because: a) a long-term German procurement commitment cannot be envisaged. (In addition to the prevailing uncertainty with respect to NATO military requirements and future economic trends—which might, for example, encourage the Germans to build up their own armaments production—there are political and, to some extent, legal problems which make it difficult for the FRG to enter into such a commitment.) b) no package proposal presently envisaged can provide the leverage we require. (In the Treasury draft substantial negotiating leverage is attributed to the readiness of Defense to provide German forces with a Cooperative Logistics System. Whether this is in fact the case cannot be determined until the term Cooperative Logistics System as used by Treasury and Defense is more precisely defined so that all three agencies have a clear understanding of what is being offered, as well as what the offer is worth. It is important, for example, to understand that giving the Germans a supply service and sharing our reserves with them applies only to those military items which we both use. The offer to share war reserves may have less magic than is implied, since in event of hostilities we, as the Germans and our other Allies are aware, would share these reserves. Thus the Germans may be unwilling to pay for something they would expect to get for nothing if the need arises. Another consideration is that the bulk of our military supplies are stored in France. The French would, of course, have to be informed of any large scale US-German sharing arrangement. This could be a particular problem if, in order to share our equipment with the Germans, it became necessary to construct additional facilities in France. c) the contingency aspect of augmentation might of itself result in the slowing down of the current negotiations. The Ambassador proposes in essence that the financial problems of the augmentation be covered within a political framework, with the Germans simply being asked to take on this increment in our foreign exchange deficit as a responsibility of their country in the present international situation. The Ambassador suggests that prior to October 17, he and, if possible, Secretary McNamara or Deputy Defense Secretary Gilpatric lay before the Germans the entire range of problems arising out of US and FRG preparedness actions. The objective of this presentation would be to impress upon the FRG the need for urgent action and to lay the groundwork for the political decisions which the new FRG Government must take. Shortly after the new government is installed, i.e., after October 17, the Ambassador proposes that negotiations on the specific problem of meeting the costs of augmenting the US forces take place in Bonn. The Ambassador would hope to be joined by State, Defense and Treasury representatives from Washington, preferably at the Under Secretary level. The Treasury-Defense Position Substantively, the Treasury-Defense position contemplates an immediate fusion of the current negotiations which have been underway since April with consideration of the future additional foreign exchange problem which will develop in the event of US military augmentation. In terms of the mechanics, it is the Treasury-Defense recommendation that the current negotiations be raised from the technical to the political level by the despatch, immediately following the installation of the new German Government, of a letter from the President to the Chancellor. This would be followed by the despatch on or about October 20 of a State-Treasury-Defense team headed by Deputy Defense Secretary Gilpatric to carry on the first phase of the “discussions.” (In the previous Treasury draft the word selected was “negotiations”. The change may indicate a movement in the direction of the position recommended by the Ambassador at least to the extent of having actual negotiations preceded by an initial Dowling-Gilpatric presentation to the FRG designed to stimulate the Germans to lay the groundwork for the necessary political decisions, to impress upon them the need for action, and to elicit from them suggestions as to how best to proceed.) Recommendations For the reasons set forth by the Ambassador the current balance of payments negotiations should not be used as a vehicle for dealing with the foreign exchange problems arising from the possible augmentation of US forces in Germany. The current negotiations should be concluded as expeditiously as possible. The US augmentation problem should be raised separately at the political level along the lines proposed by the Ambassador. * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 811.10/10-961. Secret. Drafted by Andrew Stalder (EUR/GER) on October 8 and concurred in by Robert H. Kranich (EUR/RA) and Martin. The date is handwritten on the source text. 1 No record of this meeting has been found. 2 Not attached. A copy is in Department of State, Central Files, 811.10/9-2961. 3 Not attached. A copy is ibid., 811.10/9-2261. 4 Not attached and not found. 53. Editorial Note 53. Editorial Note On October 24, 1961, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric and German Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss signed a memorandum of understanding that envisioned the creation of a military cooperative logistics system between the two governments. These arrangements resulted from the U.S. Government's recognition of the need to provide a sufficient supply line for the expanding Germany military forces and the economic advantages of cooperation in the military production field as well as the necessity of dealing with the drain on the U.S. balance of payments caused by the stationing of substantial numbers of U.S. military forces in West Germany. The text of the memorandum of understanding reads as follows: "The Minister of Defense of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Deputy Secretary of Defense of the United States have reviewed the status of the studies which have been jointly conducted by the two countries of the possibilities of increased mutual cooperation and assistance in military matters. They have concluded that a cooperative logistics system is feasible and desirable, and express their intention that formula agreements and detailed procedural arrangements to establish such a system be entered into expeditiously between appropriate representatives of the two countries. "It is understood that the cooperative logistics system contemplated by this memorandum will include the following major features: cost sharing in research and development projects; procurement services in the United States; depot supply support and depot maintenance services in Europe; sale of United States war reserve stocks prepositioned in Europe; storage facilities; and joint use of major and local United States training areas in Germany. "It is anticipated that under the proposed cooperative logistics system payments by the Federal Republic of Germany to the United States for materiel and for research, development, procurement, supply, maintenance and other logistic services, including the Federal Republic of Germany's share of the system's capital and operating expenses, will be sufficient to insure that military transactions of direct benefit to the U.S. balance of payments are large enough to offset the transactions of U.S. forces in Germany of benefit to the FRG balance of payments, on the basis of such forces presently stationed in Germany or heretofore announced for movement to Germany. In the event of further deployment of U.S. forces to Germany, the two governments will consider methods whereby the balance of payments effect of such movements can be adjusted to their mutual benefit.” (Telegram 981 from Bonn, October 24; Department of State, Central Files, 811.10/10-2461) 54. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 54. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Source Paris, December 13, 1961, 8 p.m. 3065. Eyes only for President from Dillon. Dear Mr. President: During full day Ministerial session today 1 agreement reached on IMF borrowing arrangement subject only to formal Cabinet approval where required, i.e., Canada, UK and maybe one or two others. 2 Total resources expected to be $6.1 billion plus 3 or 4 hundred million on side agreement with Swiss. Exact figure subject to possible minor adjustment after Canadian Cabinet action as we are asking 250 from them instead of 200 which they had expected. Only substantive change in formula proposed by US was adoption of requirement for 2/3 majority of participating countries to activate borrowing release. This is additional to our proposal for 60 percent weighted majority and was adopted to satisfy Dutch who at first held out for unanimous decision which would have created unacceptable veto situation. IMF Executive Board will consider and hopefully approve next week and participating countries will also exchange supplementary letters with French before end of year. Thus we will meet schedule set in Vienna of firm decision by year end so that necessary Parliamentary and Congressional action can proceed promptly. Brief communique being issued tonight 3 but documents remain classified until officially approved by govts such as Canada which require formal Cabinet approval. Faithfully yours, Douglas. Gavin * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 398.13/12-1361. Confidential; Priority. 1 The Finance Ministers of Belgium, Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United States met in Paris on December 13. 2 The agreement was formalized in an exchange of letters on consultative arrangements. For the approved texts of these letters, see the Supplement. 3 Text transmitted in telegram 3066 from Paris, December 13. (Department of State, Central Files, 398.13/12-1361) 55. Editorial Note 55. Editorial Note On January 8, 1962, the International Monetary Fund announced that its Board of Directors had reached agreement with 10 major industrialized countries on general arrangements by which the Fund could borrow supplementary funds. “This decision,” the IMF announcement stated, “sets out the terms and conditions under which such borrowing will be possible in order to enable the Fund to fulfill more effectively its role in the international monetary system under conditions of convertibility, including greater freedom for short-term capital movements.” Under these arrangements, the United States agreed to lend up to $2 billion to the Fund. For text of the IMF announcement, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962 , pages 251-253. The procedures the nations would follow in making supplementary funds available to the Fund were spelled out in exchanges of letters among the 10 nations. For texts of these letters, see the Supplement. The agreement required approval by the necessary legislative bodies. The U.S. Congress enacted enabling legislation authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to make additional U.S. loans to the International Monetary Fund in P.L. 87-490, approved on June 19, 1962. (76 Stat. 105) The U.S. Government announced its formal adherence to the IMF's general arrangements to borrow on October 24, 1962. 56. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy 56. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy Source Washington, July 6, 1962. SUBJECT Gold Attached are a number of papers 1 which you have looked at or asked for in the past two weeks in connection with discussions of the balance of payments plus one or two items I thought you might find it worthwhile to read. All these papers focus on the monetary or gold holding aspect of the problem rather than on the current balance of payments. As you are well aware, improvements in the current balance of payments will be at best slow. Such improvements do contribute to a stronger U.S. position in the international financial markets, they do not change the fundamental problem created by large foreign holdings of dollars which may be turned into gold at the pleasure of the holders. It is chiefly to this problem that the papers are addressed. 1. The first group of four items contains the proposal for the solution of the gold problem which you got from Walter Loucheim 2 through Ted Sorensen (Tab 1) and comments on it. In accordance with your request, I asked Jim Tobin and Bob Roosa to comment on it. Doug Dillon added his comments to Roosa's (Tab 2, Tobin; Tab 3, Roosa; Tab 4, Dillon). Loucheim's most important idea is that we should agree with the other major holders of gold on what ratios of gold we should hold on our total foreign exchange reserves. This would result in the present world gold stocks supporting a greater total of liquidity, and would have the effect of ruling out runs on our gold by foreign central banks holding dollars. The removal of the 25 per cent gold cover requirement for our internal currency circulation which Loucheim suggests is a necessary step to putting his major proposal into effect. 2. Tobin and Roosa agree on the accuracy of Loucheim's diagnosis of the problem and on the ultimate desirability of his proposal for agreed fixed reserve ratios. The great difference between them is that Tobin thinks both that this is a practical proposition and that it is necessary for us to move in this direction fairly soon. Roosa doubts its practicality, and further, he is much more certain that the steps the Treasury is now taking (see Dillon's memorandum) are as much as can usefully be done now. Roosa's doubts on the practicality of more far-reaching measures and his evaluation as to what should be done now are of course related. These comments reflect a continuing difference in outlook between Treasury and CEA, which was revealed in the discussions in your office Thursday. Doug Dillon and Bob Roosa are confident that they have the situation well in hand, that the various steps they are taking—which by their nature tend to be obscure and closely held—are the best that can be done now and that any large-scale changes are impossible either because the Europeans won't agree to them or because it would be a dangerous sign of weakness on our part to propose them. The Council position, on the other hand, is that some fundamental change in the mechanism of international payments is necessary. Further, it is dangerous to wait to make this change for some indefinite future time, 2, 3, or 4 years from now when we achieve an equilibrium or a surplus in our balance of payments. The inhibiting influence the gold problem has exercised on our domestic economic policy and the high price we will have to pay in foreign policy programs if we feel we must cut overseas military and foreign aid expenditures to the bone are the chief arguments in favor of the Council's position that we make a large step in the near future. The differences of viewpoint involved are illustrated by the contrast of a single pair of figures. All the operations which Dillon describes in his memorandum have resulted in our holding $400 million worth of foreign currencies in our reserves. If we carried out a plan such as Loucheim suggests we might wish to hold something of the order of $3 or $4 billion worth of foreign currencies in our reserves and correspondingly less gold. 3. The next item is a paper of Tobin's which shows how a proposal for agreed gold reserve ratios would work in some detail (Tab 5). Although it is long, I think it is clear. If we accepted this idea we would probably want to choose something like his Plan II, which has the effect of increasing total world reserves by about 10 per cent. It involves, of course, a very substantial transfer of gold from U.S. to other countries as the price of protecting us against the risk of uncontrollable runs on our present holdings. Walter Heller's covering note indicates that it is possible for you to give a gold guarantee without Congressional action. This, of course, does not answer the question of whether it is wise to do so. 4. Neither the Treasury nor the Council has given you comments on the letter of Bruno Saager 3 to Prince Radziwill (Tab 6). At the meeting, Bob Roosa really didn't answer your question of what was wrong with Saager's idea of increasing the price of gold in all currencies. First, it is better than doing nothing. It will solve our short-run problem, as well as increasing world liquidity. However, it is far from the best way of solving the problem and it has a number of disadvantages. First, the benefits go to the Soviets, to the South Africans, and to a very small extent, to Canadian and American gold mining companies who will be encouraged to mine more gold by the higher price. We combine giving advantages to the Soviets and to the South Africans with increasing our own and Canadian production of something we don't really need. Second, it leaves the basic problem of the inadequacies of the international monetary mechanism untouched, although it clearly postpones the particular problem we have to face for a number of years. It will still be true that movements of gold need not be related to the real needs of international trade and finance. If we are to exert our efforts to get the continental European countries to agree to this proposition, we might do better to use these efforts toward a more useful end. Third, it is a move which creates something of the same problems for us that devaluation would create. It encourages gold speculators. It probably leads to some lack of confidence in the dollar, even though it helps our immediate position greatly. Since it will justify the passion for holding gold, it will strengthen rather than weaken speculative motives in the international money market. These are, after all, the source of a large part of our troubles. 5. The next item is a copy of a brief comment from the Economist on the Canadian situation which Dave Bell and Walter Heller both thought you should read (Tab 7). At Tab 8, I attach Jim Tobin's paper which you read at Camp David the other day and asked me to send to Dillon for comment, in case you want to look at it again. 6. Finally, to raise the average level of the package, I include a brief essay that J.M. Keynes wrote in 1930 (Tab 9). It remains the most elegant statement of the fundamental proposition that a rational international payment system could dispense with gold altogether. The great attention paid to gold is another myth. The last few sentences are now again as apposite as they were in 1930. As you said of the Alliance for Progress, those who oppose reform may get revolution. Carl * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Balance of Payments, General, 7/1/62-7/15/62. Confidential. 1 None of the papers (tabs) is attached or has been found. 2 Walter C. Loucheim, Jr., investment consultant to the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems. 3 Not further identified. 57. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers (Heller) to President Kennedy 57. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers (Heller) to President Kennedy Source Washington, August 9, 1962. SUBJECT Why we need an interim international monetary agreement 1. To prevent and to counter speculation against the dollar. Against our $16 billion of gold are outstanding $20 billion in short-term foreign dollar claims (half official, half private). This potential liability can be vastly increased if and when our own citizens sell dollars abroad for foreign currencies or for gold. Consequently we are constantly in danger of a speculative “run” against the dollar and the U.S. gold stock. There have been three runs in the last two years—one in the fall of 1960, one in the spring of 1961 after the revaluation of the Deutschmark, and one this summer ended only by your Telstar statement. 1 An international agreement, and only an international agreement, will make it perfectly clear that there is no profit in speculating against the dollar—not just the U.S. but all the major monetary powers together will be publicly committed to concrete measures to defend it. 2. To eliminate the whims and prejudices of currency speculators and bankers from the making of U.S. policy. The vulnerability of the dollar to failures of confidence means that the U.S. Government is not master in its own house. For unless the international financial community, taking its cues from Wall Street, has “confidence,” there can always be a speculative run. Thus Chairman Martin reported to you that the dollar's “bad press” is the reason the Fed moved to higher interest rates this summer in spite of the economic slowdown at home—in effect, New York bankers have learned that one way to get higher interest rates on their loans is to talk down the dollar abroad. Thus it is argued that a tax cut or a budget deficit must be avoided, or timed, or limited, so as to nurse “confidence.” Thus U.S. military or aid outlays may be bad for “confidence”—it takes a broader and longer view to see more in these policies than dollar drains. Anyway the confidence game is one you can't win. Your intervention with Roger Blough 2 and the decline in the stock market were interpreted in some circles as bad for the dollar; but a steel price increase and a stock market boom would also have been regarded as unfavorable signals. 3. To allow the U.S. time for an orderly and constructive adjustment of its balance of payments. We cannot and do not seek to avoid the adjustments needed to eliminate the basic deficit in our balance of payments. Our basic deficit is not large, and it is declining, cost and price increases in Europe are slowly but surely working for us. The basic deficit is a danger only because its continuation may contribute to a speculative run. By itself it is clearly within our ability to finance for several more years with gold or credit—or to eliminate by drastic action. But hasty drastic action is what we want to avoid—we don't want to impair the defense or development of the Free World, or to restrict trade with new tariffs and quotas, or to slow down economic growth in the U.S. and the Free World. With the time which an agreement would give us, we can balance our international accounts in an expanding and liberal world economy. 4. To avoid worldwide deflation. There is a real danger, under present monetary arrangements, of a contagious epidemic of deflation. Present arrangements put much greater pressures to adjust on deficit countries than on surplus countries. When the Canadian dollar got in trouble, Canada took measures to deflate its economy, restrict its imports, and draw funds from the U.S. Yet Canada's problem was not inflation, but—like our own—unemployment and excess capacity. Canada's measures increased the pressure on the U.S. dollar. If we are forced to react similarly—tighter money, less expansionary budget policy, trade restrictions—we will in turn transmit deflationary pressures to Japan, the underdeveloped world, and even to Europe. 5. To provide time to negotiate a permanent improvement in the world monetary system. Quite apart from the temporary difficulties of the dollar, the world payments system needs to be systematically improved: (a) to defend all currencies against speculative attacks, (b) to internationalize the burden of providing international money, which now falls almost wholly on the dollar, and (c) to provide for an orderly increase in world liquid reserves to finance growth in trade and production. A permanent agreement can be negotiated, and the necessary legislation (like repeal of the gold cover) obtained from Congress, only if the monetary system is in the interim defended against rumor and speculation. 6. Why a visible formal agreement is preferable to continued improvisation. The techniques which would implement an interim international monetary agreement are essentially the techniques the Treasury has been so skillfully developing this last year and a half. But the Treasury has been using these techniques on a secret, day-to-day, piecemeal, ad hoc basis. There are great advantages to a systematic, public, formal, multilateral agreement governing their further use: (a) Without such an agreement, improvised expedients to avoid, postpone, or conceal small gold losses run the risk of impairing the very confidence they are intended to sustain. Even foreign governments may not have full confidence in unilateral or bilateral operations to which they are not parties. (b) Without an agreement, the U.S. does not obtain—in return for gold sales and guarantees given to foreign official and private dollar-holders—any assurance that present unguaranteed dollars will not be converted into gold. With an agreement, we will receive a quid pro quo of the greatest importance—a “standstill” on conversion of present official dollar holdings. (c) Only an international agreement, convincing to the public in its announced size, duration, and concrete provisions, can effectively defend the dollar against speculation. Confidence in the dollar cannot be maintained by our protestations alone, or by U.S. currency operations alone, no matter how skillful. The only way to send speculators permanently to cover is to have a clear public commitment to defend the dollar from all the major monetary powers. In the absence of such commitments from other governments, our best efforts to reduce balance of payments deficits and gold losses have not succeeded in sustaining confidence. Walter W. Heller 3 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Balance of Payments, International Monetary Agreement, 8/62. No classification marking. 1 Reference presumably is to President Kennedy's remarks about the U.S. dollar and gold at his press conference on July 23, which was transmitted abroad by the Telstar communications satellite. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962 , p. 570. 2 Chairman of the Board of Directors of U.S. Steel Corporation. 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 58. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of the Treasury Dillon and the Under Secretary of State (Ball) 58. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of the Treasury Dillon and the Under Secretary of State (Ball) Source Washington, August 24, 1962. The visit of French Finance Minister Giscard d'Estaing to Washington last month 1 and events and discussions here and abroad consequent on it have raised the question of whether the time is not ripe for a more explicit understanding among the major European countries and ourselves on international monetary matters. After a series of discussions among us culminating in our meeting of August 20, 2 it now appears useful to take at least the first step of making soundings with the French, and others as appropriate, on the possibilities in this direction. Accordingly, you should each send your agreed representative, Assistant Secretary John Leddy, Department of the Treasury; and Assistant Secretary G. Griffith Johnson, Department of State; to Europe as soon as possible to make these soundings on a discreet basis with the following instructions. 3 1. The purpose of making an arrangement is to strengthen confidence in the dollar, limit unnecessary foreign takings of U.S. gold, and strengthen the system of international monetary cooperation. To this end, discussions should begin with the French to see what they had in mind and whether and how they are preparing to carry forward their initiative. Discussions should also be held with the French and then, as appropriate, with others regarding the proposed “Declaration of Ten” (Section III of the Treasury's Program for Further International Monetary Action), 4 including means of increasing the automaticity of access to the IMF special resources. 2. Any interim arrangement—pending international consideration of long-term improvement in the international monetary system—should be a voluntary one undertaken on European initiative. Care should be taken to avoid the appearance of pressure from the U.S., since the belief that such pressure existed would be confidence-destroying rather than confidence-creating. The U.S. representatives shall not indicate that the U.S. might agree to any specific reciprocal concession or commitment which may be proposed. 3. One acceptable arrangement would entail the Six and the British exploring among themselves their practices in holding gold as part of their reserves. The starting point for these discussions might be a mutual recognition of the fact that each country will expect to maintain some basic “hard core” of its reserves in the form of gold, but that maintenance of a viable monetary system depends upon a mutual effort to economize in the use of gold for the remaining portion. Attention would thus be turned toward the absolute volume of desired gold holdings, rather than toward the potentially more intractable question of ratios. Mutually understood guidelines for the total gold holdings of each would then minimize pressures for competitive takings from the United States, and set an outer limit of, say, not more than $1 billion on their potential increases in gold holdings over the next two years, including any amount picked up from newly-mined gold as specified below. (a) The possibility of using the present holdings of each country (Germany, $3-3/4 billion; UK, $2-1/2 billion; France, $2-1/2 billion; Italy, $2-1/4 billion; Netherlands and Belgium, $1-1/2 billion each) as broadly acceptable guides over some interim period should be canvassed. These amounts might need to be modified to reach agreement, so long as the maximum increases envisaged remain within the $1 billion limit cited above. The French could presumably take the lead by reaffirming their own target for holding approximately three-fourths of a maximum of $3-1/2 billion of reserves in gold, but each country would need to make clear to the others its target and policies. (b) These mutually understood guidelines should provide a basis for distributing the proceeds of any gold acquired through joint purchases in the London gold market, with any other sales or purchases of gold to be effected directly through or with the U.S. rather than through the London market. (c) Increase in gold holdings consistent with the guidelines should be undertaken only in response to sustained additions to total reserves. 4. Alternatively, the arrangement might take the form of an understanding among the Six and the UK to hold increased reserves largely in dollars and only to a limited extent in gold in order to achieve an appropriate balance in the distribution of gold holdings between the U.S. and other countries. To be helpful the arrangement should be such as would not be likely to result in takings of gold in excess of (30% of the over-all U.S. deficit) (one-third of increased reserves) ($500 million per year). If the amount is much larger than this, it would not be confidence-producing. It would be understood that this amount would include any amounts acquired through joint purchases in the London gold market. Further, it would be desirable under this arrangement for any European deficits to be settled partly in gold. 5. It is desirable to avoid conditions in the understanding designed to increase the gold ratios of particular countries; e.g., Germany and Italy. John F. Kennedy 5 * Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Treasury, 8/62. Confidential; Limited Distribution. Also sent for information to the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers. Copies were sent to Sorensen, Bundy, Kaysen, and Bell. 1 President Kennedy met with Giscard d'Estaing at the White House on July 20 from 10 to 10:51 a.m. (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Books) No record of their conversation has been found. A memorandum of Acting Secretary of State Ball's conversation with Giscard at 6 p.m. the same day is printed in vol. XIII, pp. 731 - 735 . 2 No records of these discussions have been found, but, as a result of the discussion at the August 20 meeting, President Kennedy directed the formation of two committees on international monetary problems, chaired by the Department of the Treasury. He also asked Treasury, through the machinery of the Cabinet Committee, to prepare by September 15 an analysis of the steps undertaken to bring the balance of payments into equilibrium by the end of 1963 and an estimate of the probable degree of success. (Memorandum from Kaysen to Dillon, Ball, and Heller, August 20; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Balance of Payments, International Monetary Agreement, 8/62) 3 For the report by Leddy and Johnson, see the attachment to Document 59 . 4 The Treasury's Program has not been found. For a draft of the declaration, see the enclosure to the attachment to Document 59 . 5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 59. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon and the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Kennedy 59. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon and the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Kennedy Source Washington, September 12, 1962. Attached is the report which Assistant Secretary of the Treasury John Leddy and Assistant Secretary of State Griffith Johnson have made to us on their trip to Europe to confer with the French and British on the Declaration of Ten. A copy of the draft communique which the Finance Ministers of the Ten will issue after their meeting is attached to the report. It has been approved by us and by the French Minister of Finance and the British Chancellor of the Exchequer. The communique is designed to show that the leading countries are continuing to work closely together in monetary matters; that the IMF standby is readily available for use; that present resources are adequate to maintain the present price of gold; that further study of long-range improvements in the monetary field is desirable, and that meetings of the Ten are not necessarily concerned with an emergency like a U.S. drawing. France's partners in the Common Market agreed during the trip to a meeting of the Ten, but not to a communique. The French believe that they will, however, agree to its issuance, possibly with some changes reflecting their views. The French Finance Minister said that he had discussed his proposal that gold takings from the United States be limited with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who had agreed with him that high-level secret discussions should be carried on among the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy after the Bank-Fund meetings. Their ideas are still unclear to us and may not be known in full even to the most trusted subordinates of the two Ministers. We will follow this matter closely and keep you advised of developments. George W. Ball Douglas Dillon 1 Attachment Washington, September 10, 1962. Memorandum for Secretary of the Treasury and the Under Secretary of State In accordance with the President's memorandum of August 24 2 we proceeded to Paris and London during the week of September 3 where we conferred separately with the French and British on the proposed “Declaration of Ten” (Section III of the Treasury's Program for Further International Monetary Action); and with the French on the steps they may be contemplating to carry forward Minister Giscard d'Estaing's initiative looking toward an arrangement which would have the effect of limiting unnecessary European takings of U.S. gold. Our conversations in Paris were with Minister Giscard d'Estaing; M. Andre de Lattre, Director of External Affairs of the Ministry of Finance; and M. Rene Larre, French Financial Counselor in Washington. British officials present at our talks in London included Sir Frank Lee, Joint Permanent Secretary to the Treasury; Sir Denis Rickett, Second Secretary, Treasury Department; David Pitblado, U.K. Financial Counselor in Washington and Douglas Allen, all of the U.K. Treasury; and Maurice Parsons, Lucius Thompson-McCausland and F. J. Portsmore of the Bank of England. We did not meet with the Chancellor of the Excheq-uer. Declaration of Ten After some initial hesitation both the French and British warmly welcomed the idea of a ministerial meeting of the group of ten during the Fund and Bank meeting and the issuance by them of a communique. The attached draft text, which was approved by Washington during the course of our negotiations, has been endorsed by Minister of Finance Giscard d'Estaing, and Chancellor of the Exchequer Maudling. The significance of the communique lies in these points: 1. It would strengthen the public impression of continuing close monetary cooperation among the leading industrial countries. 2. It would make clear the ready availability of the $6 billion IMF standby for “decisive and prompt action.” 3. It would emphasize the adequacy of present resources—from the IMF, from bilateral arrangements such as swaps and from existing reserves—to maintain the existing price of gold. 4. It would set the stage for international study of the means for long-run improvements in the monetary field. 5. It would lay the basis for further meetings of the Ten without provoking speculation that such meetings must necessarily be concerned with emergency matters such as a U.S. drawing. The attitude of France's Common Market partners toward the proposed communique is still unclear. While we were having our first meeting with the British (Wednesday, September 5) the French discussed the proposal with the Monetary Committee of the Six. At our second meeting with the French on Thursday (the first having been on Tuesday) they reported that while all were agreed on the desirability of a ministerial meeting of the Ten, the group had not yet agreed in principle on the desirability of a communique. This hesitation was attributed primarily to the views of Van Lennep (Dutch Treasurer-General and chairman of Working Party 3) and de Stryker of Belgium. The Germans (Emminger of the Bundesbank) seemed to be on both sides of the question. Upon hearing this view we informed de Lattre that we saw no point in a meeting without a communique. He responded by saying the French now thought a meeting very important; and that the rest of the Six would no doubt agree on a useful communique along the lines of the draft now virtually agreed upon by the U.S., U.K. and France. The upshot is that the French will issue invitations to the meeting to all of the group of ten and will enclose with the invitation a copy of the attached draft of the communique. The ministerial meeting will be held on Tuesday, September 18 with issuance of the communique scheduled for Wednesday evening or Thursday morning after the Governors have made their major statements to the Fund. Officials of the Ten will meet Monday afternoon to work out such changes in the communique as may be needed to take account of views expressed by members other than the U.S., U.K. and France. French Initiative on Limiting Gold Takings We raised this question casually at the end of our meeting with Giscard d'Estaing (Tuesday, September 4) by asking whether he had any information to give us following his talks with Maudling on July 27. He said he was encouraged by Maudling's reaction. The two were in agreement that there should be high level secret discussions of the subject (which he did not at any time define) after the Fund and Bank meetings were out of the way; and that France, the U.K., Germany, Italy and the U.S. should be represented in these talks. We did not press this matter further. Apart from its sensitivity and the probability that nothing much could be accomplished until after the Fund and Bank meetings, we had good reason to believe that open pressure from the U.S. on the French might lead them to think that political questions could be successfully interjected. In London on Wednesday the British asked us what the French had said on this subject and we gave them the essence of Giscard d'Estaing's remarks. They observed that the whole affair was mysterious. The same view was expressed by the French officials the following day. We conclude that the full scope of the discussions between Giscard d'Estaing and Maudling may not be known even to their most trusted subordinates. G. Griffith Johnson Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs John M. Leddy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs Enclosure 3 Draft Communique of “Group of Ten” (9/6/62) 4 In the course of the annual meeting of the International Monetary Fund, the representatives of the ten countries (the Finance Ministers of Belgium, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, the Minister of Justice of Canada, and the Governors of the Central Banks of Germany and Sweden) participating in the Agreement to supplement the resources of the IMF concluded in December 1961, 5 met in Washington on September —— together with Mr. Per Jacobsson, Managing Director of the Fund. Since not all of the countries concerned have as yet concluded ratification, this meeting was of an informal character. Under the Agreement of December 1961, the French Finance Minister is responsible for arrangements between signature and the first formal meeting of the group. Accordingly M. Valery Giscard d'Estaing served as chairman. The Ministers reviewed the development of the international monetary situation over the past year and the prospects for the future. They also discussed the international cooperative arrangements which are being brought into being to meet the developing monetary needs of the new era of convertible currencies and progressively freer international trade. The Ministers were encouraged by the progress which has been made during the past year towards a better basic balance in international payments as a result of the measures already adopted in both deficit and surplus countries. They affirmed the objectives of reaching a balance at high levels of economic activity and by methods consistent with vigorous economic growth. While speculative and other short-term capital movements require continuing scrutiny, the means for coping with such movements have been reinforced in a number of ways and the ten Ministers agreed that these means would be used as necessary. In this connection the Ministers emphasized the importance of the new arrangements for supplementing the IMF through the addition of $6 billion of further resources and stressed that these resources would be available for decisive and prompt action. They also noted that various techniques of cooperation are being developed among monetary author-ities of the various countries in order to facilitate the functioning of the international payments system and thereby to further the objectives of the Fund. The additional resources thus provided, together with world reserves and the existing resources of the IMF, are large enough to assure a stable exchange rate system and the maintenance of the existing price of gold. The Ministers agreed that continuing study of the means for further improving the international monetary system in the years ahead was desirable. The Ministers considered that these discussions were very useful and they agreed that similar meetings should be held from time to time. * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Balance of Payments, International Monetary Agreement, 9/62-8/63. Confidential; Limited Distribution. 1 Printed from a copy that indicates both Ball and Dillon signed the original. 2 Document 58 . 3 No classification marking. 4 No record of the public release of this communique has been found. 5 See Documents 54 and 55 . 60. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy 60. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy Source Washington, September 18, 1962. 1. On Thursday 1 you will be having lunch with the Finance Ministers and Bank Governors of the Paris Club. 2 The list is attached at Tab 1. 3 As you will remember this was a joint suggestion of Dillon and Ball. The main idea of having this luncheon was to talk to these people personally about the underlying cause of the deficit in our balance of payments, namely, our disproportionate share of the defense and aid burdens for the whole free world. These people have heard the song before but never in a way which would give them a real feeling of how central it is to your thinking. This is something that you can convey directly in a way no one else can. There follows a sketch of some of the points you might make. These points have been cleared with Ball, and they are quite similar to those which Dillon would ask you to make independently, which are shown at Tab 4, with the exception noted in paragraph 2. 4 2. You should refer again, as you do in your speech, 5 to the supplemental resources agreement of the IMF Paris Club and how we welcome it. Since these men represent the nine contributing countries other than ourselves, direct expression of U.S. appreciation is appropriate. You may want to say something here about the question of further developments in the international monetary field, in addition to what is in your speech. If you do, it could be along the lines of recognition that the expanded economic strength of other countries in the Free World could properly be reflected in their expanded role in the international monetary system. We recognize the fact that there is more than one way the system might evolve in relation to the central role of the dollar, and we do not foreclose consideration of alternative schemes of improvement for the payments system. (Note: Secretary Dillon would not welcome such a statement. It would mean your taking a public position on the issue of whether we are or are not committed to maintain the dollar as a major international currency in the long-run.) 3. A few figures. Our deficit last year was $2.5 billion. This year, as Dillon will have said in his bank speech, we expect it to be somewhere in the neighborhood of $1.5 billion. Set against this a net military expenditure abroad (after receipts from military sales and other offsets) of $2 billion, and untied aid expenditures which have been running over $1 billion, which we hope to get down below $1 billion this year. Thus, more than the whole of our deficit arises from military and aid expenditures. 4. It is worth noting that our military expenditures involve gross payments abroad in the neighborhood of $3 billion. Two-thirds of these payments are in the NATO area where all your auditors, except the Japanese, come from. The Swedes, although neutral, are just as much beneficiaries of these expenditures as the members of the NATO Alliance and they know it. By comparison, NATO members undertake very little in the way of foreign military expenditures except for the UK, other than those connected with offset purchase arrangements with us. We will try to reduce these expenditures to the extent that they do not impair the common security. However, we cannot reduce them substantially unless someone else picks up more of the burden. This is especially true in the NATO area. At Tab 2 are attached estimates of the military budgets of the NATO countries and the portion reflecting foreign expenditures by them. The only substantial figure, besides that of the UK, is the German, and that reflects chiefly the military sales agreement with us. Also attached are the figures that Secretary McNamara gave to General Eisenhower about German military strength and expenditures at your suggestion. These figures do not of course reflect the substantial internal burden of our defense costs, which are likewise high in relation to those of our allies. 5. The European countries tend to be more critical of our aid expend-itures than of our military expenditures. Sometimes they have viewed them as reflecting American notions which are not really their concern. It is important to make the point that aid expenditures are security expend-itures in behalf of the free world just as much as military expenditures are. There may well be differences of view about transactions with particular countries and criticism has tended to focus on these, but by and large the rest of the world is recognizing that aid is in their, as well as our, security interest and begin to join in bearing the burdens. They have understandably in the last years focussed their efforts on their own reconstruction and their own economic progress. Now that they are making such striking success even though we have tied their aid for a year, we are still more liberal in this respect than any other donor. The $1 billion of untied aid that we continue to give out of our total aid budget of nearly $5 billion is larger absolutely and proportionately than the untied aid of other national donors combined, excluding the International Bank and affiliated institutions. Further, in the 2-1/2 years since our governments agreed to increase capital flow to the less-developed countries through DAC (of which Sweden is not a member), although the total flow has increased, the share of the U.S. has increased rather than decreased. The Europeans sometimes view aid as merely trade promotion. This is more true of their aid than it is of ours, since most of their aid loans are for short-terms at high rates. In these circumstances we cannot continue to extend long-term, low-rate loans, since in effect our aid is merely used to repay their loans. It is important for this to be recognized and for the terms of their loans to move closer to ours. In rejecting the notion that our aid is merely trade promotion, you might point out that we have a substantial export surplus on commercial account, excluding any AID- financed exports. It was about $3 billion last year. 6. We have borne the burden because we think it is in the interest of free world security; we know that our own security is intimately tied up with that of other major nations in the free world but they must recognize the converse relation. They must remember that during the period when they were unable to make any contribution we willingly carried the whole load alone. Just with respect to the six common market countries and the UK, we have extended in the past a total of $33 billion worth of foreign aid since 1946 (see Tab 3, which breaks these figures down by categories and countries). (It is worth noting that since more than half the aid was extended before 1950 when prices were substantially lower than they are now, this total would be more than $40 billion in current prices.) In addition to this sum, we have disbursed a larger amount (about $55 billion) to the rest of the world over the same time period. We do not remind others of this in order to earn their gratitude, but simply to point out that we bore the responsibility when we could, and if others do not join when they can and we no longer can do it all, our common security will be impaired. 7. The conclusion to be drawn from all this is that while both continued strong effort by the U.S. directed at reducing unnecessary overseas expenditures by the government and promoting exports and further strengthening the international payments machinery in train the problem of the U.S. balance of payments reflects fundamentally the problem of political responsibility in the free world and cannot be considered independent of that problem. Carl * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Balance of Payments, Bank Fund Meeting. Secret. 1 September 20. 2 Also known as the Group of Ten. 3 None of the tabs is attached or has been found, but see footnote 4 below. 4 Tab 4 may be the same as Document 61 . 5 Regarding President Kennedy's speech to the Boards of Governors of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund on September 20, see Document 62 . 61. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to President Kennedy 61. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to President Kennedy Source Washington, September 18, 1962. SUBJECT Your speech to the IMF Board As I informed Mr. Sorensen, I feel strongly that any reference in your speech to our readiness to discuss new initiatives in the monetary field would be most dangerous for the dollar at the present juncture. This is not a question of substance but one of psychology. At the invitation of Giscard d'Estaing, we have agreed to meet confidentially in Paris during October with the French, the British, the Germans, and possibly the Italians, in order to examine the possibilities for further cooperative steps. My reasons for recommending against any mention of our willingness to study new proposals are two-fold: First, the general theme of the IMF meeting, very effectively expounded by Per Jacobsson in his opening address, is that the present international monetary structure is strong and capable of weathering any shocks. This line will be taken by everyone, except for the British, and will be just the opposite of the situation last year at Vienna when talk was necessarily centered on the need to strengthen international monetary institutions because of the weakness of the dollar. Since the British are the only ones indicating the need for further steps at this time, your statement could be misinterpreted as indicating a measure of support for the British proposals. Our analysis of these proposals is that they are extremely dangerous for the dollar. This view is shared by those continental European officials to whom the British have confided the general outlines of their scheme. In short, it seems to us that the British proposals fit in very well with the constant, long-term effort by the United Kingdom to undermine the dollar and force its eventual devaluation. For this reason, we should clearly not appear to support Maudling's ideas. My second objection relates to the immediate future. A statement by you that we are prepared to study new ideas and welcome new initiatives would in all probability be misinterpreted by the speculative community in New York and Switzerland as indicating a lack of confidence on your part in our ability to handle our balance of payments problem within the framework of the existing monetary system. This could have dangerous and immediate effects this fall. If such a public statement by you should be interpreted in this way, it could well lead to a further run on the dollar similar to those that took place last October and November after the Vienna meeting, and last July after the Canadian crisis. The experience of these two incidents indicates that such runs bring with them the loss of $250 million or more in gold. The best we could hope for if a statement regarding our readiness to study new initiatives were included in your speech would be that it be looked on as an innocuous statement of readiness to consider any serious proposals put forward by others which naturally would always apply to the United States in its international relations. If this should be the interpretation put on the statement, it would do no harm, but neither would it accomplish anything, since there are no proposals being talked of except for those put forward by the British. On the contrary, if it were taken as a serious desire on our part to explore further new approaches at this time, it would carry with it all the dangers mentioned above. For this reason, I strongly urge that you omit any such statement from your speech. Douglas Dillon 1 * Source: Kennedy Library, Dillon Papers, Memos to President, 9/62-10/62. Confidential. Attached to the source text is a memorandum from Evelyn Lincoln to Dillon, September 20, indicating that the President had read Dillon's memorandum and approved his proposal. 1 Printed from a copy that indicates Dillon signed the original. 62. Editorial Note 62. Editorial Note From September 17 to 21, 1962, the annual meeting of the Boards of Governors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (including the International Development Association and the International Finance Corporation) and the International Monetary Fund took place in Washington. Regarding Adlai Stevenson's support for a proposed U.S. initiative to increase contributions to the International Development Association by $3 billion at the meeting, see Document 201 . The Department of the Treasury initiated this proposal, but Under Secretary of State Ball strongly opposed any specific U.S. commitment at the time. Memoranda of Ball's telephone conversations with Carl Kaysen on strategy for the upcoming meeting, including the proposed contents of President Kennedy's speech to the meeting, are in Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, AID 1961-1963, 5(2) and ibid., IMF 1961-1963, 7(2). Position papers and other documentation on the meeting are ibid., E Files: Lot 64 D 452, United States Delegation Annual Meetings, Board of Governors,IMF-IBRD-IFC-IDA. Under Secretary of State Ball spoke to the Governors on September 18. For text of his speech, see Department of State Bulletin , October 15, 1962, pages 575-582. In his address to the Governors on September 20, President Kennedy only briefly mentioned that “this country supports the proposal that the [IDA] executive directors develop a program to increase its resources.” Most of his address emphasized the importance of the dollar as an international currency and the U.S. efforts, including bringing its international payments into balance, to maintain the strength of the currency. Text of his address is in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962 , pages 691-694. 63. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to President Kennedy 63. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to President Kennedy Source Washington, November 14, 1962. SUBJECT October Developments in the Balance of Payments Deficit 1 On the basis of very early indications, our over-all payments deficit increased very substantially in October, by about $900 million, of which $56 million represented gold losses. This very large deficit, without seasonal adjustment, is in sharp contrast to the third quarter deficit of about $725 million, and to the deficit for the first nine months of the year of $1.5 billion, without any seasonal adjustment. Debt prepayments in the first nine months were about $550 million, with most of this in the third quarter. These unusually large figures in October are believed to be due primarily to transactions with Canada which may have accounted for as much as $600 million of the October deficit. The figures reflect special fiscal year-end window dressing operations by the Canadian banks of which about $180 million returned to the U.S. during the first week of November. It has been estimated that the Canadians lost about $600 million to the United States in the first half of the year. About $400 million of this was reversed in the third quarter. It is likely that the bulk if not all of the remainder of the earlier loss was reversed during October. The Canadian government also borrowed $125 million during the month from U.S. insurance companies on a long term basis and apparently attracted some short-term capital from the U.S. for investment purposes. As a result of this strengthened position, Canada yesterday reduced her Bank rate from 5% to 4%. It had been raised as high as 6% at the time of the currency crisis last June. This action should be helpful in reducing the incentive for short-term flows to Canada. Other major transactions in October, outside of Canada, included the following: an increase of about $100 million in the official reserves of France and Italy, payments of $75 to $100 million to Venezuela for taxes and royalties by U.S. oil companies, a cash subscription of $30 million from the U.S. Government to the Inter-American Development Bank, sales of about $20 million in Australian bonds to American purchasers, and approximately $30 million movement of short term funds to the United Kingdom in the last few days of October. Estimates of the basic deficit for the third quarter will not become available for several weeks. During the first half of the year, the basic deficit was less than $300 million, seasonally adjusted. From January 1 through November 7, we now estimate the over-all deficit, without seasonal adjustment, at about $2.1 billion. Last year it was $2.5 billion for the full year. During the remainder of the year we should receive a payment of almost $125 million on the British loan. We expect the deficit to be reduced another $75 million by special borrowing operations with Switzerland and Italy. On the unfavorable side, there may be window dressing operations by the European banks at the end of December which may result in some temporary capital outflow of an extremely short-term character. These figures indicate the importance of our receiving before the end of the year the German payments of $225 million due us for military equipment under the terms of the Strauss-Gilpatric agreement, 2 if the deficit for the full year is to show an improvement over the figure for the previous year. As you know this payment is now doubtful because of the recent German defense budget cutbacks. Douglas Dillon * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Balance of Payments and Gold, 6/62-3/63. Limited Official Use. 1 In a November 14 memorandum to Dillon, President Kennedy asked whether “the October loss of dollars indicates to you that we must take more drastic steps comparable to those that Canada took in the spring. Would the various steps that Canada took in the spring have an adverse effect on the economy. If not should we consider any of them.” The President added that in any event he would discuss this with Chancellor Adenauer that afternoon. (Kennedy Library, Dillon Papers, Memos to President) Regarding Canada's efforts to improve its balance-of-payments position, see footnote 11, Document 33 . 2 Regarding this agreement, see Document 53 . 64. Editorial Note 64. Editorial Note During Chancellor Adenauer's visit to Washington November 14 and 15, 1962, he held several meetings with U.S. Government officials. At the second meeting with President Kennedy on the afternoon of November 14, the two discussed the French situation and the U.S. balance of payments: “The situation in France had really been desperate until De Gaulle took over and if he had not come in when he did, there was real danger of a true civil war. "The President stated that this problem was related to another one which he wished to discuss with the Chancellor. This was the matter of our dollar balance, which of course always affects the burdens we are carrying overseas. Under no circumstances did we want to retrench in our overseas defense efforts, which were costing us about $3 billion annually. (The Chancellor expressed surprise that it was so little. He had thought it would be considerably more.) For this reason the United States greatly appreciated the Strauss/Gilpatric arrangement whereby German orders would be placed in the United States in the amount of $250 million per year. Since our difficulties in October we had had to draw on our dollar resources even more and had since then heard the disquieting rumor that for budgetary reasons the Federal Republic was expecting not to fulfill this agreement this year. This would mean that our deficit would be that much higher this year and this would have a very bad psychological effect. The President hoped that Germany could see its way to making the purchases as anticipated. "The Chancellor indicated that he was not informed in this matter and that he would look into it on his return. He would do everything in his power to see that Germany's promise was kept. "The President stated that we were appreciative of the aid extended so far in this respect by the Federal Republic, for instance their percentage of dollar holdings. It was important that our deficit did not go up over last year. If it remained the same, it was tolerable, but if it increased it constituted a worsening of the situation. He had heard that Germany expected to make up next year what they would not be buying this year but it would be better if it were done this year. The President then stated that he would like to give the Chancellor a one-page memorandum on this matter to take home with him.” (Memorandum of conversation, November 14; Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2181) The full text of this memorandum of conversation and other documentation on Adenauer's visit are printed in volume XV, pages 427 - 443 . See also Document 65 . 65. Memorandum of Conversation 65. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, November 15, 1962. PARTICIPANTS Dr. Gerhard Schroeder, German Foreign Minister Dr. Karl Carstens, State Secretary, German Foreign Ministry Erich Feldweg, German Embassy Interpreter Robert M. Brandin, Department of State Secretary Dillon Under Secretary Fowler Acting Assisting Secretary Bullitt F. Lisle Widman Raymond J. Albright SUBJECT Military Offset Arrangements; Development Assistance Activities Following his greeting to the Foreign Minister, Secretary Dillon remarked that the President had spoken yesterday about the necessity for a larger German defense budget and about the importance we place on the agreements for logistics cooperation which had been concluded by our respective defense ministries in the form of the Strauss-Gilpatric understandings. He noted the importance of fulfilling these agreements for the benefit of both countries and the Alliance. Minister Schroeder said that with respect to these agreements for military cooperation he could only respond as the Chancellor had done to the President. Neither the Chancellor nor he knew the details of the problems which had arisen. However, they promised to look into the matter immediately upon their return. He noted that the Chancellor had said he would do everything in his power to arrive at a proper solution. Minister Schroeder said he could only reaffirm, as had the Chancellor, that they did not intend to withdraw from commitments that may have been made. He noted that the short memorandum on the problem which the President had offered to provide to the Chancellor today should greatly facilitate following up on the matter when they returned. In the meantime, he would appreciate it if the Secretary would give him more details on the problem and possible solutions. Secretary Dillon said that these arrangements for military cooperation had become even more valuable than we had realized at the time the agreements were reached about a year ago. By these agreements the supply systems of our two countries had been joined in a way which made them more effective and cheaper to operate than if we duplicated our efforts. For example, the U.S. had made available U.S. Army training areas and had allotted 50% of the U.S. Air Force total training time in the Federal Republic to the German Air Force. Since the U.S. produces great quantities of the most modern military equipment, we have been in a position to sell this equipment to Germany more cheaply than alternative sources. In addition, we have given high priority to deliveries to Germany and have indicated our willingness to make changes in equipment to meet German needs. The problem that has arisen concerns $300 million of payments that were to be made by Germany for such equipment during the second half of this year. We have been informed that because of cut-backs in the German defense budget about two-thirds of this sum is not to be paid on schedule. Minister Schroeder inquired whether the payments due were for deliveries that have actually been made or whether there has been a slow-down of U.S. deliveries and therefore a corresponding slow-down in payments. Secretary Dillon responded that the payments we expect are for services we have performed according to the agreements, but that the German defense budget levels prevent payment. Minister Schroeder said he was surprised to encounter this problem in Washington, since he had not heard about it before he left and he was not familiar with arguments on the German side. Secretary Dillon said that the German Defense Ministry tells us they simply have no money. However, he wanted Minister Schroeder to understand that there was no disagreement between our defense ministries on the terms of the basic understandings. It was merely that the expected and agreed payments appear now not to be forthcoming. Minister Schroeder said he was surprised that the problem stemmed from a shortage in the 1962 budget. He would have supposed that the Defense Ministry could not have ordered more than that for which it could actually make payments. If it were the 1963 budget he could understand there might be a problem. Secretary Dillon commented that perhaps the Defense Ministry expected an extra appropriation for the 1962 budget. He referred Minister Schroeder to Herr Schiffers in the Defense Ministry as the man who is familiar with this defense budget problem. Minister Schroeder wondered how the Finance Minister would allow the Defense Ministry to over-commit itself, and he presumed that Secretary Dillon would not allow the U.S. Defense Department to become engaged in commitments which we could not pay. Secretary Dillon noted that the Strauss-Gilpatric agreement of February 2, 1962, 1 set forth specific, agreed figures and schedules concerning when payments should be made, so that the Defense Ministry certainly knew that far in advance what payments were expected of them this year. Minister Schroeder stated that once the German party in Washington receives the memorandum offered by the President they will know where the difficulty lies and can come up with a proper solution upon their return. [Here follows discussion of additional funding for the International Development Association and foreign economic assistance to Latin America, Africa, and South Asia.] * Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2181. Confidential. Drafted by Raymond J. Albright (Treasury) on November 16 and approved by Dillon's office on November 21. The conversation was held in Dillon's office. 1 This agreement was an exchange of letters between Strauss and Gilpatric. (Telegram 1796 from Bonn, February 2; Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/2-262) Final text was in telegram 1774 from Bonn, January 31 (ibid., 762.0221/1-3162), as amended in telegram 1789 from Bonn, February 2 (ibid., 762.0221/2-262). Regarding the October 24 understanding, see Document 53 . On September 24, Gilpatric and Strauss signed a second memorandum of understanding, which provided for the expansion of U.S.-German military cooperation and the continuation of the financial offset arrangements. The text of this agreement has not been found. 66. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to President Kennedy 66. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to President Kennedy Source Washington, January 16, 1963. PROSPECTIVE GOLD LOSSES We must expect further substantial gold losses over the next few months. The certainty of such losses is related mainly to our continuing heavy balance of payments deficit rather than to hoarding and speculation. In fact, the London gold market has been quiescent since November and the central bank consortium has been a net buyer of gold. At best, however, these purchases are not likely to exceed $70-80 million per month, of which the U.S. share would be one-half. Meanwhile, foreign countries that are gaining dollars over and above working balances or normal holdings are planning to take gold from us. The U.K. and the entire sterling area are in a seasonal period of surplus, which the British expect to total, very roughly, about $400 million in the first six months of 1963. The Federal Reserve has been negotiating for an increase to $250 million (from $50 million) in the mutual swap facility with the Bank of England. If these negotiations are successful, the full credit is likely to be used to absorb the U.K. accruals temporarily, pending a possible seasonal reversal of the payments flow in the fall. The British want the remaining $150 million in gold, however, of which they are taking $50 million today. France is still running large surpluses, which may total close to $1.2 billion for the year. The French will probably use half this amount for debt prepayments. Of the remainder, about three-fourths will be converted into gold since the French aim at a 75-percent gold ratio in their reserves. If the French do no more than to keep up their regular monthly purchases of $34 million ($204 million in the first six months of the year), their gold ratio will actually decline slightly. Spain's rate of reserve gains has slowed, but the Spaniards wish to raise their gold holdings to $600 million from $480 million—i.e., to about one-half the $1.2 billion in reserves they expect to reach by mid-year. Consequently, they have asked for $20 million a month for six months starting in January. The latest Spanish demand is ostensibly related to the fact that the British have withdrawn an exchange guarantee on Spain's holdings of sterling. Therefore, the Spaniards will convert some of their sterling into dollars to buy the gold so that we will probably lose somewhat less gold to the British than we otherwise might. An Austrian gold purchase of $50 million was postponed late last year through use of a Federal Reserve swap of that amount with the Austrian National Bank, but since there has been no turnaround in their balance of payments, we must expect them to run off the swap and purchase gold early in 1963. The Austrians have a steady payments surplus and wish to hold 50 percent of their reserves in gold. They are well below that ratio now. These prospective gold purchases total roughly $525 million for the first half of the year. While we might very optimistically hope to recoup as much as $200 million from the London gold market and other sources over this period, any renewal of uncertainties and fears could greatly reduce this figure. Moreover, the gold demands of the U.K., France, Spain and Austria may be augmented by those of other countries, although we think we have a fairly good basis for gauging the bulk of the first-half-of-1963 demands. The situation underscores the crucial importance of using as intensively as possible all appropriate methods to curb the balance of payments deficit. Douglas Dillon * Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Treasury, 1/63-3/63. Confidential. 67. Memorandum From the Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow) to President Kennedy 67. Memorandum From the Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow) to President Kennedy Source Washington, February 4, 1963. SUBJECT Balance of Payments Problem The full-page table, entitled “Official Gold and Dollar Holdings of Selected Countries in Relation to Their Foreign Trade and Their Total Payment Obligations in 1961,” is in the Supplement. In confronting the balance of payments problem I thought it might be interesting for you to see the reserve figures of the various nations set out in the form of the attached table.1 The last two columns show that, relative to our current trade and payments obligations, our gold reserve is still relatively large. Except for the Swiss, we lead the field. On the other hand, we face the two familiar limitations: —Our $12 billion domestic gold cover; —The burdens of maintaining the dollar as a unique reserve currency which leaves us vulnerable to sudden withdrawals; (although the French holdings should not frighten us, if we have a reasonable contingency plan, which is not all that difficult). My reflection on this table is that we are in a position to sweat out a somewhat longer basic adjustment in our balance of payments position than envisaged some months ago if two conditions are satisfied: the lifting of the domestic gold cover; and the early bilateral negotiation with key European countries (and perhaps Japan) of arrangements for them to hold dollars on longer term (say, in ten year bonds) with an exchange guarantee and with the understanding that we would reciprocate when their balance of payments were under strain. In effect, such arrangements would fund a large portion of our outstanding short-term dollar obligations and spread the burden of maintaining a reserve currency to supplement inadequate world gold supplies. This method would simply be an extension in the trend of Treasury policy; but it is urgent for three reasons. First, we cannot mount the kind of European policy most of us now envisage until the ground is under our feet on balance of payments, and we can separate our policy towards conventional forces from our balance of payments strain. Second, it is difficult to envisage acceptance of the across-the-board tariff cuts Herter aims to negotiate unless we have an environment of relatively full employment at home; and this also requires relief from balance of payments pressure. Finally, we may have difficulty with the tax bill if, in the face of continued balance of payments deficits, and no offset arrangements, anxiety should develop that prosperity via the tax cut would make our balance of payments situation worse. If another converging argument is needed, the balance of payments is likely to haunt us—among other things—in a foreign aid battle this year that will be adequately tough without its heavy shadow. I conclude that a balance of payments move of the kind I suggest here is now of the utmost urgency; and that we would undertake it from a position of greater initial reserve strength than we often grant ourselves. * Source: Kennedy Library, Dillon Papers, Memos to President, 2/62-3/63. Secret. 68. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to President Kennedy 68. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to President Kennedy Source Washington, February 11, 1963. You have asked for my thoughts on Walt Rostow's memorandum of February 4 on the balance of payments. 1 He takes the position that our gold situation is relatively good compared to other countries and that we need not worry about running further larger balance of payments deficits provided we first repeal the 25% gold cover law and negotiate substantial ten year borrowings from our European creditors. First, as to Mr. Rostow's two specific suggestions: You are aware that we all would favor repeal of the 25% gold cover law. However, when Congressman Multer floated a trial balloon on this subject during the last session of Congress, it became obvious that there was intense and emotional conservative opposition to repeal. It is highly doubtful if we could muster a majority, and, in any event, the debate that would ensue would be seriously damaging to international confidence in the dollar. Therefore, we have decided not to press this issue until public opinion shifts or until our gold stock actually drops below the ceiling. As you know, the Federal Reserve can waive the ceiling under certain conditions, and Mr. Martin has stated that he would utilize this authority if it ever should prove necessary. The waiver provisions are relatively innocuous until our gold supply drops to $6 billion—the 25% ceiling would be pierced at about $12 billion. Thereafter, the waiver provisions are so onerous as to be impractical. However, there would be plenty of time to obtain repeal after our gold stock reached $12 billion. Our decision, therefore, has been not to precipitate this unnecessary fight at this time. As to Mr. Rostow's suggestion of ten year borrowings in Europe, it is simply an extension and amplification of a new technique originated by the Treasury last year. Loans of over one year duration are not counted as liquid liabilities and thus have the effect of reducing our balance of payments deficit. Last year we negotiated $250 million of 15 month loans with Italy and Switzerland, which relieved our balance of payments to that extent. We have recently concluded a similar borrowing with Germany which runs out as far as two years, but with a shorter term option which the Germans can use in case of need. This technique has proved useful, and we intend to develop it further. However, any sudden campaign such as Mr. Rostow proposes would be doomed to failure. Most foreign central banks are prohibited by law from making long term loans, and, as a result, our borrowings are generally convertible into 90 day notes upon demand. While we may gradually extend the length of our borrowings, it is perfectly clear that the Europeans would not agree to any large scale stretch out of our present demand liabilities to a ten year term. The dollar, after all, as a key currency, is part of these countries' liquid reserves. A ten year loan would be far from liquid and could not be counted as a reserve. Mr. Rostow's proposal would put us in a position similar to Brazil or Argentina, who, when they cannot pay their debts, go to their creditors and get an agreement to stretch out the debt over a period, usually not longer than five years. In sum, while the Treasury initiative in this area has been successful and can and will be carried further, it is not susceptible of being expanded upon to the extent desired by Mr. Rostow. Mr. Roosa has already scheduled meetings in five countries during the first week in March at which he will be exploring current prospects. Finally and most important, a word about the philosophy that lies behind Mr. Rostow's memorandum. This philosophy is the natural reaction of those who find their preferred policies threatened by balance of payments difficulties. It is only natural that they search for ways to make this very real problem go away without interfering with their own project, be they extra low interest rates in the U.S. or the maintenance of large U.S. forces in Europe. However, such individuals are asking the impossible. The sine qua non of all international monetary dealings, under whatever system may be imagined, is that no country can consistently run a large balance of payments deficit. Under Mr. Rostow's program we would consolidate our present liquid liabilities into ten year loans and then promptly create new short-term liabilities to take their place. This will not be accepted by our European friends, and cannot be accepted by them if the dollar is to maintain its position as the world's reserve currency. It is difficult, if not impossible, to know when the time will come when our credit will be exhausted. If we continue as at present that time will surely come, although I do not believe it is at all imminent. In this judgment, I agree with Mr. Rostow that our position is basically stronger than many of our financial experts think. But, granting this, we must, by one means or another, put our balance of payments house in order—and the sooner the better—since time is now working against us. We simply cannot ignore the basic disciplines of the balance of payments except at our peril. One final word as to the “burden” of supporting a key currency. The burden is that we must maintain the value of our currency and cannot allow it to be devalued as if we were Brazil, Canada or Argentina. But the benefits are also great. To date, foreign countries and their nationals have acquired nearly $20 billion in dollar accounts. This, in effect, is a demand loan to us of $20 billion which has allowed us to pursue policies over the years that would have been utterly impossible had not the dollar been a key currency. Our dollar liabilities increased by $1-1/4 billion last year alone, which also would have been impossible were it not for the reserve currency status of the dollar. So while a reserve currency has its special problems it also brings in its trail real and important benefits. Douglas Dillon 2 * Source: Kennedy Library, Dillon Papers, Memos to President, 2/63-3/63. Secret. 1 Document 67 . 2 Printed from a copy that indicates Dillon signed the original. 69. Letter From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to Secretary of State Rusk 69. Letter From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to Secretary of State Rusk Source Washington, March 8, 1963. Dear Dean : I have read your letter of February 25 to Ros Gilpatric about the Japanese offset negotiations 1 and am somewhat concerned about certain points in it. If I correctly interpret the last paragraph of your letter, it implies a direct link between the level of U.S. military expenditures in Japan and Japan's remaining “a highly favorable market for U.S. civilian exports.” While any such direct link might be possible under a bilateral trade arrangement it would be contrary to the principle of multilateral trade and payments which we have all sought so strenuously to foster and which is the foundation of our entire international trade and financial policy. There is, of course, no question of the over-all adequacy of Japan's foreign currency earnings. Moreover, the experience of recent years indicates that reductions in U.S. military spending have not hindered the growth of U.S. commercial exports to Japan. Since 1953 our military expenditures in Japan have declined by more than half (from $725 to $350 million) while our commercial exports have more than doubled (from $681 to $1,413 million). The fact that U.S. commercial exports to Japan normally exceed our imports is sometimes cited as a reason why we should not try to reduce our expenditures in Japan. However, we have in the past always stood by the position that it would not be proper to concentrate on one item—merchandise trade—without considering the other items in our trade and payments which are highly favorable to Japan and which more than cover Japan's trade deficit with us. On merchandise trade alone the U.S. sells more than it buys not only to Japan but also to Germany, Italy, Spain and France (the other nations where we have sought offsets), and in fact to most industrial nations. If we were to limit our balance of payments corrective actions to nations where we do not have a trade surplus, we would eliminate from consideration most of the major countries of the world. Japan's balance of payments prospects give no cause for concern. According to Embassy Tokyo's projections of last November 21 (A-738), 2 Japan will increase its foreign exchange reserves over the three years 1963 through 1965 by almost $1 billion, despite an estimated $70 million reduction in the level of U.S. military spending. This increase of $1 billion is well in excess of the offset targets which I discussed with Secretaries Ball and Gilpatric last October ($100 million in 1963; $200 million in 1964; and $300 million in 1965). I know you recognize the urgency of getting our more prosperous allies to assume a more equitable share of the burden of Free World defense and aid, and we are in agreement that the Japanese military effort is inadequate. However, in considering military offsets and reductions in Japan, I am concerned that we may be setting our sights too low and may not be approaching the problem with sufficient urgency and initiative. I would think that once the Joint Chiefs' analyses on possible reductions in Japan are completed it might be useful to arrange a State/Treas-ury/Defense meeting, possibly with the President, to consider the offset negotiations and possible defense reductions, and to get agreement on precisely what we should aim for and how we expect to achieve it. I am sending copies of this letter to Ros Gilpatric and to McGeorge Bundy. 3 With best wishes, Sincerely, Douglas * Source: Department of State, Central Files,FN 12 US. Confidential. 1 This letter is scheduled for publication in volume XXII . 2 Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/11-2162) 3 In his March 22 reply to Dillon, Secretary Rusk wrote that certain points in his February 25 letter to Gilpatric “may have lent themselves to misinterpretation.” After agreeing with Dillon on the importance of “getting the industrialized countries of Europe and the Pacific to carry a more equitable share of the burden of Free World defense and economic assistance,” he went on to stress the equal importance of greater trade liberalization by Japan. “The military area is circumscribed by constraints,” he argued, “while the much larger civilian sector offers considerably greater room for maneuver.” (Department of State, Central Files, FN 12 US) 70. Letter From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to Secretary of State Rusk 70. Letter From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to Secretary of State Rusk Source Washington, March 19, 1963. Dear Dean : You will recall that I mentioned to you a few weeks ago my feeling that the Treasury could be of help to you in your perennial effort to obtain more adequate defense contributions from our NATO allies. As I pointed out, it has seemed to me that part of the problem lies in the fact that the Finance Ministers of our NATO allies have been able to avoid all personal responsibility for the decisions reached by their colleagues in charge of defense and foreign policy. This leaves them free to actively oppose within their own governments the appropriation of the funds required to meet agreed goals. This they have not hesitated to do even though agreements by NATO national representatives are supposed to be government commitments. Last fall's struggle in the German Government was but the latest and clearest example of many such cases. It would appear to me that Stikker's current initative on military planning 1 may present a useful opportunity to consider ways and means of tying the European Finance Ministers more closely into NATO decisions so that they will feel responsible within their governments to provide the funds needed to meet agreed force goals. As you know, this was the original thought behind the practice of including Ministers of Finance in the December Ministerial meetings. Since no substantive tasks have been assigned to the Ministers of Finance at these meetings, their attendance has become purely symbolic, and indeed some of the more important Ministers, i.e., the German Minister, seldom even bother to attend. I also feel that unless we can find a way to make better use of the Finance Ministers, serious consideration should be given to relieving them of the necessity of attending these meetings. Irrespective of your decision on this larger question, I believe that the Treasury could be of substantial help to the Departments of State and Defense in preparing the U.S. position on the capacity of our allies to finance any given military program. I note that Stikker has proposed to, “examine the financial and economic implications for member countries collectively and individually of providing the forces called for in MC26/4.” In particular, he has proposed to attempt to determine, “ whether member countries were capable of a greater financial and economic effort in favor of defense and were bearing an equitable share of the common defense burden.” I am glad to know that we are supporting Stikker in this effort and believe that the Treasury's resources can be of substantial help in reaching our overall objective of bringing NATO strategy, forces and budgets into rational balance. In particular, the Treasury should be able to help in the critical analysis of the estimates of financial capabilities of individual NATO countries prepared by the International Secretariat. In view of the importance of this matter in our overall NATO objectives, political, strategic and financial, as well as to our balance of payments, I am taking the liberty of sending copies of this letter to Bob McNamara and Mac Bundy. With best wishes, Sincerely, Douglas 2 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Balance of Payments and Gold, 6/62-6/63. Secret. The source text is a copy sent to McGeorge Bundy by Dillon on March 19. Dillon's covering memorandum reads: “Since the attached letter deals with a matter of considerable importance to our balance of payments, I would appreciate it if you could bring it to the President's attention.” 1 Documentation on NATO Secretary-General Stikker's initiative is printed in volume XIII . 2 Printed from a copy that indicates Dillon signed the original. 71. Editorial Note 71. Editorial Note French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville met with U.S. officials on May 25, 1963. The memorandum of his conversation with President Kennedy at the White House on May 25 at 11 a.m. begins as follows: "The President greeted the Foreign Minister and said he was glad to see him. He asked how things were going on in France. The Minister said the economic situation was generally favorable, but there was a danger of inflation. The government was taking certain measures such as limiting credit, increasing taxes, and liberalizing imports. The President stressed the importance the United States Government attaches to increasing the volume of trade. He said he thought so long as the interest rates and the costs of France and the United States remained relatively stable, we could look forward to such an increase. The Foreign Minister said he thought that the greatest need of the West was to have a sound monetary policy. This aspect of the common interest of the West was not being adequately discussed. The President agreed and said that matters of this sort tended to be treated too technically and to remain too much in the hands of the bankers, who do not see them in terms of the national interest. "The President then turned to the US balance of payments difficulties. He said that the United States would be short another $2.5 billion this year. The danger was not so much a matter of loss of dollars, as the possibility of a run on gold. This was our big problem. The President said that every time it was proposed that we take some steps to bring our payments into balance, we were exposed to loss of confidence in our currency which took the form of a run on the dollar. Couve asked whether the United States Government had ever considered changing the international price of gold. The President asked in turn whether this would not cause a run on the dollar. Couve said it would not, because everyone would have already agreed on the new price beforehand, and each currency would be pegged to it when it came into effect. He went on to say that he thought that the United States was dealing with the problem of the balance of payments piecemeal. The United States, he said, does not have a real deficit. It has a foreign trade surplus. He said he thought that tourists should be counted under trade. He said the real trouble was that there was too much export of US capital abroad. The President agreed that tourists are a form of trade. He pointed out that we lose $1.5 billion under this category in addition to our expenditures for military and foreign aid programs. Couve observed that tourists represented something more than trade, that they played an important political and psychological role in international relations.” (Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149, April-June 1963) The full text of this lengthy memorandum of conversation is printed in volume XIII, pages 769 - 775 . A memorandum of Ball's conversation with Couve de Murville on May 25 covering trade, monetary policy, and nuclear matters is in Department of State, Central Files, POL FR-US. 72. Memorandum of Conversation 72. Memorandum of Conversation Source Bonn, June 24, 1963. PET/MC/12 PRESIDENT'S EUROPEAN TRIP June 1963 PARTICIPANTS: United States The President The Secretary of State Ambassador George C. McGhee Assistant Secretary Tyler Assistant Secretary Manning Minister Martin Hillenbrand Mr. Pierre Salinger Mr. Robert Creel EUR/GER Mr. Lissance (interpreter) Germany Chancellor Konrad Adenauer Vice Chancellor Ludwig Erhard Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder Defense Minister Kai-Uwe von Hassel Ambassador Karl Heinrich Knappstein State Secretary Globke State Secretary Carstens State Secretary von Hase Counselor Weber (interpreter) SUBJECT Trade and Fiscal Policy Matters The President said a third subject he wished to bring up, in addition to the MLF and nuclear test ban, 1 was the general area of economic relations, including such matters as monetary policy, offset arrangements and the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations. The President said that these economic subjects were possibly even more important to us now than nuclear matters. This was because our nuclear position was very strong indeed and entirely adequate to discourage any attack on the West. The President said we would not wish to repeat the experience of the 1920's, which had had wide repercussions in Europe. If international trade could be expanded, this would help bring prosperity both to the US and to Europe. It was very important that the coming trade negotiations be successful. While foreign trade was not inherently as important to us as to the Europeans, it was nevertheless important in that it played a key role in enabling us to earn enough to maintain our overseas commitments. The President hoped that the coming negotiations could be conducted at the highest level. They should involve heads of government and Foreign and Defense ministers, and not just be left to technicians such as agricultural experts and tariff commissioners. Unless we could maintain international liquidity and a balanced trade situation, there would be difficulties which could possibly lead to a collapse. For example, he added, had it not been for the constructive role played at the Geneva trade talks by the Federal German Government we would have had a breakdown there. Continuing on this theme, the President said that in America, we lose $1-1/2 billion a year in tourist trade alone. On the other side of the coin, we send more agricultural products to Germany than the Germans sell to us. What was needed was to look to the overall balance of international trade and to make every effort to maintain this balance. At the present time the US economy was in a strong position and the dollar in good shape. The redistribution of assets internationally over the past 10 years had been healthy. The President added: “We must conduct these negotiations at the top level—otherwise we'll be ruined by bookkeepers”. Foreign Minister Schroeder said that the German deficit in tourist trade was running around $700 million a year. The President commented maybe we had better include Directors of Tourism in our discussions. It was in any case important to get the whole balance of trade out on the table. The French, Italians and Spanish had favorable tourism balances. Our overall purpose was to maintain general liquidity and upward movement in the economy on an international scale in a balanced way. Professor Erhard entered the discussion at this point. He said he wanted to tell the President that the problems of the US in the field of trade and balance of payments were well known to the Germans and they appreciated our concern. He wished to stress, however, that this was not just a US problem but one for the entire free world. Should the dollar encounter difficulties, this would affect us all just as the solar system would be disrupted were the sun no longer to stand still. In Germany, efforts had been made to take our balance of payments problem into account. For example, present German reserves totalled DM 29 billion, with a ratio of DM 15 billion in gold and only DM 14 billion in US dollars. This ratio was the most favorable to the US of all European countries. The Germans did not wish to change this because they laid great stake on their good relations with the US. They were constantly seeking ways of strengthening international liquidity and making better use of available resources. For example, the German Central Bank was already taking steps to acquire US Treasury Bonds in large amounts. The Germans were interested in strengthening not only the dollar but the international economic cohesion of the free world. The Germans would do all they could so long as the problem was bilateral in scope. Foreign trade was very important for the Germans—it represented 15% of GNP as contrasted with only 4% for the US—because it was so large a percentage of the total effort and their own economy was more vulnerable. He felt there was a complete identity of interest with us in this area. Professor Erhard then said that one of the big difficulties lay in the agricultural field. The German Government had problems with its own farmers, who spoke with a loud voice. He hoped the FRG could grapple with this problem before the end of the year. If they were not successful, it would make the Kennedy Round more difficult. He attached great importance to the success of the Kennedy Round. He thought his efforts with Governor Herter in Geneva had borne witness to this. Many other problems came to his mind in this area, although some of them concerned US internal policies, such as trade and financial policies, tax policies, etc. Maybe he would have a chance to discuss some of these with the President in Wiesbaden tomorrow. 2 In such event he hoped the President would consider him to be speaking not as German but as an expert in the field of international economics. The President agreed this might be useful. He cited the valuable contributions the Germans had made in the past on such things as military offset arrangements, general financial and monetary policy, the Geneva GATT negotiations, preparations for the Kennedy Round, etc. He had sometimes wondered why this was called the Kennedy Round and why it should not be called the Adenauer Round or the De Gaulle Round. But whatever it was called, it must be a success. We needed the cooperation of all countries, but the Federal Republic was in a particularly important position. We had been glad to have the views of the Federal Republic and would take them into account. The problems were considerable but it would amount to a failure of will and nerves if we did not solve them successfully. The Chancellor said he would like to add a word “as a layman but also as a politician”. He agreed that these matters should be the responsibility of the leading Ministers. This could cause some difficulties, however; witness the fact that the French Foreign Minister always attended the EEC meetings, and this sometimes had the effect that other countries would listen more to him than to the German technical experts. The Chancellor was not sure the President was fully aware of the great difficulties the Germans were having with the French in the field of agricultural trade matters, particularly as concerned grain prices. The French were producing more wheat than they needed and at a lower price than the Germans because they had better soil and better weather. There were problems with the German trade unions, where their boss was not George Meany but Herr Brenner. The metal workers were a very big union with a dominating position, and recent agreements on wages and hours had affected German production. Coal was no longer the source of wealth it had once been, and mining operations were expensive. The Federal Government had to look to its future economic position with some anxiety and ask whether it was going to be in a position to carry out all of its obligations. The Germans wanted to do all they could in the economic and agricultural fields and would work together for the common good. After all, we were all threatened by the same adversary. But the Germans had problems. The days of large German export balances were gone. German exports were coming down close to imports and the German trade balance was delicate. But the Germans had good will, which was an asset which counted for much. The President could count on German good will in the Kennedy Round. But it should be remembered that the Germans were not as rich as some people believed. The President said the Chancellor sounded like someone coming to a bank for a loan. The Chancellor smilingly replied that if that were the case he might talk differently. The President said that a further difficulty was that we spent $200 million a year on bases in France, where there were no offset arrangements. In France we had to earn our money somehow to maintain our bases. The French Finance Minister should know better than to accuse us of trying to dominate the French economy or trying to dump our goods there. Exports were only a small percentage of our total products. Our GNP had increased from $500 billion to $585 billion in recent months. We could lose $20 billion a year in trade without hurting. Trade was important to us only in that it enabled us to earn balances to carry out our world commitments and play a world role. Erhard said he wished to mention other things which might be done to help the situation. The Germans had revalued their currency not long ago, which had helped US exports to Germany. It was important to maintain a stable price level. The problem could not be solved by inflation of currencies all over Europe. He had suggested to Governor Herter the possibility of setting up world commodity agreements for cereals and cattle as we had on coffee and cotton. It was important to work together in GATT. We must open the doors wider to international trade; this would require less manipulation of currencies. In essence, Erhard said, he had a single request—for more open-mindedness on our part in developing instrumentalities for handling international trade and business—instrumentalities to control, direct and supervise international economic development. The President said he completely agreed. It was necessary however to make a judgment as to which tools to use. He hoped to talk further with Erhard about this tomorrow. At this point the President excused himself in view of the imminence of his scheduled press conference. 3 * Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2275. Confidential. Drafted by Robert C. Creel (EUR/GER) on June 24 and approved by S on July 6 and by the White House on July 8. The meeting was held in the Palais Schaumburg. President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk arrived in Bonn on June 23 for a 4-day visit, including a trip to Berlin. 1 A telegraphic summary of the President's conversation with Adenauer on the MLF is printed in vol. XIII, pp. 597 - 598 . A memorandum of their conversation on the nuclear test ban (PET/MC/14), June 24, is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2275. 2 President Kennedy spent most of June 25 with Erhard and others on a trip to Wiesbaden and environs. (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Books) For a record of the conversation, see Document 73 . For a memorandum from Ball to President Kennedy, June 21, which contained talking points for the President's meetings with Erhard, see the Supplement. 3 For the transcript of the President's press conference beginning at 5:30 p.m., see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, pp. 505-511. 73. Memorandum of Conversation 73. Memorandum of Conversation Source Wiesbaden, June 25, 1963, 6 p.m. US/MC/27 THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO EUROPE June 23-July 2, 1963 SUBJECT Erhard's Views on American Economy PARTICIPANTS United States The President Mr. Lissance (Interpreter) Germany Vice Chancellor Erhard Mr. Weber (Interpreter) The President opened by stating that he appreciated what Erhard had done for trade and to help Gov. Herter in Geneva. He then asked Erhard's ideas concerning the balance of payments and monetary policy. Erhard replied that he followed all aspects of the U.S. trade balance closely. This trade balance was not merely America's concern, in which case it would not be his business to talk about it, but it was something of concern to the world monetary order. A policy of defense spending and simultaneous tax reduction seemed entirely appropriate provided the two together served not merely to increase consumer purchasing power but also had the effect of stimulating productive investment. He had closely studied American tax reduction plans, however, and had concluded that if they only encouraged consumer spending, they would not speed economic growth. There is a rather strange situation that runs contrary to traditional economic views, Germany had an overboom, with a very lively market, a surplus, and continuing activity. In the same situation the U.S. had unemployment, a balance of payments deficit, and a good deal of unused productive capacity. Erhard thought we should increase the discount and interest rates. Such an increase need not at all paralyze investment activity, but would on the contrary stimulate it. Low interest rates did not produce the effect expected of them. His ideas about that and about monetary policy were embodied in a bill that he would submit to the Bundestag. He also stressed the need on the American side for a more active policy of influencing the business cycle. The President noted that last year there was a deficit of $2 billion. Now it is cut by one-third, with investment down. Erhard thought there were some devices which had not been used enough. He would have a discussion with the president of the International Monetary Fund. Erhard had proposed to him that nations should draw on the mark and not only on the dollar. Wider use of the Fund's facilities would be useful. The President commended Erhard for his helpfulness in connection with the dollar balance. If everybody wanted 100 percent gold cover, there just is not enough gold for that around. Raising the rate for money had been considered, but we must remember that when that was done before we got the recessions of 1958 and 1960. If we raise the rate now we might run into the same situation. He thought the tax cut would get things on the move. Vice Chancellor Erhard wondered whether there were not certain powerful industrial and business interests in the United States who deliberately manipulated the American economy to perpetuate a high level of unemployment. Their rationale could be that full employment in Germany having brought about a situation where the labor unions pre-sented management with ever increasing demands, a level of unemployment such as the present level in the United States would keep American labor more tractable and keep production costs favorable for export. The President dismissed such a possibility by saying that these powerful industrial and business interests were not “smart enough” to carry out such a deliberate plan. * Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2275. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. Approved by the White House on July 22. The meeting was held at the Von Steuben Hotel. 74. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany 74. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany Source Washington, July 11, 1963, 9:48 p.m. 106. ADCOR. In accordance with understanding developed on further messages to Erhard in light of brevity of President's conference with him 1 Ambassador requested approach Erhard on military offsets and on aid. Approach (or approaches) should be made in context of Deptel 373 of August 1962 2 re priorities of FRG effort. In view pledging session of India consortium scheduled July 18, Ambassador should raise development aid issues at earliest opportunity along following lines (separate message on offsets to follow): The President regrets that the brief time available for his talk with Erhard in Wiesbaden did not allow discussion of many aspects of general economic relations. He is most appreciative of FRG cooperation with U.S. as expressed in military offset arrangement, international financial action and in support of IDA. The continuation of a full military offset undertaken in the light of the U.S. balance-of-payment difficulties continues to be of primary importance in U.S.-German economic relationship. President is aware of the fact that he owes Erhard a memorandum on the U.S. view of the existing difference over offset levels and this memorandum is being prepared with urgency. 3 [Here follows discussion of cooperation with the Federal Republic of Germany on development aid.] Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files,FN 12 US. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Louis C. Boochever (A/AID) on July 10; cleared by Creel (GER) and Richard H. Davis (EUR) in draft, W. Carter Ide (AID/AA/NESA) and James P. Grant (NEA) in substance, and Walter H. Lubkeman (S/S); and approved by Frederick F. Simmons (AID/EXSEC) for David E. Bell (A/AID). Repeated to Paris (OECD) and New Delhi. 1 See Document 73 . 2 Dated August 8, 1962. (Department of State, Central Files, 811.10/8-862) 3 A memorandum on U.S.-German cooperative logistics and financial offset arrangements, with instructions to deliver it to Erhard, was transmitted in telegram 147 to Bonn, July 16. (Ibid., FN 12 US) 75. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State 75. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State Source Bonn, July 13, 1963, 8 p.m. 3433. Pass Defense and Treasury. 1. As long as US balance of payments remains a serious problem, our military presence in Germany will be vulnerable to criticism and a target for reduction, in absence of satisfactory offset arrangement to compensate for US foreign exchange costs. I have stressed this in all my talks with German officials, including Chancellor, von Hassel, and Erhard. Recent negotiations in Washington and Bonn have revealed a disturbing lack of understanding, among certain key officials in the Ministry Defense, and others, of the importance of the offset arrangements to a continuation of the present level of US military effort in Germany. 2. Despite von Hassel's firm assurance last February, MOD has been unwilling to commit itself to payments in excess of $1,000 million during US FY 1964-65 (target $1,300 million). Furthermore, they foresee payments of only about $100 million during the second half of CY 1963. From the standpoint of new orders, the prospect of reaching the target during CY's 1963 and 1964 ($1,300 million) is somewhat brighter. Thus far, however, we have only succeeded in establishing firm FRG military requirements for orders amounting to $532 million. 3. I believe Minister von Hassel, the Chancellor and other Cabinet officers have a sincere desire to provide a full offset. They seem to have a vague impression that an offset is feasible, and that it will probably be achieved anyway without much effort on their part. Actually, Germany is fairly close to being able to provide a full offset for CY's 1963 and 1964. The main difficulty at present is in maintaining a steady flow of payments during remainder of this year. This will require special effort (perhaps an advance against the CY 1964 defense budget), but with support of high levels in the German Government, I believe it can be accomplished. 4. The President's visit presents an important opportunity for a new initiative on this subject. I believe the President should seek firm assurance of a full offset from both Chancellor Adenauer and Economics Minister Erhard. The President should obtain confirmation that the agreements call for new payments (during US FY 1964-65) as well as new orders (during CY 1963-64) fully equal to US military expenditures in Germany during CY 1963 and 1964, now estimated at $1,300 million. 5. Related to the offset objective, and in some respects even more important, is the need to assure adequate defense budget for CY 1964, including compensation for any advances. I believe the President should express to the Chancellor and others his recognition of the FedRep's very important contribution to Allied security in increasing the defense budg-et from about DM 10 billion in 1960 to DM 18 billion in 1963. The President might, at same time, stress importance of maintaining momentum of the military buildup and his hope that Defense would continue to receive a reasonable priority in the allocation of budgetary funds. In our judgment, a feasible goal for 1964 would be DM 21 billion (MOD is requesting DM 21.6 billion) but I question propriety of President recommending a specific figure. McGhee * Source: Department of State, Central Files,FN 12 US. Secret; Priority. Relayed to the Department of Defense. 76. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions 76. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions Source Washington, July 17, 1963, 9:51 p.m. 98. Deliver by 9:00 a.m. Local Time. President will transmit special message to Congress on balance payments Noon EDT Thursday, July 18. 1 New elements likely draw particular attention abroad include reduction approximately one billion dollars annually in US Government dollar expenditures overseas, imposition of interest equalization tax designed to increase by approximately 1 percent interest cost to foreigners of obtaining capital in United States and $500 million IMF standby arrangement. Press will receive advance briefing here but with firm understanding that nothing be released before hour of transmission. Full text being airmailed. Maximum dissemination desired. Separate cable will contain guidance for your use in discussions with press and local governments. [Here follows a summary of the President's July 18 special message to Congress.] Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files,FN 12 US. Limited Official Use; Operational Immediate. Drafted by F. L. Widman (Treasury/OIA) and Benjamin Caplan (E/OFE), cleared by Roosa and Springsteen, and approved by Caplan. Sent to all NATO capitals except Ankara, Athens, Lisbon, and Reykjavik, and to Bern, Zurich, Buenos Aires, Canberra, Madrid, Manila, Mexico City, Moscow, New Delhi, Rio de Janeiro, Stockholm, Tokyo, and Vienna. 1 See Document 29 . 77. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 77. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Source Washington, July 20, 1963, 8:20 p.m. 517. In view apparent misunderstanding abroad, Treasury issued supplemental press release July 20, as follows: “July 19 remains effective date of interest equalization tax, recommended by President Kennedy, on purchases of all foreign securities outside U.S., Treasury said today. Following President's message on July 18, Treasury announced delay to August 16 as date from which purchases of outstanding foreign securities would be subject to rules of proposed tax, if those purchases were effected on U.S. national securities exchanges registered with Securities Exchange Commission. 1 Delay does not apply to transactions carried out on foreign securities exchanges nor to transactions in U.S. or elsewhere which are not carried out through U.S. registered securities exchanges. Recommended effective date of proposed tax on such transactions, and for taxable newly issued foreign securities purchased by American investors, remains July 19. Treasury and representatives of exchanges are currently developing detailed procedures involved in applying rules of proposed tax to transactions on these U.S. exchanges.” Request Emb cooperation in dissemination this info. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files,FN 16 US. Unclassified. Drafted by F. L. Widman (Treasury), cleared by Creel and Mortimer D. Goldstein (E/OFE), and approved for transmission by Vincent J. Monti (OC/OCT). Also sent to Paris (Embassy and USRO), Bonn, Rome, The Hague, Brussels (Embassy and BUSEC), Ottawa, and Tokyo. Attached to the source text is the typewritten text of the press release issued by the Department of the Treasury. 1 Reference is to the Department of the Treasury's announcement at 6:15 p.m. on July 18 that “purchasers of foreign securities traded on a national securities exchange registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission would not be subject to the Interest Equalization Tax proposed by the President in his Message to the Congress today on purchases made on such exchanges prior to and including August 16, 1963.” (Quoted in Department of State Bulletin , August 12, 1963, p. 256n) 78. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State 78. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State Source Bonn, July 23, 1963, 7 p.m. 314. Paris also for USRO. Department pass Treasury. 1. German opinion on President's balance of payments program, both official and private, soured somewhat over weekend and Monday. 1 Exception extended Canada 2 and, to lesser extent, skepticism over enforcement, confusion on effective date and rumored further exception for Japan, have led many to conclude that interest equalization tax will be largely ineffective and possibly even counter-productive. Several quarters have expressed fear that effort to enforce tax will draw US inevitably into exchange controls. 2. Bundesbank and Economic Ministry officials continue support program but privately have expressed disappointment over Canadian exception, which they feel has weakened confidence in entire program. Bundesbank (Emminger) believes discretionary authority implied in press release on Canadian exception suggests create one of kind of capital issues committee. Officials also not happy over discriminatory manner in which it now appears to them tax will be administered. 3. Private banking community seems concerned that situation of dollar so serious as to justify such “drastic” measures and many bankers doubt that interest equalization tax can be effectively enforced. Rumors are circulating that Congress might amend proposal to make direct investment subject to tax, thus adding to atmosphere of confusion and uncertainty. 4. Since Friday, press reaction also focused on equalization tax and acknowledged much depends on detailed proposals to Congress and Congressional handling. Some circles felt Wall Street would undergo period of isolation while others would somewhat welcome German stock market's new independence from New York. Tuesday Frankfurter Allgemeine (FAZ) considered Canadian exemption indication program not thought through and opined exemption to Japan has been granted. Banking circles, according FAZ, regretted European central banks and governments had given their approval to American action because if other governments followed US example it would mean end free international capital movements. Hillenbrand * Source: Department of State, Central Files,FN 12 US. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Paris and USRO, London, Rome, Brussels (BUSEC), and Bern. 1 July 22. 2 Following representations by the Canadian Government, which complained about the U.S. proposed measures, especially the interest equalization tax, to improve its balance-of-payments position, the U.S. and Canadian Governments issued a joint statement on July 21. The statement specified, among other things, that U.S. officials agreed to include a provision in the draft legislation to Congress “authorizing a procedure under which the President could modify the application of the tax by the establishment from time to time of exemptions, which he could make either unlimited or limited in amount.” For full text, see Department of State Bulletin, August 12, 1963, p. 256. Additional documentation on U.S.-Canadian discussions on this question is printed in volume XIII . 79. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions 79. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions Source Washington, July 26, 1963, 10:08 p.m. 176. Paris for Embassy and USRO; Brussels for Embassy and BUSEC. Following letter handed Takeuchi by Secretary Dillon this afternoon. 1 Begin verbatim text: Dear Mr. Minister: I have been deeply concerned by your letter of July 24, 1963, 2 indicating that the proposed U.S. interest equalization tax is expected to deal a severe blow to the Japanese economy and requesting consideration of an exemption for Japan. May I say, first of all, that I regret having been unable to consult with you about this measure before the public announcement was made but I am sure you will appreciate that an action of this type, like a budgetary proposal, which will have major impact on securities markets, cannot be discussed in advance even with the closest of friends. In acting to raise the cost to foreigners of long-term borrowing in the U.S. we were following the advice of our colleagues in the OECD—which will soon include Japan—but the specific technique was of our own development. This particular proposal was not discussed in advance of its announcement with any other government and indeed, the knowledge of the proposal was limited to a very few individuals within my own government. It could not have been otherwise. I am pleased that it has been possible for your representatives to discuss in detail with Under Secretary Roosa this week the probable effect of the proposed tax on Japan. It has been most helpful to have these consulations before we complete the drafting of the actual legislation which will be proposed to the Congress. In this way we are able to give full consideration to the views of the Government of Japan. The President would not have proposed the introduction of an interest equalization tax had it not become clear that the need for action to reduce the outflow of long-term capital from the U.S. was urgent. The initiation of direct capital controls would be contrary to our basic precept of free markets and we could not take this route. A substantial increase in our whole long-term interest rate structure, if such an increase could practicably have been effected, would have thrown our economy into reverse and damaged the economy of every free nation as well. In moving to reduce the outflow of capital we fully realized that our action would have a significant impact on our friends abroad, but the U.S. cannot eliminate its balance-of-payments deficit unless some of the surpluses of our friends are also affected. I trust and am confident that the leading industrial nations of the world including Japan will understand the necessity for the action taken. I have already received assurances from the leading Western European powers that the steps taken last week including the tax proposal to strengthen the position of the dollar are both understood and supported. They are prepared to make adjustments just as we are having to make adjustments. In recent years the general pattern of U.S.-Japanese economic relationships has been such that Japan has had large net dollar earnings from its trade and service transactions with the U.S., taken together, and has used these dollars as well as the very large volume of dollars borrowed from the U.S., short-term and long-term, to meet its deficits with other areas of the world and to build its foreign exchange reserves. This proc-ess, so necessary to Japan's progress and development, has now helped to establish Japan in a position of strength. This new situation warrants, as I am sure you will agree, increasing reliance of Japan on other sources of capital as well. We do not expect that our interest equalization tax will prevent Japanese borrowing in our markets. Because of the wide difference between the Japanese interest rate structure and the interest rates which Japan pays on its borrowings in the United States, some part of the borrowings previously contemplated by Japanese firms or the Japanese government should still be practicable. Our markets remain completely open and free. The only difference is an additional element of borrowing cost that will deter some borrowers, but not all. This is why we feel certain that any urgent Japanese needs can continue to be met. The unusual exemption being considered for Canada should be understood in these same terms. In effect, the Canadians, agreeing with us that the volume of their borrowing here must be restrained, have undertaken to bring about any changes in their own interest rate structure needed to reduce the differentials between interest rates in their markets and ours, and thereby deter Canadian borrowing here. The exemption we are recommending for Canada relates only to new issues of Canadian securities, not to the purchase by Americans of outstanding securities—the latter will in any event remain subject to tax. This unusual exemption is practicable only because of the unusually close interrelationships between the Canadian capital markets and our own. The significant result is that Canadian borrowing here will be substantially reduced to the approximate levels characteristic of earlier years. I am sure you will agree with me, regrettably, that the United States must curtail the overall amounts borrowed in the long-term capital markets here, at least for a time, if we are to restore equilibrium in our payments position. It is because that restoration is essential for the stability of the international monetary system that we have been forced to introduce the proposed tax. Its effect will also be to discourage as well many of the European borrowers who, at the time of the President's announcement, were planning a substantial volume of additional financing in the United States. But we will not be required to choose among countries nor among borrowers. The tax method will assert its effects through the market process, with an increase in the comparative cost of borrowing here acting to reduce the amount that will be borrowed. My feeling, Mr. Minister, is that we must now keep a close watch on developments. We will look forward to further discussions with your representatives here on a continuing basis. I am particularly looking forward to an opportunity of reviewing the entire situation with you when you come to Washington at the time of the annual meeting of the International Bank and Fund in September. No doubt we will have further occasion to consult on the special economic problems in our own balance of payments relationships at the time of the Joint Japan-United States Cabinet Committee meeting in Tokyo in November. I suggest we plan on that basis. Sincerely yours, Douglas Dillon. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files,FN 12 US. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Widman (Treasury/OIN), cleared in substance by Goldstein, and approved by Monti. Sent to Tokyo; repeated to Bern, Bonn, Brussels, Canberra, The Hague, London, Ottawa, Paris, Rome, and Zurich; and pouched to Copenhagen, Luxembourg, Madrid, Oslo, Stockholm, and Vienna. 1 Circular telegram 179, July 27, reported that when Ambassador Takeuchi called on Secretary Dillon on July 26 to receive this letter, Dillon also showed him a press release that the United States intended to issue over the weekend that would make clear that it would grant no exemption from the interest equalization tax to Japan. Takeuchi became “quite disturbed” and “objected to specific mention of Japan in press statement and indicated GOJ would continue to press for exemption.” Dillon agreed not to issue this statement but sought to make clear to him that “some action would be required prior to reopening of markets to halt damaging rumors that exemption would be extended to Japan.” (Ibid.) 2 Not found. 80. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany 80. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany Source Washington, July 30, 1963, 9:07 p.m. 300. Joint State-Treasury-Defense. Embtel 374. 1 Re Part I Joint Report we agree that there should be no doubt that the U.S. expects a full offset to U.S. defense expenditures in both payments and orders. Therefore it is proposed that Secretary McNamara present the following letter to Minister von Hassel to make it absolutely clear that we expect full offset. This is in keeping with the past practice of exchanges with the FRG MOD on this subject. Begin text "1. In consonance with the assurances that you gave President Kennedy and in accordance with the memorandum presented to Minister Erhard, 2 following his discussion with President Kennedy during his recent visit, it is in our mutual interest to offset in full the dollars received by Germany as a result of U.S. defense expenditures in Germany. "2. Therefore, the level of FRG payments—as well as orders—resulting from the cooperative logistics arrangements between our respective governments, which will have benefit both to the military capabilities of the armed forces of the FRG and to the U.S. balance of payments, should result in a full offset of U.S. defense expenditures in the FRG, presently estimated at $1,300 million for CY 63-64. "3. It is our understanding that this objective is in consonance with a $1,300 million planned FRG procurement objective for CY 63-64.” End text. Re second troublesome feature mentioned Embtel we realize FRG could use para 4 to modify payments schedule, but we do not consider it feasible eliminate reference to Feb. 2 exchange of letters or to amend those letters. 3 * Source: Department of State, Central Files,FN 12 US. Confidential; Operational Immediate. Drafted by Henry J. Kuss (Defense) and Robert M. Brandin (EUR/GER) on July 29; cleared by Sullivan (Treasury), Brandin, David Klein (White House), and Grant G. Hilliker (S/S); and approved by Jeffrey C. Kitchen (G/PM). 1 Telegram 374 from Bonn, July 27, claimed that the Joint Report, which was signed on July 24 by representatives of the Department of Defense and the German Defense Ministry and was to be signed by German Defense Minister Kai-Uwe von Hassel and McNamara during the latter's visit to Bonn July 31-August 2, was not clear whether the payments offset during the next 2 years would be $1,300 million or $1,000 million. The telegram expressed the fear that the German Government would interpret the Joint Report as “U.S. acquiescence to FRG minimum payments schedule totaling $1,000 million.” (Ibid.) The Joint Report has not been found. 2 See footnote 3, Document 74 . 3 The source text has no signature. 81. Editorial Note 81. Editorial Note Concerns in the Government of Japan about the Kennedy administration's proposed interest equalization tax prompted Japanese Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira to come to Washington for discussions with senior U.S. officials. He met separately with Under Secretary Ball and Secretary Rusk on August 1 and with President Kennedy on August 2, 1963. Memoranda of all three conversations are scheduled for publication in volume XXII . Regarding earlier Japanese complaints on this question, see Document 79 . 82. Memorandum of Conversation 82. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, September 24, 1963. SUBJECT U.S. Troop Reductions in Europe PARTICIPANTS Germans Dr. Gerhard Schroeder, Foreign Minister, Federal Republic of Germany Ambassador Karl Heinrich Knappstein, German Embassy Dr. Albert Reinkemeyer, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Foreign Office Mr. Heinz Weber, Counselor-Interpreter Americans The President Acting Secretary Ball Ambassador George C. McGhee, American Embassy, Bonn Assistant Secretary William R. Tyler, EUR Mr. Richard B. Finn, Deputy Director, GER The President said that he also wished to talk about troop reductions in Europe. 1 He noted that there had been a problem arising from the withdrawal of 600 US troops from the Berlin Garrison. He said that the US has very large forces abroad and an extensive logistics line, which has been set up almost on a wartime basis. The United States maintains around 300,000 men in Europe. The President said that the US does not want to take actions which would have an adverse impact on public opinion in Germany but does not wish to keep spending money to maintain forces which are not of real value. Mr. Ball commented that these reductions relate to non-combat units. Mr. Schroeder said that the important thing is to have detailed talks in advance so that objectives are made clear and public opinion can be clarified. Otherwise people in Germany would think the US was reducing its forces as a result of some arrangement between the US and the Soviet Union. The important thing is to explain these matters in advance and to carry out the reductions at an appropriate time. The President said that the US would discuss these matters with the Federal Republic as the situation develops. In the case of US forces in Germany, the President said the arguments against reductions at this time are more powerful than the arguments in favor. Mr. Schroeder said there are positive aspects to these reductions. The US always maintains large numbers of supporting units with its divisions. If some of these units are withdrawn, this may have an effect on German performance. The Foreign Minister repeated that the Federal Republic would be agreeable to withdrawals if there were good preparation in advance. The President noted that these reductions involve about 18,000 men, largely in France, Britain and Spain. He emphasized that the US would stay in close touch with the Federal Republic on this subject. Mr. Schroeder stated that the decisive point is that German public opinion should feel that there has been frank consultation. He commented that Germany is a little different perhaps in this respect. When the President went to Berlin, his statements were of great importance and were well received. Nevertheless the US is at some distance from Germany and the German people feel the need for an “allowance” of goodwill and understanding. The President said he understood this point. He was glad that he had been able to go to Germany to show the interest of the U.S. and our understanding of the German situation. It is probably hard for the German people to understand clearly some of the problems which the United States considers of major importance, such as the race problem and Cuba. As the meeting broke up Mr. Ball said it had been a very unusual meeting since the subject of poultry had not been discussed. The President emphasized his interest in an early solution of the problem. Mr. Schroeder said that he was very aware of this matter and that the Federal Republic had been working for what it hoped would be a solution of the problem of poultry levies. The meeting ended at 11:35 a.m. * Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149, July-September 1963. Secret. Drafted by Richard B. Finn (EUR/GER) on September 30 and approved by U on September 30 and the White House on October 4. 1 For additional documentation on decisions leading to troop reductions in Europe, see Documents 26 ff. 83. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Japan 83. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Japan Source Washington, November 20, 1963, 9:07 a.m. 1317. Consultative Task Force for interest equalization tax met November 18 in Department. Japanese represented by Minister Yamashita, Ohkawara, Matsumoto and Kaya. US represented by Under Secretary Daane of Treasury, Barnett and Trezise of State, and others. Interest Equalization Tax Japanese expressed concern over delayed timing of IET enactment and its implications and GOJ dilemma in attempting to estimate foreign capital component in public investment sector of budget. Said survey of European capital market possibilities has proven disappointing and GOJ now is faced with decision whether to return to New York market for funds. We informed the Japanese that shape and content of IET would most likely be same as described to them earlier, that delay in passage of bill was result of “legislative glue” and not from any change in favorable attitude of Congress, that we thought it possible House would approve in December and Senate would take action in January. The capital market would then open with the one percent interest rate equivalent in tax added. 1 Said we are delighted that Japanese making efforts obtain European capital. In response to questions we assured them that Washington Post and New York Time s editorials suggesting establishment of Capital Issues Committee to screen foreign borrowings did not have USG backing. 2 [Here follows brief discussion of other U.S.-Japan economic questions.] Johnson * Source: Department of State, Central Files,FN 16 US. Limited Official Use; Priority. Drafted by Martin Y. Hirabayashi (FE/EA/J), cleared by Blaser (Treasury) in substance and Thelma E. Vettel (FE/EA), and approved by Leonard L. Bacon (FE/EA). 1 The Interest Equalization Tax Act was not enacted until September 4, 1964. (P.L. 88-563; 78 Stat. 809) 2 Not further identified. Foreign Assistance Policy Foreign Assistance Policy 84. Report Prepared by the Policy Planning Council Washington, undated. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5-MSP/1-1961. Secret. Drafted by William O. Webb (S/P) on January 19. Forwarded to Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Raymond A. Hare under cover of a January 19 memorandum from George A. Morgan, which is attached to the source text. Morgan indicated in his memorandum that, following Hare's oral request, the Policy Planning Council “has for some months been analyzing the problem of the effectiveness and optimum goals of US external military aid policies and programs,” and this paper represented its general conclusions. 85. Memorandum From Manning H. Williams of the Operations Coordinating Board to the Executive Officer of theOperations Coordinating Board (Smith) Washington, January 25, 1961. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Food for Peace. No classification marking. Attached to the source text is a newspaper clipping from The New York Times, January 25, 1961, summarizing a task force report, chaired by Murray D. Lincoln, President of Cooperative for American Remittance Everywhere, Inc. (CARE), which recommended among other things discarding the concept of “surplus disposal” legislation in favor of increased funding for 5-year contracts with foreign nations wanting U.S. farm products. This report is also summarized in Department of State Bulletin, February 13, 1961, p. 217. 86. Editorial Note 87. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Agriculture Freeman, and the Director of the Office of Food for Peace (McGovern) Washington, January 31, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 800.03/2-161. No classification marking. 88. Editorial Note 89. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Martin) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball) Washington, February 7, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 811.0040/2-761. Confidential. Forwarded to Ball through the Executive Secretariat. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: “Seen in B.” 90. Memorandum From the Deputy Coordinator for Mutual Security (Bell) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball) Washington, February 8, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 811.0040/2-861. Confidential. 91. National Security Action Memorandum No. 22 Washington, February 20, 1961. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM No. 22. No classification marking. 92. Memorandum for the Record Washington, February 23, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 800.0000/2-2361. Confidential. Drafted by Fessenden. 93. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, February 25, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5-MSP/2-2561. Secret. Drafted by James M. Wilson, Jr. (B/FAC) and Seymour Weiss (B/FAC) on March 1. 94. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Kennedy Washington, February 28, 1961. Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Staff Memoranda, Rostow. Secret. 95. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy Washington, March 10, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5-MSP/3-1061. No classification marking. A March 6 draft, attached to the source text, is identical to the text printed here, except for the first paragraph that makes no mention of the upcoming Monday meeting. In the margins of the March 6 draft are the following handwritten comments: “Hand carried to Pres. by Sec 3/6/61” and “Revised & sent 3/10 to W[hite] H[ouse]”. 96. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, March 15, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5-MSP/3-1561. Secret. Drafted by Weiss and retyped in B/FAC on March 14. 97. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, March 17, 1961. Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, Lot 65 D 330. Confidential. Drafted by Lucius D. Battle (S/S) on March 17. 98. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions Washington, March 17, 1961, 10:12 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 398.00-LO/3-1761. Official Use Only. Drafted by James C. Lobenstine (E/OFD/ED); cleared (all in draft) by Myer Rashish and Bator (B), Edwin M. Martin (E), Foy D. Kohler (EUR), John C. Renner (EUR/RA), Isaiah Frank (E/OFD), Jacob J. Kaplan (B/FAC), Walter J. Stoessel, Jr. (S/S), and Griffin and Hooker (Treasury); and approved by Ball. Transmitted to Bonn, Brussels (pass BUSEC), The Hague, Lisbon, London, Ottawa, Paris (pass USRO), Rome, Bern, Dublin, Madrid, Stockholm, Tokyo, and Vienna. 99. Editorial Note 100. Editorial Note 101. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State London, March 28, 1961, 11 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 398.00-LO/3-2861. Confidential. Repeated to the OEEC mission in Paris, Reykjavik, Oslo, Stockholm, Copenhagen, Luxembourg, Athens, Ankara, Madrid, Vienna, and Bern. A typewritten note on a draft copy indicates that the telegram was repeated to the DAG capitals. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1821) 102. Airgram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State London, March 30, 1961, 1 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 398.00-LO/3-3061. Official Use Only. Repeated to Reykjavik, Oslo, Stockholm, Copenhagen, Luxembourg, Athens, Ankara, Madrid, Vienna, Bern, the other DAG capitals, USRO in Paris, and USEC in Brussels. 103. Editorial Note 104. Memorandum of Conversation Between President Kennedy and Foreign Minister von Brentano Washington, April 13, 1961, 10:30 a.m. Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149, January-April 1961. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the source text. Approved in B on April 24, in S on April 25, and at the White House on May 11. The meeting was held at the White House. 105. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs (Coombs) to the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) Washington, May 5, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 811.0000/5-561. Personal and Confidential. The source text is initialed “PHC per LL,” presumably Lillian Lovitz (CU). A typewritten note at the end of the source text reads: “Dictated but not signed by Mr. Coombs.” 106. Letter From Secretary of Agriculture Freeman to the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) Washington, May 12, 1961. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 65 A 481, Agriculture, FY 1962. No classification marking. 107. Memorandum From the Director of the International Cooperation Administration (Labouisse) to President Kennedy Washington, May 12, 1961. Source: Washington National Records Center,RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 65 A 481, Agriculture, FY 1962. No classification marking. 108. Editorial Note 109. Report Prepared by Charles Burton Marshall Washington, May 17, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5-MSP/5-2361. Secret. Attached to the source text is a May 23 memorandum from Marshall to Secretary Rusk, which indicated that the report was completed on May 17 and recommended that it be discussed “in a meeting similar to the one of February 25 which gave rise to it.” 110. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) to Secretary of Agriculture Freeman Washington, May 19, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 811.00/5-1961. No classification marking. Drafted by Alice May (ICA/EXSEC) on May 17 and redrafted in ICA/D on May 18 and cleared by Labouisse. Attached to another copy is a May 19 memorandum from Labouisse to Bowles, urging Bowles to sign the letter the same day if possible. He argued, “In view of his [Freeman's] memorandum to the President of May 5 and the likelihood that the President may make some decision on this matter within the next few days, I feel it is most important to have the Department's views on record as soon as possible.” (Washington National Records Center, RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 65 A 481, Agriculture, FY 1962) 111. Letter From Secretary of Agriculture Freeman to the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) Washington, May 25, 1961. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 65 A 481, Agriculture, FY 1962. No classification marking. 112. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, May 26, 1961. Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Top Secret. Drafted by Weiss on May 31. Not submitted to the Secretary for approval but cleared by S/S on June 2. 113. Editorial Note 114. Memorandum for the Files Washington, August 26, 1961. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 65 A 481, Labouisse. Confidential. Drafted by Labouisse. 115. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Kennedy Washington, September 18, 1961. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda, Rostow, 2/61-6/62. No classification marking. Copies were sent to McGeorge Bundy, Ralph Dungan, and Theodore Sorensen. 116. Editorial Note 117. Editorial Note 118. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Kennedy Washington, October 4, 1961. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda, Rostow, 2/61-6/62. Confidential. 119. Letter From the Deputy Director of the Office of Food for Peace (Symington) to the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hamilton) Washington, October 4, 1961. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 65 A 481, Food for Peace, FY 1962. No classification marking. 120. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) to the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hamilton) Washington, October 7, 1961. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 65 A 481, Administration—State, FY 1962. Official Use Only. Drafted by A.E. Rice (U) and transmitted through S/S and EXSEC (AID). The handwritten notation, “Thank you F.H.,” appears on the source text. 121. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (McGhee) to the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hamilton) Washington, October 17, 1961. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 65 A 481, Hamilton, Oct. 10 Memo “Foreign Assistance”. No classification marking. 122. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Martin) to the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hamilton) Washington, October 23, 1961. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 65 A 481, Oct. 11 Memo “Terms of Reference for AID Negotiations”. Official Use Only. 123. Memorandum for the Record Washington, October 23, 1961. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 65 A 481, White House, FY 1962. Secret. Drafted by Komer. Copies were sent to McGeorge Bundy, Rostow, Bell, Dungan, and Kenneth Hansen. Attached to the source text is an October 24 memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to Hamilton, which indicates that Komer was conducting a White House review of major MAP programs and that he would be available if Hamilton “should want to talk with him about it.” Bundy added that, although Jeffrey Kitchen was the formal chairman of the review, most of the energy for it came from Komer and Kenneth Hansen of the Bureau of the Budget. Also attached to the source text is a copy of an October 25 memorandum from Don Easum (AID) to Battle (S/S), indicating that AID was taking no action on Komer's memorandum and was giving a copy only to Frank Coffin, but that a copy could be given to G/PM at Battle's discretion. 124. Report Prepared by the Policy Planning Council Washington, October 26, 1961. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 65 A 481, State Department Policy Planning, FY 1962. Confidential. The portion of the source text printed here comprises pages 1-4 of the 40-page report. 125. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (McGhee) Washington, November 1, 1961. Source: Washington National Records Center,RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 65 A 481, State Department Policy Planning, FY 1962. Confidential. An undated, mimeographed notice attached to the source text indicates that the Secretary's memorandum should be considered an addendum to the Policy Planning Council paper (Document 124). 126. Summary Minutes of Meeting of the Interdepartmental Committee of Under Secretaries on Foreign Economic Policy Washington, November 1, 1961. Source: Department of State, E Files: Lot 65 D 68, Interdepartmental Committee of Under Secretaries on Foreign Economic Policy. Official Use Only. Presumably drafted by Ruth S. Donahue, who is listed as Recording Secretary. Regarding the formation and functions of the ICFEP, see Document 5. 127. Editorial Note 128. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs (Kitchen) to Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, December 12, 1961. Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, Guidelines for Military Aid Program. Secret. Attached to the source text were the conclusions of the Steering Group Report, paragraphs 7-19, which are in the Supplement, and the country alternatives and recommendations, paragraphs 54-85, not printed. Attached to an earlier, nearly identical draft of Kitchen's memorandum, December 9, which was addressed only to Secretary Rusk, was the entire report of 40 typescript pages. 129. Memorandum From the Acting Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Gaud) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, January 12, 1962. Source: Washington National Records Center,RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 65 A 481, Military Assistance, FY 1962. Confidential. The source text is Tab D to an attached memorandum from Chenery to the Acting Administrator, January 12, which also summarizes the Steering Group Report. The other tabs, not found, were the text of the report, country annexes, and comments on the report by members of the steering group and Department of State and AID officials. Also attached to the source text are a covering memorandum from Chenery to the Acting Administrator, January 12, recommending that Gaud familiarize himself with the Steering Group Report and sign the memorandum to Secretary Rusk, and a memorandum from Carol Carter Moor (S/S-RO) to Easum (AID), January 10, indicating that G/PM wanted AID comments on the report by January 12. 130. National Security Council Record of Action No. 2447 Washington, undated. Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council. Secret. The Action was taken at the 496th NSC meeting on January 18, along with Record of Action No. 2446. The source text is attached to a transmittal memorandum from Battle to several Department of State principals, January 23. A draft Record of Action was not discussed until an NSC Standing Group meeting on January 19 (Record of Action, January 19; Department of State,S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Standing Group, 1/19/62), and was apparently not approved until some time between January 19 and 23. 131. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hamilton) to President Kennedy Washington, February 9, 1962. Source: Washington National Records Center,RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 65 A 481, Development Financing, FY 1962. Official Use Only. The source text, which was sent through the Secretary of State, bears the notation “DR per GWB” in the Secretary's handwriting. The source text also bears a second date, February 12, 1962, which is elsewhere given as the document control date and is presumably the day the memorandum was forwarded to the White House. (Memorandum from Easum to Executive Staff (AID), March 13; ibid.). 132. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hamilton) to President Kennedy Washington, February 9, 1962. Source: Washington National Records Center,RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 65 A 481, Development Financing, FY 1962. Official Use Only. The source text, which was sent through the Secretary of State, bears the notation “DR per GWB” in the Secretary's handwriting. Three charts and two tables of statistical material attached to the source text are not printed. 133. Memorandum From President Kennedy to the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hamilton) Washington, March 2, 1962. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 286,AID Administrator Files: FRC 65 A 481, Development Financing,FY 1962. No classification marking. An attached memorandum from Dungan to Hamilton, March 5, stressed that the President wanted AID loan policy to be applied in a flexible way and that he was concerned about the United States picking up the soft loans in consortia with other countries. Dungan added that it would be useful during the upcoming review of the AID program with the President “to discuss AID loan term policy along with the other matters under consideration.” Regarding this review, see Document 134. Subsequently, it was decided to distribute the memorandum, along with Dungan's memorandum, in the NSAM series, and they became National Security Action Memorandum No. 130, March 2. (Memorandum from Charles E. Johnson (NSC Staff) to Battle, Charles Sullivan (Treasury), Joseph Toner (AID/EXSEC), and Osborne Hague (Budget), March 8; Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM No. 130) 134. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, March 9, 1962. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 65 A 481, White House, FY 1962. Confidential. Drafted by Chenery on March 10 and approved in the White House on April 20. The meeting was held at the White House. Attached to the source text is a note from Easum to Hamilton, March 20, indicating that a draft of the memorandum of conversation had been approved with minor changes by Lingle and Coffin, and Easum initialed clearance for Hamilton on the note. An attached undated memorandum from Battle to Dungan indicates that the memorandum of conversation had also been approved by Ball. 135. Paper Prepared in the Agency for International Development Washington, April 4, 1962. Source: Washington National Records Center,RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 65 A 481, Development Financing, FY 1962. No classification marking. The source text, labeled “FINAL DRAFT,” was forwarded under cover of a memorandum from Easum to AID Executive Staff, April 4, for discussion at a meeting of the Executive Staff on April 5 at 8:30 a.m. For an unofficial record of discussion of this meeting, April 5 (ES/RA-23), which was attached to the source text, see the Supplement. 136. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to the President's Special Assistant (Dungan) Washington, April 14, 1962. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 65 A 481, Development Financing, FY 1962. Official Use Only. Forwarded under cover of a memorandum from Dungan to Lingle, April 19, which noted in part: “I thought you might be interested in having Carl's comments which appear to be quite pertinent.” 137. National Security Action Memorandum No. 146 Washington, April 20, 1962. Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM No. 146. Confidential. An information copy was sent to General Maxwell D. Taylor. 138. Letter From the President's Military Representative (Taylor) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) Washington, April 20, 1962. Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM No. 146. Secret. 139. National Security Action Memorandum No. 150 Washington, April 20, 1962. Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM No. 150. Confidential. Information copies were sent to General Taylor and David E. Bell. NSAM No. 150 apparently originated with a suggestion from Chester Bowles who, after traveling in Iran, Ethiopia, Egypt, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, observed that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers could make a “massive contribution” to the U.S. overseas development effort. (Airgram 355 from Karachi, March 6; Department of State, Central Files, 611.90D/3-662) A memorandum from Harold Saunders to McGeorge Bundy, April 16, followed up on Bundy's request for an NSAM on this subject. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM No. 150) 140. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hamilton) to President Kennedy Washington, May 25, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM No. 159. Confidential. 141. National Security Action Memorandum No. 159 Washington, May 31, 1962. Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM No. 159. Secret. A copy was sent to David Bell. 142. Letter From President Kennedy to the Ambassador to India (Galbraith) Washington, June 22, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 6/11/62-6/24/62. Confidential; Eyes Only. 143. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to the Ambassador to India (Galbraith) Washington, June 22, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General. Confidential. The source text accompanied the President's June 22 letter to Galbraith, Document 142. 144. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development's Executive Assistant (Funari) to the Administrator (Hamilton) Washington, June 23, 1962. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 65 A 481, White House, FY 1962. Official Use Only. 145. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, and the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hamilton) Washington, June 23, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, DOD, Vol. IV, 6/62. Secret. 146. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State New Delhi, July 9, 1962, 7 p.m. Source: Department of State, S/S Eyes Only Microfilm. Confidential; Priority. Relayed to the White House. 147. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, July 10, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Balance of Payments and Gold, 6/62-3/63. Confidential. Copies were sent to George Ball, Fowler Hamilton, and David E. Bell. 148. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy Washington, July 11, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, AID, 1/62-8/62. Confidential. A handwritten note on the source text indicates the memorandum was taken from the President's weekend reading of September 13. 149. Editorial Note 150. National Security Action Memorandum No. 177 Washington, August 7, 1962. Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM No. 177. Secret. Copies were sent to Dillon and Bell. 151. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions Washington, August 29, 1962, 4:06 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 800.03/8-2962. Official Use Only; Priority. Drafted by Nathaniel McKitterick (IO/OES) on August 28; cleared by Richard H. Roberts (Agriculture) in substance, David Richardson (AID), Frank K. Hefner (IO/OIA), Charles M. Hill (EUR), and Louise McNutt (FE); and approved by Harlan Cleveland (IO). Sent to Paris, London, Bonn, Rome (Embassy and FODAG), and Tokyo. For background on U.S. policy toward multilateral world surplus food programs in 1961, see the memorandum from L.D. Battle to McGeorge Bundy, October 28, 1961, and McGovern's memorandum to Secretary Rusk, November 2, 1961, both in the Supplement. 152. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, September 25, 1962, 3:30 p.m. Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Official Use Only. Drafted by Leatherman on October 1 and approved in U on October 11. 153. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, September 26, 1962. Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential. Drafted by O'Mahony on October 4 and approved in U on October 16. 154. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy Washington, November 16, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office File, Staff Memoranda, Kaysen. Confidential. 155. Memorandum of Conversation New York, November 20, 1962. Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Barnett and approved in S on November 29. 156. Editorial Note 157. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Washington, December 26, 1962, 7:25 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 374.800/12-2662. Official Use Only; Priority; Verbatim Text. Drafted by R. Palmer (AID/IDOS); cleared by 12 officers from AID, State, and Treasury; and approved by Coffin. Repeated to all other DAC capitals. 158. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to the President's Special Assistant (Dungan) Washington, March 5, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Foreign Aid, Clay Report. Confidential. A copy was sent to McGeorge Bundy. 159. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (McGhee) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, March 15, 1963. Source: Department of State, Central Files,AID 1. Confidential. The source text, which was also addressed to Under Secretary Ball, was transmitted through S/S. A handwritten notation reads: “Secretary saw.” 160. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Bell) to President Kennedy Washington, March 15, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM No. 159. Secret. 161. Editorial Note 162. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Food for Peace (Reuter) to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Gordon) Washington, March 26, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Balance of Payments, Cabinet Committee, 3/63#7/63. Official Use Only. A copy was sent to Kaysen. 163. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Fulbright) Washington, March 27, 1963. Source: Department of State, Central Files, FT (EX) US. No classification marking. Drafted by H.H. Barger and D.J. James on March 19 and cleared by eight Department of State officers and AID/LA. 164. Summary Minutes of Meeting of the Interdepartmental Committee of Under Secretaries on Foreign Economic Policy Washington, April 11, 1963. Source: Department of State, E Files: Lot 64 D 452, Economic Affairs (General), Interdepartmental Committee of Under Secretaries on Foreign Economic Policy. Official Use Only. Presumably drafted by Ruth Donahue, who is listed as Recording Secretary, on April 19. 165. Current Economic Developments Washington, April 16, 1963. Source: Washington National Records Center, E/CBA/REP Files: FRC 72 A 6248, Current Economic Developments. Confidential. The source text comprises pp. 14-17 of the issue. 166. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Bell) to President Kennedy Washington, April 22, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, AID, 4/63-9/63. Confidential. Attached to the source text is a memorandum from Easum to Lawrence F. O'Brien, April 22, noting that Secretary Rusk was given a copy of Bell's memorandum that morning, had reviewed it briefly, and may have discussed it with the President at the NSC meeting. The summary record of the NSC meeting contains no discussion of Bell's memorandum. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings, 513th Meeting) Easum added that the President should read the memorandum prior to the leadership breakfast the next day. 167. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Bell) to President Kennedy Washington, May 13, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM No. 159. Secret. Komer's May 16 memorandum to McGeorge Bundy(Document 168) was attached to the source text. 168. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, May 16, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM No. 159. Secret. 169. Memorandum From the Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Hansen) to Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff Washington, May 21, 1963. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 65 A 481, White House, FY 1962. Secret. Attached to the source text is a May 22 memorandum from Komer to David Bell, which reads: "Here, with Ken Hansen's OK, is his acid comment on your reply to NSAM 159 (military-economic aid coordination). However politely phrased, the reply seems to add up to saying that not much has been done, nor is contemplated. "As I told Frank, I don't want to show a report like this to the President without checking tactics with you. Would you want, for example, a fairly tart reply from the President saying in effect ‘this isn't good enough; let's keep humping.' You could use this to back your hand on next moves.” 170. Letter From Secretary of Defense McNamara to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, July 9, 1963. Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM No. 242. Confidential. A copy was sent to McGeorge Bundy. The source text is Tab A to an undated memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to Secretary Rusk. As summarized in Johnson's memorandum, McNamara's letter was an outgrowth of correspondence on military sales between McNamara and Bell. Bell's June 24 letter to McNamara, McNamara's June 28 reply, and McNamara's June 27 memorandum to William Bundy are Tab C. Tab D is printed as Document 171. U. Alexis Johnson transmitted his memorandum to Rusk (with all its tabs) under cover of an undated memorandum to Bell asking for his concurrence. 171. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, July 26, 1963. Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM No. 242. Confidential. Copies were sent to McGeorge Bundy and Bell. The source text is Tab D to U. Alexis Johnson's undated memorandum to Secretary Rusk; see the source note, Document 170. 172. Current Economic Developments Washington, August 6, 1963. Source: Washington National Records Center, E/CBA/REP Files: FRC 72 A 6248, Current Economic Developments. Limited Official Use. The source text comprises pp. 14-17 of the issue. 173. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to Secretary of the Treasury Dillon Washington, August 23, 1963. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-3. Confidential. Forwarded to Under Secretary Ball for his signature under cover of an August 5 memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to Ball. The August 23 date was later stamped on the source text when it was sent to Secretary Dillon. 174. Editorial Note 175. Editorial Note 176. National Security Action Memorandum No. 276 Washington, December 26, 1963. Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM No. 276. Secret. A copy was sent to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. 177. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) Washington, December 30, 1963. Source: Department of State, S/S Briefing Books, 1962-1966: Lot 66 D 219, Executive Branch Committee on Foreign Aid. Personal and Confidential. An undated note in the Secretary's handwriting to Ball, attached to the source text, reads: “A good statement of this point. DR‘ 84. Report Prepared by the Policy Planning Council 84. Report Prepared by the Policy Planning Council Source Washington, undated. US MILITARY AID POLICY TOWARD NON-NATO COUNTRIES 1. Development of a clear concept of the rationale and purpose of US external military aid programs has been hampered by a widespread disposition to justify military aid primarily on grounds that it should contribute—more or less directly—to strengthening the military posture of the United States. Experience since World War II, however, has shown that US military aid also serves a variety of non-military purposes and that even the purely military returns vary widely in nature and amount from country to country. This confusion about the purpose of military aid and the impossibility of laying down broad criteria applicable to a world-wide military aid program has caused difficulty not only with Congress but in the formulation and administration of military aid. 2. Military aid does and should serve a variety of purposes. The more important ones are listed below and demonstrate clearly that (a) many are non-military; (b) few if any have general application; most are important in some areas and unimportant or inapplicable in others; and (c) their importance in different areas changes with changing military and political conditions. These variously valid purposes are to: (1) Assist the US to deter or meet overt Bloc aggression; (2) Provide quid pro quo for the right to maintain US bases; (3) Develop facilities in the recipient nation for possible use by US forces in the event of local aggression; (4) Assist a country to cope with Bloc-inspired subversion, disorder, or guerrilla activity; (5) Assist in maintaining internal security; (6) Preserve the territorial integrity of the recipient nation against its neighbors; (7) Deter recipient nations from seeking military aid from the Bloc or other undesirable sources, or balance the effects of such aid; (8) Maintain pro-US regimes; (9) Assist in assuring a pro-US indoctrination in local military groups; (10) Support nation-building activities. 3. One principle that is generally valid with regard to military aid is that we should tailor the aid to serve, as well as possible, as many as possible of the purposes that are valid at the particular time and place. Thus for example even if an aid program is initiated as quid pro quo for base rights, we should seek to have it serve other constructive purposes, such as nation-building, not just tickle the vanity of the recipients. 4. Non-NATO recipients of US military aid by and large now fall into three general categories: 1 (a) those requiring assistance for military forces to meet a demonstrable military threat; (b) those requiring military assistance to meet threats of subversion, guerrilla activity, or local aggression; (c) those having no demonstrable military requirement for assist-ance but receiving military aid largely for political or other reasons such as quid pro quo for base rights. 5. The problems with regard to administering military aid programs for countries in category (a) are largely military ones once the decision has been made regarding the desired level of indigenous forces it is in the US interest to support. However, the decision which places a given country in category (a) is not always a purely military or strategic one. For example, Pakistan has been receiving military assistance with the aim of building a force capable of contributing to the defense of Pakistan against Bloc aggression. It might well be asked, however, whether the limited contribution even US-supported Pakistani forces could make toward coping with Bloc aggression compensates for the drain on Pakistani resources which could otherwise be devoted to economic development and for the political problems US military aid to Pakistan has caused with India and Afghanistan. In short, military criteria should not be the only basis for deciding what kind of a military aid program in a given country best serves US interest. 6. This is clearly even more true in the case of countries falling in categories (b) and (c). Overemphasis on conventional military criteria has in part been responsible for the comparative neglect in US military assistance programs of the need for aiding non-NATO nations to cope with the whole range of internal security problems including subversion, internal disorders, and guerrilla activity. Internal security, as thus defined, is rapidly becoming a major problem for many non-NATO nations and hence for the US. In most areas, political and economic meas-ures are necessary for a permanent solution of the causes of internal security; hence the military aspects of an aid program must be dovetailed with them, and often be subordinate to them. 7. Finally, there are countries in category (c) which for a variety of non-military reasons are receiving or should receive military aid. In these cases, the type of military aid given should be determined almost exclusively by political considerations. 8. Thus, in all cases where purely military requirements, from the US point of view, are not overriding or are subordinate to political requirements, US military assistance programs should be geared primarily to achieving US economic, social and political objectives in a given country. These objectives will vary, of course, from country to country, but in general this approach to military assistance should make for greater efficiency in the use of military aid, not only to improve internal security capabilities, but, for example, to indoctrinate military personnel along lines favorable to US interests and assist nation-building activities through the construction of roads, harbors, etc., and the training of labor in useful civilian skills. 9. If US military assistance programs are going to achieve maximum results politically as well as militarily, it will be necessary to make some changes in the administrative arrangements under which these programs are now formulated and implemented in order to achieve closer cooperation between State and Defense. It is not recommended that any type of new joint agency be established. Indeed, despite the substantial and increasing political content of military aid programs, primary responsibility for them should remain with Defense. The desired goal could perhaps best be achieved by assigning a few State officers to work on an integrated basis in Defense. They would not be expected to speak officially for State or to be a substitute for the liaison that now takes place at various levels between State and Defense on military assistance programs. Their primary contribution would be to bring their experience in political and economic affairs to bear at an early stage on the formulation and administration of military assistance programs, in a way that is virtually impossible within existing bureaucratic liaison machinery between the two Departments. Their participation in the preparation and implementation of military assistance programs would, at the very least, assure that political and economic, as well as military, goals were being given constant and fruitful attention. * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5-MSP/1-1961. Secret. Drafted by William O. Webb (S/P) on January 19. Forwarded to Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Raymond A. Hare under cover of a January 19 memorandum from George A. Morgan, which is attached to the source text. Morgan indicated in his memorandum that, following Hare's oral request, the Policy Planning Council “has for some months been analyzing the problem of the effectiveness and optimum goals of US external military aid policies and programs,” and this paper represented its general conclusions. 1 Some countries fall into more than one category. [Footnote in the source text.] 85. Memorandum From Manning H. Williams of the Operations Coordinating Board to the Executive Officer of theOperations Coordinating Board (Smith) 85. Memorandum From Manning H. Williams of the Operations Coordinating Board to the Executive Officer of theOperations Coordinating Board (Smith) Source Washington, January 25, 1961. SUBJECT Food-for-Peace through Development In his memorandum of January 24, 1 President Kennedy said he has asked the Food-for-Peace Director to conduct an intensive review of uses of U.S. agricultural products abroad and possible improvements in them. Immediate attention should be given to focusing on the “food for development” aspects of Food-for-Peace. This is the realistic focus for advancing U.S. interests and also the interests of the impoverished countries. Although “food for development” is already an integral part of the President's general Food-for-Peace program, it seems to have been pushed to the background by the idea of “helping provide a more adequate diet for peoples all around the world.” 2 If our program is too broad, it will arouse expectations abroad we cannot fulfill, and seem unrealistic to our own people. "Food for development,” however, is a promise we can readily fulfill. We can 3 use our tremendous food production capacity to help other people prepare to feed themselves better. What is involved can be easily explained. For example, if we send steel rails and engineers to help country X build a railroad, we also send enough wheat to feed and pay the wages of the local workmen who clear the jungle and lay the rails. This has been done already to a limited extent; we need to stress 4 the concept “food for development” and popularize it. Yugoslavia has been an excellent example. Large quantities of American food made available to the Yugoslav government and sold for local currency have not only averted hunger in Yugoslavia but have generated the funds necessary for important development projects. One of the results has been that Yugoslavia no longer needs American food imports, which can be diverted where they are more needed. Another result is that Yugoslavia is making better progress toward meeting the present and future needs of its people than it could as a member of the Soviet bloc. Use of food for development on a limited scale has also been successful in India. In Europe after the war, our agricultural products helped prime the pump. In many parts of Asia and Africa today food can help build the pump. The example of building a railroad was used above. Wheat can also generate funds to build universities, pay teachers, and subsidize students. Generous and kind as the American people are, in the long run they will probably give much more enthusiastic support to a food program geared to developing a foreign country than they will to an appeal to feed the hungry. (This does not apply, of course, to disaster relief, or to other emergency measures, when the American people will of course want to help.) Food for development programs have the extra advantage of promising an eventual end, and a happy one, even if a long way off. I am not suggesting that the slogan “Food for Peace” be abandoned. I do suggest that consideration be given to emphasizing that “Food for Peace” means primarily food for development. The slogan might even be expanded to “Food for Peace through Development.” M.H.W. * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Food for Peace. No classification marking. Attached to the source text is a newspaper clipping from The New York Times, January 25, 1961, summarizing a task force report, chaired by Murray D. Lincoln, President of Cooperative for American Remittance Everywhere, Inc. (CARE), which recommended among other things discarding the concept of “surplus disposal” legislation in favor of increased funding for 5-year contracts with foreign nations wanting U.S. farm products. This report is also summarized in Department of State Bulletin , February 13, 1961, p. 217. 1 In this memorandum to department heads and agencies, the President explained the centralization of government oversight of the movement of agricultural commodities and products abroad under the Director of the Food for Peace Program, who was directed “to exercise affirmative leadership and continuous supervision over the various activities in this field, so that they may be brought into harmonious relationship.” Accompanying the memorandum was Executive Order 10915, January 24, 1961, which provided the legal authority for the Director's assumption of these additional coordinating responsibilities. For text of the President's memorandum and Executive Order, see Department of State Bulletin , February 13, 1961, pp. 216-217. 2 The quotation is from the President's January 24 memorandum. 3 The word “can” has been inserted by hand. 4 The word “broaden” has been crossed out and “stress” has been inserted by hand. 86. Editorial Note 86. Editorial Note On January 28, 1961, President Kennedy nominated Henry R. Labouisse to succeed James W. Riddleberger as Director of the International Cooperation Administration (ICA). Labouisse, a lawyer, held various appointments with the U.S. Government from 1941 to 1951. He served with the Mutual Security Agency 1951-1954 and was Director of the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees 1954-1958. Labouisse's nomination as ICA Director was approved by the Senate on February 22, and he was sworn in on March 1 . 87. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Agriculture Freeman, and the Director of the Office of Food for Peace (McGovern) 87. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Agriculture Freeman, and the Director of the Office of Food for Peace (McGovern) Source Washington, January 31, 1961. I believe it would be useful to send a food-for-peace mission immediately to Latin America to explore the manner in which our food abundance can be used to help end hunger and malnutrition in every area of suffering throughout the hemisphere. 1 Responsibility for developing and directing the mission should rest with the Director of the Food for Peace Program. However, I believe it should be done in cooperation with the Mutual Security Administrator, the International Cooperation Administrator, and the Secretary of Agriculture. This mission can have an important effect upon our international obligations and responsibilities. Please give it your full cooperation. John F. Kennedy * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 800.03/2-161. No classification marking. 1 This memorandum is apparently a response to a January 26 memorandum from McGovern to President Kennedy, in which he suggested that a special food-for-peace mission, composed of representatives from FAO, ICA, and the Department of State and directed by the Food for Peace Office, should be sent to Africa, Latin America, and possibly Southeast Asia. (Ibid., 800.03/1-2661) 88. Editorial Note 88. Editorial Note At the National Security Council meeting on February 1, 1961, one agenda item for discussion was studies of Executive branch organization. Following discussion at this meeting, President Kennedy approved, among other items,NSC Action No. 2399-c, which “Noted the President's view that the foreign assistance program must be reorganized before presentation to the Congress; and that the Director, Bureau of the Budget, was planning to submit such a reorganization along with the new foreign aid program.” (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) In National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) No. 6, February 3, addressed to David E. Bell, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, McGeorge Bundy confirmed this assignment. (Ibid., S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM No. 6) 89. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Martin) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball) 89. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Martin) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball) Source Washington, February 7, 1961. SUBJECT Multilateral Approach to Increased Foreign Aid I spent an hour with Mr. Rostow this morning during which he outlined his understanding of what the President wanted to accomplish in this field and we discussed various possible approaches and means for overcoming the obvious difficulties in the way of accomplishment prior to the presentation of the FY '62 aid program. He asked that we do some preliminary work on what we thought would be a fair distribution of an increment of about $1 billion in European aid defined, as we would define it, to exclude private investment and exporter credits. He also asked that we prepare a diplomatic plan of campaign. With respect to the latter I would recommend on the basis of my discussion with Mr. Rostow, and I think he would agree with the broad outlines, that we should operate approximately as follows: 1. Get Adenauer to Washington as soon as possible and discuss with him in the context of an expanded US program the need for an expanded German program as an absolutely necessary prerequisite for an expanded European program. This is the crucial part of the operation. As Adenauer is concerned above all with his election prospects, he is likely to feel that too heavy pressure on him to commit himself to raise taxes or cut welfare expenditures to provide foreign aid will damage his election chances. Being a sensitive and often irrational old man, he could well interpret such pressure as reflecting a desire on the part of a new left-of-center government in the United States to have a similar government in Germany. It will be necessary to emphasize this program as a part of a general plan for putting new life into the Atlantic Alliance, as one in which the United States will add to its contribution and not just ask Europeans to pick up more and as one which is in Germany's interest as well as our own. Mr. Rostow has suggested that we may wish to offer to secure a commitment to such a program from Mr. Brandt in order to take it out of the election arena. This is a matter to be examined with great care to ensure that Adenauer doesn't resent it. Our future negotiating tactics should be explained to Adenauer in detail so he feels he is in full knowledge of our plans and a full partner. Talking to Adenauer may well not be enough as he does not really understand economic matters and may make general commitments which his Cabinet will talk him out of. There, therefore, should be other contacts in addition to that between our President and the Chancellor but, of course, with the Chancellor's approval. 2. The best chance of getting a general willingness to move ahead on aid in Europe would be to hold a NATO Ministerial meeting, preferably of the 3 Minister-type, by mid-March at which we would present a four or five-part package for revising and strengthening the alliance. Presumably such a package will include an attack on the division of the military effort as well as on the economic aid effort. A connection between the two must be recognized. Such a meeting should be asked to approve a commitment to move ahead on aid by all countries in a position to do so by a round amount divided between Europe and North America. Something should probably be agreed as to what counts as aid broadly speaking and as to the broad guiding plan which should govern the division among countries of such a program. The United States should make clear that any commitment is contingent. This is necessary to take account of the difference between the United States position, where the executive can only recommend to the Congress, and the position in most European countries where the legislature carries out the executive decision or the executive falls. 3. This decision in broad principle should be followed by a Ministerial meeting of OEEC to bring the neutrals into the picture and enlist their aid, and to work out a more specific program of aid utilizing such technical, economic and statistical assistance as may be necessary. Great stress must be placed throughout on avoiding getting started on any considerable exercise with respect to categories of aid or definitions of capacity to pay or give aid. 4. Discussions should be held promptly with FE on how to bring Japan into this schemata. 5. Once a general outline of this character is agreed, we will wish to examine the role to be played in it by the DAG meeting scheduled for end-March and by the Indian and Pakistan Consortia meetings now scheduled for mid-April and mid-May. They all have a minor role but they can be useful in dramatizing the problem and the steps being taken. 6. If a scheme of this general character has some merit, it would be desirable to discuss it informally with Frank Lee and Jean Monnet 1 next week. They are both knowledgeable and discreet. * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 811.0040/2-761. Confidential. Forwarded to Ball through the Executive Secretariat. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: “Seen in B.” 1 Frank Lee, British Joint Permanent Secretary of the Treasury, and Jean Monnet, French political economist and chairman of the Action Committee for a United States of Europe. 90. Memorandum From the Deputy Coordinator for Mutual Security (Bell) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball) 90. Memorandum From the Deputy Coordinator for Mutual Security (Bell) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball) Source Washington, February 8, 1961. SUBJECT Mr. Martin's February 7 Memorandum on Multilateral Approach to Increased Foreign Aid 1 I am in general agreement with the thesis that it is desirable to attempt at the highest political level to obtain a political decision on the part of European governments to engage in an increased economic aid effort to be related to a similar increased aid effort on our part. As I understand it, the Rostow notion envisages a possible dimension of an average of a billion dollars a year over the next four years with flexible phasing. It seems to me, however, that it would be most unwise to mix efforts to extract such decisions from the Europeans with efforts to deal with the military problem. It is true enough that increased military and economic aid efforts come out of the same budgets but this is in itself a good reason not to deal with the two together. The most important consideration, however, seems to me to be the absence of a clear basis for delineating what the NATO military posture should be. Most people concerned with the subject have been agreed for a long time that the present plan (MC-70) 2 particularly needs revision and I would think any effort to deal with burden sharing on military costs ought to come after, not before, a revision of the military plans. Obviously also, the negotiations envisaged presume a decision yet to be made with regard to U.S. effort and a decision which can only be made in the context of other decisions regarding the handling of foreign aid in the 1962 budget. John * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 811.0040/2-861. Confidential. 1 Document 89 . 2 Regarding MC#70, see in Foreign Relations , 1958-1960, vol. VII, Part 1, pp. 314 - 317 . 91. National Security Action Memorandum No. 22 91. National Security Action Memorandum No. 22 Source Washington, February 20, 1961. In the wake of our discussions last week with the Germans and the British, 1 I hope we can press on as a matter of high priority the development of formulas for fair sharing in both foreign aid and military partnership, with our European allies, as well as with arrangements that will ease the balance of payments problem of the United States and other deficit countries. We need to make rapid progress with these ideas in order to prepare the way for our efforts on behalf of foreign aid in Congress and with our own people. I know that George Ball has been making good progress in this area, and all I am saying is that I hope he will keep it up as a matter of urgency. JFK 2 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM No. 22. No classification marking. 1 German Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano visited Washington February 16-19. For memorandum of Brentano's conversation with President Kennedy on February 17, vol. XIV, pp. 8 - 11 . On February 16, Edwin M. Martin and Sir Denis Rickett, Second Secretary of the British Treasury, discussed plans for the upcoming March meeting of the Development Assistance Group in London. (Memorandum of conversation, February 16; Department of State, Central Files, 398.00-WA/2-1661) 2 Kennedy's initials appear in an unidentified hand, indicating Kennedy signed the original. 92. Memorandum for the Record 92. Memorandum for the Record Source Washington, February 23, 1961. SUBJECT Burden-sharing In a brief conversation after the meeting of the Acheson Advisory Group 1 on February 22, Mr. Rostow made the comments below in response to a question about the concept of burden sharing especially in the field of aid to less-developed countries. He also said that he had made similar points in his talk with Kristensen. Mr. Rostow said that he believed it was most important that we not permit the “statisticians” to dominate any burden-sharing exercise. He thought that any burden-sharing operation should be under firm political direction so that the outcome of the exercise will make political sense. However, the help of economists and statisticians should be sought in order to provide an adequate factual basis for whatever general conclusions are reached. In other words, the operation should involve an interaction between political authorities, who should be clearly in charge, and technical experts, who would provide a factual rationale for the conclusions reached. It is unlikely that the first attempt at arriving at an adequate burden-sharing arrangement would result in agreement. The necessary next step will undoubtedly be the establishment of a small, high-level, independ-ent “Wise Men's” group, which would, it is to be hoped, reach impartial conclusions regarding the overall nature of the Western effort and the proper distribution of the burden. Mr. Rostow also said that he thought representatives from selected less-developed countries should be invited to participate with any OECD burden-sharing operation. Mr. Rostow felt that the representatives should be drawn from “hard criteria” less-developed countries. In other words, we should not have representatives from countries which simply would bid for excessively large aid from the Western world, but by countries like India which have in the past established realistic criteria and which would be interested in seeing the criteria kept on a realistic basis. I mentioned to Mr. Rostow my views on the danger of attempting to combine into a single operation burden sharing on both aid to less-developed countries and sharing of the common defense burdens. I pointed out that combining them into a single exercise in this way could well mean that the Europeans would bargain off their defense responsibilities against their responsibilities to provide economic aid to less-developed countries and that this would undoubtedly work to the detriment of their defense efforts. Since it may well be that we will be attempting to persuade the Europeans to increase their defense efforts, particularly their conventional forces, and since this will require them to allocate increased resources to defense, it might therefore be seriously detrimental to our efforts in the defense field if a single joint economic aid and defense burden-sharing exercise were attempted. * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 800.0000/2-2361. Confidential. Drafted by Fessenden. 1 President Kennedy appointed the Acheson Advisory Group to study the future needs of NATO. 93. Memorandum of Conversation 93. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, February 25, 1961. SUBJECT Meeting Between the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget on the Military Assistance Program PARTICIPANTS See Page 4 below 1 1. Mr. McNamara indicated that the briefing which Defense personnel were to provide as a point of departure for the meeting had not received prior review or clearance within the Pentagon. Thus all principal participants would be hearing it for the first time. Mr. Bundy of Defense then presented a briefing in two parts which covered, first, the development of Five Year Military Assistance Plans and the derivation of the $2.4 in new MAP funds for FY 1962 originally requested of the previous administration and, second, certain possible alterations in concept stemming from preliminary conclusions of evolving strategic studies which suggested themselves for further consideration. He noted that while there were obvious dangers inherent in generalizing on the direction of these strategic studies four basic patterns appear to be emerging which could materially affect military assistance planning: (1) the ability of U.S. forces to conduct effective limited war operations and thereby deter limited war is receiving higher priority than heretofore; (2) increased attention is being given to a greater sharing of the security burden by our more developed allies and the consequent tapping of their military potential; (3) Free World ability to counter the guerrilla and other subversive tactics of the Communists' sub-limited war threat is receiving greater emphasis; and (4) ultimate victory in the cold war is dependent on top priority being given to the achievement of self-sustaining growth by the underdeveloped countries. The implications of the foregoing in terms of the future design of military assistance programs, according to Mr. Bundy, might include the following: 1) Basic national policy currently requires that “the United States and its allies in the aggregate will have to have, for an indefinite period, military forces with sufficient strength, flexibility, and mobility to enable them to deal swiftly and severely with Communist overt aggression in its various forms and to prevail in general war should one develop.” The mix of aggregate free world capability to deal with overt aggression must be changed by expanding the role of U.S. forces and the forces of economically-developed allies and by reducing the role of underdeveloped countries. 2) Top priority should be given by MAP to assist those economically-developed countries which possess the potential for significant contributions to free world military might to make the most effective possible contributions to free world limited and general war capabilities. An important by-product of this approach would be the establishment of the U.S. as the arsenal of the free world, its exports of military equipment and services substantially expanded through the use of cost-sharing assistance to our economically developed allies. 3) The top priority objective of U.S. policy in the underdeveloped countries is the achievement of a progressive internal environment secure from the ravages of Communist guerrilla activity and the various other covert activities which characterize the international Communist conspiracy. Where substantial fighting potential exists, particularly in ground forces (e.g. Greece, Turkey, Korea and GRC), a compact force structure should be sought which will permit effective indigenous support of free world military operations without sacrificing the priority objective. 2. Insofar as the foregoing bore upon the necessity for reaching judgment on the FY 1962 budget level for military assistance, the Defense studies suggested that the requirements, whether developed under previous guidelines or under the altered concepts would require no less than the $2.4 billion originally recommended by the Departments of State and Defense for inclusion in President Eisenhower's FY 1962 budg-et. This compares to the $1.8 billion figure actually agreed upon by President Eisenhower. 3. General Lemnitzer noted JCS support for the basic long range planning concept as essential to the development of sound programs and stated that the JCS agreed that a FY 1962 level of $2.4 billion was required if U.S. security objectives were to be accomplished. He nevertheless reserved his position on the second part of Mr. Bundy's presentation pending further JCS study. 4. Mr. David Bell pointed out that President Kennedy had indicated that decisions on the amount of economic and military aid to be requested of the Congress and the presentation of Presidential messages related thereto should be completed by the third week of March. 5. Secretaries Rusk and McNamara noted that there were a significant number of highly complex issues which would have to be considered on an urgent basis in any substantive review of the Military Assistance Programs, and agreed that this could not be completed prior to the March deadline for fixing the FY 1962 budget request. A judgment on the FY 1962 figure would therefore have to be reached on the basis of a more rapid and broad brush approach to the problem. Action : Secretary McNamara agreed to provide recommendations for State consideration with regard to the FY 62 level to be proposed to the President, such recommendations to be available within 10 days. Mr. Nitze was assigned Defense responsibility for this effort. Mr. Rusk asked that Mr. Ball accept responsibility for coordinating the State-Defense effort. 6. It was recognized that there were a number of fundamental political and economic issues which might warrant an altered approach in our military aid posture toward NATO as well as toward the underdeveloped areas. Particularly in connection with certain of the alterations which were suggested for further consideration, e.g. such as the concept of the development of “compact forces”, General Lemnitzer indicated that the JCS would want to have the opportunity for a careful study of the underlying implications. Secretary McNamara indicated a similar view. Mr. Rusk stated, however, that an effective review obviously required an ample period of time for completion, and indicated a number of areas which he suggested required a fresh approach with our thinking not being unduly proscribed by our past posture. Mr. Rostow pointed out that even in the event that adjustments in policies or concepts were agreed upon, actual implementation would have to take into account the need for careful and time-consuming negotiations with our allies to secure agreement to any proposed adjustments which affected our implied or specific commitments. Mr. John Bell indicated that a careful interagency review of basic political and military concepts was deemed highly essential and suggested that the President's submission of the FY 62 program should make clear to the Congress that such a review was going forward. 7. Mr. David Bell asked whether there was a consensus of views as to where, within the President's budget, Military Assistance should be shown. Mr. McNamara and General Lemnitzer expressed the strong view that MAP should continue to be presented as an integral part of the Mutual Security Program budget. Mr. Rostow indicated that this was a matter which should be explicitly checked with the President, who, Mr. Rostow felt, may prefer a separation of MAP from the MSP legislation in order to de-emphasize the security aspect of foreign aid. It was generally agreed that under either arrangement no adjustment was contemplated in the administration and control of the program and that the place of MAP in the budget would be discussed with the President at the appropriate time. 8. Secretary Rusk referred to the current study on U.S. bases being conducted by the Dept. of Defense noting that it would be of great interest to the Dept. of State. Secretary McNamara stated that he would see that a copy would be made available to Mr. Rusk. * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5-MSP/2-2561. Secret. Drafted by James M. Wilson, Jr. (B/FAC) and Seymour Weiss (B/FAC) on March 1. 1 The list is not printed. Secretary Rusk was accompanied by 12 officers, including Chester Bowles and George Ball. Secretary McNamara was accompanied by 10 officers, including Roswell Gilpatric and General Lemnitzer. Also attending were Walt Rostow from the White House, Robert Knight from the Department of the Treasury, and David Bell and Robert Macy from the Bureau of the Budget. 94. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Kennedy 94. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Kennedy Source Washington, February 28, 1961. SUBJECT Crucial Issues in Foreign Aid Note : You will be getting George Ball's official view shortly. 1 Here are the highlights as I now see them. I shall be prepared to comment on finer points as you wish. The Old Look. 1. The foreign aid program we have inherited has these characteristics. The bulk of the resources available is either for direct military purposes (about $2 billion), or to assure military base rights, to support military forces, or to avoid short-run political or economic instability or collapse. Of the $2.2 billion sought in the last Eisenhower budget for non-military purposes, less than $500 million was for development purposes. We are in the position of, say, the New Haven Railway, pouring out large sums to keep afloat, but with neither a defined forward objective nor the fresh capital to move towards it. We begin with a program that is almost wholly defensive in character and one which commands neither the resources, the administration, nor the criteria designed to move the underdeveloped countries towards sustained economic growth. 2. In addition, the program has the following familiar weaknesses. Its financing, as well as its perspective, is short-run rather than long-run. The small development component is mainly guided by a project approach rather than an approach in terms of developing whole nations. Its legislative underpinning is piecemeal, reflecting geological layers of past interests and problems. Its administration is diffuse. Its personnel is, for the most part, mediocre: in particular, the program is long on technical assistance types and desperately short of men at home and in the field who understand the economic development problem. The European contribution to the whole program is inadequate, somewhat misdirected, and there is no effective machinery for coordinating our own efforts with those of the Europeans. At home there is profound uneasiness and dissatisfaction with a program which has appeared to yield little result at great cost. This is where we start. The New Look. 3. In general, the new look consists of a turn-around from a defensive effort to shore-up weak economies and to buy short-run political and military advantage, to a coordinated Free World effort with enough resources to move forward those nations prepared to mobilize their own resources for development purposes. The goal is to help other countries learn how to grow. Aid ends when self-sustained growth is achieved and borrowing can proceed in normal commercial ways; e.g., Mexico. This notion can be made an effective basis for a new non-colonial approach of the Atlantic Community to the southern half of the world; and even relatively poor countries, who have passed the take-off, can contribute—in technical assistance if not in long-term capital; e.g., Mexico, Israel, Philippines, as well as Japan. 4. The crucial element here is the new criteria we wish applied in granting aid. Aid shall go to those who have developed at home the capacity to absorb capital productively. We cannot, clearly, pull the plug immediately on countries we are shoring up (e.g., Viet-Nam, Laos, Jordan); nor can we eliminate aid from places where we are buying what we regard as a serious military advantage [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ].What we can do is shift rapidly out of defense support and special assistance into long-term development lending in places where there appears to be a basis for turn-around (e.g., Taiwan, Korea, Turkey, Greece, the Philippines, and even, perhaps, Iran). We can put countries which are asking for aid but do not now have good development programs, on notice that they must develop serious domestic programs before any increases in aid will be granted; e.g., Indonesia and Afghanistan. This kind of response, however, can only be given without grave political risk if we have long-run borrowing authority, or its equivalent, so we can say the funds are, in effect, earmarked against the time when, with our help, they have qualified under the new criteria. Most important of all, we must promptly expand our commitments to those countries which now have the capacity to absorb capital productively in a reasonably short period; e.g., India, Pakistan, Nigeria, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela. 5. It will take some time and the greatest discipline in our whole establishment to bring this turn-around about; but it is the only path that makes sense. And it can be promptly begun. 6. More concretely, the program we must devise should have these technical characteristics: —Military aid should be separated in the budget; but it should be under tighter civil control with respect to policy than it now is. —Both the scale and the type of forces we support under the military aid program should be put under fresh scrutiny, notably in the light of the guerrilla problem. —A concerted effort should be made, through our military aid programs, to induce the local military to use their military resources for constructive purposes. —Given the situation in Korea, Viet-Nam, Taiwan, and Jordan, it is doubtful if in the first year we can much reduce total aid to our rickety partners; but a concerted effort to squeeze non-development aid this year should be attempted. —The development funds available must be put on a long-run basis. This is crucial. —The volume of American development funds available over, say, a four-year period must be enlarged at about an average rate of $1 billion a year more than the $500 million or so we now command. But the application of the new criteria makes it unlikely that actual disbursements would increase very much in the first year of the new program. Of this average $1 billion per annum increase, half might well consist of expend-itures for agricultural commodities. —The outcome of the burden sharing exercise in OECD should be a net increase in long-term development aid from other industrialized countries of about the same order of magnitude; that is, an extra $1 billion per annum over present levels. This would give us an extra Free World margin of about $2 billion a year. Over the four-year period something like a third of the net increase in European lending should come from Germany; a bit less than a third from Great Britain; and the balance from other European countries, Canada, etc. —Perhaps the most crucial technical decision you will have to make is whether you seek this long-term element in the program via borrowing authority for a banking institution within the foreign aid organization, or whether we go on with annual appropriations with a vague Marshall Plan type of forward commitment by the Congress as to scale. There are other alternatives Ball will present. —Contingency aid for emergencies should be at least as high as it has been ($250 million); and it should be much more firmly in your hands. —Administratively the foreign aid effort must be unified firmly under the direction of a single, strong person. If we decide that it should remain within the State Department, as at present, and under the direction of the Under Secretary of State, the choice of his deputy for foreign aid is a crucial choice. —The greatest weakness within the foreign aid organization, both at home and in the field, is the lack of first-class development planners; and whatever table of organization is finally agreed, this fundamental weakness must be remedied. Education and Human Resources Development. 7. In addition to the capital fund, we need radically to reorganize the whole ICA technical assistance program in new directions. It is now, both at home and in the field, weighted heavily with traditional technical assistance projects, some of them of a low order. In the field our embassies are loaded with too many people doing small jobs where the net gain is probably not worth the administrative burden and cost, either to ourselves or to the local governments. A major and ruthless overhaul of existing programs is necessary with a new emphasis on basic education; on bringing modern science to bear in the underdeveloped areas; on technological training (notably in local institutions) to complement economic programs; and the financing of projects aimed at modernizing social institutions—land tenure; self-help housing; etc. 8. The Peace Corps, while separate in important ways, should be linked to Education and Human Resources development. This program might cost over-all perhaps about $500 million per annum. 9. In presenting this part of the new effort, we should dramatize the relation between education and human resources development, on the one hand, and a nation's capacity to absorb capital productively on the other. Organization Structure. 10. Since November 8, 1960, a most extraordinary concentration of thought and memoranda-writing has taken place on the question of how to reorganize foreign aid. Much of this literature is centered about whether the foreign aid structure should be built around a country or a functional approach. The crucial issues to watch are these: —Who the boss will be. He must be very good. —Is there provision for a new group of first-rate country planners who understand the new criteria, who will be able to deal firmly with the military aid component, who will be able to weave together sensible country programs from what foreigners contribute in capital, what we contribute in capital, what human and institutional development can provide along with what the locals are doing. Such men are not now in our organization. —Is there a definable unit which Congress and the public can see, to which the large development funds we are requesting can be allocated. —Is there serious provision made for conducting surgery on the present ICA technical assistance program and staff. 11. Should you decide to go ahead with this new look which would commit this country to a substantial increase in development funds over a four-year period (but not much increase in disbursements in the first year), these problems should be settled soon: —Congressional consultation before your message to Congress. —The drafting of a dramatic message which you may well wish to deliver personally—which would give life to the new look, the turn-around process, and our whole stance towards the underdeveloped areas. —We must arrange a first-class mobilization of the public groups now waiting in place within Eric Johnston's old outfit, 2 ready to back your play. —We shall need a maximum effort at the March meeting of DAG to get contingent commitments from the Europeans so that Congress will understand that any cutting of your program is likely to involve at least a dollar-to-dollar loss of European contributions. 12. Only you can make a judgment as to whether the launching of this new program, with its dual components of long-term development and tough banking criteria, can be pulled off. None of us underestimates the reality of the political problem, the unpopularity of foreign aid as it has been, and the dissatisfaction with the results it has yielded. On the other hand, these things should be borne in mind: —Unless we move on an expanded basis, it is unlikely that we shall, in the end, get anything significant out of the Germans and other Europeans. We have given the Western alliance a real lift with our recent initiatives in this direction. Unless we back our play, these moves will properly be regarded as empty gestures in the Eisenhower tradition. —We have stirred great hopes in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America and acquired very serious commitments to development, notably in the Indian Peninsula and in Latin America. We must back our play or these hopes will fade. Foreign aid will not solve the guerrilla problem; but a program like this may be the necessary backdrop to a solution. —With respect to the balance of payments situation, we can put ourselves in a fairly good position on foreign aid. If there is a radical breakthrough on the reserves question this spring—which is doubtful—we could go ahead making our loans untied. If the balance of payments situation is still unresolved, we can make these new loans on tied basis. This will mean that the new development program can be honestly presented as a measure which would increase American domestic production and exports. —If we can translate the fair shares principle into some kind of reality in OECD this spring, the political basis in the U.S. for our program will be strengthened before Congress finally votes. —From having worked with the American groups interested in foreign aid (enlightened businessmen, labor leaders, churches, women's clubs, etc.), I know that their efforts and tenacity will be directly proportional to the boldness of our vision and our program. 13. Finally, I simply report what Dick Bolling 3 told me: “The bigger the President goes in foreign aid, the easier it will be in the House.” * Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Staff Memoranda, Rostow. Secret. 1 Not further identified. 2 Johnston, a motion picture executive, had served as chairman of the International Development Advisory Board since the early 1950s. 3 Presumably Representative Richard Bolling (D-Mo.). 95. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy 95. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy Source Washington, March 10, 1961. SUBJECT New Proposals for the Foreign Aid Program In anticipation of our Monday meeting to discuss the report on Reorganization of Foreign Assistance, and its accompanying proposals, 1 I want to take this opportunity to restate my own deep concern and strong convictions on the historic situation in which we now find ourselves. I feel certain that this concern and these convictions are widely shared by all those who have worked to produce these new proposals. The scale, shape, and direction of the new proposals are themselves based on an awareness of the increasing seriousness of the world situation. But we are also aware that both public opinion and political sentiment on Capitol Hill require the highest level Presidential leadership if our proposals are to attract the necessary support. Unquestionably, the need for the intelligent use of foreign assistance continues and is likely to increase. In three underdeveloped continents we have reached a watershed where the holding operations of the past are clearly inadequate and where new initiative of a dramatic and positive kind are essential. Even if the Soviet threat did not exist, these requirements would be present and should impel us and other economically developed countries to adopt new policies. But the Soviet threat itself is taking on new forms, specifically including the availability of massive sums for trade and aid to be expended as Soviet political aims dictate. Here at home the political and public climate for the aid program has been allowed to deteriorate just at the time when a more sophisticate understanding and a stronger long-term commitment is needed. Part of this is the result of years of fraudulent justifications of the program as a short-term, anti-communist, quick-results proposition. Part of it is the understandable effect of boredom with the old symbols, maladministration and waste, neo-isolationism, and the protectionism produced by the economic distress inside our own economy. I believe that most of us who have worked on this program feel that we have come to an important crossroads. In all likelihood, a fresh, positive aid program, scaled to the requirements, and presented with persist-ence and boldness, has a much better chance of Congressional approval and popular acclaim than another round of the old Mutual Security bill with the now standard figures on military assistance, “defense support”, “special assistance”, and all the rest. We are facing a period much like 1940, when Lend Lease would never have been thought politically possible by ordinary politicians, but when farsighted leadership and Presidential initiative achieved a breakthrough. This is also a time like 1947, when neither the Congress nor the country was supposed to be ready for the Marshall Plan, but when a similar energy and influence provided the national momentum we needed. The accompanying proposals have been drafted under the assumption that the top leadership in the new Administration throughout the White House, Cabinet, and sub-Cabinet levels, can and will be mobilized to undertake the important assignments in public education which will be an essential prerequisite to the program's enactment. In practical terms, this will require a major public effort in the months of April and May between the presentation of your aid message and the presentation of the detailed program on Capitol Hill. These considerations are uppermost in my mind at the moment, and I am sure that my colleagues share them. I think it is essential that they be appreciated and understood at the outset, for without them the program itself will be in trouble and indeed would not have been devised. Dean Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5-MSP/3-1061. No classification marking. A March 6 draft, attached to the source text, is identical to the text printed here, except for the first paragraph that makes no mention of the upcoming Monday meeting. In the margins of the March 6 draft are the following handwritten comments: “Hand carried to Pres. by Sec 3/6/61” and “Revised & sent 3/10 to W[hite] H[ouse]”. 1 Neither the report nor its accompanying proposals nor a record of the meeting on Monday, March 13, has been found. A March 8 memorandum from Battle to S/S-RO indicates that this White House meeting with the President would concern foreign aid. (Ibid., 800.0000/3-861) Participants at the 10:05-10:50 a.m. meeting on March 13 were the President, Secretary Rusk, Bowles, Ball, David Bell, McGeorge Bundy, Sorensen, and Rostow. (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Books) 96. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Secretary of Defense McNamara 96. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Secretary of Defense McNamara Source Washington, March 15, 1961. Dear Bob: At our meeting on February 25, a record of which is attached, 1 we agreed that a review of the basic premises underlying the Military Assistance Program should be initiated without delay while recognizing that the complexity of the problem would require a considerable period of time to assure an adequate product. I believe we should pursue this effort with a view to having at least initial recommendations for our joint consideration by May 1. I suggest that this matter can be most effectively approached by a joint State-Defense effort. I have asked Mr. Charles Burton Marshall to undertake this and he will be in touch with you in the very near future. Substantively, I would anticipate that our efforts should address themselves to an assessment of evolving political, economic and military concepts as they relate to a projection of how the MAP should be formulated as to best serve United States strategic interests, including our foreign policy objectives, in the future. As I indicated at our meeting I believe that there are a number of problems in the various geographic areas which require a fresh look, initially uninhibited by preconceptions as to the limitations placed upon us by our past policy posture. As you know, we already have underway a number of studies such as those being conducted by Mr. Acheson on NATO 2 and Mr. Berle on Latin America 3 which we should be able to draw upon. Similarly the Defense studies which you made reference to, such as those on Local War and Military Bases, 4 would undoubtedly make a major contribution to achieving an effective reassessment of the basic promises underlying the military assistance program. Those and other similar areas of investigation should proceed from the basic policy guidance outlined in my letter to you of February 4 5 since I view this reassessment of our military assistance program as an essential part of the total long-range study of U.S. military posture to which my letter was addressed. The full facilities of the Department will be mobilized to provide a prompt but thorough address to this matter, and I am sure that you share an equal interest in having the fullest and most effective Defense participation. With warm personal regards, Sincerely, Dean Rusk 6 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5-MSP/3-1561. Secret. Drafted by Weiss and retyped in B/FAC on March 14. 1 Not attached, but reference is to Document 93 . 2 See footnote 1, Document 92 . 3 Documentation on the Latin American task force, chaired by Adolf A. Berle, Jr., is scheduled for publication in volume XII . 4 Documentation on these two Defense studies is scheduled for publication in volume VII . 5 Not found. 6 Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original. 97. Memorandum of Conversation 97. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, March 17, 1961. Mr. Ball reviewed the aid presentation and indicated that he would ask Mr. Labouisse to take on the matter full time with Jack Bell as Deputy provided it was agreed that we would support Mr. Labouisse for the top job. Mr. Rusk agreed and asked Mr. Battle to clear with Mr. Bowles. (Mr. Battle saw Mr. Bowles who was enthusiastic about the appointment but felt that release of information should be delayed as long as possible to prevent any opposition or rival candidates from developing.) Mr. Ball reviewed the problem of burden sharing and indicated that he thought the Germans might agree to one per cent of gross national production. This seemed satisfactory to Mr. Rusk. Mr. Ball reviewed the need for top level members in the DAG organization and described the functions of the DAG which he described as a clearing house for country reports on the aid they are giving other countries. He indicated it would not be an operations coordination but an information clearing house. The requirements of the Tuthill job were discussed. 1 [Here follows discussion of the task force report on the Konkoure Dam and foreign assistance to Africa.] Mr. Ball informed the Secretary that the White House might announce that he would go to the OECD meeting in the statement on the signing of the treaty. 2 The Secretary thought that a signing ceremony with photographs at the White House and with appropriate Congressional representation might be desirable. Mr. Battle pointed out the urgency of getting the papers through so that we would be the first depositor of ratification. LDB * Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, Lot 65 D 330. Confidential. Drafted by Lucius D. Battle (S/S) on March 17. 1 Reference is presumably to John W. Tuthill, who became Representative to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) on March 6. On October 4, President Kennedy designated him Representative to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the successor to the OEEC. 2 By a vote of 72-18, the U.S. Senate consented to ratification of the OECD treaty on March 16. At the signing ceremony for ratification of the treaty at the White House on March 23, President Kennedy announced that Ball would represent the United States at the Development Assistance Group (DAG) meeting in London March 27-30. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961 , pp. 212-213. 98. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions 98. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions Source Washington, March 17, 1961, 10:12 p.m. 1415. Department calling in Economic Counselors Embassies DAG countries Monday March 20 for delivery following paper as US paper for new DAG agenda item. Make text available appropriate officials earliest opportunity, Monday at latest. Washington Embassies will be told you have text. Text memorandum following: Begin Verbatim Text The Fourth Meeting of the Development Assistance Group will be the first since the United States Senate approved U.S. membership in the OECD. 1 The Senate action symbolizes the American commitment to progressively closer cooperation in solving our common economic problems. In this spirit we have certain proposals to make for expanding joint efforts to assist the less-developed areas. A. The Problem and the Opportunity. 1. The poverty of large parts of the world is the central problem of the 1960's. We should jointly mobilize the capital and skills of the industrialized countries to help solve this problem. 2. Opportunities for progress in the economic development of the less-developed countries are greater than they were in past decades. The poor nations realize that their poverty is not preordained and immutable. They aspire to the fruits of development, and are determined to break the bonds of poverty. 3. Many countries are now able to use effectively more outside resources. The industrialized countries have the resources which in many cases are of vital importance. 4. We have a moral obligation to help these less-developed countries. As President Kennedy said: “To those people in the huts and villages of half the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery, we pledge our best efforts to help them help themselves, for whatever period is required—not because the Communists may be doing it, not because we seek their votes, but because it is right.” 2 5. Without substantial outside help there is small chance that most less-developed countries will achieve rapid economic growth in freedom. Only by the hope and reality of achieving an adequate level of growth will they be able to turn their energies toward constructive purposes. If they are frustrated in this—if progress proves a delusion—then their energies will be diverted to purposes which are not only self- destructive, but destructive of our whole Free Society. B. A New Approach to the Needs of the Less-Developed Countries. 1. The collective needs of the less-developed countries for development assistance are very large. By any reasonable calculation, however, these needs are small when measured against the wealth of the industrialized countries. The amount of such assistance which can be used effectively for economic development will vary from country to country, depending in part on its stage of development. 2. Both for the countries in the stage of preparation and for those already growing rapidly the problem of external assistance must be viewed as a long-term one. It can not be thought of, or dealt with, in terms solely of individual projects, or of annual programs. If external assist-ance is to be effective in accelerating economic development, it must be used to support and encourage the less-developed countries in undertaking long-term national or regional development programs. 3. Not only the quantity of resources, but the terms on which they are made available, are important. The terms must correspond to the economic situation of the individual recipient country. It is not enough to examine only the individual projects on which the money is spent and the extent to which they are self-liquidating. Rather, it is in relation to a country's total expected growth rate and its balance of payments that a judgment must be made as to its capacity to service additional external debt. In most less-developed countries today, the principal need is for grants or “soft” loans. Only when a country is well on the way to achieving cumulative growth should an increasing fraction of outside resources be made available on normal banking terms. There appears to be general agreement on these propositions, to judge from the papers on Terms and Conditions of Aid submitted by member governments, and the Secretariat's summary. 3 C. The Joint Program. 1. The prospective members of the OECD have accepted the principle of cooperation in contributing to the sound economic expansion of countries in the process of economic development.DAG is the appropriate vehicle for continuous consultation, for reaching together some consensus on principles and procedures, and for mounting an adequate effort. 2. What is required is an increased, long-term, joint effort to help meet the needs of the developing countries. For this purpose, we can perhaps set as a collective target a sum of one per cent of our aggregate income. 3. This is not proposed as a specific target for each member country. Rather it is proposed that the members of DAG seek to agree on equitable principles for sharing the common effort. D. Principles of Fair Sharing. 1. There is no simple formula. The benefits of an effective aid program are joint and indivisible. They accrue to each member from the scale and quality of the total program—not in proportion to the member's own contribution. 2. In deciding how to share the total program, we should look to the principles which have come to be accepted within our countries as fair and reasonable. These principles can be briefly stated. The contribution of each should be in relation to his capacity to pay. The rich should contribute a larger fraction of their income than those less well off. The contribution to economic aid must take full account of the contribution to the joint defense. 3. The balance of payments and state of reserves of an aid donor are particularly relevant to the form in which aid is given. 4. We should be able to endorse these general principles, and, on this basis, to agree on what it is reasonable for each member to do. E. The New United States Program. The President is about to send to the Congress a message requesting authority for a long-term economic assistance program. 4 This message will be made available before the DAG meeting convenes. F. Proposals. 1. All the more advanced countries accept the obligation to join in assisting the less-developed countries. The members of DAG have assumed a special responsibility in this effort. 2. The members of DAG would, at the Fourth Meeting, consider expanding their aid programs and agree on a mechanism for the coordination of aid efforts. The following principles would guide the joint efforts: a. A sustained and enlarged aid program, systematically financed; b. Government assistance on terms more favorable than normal banking terms, including grants, loans repayable in the currency of the borrower, and loans repayable in foreign exchange at low interest and with long maturities; c. Fair sharing of the joint aid effort, taking into account capacity to pay and contributions to the common defense. 3. Each member would seek to develop its own aid effort embodying the foregoing principles. 4. In order to facilitate consultation on the joint development of new programs, and in order to prepare for the transition to the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, all DAG members would: a. Agree to the selection of a permanent Chairman, who would be empowered to initiate and carry forward the work of the group; b. Assign to DAG senior officials, empowered to speak for their Governments. These officials should be prepared to meet on call of the Chairman between regular meetings of the DAG. 5. The Chairman would: a. Initiate and carry forward, with the assistance of the OEEC Secretariat, any studies required to carry out the purposes of DAG. b. Undertake such discussions with member governments as might be required to assist in the development of effective and adequate programs of economic assistance. 6. The DAG would provide: a. A forum in which member governments can systematically consult regarding their individual economic assistance efforts and through which cooperation can be effected. b. A central point for the collection and compilation of information regarding the assistance activities of all members. In this way the DAG should serve as a clearing house through which all members can be kept continually informed as to the economic assistance activities of other members in each underdeveloped country. This would require an expansion of the system of reporting on new aid commitments. c. A mechanism for improving the effectiveness of existing programs and for bringing about a greater total effort on the part of the member countries. End Verbatim Text . Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 398.00-LO/3-1761. Official Use Only. Drafted by James C. Lobenstine (E/OFD/ED); cleared (all in draft) by Myer Rashish and Bator (B), Edwin M. Martin (E), Foy D. Kohler (EUR), John C. Renner (EUR/RA), Isaiah Frank (E/OFD), Jacob J. Kaplan (B/FAC), Walter J. Stoessel, Jr. (S/S), and Griffin and Hooker (Treasury); and approved by Ball. Transmitted to Bonn, Brussels (pass BUSEC), The Hague, Lisbon, London, Ottawa, Paris (pass USRO), Rome, Bern, Dublin, Madrid, Stockholm, Tokyo, and Vienna. 1 See footnote 2, Document 97 . 2 The quotation is from President Kennedy's inaugural address of January 20, 1961. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961 , p.1. 3 Neither identified. 4 See Document 100 . 99. Editorial Note 99. Editorial Note On March 18, 1961, George W. Ball left for Europe to explain the administration's new foreign aid program and to participate in the meeting of the Development Assistance Group (DAG) in London March 27-29. Founded in early 1960, DAG was composed of the representatives of the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Federal Republic of Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, European Economic Community, and Japan. For text of the note delivered to the DAG member nations in preparation for Ball's visit, see Document 98 . From March 19 to 22, Ball had informal sessions in Bonn with German Finance Minister Franz Etzel, representatives of the German Foreign Office under the chairmanship of Hilger van Scherpenberg, Economic Minister Ludwig Erhard, and Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss. For texts of memoranda of Ball's two conversations with Van Scherpenberg on the morning and afternoon of March 20 and of the informal minutes issued by the two sides on March 22, see the Supplement. From March 23 to 26, Ball visited Paris. On March 23, he conferred with French Finance Minister Wilfrid S. Baumgartner, Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville, and other French officials, and he attended an OEEC Council meeting on March 25. After flying to London on March 26, Ball met with A.F.W. Plumptre, head of the Canadian DAG delegation. For reports of the morning DAG meeting on March 27 and the subsequent meeting restricted to the heads of delegation, see Documents 101 and 102 . Memoranda of Ball's conversations on this European trip and memoranda summarizing the DAG sessions, March 27-29, are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1817, 1819, and 1821. For texts of two resolutions adopted at this DAG meeting, March 29, and the communique, March 30, see Department of State Bulletin , April 17, 1961, pages 553-556. 100. Editorial Note 100. Editorial Note On March 22, 1961, President Kennedy sent a special message to the Congress on foreign assistance. While preparing for this foreign aid initiative, the President directed that no foreign aid bill should go to Capitol Hill without his “explicit approval.” (Memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to Ball; Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM No. 21) The President's March 22 message was the outgrowth of studies and memoranda on the subject by concerned principals and meetings with the President. See, for instance, Documents 94 and 95 . Moreover, in a March 13 memorandum to the President, Walt Rostow forwarded his ideas for the “crucial portion” of the President's upcoming foreign aid message, as did Bowles in his memorandum to Richard Goodwin, March 18; for texts of both, see the Supplement. Regarding the drafting of the President's special message, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., gives credit to Walt Rostow, David Bell, and the latter's deputy, Kenneth Hansen, who took the original text, drafted in terms of “an old-fashioned ‘let's beat communism through foreign aid' appeal,” and “managed to insert a little of the new philosophy into the text before it was delivered.” ( A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House , page 592) According to Rostow, Sorensen wrote a “low-key first draft of the aid message,” which “was geared to the rather gloomy prospects on the Hill. Kennedy evidently wished to aim somewhat higher. He had Sorensen send the draft to me for revision. And, when Kennedy approved the new directions suggested by me (and perhaps, by others), Sorensen, quite typically, carried forward in a more heroic direction with verve and elegance.” ( The Diffusion of Power: An Essay in Recent History , page 187) The President's message began with a discussion of three propositions: 1) the existing foreign aid programs were “largely unsatisfactory and unsuited for our needs and for the needs of the underdeveloped world as it enters the Sixties;” 2) the economic collapse of free but less- developed nations “would be disastrous to our national security, harmful to our comparative prosperity and offensive to our conscience;” and 3) the 1960s presented “an historical opportunity” for the United States and other free industrialized nations to initiate a major foreign assistance effort that could “move more than half the people of the less-developed nations into self-sustained economic growth, while the rest move substantially closer to the day when they, too, will no longer have to depend on outside assistance.” After elaborating at some length on these points, the President expounded on “a whole new set of basic concepts and principles,” which included integration in a single agency of the aid programs of the International Cooperation Administration, Development Loan Fund, Food-for-Peace, Export-Import Bank, and the Peace Corps; the need for country plans carefully tailored to meet the needs of each country; long-term financing and planning; special focus on development loans repayable in dollars; and special attention to those nations most willing to utilize their own resources, make necessary reforms, and engage in long-range planning. He also emphasized a multilateral approach designed to encourage and complement an enlarged foreign aid emphasis of other industrialized nations, and a separation of social and economic development from military assistance. President Kennedy concluded by asking Congress for a foreign aid budget of $4 billion, which the previous administration had requested, although he proposed reduction of the military assistance component from about $1.8 billion to $1.6 billion so that more could be spent on economic aid, especially development loans. Text of the message is in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961 , pages 203-212. 101. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 101. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State Source London, March 28, 1961, 11 a.m. 3897. From Ball. This reports on Monday 1 morning session DAG meeting. Meeting chaired by Selwyn Lloyd who made short welcoming speech and emphasized need to provide assistance to less developed countries collectively. He referred to US note on joint aid program 2 and asked Under Secretary Ball to speak first. US (Ball) stated that since last DAG meeting three events of importance have taken place in US: 1) national elections and installation of new administration, 2) ratification by US of OECD Convention, 3 and 3) transmittal by President Kennedy of message to Congress calling for increased effort assist less developed countries. 4 Ball explained evolution of US attitude toward OEEC/OECD. In contrast with period after World War II, today economic cause and effect is two-way street and major industrial powers live in world of great economic interdependence. Ball stated that we regarded broadening cooperation to embrace common responsibility of industrialized countries for assisting LDCs as the most important feature of transformation OEEC to OECD. This common task of aiding LDCs is more difficult and complex than problem encountered in connection Marshall Plan. LDCs not only have great need for capital but also for skills and administrative talents. This task requires not only contribution of our resources but also our ingenuity. Ball emphasized that present decade must be decade of development. No task confronting us is more important. If we succeed there is real chance that LDCs may be able direct their energies to constructive tasks. But if they become convinced that benefits of industrialization are not being attained there is a great chance that their energies will be turned to destructive ends. Even a substantially increased effort to assist LDCs will require only small portion of our total resources. Assistance in magnitude of one percent of our aggregate GNP is relatively small and we must think in terms of sustained effort of approximately this magnitude. In assessing contribution of each country to such a joint aid effort account must be taken of other contributions to the common welfare, with particular reference to defense expenditures. Also an assessment of proper share for each country should be based on capacity to pay, with richer countries making proportionately greater effort than those less well off. Balance of payments considerations are most relevant to form of aid. Countries with persistent payment surpluses should make aid to LDCs available on untied basis. Countries with payments deficits could extend aid on tied basis. Concerning quality of aid, Ball said it essential recognize that aid should be tailored to requirements of LDCs. There is substantial difference between usefulness to LDCs and burden on industrialized countries of short-term export credits and grants and long-term loans. He warned against putting too much emphasis on short-term loans. Industrialized countries must be careful not put LDCs in position of having become capital exporting countries because of necessity repaying short-time loans. Type of assistance that contributes most to economic development is that made available by official grants and long-term loans as part sustained governmental program. If LDCs are to make necessary sacrifices they need to be assured that economic assistance will be sustained over period longer than one year. Ball then made following procedural suggestions: 1. Expansion and improvement of reporting facilities with emphasis on current information concerning what each member is making available to each LDC. Expanded and improved information would provide sound basis for further coordination of aid efforts. 2. DAG and later DAC should have full-time chairman. 5 He should be assisted by Secretariat of OEEC/OECD. 3. Representatives to DAG should be senior officials in position speak for their governments. 4. On basis improved reporting and strengthened mechanism, we could then develop common enterprises and improve efficiency our national programs. Ball concluded by indicating that this proposal on joint aid effort reflected US determination to move forward with our partners in common endeavors in OECD. In view magnitude of task and shortness of time, he urged others to approach problem of assisting less developed countries in same spirit. UK (Barber) welcomed US statement and characterized it as inspiring, constructive and extremely important. Barber said that task was of immense proportions and great importance and that DAG members should strive to respond positively to US proposal. Barber said US proposal was complex and would require careful study. He made following preliminary remarks: he stated that DAG/DAC was proper place to discuss levels of aid and country contributions. Concerning question of taking into account defense expenditures, Barber said that this was relevant factor for UK with worldwide commitments. He was not, however, ready to agree at present that defense effort has general relevance in assessing aid contributions. Barber welcomed emphasis placed by US on type of assistance most likely to help LDCs. He considered that it would be useful to arrive at some agreement on what constitutes aid. Concerning US procedural suggestions Barber said UK was willing to consider what steps might be usefully taken to facilitate transformation of DAG and DAC so that DAC could take over going concern full of vitality and purpose when OECD comes into force. In conclusion Barber said that all must do as much as possible to help LDCs and respond to US proposal in that spirit. Germany (Westrick) welcomed President Kennedy's aid message and Ball's statement. He said DAG countries must not fail respond to US initiative. Germany welcomed basic points of US proposal. He thought it useful set goal for general aid effort and welcomed opportunity discuss principles pertaining capacity to pay—most important of which in German eyes was concept of progressivity. He cautioned against examining defense expenditures in DAG. Westrick welcomed idea of permanent chairman for DAG and considered it desirable expand exchange information as basis intensified coordination aid policies. He proposed that first permanent chairman be American. Italy (Aggradi) characterized US proposals as far-reaching and requiring careful study. He presented preliminary Italian reaction in very general terms as follows: He said it absolutely essential prevent increased disparity between standards of living in developed and less developed countries. Italy agreed in principle to joint program of aid to LDCs sustained for long period. Aggradi said that Italian experience in southern Italy demonstrates that long-term loans and grants are much more useful than short-term credits. France (Sadrin) expressed agreement with many features of US proposal. He stated his understanding that US does not intend formulate precise mathematical formula for burden sharing. Sadrin stated that all DAG countries should undertake aid effort of about one percent GNP and that we should take opportunity provided by OECD to harmonize aid efforts. He agreed to concept permanent chairman for DAG. Canada (Plumptre) welcomed inspiring initiative so ably presented by Ball. He pleased that US should have given question of aid to less developed countries such high priority and stressed need for common effort. He welcomed Ball's comments on quality as well as quantity of aid, indicating that unbridled extension of short-term loans could be harmful. He agreed aid should be increased and improved. However, he had some question as to whether it would be wise put forward as goal one percent of income. With this qualification Plumptre welcomed substance and spirit of US proposal and agreed to strengthening DAG by appointing permanent chairman. Japan (Shimoda) expressed appreciation to US for putting forward such extensive plan. He said that while unable make drastic increase Japan will do best and will cooperate with other countries. Concerning burden sharing, Shimoda considered it essential take fully into account per capita income. He also cautioned against referring in public to common defense because of probable reaction of LDCs. Netherlands (Van Houten) welcomed US initiative and stated that aid effort of all industrialized nations should be intensified. Concerning goal of one percent GNP, Van Houten expressed agreement with Canadian position. He agreed with US proposal for permanent chairman. Belgium (Daufresne de la Chevallerie) said that aid is problem common to all and that coordination of aid efforts is essential. He agreed that DAG, within framework OECD, should be forum for discussing aid coordination. Portugal (Pereira) said it premature to establish program of any given size. He thought that it important discuss coordination commercial policies with view to stabilize commodity markets. Barbour * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 398.00-LO/3-2861. Confidential. Repeated to the OEEC mission in Paris, Reykjavik, Oslo, Stockholm, Copenhagen, Luxembourg, Athens, Ankara, Madrid, Vienna, and Bern. A typewritten note on a draft copy indicates that the telegram was repeated to the DAG capitals. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1821) 1 March 27. 2 See Document 98 . 3 See footnote 2, Document 97 . 4 See Document 100 . 5 The Development Advisory Council (DAC) took over the functions of the DAG after the OECD treaty entered into force on September 30, 1961. 102. Airgram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 102. Airgram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State Source London, March 30, 1961, 1 p.m. G-1215. From Ball. Subsequent to Monday morning DAG session Heads of Delegation Meeting was held to consider further U.S. proposal. Minutes of Meeting, of which two copies circulated to each Delegation, are quoted below. "Sir Frank Lee said that he had suggested this restricted meeting because he thought that it would be helpful if Heads of Delegations considered together what should be aimed at as the outcome of the Fourth meeting of the Group in respect of the proposals made by the United States Government. There might be some limit to the extent to which it was practicable to take final decisions at this meeting, but it was important to convey the sense of urgency which Mr. Ball had emphasized and which all Delegations shared. "Mr. Ball said that he had had an opportunity since he made his statement at the first full session 1 of having some conversations with Heads of Delegations and their colleagues and had found that there were some areas where his proposals were perhaps not fully understood. "So far as burden sharing was concerned the United States aim was to secure recognition from the major industrial powers that they each had an obligation to contribute to the effort to raise the standard of the less-developed countries to the fullest extent, having regard to their own capacity and commitments. It was not the intention at this stage to seek agreement on a precise mathematical measure of what each country's effort should be. The suggestion that 1% of the aggregate national incomes of the industrialised countries should be devoted to less-developed countries was a broad indication of the overall target. It was not a new figure: something of the kind had been talked of for some time past. It might be possible later for the D.A.C. or the Development Assistance Committee of the O.E.C.D. to consider whether a more precise formula which was acceptable could be found, but he entirely agreed that there should be no question of dictation by the Group to member countries. He thought that an extended exchange of information about member countries' policies and programmes and the pooling of common experience might lead to more effective action and should be considered by the D.A.C., which should also address itself to the somewhat delicate question of its own relations with the less developed countries. "So far as the proposal that the D.A.G. should have a full-time Chairman was concerned he said that the description ‘full-time' was more important than the description ‘permanent'. It was clear that the Chairman would have to be an experienced man of first-rate qualities but a man who at the same time could work easily with member Governments and not impose his views on them. Mr. Ball hoped that this meeting of the Group would be able to agree in principle that there should be a full-time Chairman for the future. This would give considerable impetus to the work of the Group: and problems could be the more readily solved the earlier they were tackled. Delay would mean not only wasted time but that the task ahead might prove still more difficult. "M. Sadrin (France) said that the D.A.G. did not itself make a contribution to the less developed countries but one of its functions was as it were to carry a message to them. The effect of the United States proposals would be to give a clear impression that the D.A.G. in future would concentrate on practical measures rather than purely theoretical approaches to the problem of providing aid, and this impression would be reinforced by the appointment of a Chairman who would devote his full time to the work of the Group. Co-ordination could be even more important than an increase in the total amount of aid since it would help to ensure that aid was not wasted, and it was most desirable that the Chairman, who could bring about better coordination, should begin work without delay. "So far as the 1% formula was concerned, this would have the advantage of demonstrating the desire of the industrialised countries to continue to contribute to the poorer countries according to their means and capacity, but he thought that it was important that no specified amount of aid should be allocated to donor countries. In any case nothing was more difficult than to find a statistical formula which would suit a number of countries. The intangible pressures which a Group like the D.A.G. could put upon member countries could be more effective than agreement on mathematical burden sharing. "M. Marjolin (European Economic Commission) said that he agreed fully with Mr. Ball that the most urgent task was the creation of an effective D.A.G. with a competent and skilful Chairman and a good Secretariat. The essence of the problem was co-ordination and this in turn implied a need for more information. Among the first tasks of an improved D.A.G. would therefore be, as Mr. Ball had said, an extension of existing reporting procedures. This involved some difficult technical problems—for example the question of comparability of aid statistics—but he had no doubt that a meeting of experts from the countries concerned could find solutions quite quickly. The D.A.G. itself should proceed to a broad exchange of views on the experience of member countries. In particular they should be frank about aid which in the past had been wasted or not used to the best advantage. The provision of aid also raised certain social and political problems which might be considered in a more restricted session of the D.A.G. like the present meeting of Heads of Delegations. In theory it was possible to argue that while each country should control its own programmes there should be a broad ‘division of labour' among donor countries and programmes should be co-ordinated beforehand, but each donor country had areas of priority and had to make its own decisions about the direction of its own effort. He thought that the D.A.G., and later the Development Assistance Committee of the O.E.C.D., should be ready to help under-developed countries to draft their own aid programmes. The President of the United States had said that if aid was to be provided by the donor countries on a long term basis there should be long term planning on the part of the recipients also, but many of the less developed countries could not draft their programmes without outside help. He thought finally that it might be desirable for a Working Party to meet before the next session of the D.A.G. to consider how best the Group might be made a more efficient instrument. "Mr. Westrick (Germany) said that he agreed with Mr. Ball that the principle should be adopted that each country must do the maximum that it could having regard to its own circumstances, and must decide for itself what contribution it should make, though he sympathised with the view that it was useful to have some formula as a guide so long as a precise allocation was not imposed on donor countries. So far as the question of a full-time Chairman was concerned it would be useful to obtain a decision at this meeting on this matter, but this would have to be a decision in principle only since it was necessary to know in more detail the precise functions which the Chairman would have. It was important to proceed slowly and not to put too much power in the hands of the Chairman at the outset. It might be desirable to set up a small working party to consider what the functions of a full-time Chairman should be. It was certainly important not to lose time. Mr. Westrick added that in his view it was important to examine all programmes and projects for aid to under-developed countries so as to ensure that they were arranged in the interests of the less developed countries themselves and not in the interest of the exporters of the donor countries. Only on this disinterested basis could the Group hope to achieve its political aims. "Mr. Ferrari-Aggradi (Italy) said that he entirely agreed that there was a need for effective action, but the present meeting should seek agreement on the aims of the Group rather than on details. It was right that each country's effort should be made in accordance with its own capacity. His Government fully recognised the importance of the problem of aid to under-developed countries and thought that the next few years would be crucial. There were many difficulties in this field, both economic, psychological and practical. There was a lack of capital and a shortage of trained men, as well as the psychological difficulty that the less developed countries were often impatient to get ahead with development plans more quickly than was practicable. While it was important that donor countries should themselves act quickly and decisively, it was nevertheless true that long-term programmes needed time in their preparation as well as their fulfilment. The Group would be achieving something if it gave hope that the programmes would be carried out. So far as the question of a full-time Chairman was concerned he agreed that this was most desirable. He thought also that aid should be organized on a regional basis since the problems were not the same, for example, in Latin America and in Africa. The question of co-ordination and collaboration was most important, since among other things it would help to avoid mistrust and should lead to a more effective joint effort. "Sir Denis Rickett (United Kingdom) thought that it might be useful to consider briefly the past history of the Group. Its life had been relatively short and it had held three meetings. 2 These had concentrated first on the collection of information, and this had led to the preparation of the O.E.E.C. Basic Study; 3 secondly the Group had used the technique of confrontation under which the host Government on each occasion made a statement about its own aid policies and practices and was subject to questioning by other member governments. In addition the third meeting of the Group had concerned itself with the question of technical assistance. The Group already had some achievement to its credit: the question now was to determine how far its functions should be changed and developed. It should be remembered that at the first meeting it had been expressly decided and stated in the Press Communique that the ‘Group's efforts should not involve discussion of amounts of financing for particular regions, countries or projects'. It might be desirable to reconsider this, but it would be necessary to examine the position thoroughly before any change was made. The Group had also agreed that it would not embark on elaborate statistical calculations of burden sharing, though an equitable distribution of the burden of providing aid had always been one of the broad objectives of the Group. What might now be desirable would be to consider whether there were any objective tests which could be applied so as to ensure that member countries were taking a fair share. "So far as the question of a full-time Chairman was concerned, he thought that this was an eminently sensible idea and that the importance of the Group's work fully warranted the appointment of someone who could impart new drive and direction to it. In addition it might be desirable to arrange in future for fewer large formal sessions and more informal restricted meetings. The Working Party which had been meeting in Paris under Dr. Stedtfeld's Chairmanship had already achieved a great deal in a short space of time, and still more use might be made of such working parties. The next steps might be to get ahead with the appointment of a full-time Chairman and then for a small group to be called together to draw up plans for the future work of the D.A.G. "Mr. Plumptre (Canada) said that it was clear that the D.A.G. could be more useful in future if it concentrated on an improvement of both the quality and the quantity of aid programmes. He welcomed the proposal that there should be a full-time Chairman whose own character and ability, however, would be of supreme importance. So far as proposals for the expansion of arrangements for exchanging information were concerned, he thought that member countries ought to be sure that the information already available was being fully used before it was agreed to embark upon still further exercises. So far as the question of a formula was concerned, he attached much more importance to the influence of personality than to mathematical calculations, and thought that the right Chairman could help to solve the problem by giving sensible and effective guidance. The provision of aid was a heterogeneous matter: it depended very greatly on the political background in each donor country, and formulae which suited political conditions in one country would not suit another. It would in his view be necessary for the D.A.G. to move very cautiously in respect of any direct consultation with the under-developed countries. The United Nations and the other international institutions of which the less developed countries were members were far more suitable bodies for activity of this kind. He agreed that the Group should consider most carefully the question of changing the decision that it should not allocate aid to countries or projects. "Mr. Kristensen (Organisation for European Economic Co-operation) said that so far as reporting of aid transactions and the exchange of information was concerned the arrangements made within O.E.E.C. were already developing and improving. The Basic Study of the flow of funds from donor countries in the years 1956-59 would be kept up to date by a system of half yearly reporting and the Secretariat was now seeking also to provide figures, so far as possible, of the flow of funds into recipient countries. They were finding new staff and hoped to embark on new analysis and evaluation. So far as the question of the early appointment of a full-time Chairman was concerned he agreed that a man with all the qualities which had been mentioned could make the Group very effective, but there were difficulties about the proposal. In particular, the Preparatory Commission had recommended that the Development Assistance Committee of the new O.E.C.D. should appoint its own Chairman. 4 Even if it was agreed now in principle that the appointment of a full-time Chairman for the Group was desirable it was advisable to leave the actual election until after the O.E.C.D. came into being. There might be danger in the interim period in having two centres of gravity—the Chairman of the D.A.G. and the Secretariat of the O.E.E.C. There might also be intensified difficulties with less developed countries and members of O.E.E.C. who were not members of the D.A.G., as well as those who were considering whether to join, and this should be borne in mind. If the Working Party which it had been suggested might be set up to consider the new functions of the D.A.G. were agreed upon it might also consider these problems. "Mr. Shimoda (Japan) said that while he agreed that the idea of a full-time Chairman had advantages there were some disadvantages and he found it difficult to come to a conclusion without knowing more precisely what the powers and functions of the Chairman would be. Moreover, since Japan was not a member of the O.E.C.D. he would like to have time to consider the relationship of this Chairman and the O.E.C.D. He entirely agreed that the matter was urgent but nevertheless thought that there should be time for him to consult his Government before the Group took any decisions. "Dr. Pereira (Portugal) said that he thought that ideally the election of the Chairman should not be made until after the O.E.C.D. came into being. If it were decided to nominate a Chairman of the Group before that, much would depend on the powers to be given to the Chairman and the qualities of the man who was proposed to be elected and he could not give a final decision on behalf of his Government. He was attracted by Sir Denis Rickett's proposal that the D.A.G. should meet more frequently in smaller groups. "Dr. Van Houten (Netherlands) agreed about the desirability of a full time Chairman for the Group who would be able, among other things, to deal with the question of relations with the under-developed countries. The powers given to the Chairman, would, however, be a matter for consideration. He would have a very important co-ordinating task. He would have to see that aid to under-developed countries was provided more efficiently and to study the various proposals for burden-sharing according to a formula. But he would have to base himself on the assumption that the provision of aid to under-developed countries must remain in essence a national responsibility. All these questions ought to be considered in working out what should be the powers of a full-time Chairman. "M. Daufresne de la Chevallerie (Belgium) said that he had sympathy with the view that the appointment of a full-time Chairman before the inception of the O.E.C.D. could create two separate centres of gravity even though the Chairman of the D.A.G. sat in Paris, and that this must receive full consideration. "The following further points were made in discussion: (a) Mr. Ball emphasised that the United States proposal would be for the full-time Chairman to have his office in Paris. (b) The recommendation of the Preparatory Committee of O.E.C.D. was that the Development Assistance Committee should elect its own Chairman. (c) The sense of urgency which member countries were agreed was important might be dissipated if decisions on the Chairmanship were postponed until after the O.E.C.D. came into being—which might not be until September 1961. (d) In considering the functions of a Chairman of the D.A.G. reference must be made to the original Resolution of the Special Economic Committee in Paris on 12th January 1960. 5 "Sir Denis Rickett (who took the Chair after Sir Frank Lee had left the meeting) said that it was quite clear that the D.A.G. could not appoint the Chairman of the Development Assistance Committee of the O.E.C.D. On the other hand it would be possible for member countries of the D.A.G. to agree upon the election of a Chairman of the D.A.G., and to arrange subsequently that the same Chairman should be elected by the Development Assistance Committee. The discussion had illustrated some of the difficulties which the proposal that there should be a full-time Chairman of the D.A.G. presented, but it had also shown the broad lines on which a resolution for adoption by the Group at the Fourth Meeting might be drawn up.” Barbour * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 398.00-LO/3-3061. Official Use Only. Repeated to Reykjavik, Oslo, Stockholm, Copenhagen, Luxembourg, Athens, Ankara, Madrid, Vienna, Bern, the other DAG capitals, USRO in Paris, and USEC in Brussels. 1 See Document 101 . 2 The first three meetings of the DAG were in Washington March 9-11, 1960, Bonn July 5-7, 1960, and Washington October 3-5, 1960. Documentation on these meetings is in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960 , pp. 329-331, and Department of State Bulletin , October 24, 1960, pp. 645-646. 3 Reference presumably is to the Study Group of Four, which the Special Economic Committee created on January 13, 1960, and the OEEC approved the following day. The OEEC published the report of this study group, A Remodelled Economic Organisation, in April 1960. 4 On July 23, 1960, the OEEC created the preparatory committee to complete the draft convention on the OECD. For text of this committee's report, late November 1960, see The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development: Convention of 14th December 1960, Report of the Preparatory Committee, Related Documents , pp. 23-83. 5 Reference may be to the prepared draft on the establishment of the Development Assistance Group and its terms of reference, which the U.S. delegation circulated to the Special Economic Committee on January 12, 1960. See Department of State Bulletin , February 1, 1960, pp. 144-145. 103. Editorial Note 103. Editorial Note On March 30, 1961, President Kennedy appointed ICA Director Henry R. Labouisse as chairman of a task force to bring about the transition from existing foreign aid programs to the new approach outlined in the President's March 22 message. Labouisse was given “responsibility and authority to formulate programs and legislation appropriate to bring into effect my proposals, as well as to establish a new organization which will integrate the programs of ICA, DLF, the Peace Corps and the Food for Peace Program.” (Memorandum from President Kennedy to the Secretaries of State, the Treasury, and Defense, et al., March 30; Department of State, Central Files, 700.5-MSP/3-3061) At his press conference on April 12, President Kennedy formally announced the creation of this task force—what he called “an advisory group”—under Labouisse. He also indicated that Eugene Black, President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and “other distinguished members of the banking community” would be helping the administration on the problems of development assistance abroad, while Theodore Tannenwald, a New York lawyer, would assist in the drafting of the foreign aid legislation, and George Gant of the Ford Foundation would help with the organizational aspects. Finally, he announced the appointment of several experts to provide advice on putting the aid on a sound and economical basis, which the President called “the most important phase of the effort.” For text of the President's statement, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961 , page 258. Labouisse created three task force groups, or subcommittees, as follows: Legislation and Congressional Presentation, chaired by Tannenwald; Organization and Administration, headed by Gant; and Program Development, with Frank M. Coffin, Managing Director of the Development Loan Fund, as chairman. In addition, Professor Max Millikan, Director of the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute for Technology, and Henry Alexander, Chairman of the Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York, headed panels of private citizens and consultants. The task force met regularly during the spring of 1961. It solicited comments and suggestions from posts abroad in circular telegram 1644, April 21. (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5-MSP/4-2161) For text of a report entitled “Research and Development in the Development Assistance Program,” prepared by the Development Assistance Panel of the President's Science Advisory Committee, which was made available to Labouisse's task force, see the Supplement. Following NSC discussion of U.S. policy toward Cuba on May 5, NSC Record of Action No. 2422-l, approved by the President on May 22, directed implementation of several measures to strengthen the Alliance for Progress. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) Among these measures, the task force was directed to study Latin American needs and capacity to absorb capital in preparation for the administration's proposed request for a supplemental appropriation of $200-400 million for development loans for FY 1962. (Memorandum from Ball to Labouisse, May 9; Department of State Bulletin , June 12, 1961, page 918) The Labouisse task force report was published as a paperback pamphlet under the title An Act for International Development: A Summary Presentation, June 1961 (Department of State Publication 7205). 104. Memorandum of Conversation Between President Kennedy and Foreign Minister von Brentano 104. Memorandum of Conversation Between President Kennedy and Foreign Minister von Brentano Source Washington, April 13, 1961, 10:30 a.m. ADENAUER VISIT Washington April 12-13, 1961 SUBJECT Aid to Underdeveloped Countries PARTICIPANTS (See attached list) 1 In opening the discussion on aid to underdeveloped countries, the President stated that useful discussions had taken place with Foreign Minister von Brentano in February, 2 and that more recently Mr. Ball had held equally useful talks in Bonn on this subject. 3 The President added that it is in the common interest of all of us to provide for a stable economy for the underdeveloped countries, so that they will see some hope in solving their problem through a non-communist system. He cited one example of German aid efforts for which the US is particularly grateful—what they are doing in Bolivia. The President stated that this is most helpful. The US has been carrying a very heavy aid burden for the past few years, and the needs are growing rather than diminishing. Therefore the US will appreciate anything the Federal Republic can do to help. The President added that the US feels that the Atlantic Community is the key and the anchor to free world security. If the world to the south becomes unstable and insecure, then the Atlantic Community will be insecure. Therefore all these aid efforts should be coordinated. The US aid program is now to be more efficiently coordinated. There should be continuing consultation between countries so that each country knows what is being done by other countries in the aid field. Foreign aid should be a multi-national and not a national effort. The President noted that there are presently four areas offering possibilities for cooperative efforts: Bolivia —Bolivia is a most critical problem, both politically and economically. This would be the worst time for the Castro regime to get a foothold in another Latin American country; this would add momentum to the Communist movement at a time when the momentum is going down. Turkey —Here is a NATO ally which has vigorously opposed the Soviet Union and which is maintaining a large military program, assisted by substantial US grant aid. Turkey has a critical economic problem, resulting in considerable measure from its military effort. India and Pakistan —Both countries have broad long-range economic development plans which call for continuing and large-scale external assistance. The President then called on Under Secretary Ball to comment on aid to underdeveloped countries. Mr. Ball noted that steps are being taken within the forum of the DAG and OECD to expand and improve the areas of cooperation for providing assistance to underdeveloped countries. As to India, Mr. Ball noted that meeting with the consortium of nations responsible for financing the third 5-year plan would be taking place in the next two to three days to discuss the next economic plan for India. He hoped that the Federal Republic could commit substantial amounts toward the fulfillment of that plan, extending over the next two to three years. Both Pakistan and India require financing for longer than a one-year period. Pakistan also is being examined by a consortium of nations meeting soon. The US is entering into a sizable burden of commitments, and it is hoped that Germany can do likewise. Both countries need long-term loans at low interest rates. Turkey too has a balance of payments problem. It has taken on tremendous military burdens under its NATO commitments. The US has given $90 million in grant aid over the past three years. We hope that the Federal Republic can help now by providing long-term loans as well as grant assistance, so as to not add further to Turkey's short-term capital debt problem. On COMIBOL, Mr. Ball noted that we have a representative in Bonn for discussions on Bolivia, and that the Federal Republic has been very helpful in cooperating with us. We hope that in view of the political situation, the Federal Republic will continue to provide assistance to Bolivia, jointly with the United States program. Foreign Minister von Brentano said that there was a question whether in the case of Bolivia, the problem was simply one of reviving COMIBOL. Preliminary reports on the German side indicated that a much broader program of economic reconstruction would be required, costing a minimum of $150 million. Turning to Turkey, the Foreign Minister reported that bilateral talks will begin tomorrow in Bonn on the 1961 financial needs of that country. The Federal Republic plans to make DM 100 million available for Turkey in 1961/62 and will also consider extending long-term 3% loans for economic infrastructure purposes. Minister Etzel recently visited India and tentatively pledged DM 400 million in assistance for first year of India's third 5-year plan. The Federal Republic will participate in the consortium for the India and Pakistan programs along with the World Bank. As to Pakistan, the Federal Republic is prepared to make available DM 75 million annually for 1961/62 and also through the coordinated efforts of the consortium discuss possibilities for further financial assist-ance. The Foreign Minister then reverted to Turkey and stressed the Chancellor's special interest in that country, which he regarded as a particular responsibility of the Federal Republic to assist. A total of DM 1.5 billion has been made available up to the present time, and the Federal Republic is prepared to undertake whatever may be necessary in further meas-ures. The Foreign Minister summed up by stating that the Germans are prepared to do their share with the US on foreign aid through the DAG and OECD, and within this framework to determine what program should be undertaken bilaterally and multilaterally. Mr. Ball stated that he was grateful for von Brentano's statement. It shows there is general agreement on the problem of foreign aid. He then commented briefly that the US is prepared to extend substantial assist-ance to India and Pakistan and hopes that in the consortium talks the Federal Republic will contribute in proportionately substantial measure. Mr. Ball stressed the need for long-term assistance to Turkey rather than short-term or even medium-term loans, in view of their balance of payments situation. In conclusion, the US would be pleased to discuss Bolivia with the German Government representatives when they come to Washington in May for that purpose. The President expressed his gratification that progress is being made in aid planning. The problem will continue for years to come. The US is now trying to provide aid on a longer term basis. This is a difficult political problem domestically, just as it must be for the Chancellor. * Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149, January-April 1961. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the source text. Approved in B on April 24, in S on April 25, and at the White House on May 11. The meeting was held at the White House. 1 Not printed. The list included Chancellor Adenauer, but he apparently did not take part in this part of the conversation. For a memorandum of Adenauer's conversation with President Kennedy on the balance-of-payments problem on April 13, see Document 44 . 2 See footnote 1, Document 91 . 3 See Document 99 . 105. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs (Coombs) to the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) 105. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs (Coombs) to the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) Source Washington, May 5, 1961. SUBJECT The “New Look” in Foreign Assistance In the next few days, before the Foreign Aid Pattern gets frozen, I hope you will sit down with Labouisse, Coffin, Ball and Bell and make sure that the foreign aid program is really going to have a “new look”, with a heavily increased emphasis on people and their development, not two or three years from now but in FY 1962. There is real danger that two years from now people will ask, “What is new about Kennedy's foreign aid program?” Much attention has been devoted to important technical changes—such as longer budget periods—but the cards are stacked against a major shift in the pattern of programming. (1) Many old timers either do not understand or do not believe in the “new emphasis” on human resource developments. (2) The staff, in Washington and the field, is loaded with narrow specialists whose projects would hereafter receive less emphasis. They will naturally resist a shift. (3) The argument is made that so much old stuff is in the pipeline that at least one year, maybe two, of “turn-around time” is needed. There is some truth to this, but we need to be very tough in cutting off old stuff in order to start on new. (4) The loan program will in all probability go into physical stuff which can be photographed and mortgaged and earn an interest rate. Actually, investment in education will yield a higher economic return in the long run but it's not a banker's idea of an “investment.” (5) There is a prevalent notion that education can be emphasized at little cost by supporting a few pilot demonstrations here and there. On this premise, people say they are all for an emphasis on education but then end up providing meagre money for it. Actually educational development will require a great deal of money and we kid ourselves if we think otherwise. For weeks now I have been pushing hard at every opportunity for a genuine emphasis on education and human resource development. Harry Labouisse and Harry Coffin are fully sympathetic, I am sure. But somehow, when the charts get drawn and the budget figures get laid out, education tends to get obscured and lost in the shuffle. I am afraid that everyone has been so busy with the technical details that insufficient attention has been given to the political dimensions, both domestic and international, on which the success of the program will ultimately rest. (1) It is imperative that the Kennedy foreign assistance program look different and be different, right from the outset. It must not be the same old program with new labels. (2) Both the American people and foreigners will respond to a strong and clear emphasis on people and on education. This should be the hallmark of the new Kennedy program. The philosophy should be clear and simple: a society's main wealth is in its human resources; the development of people must precede the development of industry (this is the history of U.S. development); the development of new, viable, free societies is much broader and more complex than simply economic development; the United States values people more than material things, we place our confidence in the liberation of human energy and aspirations through the education of peoples' minds. Incidentally, I saw Adlai in New York on Friday 1 and he feels strongly along the same line. I hope that you and Dean and the President will all ask one key question about the plans for the new foreign assistance program: How new will it actually look and be—as seen by the public—in the coming year, and how much increased emphasis will there really be on human resource development? One final point: It is very important that our accent on education be very visible, even in the organizational structure of the program. If education is buried away in the regional bureaus and there is no provision for a top flight person with a good staff to worry about educational development in the program generally, it will be impossible to attract good enough people into the program to provide strong leadership on the education front, and we will lose an important political advantage at home and abroad. * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 811.0000/5-561. Personal and Confidential. The source text is initialed “PHC per LL,” presumably Lillian Lovitz (CU). A typewritten note at the end of the source text reads: “Dictated but not signed by Mr. Coombs.” 1 April 28. 106. Letter From Secretary of Agriculture Freeman to the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) 106. Letter From Secretary of Agriculture Freeman to the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) Source Washington, May 12, 1961. Dear Chet : Pursuant to our conversation of yesterday morning at the Cabinet meeting, 1 the enclosed are forwarded for your perusal as you review the whole matter of the new economic aid agency this weekend. 2 I believe they are self-explanatory. Two points really are made. First, that food and agriculture are fundamental to any economic aid program for any developing country. This includes the food, as such, as an element of nutrition and capital investment, and also the matter of technical agricultural development and assistance. Second, the whole matter of how an aid agency should operate is vital we think, and the report of the Labouisse Committee, in my judgment, is very seriously lacking in a number of respects. 3 I believe it very important that responsibility be centralized but that operations be specifically delegated to operating agencies. On the surface, these may seem like conflicting principles, but in practice they need not be, and if a program is properly administered it can combine the centralization of responsibility necessary to resolve operating conflicts in the field with the effective operation that will flow from getting the best personnel, together with the resources of the operating department, behind a specific program which has been delegated to that operating department. A third phase of all of this, of course, is the paramilitary and developing extra government organizations, to wit: cooperatives, trade unions, etc. Here I think we again find our greatest opportunity in agriculture and through cooperatives, and it's an area in which I have special interest, having spent a bit of time in some of these nations during World War II. All in all, I'm deeply concerned about this and I desperately hope that no final decision is made until it has been carefully reviewed for a mistake with the resulting conflicting jurisdictions, and competition between agencies I think will be very serious. Our resources are limited and we ought to use them to the best advantage and move in close coordination and harmony in the same direction. Anyway, do look this over, and I hope you will give me a ring sometime early next week. Sincerely yours, Orville * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 65 A 481, Agriculture, FY 1962. No classification marking. 1 No record of this conversation has been found. 2 The enclosures are not attached nor further identified, but Bowles in his reply ( Document 110 ) identified one as a May 5 memorandum from Freeman to the President. For text, see the Supplement. 3 Regarding the Labouisse report, see Document 103 . 107. Memorandum From the Director of the International Cooperation Administration (Labouisse) to President Kennedy 107. Memorandum From the Director of the International Cooperation Administration (Labouisse) to President Kennedy Source Washington, May 12, 1961. SUBJECT The Food for Peace Program The Foreign Aid message calls for the creation of a single Aid Agency equipped with a flexible set of tools including the Food for Peace Program. 1 In order to carry out these basic concepts, the Task Force recommends that an Office of Food for Peace be established in the new Agency with primary responsibility for the over-all Food for Peace Program. 2 This office would, among other things, formulate and negotiate sales agreements with other nations for agricultural commodities under Titles I and IV of PL 480. This would be done after consultation with the appropriate elements of the State Department and other interested agencies. The availability and composition of specific commodities for these sales and their possible effect on usual dollar marketings would continue to be determined by the Department of Agriculture. The necessary authority for putting this function in the Aid Agency is provided for in the omnibus farm bill now before Congress which will amend PL 480 so as to transfer from the Secretary of Agriculture to the President the authority to determine which nations are eligible for Title I and Title IV Sales Agreements. USDA objects to placing these functions in the new Aid Agency on the grounds that it would subordinate the USDA sales program to the Aid Agency. 3 It argues that the Congress is more likely to support a reasonably high level for these programs if the present arrangements remain essentially undisturbed. This would leave the initiative for the formulation of sales agreements in the USDA and the power of final decision in the present interagency committee. The Task Force recommends against the USDA proposals because they are inconsistent with the decisions already made by you as set forth in the Foreign Aid message and because they would seriously undermine the country programming concepts fundamental to the new approach set forth in the message. We also believe that the integration of the PL 480 program into the assistance effort will enhance, rather than hinder, the utilization of agricultural commodities overseas. The decision-making process will be streamlined under the Task Force recommendation and the Director of the Office of Food for Peace will have the opportunity and responsibility for developing new techniques for increasing the use of these products in our assistance programs. The above arrangements recommended by the Task Force would assure protection of the interests of both agencies and any dispute between USDA and the Aid Agency which could not be reconciled by them would require Presidential decision. Henry R. Labouisse 4 * Source: Washington National Records Center,RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 65 A 481, Agriculture, FY 1962. No classification marking. 1 Reference is presumably to the President's March 22 message on foreign assistance; see Document 100 . 2 Attached to the source text but not printed is a task force paper titled “Working Group III, Organization and Administration, Document No. 1,” dated May 8. 3 The specific arguments advanced by the Department of Agriculture have not been found. 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 108. Editorial Note 108. Editorial Note In late March 1961, Charles Burton Marshall began his study of the military assistance program. Marshall had served as a staff assistant to the House Foreign Affairs Committee 1947-1950 and as a member of the Department of State's Policy Planning Staff 1950-1953. Marshall's appointment to write this study derived from agreement among the new leadership of the Department of Defense and Department of State that the complex economic and political issues might require a different approach to military aid. At an interagency meeting on February 25, Secretaries McNamara and Rusk discussed the prospect of a study of these issues; see Document 93 . In a March 15 letter to McNamara, Secretary Rusk outlined the parameters for the Marshall study; see Document 96 . In a March 29 letter to Secretary Rusk, Deputy Defense Secretary Gilpatric endorsed Secretary Rusk's recommendations for this study which Marshall had already begun. (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5-MSP/3-2961) Other documentation on the preparation of this study is ibid. Marshall completed the study on May 17. For its recommendations, see Document 109 . For interagency discussion of its conclusions at a meeting on May 26, see Document 112 . 109. Report Prepared by Charles Burton Marshall 109. Report Prepared by Charles Burton Marshall Source Washington, May 17, 1961. MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR THE 1960'S [Here follow Parts I-V (pp. 1-45 of the source text). The parts are entitled: I, Military Assistance in Relation to National Aims; II, Military Assistance in Areas Subject Primarily to Threat of Internal Aggression; III, Military Assistance in Areas Under Internal and External Threat; IV, Military Assistance in the NATO Area; and V, Perspectives on Military Assistance.] VI. Recommendations 100. The exigent questions about military assistance are best understood in relation to the whole situation now confronting the United States. However, necessary, empirical examination of needs in particular areas gives little clue to the answers. The range of opportunity for useful accomplishments is great and varied. The United States might resolve its will at any one of a number of levels of endeavor. Yet it cannot truly discover its will by poring over figures. It should do so by taking counsel of its aims and the measures of the danger it is in. 101. To put it moderately, that danger is high. The resolution of the United States has increasingly come into question. Adversary forces appear to have the initiative in many sectors. The exigency of the situation has been almost without exception among those consulted during the preparatory stages of this report. No amount of assurances exchanged among themselves, no amount of repetition to others of the firmness of our resolution, can suffice to redress the danger. The essential is to use opportunity—and to create opportunity—to demonstrate resolution by concrete commitments and actions. 102. Military assistance is a channel of action appropriate for that purpose. It is then to be used at the nation's initiative, without requiring concurrence of others. A demonstration now of the intention of the United States not just to hold a line but to push on to required achievements in joint security will serve the United States well. It can stir imagination and heart among those allied with the United States, reassure those under the pressure of uncertainty, and elicit complementary actions. 103. The important thing now is to use military assistance to begin far-reaching programs of force improvement stretching over a reasonably calculable future—say, six years. Such programs are relevant to needs consonant with the purposes of the United States in each of the areas considered in this report. 104. It would overtax the prophetic abilities on call to attempt to project the requirements called for over such a span. The various estimates scanned are too widely variant to permit exactitude. The principal variables in mind in stating this reservation are the following: a. The level of modernization requiring to be undertaken in NATO. b. The level of requirements for nuclear weapons in NATO and the related transferability to conventional capabilities of funds now allocated for nuclear capabilities in NATO. c. The extent of complementarity likely to be found necessary as plans to this purpose develop in respect to meshing indigenous forces with United States forces in countries subject to external threat as well as internal threat. d. The extent of military civic action programs likely to be found feasible in the above countries and those singly subject to internal threat. 105. In view of this report, a sum in the magnitude of three quarters of a billion to one billion dollars in addition to the authorization already requested is in order in fiscal year 1962. 106. On a conservative basis, subsequent annual requirements signally less than those recommended herein for authorization and appropriation for fiscal year 1962 scarcely seem likely. A reasonable premise is that about half of the cumulative increments over the period would go to the stimulus of force improvements for NATO. 107. Finally, military assistance should be carried on in consonance with the views developed in the body of this report. * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5-MSP/5-2361. Secret. Attached to the source text is a May 23 memorandum from Marshall to Secretary Rusk, which indicated that the report was completed on May 17 and recommended that it be discussed “in a meeting similar to the one of February 25 which gave rise to it.” 110. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) to Secretary of Agriculture Freeman 110. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) to Secretary of Agriculture Freeman Source Washington, May 19, 1961. Dear Orville : After your comments to me at Cabinet last week, I gave some further thought to the points you touched upon with respect to the new aid agency and how it should operate, and specifically in reference to food and agriculture programs abroad. I appreciate your giving me your views in greater detail in your letter of May 12, 1 and the enclosed copy of your memorandum to the President of May 5. 2 Obviously, all of the questions concerning the new aid agency have not yet been resolved, but an enormous amount of thinking has gone into the plans as they now appear to be shaping up, and I know that the proposals of Mr. Labouisse's Task Force are the product of the best judgments of some very competent people on the basis of past experience of the ICA and other aid agencies, their analysis of the current situation worldwide, and their assumptions as to the President's own desires as set forth in his Message. Of the three major points made in your letter, I should like to comment first on the one relating to operation of the aid agency. You have suggested that responsibility for aid programs abroad be centralized in the aid agency, but that operations be delegated to those agencies of the Federal Government having the specific expertise and greatest facilities for the particular functional area involved. It seems to me that what we are really confronted with here is a kind of a perennial dilemma which confronts organization planners, i.e., whether a job can best be done by a comprehensively organized, central organization, or whether it can best be done by a relatively small central group, farming out the operating end to specialized agencies for implementation. As you know, the fragmentation of our aid efforts has been the cause of one of the program's greatest difficulties in the past, and the President's proposal to establish a single aid agency “in place of several competing and confusing aid units” was aimed specifically at overcoming this difficulty. I feel that the President, in calling for a single aid agency, did not contemplate simply a coordinating entity which would develop plans, coordinate and negotiate with other agencies for operation of the program, and then make final recommendations to the President. Since the aid agency must defend the program before the Congress, it would seem essential that it also must take responsibility for the over-all direction and operation of the program in each country. This does not mean, however, that specialized departments of the U.S. Government—Agriculture, HEW, Labor, Federal Aviation Agency, etc.—do not have an important and vital role to play. I am told that the major existing aid agency—ICA—makes extensive use of the expertise of the other departments, both in the process of developing programs and their implementation. For example, it is “buying” about $2,000,000 worth of services from the Department of Agriculture, including plant and seed testing, distribution, etc., salinity and soil fertility testing and advisory services, insect control, technical consultation and support activities, preparation of technical guidelines, special publications, and the like. Again, ICA is using the Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Yards and Docks to supervise construction projects overseas, particularly road construction projects; is using the Federal Aviation Agency to supervise the installation of navigation equipment in key airports around the world; and it has a “contract” with the National Institute of Health to carry out certain research and development activities in connection with the health components of country programs, particularly with respect to malaria eradication. I am told this list could be extended almost indefinitely. I am sure that the new administration will continue and indeed expand the use of such specialized services. Moreover, it seems to me there might well be additional ways in which such Departments as Agriculture and the new aid agency might work together in a common U.S. interest. For example, consideration might be given to a substantially greater exchange of agricultural technicians between the Department of Agriculture and the new agency, with personnel of one from time to time being detailed to the other. Perhaps also a more efficient arrangement could be made so that the new agency might rely upon the Department to provide it—on a reimbursable basis, if necessary—prompt access to top-notch departmental experts for short-time consultancy. No doubt further conversations between the Department and the new aid agency would uncover still other areas where closer cooperation would be highly effective. As to the other points in your letter—the importance of food and agriculture in economic aid programs abroad, and the use of cooperatives—I am in complete agreement. The meeting of the food requirements of a country is to my mind a matter of first priority. Whether this is accomplished through emergency food programs utilizing our surpluses, or through augmentation of the country's own food production resources, or both, the role of food and agriculture is indeed a primary one. I think it must, nevertheless, be fitted in as a component of the total country program. I believe cooperatives offer a particularly useful potential for providing the first and primary needs of farmers in the developing countries and I know that Mr. Labouisse shares this point of view. He has, in fact, just recently notified the farm organizations that the ICA would welcome their assistance in helping to find competent technical advisers and in the creation and development of cooperatives in some of the countries in which we operate. I think it would be very useful for you to solicit the views of the members of your advisory committee as to ways in which cooperatives of the U.S. can assist in the work we are attempting to do in the newly developing countries. Thank you again for giving me your thoughts on this important matter. We are all anxious that the aid program be established on a sound footing that will assure the most effective operation of our programs abroad. I should be happy to discuss this whole matter with you further if you wish. Sincerely yours, Chet 3 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 811.00/5-1961. No classification marking. Drafted by Alice May (ICA/EXSEC) on May 17 and redrafted in ICA/D on May 18 and cleared by Labouisse. Attached to another copy is a May 19 memorandum from Labouisse to Bowles, urging Bowles to sign the letter the same day if possible. He argued, “In view of his [Freeman's] memorandum to the President of May 5 and the likelihood that the President may make some decision on this matter within the next few days, I feel it is most important to have the Department's views on record as soon as possible.” (Washington National Records Center, RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 65 A 481, Agriculture, FY 1962) 1 Document 106 . 2 See the Supplement. 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Bowles signed the original. 111. Letter From Secretary of Agriculture Freeman to the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) 111. Letter From Secretary of Agriculture Freeman to the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) Source Washington, May 25, 1961. Dear Chet : Thank you for taking the time to read my memorandum 1 and to think about my views in connection with foreign aid administration and to write me your long and detailed letter of May 19. 2 You have had a great deal more experience with this than I, but I must say that I am fearful that a mistake may very well be made in connection with the nature of the new aid agency. Since receiving your letter I have carefully canvassed a number of the people here in our Department; there are literally hundreds of them who have served in various capacities overseas, many of whom have been involved from the very early days of the aid programs and have operated under different kinds of organizational setup. Without exception, they feel strongly that at the present time and place—and particularly in the under-developed Nations—it is crucial that we do the best job possible, obtain the best people, and have a continuity of operation which can best be accomplished through the medium of our operating departments. It would appear from some of the discussions that we may end up somewhere in between in connection with this with a good deal of delegation in fact, if not in theory. For my part, I have expressed this viewpoint as strongly as I could and I hope it will be recalled; in any event, we in Agriculture are anxious to do a job. I hope as the new agency is launched that you will be able to give it some of your personal attention, Chet, for it will be very important how initial relationships work out. We in Agriculture expect to have in a few weeks an evaluation of some of the key nations in terms of both the use of food and technical assistance in agriculture and also what we think ought to be done. We are anxious to move ahead and prepared to give of our resources in making development programs work in crucial areas around the world. As always, I expect those who are willing to work and have some resources to work with will have a chance to use them and I am assuming that will be the case here. In any event, thanks for your letter. I hope we have time to visit some day soon. Sincerely yours, Orville Chet—We just want to do a job & not from left field where this Dept. has been for 8 years—Tell us what to do & we will go! 3 * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 65 A 481, Agriculture, FY 1962. No classification marking. 1 Presumably reference is to Freeman's May 5 memorandum to the President. See the Supplement. 2 Document 110 . 3 The postscript is handwritten. For additional correspondence on the question of the responsibilities of the Department of Agriculture in the foreign assistance program, see Freeman's May 25 letter to Secretary Rusk, Secretary Rusk's August 3 letter to Freeman, Freeman's June 30 letter to Bowles, and a September 20 memorandum from Joseph S. Toner, ICA Executive Secretary, to John O. Bell (B/FAC), all in the Supplement. 112. Memorandum of Conversation 112. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, May 26, 1961. SUBJECT Meeting on Marshall Study of Military Assistance Program PARTICIPANTS [Here follows a list including Secretary Rusk, Dean Acheson, Charles Marshall, Roswell Gilpatric, and officials from the White House, ICA, Department of the Treasury, and CIA.] 1. Secretary Rusk opened the meeting by expressing appreciation for the excellent study of the Military Assistance Program conducted by Mr. Marshall. He noted that it dealt with one of the most complex of problem areas. Mr. Rusk stated that it was to be expected that military assistance would be vigorously attacked by the Congress, with members of the Foreign Relations Committee having given notice to this effect. There would undoubtedly be criticism concerning: too great an emphasis in the past on the military effort without proportionate success, of our military aid supporting regimes which cannot survive because of lack of popular support; of its effect in projecting a militaristic image of the United States, etc. Despite the foregoing, the Secretary noted that dealing with the Sino-Soviet threat around the globe presented very serious problems which at least in part could perhaps only be met through use of the military aid technique. With this introduction, he asked Mr. Marshall for a brief synopsis of the major points covered by his study. 2. Mr. Marshall alluded to the fact that his last previous association with the military assistance program was in 1949 when he assisted in the writing of the Congressional Report on the first military assistance program. He thus undertook the current study without prejudice to the past and without compulsion either to endorse or to reject previous policies and programs. Mr. Marshall stated the point of departure for the study represented the enduring aim of U.S. policy, specifically the need for preserving an environment compatible with a continuing vitality of the political propositions summed up in the preamble of the Constitution. He noted that U.S. policy aims vary from one stage to another, were by no means fully subject to our dictate and only in part subject to our influence. 3. He then turned to our present circumstances which set the frame of reference for the study. He referred to the fading away of the imperial colonial order which formerly served as the basis of order between peoples of highly different cultures and levels of development living great distances from each other. This together with the heightening awareness of disparities in economic and political equality between states and among various portions of the populations within states, the growth and power of the world communist movement, and the effect of invention and weapons systems having such a redundancy of power as to place them out of all balance with rational political ends, all contributed to the problems with which US foreign policy and military assist-ance as a tool of that policy were required to deal. The general lines of the objective should be to attempt to proceed with a new order reflecting collaboration among juridically free and equal states. This would require a development of communities of outlooks and interests. But it would also require the countering of the military threat and the preventing of communist pre-emptions, whether they be military or political. He noted that it was important to understand that our aims were not logically distinguishable as between the long and short term since all of the undertakings required of us begin now and all carry into the far future. The point is that the objectives of countering the military threat and preventing pre-emptions must be realized if we are to have a chance at developing the new order and developing a community of outlook. 4. Mr. Marshall then turned to a discussion of the Communist threat with its total claim on the future and on legitimacy related to its version of a law of history which dictated the inevitable triumph of its point of view. To pursue its aims the Communists had many assets stemming from its inter-continental deterrent force through its large conventional war making capabilities, to its far-flung underground organ-ization and, indeed, even in its internal organization which permitted a short response time in decision making, a monopoly of information channels and the possession of the revolutionary mantle. For the calculable future the threat would continue. A key point in his study was the recognition that the threat of communism may be expected to continue, restrained only by considerations of prudence relating to countervailing factors. The prolongation of the cold war, however undesirable in itself, is preferable to the alternatives of unleashed violence on the one hand or capitulation on the other. 5. As described by Mr. Marshall the threat ranged from internal security through external aggression and over this spectrum there existed a wide range of varying scope and intensity of effort. The requirement for U.S. policy, therefore, was to provide a matching continuity of response, a matching wholeness. Mr. Marshall noted that there did not exist a hierarchy among the options available to us but rather a set of concurrent and linked necessities. There were the needs of internal security in its various forms, beginning with economic development and proceeding through para-military and military forces, to counter guerrilla actions. Similarly with regard to the external threat, there was involved both country military forces and US support, for coping with and deterring limited hostilities, through the series of collective security preparations for local wars, finally into requirements related to US strategic forces. In his statement, Mr. Marshall pointed out that he attempted to classify countries into three major categories: (1) the single threat countries, (2) the double threat countries and (3) the asset countries, i.e., largely NATO. In considering the situations which affected these various countries, Mr. Marshall found it necessary to put aside the distinction between military and political as not representing a meaningful division. All military assistance programs contain elements of both and to be properly understood must be considered as totalities. 6. As to the single-threat countries, these being along the Asian littoral, Africa and Latin America, these were typified by internal political malaise and by being removed in terms of logistic proximity from the Sino-Soviet heartland. Here the root problem was that of a peoples being thrust into modernity without habits and institutions for coping with it. This situation was aggravated by such factors as cultural dislocation, population growth, the power of modern communications, etc. In such situations there was the danger on the one hand of the development of oppressive regimes or of forces gaining an ascendancy having aspirations beyond capacity for fulfillment. In either case, the eventual absorption by the Communists was a clear threat. Military assistance along with diplomatic activities, cultural and information programs and assistance in economic development could provide a useful means for dealing with this problem. Military assistance represented one of the ways of reaching significant elements of these societies. Moreover, without the stability provided by military force, economic and political development was not possible. Mr. Marshall found that there existed a concern on the part of many that the development of military forces in these countries would be economically counter-productive. He also noted an opposite tendency on the part of some to believe that the production of military forces was the absolute and sole consideration. In fact, Mr. Marshall found that the relationship was much as a fence to a cornfield where an increase in the acreage planted did not suggest a decreased necessity for fencing or alternatively that it would be a sign of wisdom to put all efforts into the fence and none into the cornfield. The relationship should be mutually supporting. In fact, Mr. Marshall pointed out that the relationship of defense expenditures to economic productivity could be either retarding, neutral or, in some instances, positive depending upon how they influence the growth of capital, labor, skill and technology. In sum, in the single threat countries there was an essential role for military assistance to play: it provided a linkage between military proficiency and other factors, making for success in economic and political development. 7. In such countries, Mr. Marshall pointed out there was a high importance to be placed on military assistance in complementing civil responsibilities, i.e. so-called civil action programs. He pointed out that the military assistance program represented the largest exchange of persons activity which we conducted, that it had a direct relation to individuals and groups in sensitive positions within the societies concerned and that the military could and did play an important role in developing and imparting special skills to the society. He pointed to the importance of keeping the role of the military activities and civic action activities in correct perspective. Military activity must be considered as auxiliary but not as a substitute for the civilian components of government. Moreover, it was important that the essentially military character of military forces be recognized. They should be military forces with a civic action capability and not vice versa. He noted in passing that there would probably be certain resistances on the part of the countries to translating their military forces into civic action and police units, particularly as this impinged on the symbolic importance of military forces as a sign of sovereignty. Nevertheless, this was an important objective to be sought with the military forces entering into activities of recognizable utility to the society such as transport, communication, health, sanitation, etc. In doing so, it should be understood that the military forces and thus military assistance was getting very close to the heart of the relationship between regimes and peoples. The requirement therefore was for the closest of coordination both in the field and in Washington between the political, economic and the military aspects of US government programs and policies. 8. In conclusion, on the singly threatened countries, the question is not whether we believe that these countries should have armed forces or even whether we agree that these countries shall have military assist-ance. The question is how to best meet the Communist competition in providing such assistance. We have no choice since as in poker coming out second best is to lose the entire stakes. 9. Mr. Marshall then turned to the doubly threatened countries, noting that the internal threat posed a situation similar to that described in the singly threatened countries. But in addition, these other countries, in the vulnerable arc from Southeast Asia through the Middle East, by virtue of being adjacent to the Sino-Soviet heartland, were, as indicated by Mr. Khrushchev's own pronouncement, the targets of “legitimate wars”. To such countries, the problem of meeting internal security requirements becomes all the more difficult because of the press of the external threat. None of the countries involved can count on an independent future without US support and each of them recognize this to be the case. The question is how to effect such support which can be effective and persuasive only if manifestly enforceable. In his study, Mr. Marshall discussed the idea of guaranties to such nations which would give them protection of forces from external aggression. Quite aside from the political questions which this involved, he questioned the persuasiveness and effectiveness of such guaranties unless they could be manifestly enforceable. For this condition to prevail indigenous forces were required unless we wished to resort to nuclear weapons which in themselves presented such serious problems as to make their use in such situations of highly questionable utility. Indigenous forces were required for a variety of reasons: To provide perimeter defense; for holding key areas essential to providing points of ingress for US forces; for complementing US forces after deployment; and for fighting a guerrilla action if overrun. Thus Mr. Marshall pointed out that in meshing the local forces with those of the US lies the heart of the joint defense in countries of the vulnerable arc. It was essential that this be reflected not solely in conceptual terms but as a specific reality in US planning. 10. Mr. Marshall then turned to the NATO area. Here he briefly reviewed the essential premises of the Acheson report which he stated he accepted as a point of departure for his military assistance study. He noted that this area represented the base for a relationship with all the areas of the world; without it the US would be at bay in its continental position. 11. With the withering of the nuclear deterrent, there was a necessity for forming a strategy better adapted to the new situation and specifically having greater emphasis on conventional capabilities. To accomplish this new strategy would require a consensus of the NATO allies. The cost of the undertaking was not yet defined in detail; however, initial studies indicated an order of magnitude of some additional $20 billion over a five year period. While from a theoretical point of view this was within the economic capabilities of the Europeans themselves, the difficulty was that we cannot deal with situations as if they represented pure economic theory. In fact they turn on a complex of considerations going to the question of public will, strength of governing authority, comprehension and acceptance of new strategy, etc. Mr. Marshall pointed out that an attempt to establish an equitable and feasible formula for burden sharing was a fruitless endeavor. Clearly, both we and the Europeans could do more. One way of looking at the problem was to weigh the alternatives foreclosed by accepting a bigger burden, in other words, who was hurt more by making an additional sacrifice. Here the Europeans might well believe that moving back from cars to bicycles, or bicycles to walking was more of a sacrifice than the Americans would be called upon to make if we contributed more of our resources to the common defense effort. It was necessary to recognize that the US was cast in the role as leader and as exemplar. It would be necessary therefore to combine persuasion with inducement. In order to demonstrate the importance with which the US views the necessity for an adequate NATO defense, we would have to share in the increased burden of the defense effort. Mr. Marshall described other methods of inducing an increased NATO effort such as US willingness to provide the nuclear support for NATO, the modernization and filling out of US forces; or even an increase in US forces in Europe. While all were significant, none singly nor combined provided a sufficiently rapid, sufficiently dramatic and irretractable contribution to serve the purpose. Mr. Marshall indicated that he would not favor simple unencumbered grants of increased military aid but would tie such assistance to conditions which resulted in specific increases in European defense budgets. This might be left to negotiation through our Ambassador to NATO. 12. Mr. Marshall concluded his presentation by indicating that his study had suggested that there would be a total requirement, above and beyond the approximate $1.6 level previously requested by the Administration for the maintenance of existing military forces, which would approach three-quarters to a billion dollars annually if the totality of the US national security objectives as presently identified were to be successfully accomplished. This was a need which he foresaw extending for an indefinite period into the future. 13. The meeting was then opened to discussion. Mr. Gilpatric stated his general agreement with Mr. Marshall's report though noting certain reservations. With regard to the value of a US guaranty, Mr. Gilpatric stated if it were to be collateralized on certain specifics such as the provision of airlift as was contemplated in SEATO, we should be able to exercise a greater degree of control. Secondly, he questioned whether, in connection with NATO, we could not induce an increased effort given the fact that this Administration had withdrawn the previous threat of force reductions left by the Eisenhower Administration, had agreed to provide a nuclear submarine commitment and was undertaking a buildup of conventional capabilities of U.S. forces. Mr. Acheson interjected that he agreed with the Marshall study that such inducements as those cited by Mr. Gilpatric simply would not be sufficient. There was no question that the Europeans had the requisite economic capability, this was unchallenged. But it was also unchallenged that the military requirement for more adequate forces, particularly with a conventional capability, existed and had existed for some time. Yet this requirement had not been met. We believe the Europeans have a capability for doing more but similarly they believe we could do more. The fact of the matter is, Mr. Acheson pointed out, the requirement will not be met until and unless the US accepts the role of the leader and shows the way. Unless we are prepared to undertake such an action which will mean a greater amount of military assistance for NATO, we shall be left with nice sounding policy statements but without the military forces which are absolutely essential to our own security. 14. Mr. Rusk commented on the inherent “witchcraft” in nuclear weapons where the temptation was to gamble that the threat to employ them will deter war. We have been telling our NATO allies for the last eight years that this was our policy. Now we want them to shift to a more effective conventional buildup and it is difficult to get them to do so. He then turned to Iran, pointing out the difficulty which would ensue in attempting to hold this area against the Soviets. [ 4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] Mr. Marshall referred to his report stating that he felt Iran to be something of a special case where perhaps lesser numbers and lighter equipped forces might be possible. However, he noted that his study simply was much too abbreviated to permit the careful investigation that this situation would require. Mr. Nitze challenged the view that Iran was essentially different from other of the doubly threatened areas. In the first place, he pointed out that it was important to attempt to deter the Russians, and in this connection the existence of Iranian forces obviously played a role. The alternative was to have small forces which would clearly increase the pressures on Iran to accommodate to the Soviets. [ 4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] As to the internal problem raised of the existence of large forces in Iran, this essentially was a political problem which would have to be solved as best we could but which did not invalidate the other arguments for Iranian forces. 15. Mr. Rusk commented that there was a danger in our commitments not being credible because of our own failure to believe in them ourselves. In this connection, he commented on the recent Laos history noting how little weight had been given to the fact that we had provided a commitment to Laos which we never really honored. Granting that Laos was a bad place in which to put US troops, Mr. Rusk noted that this was a matter which we knew before we made the commitment. Thus he noted that it was a bad idea to take on a commitment on which we have no intention of following through. If, however, in such places as Vietnam and Thailand we really were prepared to take our commitment seriously and combine our forces with theirs then the resulting situation was a quite different one. Mr. Gilpatric raised a question as to whether the act of prepositioning US forces didn't gain credibility for a guaranty. Mr. Rusk agreed that it did and cited an example of Korea. Mr. Rusk asked Mr. Acheson whether prepositioning of US forces in Iran would not make clear, as was clear with Europe, that we intended to engage the Soviets in the event that an invasion was attempted. Mr. Acheson stated that he thought there was a vast difference between the Iranian and the European situation, primarily because Europe was vital to the U.S., and Iran, however important, was not. Mr. Rusk, however, pointed out that a chain reaction could be expected—if we lost Iran. Mr. Nitze supported Mr. Rusk noting that while Berlin might very well be the key to the North, Iran could be the key to the Middle East and the South. Mr. Hilsman noted that there was considerable significance attached to manner in which an area such as Berlin or Iran was lost. If it is lost through a Munich-type negotiation, the entire alliance structure could be undermined. If, however, it is lost through military action, through being “kicked out”, the result is more likely to be a solidification of resistance to the aggression. Mr. Nitze pointed out that there was a danger of a gradual, step-by-step takeover which moves slowly from neutralism to Communist absorption with each succeeding action being so gradual as not, in and of itself, to warrant counter-military action on the part of the United States. 16. Mr. Rusk questioned as to whether it would not be possible to consider the establishment of priorities in the programming of military assistance which took into account the relative importance of various areas to the United States. We might, for example, cite as a first priority areas needed for the support of the US strategic retaliatory capability; secondly, NATO which would be on an almost equal plane; thirdly, the Pacific basin; fourthly, the doubly threatened areas; and lastly, the single-threatened areas. Mr. Nitze stated that the biggest threat which we had to face was the political one and that this was true now and had always been the case. As a result, one might with some justification reverse the order of priorities cited by Mr. Rusk. Mr. Dulles said that he wished to comment on the fact that most of the underdeveloped countries could not afford an army, police force and an internal security/FBI type of force. He noted that considerable time had been given in the past to considering this problem, referring to the 1290d studies, 1 but that he felt that additional consideration was required. Mr. Rusk noted that a different situation existed in each country even though we had a tendency to try to generalize about them. In returning to the question of priorities, Mr. Marshall questioned whether this was a feasible way to approach the problem. For example, were the requirements for countries in priority one to be completely filled before any attention was to be given to countries in lesser priorities? The problem really was that, if over an extended period we applied an inadequate level of resources, it would be impossible to carry out the policies which were currently stated to be in the vital national interest. 17. In turning to the disposition of the report, Mr. Gilpatric suggested that a more specific series of recommendations be developed by a smaller group. Mr. Rusk noted that there were a few questions which were perhaps not completely treated in the report, such as defining how far we go in competing with the Russians. Mr. Bundy returned to the question of priorities, noting that in many of the areas which created great problems of a political nature there was really not much money involved. The real money was required for Korea, Turkey, Formosa, and perhaps Vietnam and Thailand. These together with NATO were where the big dollar signs are. He noted that the Department of Defense planners had developed a draft proposal consistent with the Marshall Report which indicated a resource requirement distribution. He suggested that a working group be established (a) to identify the necessary policy decisions which were required and (b) to show the financial implications of such decision, this job to be completed in the immediate future. Mr. Nitze indicated that the line organizations of the Department of State and Defense should be ready to review the Marshall paper and proceed with its implementation which might well include requirements for NSC approval. Mr. Fowler raised the question of balance of payments considerations. Mr. Bundy pointed out that this was only slightly applicable to military assistance programs since the items procured for the program were procured in the US. Mr. Fowler asked about the problem as it related to prepositioning of US forces. Here it was agreed that this could have an important balance of payments impact and that this was a matter which should be identified in any subsequent proposals involving pre-positioning. Mr. Rusk returned to the subject of moving the report to a more definitive stage indicating that he thought a paper should be submitted to the NSC. He stated that the Marshall study should be covered by an appropriate transmittal indicating that general agreement had been reached on the study by the Departments of State and Defense. This might then be followed up by a more specific agency development of programming guidance as required for the development of subsequent military assistance programs. Mr. Wilson indicated the need for an NSC official sanction of the general policy guidance in order to permit the line organizations to proceed with the detailed programming operation. * Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Top Secret. Drafted by Weiss on May 31. Not submitted to the Secretary for approval but cleared by S/S on June 2. 1 Reference is to NSC Action No. 1290-d, approved December 21, 1954, in which the National Security Council: “Requested the Operations Coordinating Board to present to the Council a report on the status and adequacy of the current program to develop constabulary forces to maintain internal security and to destroy the effectiveness of the Communist apparatus in free world countries vulnerable to Communist subversion.” See Foreign Relations , 1952-1954, vol. II, Part 1, p. 844 . At its meeting on April 11, 1957, the National Security Council discussed a progress report of the Operations Coordinating Board on the “Overseas Internal Security Program,” formerly called the “1290-d program.” See ibid., 1955-1957, vol. XIX, pp. 475 - 477 . 113. Editorial Note 113. Editorial Note The fifth meeting of the Development Assistance Group (DAG) met in Tokyo July 11-13, 1961. U.S. memoranda, all dated June 24, which elaborated the administration's positions on several specific issues, were distributed to the participants in advance of the meeting. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1922) Extensive documentation on the Tokyo meeting is in Department of State, Central File 398.00-TO. James W. Riddleberger, head of the U.S. Delegation, presided over the DAG sessions, which discussed incentives to private capital investment in developing nations and the important role of public investment. The member nations created a working group to prepare recommendations for implementation of the common aid effort, including the issue of equitable sharing of foreign assistance. They also decided to coordinate the common aid effort more closely with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and agreed in principle to set up an OECD Development Center. In an address before the Canadian Parliament in Ottawa on May 17, President Kennedy had suggested such a center “where citizens and officials, and students and professional men of the Atlantic area and the less-developed world can meet to study in common the problems of economic development.” For text of the President's address, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961 , pages 382-387. For text of the DAG communique, July 13, see Department of State Bulletin , August 14, 1961, pages 302-304. 114. Memorandum for the Files 114. Memorandum for the Files Source Washington, August 26, 1961. I had a talk today with Secretary Rusk. I covered the following points: 1. I said that I had become increasingly concerned over the tend-ency to extend our foreign aid commitments without adequate attention to the criteria of the President's new program, the availability of funds, and the undertaking the Administration witnesses had made in the course of the Congressional presentations. 1 I referred to the circular telegram, No. 1066, which had expressly pointed out that it should not be assumed that U.S. aid would be given to every country, 2 and I mentioned the newspaper report about an alleged statement by Assistant Secretary Williams of possible aid to Malagasy. 3 I referred also to the attitude of some of our Ambassadors who seem to feel that we should give aid to the countries to which they are accredited, largely on the ground that we are giving it to other countries. I said that my principal concern, however, had to do with the emergency aid provision of the Punta del Este Charter (Chapter 3). 4 I pointed out that this was an open offer to all the Latin American countries to come in within 60 days for dollar aid; that it was very unlikely that such aid could be provided for out of development lending; that the uncommitted portion of our development grant fund was earmarked mostly for Africa; and that, consequently, the emergency aid for Latin America would have to come from the contingency fund which was already very seriously depleted. The Secretary indicated agreement with my concern. I said that I had spoken to Mr. Woodward 5 about this matter yesterday, emphasizing the importance of advising our Latin American missions not to encourage requests for emergency aid and, on the contrary, to discourage it. 2. I suggested to the Secretary that it was most important for him to caution all Department officers about making aid commitments and requested that he instruct that no commitments be made without my approval. I also suggested that he advise the President of the seriousness of controlling our aid commitments. The Secretary indicated that he would take appropriate action along the above lines. 3. I then discussed with the Secretary the matter of the Djakarta Bypass (see accompanying memorandum of today's date). 6 HL * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 65 A 481, Labouisse. Confidential. Drafted by Labouisse. 1 Regarding the congressional hearings on foreign assistance, see Document 116 . 2 CG-1066 to all posts, June 23. (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5-MSP/6-2361) 3 Not further identified. G. Mennen Williams was Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. 4 The Charter of Punta del Este established the Alliance for Progress. For text of this Charter, signed by all members of the Organization of American States, except Cuba, in Montevideo, Uruguay, on August 17, 1961, see Department of State Bulletin , September 11, 1961, pp. 463-469. 5 Robert F. Woodward, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. 6 Not found. 115. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Kennedy 115. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Kennedy Source Washington, September 18, 1961. SUBJECT Foreign Aid Strategy, Next Six Months It is agreed that the first essential in foreign aid is a good boss; and it is agreed that his first job is to strip down the old staff and build a new one of first quality. But given the fact that we have only about six months to create a new look in foreign aid—and to justify the battle for long-term aid—I believe it is also necessary to have a clear substantive strategy; and to move with maximum speed to give it life. I believe the correct strategy consists of giving the highest priority and momentum to two enterprises. First, bringing as many nations as authentically qualify under long term aid arrangements of the kind we now have with India. These are possible candidates: Pakistan, Nigeria, Tanganyika, Iran, Egypt, Formosa, Tunisia, Brazil, and two or three other Latin American nations. These nations now have reasonably respectable national plans, or could develop them in short order (e.g., Brazil). With a maximum effort, we could go into Congress next year with almost two-thirds of the population of the underdeveloped areas of the Free World under the new arrangement. The turn-around would then have substance in Congress, quite aside from its wholesome impact on our relations with the other underdeveloped nations. But, second, in order to do this, we must develop consortium arrangements, in which others contribute as well as ourselves; notably, the Germans and the Canadians, who could do more. We must be able to demonstrate to Congress by next Spring not only that the turn-around is more than rhetoric but that, roughly speaking, our development aid is being matched by the rest of the Free World. Technically both objectives are achievable; but the strategy must be understood from the top to the bottom of the government; Gene Black must cooperate to the hilt, as father of the consortia; Riddleberger must push DAG as hard as it can be done; you and the Secretary of State, as well as Ball and the aid boss, must work over the Germans, Canadians, etc., unremittingly. * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda, Rostow, 2/61-6/62. No classification marking. Copies were sent to McGeorge Bundy, Ralph Dungan, and Theodore Sorensen. 116. Editorial Note 116. Editorial Note On May 25, 1961, President Kennedy delivered a special message to a joint session of the Congress on urgent national programs. Among the major measures discussed in his message was the importance of military and economic assistance, and he indicated he would shortly submit draft legislation to implement the administration's foreign aid program. On the following day, May 26, he sent identical letters to President of the Senate Lyndon B. Johnson and Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn describing the major features of the attached draft legislation on foreign aid. For text of his remarks to the joint session, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961 , pages 396-406. For text of his letter, see ibid., pages 407-411. The draft bill became S. 1983, which Senator J. William Fulbright introduced for the administration on May 31. Text of this bill is in International Development and Security: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-seventh Congress, First Session , Part 1, pages 1-25. Hearings on the bill in the Senate and House of Representatives took place from May 31 to July 6. For texts of these hearings, see ibid., Parts 1-2, and The International Development and Security Act: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Eighty-seventh Congress, First Session , Parts 1-3. Testimony by Henry Labouisse, Adlai Stevenson, Secretary Rusk, and several other administration officials on behalf of the bill in closed session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as well as minutes of the Committee's meetings extending to July 24 are in Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series), Eighty-seventh Congress, First Session, 1961 , volume XIII, pages 3-18, 81-233, 277-378, 380, and 395-401. Considerable documentation on the Kennedy administration's strategy in supporting the foreign aid legislation in Congress is in Department of State, Central Files 700.5-MSP and 811.0000. Two letters from Under Secretary of State Bowles to President Kennedy, May 22 and 23, in which Bowles offered much advice and encouragement on the promotion of the foreign assistance program, are in the Supplement. Administration officials also expounded on the foreign assistance program in public forums. For texts of the remarks of President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk, for example, in addresses to the Eighth National Conference on International Economic and Social Development in Washington on June 15 and 16, see Department of State Bulletin , July 3, 1961, pages 3-10. After the House and Senate passed separate foreign assistance authorization bills, a conference committee resolved differences in the two bills on August 30, and the House and Senate passed the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as it was called, on August 31. On September 4, President Kennedy signed the bill into law. (P.L. 87-195; 75 Stat. 424) For text of President Kennedy's signing statement, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961 , page 588. In his signing statement, the President said, “I am hopeful that the Congress will provide the funds necessary to fulfill the commitments it undertook in enacting this legislation.” The congressional appropriations committees cut foreign assistance, however, and the resulting Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1962, approved on September 30, 1961 (P.L. 87-329; 75 Stat. 717), appropriated only $3,914,600,000 for foreign aid for fiscal year 1962, including $1,600,000,000 in military aid, $1,112,500,000 in development loans, and $296,500,000 in development grants. The total amount was $860,900,000 less than the $4,775,500,000 revised total that the administration had requested and $338,900,000 less than that authorized in the Foreign Assistance Act, 1961. ( Congressional Quarterly Almanac , volume XVII (1961), pages 310-311) A summary and analysis of the congressional legislation on foreign aid, including amendments to P.L. 480, is in Current Economic Developments , Issue No. 634, October 10, 1961, pages 1-8. For text, see the Supplement. 117. Editorial Note 117. Editorial Note On October 3, 1961, Fowler Hamilton was sworn in as Administrator of the new Agency for International Development (AID). The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 specified that a new agency would replace the International Cooperation Administration and the Development Loan Fund within 60 days after enactment of the law. Executive Order 10973, November 3, 1961, specified the terms for the establishment of the Agency for International Development. The Department of State Delegation of Authority No. 104, November 3, 1961, conferred specific responsibilities on the Agency for International Development. Both the Executive Order and the Delegation of Authority were deemed to have been in effect since September 30. For text of the President's remarks at the swearing-in ceremony, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961 , pages 633-634. For an extract from Executive Order 10973, see Department of State Bulletin , November 27, 1961, pages 900-902. For text of Department of State Delegation of Authority No. 104, see 26 Federal Register , 10608. President Kennedy's September 20 letter of appreciation to ICA Director Henry R. Labouisse for his services, and Labouisse's October 6 farewell message to the ICA staff are both in the Washington National Records Center, RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 65 A 481, Labouisse. The President appointed Labouisse as Ambassador to Greece on December 15. A memorandum from Ball and Hamilton to John O. Bell, October 14, designated Bell as chairman of a task force, with two additional representatives from the Department of State and two from AID, “to review the functional assignments and responsibilities of the Department and AID and to recommend plans for achieving the most effective and efficient division of labor between the two and the elimination of unnecessary functions.” Bell's group was to present its report as soon as possible, with an interim report in any case no later than October 21. (Department of State, Central Files, 110.4-AID/10-1461) This report has not been found. 118. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Kennedy 118. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Kennedy Source Washington, October 4, 1961. SUBJECT Neutralism and Foreign Aid This is a short version of a longer memorandum I circulated for criticism within the White House staff. 1 I believe it represents something of a consensus. 1. It appears urgent both with respect to the workings of the government and to the world outside that we clarify the approach we shall take in foreign aid with respect to neutrals and neutralism. The issue may, in any case, arise at your next press conference. Or you might wish to find some other occasion to issue a statement; for example, as clarifying guidance to the Director of AID and other responsible government officials. 2. The policy issue is this: To what extent shall we permit our aid policy to be governed by long-term considerations governing the American interest in the underdeveloped areas; and to what extent should we try to use aid policy to achieve short-range verbal or voting shifts in alignment on world issues? To put the matter sharply, should we let our aid policy be governed by our interest in the continued independence of these nations; in their absorbing their energies on domestic problems; and in building a long-term dependence of these nations on the West; or should we permit our aid policy to be sensitively governed by the positions taken on particular international issues by neutrals? 3. In my view our general rule should be that we use our aid program to achieve the three major strategic objectives to which aid might contribute: viable independence; an increased concentration on domestic affairs; and a long-term dependence on the West. We should, however, be prepared to make exceptions; but these exceptions must be very carefully weighed, case-by-case, against their cost to the longer strategy. In making exceptions, moreover, we should measure not only the cost but the realistic possibility of achieving a significant change in a nation's policy by the granting or withholding of aid on a short-run basis. We should also consider the technical and legal difficulties in turning aid on and off; e.g., the Volta project. 4. In short, I believe it possible for us to use aid for serious long-run American objectives with respect to neutrals and, also, occasionally and sparingly to yield a minor tactical gain. But it is crucial that we do not permit our short-term tactics to disrupt the long-term strategy; and this is notably the case because, as the accompanying appendix indicates, 2 there is reason to believe that the degree of long-term dependence on American or Communist aid may be one significant factor in determining how neutrals align themselves on the major world issues. 5. A possible statement of policy guidance might read something like this: "The fundamental objective of American aid is to assist the less developed nations maintain and strengthen the foundations of their independence and to improve the welfare of their peoples. As a general rule, American aid shall be allocated on the basis of evidence that the governments and peoples concerned are making serious and sustained efforts to mobilize their own resources and to create and to implement well balanced long-term development programs. The United States government expects other independent governments to pursue their interests as they see them; and it does not expect them to agree with American views on all occasions. But when the views and actions of a government systematically run counter to vital American interests—and suggest a basic change in orientation away from a truly independent stance—this fact will be taken into account in our aid policy, on a case-by-case basis.” 6. You may find the attached Appendix of mild interest and amusement; but it is not to be taken too seriously. * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda, Rostow, 2/61-6/62. Confidential. 1 The longer memorandum, as described in a covering memorandum from Carl Kaysen to J. Robert Schaetzel (U), October 5, was 6 pages in length. (Department of State, Central Files, 811.0000/10-561) The memorandum is not in the file and has not been found. 2 Entitled “U.S. and Soviet Aid and the Belgrade Conference”; not attached and not found. 119. Letter From the Deputy Director of the Office of Food for Peace (Symington) to the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hamilton) 119. Letter From the Deputy Director of the Office of Food for Peace (Symington) to the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hamilton) Source Washington, October 4, 1961. Dear Fowler : Your secretary will bear me out that I made some manful attempts to return your call last week. Right now I am off to the Latin American Regional Operations Conferences which will give me a brief opportunity to regale Ambassadors and USOM Chiefs on the obvious advantages of food assistance versus, say, purely good old dwindling dollars. I will be returning around October 19, and hope to have a chance to see you shortly thereafter. I understand you had an interesting luncheon yesterday with George McGovern, Secretary Freeman and others. There are market development aspects to certain Title III operations which perhaps serve as one basis for Agriculture's interest in taking them over. Indeed, one of the most effective school lunch programs I have seen is the one being conducted in Lima by the Great Plains Wheat people. However, I don't think it would be feasible for Agriculture to take over such an important aspect of Foreign Aid, driving an illogical wedge into what would otherwise be AID's jurisdiction. Due to the dual nature of food assistance—that is its economic effect and political importance both at home and abroad—there is an understandable interest on the part of Agriculture which must constantly be recognized, if not always satisfied. That is one of the reasons, I think, why the President created the Food For Peace office, namely to help resolve the divergent approaches of ICA, State, and Agriculture toward PL-480 operations. 1 Last spring when legislation was being prepared to create the new AID Agency, there was considerable pressure to remove the Food For Peace office from the White House and merge it into your Commodities Division. This would certainly have compromised our effectiveness as a go-between, and we hope we can still serve that function. On the other hand, our effectiveness in “narrowing the gap between abundance at home and near starvation abroad” depends on the emphasis AID is willing to place on food assistance as an adjunct to economic development. We have gained the impression that State and ICA people both in Washington and in the field prefer to deal with dollars than with food. This is due to a combination of factors including the suspicion they have shared with foreign critics that Food For Peace is a “dumping operation”, plus the relative simplicity of handling dollars versus food. But we hope that increasing attention will be given to food aid because, properly administered, it does “reach people”, and help to create an inflation-resistant stability that dollars do not always create. I am enclosing a copy of the talking paper which will be the point of departure for my presentation to the conferees—and which shows what's on our minds these days. 2 Sincerely, Jim * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 65 A 481, Food for Peace, FY 1962. No classification marking. 1 P.L. 480 was formally entitled the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act, enacted on July 10, 1954. For text, see 68 Stat. 454. 2 Not enclosed and not found. 120. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) to the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hamilton) 120. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) to the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hamilton) Source Washington, October 7, 1961. SUBJECT Criteria for Aid Following our discussion the other day, I thought it might be useful to put down briefly my views on aid criteria. I do this hesitantly knowing what a difficult problem this is and well aware that my ideas are still very tentative. I hope, however, that in some measure they will be helpful to you. My own experience in OPA during the war convinced me that standards can be made to work if they are reasonably devised and intelligently applied. I think the same lesson can be drawn from our experience with aid to the Philippines after World War II where the Bell mission set down rather rigid criteria and insisted on them. 1 The subsequent emergence of Magsaysay was strengthened probably by this insistence. If we do not have firm criteria, we will surely be in trouble on the Hill next year. And in our administration of funds we will be subject to intense pressures without the guidelines we need to discriminate among them. Congress was quite explicit in the law. With respect to the development loans and grants, the President is directed to emphasize assistance to “long-range plans and programs” taking into account “the extent to which the country is showing a responsiveness to the vital economic, political and social concerns of its people, and demonstrating a clear determination to take effective self-help measures”. 2 This injunction is reiterated elsewhere in the act with special reference to Latin America. These three are the essential elements: good planning, an awareness of popular needs, and efficient use of local resources. All of them clearly imply the need in many countries for major reforms in tax systems, land tenure, exchange controls, public administration, and the like. In practice this means that now is no time for “business as usual”. Time is short and the prejudices and vested interests of small elites must not be allowed to stand in the way of progress. These are days of real crisis. Those who face up realistically to the urgency of democratic change are those with whom we must work most closely. This suggests that we may find it most useful in setting our stand-ards to divide countries into several groups, roughly as follows: 1. Countries with highest priority should be those taking with the greatest seriousness the importance of solid planning, maximum mobilization of local resources, and a dedication to social justice, and with programs already under way. For these countries we should take advantage of our five year authorization to give assurances of long-range assistance. 2. A second category would be countries with the right kind of ideas on paper but which have not yet carried them out. I would put these countries on a “short halter”, helping them to get going by setting target dates and pointing to the aid which they might get if they bestirred themselves, but holding off on any major aid until they did so. 3. The third classification would be countries without even paper plans and programs. Here our first effort would be to help them develop the technical competence to take this fundamental step. It may well be that we should bring outside people right into the administrative structure of their government, perhaps through multilateral agencies. 4. The final group would be countries with such over-riding military or political problems that we must give emergency aid without regard to standards. Hopefully these would be only short-term situations. Insisting on countries meeting our criteria is going to mean that we shall be turning down many requests for aid. The pressure to give in to these requests will often be intense but the answer, I feel, is not to lower our standards but to find additional inexpensive ways to show our goodwill. For instance, a powdered milk program for the school children of the national capital or a new public health clinic attached to an existing American institution would demonstrate our continuing concern. Some technical assistance and training would be possible. We may want to isolate individual projects which meet our standards, providing aid only to them. In all of this I think we ought to be alert to the importance of publicizing our position. Of course it must be done tactfully but there is enough international agreement now—particularly in Latin America—that it should be easy to quote utterances of the national leaders of recipient countries who have endorsed our views. During my forthcoming visit to Latin America I intend to discuss these ideas with our people in the field. I hope that in so doing I can help sharpen even more our thinking on this crucial problem. * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 65 A 481, Administration—State, FY 1962. Official Use Only. Drafted by A.E. Rice (U) and transmitted through S/S and EXSEC (AID). The handwritten notation, “Thank you F.H.,” appears on the source text. 1 Reference is to an Economic Survey Mission, headed by Daniel W. Bell, which visited the Philippines July-September 1950 to survey the economic situation there and to recommend self-help measures for the Philippines as well as measures for U.S. assistance. 2 The quotations are from the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. (75 Stat. 426) 121. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (McGhee) to the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hamilton) 121. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (McGhee) to the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hamilton) Source Washington, October 17, 1961. SUBJECT Foreign Assistance On the points in your memo of October 10 1 my thoughts are: (1) Rather than distinguish between political and economic aspects of foreign aid matters, I would stress the relationship between foreign aid and overall U.S. objectives. These objectives, as formulated by the Department of State, should be the source from which stem the aid and other programs which constitute the tools of U.S. foreign policy. Conversely, the impact of a given tool on attainment of the over-all objectives should be the main criterion by which its results are evaluated. I fully concur in the emphasis on country planning which characterizes the most recent thinking on foreign aid in our Government. In this connection, I would urge that over-all U.S. objectives for a particular country take priority as a rule over general concepts governing the use of our various foreign aid resources. Such concepts are of course necessary—I appreciated your comment on our aid criteria paper, by the way 2 —but they should be flexibly applied to individual cases. Thus it seems to me that country aid programs should be developed initially in response to foreign policy guidelines supplied by the Department of State. Papers endeavoring to give such guidelines are in preparation for all countries with which we have diplomatic relations. They are discussed in draft at the working level in AID and you are given an opportunity to comment formally before the papers are issued. These guidelines papers are an innovation in Washington and it may take some time to get them into fully satisfactory shape. Even then it may not always be possible to have a guidelines paper sufficiently up to date at just the time needed to start a new aid planning cycle. Hence although I hope the guidelines papers will generally do the job, procedures should always allow for the possibility of their being supplemented or replaced by ad hoc guidance, ordinarily to be given by the State regional bureau concerned. After projections for a particular country aid program have been drafted pursuant to the foreign policy guidelines, I think the program should be further refined by a series of discussions between State and AID officers here and in the field, each of whom is aware of the special requirements of the other's business. The upshot of these discussions should be a meeting of minds, taking into account such limitations as the amount of funds probably or actually available. I assume that the regional bureaus would coordinate State's side of these discussions in Washington. In some instances of course there will be unresolved differences, requiring an appeal mechanism. If the appropriate officer in AID is unable to settle the point with the appropriate regional Assistant Secretary of State, I would suggest an intermediate appeal to your Deputy and the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. Only issues they were unable to resolve would then need to be discussed by you with the Secretary. (2) I agree with the desiderate you mention under this head, but will leave it to my operational colleagues to suggest procedures. * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 65 A 481, Hamilton, Oct. 10 Memo “Foreign Assistance”. No classification marking. 1 This memorandum, which was sent to several foreign policy principals, has not been found, but from this response as well as others it apparently set forth procedures to ensure effective coordination between AID and other executive agencies in discussing assistance matters with foreign governments. 2 Reference is to a paper on foreign aid criteria prepared by the Policy Planning Council, which was forwarded to Hamilton under cover of a memorandum from McGhee, October 4. (Washington National Records Center, RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 65 A 481, State Department Policy Planning, FY 1962) In a note to McGhee, October 17, Hamilton wrote: “Thanks for the able memo on Foreign Aid Criteria. Now that I am in the saddle I'll see that we use it in getting one out for the guidance of everyone concerned.” (Ibid.) For an extract from the final paper issued on October 26, see Document 124 . 122. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Martin) to the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hamilton) 122. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Martin) to the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hamilton) Source Washington, October 23, 1961. SUBJECT Terms of Reference for AID Negotiations I concur fully in the belief expressed in your memorandum of October 11 that it is necessary to establish clearly the basic decisions, terms of reference, and level for our aid programs in individual countries. 1 A procedure such as you suggest may well be the most satisfactory approach to this question. In arriving at the determination of the individual elements in this procedure, I believe that we should above all seek to avoid some of the pitfalls of the past. In the first instance, this means being very clear on the meanings of the terms we use. You suggest that a maximum aid level should be established for each country which would be controlling in any aid discussion with the foreign government. I fully share your preoccupations in this regard. We must, I believe, be careful regarding the use of this term “aid level,” and regarding what we include in it. The meaning of the term varies considerably from country to country depending on the kind of assistance each has been receiving from the United States in years gone by. The term has greatest relevance in a country which, in the past, received little from the United States other than Defense Support or Special Assistance grant aid, and would now be receiving predominantly Supporting Assistance. In those relatively few countries which have progressed sufficiently far so that we will in the future be able to make use of our long-term commitment authority in support of their development plans, there may be a commitment of development loan funds in support of the (annual segments of the) development plan, which come close to being an “annual aid level.” Otherwise these funds can be included only on a very rough and preliminary basis. In our new approach, we are to place greatest stress on the totality of U.S. instruments in meeting the development problems of development countries. In some countries it would certainly be quite appropriate to include P.L. 480 and Export-Import Bank loans in the U.S. aid figures. However, except in the Indian type of situation, it is not only impossible to include Exim loans in an “aid level,” but would, I believe, be undesirable. Regardless of what kind of “maximum aid level” you decide is necessary, I believe that we should keep clearly in mind the distinction between a level determined for internal programming purposes, and one which forms the basis for discussions with other governments. The former is necessary if you and your programming staff are to keep control over the funds appropriated annually to AID. If you are to maintain control over the program, and maintain your ability to meet constantly changing political as well as development situations, the programming levels must be kept under constant review, particularly in the development lending field, and cannot be permitted to become “frozen” early in the fiscal year. Regardless of what kinds of provisos we hedge our statements with, any figure mentioned to another government invariably and inevitably becomes the minimum commitment with which we then have to live. If this is the annual allocation to a Supporting Assistance country, this is necessary and acceptable on both sides. To the extent that we really mean to turn over a new leaf in the development loan field, this becomes undesirable except in those few cases where we are making a commitment to support a development plan. With respect to your second and third points, we certainly should have very clearly in mind the specific terms of reference and conditions under which aid commitments would be made and programs conducted. In some cases it may be possible, as you suggest, to prepare a statement of these terms and conditions for presentation to the other government. In some cases, I would imagine that we might be able to secure a greater degree of host government acceptance of the kinds of conditions we would consider desirable if we did not seek to present these in writing as conditions of U.S. aid, at least at the outset. We need to maintain a posture of supporting the most forward-looking elements in the country. We might find, for example, that we encountered intense resistance on the part of the government to reforms which the country team and we gave top priority in the particular country, but that much more progress was possible in another area than had been suspected. This, however, is a question of negotiating techniques. I certainly agree that before agreements with other governments are concluded, there should be a very clear understanding of what the conditions are. There is one further reason for us to maintain a considerable degree of flexibility on maximum aid levels for individual countries. It is most important that we be able to show Congress some progress in getting other industrialized countries to increase their aid efforts and to improve their terms. Whether in formal consortium arrangements such as those organized by the IBRD for India and Pakistan, or whether in far more informal bilateral discussions with other potential donors, we can maintain some bargaining leverage only to the extent that our own position is not frozen in advance. If the recipient country is already fully aware of what we intend to do, our position is frozen. Edwin M. Martin * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 65 A 481, Oct. 11 Memo “Terms of Reference for AID Negotiations”. Official Use Only. 1 This memorandum on the terms of reference for AID negotiations has not been found, but it apparently was sent to several Assistant Secretaries of State with requests for comments and suggestions on four specific areas. Replies from the Assistant Secretaries of several regional bureaus are ibid. 123. Memorandum for the Record 123. Memorandum for the Record Source Washington, October 23, 1961. SUBJECT Why Such Reluctance to See a MAP Turnaround? The more I get into the MAP business the more I see that a key obstacle to a MAP turnaround and to frank appraisal of where the US ought to be putting the emphasis in its aid effort is the real fear on the part of ambassadors, country teams, and Washington officials that they will be giving up something for nothing. They argue that if it were really possible to look at the aid to a given country as a total package and to tailor its components for optimum impact, they would happily opt for more economic and less military aid. But they fear that this would not be the case. They claim that if they recommend a cut in MAP over the next five years they will simply be denying themselves at least one sort of country leverage without any assurance whatsoever that this will be compensated for in other fields. This is one of the most serious impedimenta to a rational “new look” at the MAP. One ambassador said frankly “If I play ball with you and tell you that I feel MAP ought to be cut because our chief problems here are internal and not external, but my colleagues in other countries don't play ball and continue making a big case for both economic and military aid, the result will be that my country takes a cut whereas they continue to get military baksheesh.” A DCM opined that he had for years written justifications for MAP with tongue in cheek because he was fully aware that the military threat was secondary to the internal. But he feared that if he did not, MAP would simply be reduced and the country team would lose one form of valuable leverage, without gaining another. A State official complained that if his bureau recommended a cut in MAP and a switch of the funds saved into economic aid, the Budget Bureau would accept the MAP cut but would argue that an increase in economic aid was more than previous experience showed to be necessary and deny it. I realize all the problems involved in shifting substantial funds from MAP to other aid programs. A prolonged educational process will be involved, not least on the Hill. However, unless we can convince all concerned that the objective is not just a reduction of the total aid burden but a redirection of our total effort into areas of real payoff, we're going to keep running into this powerful bureaucratic defense mechanism. The remedy is obvious. We must shoot for greater fungibility between aid accounts and make it stick. Making Fowler Hamilton aid coordinator is an excellent first step, because he will have a vested interest in seeing this done. We should help him by seeking greater transferability between aid accounts, larger contingency funds, etc. We should not let MAP get put into DOD budget. And, in the six country MAP review we should not simply recommend a cut of so much in MAP over a six year period. Instead we should recommend a shift of comparable magnitude into forms of aid more directly attuned to the chief threats we face. Bob Komer * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 65 A 481, White House, FY 1962. Secret. Drafted by Komer. Copies were sent to McGeorge Bundy, Rostow, Bell, Dungan, and Kenneth Hansen. Attached to the source text is an October 24 memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to Hamilton, which indicates that Komer was conducting a White House review of major MAP programs and that he would be available if Hamilton “should want to talk with him about it.” Bundy added that, although Jeffrey Kitchen was the formal chairman of the review, most of the energy for it came from Komer and Kenneth Hansen of the Bureau of the Budget. Also attached to the source text is a copy of an October 25 memorandum from Don Easum (AID) to Battle (S/S), indicating that AID was taking no action on Komer's memorandum and was giving a copy only to Frank Coffin, but that a copy could be given to G/PM at Battle's discretion. 124. Report Prepared by the Policy Planning Council 124. Report Prepared by the Policy Planning Council Source Washington, October 26, 1961. PPC 12-61 THE NEW AID CRITERIA AND U.S. FOREIGN ECONOMIC PROGRAMS I. Summary and Conclusions Our new approach to foreign economic assistance with its emphasis on self-help and long-range planning represents a major advance in our aid thinking and holds out the promise of more prudent and effective use of our aid funds. No less important it aligns the US with the forces for economic and social progress in the less developed countries. Because of widely different circumstances in individual countries our self-help approach needs to be flexible and pragmatic rather than doctrinaire. It cannot, moreover, be expected to achieve quick and dramatic results. Self-help must be viewed as a gradual and evolving proc-ess since it is addressed to some of the most deep-seated obstacles to economic growth. Unquestionably we can utilize our aid more effectively to induce self-help than heretofore. We should be careful, however, not to overestimate our capabilities in this regard. Many countries, particularly in Latin America, though they have the capability, have no great sympathy or understanding for self-help since it strikes at the heart of entrenched interests with which existing regimes are identified. Others in the pre-development phase, notably some of the newly independent states of tropical Africa, have only limited capacity for self-help. In still others such as Pakistan, Iran and Turkey overriding US political and strategic interests place limitations on the amount of leverage we can derive from our aid. We cannot expect, therefore, to shift abruptly from a policy only mildly concerned with self-help to a rigid policy of adequate self-help on [and?] no aid. To do so would seriously undermine our relations with the less developed countries and jeopardize vital US strategic interests. Rather we should seek to achieve gradual but steady self-help gains in aid recipient countries, recognizing that sweeping demands for economic and social reform might even be counterproductive. If we maintain persistent pressures for progressive economic and social reforms, the effectiveness of our efforts to move the less developed countries toward long-term political and economic stability will increase correspondingly. Implementation of our new aid approach may be facilitated if we can develop more refined and objective guidelines for judging self-help. One possible approach is to group aid recipient countries according to their stages of economic development and to develop different sets of performance standards for each group. These could then be adjusted to take account of special political and other factors in individual countries within each group. Most important, however, is the need to identify the half dozen at most specific self-help measures we should concentrate our efforts on in each country in order to maximize its economic and social growth. Our assistance gives us only so much leverage in aid recipient countries and we should not dissipate this by scattering our efforts. We as the aid giver are going to have to assume the major burden of persuasion. This will require the most skilled and imaginative economic diplomacy if we are to achieve the full potentialities of our new aid concepts. [Here follow Parts II-VII of the report: II. Introduction; III. Opportunities for Self-Help; IV. The Need for Flexibility; V. Obstacles to Self-Help; VI. The Need For More Precise Measures of Self-Help; and VII. Some Hazards in the Self-Help Approach.] * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 65 A 481, State Department Policy Planning, FY 1962. Confidential. The portion of the source text printed here comprises pages 1-4 of the 40-page report. 125. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (McGhee) 125. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (McGhee) Source Washington, November 1, 1961. SUBJECT The New Aid Criteria and U.S. Foreign Economic Programs I have read the reference paper with great interest and found it a valuable discussion of a very complex problem. 1 It seems to me that there are certain questions which could serve to clarify our policy and strengthen our notion of self-help. First, will an investment of American aid yield a satisfactory return in results? We do not have resources to waste. There is more to be done than our resources can accomplish. Therefore, we cannot afford bad investments. A temporary amiability on the part of a government receiving aid or the warm feeling which an American ambassador gets by saying “yes” instead of “no” are not adequate returns on the investment of critically scarce resources. Second, under what conditions are we justified in digging into our own taxpayers' pockets and postponing some of the great social needs of our own society in order to render assistance to another country? Can we defend aid to a country which protects its own entrenched interests at a time when we are picking up about 70% of the earnings of corporations in some form of taxation and when personal income taxes range from 20% to 90%? Are we justified in spending public money to provide capital to a country whose own capital sneaks off to Swiss banks? I do not agree that we, as the giver of aid, must assume the major burden of persuasion on the subject of self-help. The burden of persuasion must be shifted to those who are trying to obtain U.S. resources for their own economic and social development. Clearly, their development is in our interest but we must not let this fact trap us into a responsibility for their standards of living or development. I am not impressed by the thought expressed at our African Chiefs of Mission Conference that if we fail to respond to their economic development needs “our Missions might as well pack up and go home”. To the extent that our ambassadors become dependent upon foreign aid programs, to that extent they become weak and ineffective representatives of American interests abroad. Surely our objective is to work toward an absence of need for American assistance; this means to me that there ought to be a number of countries in which we do not even start down the trail of providing assistance. If we plan to continue to keep going to the Congress for aid programs for 70-80 countries, the Congress and the American public will rebel—and in my judgment that would be right. We ourselves must establish some priorities and work toward some division of labor among the industrialized countries so that every underdeveloped country in the world is not an aid client of the United States. We should develop a special citation or decoration for an ambassador who gets his particular country off our aid list. One possibility for dealing with the above problem is to put certain of our activities on a regional rather than a country basis. For example, we could have a regional program for training indigenous experts without having an aid mission in each country. Private foundations have been doing just that for decades. Further, we could play a regional role (without calling it that) by strengthening certain selective training institutions where young people of neighboring countries could receive advanced training. Further, we might combine this with some regional division of labor in the field of advanced training—somewhat along the lines on which a group of our own Southern States have been working for many years. There are certain matters of self-help on which we should be as uncompromising as possible. I have in mind, for example, the question of graft and corruption. We can afford not to condone it in any way because we know that the elimination of graft is a continuing battle within our own society. Let us not underemphasize the critical importance of this matter; a handful of instances of corruption, with which our aid programs are associated, can blow our entire aid effort right out of the water. Dean Rusk * Source: Washington National Records Center,RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 65 A 481, State Department Policy Planning, FY 1962. Confidential. An undated, mimeographed notice attached to the source text indicates that the Secretary's memorandum should be considered an addendum to the Policy Planning Council paper ( Document 124 ). 1 Document 124 . 126. Summary Minutes of Meeting of the Interdepartmental Committee of Under Secretaries on Foreign Economic Policy 126. Summary Minutes of Meeting of the Interdepartmental Committee of Under Secretaries on Foreign Economic Policy Source Washington, November 1, 1961. [Here follows a list of participants (19).] THE AID PROGRAM Administrator's Statement. Mr. Fowler Hamilton, Administrator of the Agency for International Development, first outlined the dimensions of the aid program. The total aid program provides about $6 billion for this fiscal year. The $6 billion includes (1) about $2 billion for military aid ($1.6 billion for hardware and $400 million for supporting assistance); (2) agricultural aid between $1.5 and $2 billion; (3) development assistance, with development loans comprising $1.1 billion and development grants $400 million; a contingency fund of $275 million, and $153 million for aid through international organizations. For the 1,500,000,000 people in the non-Communist underdeveloped countries, the non-military aid of about $4 billion amounts to about $2.70 per capita. Much of this is committed to programs already underway. Hence, the amount available is limited. Mr. Hamilton then indicated the kinds of questions which have been put to him since he came on duty. Most of them relate to standards for making grants or loans. How to decide how much is to go to whom for what? The motif of the new program is economic development. Whatever other purposes are expected to be served are supposed to be served as by-products of the process of aid-dispensing and the economic development that takes place. At the hearings before Congress, there were many comments that the program had been confused as to purpose and poorly administered. One reason for confusion is that the purposes of the program have been constantly changing: first, lend lease; then, post-war relief and European reconstruction; next, Point IV technical assistance to underdeveloped countries and defense support in selected places; large agricultural aid starting in 1954; more emphasis on development loans in 1958; and now, a new period when we are to support, on a fairly long-term basis, not just specific projects but also political and social reforms which will contribute to economic progress. It is understandable, with the constant change, that people are confused about the aid program. Even those who understand the different kinds of funds are confused as to what they are supposed to accomplish. Mr. Hamilton said that we have to have some standards—both in order to do a useful job and in order to keep the program going (by articulating it to Congress and the public). Mr. Hamilton said that his discussion with Mr. Jagan of British Guiana had provided the occasion to apply one sound procedural rule, namely, that we don't discuss money until we have seen a good plan . Mr. Jagan realized he was the victim of a principle—a procedural principle which he didn't like but which he understood—and therefore we didn't get into a discussion of the merits of his case. But suppose there are satisfactory plans. What standard should we use in choosing among countries? Among projects? One person may say we should teach the blind to read Braille; another will argue that instead we should devote our funds to curing glaucoma. Mr. Hamilton asked for comments on what he should use as standards. DISCUSSION The discussion brought out the great diversity of views that prevail regarding the way the aid program should be handled. In view of the diffuse character of the discussion only selected points are enumerated here. 1. Danger of Ritual . There is the danger that countries will develop fairly respectable plans, send a high official to Washington, arrange some kind of a political threat or pressure, and extract an aid commitment. 2. Broad Character of Basic Objectives . The basic objectives—political independence (not necessarily an alliance with the United States), political stability, more democratic political institutions, non-Communist orientation, and economic improvement—are too general to provide much help in evaluating aid requests. 3. Exclusion of Countries Difficult . Countries that do not receive aid feel that they are discriminated against and the threat to reduce aid drastically elicits talk of a political upset which might turn the country toward the Communists or provide an economic setback. Poor, relatively stable non-Communist countries are likely to be particularly bitter about not receiving aid. 4. Development Plans . Countries should usually be required to have development plans. These plans tend to be projections which provide part of the window-dressing required for a grant. Granted the desirability of some kind of plan or projection, at least for Congressional appropriation purposes, refinement of a plan can be carried to useless extremes. 5. Project vs. Program Aid . It is often helpful in terms of efficiency to have the aid money directed toward a specific project and it is always helpful politically to have a project as a symbol of American aid, but a strong case can be made for aid which is not related to a specific project, particularly in connection with a consortium program. 6. Economic Productivity of Aid A Difficult Criterion to Apply . It is frequently said that the money should be put in those countries and in those projects or programs where it will yield the greatest return in terms of increased national output. There is so much uncertainty, however, as to the yields of various outlays, even in strictly economic terms, that this criterion provides no sure guide. Moreover, there are the claims on funds represented by projects or programs already started, unanticipated emergency needs, and the political necessity of making some funds available simply to help keep a sympathetic government in power. 7. Self-Help . One thing the Administrator can do, mainly through the field missions, is to determine whether countries are serious about their plans for improvement and whether they are prepared to do some extra things themselves. The word will get around very fast if countries have only to give lip-service toreform in order to get aid. 8. Absorptive Capacity . New and continuing studies should be made of the capacity of less developed countries to absorb productive resources from the outside. It may be that we grossly exaggerate the absorptive capacity of many countries. 9. Burden Sharing . The economic capacity of the United States and other relatively developed countries to supply development aid to the less developed countries is probably not the limiting factor at the present time. Arrangements can be made so that aid need not have serious adverse balance of payments effects. The consortium approach provides a device for coordinating aid to particular countries; its effect on the total volume of aid is hard to estimate. 10. Specific Short-Term Objectives for Particular Countries . It would be desirable for the AID Administrator to have quite specific concrete short-term objectives for the aid program in particular countries so that he, the Congress, and the public could have a reasonably firm basis for judging the usefulness of the aid expenditures. The Role of Agricultural Commodities in the Aid Program. Mr. Murphy noted the difficult time the Administration had in getting appropriations for aid. On the other hand, authorization for disposal of agricultural surpluses can be obtained without the Administration turning a hand. This brings up the question of what we can do with commodities instead of money in the aid program. He felt that to date the role of commodities has not been integrated very well with country aid plans and thought it would be useful for Agriculture and AID people to get together early in the planning stage. Agriculture's part in the aid program is not merely disposing of surpluses. Some commodities will have to be purchased as they are not really in surplus. On cotton, for example, we now have the carry-over that we think there should be. If we want more cotton for PL-480 programs, the acreage allotment will have to be increased and the cotton bought for the aid program! Wheat is the principal commodity in surplus. Joseph D. Coppock 1 * Source: Department of State, E Files: Lot 65 D 68, Interdepartmental Committee of Under Secretaries on Foreign Economic Policy. Official Use Only. Presumably drafted by Ruth S. Donahue, who is listed as Recording Secretary. Regarding the formation and functions of the ICFEP, see Document 5 . 1 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 127. Editorial Note 127. Editorial Note The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) held its first Ministerial Meeting in Paris November 16-17, 1961. Proposals by John W. Tuthill, Ambassador-designate to the OECD, for U.S. initiatives at this upcoming OECD meeting emphasizing the recent dramatic growth of the Western European nations and promoting a vigorous plan for future cooperative economic development are contained in Cedto 295 from Paris, October 27, which is attached to a November 1 memorandum from Edward R. Murrow to McGeorge Bundy, endorsing and elaborating on Tuthill's proposals. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Department of State, 11/1/61-11/5/61) Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs George W. Ball headed the U.S. Delegation to this OECD Ministerial Meeting. For text of his statement at the November 16 session, see Department of State Bulletin , December 18, 1961, pages 1014-1018. For text of the communique, November 17, see ibid., December 18, 1961, pages 1018-1020. Documentation on the OECD Ministerial Meeting is in Department of State, Central File 374.800. 128. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs (Kitchen) to Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara 128. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs (Kitchen) to Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara Source Washington, December 12, 1961. SUBJECT Report of the Military Assistance Steering Group Pursuant to the directive issued by you jointly, 1 an inter-agency Military Assistance Steering Group has considered the principal military, political and economic issues bearing on the utilization of military aid for achieving U.S. objectives in six countries which are major recipients of U.S. Military Assistance. We have sought to determine whether there are feasible alternative methods which, if pursued over the long-run, might accomplish more satisfactorily U.S. objectives and which, in particular, would facilitate a more complementary programming of U.S. economic and military assistance. Our report, designed to establish policy guidelines for military assistance planning, is attached for your consideration. (Tab A) 2 The essence of our conclusions is that, although sufficient military strength must be maintained in these countries to help deter local aggression and to assure internal security, the main thrust of U.S. aid in the next decade should be directed toward repelling the more likely Soviet threat of indirect aggression by furthering economic development and nation-building. Because U.S. and local resources are limited, a redirection of our assistance programs is required which will involve shifting gradually increasing proportions of aid from military to economic programs, a stretch-out of force modernization, and avoidance of the introduction of advanced and sophisticated materiel into countries whose financial, manpower and skills resources are inadequate. While it is clearly recognized that such a program will introduce difficult problems of turnaround, and, indeed, that implementation at an early date may not be possible in certain countries for political reasons, it is considered most important to establish now the governing policy for program development. As chairman of the Steering Group, I subscribe to the recommendations of the report. It is also endorsed by Robert Komer, the White House staff participant, Kenneth Hansen, the Bureau of the Budget participant and Seymour Rubin, the AID participant. William Bundy, the Department of Defense participant, while subscribing to the general conclusions of the report has entered a reservation regarding implementation of the recommendations for Korea on the grounds that “the alternative totals have no basis in any current analysis” and also that he is “not prepared to conclude that we should alter our basic conception of the mission of ROK forces.” (Tab B) The report itself emphasizes that implementation in Korea can proceed only as our economic aid plans become firm and when we can determine whether increased U.S. conventional capability creates an additional basis for changing force posture in Korea. Mr. Bundy also notes that the Turkish situation is highly uncertain “on the economic front.” I concur with his observation regarding attention which must be paid to increasing problems in obtaining important facilities in Turkey, although I believe that certain proposals known to you will have a more important bearing on resolving these problems than will any given amount of military aid. As noted in the body of the report, the JCS take the position that this is no time to make, nor to plan, reductions in military aid to the six countries. Admiral Smith, the Special Assistant for Military Assistance Affairs to the Joint Staff, who participated in the group's work, has formally indicated his non-agreement “to reductions in military assistance to be imposed at present or in the foreseeable future.” (Tab C) Our ambassadors in the six countries, supplemented by their MAAG chiefs, responded to your letter requesting a reappraisal of the stewardship of U.S. aid in their countries of assignment with briefs generally defending strongly the existing field plans. 3 However, Ambassador Holmes was most forthcoming in dealing with a possible reduction in the force structure of the Iranian army provided selective modernization can be effected, increased economic aid can be substituted, and he can indicate to the Shah U.S. aid plans over a five-year period. Ambassador Berger, in a necessarily delayed response, left open the possibility of more far reaching changes in the Korean forces depending on accomplishments and developments measured over the next year. At the request of Secretary McNamara and Budget Director Bell, a separate examination has been made of the implications of the steering group Report for the FY 1962 and 1963 military aid programs. This is presented in four charts at Tab D based on “high” figures representing DOD program requests and BOB “low” proposed alternatives. The steering group recognizes these are not firm figures but the best presently available for illustrative purposes, and the DOD figures, especially for 1963, reflect some reductions from previous plans. The charts set forth a six-country total difference of $94 million for 1962 and $151 million for 1963 which the Defense and Budget representatives respectively are prepared to support. Mr. Chenery, 4 on behalf of AID, generally favors the larger reductions but believes such reductions should be offset by assuring, insofar as possible, early equivalent increases in economic assistance. Mr. Komer and I, while advocating some cuts in FY 62 and particularly in FY 63 to emphasize firmly the new policy direction, recognize that too sharp a cut immediately would create strongly adverse local political repercussions. We suggest that (a) reductions greater than $50 million from DOD's present FY 1962 program and $125 million from FY 63 would be excessive; (b) sharper cuts should be delayed until reallocation of a substantial portion of the “savings” into economic aid programs is feasible; (c) the country teams and unified commands should be given latitude to re-program within the lower ceilings; and, (d) a substantial proportion of the cut in both years should be allocated to Korea, by far the largest single MAP recipient. Copies of this memorandum and attachments are being transmitted to all steering group participants for the attention of their principals. I recommend that if you approve the conclusions as set forth in paragraphs 7 through 19, and the recommendations as set forth briefly in the country sections of the report, you confer with a view to achieving agreement that the report be accepted as establishing policy for Military Assistance program formulation. It is suggested that you may then wish to meet with the President and selected members of the NSC to obtain final approval. 5 Jeffrey C. Kitchen * Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, Guidelines for Military Aid Program. Secret. Attached to the source text were the conclusions of the Steering Group Report, paragraphs 7-19, which are in the Supplement, and the country alternatives and recommendations, paragraphs 54-85, not printed. Attached to an earlier, nearly identical draft of Kitchen's memorandum, December 9, which was addressed only to Secretary Rusk, was the entire report of 40 typescript pages. 1 The directive has not been found but is elsewhere identified as a July 8 paper by Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, which approved the creation of an interagency steering group, composed of State, Defense, JCS, ICA (AID), and White House representatives, to prepare a basic review of military assistance policy and planning assumptions for seven major MAP recipient countries (China, Greece, Iran, Korea, Pakistan, Turkey, and Vietnam). (Memorandum from Avery F. Peterson (FE) to Walter P. McConaughy (FE) and John M. Steeves (FE), July 21; ibid., FE/EA Files: Lot 65 D 235, K2-C.1, Military Assistance (FY '59-61)) Regarding the preparation of this review, see also the source note, Document 123 . 2 Tabs A-D are not attached and have not been found. 3 The responses have not been found. 4 Hollis Chenery, Director for Program Review and Coordination Staff, AID. 5 The Steering Group report was discussed at meetings of the NSC Standing Group on January 5 and 12, 1962. (Record of Action, January 10 and January 12; Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Standing Group, 1/5/62 and 1/12/62) Kitchen's memorandum was transmitted under cover of a memorandum from Battle (S/S) to McGeorge Bundy, January 16, 1962, to supplement the draft NSC Record of Action for consideration at the NSC meeting on January 18, 1962. A draft NSC Record of Action on the military aid program, January 13, 1962, which was prepared in response to decisions at the January 12 NSC Standing Group meeting, is ibid.,S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council. 129. Memorandum From the Acting Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Gaud) to Secretary of State Rusk 129. Memorandum From the Acting Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Gaud) to Secretary of State Rusk Source Washington, January 12, 1962. SUBJECT Report of the Military Assistance Steering Group 1 On behalf of AID I wish to support the conclusions of the Military Assistance Steering Group. We particularly endorse their view that “the main thrust of U.S. aid in the next decade should be directed toward re-pelling the more likely Soviet threat of indirect aggression by furthering economic development and national building.” It is increasingly apparent that neither the capability nor the will to resist communist aggression and subversion can exist in the absence of satisfactory rates of economic and social development. Present plans call for substantial increases in development assist-ance to this group of countries in FY 1963, particularly for Korea, the Republic of China and Turkey. Planned lending would continue at a high level in Pakistan. In these four countries projected development lending levels appear to be near the upper limit of the effective absorptive capacities of their economies at this time. In the case of Greece and Iran, substantial amounts of U.S. development lending are projected. When combined with other free world assistance and more effective utilization of indigenous resources, it should result in satisfactory progress toward the goal of self-sustaining growth. It is presently planned to reduce supporting assistance levels in FY 1963 in several of these countries. In every case where this is contemplated, however, increases in development lending will help ease the transition from supporting to development assistance. Furthermore, by directing assistance to long-term development, we enhance the ability of these countries to assume a progressively larger share of the joint defense burden from their increased national product. Our support of the conclusions of the Steering Group Report is thus already reflected in our planning for FY 1963. For the longer term we believe a continuing effort should be made to adapt the size and character of the military forces of these countries to the changing nature of the security threats which they face. The Report points up the advantages of an overall approach to both military and economic aid programs which AID hopes to be able to continue in the future. William S. Gaud * Source: Washington National Records Center,RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 65 A 481, Military Assistance, FY 1962. Confidential. The source text is Tab D to an attached memorandum from Chenery to the Acting Administrator, January 12, which also summarizes the Steering Group Report. The other tabs, not found, were the text of the report, country annexes, and comments on the report by members of the steering group and Department of State and AID officials. Also attached to the source text are a covering memorandum from Chenery to the Acting Administrator, January 12, recommending that Gaud familiarize himself with the Steering Group Report and sign the memorandum to Secretary Rusk, and a memorandum from Carol Carter Moor (S/S-RO) to Easum (AID), January 10, indicating that G/PM wanted AID comments on the report by January 12. 1 See Document 128 . 130. National Security Council Record of Action No. 2447 130. National Security Council Record of Action No. 2447 Source Washington, undated. Review of the Military Aid Program 1. Discussed the Report of the Military Assistance Steering Group and noted the following Presidential instructions: a. Further reviews are to be made promptly of the military and economic aspects of long range US aid planning for certain major country programs. In these reviews, and in general aid planning, all concerned are to bear in mind that while we would like to have enough aid to accomplish all of our military and economic aid objectives, we are likely in any given period only to get enough appropriations to accomplish a portion of them. Therefore, we must plan in terms of which mix of military and other forms of aid will best serve our overall national security aims. In this sense, we must recognize that MAP and AID programs are competitive, as well as complementary, in terms both of their claim on US and local resources and their impact on the recipient countries. b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will reconsider their comments on the Steering Group Report, 1 taking into account the considerations in a above and recognizing that decreases in 2 military aid would be compensated by increases in economic aid. 2. Agreed that for Korea, Iran, Greece and Turkey, the following should be prepared for submission by July 15: a. Proposed FY 1964-68 Military Assistance Plans (including the final proposed FY 1963 Program). b. Similar plans for AID programs for the comparable period. c. Recommendations, made in the light of the considerations in Para 1-a above of the mix of these programs, as well as our appreciation of the relative threats to overall US security interests in these countries. Military Assistance plans for Korea and for Greece and Turkey should include an alternative program based on the lower financial levels proposed by the MAP Steering Group and an analysis of the pros and cons. In addition, the following are to be made: (1) For Korea the military economic and political studies necessary to recommend a desirable Korean force level and structure, including the desirable level of US forces in Korea. (To be submitted by 15 June 1962.) (2) For Iran a report (to be submitted as promptly as possible and not later than 15 February) on a proposed approach to the Shah to achieve a reduction to a force level of 150,000, taking account of relevant political and economic factors. (3) For Greece and Turkey the report (to be submitted by 15 July 1962) will take account of the special factors created by their NATO membership and participation in the present Berlin crisis buildup. 3. The Director of AID, acting under Executive Order 10973, 3 will be responsible for carrying out the above studies. To assist him in an advisory role, he may continue, if he so desires, the Military Assistance Steering Group to be chaired by AID. 4. Agreed that the Director of AID will also study what improved planning and programming techniques are needed so that military and AID programming can be effectively coordinated to insure that total US aid to any given country is used to the best overall advantage. This report, to be submitted not later than 1 May 1962, is to include recommendations as to the most effective means, at both country team and Washington levels, for meshing the AID and MAP planning cycles. * Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council. Secret. The Action was taken at the 496th NSC meeting on January 18, along with Record of Action No. 2446. The source text is attached to a transmittal memorandum from Battle to several Department of State principals, January 23. A draft Record of Action was not discussed until an NSC Standing Group meeting on January 19 (Record of Action, January 19; Department of State,S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Standing Group, 1/19/62), and was apparently not approved until some time between January 19 and 23. 1 Reference presumably is to the undated JCS position paper, “Guidelines for the Military Aid Program” (JCSM-43-62), which commented on a January 13 draft NSC Record of Action. (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, Guidelines for Military Aid Program) 2 The word “in” has been inserted by hand in response to a January 22 memorandum (attached to the source text) from Bromley Smith to all holders of this Record of Action, requesting this change. 3 See Document 117 . 131. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hamilton) to President Kennedy 131. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hamilton) to President Kennedy Source Washington, February 9, 1962. SOURCE Terms of AID Development Loans The purpose of the accompanying memorandum 1 is to provide you a summary of the results of the reappraisal of AID loan policy that you requested. The memorandum reflects in general the views of Douglas Dillon, Harold Linder, Eugene Black and myself. George Ball has expressed doubt about the position taken herein and he thinks that AID loan terms might be made somewhat harder now and that by such action we might be in a better position to influence other lending countries to soften their terms. 2 While our views represent our best judgment, they are not free from doubt; and as we further study these matters, they may change. The memorandum may serve as a basis for consideration by the National Advisory Council 3 and for such discussion as you may desire. We would suggest that any such discussion include the Secretary of the Treasury and the President of the Export-Import Bank. In the meantime there is no rigid rule on AID loans, but in general loans are being granted on the basis of a 40-year maturity, 3/4 of 1% credit fee in lieu of interest and 10-year grace period with substantially differing terms in special situations. Fowler Hamilton * Source: Washington National Records Center,RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 65 A 481, Development Financing, FY 1962. Official Use Only. The source text, which was sent through the Secretary of State, bears the notation “DR per GWB” in the Secretary's handwriting. The source text also bears a second date, February 12, 1962, which is elsewhere given as the document control date and is presumably the day the memorandum was forwarded to the White House. (Memorandum from Easum to Executive Staff (AID), March 13; ibid.). 1 Document 132 . 2 For Ball's detailed comments on an earlier February 6 draft of the accompanying memorandum, which he sent in a memorandum to Hamilton, February 8, see the Supplement. 3 Reference is to the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems. 132. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hamilton) to President Kennedy 132. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hamilton) to President Kennedy Source Washington, February 9, 1962. SUBJECT Terms of AID Development Loans This memorandum sets forth the background against which AID loan policy has evolved, gives our conclusion as to present AID policy and plans, outlines the advantages of such policy and the principal objections thereto, and states our proposals to deal with those objections. Background . The Development Loan Fund was established in 1957 as a means of shifting U.S. economic assistance to the extent possible from a grant to a loan basis and of emphasizing assistance to promote economic development. At the beginning DLF loans were almost entirely repayable in local currency in order to avoid burdening the balance of payments of the less-developed countries which in turn would have adversely affected the operation of the IBRD and the Export-Import Bank. The IBRD and the Export-Import Bank had been in operation for many years and both were engaged in development financing on terms which have come to be regarded as “conventional,” and which are determined by their sources of lending funds, by the Articles of Agreement in the case of IBRD, and by U.S. legislation in the case of the Export-Import Bank. These terms provide for dollar payment, interest at 5-3/4 percent (presently) and maturity based generally on the estimated productivity of the project or generally in the range of 15-25 years. Again in 1959 consideration was given to making DLF loans repayable in dollars, although on more favorable terms than the IBRD and the Export-Import Bank. Eugene Black objected to substantial dollar repayment of DLF loans on the ground that loans on this basis would so consume loan repayment capacity of less developed countries as to make it impossible for them to gain access to private capital or to borrow further from IBRD, Export-Import Bank or from other Western country lenders. This view prevailed and DLF credits continued to be generally made repayable in local currencies with maturities comparable to those of IBRD; an interest rate of 3-1/2% was provided for economic overhead projects but other lending was generally at 5-3/4%. Such loans were substantially like grants from the point of view of impact on the balance of payments of developing countries because they were repayable largely in local currencies; unlike grants, however, they did impose the discipline of scheduled repayments on the internal finances of the borrowing countries. The 1961 AID loan legislation required repayment in dollars because of the problems inherent in the accumulation of large amounts of local currencies derived not only from DLF loans but from other U.S. programs, such as the very large agricultural surplus sales under P.L. 480. Some currencies were being acquired in amounts far in excess of our prospective needs and of their usefulness in further programs in the countries concerned. Moreover, other countries became disturbed by the relatively large accumulation by the U.S. of their currencies. To reverse this trend, then, the AID legislation was established to provide dollar repayment on development lending. Since such lending was to be of greater significance in the future and since the ability of less-developed countries to service dollar indebtedness is generally minimal, it was proposed that loan service terms would be established to impose as light a burden as feasible on the present balance of payments of recipient countries and to permit repayments to be effected over a long term at times when the development efforts of such countries would show greater progress. It was therefore felt that it would be better to obtain a smaller annual service return in dollars than the larger returns in local currency previously in effect. Congress was fully advised and understood that such loans would be made on very liberal terms. For example, in your Foreign Aid Message, it was stated that “the single most important tool will be long-term development loans at no or low rates of interest.” Conclusion . Our policy review has led us to conclude: 1. A loan term policy with flexibility for special cases, but based primarily on loans at 40-year maturity, 3/4 of 1% credit fee in lieu of interest and 10-year grace period, would best serve United States foreign policy objectives of fostering long-term economic development and stable governments in friendly less-developed countries. It would be our intention, as individual recipient countries improve their payments position, to shorten the maturities rather than raising interest rates or credit fees until such time as it is possible to shift to conventional terms completely. 2. The United States should reserve the right to renegotiate with respect to shortening the maturity of loans at the end of the 10-year grace period. 3. The problem arising out of the difference between liberal AID loan terms and harder terms of other Western country lenders is best dealt with by continuing to exert pressure on such countries to soften their terms. Advantages of Aid Policy . The considerations that lead us to support such an AID loan policy, with very liberal terms, include the following: 1. As a group the underdeveloped countries face serious balance-of-payments difficulties which are likely to persist for many years. The percentage of their exports which must be used for the repayment of foreign debt, public and private, is large and growing. As our aid expenditures and those of other countries increase—as they must if we are to achieve our development objectives—the problem of financing repayment of debt will become increasingly serious. The attached charts, although not completely up to date, illustrate these trends. 2. AID loans must be on liberal terms if they are not to impair the operations of IBRD and the Export-Import Bank, and private investors. If AID terms are hardened the debt-service burden of less-developed countries will become further strained, and the borrowing countries will not be able to meet required payments to the various lending institutions or make other required external payments. AID can best carry on its work as a source of capital needed by countries which cannot obtain sufficient conventional financing and for activities for which conventional financing is not available. Substantial hardening of AID terms would make most questionable the extent to which IBRD and Export-Import Bank could participate in loans such as those to India and Pakistan in the recent consortia. Our objective of stimulating a greater degree of development depends upon providing capital additional to that which is available from conventional sources. If this cannot be accomplished on a dollar-repayable loan basis, the alternative would appear to be to return to grant aid or local currency repayment. 3. Development loans frequently finance basic economic infrastructure projects which typically do not generate exportable wealth sufficient to repay the loans for many years. 4. It is our judgment that the most effective way to induce other lending countries to ease the terms of their loans is not to harden our terms to correspond more closely to theirs, but rather to continue to emphasize the discrepancy between our terms and theirs. We have succeeded in persuading other countries (notably Germany) substantially to liberalize their lending terms. Retreat from our liberal policy would also hamper Eugene Black's efforts to induce an increase in the country contributions to, and thus the loan capacity of, the International Development Association (IDA) which extends loans with 50-year maturities, a 3/4 of 1% credit fee in lieu of interest and 10-year grace periods. The present hard currency capitalization of IDA is about $760 million. The United States share is about 42%, the other industrialized countries putting in 54% and the less-developed countries 4% of the hard currency resources. 5. If AID loan terms approach those of IBRD or Export-Import Bank, Congressional opponents of the AID program will argue that AIDdevelopment loan authority constitutes a duplication of effort and can be eliminated, leaving IBRD and Export-Import Bank to carry our entire development financing load—a task they cannot perform. 6. Liberal AID loan terms, generally based on 40-year maturity and 3/4% fee, permit the United States: (a) to induce long-term development planning, including self-help; and (b) to provide loan terms consistent with the limits on the dollar repayment capacity of less-developed countries; and (c) to respond to other foreign policy considerations where appropriate. 7. Liberal AID terms tend to offset such detrimental effect on borrowing countries as might arise from our balance of payments policy of requiring American procurement with respect to commodities for which the United States price is substantially higher than the world price. Objections to AID Policy . The two principal objections to a liberal loan policy for AID are: 1. Present loan agreements fail to make provision for hardening of loan terms if the borrowing country's dollar repayment capacity unexpectedly improves, as in the case of Libya with its newly discovered oil reserves. 2. Liberal AID loans at least indirectly enable the borrower to repay loans made on harder terms by other Western countries. In this connection, however, it should be recognized that much of our lending is done by Export-Import Bank. This year Export-Import Bank may lend on its relatively hard terms as much as one billion dollars—almost equal to the total AID lending authorization. If Germany were to be persuaded to make half of its loans on relatively hard terms and half on soft terms comparable to those of AID, its total lending policies would be comparable to ours. It should be noted that in the case of France, about 85% of French economic aid totalling over $1 billion annually, mostly to the franc area, consists of outright grants. Proposals to Deal with Objections. 1. We propose to deal with the first objection by requiring each borrowing country to agree that the United States reserves the right at the end of the grace period to renegotiate the maturity of the loan if conditions in the borrowing country, including its then existing and prospective dollar earning capacity, indicate that acceleration of repayment is feasible. Changes in the terms would require mutual consent. Furthermore, at any time that aid is no longer required because of dramatic changes in the recipient country, we would cease making liberal term loans. 2. We propose to deal with the second objection by continually pressing other countries further to liberalize their loan policies, so as to approximate as closely as possible the terms presently granted by the United States. To this end we are considering requesting a DAC Ministerial Meeting to be held in Paris in the spring at which we will again urge DAC countries to further soften loan terms. We would plan to follow up such a meeting with a second meeting in Washington in September at the time of the meeting of the Board of Directors of IBRD, at which we are hopeful more progress will be made in obtaining commitments by DAC countries to increase their development lending and still further to liberalize loan terms. Eugene Black has indicated his willingness to use his good offices to facilitate these ends in view. Fowler Hamilton * Source: Washington National Records Center,RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 65 A 481, Development Financing, FY 1962. Official Use Only. The source text, which was sent through the Secretary of State, bears the notation “DR per GWB” in the Secretary's handwriting. Three charts and two tables of statistical material attached to the source text are not printed. 133. Memorandum From President Kennedy to the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hamilton) 133. Memorandum From President Kennedy to the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hamilton) Source Washington, March 2, 1962. SUBJECT Terms of Aid Development Loans I concur in your proposal in your memorandum of February 9, 1962, 1 to establish liberal terms as a basis for development lending. Our fundamental purpose in offering these loans is to advance the development of countries who are already mobilizing their own resources extensively, whose needs are great, but whose capacity to repay will come only with the long run development of their national economy. Long term, low interest loans will allow carrying out many high priority and worthwhile development projects and programs which meet the stiff stand-ards set by Congress and the Executive Branch, but for which financing on conventional terms would be either unavailable or inappropriate. At the same time, I agree that we must also retain substantial flexibility in our loan term policies so that we can suit both interest rates and maturities to the individual situation. Countries have different repayment capacities justifying differing loan terms. Some kinds of loans, such as those for private and public revenue-producing projects or for short and medium term economic requirements, should usually be made on terms considerably more strict. As we expand our lending programs, I am concerned that we construct a lending strategy involving foreign assistance loans, the Export-Import Bank, and the Inter-American Bank Trust Fund which builds on the individual advantages and specialties of each agency, and which ties in closely with the international lending agencies. To this end, I would like you to investigate thoroughly the use of consortia as a means of correlating our programs with those of others, and ways by which we can strengthen the organizational and administrative leadership of consortia. 2 I would further like to have your advice on other steps we might take to increase the coordination of the several U.S. and international lending agencies in major countries, and on whether it might be possible to build up functional specialties in certain of these agencies to attack specific development problems. You should assume a primary part in examining these questions and I look forward to your recommendations at such time as you have formulated them. John F. Kennedy * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 286,AID Administrator Files: FRC 65 A 481, Development Financing,FY 1962. No classification marking. An attached memorandum from Dungan to Hamilton, March 5, stressed that the President wanted AID loan policy to be applied in a flexible way and that he was concerned about the United States picking up the soft loans in consortia with other countries. Dungan added that it would be useful during the upcoming review of the AID program with the President “to discuss AID loan term policy along with the other matters under consideration.” Regarding this review, see Document 134 . Subsequently, it was decided to distribute the memorandum, along with Dungan's memorandum, in the NSAM series, and they became National Security Action Memorandum No. 130, March 2. (Memorandum from Charles E. Johnson (NSC Staff) to Battle, Charles Sullivan (Treasury), Joseph Toner (AID/EXSEC), and Osborne Hague (Budget), March 8; Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM No. 130) 1 Document 132 . 2 In a memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, June 6, 1963, Executive Secretary Brubeck noted that he concurred with AID's opinion that this requirement for a study of the use of consortia and of the methods of coordination between the United States and international lending agencies had been fulfilled in the many reports on various aspects of AID programs and should be dropped from follow up reports to the White House. A handwritten note on this memorandum reads: “8/7/63, ‘OK to drop' per Bromley Smith.” (Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) 2) 134. Memorandum of Conversation 134. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, March 9, 1962. SUBJECT Conversation with the President on AID Matters PARTICIPANTS The President Mr. Ball Mr. Bell Mr. Dungan Mr. Hamilton Mr. Lingle Mr. Coffin Mr. Gaud Dr. Chenery Mr. Nicholson 1. Mr. Hamilton outlined the division of functions among himself, Mr. Lingle and Mr. Coffin 1 and introduced Mr. Lingle. 2. Mr. Lingle made a brief statement about his approach to his new responsibilities in AID. He said that he intended to make it his first job to get the Agency properly staffed and organized. He thought it was important to have a clear understanding from the President as to the nature of the job that AID was supposed to do, particularly in relation to the Alliance for Progress. 3. The President inquired about the distinction between programs and operations. There were statements by Mr. Coffin, Dr. Chenery and Mr. Lingle to clarify the nature of the programming process and the way in which programs were formulated in a specific case. 4. The President expressed concern about the way in which AID policies in certain countries would be presented to Congress, particularly for India, Poland, Yugoslavia and Ghana. He suggested that Ambassador Galbraith should testify on the Indian situation. He expressed a desire to discuss the policy in the other countries with Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Hutchinson 2 before they testified before the Congressional Committees on this subject. 5. There was an extensive discussion of the Alliance for Progress and the difficulties in getting it properly organized. Mr. Lingle stressed the need for a clear directive from the President to AID so that responsibility would flow in a direct line through the Office of the Administrator to the Coordinator of the Alliance (and a definition of responsibilities for the Alliance within the Department of State). The President explained his reaction to the chaotic picture that was presented in the previous meeting on the Alliance two weeks ago, 3 but agreed with Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Lingle as to the desirability of the Alliance remaining within AID. It was agreed that the Alliance should be visible as a separate entity but not otherwise become a separate agency. The President said that the other AID regional bureaus would have to recognize the special position of Latin America in the AID program at this time and not feel neglected because of the emphasis being put on the Alliance. It was generally agreed that the main problem in getting the Alliance organized was to find a strong deputy for Mr. Moscoso 4 who could take over most of the administrative work and leave him free for program decisions, negotiations, and external representation of the Alliance. The possibility of Mr. Nicholson's 5 being available as a Special Assistant to Mr. Hamilton to help organize the Alliance for Progress was discussed. 6. Mr. Bell outlined his understanding of the way in which the activities of the Export-Import Bank, Food for Peace and other U.S. agencies engaged in foreign assistance should be coordinated by AID. He stated his understanding of the Executive position that the focus of the responsibility to put together the various agencies' positions in a particular country and coordinate the U.S. action should be the Administrator of AID and the regional Assistant Administrators. The President asked Mr. Ball for comments on this point, and Mr. Ball agreed with the statement made by Mr. Bell. Mr. Bell was asked to prepare a directive which would clarify this relationship. * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 65 A 481, White House, FY 1962. Confidential. Drafted by Chenery on March 10 and approved in the White House on April 20. The meeting was held at the White House. Attached to the source text is a note from Easum to Hamilton, March 20, indicating that a draft of the memorandum of conversation had been approved with minor changes by Lingle and Coffin, and Easum initialed clearance for Hamilton on the note. An attached undated memorandum from Battle to Dungan indicates that the memorandum of conversation had also been approved by Ball. 1 Walter L. Lingle and Frank M. Coffin were Deputy Administrators, AID. 2 Presumably Edmond C. Hutchinson, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Europe-Africa, AID. 3 Reference may be to a February 16 meeting of several senior administration officials with the President on the Alliance for Progress. (Memorandum of conversation, February 16; Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149, January-July 62) 4 Teodoro Moscoso, U.S. Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress. 5 Presumably James T. Nicholson, member of the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Assistance. 135. Paper Prepared in the Agency for International Development 135. Paper Prepared in the Agency for International Development Source Washington, April 4, 1962. ES/D-26 (Rev.) DOLLAR REPAYABLE DEVELOPMENT LOAN TERMS I. Scope of Paper This paper sets out the criteria which govern the establishment of the terms of all AID dollar repayable development loans. These loans include those which may be made under the authority of Chapter 2, Titles I (Development Loan Fund) and II (Development Grants and Technical Cooperation) and Chapter 4 (Supporting Assistance). The purpose of the paper is to assure reasonable consistency in the establishment of AID loan terms. II. Basic Criteria A. AID loan terms will be based primarily on an estimate of the borrowing country's capacity to service long-term foreign debt. B. A 40-year maturity, 3/4 of 1 percent credit fee and 10-year grace period will be applied to most of the less-developed countries. C. When analysis of long-term foreign debt-servicing capacity shows that a particular nation's prospects are more favorable than that of most of the countries, harder terms will be applied. III. Combinations of Development Loan Terms Either of the following two combinations of terms will be employed as appropriate unless other terms have been approved by the Administrator. (A) (B) Maturity 40 years 15, 20 or 25 years Grace Period 10 years 0 to 5 years Interest 3/4% credit fee 3/4%, 3-1/2% or 5-3/4% IV. Application to Specific Countries A. On the basis of a periodic world-wide review, the combination of terms applicable to each potential borrowing country is established in Attachment A. B. The Administrator will approve any changes in this pattern in the absence of a world-wide review. V. Other Considerations A. Terms for short-term, emergency balance of payments or budget support requirements will include a maturity of up to 5 years, 3-1/2 (or more) percent interest and a grace period when necessary not to exceed two years. B. For loans to private borrowers and to public self-liquidating revenue-producing projects, procedures will be utilized to maintain a normal debt burden on such borrowers without unduly aggravating the host country's balance of payments difficulties. Thus, in the usual case, a two-step arrangement will be concluded between the borrower, the host government and AID, which provides for dollar repayment by the borrower on normal terms (approximating Export-Import Bank terms). However, this loan may be repaid in local currency to the host government, which then will assume the obligation to repay AID in dollars but on terms similar to those which otherwise would be established by AID for direct loans to the host government. AID also retains discretion when appropriate, to establish direct loans on normal terms to private enterprise and revenue-producing self-liquidating public projects. Attachment A 40 Year Package LA Bolivia El Salvador Guatemala Haiti Honduras British Honduras Nicaragua Paraguay FE Burma Cambodia Indonesia Korea Laos Philippines Taiwan Vietnam AFE Ethiopia Ghana Liberia Morocco Nigeria Somalia Sudan Tunisia Ivory Coast Mali Sierra Leone Uganda Kenya Tanganyika Gabon Other African Countries NESA Afghanistan Jordan Turkey Egypt Yemen Ceylon India Pakistan Nepal Terms on Chile and Colombia will be determined as a result of discussions on the consortia to be established for these countries. * Source: Washington National Records Center,RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 65 A 481, Development Financing, FY 1962. No classification marking. The source text, labeled “FINAL DRAFT,” was forwarded under cover of a memorandum from Easum to AID Executive Staff, April 4, for discussion at a meeting of the Executive Staff on April 5 at 8:30 a.m. For an unofficial record of discussion of this meeting, April 5 (ES/RA-23), which was attached to the source text, see the Supplement. 136. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to the President's Special Assistant (Dungan) 136. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to the President's Special Assistant (Dungan) Source Washington, April 14, 1962. SUBJECT Comments on the Attached Paper, “Dollar Repayment Development Loan Terms” 1 1. The paper seems to me good as far as it goes with the exception of one or two minor points which I discuss below. However, it errs by omission in failing to deal with the question of what the mix of loans available to any given country will be. In no country is it likely that all the aid will be given in terms of a single set of loan conditions. Therefore, some countries may in fact be receiving some loan funds on the A basis and other funds on the B basis. 2. The division of countries suggested in the appendix seems reasonable. It is consistent with the internal surveys of stated development in Latin America made by Hollis Chenery's office. 2 A minor point is that Chile seems to have disappeared from the list of Latin American countries. 3 3. 5B raises a problem. It appears to imply that development banks and similar institutions in recipient countries must always make loans to private enterprise at “normal” (equal commission?) rates. One of the functions of these development banks is to encourage private investment by making capital available at lower rates. It may be argued that this raises the problem of subsidizing individual entrepreneurs to their personal profit. This is a genuine problem but one which should be met by the tax system of the host country in such a way as to permit re-investment of profits but to penalize high personal consumption out of entrepreneurs' incomes. CK * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 65 A 481, Development Financing, FY 1962. Official Use Only. Forwarded under cover of a memorandum from Dungan to Lingle, April 19, which noted in part: “I thought you might be interested in having Carl's comments which appear to be quite pertinent.” 1 Document 135 . 2 These surveys have not been found. 3 A marginal handwritten note next to this sentence reads: “This has been repaired.” 137. National Security Action Memorandum No. 146 137. National Security Action Memorandum No. 146 Source Washington, April 20, 1962. TO The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Attorney General Director of Central Intelligence Director, Bureau of the Budget SUBJECT Improvement of Police Training and Equipment in Newly Emerging Countries The President is interested in seeking improvements in the equipment and training of police forces, particularly in the capitals and other major cities, of many of the newly emerging countries to assure that they can maintain order without the excessive use of violence. In addition, the President is interested in having a review made of whether the organizational location of technical assistance on police training should remain under AID or be handled in some other manner. The President would like to have you designate representatives to participate in a study of these two questions under the leadership of the Department of State. As a part of this study he would like to include an examination of the police techniques in the United States, in France, Italy and other selected countries to assure that our technicians are aware and take advantage of the extensive police experience in these capitals. In addition, he would like to have the study avail itself of the work already done by the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency). 1 The President wishes to have your recommendations as soon as possible concerning ways to improve the training and equipping of police forces in sensitive areas and what organizational changes, if any, are needed to improve our performance in this field. McGeorge Bundy * Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM No. 146. Confidential. An information copy was sent to General Maxwell D. Taylor. 1 NSAM No. 124, January 18, 1962, which established the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) is printed in vol. II, pp. 48 - 50 . 138. Letter From the President's Military Representative (Taylor) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) 138. Letter From the President's Military Representative (Taylor) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) Source Washington, April 20, 1962. Dear Alex : I am writing you in your capacity as Chairman-designate of the interdepartmental committee set up to implement National Security Action Memorandum No. 146. 1 My purpose in writing is to make available to your committee my personal views on this important matter of improving U.S. organization and techniques in support of police training in foreign countries. In considering the requirements for police-type training abroad, I am first struck by the diversity in the problems of various countries. In some, the primary need may be for crime prevention and routine police techniques such as are found in our city and state police forces in the United States. At the other extreme there are other countries with a requirement for paramilitary constabulary forces of the kind maintained in many Latin American countries to offset the armed forces and to protect the regime against subversion and coup d'etat. Between these extremes are many gradations which involve activities related to the work of the FBI, the Army, and the CIA. Thus, every country tends to pose a special police problem to be diagnosed and resolved by our ambassador with the help of his country team. It is his task to produce an effective program suited to the needs of his country which utilizes all U.S. assets to meet the local situation without concern for departmental lines of jurisdiction. This local plan should represent the best use of U.S. assets to meet the particular indigenous problem. I have no difficulty with this concept and consider that its general acceptance would meet, in principle, the organizational requirements abroad, provided that our ambassadors understand their responsibility and are acquainted with the assets of the various Federal departments at home which can support them. The difficult question is how to deal with these differing country team programs when they reach Washington. They will, presumably, arrive through State Department channels but, after reaching State, they must be sent to some focal point in the Government where over-all responsibility will rest for their implementation and support at the Washington end. It appears to me that this focal point could be in State, in AID, in Defense, or in a newly created agency. As I am instinctively averse to the latter solution except as a last resort, I feel that we should first explore thoroughly the relative merits of the first three solutions. It is this exploration of pros and cons which I would regard as the primary task of your new committee. It might be worthwhile to ask State, AID and Defense to submit separate plans showing how they would carry out their responsibility if this task were assigned to them. Such a plan should include the designation of the key individuals who would be nominated to the principal positions. Of one thing I am quite sure, namely, that the head man must be a strong figure, supported by a joint staff representing AID, FBI, Defense, and CIA. I would prefer to find this individual in AID, but the primary consideration is to get the best man and set him up in the best place to produce results. This pragmatic consideration, I feel, should take precedence over any question of principles with regard to civil versus military control or any related scruple. Please excuse the long letter on the ground that my work in the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) has aroused a very keen interest in the police training program. I am at the disposition of your committee for any follow-up discussion which you may desire. Sincerely, Maxwell D. Taylor * Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM No. 146. Secret. 1 Document 137 . In an April 25 memorandum to the heads of the other Departments participating in this study, Secretary Rusk formally designated U. Alexis Johnson as chairman of the committee. (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM No. 146) 139. National Security Action Memorandum No. 150 139. National Security Action Memorandum No. 150 Source Washington, April 20, 1962. TO The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense SUBJECT Using U.S. Military Engineers as Contracting Agents on AID Projects The President would appreciate your exploring the possibility of expanding the use of our military engineers as contracting and supervisory agents on AID projects. He is aware that the Army Corps of Engineers and the Navy's Bureau of Yards and Docks are now working very effectively in this capacity on a number of projects. He recognizes that there may be situations where, for political or economic reasons, we can not use the engineers this way. However, he believes that we should take advantage of their skill and excellent reputation wherever possible and that some expansion of their activities may be of considerable value to our aid programs. Would you please review the opportunities and problems in this field and report your recommendations to the President by 1 June. 1 McGeorge Bundy * Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM No. 150. Confidential. Information copies were sent to General Taylor and David E. Bell. NSAM No. 150 apparently originated with a suggestion from Chester Bowles who, after traveling in Iran, Ethiopia, Egypt, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, observed that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers could make a “massive contribution” to the U.S. overseas development effort. (Airgram 355 from Karachi, March 6; Department of State, Central Files, 611.90D/3-662) A memorandum from Harold Saunders to McGeorge Bundy, April 16, followed up on Bundy's request for an NSAM on this subject. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM No. 150) 1 The deadline for the report was later extended to September 1, 1962. (Memorandum from Bundy to Rusk and McNamara, June 13; Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316,NSAM No. 150) For a follow-up response in a memorandum from Acting AID Administrator Coffin to McGeorge Bundy, October 30, as well as a dissenting view contained in a memorandum from Robert L. Moorman, Deputy Director of Engineering (AID), to Fowler Hamilton, November 9, see the Supplement. 140. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hamilton) to President Kennedy 140. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hamilton) to President Kennedy Source Washington, May 25, 1962. SUBJECT Methods for Improving the Coordination of Economic and Military Aid Programs In accordance with NSC action 2447 of January 18, 1962, 1 the Agency for International Development has studied ways in which improved planning and programming techniques might contribute to more effective coordination between economic and military aid programs. A report on the subject is attached to this memorandum. 2 The main conclusions and recommendations of this study, which I will summarize below, have been discussed with the agencies concerned 3 and have been agreed to in principle. I propose to carry them out promptly. 1. Purpose, Character and Scope of Program Coordination The aim of improved coordination between military and economic aid is to enable both programs to be used more effectively in the achievement of U.S. foreign policy objectives. Coordinated programming of military and economic aid requires (a) an assessment of the balance between the total amounts of each (the “mix” problem); and (b) an examination of ways in which each program can support the other, to the maximum advantage of overall U.S. interests (the “side-effects” problem). While the instruments to be coordinated are the dollar aid programs, it is obvious that meaningful coordination requires examination of the effect of dollar aid on the allocation of the larger volume of non-aid resources available within recipient countries, and particularly on their allocation between military and development uses. To improve coordination, it is necessary that there be greater concert in planning the separate programs both in the field and in Washington. Traditionally, the determination of how much should be allocated to each program has usually proceeded by separate consideration of the military and the economic results to be achieved. The combination of military and economic aid received by a country as a result of this procedure has not previously been subject to significant revision on the basis of an evaluation of total U.S. objectives in the country. Deliberate assessment of the proper balance between military and economic programs is intended to rectify this shortcoming. Coordination between the programs is quantitatively a significant problem in only a small number of countries on the Sino-Soviet periphery (e.g., Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, Thailand, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and Greece), although it is worth noting that these countries receive a relatively large share (about 40 percent) of total U.S. military and economic aid. The problem is quantitatively smaller, but not insignificant, in a number of other countries, (e.g., the Philippines, Morocco, Ethiopia, Indonesia and Burma). It is of negligible significance in the majority of aid-receiving countries in Latin America and Africa. However, even in these countries, there is a potentially important problem that requires serious attention in coordinated aid planning. This problem relates to military sales agreements, financed by official U.S. sources, with countries in which MAP grant-aid may be quite small, e.g., Brazil and Argentina. In some cases, the net effect of such agreements may simply be that “economic” aid funds help to finance purchases of military end-items. In any case, because of the impact which such sales may have on the use by recipient countries of their own resources, and hence on the effectiveness of economic aid programs, it is essential that such sales agreements be given coordinated consideration before they are formally discussed with potential buyers. 2. Getting the Best Mix Between Military and Economic Aid As mentioned above, I regard the consideration of alternative ways of using various total amounts of U.S. resources in particular countries and regions as essential for comparing the costs and benefits of different courses of action, and thereby reaching better decisions concerning the use of aid and furtherance of U.S. foreign policy objectives. Various techniques may be useful for conducting the mix studies as part of the regular process of planning programs in major recipient countries. One technique would require a determination in Washington of alternative “high-low” combinations of dollar guideline figures, for military and for economic programs, to guide the formulation and evaluation by the Country Team of different program mixes. This is the technique which is being used this year in Greece, Turkey and Korea in connection with the program planning for FY 1964-1968. Another technique would require formulation by the Country Team of a “minimum” and a “preferred” program for military and for economic aid, without specification of dollar guidelines from Washington. Essentially similar analysis and judgments are called for by both techniques. It is also necessary, with both techniques, to examine the effects over time of the alternative aid combinations. In some cases, of which Turkey may be an example, greater aid allocation to productive investment over a five-year period may permit both more economic growth and a sufficient expansion of self-financed defense outlays to offset some reductions in MAP deliveries. Such an outcome would depend on measures to assure that a large part of the resulting increases in output is devoted to reinvestment and to defense financing by the recipient country. Action Planned: I plan to make the “mix” exercise a regular part of coordinated planning in the key countries in which both programs are large, and to employ, in different countries, various techniques for assessing the aid balance. In other countries, formal exercises of this sort will not be necessary. However, in countries in which significant military sales are contemplated, a corresponding analysis will be required of the political, economic, and military consequences of differing amounts and kinds of sales transactions, before decisions are made. 3. Mutual Support Between Programs In addition to the problem of the proper balance between programs, effective coordination requires that the planning of each program take full account of the opportunities that may exist for supporting the other program. Such complementarities may entail indirect benefits, such as the contribution of improved military security toward raising the productivity of civilian investment, or the contribution of economic and social development toward increasing the effectiveness of internal military security programs. They may also entail more direct benefits, such as the contribution of military infrastructures, technical training programs, and engineering and construction battalions toward raising civilian output; or the contribution of civilian transportation investment to improved military logistics. The general implication of such complementarities is that the design of both military and economic programs should take into explicit account, as secondary criteria of choice, the sorts of side-effects that represent benefits of primary importance to the other program. The aim of this effort should be to find, on the military side, for example, a combination of forces, equipment, and infrastructures that is approximately as effective as other possible combinations, in military terms, and yet performs substantially better, in economic, social and political terms. The design of development programs should make a similar effort to take into account, as secondary criteria of choice, those side-effects that may contribute to advancing the military program. These points are not new. The emphasis already placed on civic action in the MAP planning guidance, in the recent survey teams, and in the AID/DOD formula for funding civic action projects, represents the same approach. But in countries in which the U.S. programs and the domestic defense establishments are relatively large, much more can be done in this direction. Action Planned: In revising programming methods, I intend to place greater stress on the role of non-military side-effects as an important element in the planning of military programs, and of military side-effects as an important element in planning economic programs. In all the relevant countries, the Country Team will be asked to indicate the specific meas-ures and projects by which the local military establishment can provide benefits to the civilian economy, and to estimate the value of such benefits that are being and can be provided. The Country Team will also be asked to identify specific ways in which the development program is providing benefits to the military effort. In one or two key countries, pilot studies may be undertaken to see the extent to which the military program and defense establishment can be appropriately used to obtain substantial non-military benefits. 4. Meshing the Planning and Programming Cycles One obstacle to improving coordination between the programs arises from the fact that their planning cycles are usually out of phase with each other. The A.I.D. cycle starts about six months later than the MAP cycle. This gap gradually diminishes in the next few months, and disappears by March, when both programs are presented to Congress. A gap reappears in the fall when programs are finally approved for execution. The fact that the two program cycles are usually out of phase is not the major obstacle to improved coordination, but it does create problems that interfere with coordination. Probably a greater obstacle has been that the economic programs are usually planned on an annual basis, while the military programs are formulated as part of a five-year plan. The program changes which coordination may require can be more effectively worked out over a five-year planning period than an annual period. Action Planned: I am shifting the planning of economic programs to a five-year basis, comparable to the military programs, in countries where it is feasible and desirable to do so. In order to mesh the cycles, I also intend to take the following steps: (1) To consolidate the A.I.D. and MAP programming and policy guidances into a single document that would go to the field in February or March of 1963, to guide planning of the FY 1965-1969 programs; (2) To request submission by the Country Team of both military and economic plans, as parts of a single country assistance strategy, by early or mid-August of 1963. This joint country assistance plan would allow for prior consultation between the Ambassador and the Unified Commander concerning the proposed submission; (3) Beginning in the summer and fall of 1962, to make the inter-agency review of each program a more effective joint effort for identifying issues relating to program coordination, and, beginning in the fall of 1963, to hold these inter-agency hearings at about the same time in the cycle. 5. Personnel, Organization and Procedures for Coordination Besides the foregoing suggestions concerning methods of coordinated programming, coordination can be furthered by various administrative and procedural measures. Some of these measures relate to exchanging A.I.D. and ISA personnel in Washington, as well as encouraging a few A.I.D. people periodically to attend key courses at the Military Assistance Institute, and a few ISA and prospective MAAG personnel to attend the Institute for International Development conducted by A.I.D. A number of other suggestions have been advanced concerning arrangements that might be made in the field. One of these would establish an assistant director for economic-military planning in three or four of the relevant U.S. A.I.D. missions (e.g., Korea, Thailand, Vietnam and Turkey), and an assistant MAAG chief for economic-military planning in several other relevant countries (e.g., Greece, Iran and China). Another suggestion, advanced by the Budget Bureau, is to establish a central, coordinating staff attached directly to the Ambassador to perform essentially the same function. A third suggestion is to establish an A.I.D. advisor, attached to the Unified Command, whose aim would be to bring economic considerations into the process of reviewing MAAG plans at the Unified Command level. Action Planned: Some of these suggestions are alternatives. Some are mutually supporting. I intend to test in various countries several, and maybe all, of the suggestions relating to organizational and personnel arrangements in the field. In addition to arrangements of this sort in the field, improved coordination requires some modification of organization and procedures in Washington. Organizationally, it requires that A.I.D., besides administering the economic aid programs, strengthen its capacities and procedures for program coordination. For this purpose, the central A.I.D. coordinating staff must be intimately associated with both military and economic programs and must function as an impartial advisor to me to help in carrying out coordinated planning techniques, and to identify issues that require decision by me in my role as program Coordinator. In this connection, I envisage the following coordinating procedure in Washington: (1) In the light of a comparison between alternative aid mixes received from the field, the coordinating staff of A.I.D. would prepare a list of issues, together with its suggestions for resolving them; (2) After suitable inter-agency discussions, including appropriate consultation with the Advisory Group on military assistance, I would make decisions on these issues; (3) If any objections remained, the Department of Defense could, of course, appeal such decisions to the President. Action Planned: I intend to put the above suggestions into effect, as far as possible, in connection with the current Washington review and evaluation of the “mix” exercises on Korea, Greece, and Turkey, and to develop and adapt them for future use, as appropriate. To encourage closer relations between the agencies concerned, I also plan to have periodic meetings of top policy-making officials to consider problems of mutual concern to both programs. Fowler Hamilton * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM No. 159. Confidential. 1 Document 130 . 2 The report, entitled “Methods for Improving the Coordination of Economic and Military Programs,” May 24, is not printed. 3 An example of the interagency process is the detailed review of an earlier draft of the report by Komer in a memorandum to Frank Coffin, May 2; see the Supplement. 141. National Security Action Memorandum No. 159 141. National Security Action Memorandum No. 159 Source Washington, May 31, 1962. MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Administrator,AID SUBJECT Methods for Improving the Coordination of Economic and Military Aid Programs 1 I have reviewed the memorandum submitted by the Administrator, AID 2 in response to paragraph 4 of NSC Action 2447 and generally endorse the actions he plans to take. While I recognize that considerable experiment may still be necessary before we devise the most effective techniques for getting the best overall “mix” of US aid to any given country, the actions planned appear to me to be a major step in the right direction. I expect the AID Administrator, as part of his responsibility for continuous supervision and general direction of foreign assistance programs, to put the new procedures promptly into effect. It is my desire that all agencies concerned render him full and effective cooperation to this end. If any major complications arise in this process, I would like them brought promptly to my attention. I also desire a progress report on actions taken and any further recommendations in the light of the experience gained with the new procedures no later than 15 January 1963. 3 John F. Kennedy * Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM No. 159. Secret. A copy was sent to David Bell. 1 In a May 31 memorandum to the President, Komer provided background on the problems of coordinating military and economic aid. He also indicated that the President's staff and the Bureau of the Budget strongly supported the AID proposals, and suggested that the President sign this NSAM “to put the necessary steam behind the exercise,” which was “designed to endorse AID's efforts and to stimulate Hamilton to take hold firmly of his supervisory responsibilities.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM No. 159) 2 Document 140 . 3 Monitoring the progress of this report as well as the related tasking for a final report on NSC Record of Action No. 2447 (see Documents 130 and 140 ) are summarized in Department of State, Follow Up Reports: Lot 70 D 264, Vols. VI-IX. Ultimately, the White House agreed to defer the report on NSAM No. 159 for further review (memorandum from Herbert Gordon (S/S-S) to John A. McKesson (S/S), October 9, 1963; ibid., Follow Up Report for the Period May 29, 1962 through June 1964), but the report still had not been submitted by late 1963 when the President's Committee To Examine the Foreign Assistance Program assumed responsibility for the review of foreign military and economic assistance planning. See Document 175 . 142. Letter From President Kennedy to the Ambassador to India (Galbraith) 142. Letter From President Kennedy to the Ambassador to India (Galbraith) Source Washington, June 22, 1962. Dear Ken : Yesterday I had a meeting with Fowler Hamilton and his Regional Directors to discuss the effect of aid programs on our balance of payments. 1 In the course of the discussion I asked how effectively we could tie the funds we were giving. As I understood the responses of the several Regional Directors, this varies greatly from country to country, depending on the pattern of trade. I am not sure that they have made their point clear to me or that they answered the arguments you made on your recent visit for a more effective and complete tying program. I have asked Carl Kaysen, who listened to the discussion, to write the attached memorandum for you, setting forth the issues as they arose out of that discussion. 2 I would appreciate it if you would respond to him with as much technical detail as seems appropriate and without the limitations that you might feel in discussing the matter with one who is not a professional economist. Sincerely, John F. Kennedy 3 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 6/11/62-6/24/62. Confidential; Eyes Only. 1 The President met with Hamilton and other AID personnel on June 21 from 4:10 to 5:35 p.m. (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Books), but no further record of this meeting has been found. A June 18 memorandum from Dungan to Hamilton outlined four subjects for discussion at the meeting: general review of AID budget and programming processes, review of program progress in FY 1962 by regions, elimination of procedural defects, and peculiarities in some of the regions. (Washington National Records Center, RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 65 A 481, White House, FY 1962) 2 Document 143 . 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Kennedy signed the original. 143. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to the Ambassador to India (Galbraith) 143. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to the Ambassador to India (Galbraith) Source Washington, June 22, 1962. SUBJECT Tied Aid 1. We are now tying a very substantial proportion of our aid, and we propose to go even further in this process. The current flow of foreign payments on the aid account reflect earlier commitments made when we were not trying to enforce the present degree of tying. The attached memoranda give some figures on the magnitudes involved for FY 1963. 1 I am sure you have seen them, but you may not have a copy available to you in New Delhi. For FY 1963, total overseas expenditures are $1,022 million out of $3,271 million total expenditures on the aid account (excluding PL 480 and MAP, which gives rise to almost no foreign expenditures). This total involves three major elements: One, use of AID funds for dollar procurements in third countries. Two, various kinds of transactions, the sum and substance of which is the use of dollars to acquire local currencies. Three, contributions to international organizations. These amount respectively to $241 million, $690 million, and $149 million. The third item is a contractual obligation which we cannot control. This leaves the first two. 2. Offshore purchases from third countries, as they are called in the barbarous language of AID, now come almost entirely from other underdeveloped countries. As you know, there is a list of 19 prohibited countries, including all the industrialized countries, from which offshore purchases are forbidden, except by special waiver. The characteristic example of what now happens is that, say Pakistan, is allowed to use dollars to buy steel from India rather than from the U.S. It is argued by AID that cutting off this possibility would involve an ultimate loss that outweighed the gains in immediate dollar savings. First, it would greatly increase the cost of steel to Pakistan and thus diminish the effectiveness of our aid proportionately. Second, it would deprive India of a market which is economically here. This is more important for India, for whom outlets for her newly growing industrial exports are a problem, than it is for more advanced countries. Finally, since India's aid claims are scrutinized in light of its total flow of foreign resources, the dollar saving is only transitory. A decrease in India's opportunity to earn dollars by trade will generate a demand for an increase in aid, which in substantial part will have to be met. As you see from the discussion in the attached memorandum, the major part of the third-country procurement has occurred in your part of the world. 3. The larger item which we can try to control is the purchase of local currencies for dollars, either in the form of budget support, contracts for local services, direct hire of foreign personnel, or whatever. An inspection of the figures shows that this kind of activity is most heavily concentrated in Latin America and Africa (see Table I of the April 6 memorandum). 2 This, in turn, reflects two facts: (a) Many of the countries in these areas do not now possess adequate governmental machinery for raising funds internally, whether by taxation or borrowing, and applying them to aid programs. (b) In these same countries, the will may be as deficient as the means. Our own political interest in getting aid programs started and in focussing heavily on those programs which are immediately visible—health, education, and housing, for example—means that in the absence of means and will for providing local resources through local means, we must resort to the use of dollars to purchase local currencies in one fashion or another. As you know, we are now moving, not entirely independently of stimuli from you, to require that the U.S. funds so used be placed in segregated accounts which can be spent only in the U.S. 4. However, this does not entirely solve the problem. Where a country has small exchange earnings, where it spends a small proportion of the earnings in the U.S. in any event, and where dollar aid is large in relation to the previous flow of exchange earnings, tying can be relatively effective. This is the case for some of the smaller Latin American countries. However, it is not the case for many countries, and especially not for large countries such as India. It does not seem possible to make such countries treat all dollar aid as a net addition to their demand for U.S. exports. It is not, of course, that it is inconceivable that a mechanism can be found for this purpose. Rather, any mechanism would require agreement by the country concerned and acceptance by other suppliers, which I think it highly unlikely we can achieve. Further, if we could achieve it, it would be at a cost to ourselves which would negate in large part the very purpose we seek to attain. In the first place, such restrictions on purchases from non-U.S. suppliers would be inconsistent with our attempt to get other countries to bear a larger part of the costs of providing aid. They, too, could play at the game of trying to force recipients to spend all receipts in their currencies directly on their own goods. Second, the countries themselves would be unwilling to impose so drastic an alteration in their patterns of supply. If we tried to get them to do so, we would defeat in some degree the political gains we seek to achieve by aid. Further, even if these alterations in behavior were possible, they would take some time to achieve. I am convinced that it is unwise to treat our balance of payments problem as if it were a permanent one and alter our fundamental policies and practices in a long-run way to correspond to a temporary problem. I do not deny that we can do something more than we have been able to do in respect to the purchase of local currencies for dollars, and that there are arguments against this practice quite independent of our balance of payments difficulties. I think, however, it is a mistake to view this as a magnitude which can be pushed down very substantially below its present level. 5. The conclusions I draw from this discussion are twofold: One, we should certainly do as much as we can to see to it that dollar expenditures in connection with aid are only those necessary to achieving the aims of the aid program. We should do the same in other areas of government expenditure. However, I think we should not expect that this in itself will change the current balance of payments deficit into a surplus. What is more important, we should recognize that the problem caused by large foreign holdings of dollar claims that might cause a run on the dollar has only an indirect and not a direct connection with the continuing deficit in our balance of payments. My own judgment is that we have to go further than we have gone in attacking this problem directly. It would be a mistake to focus all our energies on the balance of payments part of the problem and none on those actions which can directly affect the likelihood that foreign holders of dollar claims will try to turn them into gold at a rate which we cannot stand. This memorandum is not the place to argue this point in detail, but I mention it simply to put the matter in proper perspective. Carl Kaysen 3 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General. Confidential. The source text accompanied the President's June 22 letter to Galbraith, Document 142 . 1 No memoranda are attached to the source text and, with the possible exception of the April 6 memorandum cited in footnote 2 below, are not further identified. 2 Reference may be to an April 6 memorandum from Frank M. Coffin to Secretaries Rusk and Dillon, describing a joint Treasury and AID study underway on possible means of lessening the impact of the foreign aid program on the U.S. balance of payments. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Balance of Payments and Gold) 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 144. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development's Executive Assistant (Funari) to the Administrator (Hamilton) 144. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development's Executive Assistant (Funari) to the Administrator (Hamilton) Source Washington, June 23, 1962. SUBJECT Summary of Meeting with White House Staff, June 23 1 Mr. Dungan opened the meeting by saying that he thought the session with the President on Thursday, June 21, was helpful. 2 However, he said that the President noted certain deficiencies in preparation for that meeting and that there were certain problems concerned with A.I.D.'s presentation. Dungan said, in his opinion, that it was unfortunate that facts and figures were not at fingertips when called for by the President. He indicated that the President was unhappy with the inability of A.I.D. to provide information on (a) the follow-up and implementation of loans and projects, and (b) the effect of these loans, grants and projects on balance of payments. Dungan stated that nearly all of the questions that the President might ask could have been anticipated and could be anticipated in future meetings. Dungan further indicated that at the next meeting A.I.D. officers should be prepared to tell the President what can be done with the existing A.I.D. program to help the dollar and gold reserve positions. 3 He indicated that the President is much concerned. For example, he said, was it necessary for the U.S. to provide for local costs, particularly in housing? Mr. Coffin replied that he could understand the President's concern but was not sure that in the development aspect of A.I.D.'s program much improvement could be made vis-a-vis balance of payments problem. Mr. Dungan was then called from the meeting. Mr. Kaysen agreed that local currency costs were the big problem. But he believed that A.I.D. needed a schedule of what can be done on given amounts of money. He believed that a priority list with costs of each individual item should be prepared so that A.I.D. could present to the President a meaningful schedule of expenditures and what those expenditures would accomplish. At the previous meeting A.I.D. officers were not successful in convincing the President that A.I.D. was able to scrutinize the expenditures in relation to what they accomplished. He cited the Vietnamese matter as an example. Mr. Janow 4 vigorously protested. He stated that A.I.D. officers had strenuously objected to the use of A.I.D. funds for what were essentially military and political purposes. He stated that FE had contested DOD, CIA and State every step of the way; but that he had been overruled in every instance. Kaysen replied that perhaps A.I.D. had not stood up to the pressures and that, in any event, if there was a substantive issue involved here the President should have been informed about it prior to the time a decision was made by the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense. Mr. Janow replied that Mr. Forrestal 5 of the White House had been informed, that A.I.D. had been successful in reducing the amount from $25 million to $10 million and that members of the White House staff had informed him that political and military considerations were of overriding importance. Mr. Kaysen then made the point that A.I.D. does not have the internal procedures necessary to substantiate its case and has not, as a general rule, communicated that case effectively to the decision makers. Mr. Hutchinson commented that in the conflict of military and political considerations on one hand and development considerations on the other, that A.I.D. would never win. Mr. Kaysen replied that A.I.D. must nonetheless make the effort and apprise the President prior to the time of a hard decision being made at Cabinet level. Mr. Amory 6 interjected at this point to say that he thought that the A.I.D. officers were correct in contending that DOD and State must also be made aware of the President's concern over the balance-of-payments problem. Mr. Kaysen went on to indicate that at any time A.I.D. funds are expended on programs or projects in which A.I.D. does not believe, the President should be informed. He intimated that the President is not always aware that A.I.D. funds are expended to meet commitments made by the Department of Defense and State. Kaysen then urged A.I.D. officers to use the White House staff to warn the President before the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense make decisions involving A.I.D. funds. Mr. Gordon 7 commented that there was disagreement in the White House staff on these matters and he believed that this presented a problem. Mr. Kaysen replied that these members of the White House staff generally in touch with specific areas could be expected to present the arguments and debate the issues before the President. However, he commented again that the essential problem was that A.I.D. did not have the internal procedures necessary to make clear its position and to inform the President of the effects on the balance-of-payments position of the commitments made for political and military consideration. Mr. Coffin then commented that, if this is the information that is needed, the meeting on Thursday 8 would be too soon. He stated that A.I.D. would have to set up an internal machinery to flag balance of payments problems on each outlay of funds. He instructed PRCS to meet with the Program Officers of each regional bureau to start work on this immediately. Mr. Gordon commented that it was difficult to estimate the effect on the balance of payments in the first instance of each outlay. In effect, A.I.D. would be telling the President, not only the effects on balance of payments, but whether to aid the country or not, which was essentially a policy matter rather than a procedural one. There followed a brief general discussion of the reply that was to be made to the President's memo of June 22nd. 9 Mr. Kaysen indicated that it was not intended that the President should act as a loan officer. However, he insisted that A.I.D. should be able to present a schedule that will tell the President what the effects of each loan, grant and agreement would be on the balance of payments position. Mr. Coffin raised the matter of waivers of procurement. Mr. Waters 10 commented that there was no standard, from a balance of payments viewpoint, by which one might judge effects of waivers of procurement. Mr. Coffin then asked that the meeting with the President be postponed until after July 4th. Mr. Kaysen replied that he would attempt to get it for July 3rd and that most likely it could be postponed until after July 4th. 11 Mr. Kaysen departed from the meeting. Mr. Coffin then instructed Mr. Gordon to prepare the necessary materials in consultation and conjunction with the various regions. The presentation to the President would include balance of payments problems, internal controls, and some consideration of the general administrative problem implied in Mr. Kaysen's request that the White House be informed prior to Cabinet level decisions. John Funari 12 * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 65 A 481, White House, FY 1962. Official Use Only. 1 Another summary record of this June 23 meeting was prepared by Easum, undated. (Ibid.) 2 See footnote 1, Document 142 . 3 In a memorandum to Secretary of the Treasury Dillon and AID Administrator Hamilton, June 20, President Kennedy stated: "1. I would like in the future for all actions which affect our dollar drain or balance of payments to be brought to my attention before final decision is made. "2. Before any loan stabilization or AID agreement is made I would like to have an indication of what effect it would make on our dollar position.” (Kennedy Library, Dillon Papers, Memoranda for the President, 5/62-6/62) 4 Seymour J. Janow, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Far East, AID. 5 Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff. 6 Robert Amory, International Division, Bureau of the Budget. 7 Lester Gordon, Deputy Director, Office of the Director for Program Review and Coordination Staff,AID. 8 June 28. 9 The reference should presumably be to the President's June 20 memorandum; see footnote 3 above. For Hamilton's response to this June 20 memorandum, see Document 12 . For the President's reactions to it, see footnote 3, Document 12 . 10 Herbert J. Waters, Acting Assistant Administrator, Office of Material Resources, AID. 11 No record of the next meeting with the President, which took place on July 6, 11 a.m.-12:07 p.m., has been found. (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Books) In a memorandum to Hamilton, June 28, Dungan wrote that Hamilton should be prepared to discuss three topics at this meeting: interim reporting system on proposed AID commitments involving the expenditure of funds abroad, the AID internal machinery for evaluating proposals which involve commitments to spend funds overseas, and a review of country programs with special attention to Latin America. (Washington National Records Center, RG 286,AID Administrator Files: FRC 65 A 481, White House, FY 1962) 12 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 145. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, and the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hamilton) 145. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, and the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hamilton) Source Washington, June 23, 1962. I am greatly disturbed at the apparent lack of control and coordination between our various programs in the international field and our seeming inability to assure that our political objectives are advanced by actions taken by AID or other agencies. I have specific reference to the announcement from New Delhi of the signing of a $250 million loan with the Indians at the very time when, in the United Nations, the Kashmir issue was being discussed and the MIG question was very much a live issue. 1 In these circumstances, I believe it essential that, under the leadership of the Secretary of State, a procedure is developed to guarantee that before any major action is announced, such as an economic or military aid agreement, to explore fully its coordination with our foreign policy objectives. This procedure should precede any action. For example, I understand this week that Chile, Venezuela, Ireland 2 and the UAR all abandoned an agreement that they had to sponsor the Kashmir resolution, leaving us holding the bag. It seems to me that some indication of our displeasure might be manifested by the slowing up of our AID agreements with those countries. Ireland finally came through. 3 I would appreciate it if you would develop this procedure at the earliest possible time. John Kennedy 4 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, DOD, Vol. IV, 6/62. Secret. 1 The Soviet Union had proposed the sale of MIG planes to India. 2 The word “Ireland” was inserted by hand. 3 The last sentence was added by hand. 4 Kennedy's signature appears in an unidentified hand, indicating Kennedy signed the original. 146. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 146. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State Source New Delhi, July 9, 1962, 7 p.m. 91. Department pass White House. Eyes only to Kaysen for the President. The President's letter and accompanying documents were delayed en route. 1 Accordingly I am using telegram to expedite response. In recent years I have not believed that we could defend the aid program politically were it “both” a large budget charge and a substantial drain on payments balance. Since aid is an essential offset to our foreign policy we must minimize its impact on payments balance by every feasible means. (As I think you know, this is not a new conviction. I repeatedly blocked proposed democratic-liberal attacks on the Eisenhower administration for tying the DLF outlays.) Every step to minimize dollar loss will have some effect on the convenience, efficiency or effectiveness with which aid program is conducted in the particular country. Some damage to objectives of the aid program cannot thus be an objection per se. It is only an objection if the damage frustrates goals. This leads me to comment on three other points in your memorandum before I get on to the main business of what we do, to wit: (1) The test of a conserving measure is not as you say on page 3 paragraph 5 of your memorandum that it will fail “in itself (to) change the current balance payments deficit into a surplus.” (Indeed I doubt that you meant this should be taken literally. We would both obviously settle for a healthy improvement.) The goal is to make aid as nearly neutral as possible in balance of payments effect. This increases our ability to use this valuable instrument without balance of payment calculation. (2) I am distressed by your cautionary references about impairing the principle of multilateralism for an essentially short-run remedy. As we both agree, one of the profound tendencies of the American establishment is to commit itself to fashionable principles per se and not examine their effect and the effect of change on their effect. Multilateralism has worked well in these last years because we have paid for it. It has not worked in this century unless someone was financing it with large capital exports like ours in the twenties and again in the fifties. Germany, France and Italy can now be multilateral as hell (though not as multilateral as we are) because our deficit eases all the strain and more. But as the establishment has yet to realize no country is multilateral if it has payments problems and no country, not even Switzerland, would be. These are questions to be decided not on high principle but at the low level of national policy. (3) I agree with your perspective pertaining point about liquidity arrangements and I too yearn to keep my card as a professional economist on these subtleties. But the fundamental problem is still what we earn abroad as against what we spend abroad. And that is properly the subject of our present concern. However, as usual, I mostly approve your analysis and I now turn to affirmative action. This requires three broadly related steps as follows: (1) Recognition that flat purchase of local currency for dollars is, on the whole, a most wasteful form of aid justifiable only in emergency circumstances. Special cases like Vietnam apart, we buy local currency in countries that have not reached the stage of development where they can use capital imports from the United States or where we must bribe the government into domestic reforms. Local currency generated by dollars accomplishes nothing in the first instance that straightforward credits from the central bank would not accomplish. (Some of these programs trace to the time when Randalls 2 of the world were uniting in defense of prehistoric view of currency management.) At a later stage the local currency does expand demand including demand for imports. In the absence of internal planning, in the presence of large differences in incomes and in the absence of exchange control, these reserves will ultimately finance imports of consumers goods or services (including travel) mostly for the comparatively well-to-do or the minority with American-European consumption standards. There is a nice question whether we should finance such imports even from United States. But, as you properly note, from Africa this demand will flow naturally to Europe. And even South Americans long ago learned that Parisian brothels are safer, cheaper, more conveniently located and possibly even more imaginative than those of New York. (2) The first part of the remedy is to accord a highly unpreferred rating to this form of aid. (For schools which you mention our main thrust should be provision of help with books, equipment and teacher training rather than local budget support. Local currency should come where at all possible from local taxes. We should adhere where possible to the old rule that we supply the foreign exchange component.) However, I concede the need for bribing virtue in some cases. And even though we persuade countries to create currency this has the well-recognized effect of expanding demand including demand for imports. We should be willing, perhaps as a fairly common course, to establish reserves against local currency expansion that is issued for approved purposes. However, we must establish firm rules. These reserves should under all circumstances be held in New York. And it should be part of the bargain that they may be drawn upon only for approved categories of procurement in the United States. At one step this policy reduces the supply of dollars floating around outside and gives partial control over both the place and object of use. To work out these arrangements will be time-consuming and inconvenient and there will, accordingly, be strong arguments against them from men who, naturally, want to get on with the job. Such objections call for sympathy without concessions. (3) There remains, however, the third problem which is that dollars from trade can be easily substituted for dollars from aid. Except where trade earnings are negligible, to tie aid will lead only to a redirection of trade earnings if these customarily go elsewhere. Accruals from the provision of dollar-backing for the currency in the cases just cited can be spending for austere objects that would be required in any case from the United States while releasing other hard currency earnings for the Place Pigalle or for that matter Schneider-Creusot. Here, however, the problem is no longer peculiar to aid in the form of local currency purchases. It exists wherever aid is combined with other sources of dollars, the possibilities depending on geography and the amount of other convertible currency available for switching to non-dollar procurement. And we must think of this indirect leakage at several levels. A South American country uses tied dollars for essentials in the US and has its untied dollars for elsewhere. India gets aid to cover most of its needed dollar procurement and uses its trade-earned dollars in Germany. Then there is a deeper leakage when India or Pakistan get non-project aid on PL-480 wheat or cotton and thus do not have to curtail purchases in Germany to div up the necessary dollars for these resolute essentials procurable only in the US. The only answer here is a measure of mild bilateralism. Aid being a substitute for American purchases, we must begin to put into all our significant aid agreement provisions against such substitution. The Nigeria formula is in the right direction. I do note the highly unmilitant determination in the aid memorandum—“would appear to require an effective system of exchange control…not always desirable…experiment will be (carefully) observed with a view to (possibly) extending.” And the Nigerian case does not deal at all with what I have called the deeper leakage, i.e., the fact that aid or PL-480 gets free what would otherwise have [to] be bought in the US leaving earned dollars for Europe. Here, and this is most important, we must keep solidly in mind that the colonial world which we have inherited has trade channels, specifications, consumer habits, financial arrangements, and a dozen other ties which automatically guide trade to the erstwhile European Motherlands. (In India and Pakistan it is infinitely easier to buy from England than elsewhere and where else can you get one where you pull the chair.) To combat and overcome this continuing bilateralism, which it is, we must have responses of our own and the aid leakages make them urgent. First we must formulate a rule. It is broadly that major recipients of our aid—we can safely ignore the de minimus countries and should—should have expenditures in the US as compared with the total in the other industrialized countries that are about in the same proportion that their combined aid and trade accruals in dollars are to the combined accruals from the other advanced countries. This effort should initially be hortatory but no less vigorous for that reason. We can say that, if our costs prove to be seriously higher as the result, we will consider this in the aid allocation. We can afford to spend more for a reduced dollar drain. Note also that at any significant level of development, import controls to stop frivolous overseas use of scarce resources are essential and especially for countries receiving scarce dollar aid. Even in the most primitive country foreign trade is subject to some guidance and we can help. You are wrong, I am sure, in suggesting that such action will invite retaliation. The major European countries cannot apply this rule because they are away ahead of it and for them the use of similar measures is not a matter of abstract principle but of need. On the other hand such pressure by us will encourage the European countries to extend more credits because they will not be financing their trade to the underdeveloped world out of our dollars. You will be interested to know that I broached this line of thinking to both Desai and Jha 3 before they left on their current hunting trip. Both concede that we are financing their Western European imports, both were deeply depressed at the thought of redirecting their trade and both immediately asked if they could say in their discussions of aid with the Germans and other Western Europeans that the Americans were thinking along these lines. If hortatory efforts do not suffice, the next step would be gentlemen's agreements in negotiation of aid arrangements. Only then something stronger. In communicating these ideas to the President you should not minimize the horror that they will arouse in the more theological of his followers. Nor should you fail to remind him that on these matters I am usually right though at that stage in time just before the need for action becomes generally evident and when as a result sensible proposals invariably arouse the maximum of righteous indignation. 4 Galbraith * Source: Department of State, S/S Eyes Only Microfilm. Confidential; Priority. Relayed to the White House. 1 Documents 142 and 143 . 2 An apparent reference to Clarence B. Randall, Chairman of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy during the Eisenhower administration. 3 Morarji Desai, Indian Finance Minister, and Bibodanan Jha, Chief Minister of the Indian State of Bihar. 4 For reactions to Galbraith's views as set forth in this telegram, see the memorandum from Dick Cooper, Council of Economic Advisers staff member, to Kaysen, July 13; Kaysen's memorandum to the President, July 13; and Dillon's memorandum to the President, July 17; all in the Supplement. 147. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk 147. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk Source Washington, July 10, 1962. I have held two reviews of the overseas expenditures of AID with Mr. Hamilton, his Regional Directors and other members of his staff on June 21 and July 5 [6]. 1 Under Secretary Ball was present at the second of these meetings. Their purpose was to make clear to those responsible for administering the AID program how urgently they should pursue the task of holding to the minimum the balance of payments drain consequent on AID programs. All development loans are now tied to U.S. procurement. A large share of the AID expenditures that create claims against dollars arise from cash grants and local currency purchases. Many of these have in the past been in response to crisis situations; recent examples are South Vietnam and Argentina. I think it would be most helpful if you were to see that the same sense of concern about the balance of payments impact of these programs was transmitted to your geographic bureaus, which must appraise requests for emergency funds. John F. Kennedy 2 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Balance of Payments and Gold, 6/62-3/63. Confidential. Copies were sent to George Ball, Fowler Hamilton, and David E. Bell. 1 See footnote 1, Document 142 , and footnote 11, Document 144 . 2 Printed from a copy that indicates Kennedy signed the original. 148. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy 148. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy Source Washington, July 11, 1962. SUBJECT Coordination of Actions and Announcements on Economic and Other Assistance I fully share your concern regarding the control and coordination of our foreign assistance actions to assure the accomplishment of our foreign policy objectives. 1 I am calling together top State and A.I.D. officials to ensure that they understand your concern and that our procedures are responsive to the task. I am also writing to the Secretaries of the Treasury and Defense, the Director of USIA, and the President of the Export-Import Bank to ask their cooperation in this matter. The Secretary of Defense has already assured me of his full cooperation not only in connection with military aid announcements or actions but also with respect to military sales arrangements. Assistant Secretaries of the geographic bureaus of the Department will be assigned full responsibility for assuring that the full range of political and other foreign policy considerations are considered prior to foreign assistance action. A.I.D. Assistant Regional Administrators will have the responsibility for keeping their counterparts in the geographic bureaus apprised of pending aid assistance actions and announcements, including P.L. 480 programs. If an issue arises in the discharge of these responsibilities, the issue will be referred immediately to the A.I.D. Administrator, Fowler Hamilton, and, if necessary, to me. I will, of course, bring to your attention particularly sensitive matters. I am asking each Assistant Secretary to give this matter his closest personal attention and exercise the tough-mindedness required for the advancement of American interests. This involves a high degree of judgment. This process must inevitably involve judgments as to what is in the national interest—both in the short-run and in the long-term. Fowler Hamilton and I will be prepared to discuss this matter with you further after our meeting with State and A.I.D. senior officers. Dean Rusk * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, AID, 1/62-8/62. Confidential. A handwritten note on the source text indicates the memorandum was taken from the President's weekend reading of September 13. 1 See Document 145 . 149. Editorial Note 149. Editorial Note The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development held its tenth meeting in Paris July 25-26, 1962, to discuss the results of the first annual Aid Review and future work. Ambassador James W. Riddleberger served as head of the U.S. Delegation and chairman of the meeting. Frank M. Coffin, AID Deputy Director, was also a member of the U.S. Delegation. For text of the communnique issued at the end of the meeting, along with a resolution adopted by the Committee on July 26, see Department of State Bulletin, September 10, 1962, pages 395-397. For Riddleberger's telegraphic report on the meeting to the Department of State, July 31, see the Supplement. Other documentation on the DAC meeting is in Department of State, Central File 800.0000. 150. National Security Action Memorandum No. 177 150. National Security Action Memorandum No. 177 Source Washington, August 7, 1962. MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Attorney General The Administrator, AID The Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT Police Assistance Programs I hereby approve the recommendations of the interdepartmental committee on Police Assistance Programs, 1 and direct that they be promptly put into effect as follows: 1. The US should give considerably greater emphasis to police assistance programs in appropriate less developed countries where there is an actual or potential threat of internal subversion or insurgency; to this end, while individual programs should be subject to normal review processes, AID should envisage very substantial increases in the global level of the FY 1963 program, with further increases in subsequent years where there is a demonstrated need. The DOD should also give, where appropriate, increased emphasis to the police aspects of existing MAP programs. 2. The Committee's statement of the role and function of police programs and criteria for their initiation in its report [is to] be the basis for guidance in Washington and to the field; using this guidance, AID should insure that Washington agencies and country teams give appropriate priority to police assistance, including equipment where needed. 3. Subject to the general policy guidance of the Secretary of State in internal defense matters, the Administrator of AID is charged, in his capacity as coordinator of US aid programs, with responsibility for coordination and vigorous leadership of all police assistance programs; that he establish an interagency police group, to be chaired by his designee, to assist him in this responsibility. 4. AID is charged with operating and funding responsibility for all such programs, except for their covert aspects and for those programs which the Administrator of AID, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, decides should be carried out by the Department of Defense. 5. To carry out its responsibilities, AID should establish an office specifically charged with police matters, staffed with sufficient qualified personnel to: (a) provide centralized professional and technical planning guidance to the country teams, police missions and State and AID regional bureaus; (b) provide professional and technical guidance and professional and technical supervision in implementing programs; (c) establish and supervise training requirements for US police technicians, and standards for evaluating professional competence; (d) to conduct surveys and program evaluations; (e) to provide an essential repository of technical knowledge based on research in the latest techniques of controlling subversion and mass violence; AID should appoint a senior professional to head this office, responsible to the Special Assistant-Internal Defense with direct access to the Deputy Administrator; while line responsibility for AID police programs remains with each regional AID bureau, sufficient professional personnel should be assigned to the new Office to provide the centralized staff support outlined above. 6. AID should promptly devise methods for improving recruitment and training of personnel especially suitable for work with foreign police forces; other US agencies should cooperate in making qualified personnel available for duty with the police assistance program without prejudice to their career status. 7. AID should initiate the necessary studies and interdepartmental coordination looking toward early establishment of an international police academy under Government management to coordinate training more closely with US internal defense objectives and tighten US Government control over all training to improve its quality and insure its responsiveness to need. 8. To protect police programs, with their primarily internal defense rationale, from suffering as marginal competitors with primarily economic development projects, AID and the Bureau of the Budget should develop some means of providing the necessary degree of funding autonomy, such as creating a new AID line item for “internal defense” in the FY 1964 budget or funding through the Military Assistance Program though keeping the program in AID. 9. AID should develop ways to expedite a delivery of equipment, perhaps through stockpiling standard items. 10. Wherever possible, we should coordinate our police effort with similar programs of other friendly Western countries to assure that they are complementary; we should encourage such countries to provide similar assistance where appropriate, but not rely exclusively on them for this purpose; our aims in this respect should be to assure that adequate Western assistance is available to any country which needs it to deny the police assistance field to the Communist Bloc. 11. The Administrator of AID, as coordinator of US aid programs, is charged with carrying out the above recommendations, 2 and he should report to me no later than 1 December 1962 on progress made; 3 this report should include his revised FY 1963 and proposed FY 1964 program level. 12. The Special Group (C-I) should review the implementation of the Police Committee Report in accordance with the responsibilities assigned under National Security Action Memorandum 124. 4 John F. Kennedy * Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM No. 177. Secret. Copies were sent to Dillon and Bell. 1 These recommendations, contained in a July 20 memorandum from the Interdepartmental Committee on Police Assistance Programs to President Kennedy, as well as additional documentation on the formulation of police assistance programs, are scheduled for publication in volume VIII . 2 A letter from President Kennedy to Hamilton, August 7, emphasizing the importance of the AID role in launching this program, is in the Supplement. 3 This report is contained in a memorandum from Acting AID Administrator Coffin to the President, December 1. (Washington National Records Center, RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 67 A 1530, Chron Files, Dec. 1-9, 1962) For comments on the report, see the December 6 memorandum from General Maxwell D. Taylor to McGeorge Bundy, and the December 10 memorandum from Michael Forrestal to McGeorge Bundy, both in the Supplement. 4 NSAM No. 124, January 18, which established the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency), is printed in vol. II, pp. 48 - 50 . 151. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions 151. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions Source Washington, August 29, 1962, 4:06 p.m. 353. Ref: Tokyo CW 8841 May 4, 1962. 1 Others CW 9447 May 5 [25], 1962. 2 Unless you see overriding objection to the contrary, please approach immediately highest appropriate government official and urge government make substantial pledge to World Food Program at Pledging Conference scheduled New York September 5, 1962. Inform said official that United States plans to pledge three year program, including $40 million in commodities and $4 million in shipping serv-ices, both at world market prices. In addition United States will pledge, subject to matching provisions and Congressional action set out below, $6 million in cash, which may be reduced to $5 million to the extent that additional shipping services are required. Cash pledge is subject to availability of appropriated funds. Cash pledge will also be subject to matching formula similar to that governing United States contributions to UN Special Fund and ETAP wherein United States contribution is managed so as not to exceed 40% of total. USG hopes other countries will likewise make equally generous contributions, thus avoiding any review of our own cash pledge. FYI. United States pledge will also be accompanied by the condition that USG will have to give prior approval in each individual case where United States commodities, services or cash are used for a World Food Program project. 3 This condition is necessary to avoid use of our contribution in countries and programs currently proscribed by legislative or administrative directives. FAO should be informed of this condition, but it is not necessary to so inform other governments since this condition is not expected to result in any curtailment of our pledge once that pledge is approved by Congress. 4 Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 800.03/8-2962. Official Use Only; Priority. Drafted by Nathaniel McKitterick (IO/OES) on August 28; cleared by Richard H. Roberts (Agriculture) in substance, David Richardson (AID), Frank K. Hefner (IO/OIA), Charles M. Hill (EUR), and Louise McNutt (FE); and approved by Harlan Cleveland (IO). Sent to Paris, London, Bonn, Rome (Embassy and FODAG), and Tokyo. For background on U.S. policy toward multilateral world surplus food programs in 1961, see the memorandum from L.D. Battle to McGeorge Bundy, October 28, 1961, and McGovern's memorandum to Secretary Rusk, November 2, 1961, both in the Supplement. 1 This instruction, sent to Embassies in FAO member countries, asked officers in charge to hold consultations with the governments to which they were accredited regarding prospective pledges to the World Food Program, unless they felt an approach at this time might be counterproductive. (Department of State, Central Files, 800.03/5-462) 2 This instruction, a slightly revised text of CW-8841, was sent to all Western European posts (including Reykjavik, Dublin, Vienna, and Belgrade), except Athens and Helsinki. (Ibid., 800.03/5-2562) 3 At the United Nations/FAO Pledging Conference for the World Food Program, held at U.N. Headquarters in New York on September 5, the United States pledged the amounts specified in this telegram along with a number of reservations. See Yearbook of the United Nations, 1962, pp. 238-239. 4 According to a letter from Secretary of Agriculture Freeman to Cleveland, October 15, leaders of the House and Senate Agriculture Committees deleted Title V of the Food and Agriculture Act of 1962 (enacted September 27, 1962), which would have given the Department of Agriculture explicit authority to participate in the World Food Program, and refrained from further denial of such authority under Title II of P.L. 480 and other legislation only after Freeman's personal assurance “that the Department of Agriculture would be the primary point of contact, in cooperation with the State Department, between our Government and the World Food Council.” (Department of State, Central Files, 800.03/10-1562) 152. Memorandum of Conversation 152. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, September 25, 1962, 3:30 p.m. SUBJECT Standard Oil Company's Opposition to AID Loans for Public Sector Oil Expansion PARTICIPANTS The Under Secretary Mr. David Sheppard, Executive Vice President and Director, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey Mr. Cecil Morgan, Executive Assistant to the Chairman of the Board on Public Affairs, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey U—Mr. Allan Robbins, Special Assistant (for International Business) to the Under Secretary SOA—Mr. F.D. Leatherman, India Desk Officer, Economic Affairs, Office of South Asian Affairs Following an exchange of pleasantries, Mr. Sheppard expressed the concern of his company with respect to reports that the GOI was asking AID for a large amount of money for financing public sector petroleum projects in India which could be financed with private capital and which would compete with the Standard Oil Company. The Under Secretary said that there had been a request for financing of a pipeline, the foreign exchange cost of which might amount to about $5.5 million. Mr. Sheppard said that he did not wish to take the Under Secretary's time to discuss a problem involving a small amount of money in one country. In a larger context his company wished to express its opinion that public funds should not be diverted to areas of activity in which private capital stood ready to do the job. He left a copy of a memorandum (attached) 1 on the subject, with the Under Secretary and Mr. Robbins. The Under Secretary said that he appreciated the viewpoint of the Standard Oil Company; so much so in fact, that he had dwelt heavily on the part of private enterprise in development in his September 18 speech before the annual meeting of the World Bank (IBRD). 2 He read a part of the speech (pages 6-9) and gave copies to Messrs. Sheppard and Morgan. The Under Secretary also remarked that the Department in recent instructions (CW-8639 of April 27, 1962, and CA-2673 of September 11, 1962) 3 to all Foreign Service Posts had reminded our Ambassadors and other officials abroad of their continuing responsibilities with respect to support for and protection of American private business abroad. The Under Secretary said that Mr. Robbins would be dealing with problems of American business abroad as they occur in all parts of the world and would welcome a continuing exchange of views with the ESSO representatives. * Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Official Use Only. Drafted by Leatherman on October 1 and approved in U on October 11. 1 Not attached and not found. 2 The text is printed in Department of State Bulletin, October 15, 1962, pp. 575-582. 3 These instructions are in Department of State, Central Files, 200.11/4-2762 and 200.11/9-1162, respectively. 153. Memorandum of Conversation 153. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, September 26, 1962. SUBJECT West German Foreign Aid PARTICIPANTS Germans The German Ambassador 1 The Minister for Economic Cooperation, Walter Scheel Gustav-Adolf Sonnenhol, Ministerialdirektor, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation Fritz Stedtfeld, Ministerialdirigent, Ministry of Economics Werner Johann Lamby, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation Hans Juergen Duerr, Press Chief, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation Americans The Under Secretary Deputy Assistant Secretary William C. Burdett Edwin M. Cronk, American Embassy, Bonn George S. Springsteen, Office of the Under Secretary Jacob J. Kaplan, AID/IDOS Joseph E. O'Mahony, EUR/GER Magnitude of German Aid Following introductory remarks by both sides, Minister Scheel opened the discussion by stating that he was anxious to receive Mr. Ball's comments and suggestions regarding the appropriate magnitudes of aid various industrialized countries might be expected to supply to the LDC's. He pointed out that this subject is of such importance that it must be discussed amongst donors at the highest levels of government. As far as the Federal Republic is concerned, Minister Scheel maintained, fairly successful foreign economic assistance programs have already been launched and are being implemented. The Federal Government faces a number of problems and uncertainties, however, in regard to the future of the German economy and the size and type of foreign aid program it will be in a position to make available from now on. He pointed out in this connection that current German foreign aid cash outlays are made from funds derived to a large extent from extraordinary, non-recurrent sources (proceeds from the sale of Volkswagen shares, etc.), but that future official aid program payments must come almost entirely from a budget which is already overburdened. The Under Secretary replied that aid problems, including those related to the need for giving regular consideration to how much economic assistance various countries might provide, will be with us for a long time. We must expect to encounter difficulties in attempting to sustain our aid expenditures. The American and German people may not always be aware of the necessity for maintaining foreign aid programs of sufficient magnitude to do the job that needs to be done. Tangible results from foreign economic assistance usually occur slowly and they may not always be apparent to the public. We will need to discuss aid problems with each other on a regular basis, the Under Secretary stated, and we must keep in mind that matters such as the magnitudes of various countries' aid programs have political as well as economic implications. There must, of course, be a mutual recognition of each country's independence. When the U.S. makes certain suggestions regarding the magnitude of effort the U.S. or Federal Republic might take on as part of the common task, we are in no way suggesting that West Germany is an auxiliary power in this task. We expect to receive suggestions from the Federal Republic, and we are anxious to be of help to the Federal Republic where we can. Minister Scheel responded that he wanted to assure Mr. Ball that the Federal Republic does not in any way regard U.S. suggestions as demands. The Federal Republic fully realizes that there is a very important and large job to be done, that it cannot be done by one country alone, and that there must be an apportionment of the effort. The Federal Republic, declared Minister Scheel, does not intend to retreat from the current average level of economic assistance being extended to the LDC's. Chancellor Adenauer, Scheel added, committed the German Government to this policy at a recent news conference. 2 The Federal Republic, the Minister went on, is prevented from doing more than this by financial realities. The West German economy is not surging ahead any longer, and so tax revenues are not increasing to the same extent as in previous years. Deficit financing is impossible—the Federal Government must operate within its revenues—the constitution requires it. Given rising defense expenditures, therefore, there are severe limitations on the amount of funds available to the Federal Government for foreign aid. The general guideline for German foreign aid, Minister Scheel explained, will be DM 3 billion, or approximately one percent of gross national product. As gross national product increases, the DM 3 billion annual target will be adjusted. However, the Federal Republic might not provide exactly this much every year, but will make it available on an average over a period of years. In 1961, for example, commitments ran far above DM 3 billion. In other years, therefore, they can be expected to run under DM 3 billion. Public funds, Minister Scheel went on to explain, will not be sufficient to finance the full DM 3 billion annual program. Consequently, private funds must be tapped for this purpose. Private investment, after all, said the Minister, is usually a better form of aid than public investment. The Federal Republic realized a need exists for both kinds of investment, though, and will provide both. Development Loan Terms The Under Secretary pointed out that a meeting of minds is necessary on development lending terms. Differences in the terms attached to foreign loans extended by various countries, Mr. Ball stated, can, among other things, create political problems for us. When the U.S. finds it necessary to extend a very large volume of assistance to a particular country “to keep it from going down,” and that country receives loans from other sources on much less liberal terms, the effect is that the U.S. is underwriting the repayment of these other credits. Such situations are obviously difficult to justify. Minister Scheel answered that maturities for West German long-term development assistance credits have been stretched from 15 to 20 years. Such terms were never heard of in the Federal Republic prior to World War II. Interest rate policy is to charge 3-4 percent for loans connected with infrastructure projects, 4-5 percent on mixed infrastructure-commercial projects and close to German market rates on purely commercial projects. The latter rates, Scheel added, are almost always very far below the market rate of interest prevailing in the LDC requesting the loan. Perhaps one reason U.S. and German development loan terms tend to differ in places, Minister Scheel remarked, is that in extending development assistance the Federal Republic looks primarily at the soundness of a given project and the outlook for its success, while the United States looks primarily at the balance of payments situation of the country. This whole subject of criteria for aid is going to be discussed in the DAC. While the Federal Republic has moved somewhat in the direction of the U.S. position on this question, very significant differences continue to exist between our two sets of criteria. The Under Secretary pointed out that we are certainly very much concerned about the soundness of the projects we help finance, but we are concerned at the same time that the LDC's do not pile up debt service burdens that will lead to financial crises. The LDC's, the Under Secretary added, must be taught financial responsibility. It could be extremely unsettling for LDC's to get into the habit of allowing themselves to get into financial trouble in the belief that they will always be bailed out. If we fail to take into account the ability of the LDC's to meet their foreign debt obligations, we are not doing them a service. The DAC, the Under Secretary suggested, should examine the amortization curves of the foreign debts of the LDC's to avoid crisis conditions from developing. The DAC should take into account the ability of the LDC's to increase their export earnings. Unfortunately, many LDC's are unfamiliar with export promotion. In this regard, the OECD can be helpful in alleviating some of the trade problems facing the LDC's. Minister Scheel agreed that the DAC and OECD should do these things. He added that in his opinion increased trade is the key to the problem of economic development. It is easier, even if less effective, to give capital to the LDC's than to open new markets for them. At the same time, however, we must be careful, Scheel warned, to see that our investments in the export industries of the LDC's—especially the Latin American LDC's—are adequately planned on a worldwide basis. We must avoid investing in the banana or coffee industries of every LDC. Otherwise, we will only contribute further to the flooding of the world markets with such products. Aid Coordination One piece of unfinished business that lies before us at this time, Mr. Ball stated, is the determination of the roles individual Atlantic nations should play in contributing toward the common effort. We can expect the United States to take a leading role in certain places, the Federal Republic can take the lead in other places, and the EEC can do the same elsewhere. The role of the Federal Republic can be fairly broad, especially since it is unencumbered by a recent history of colonialism. As colonial arrangements were dissolved, the Under Secretary continued, power vacuums were created in many parts of the world. The Federal Republic has considerable freedom of movement throughout the less developed regions which certain other countries possess to a considerably less extent. The question remains, however, just who will do what, where. It is the U.S. view that the DAC can play an especially useful role in this regard. The DAC is still in a very early stage of development. We think it can be improved upon and made a more useful instrumentality for achieving this type of coordination. Minister Scheel replied that the Federal Republic is willing and anxious to coordinate its foreign aid policies and operations with other donor countries. The DAC seems to him also to be the best instrumentality for doing this, but he must agree that the DAC is in need of improvement. We have to consider DAC's future very carefully. For example, the DAC should be called in at an early stage to help plan development programs for LDC's and to decide upon assistance arrangements. The World Bank and the DAC need to cooperate very closely. Minister Scheel then went on to say that the whole matter of coordination and of reaching decisions about the sharing of responsibilities for development assistance is taken very seriously by the German Government. The Federal Republic may appear particularly sensitive about its role at times—it is a new participant in the foreign aid field and needs to gain experience. The Federal Republic does not intend to escape from its responsibilities, but there are a great many problems to work out concerning the best means of coordinating our activities. Africa Minister Scheel said he was somewhat concerned regarding our approach to Africa. The Federal Republic feels that, despite the language and ideological barriers which tend to come between Africa and the West, impulses exist which can lead to desirable relationships between these two areas. The nations of the Atlantic Community must take advantage of these impulses, Scheel declared, and help determine future developments on the African continent. This work cannot be left in the hands of international organizations. For one thing, we do not know what the goals of these international organizations may be. We must make our own approaches—only in that way will we know they are being made in pursuance of the goals we establish. The U.S. and the Federal Republic, the Minister said, have no special relationships with particular African countries such as other European powers have. U.S. and FRG interests will be served by African economic development. It has been his observation that the more stable African countries are those which are more pluralist in structure, especially in industrial structure. Single industry economies are the least stable. To become economically sovereign the African countries must expand their relations with many other partners. The Minister went on to say that Africa is in need of a long-term trade and development plan. Such a plan should be worked out as soon as the UK joins the EEC. Attitudes Toward Private Investment and Property Minister Scheel expressed the view that the availability of large-scale public capital may be having an adverse effect on the flow of private capital. Public capital should supplement, not replace private capital, Scheel said. The terms assigned to public loans are so much more advantageous to the borrower, however, that enormous efforts are made to obtain such funds and the possibility of securing private financing is often neglected. Furthermore, countries that have an unfriendly attitude toward private foreign capital seem to feel they can discourage the inflow of such investments and make up the loss by appealing for foreign aid. Scheel described situations of this kind as intolerable. The Under Secretary said that he made a similar point in his speech the week before to the IBRD, and added that actions against foreign capital also tend to discourage domestic private investment. The U.S., Mr. Ball explained, does not intend to infringe upon the sovereignty of any LDC, but if an LDC is intent upon following a policy of this sort it must face the consequences. Minister Scheel and the Under Secretary agreed that economic development would be fostered by a freer flow of capital. Mr. Ball pointed out that internal savings are insufficient to finance economic development programs in the LDC's. These countries are dependent today upon foreign investment capital much in the same way the U.S. was during its early period of development. We are not infringing on the sovereignty of the LDC's, Mr. Ball added, if we tell these countries that we have no intention of sending public capital into their economics to do the job that domestic or foreign private capital can be induced to perform. In the past, declared the Under Secretary, we were overly reluctant to make this clear. In the future we should say it, and say it uncategorically. During the first half of this year, the Under Secretary pointed out, there was a net outflow of private capital from Latin America. A development of this sort tends to defeat the economic development efforts being made with public funds. Minister Scheel pointed out that the Federal Republic recently has refused to grant guarantees for investments in Brazil and India because these countries have refused to enter into agreements with the FRG for the protection of private capital. The Federal Republic would like to see an international agreement concluded on private property protection, but, said the Minister, the U.S. has appeared very reserved to this idea. Mr. Ball pointed out that the U.S. aid legislation requires us to terminate assistance to countries that expropriate private property without adequate compensation. The Under Secretary concluded by saying that the United States has not taken a doctrinaire position on the advisability of an international agreement such as described by the Minister. * Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential. Drafted by O'Mahony on October 4 and approved in U on October 16. 1 Wilhelm C. Grewe. 2 Not further identified. 154. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy 154. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy Source Washington, November 16, 1962. Mr. President: I should like to put in my 2# worth on the choice of a new Director of AID. 1 I know that Dave Bell is not eager to take the job, and his reluctance is a factor that naturally must weigh heavily with you. I wish to argue for appointing him despite it. AID is the major positive instrument of our foreign policy; it needs the best man we can get. I think I know enough about the AID program and its problems, and I know Dave Bell well enough to make my observations of some value. As I see it, there are three central tasks in the job: a. To comprehend the purpose of the whole spectrum of aid activities and relate them to the broader purposes of our foreign policy, and to articulate this relation in a meaningful way, both for the agency itself and for the rest of the government; b. To take a firm grasp on the managerial and administrative problems of the agency; c. To provide Congress with an understandable rationale for aid expenditures, and to show immediately by argument and then by performance that there is some relation between spending money and achieving our objectives. The three tasks are strongly interrelated. One reason for declining Congressional confidence in foreign aid is the lack of understandable purpose in the program. A succession of administrators has failed to produce a comprehensible account of the national interests served by foreign aid and how the programs they are defending will achieve them. This, in turn, has reflected the difficulty of explaining what they themselves do not understand. Our new emphasis in economic development is important, but economic development as such is only part of what we are doing in AID, and the promotion of economic development in every country of the world is not of equal interest to the United States. Generalized blanket explanations of the desirability of progress are poor justifications for particular programs. If AID is organized, operated, understood and explained only as a large collection of individual projects spread over 80 countries, its vulnerability to criticism will remain high. Dave Bell combines better than anyone in sight the qualifications for doing all three tasks. His previous training and experience have given him both a deep understanding of what foreign aid can and cannot do, and direct practical experience of how it does what it can do. His work within the government has demonstrated his administrative and managerial talents. The difficult double task of relating the conception and design of our aid program to the rest of our foreign policy, and at the same time meeting the radically different operating requirements of running an aid program can be done better by someone who has seen both parts of the task from the inside, as Dave has. I cannot, of course, speak to the question of Dave's persuasive powers with the Congress from first-hand knowledge. He is not a novice: he now has had two years of experience in dealing with appropriations committees. My second-hand understanding is that he has won their respect, as he has won the respect and confidence of everybody in the Executive Branch with whom he deals. The combination of experience and training that Dave brings to the job is such that there would be almost no start-up time involved in his taking over the management of the enterprise. He knows most of the top people and, what is more important, he knows and understands the problems. My own observation of Fowler Hamilton is that, for all his intellectual gifts, he never really did achieve a clear understanding of what he was trying to do. Finally, Dave has the physical and moral energy and drive needed for one of the most demanding and difficult jobs in the government. 2 CK * Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office File, Staff Memoranda, Kaysen. Confidential. 1 Fowler Hamilton submitted his resignation as AID Administrator on November 10, and he left office on December 7. 2 President Kennedy appointed David E. Bell to succeed Hamilton as AID Administrator on November 28. Bell took the oath of office on December 21. His confirmation hearing on January 22, 1963, is in Nominations of Christian A. Herter, William T. Gossett, and David E. Bell: Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-eighth Congress, First Session (Washington, 1963). His appointment was approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 23 and confirmed by the Senate on February 19. Kermit Gordon succeeded Bell as Director of the Bureau of the Budget. 155. Memorandum of Conversation 155. Memorandum of Conversation Source New York, November 20, 1962. SUBJECT Secretary's Discussion of Population Problems with Foundation Executives PARTICIPANTS Secretary of State Mr. John D. Rockefeller, III, Rockefeller Foundation Dr. Leona Baumgartner, Assistant Administrator for Human Resources and Social Development—AID R.W. Barnett, E/ES List of other Participants Attached. 1 On November 20 at 5 PM, Mr. John D. Rockefeller 3rd was host at a meeting where Secretary Rusk talked about population problems to about 30 executives of American foundations. The meeting was held at the Studio Apartment of the Radio City Music Hall, 61 West 50th Street, New York City, N.Y. Mr. Rockefeller introduced the Secretary. He said that he found grounds for discouragement in the growing magnitude and complexity of the population problem, and grounds for encouragement in the apparent growth of responsible interest in achieving some kind of an understanding of its nature, and willingness to explore possible solutions. He said that he believed that private foundations and the government had much to gain from exchanging views on this matter, and expressed his gratitude that the Secretary had consented to participate in a meeting for that purpose. The Secretary said that the relationship of population trends to possibilities for improved economic and social welfare was, of course, important. He would be influenced by several prejudices, he said, as he proceeded to discuss the problem with the particular audience he was facing. First, as a former member of the community of foundation executives, 2 he would feel particularly sensitive about the impropriety of anyone in government intruding upon the trust which they bore as executives of private foundations. Second, problems posed by population trends were urgent, but other problems were urgent too. He would make no effort to influence foundations' decisions on priorities of urgency. Third, he was skeptical about the need at this stage of coordination of work in this field. The need was initiation and an expansion of activity in which “everybody could pitch in”. The Secretary said that something like an “explosion” of interest in population problems seemed to be taking place. He believed that the government had had something to do with this. For example, over the last three or four years, there had been a shift from short to longer term planning of programs to meet the needs of aid-receiving countries. This change in approach brought to the fore, for many countries, the importance of taking into account demographic trends. It had been said that five countries in the world now have population policies. It was likely that other countries will be wanting to follow suit. The Secretary considered the obvious increase in United Nations interest in the population problem to be a reflection of its members' growing concern with the matter; the UN seemed to be moving now from activities of a purely informational character to “action” programs, i.e. technical assistance. United States internal political considerations, the Secretary said, are not really central to the US Government's formulation of ways to act effectively on the population problem. This was not to say, he observed, that population policy was not a sensitive issue. It was. However, it was a sensitive issue in other countries as well, and sensitivities were involved in countries' dealings with each other. The heart of the matter lay in the fact that for quite a few countries rates of population growth seemed to cancel prospects for improvement of economic and social welfare, despite intensive efforts to promote economic development by savings and foreign aid. Economic development is, the Secretary said, a terrifying challenge for native leaders of these countries. Many of them had argued that the growth of strength and prosperity in their countries was frustrated by colonial administrators. With this authority now removed, native leaders must make headway in proving their capacity to show economic and social progress, or be swept aside in favor of others who are promising that they have the capacity to do so by other means. The Secretary declared his continued conviction that less-developed countries can achieve success with free institutions but he recognized that failures could cause resort to alternatives. Addressing himself specifically to what government and foundations can do in this situation, the Secretary dwelt first upon the role of government. Government can help to create and keep alive continuing interest in the relation of population changes to economic and social development. If asked for information, advice, or assistance on population problems, the government can respond to requests. The government can keep in contact with private organizations. It can do more research of its own. The Secretary's own guess was that the National Institutes of Health would be doing more research. Government needs, however, he said, the stimulus of ideas, and it needs the research which private organizations produce. Government cannot and should not crusade. If and when a foundation develops an interest in the population problem, it should decide for itself which of its phases it is best equipped to take hold of. Foundation experience over the past thirty years or so can cast some light on possible fields of practical activity. There remains much room for expansion of old activity and exploration of new. The Government is not “overwhelmed” by the difficulties which are sometimes associated with the political sensitivities about this problem; there are needed things to be done by both government and private organizations. We need not fear doing them. The Secretary then threw the meeting open for general discussion. In response to questions from the audience: He replied to Mr. Rockefeller's inquiry about how “communication” might be improved among all those interested in population problems by saying that he hoped that there could emerge a number of centers of information where a pooling of knowledge and of reports about general activities could have some influence on decisions. Dr. Baumgartner (AID Assistant Administrator for Human Resources and Social Development) expressed the hope that her office in AID could, over time, serve as another point of contact. Responding to a question by Mr. Kenneth Thompson (Rockefeller Foundation) about the possibility of “Luke” Battle calling a regional conference for Africa, Mr. Barnett (E/ES) summarized the present activities of the economic commissions for Asia and the Far East, Latin America and, specifically, Africa. He observed that it was the Department's view that often effective results were produced when population problems were talked about multilaterally amongst countries with common political, economic, cultural and religious problems. It was desirable, whenever possible, to eliminate the national imprint from information and advice about population problems, and particularly so in Latin America. The Secretary stressed the importance for Americans to respond to requests of other countries where population problems were concerned. The US should not advocate specific solutions, and the US Government officially must make clear that any programs which other countries may, by their own decisions, consider to be desirable are, in fact, their own. He mentioned risks of misunderstanding and possible future recrimination which could flow from deviation from these rules. Population, he said, is not a general problem. It is a problem in specific countries and within those countries in specific localities. Factual information should be assembled and scrutinized case by case. The Secretary deplored the use of slogans to cover blanket solutions of problems. He deplored, by way of illustration, the uncritical advocates of undifferentiated “land reform” and said that population problems did not lend themselves to uniform solutions any more than land problems. The Secretary warned his audience particularly of the risk of promising too much to countries which may have asked for help. The awakening of excessive expectations and then their disappointment could set back progress in this field for 20-30 years, he said. Dr. Baumgartner strongly reaffirmed the Secretary's warning not to promise too much. President Heald, of the Ford Foundation, expressed satisfaction at the good relationship which had been established between his foundation and the Department. Mr. Lamont duPont Copeland spoke about the desirability of American efforts to bring the population problem to the attention of “thought” leaders of foreign countries. Mr. Kenneth Thompson, of the Rockefeller Foundation, expressed some doubt that the US political problem was not a greater impediment to activity in the field of population problems than the Secretary had suggested. At the Secretary's request, Mr. Barnett referred to the interest of the National Catholic Welfare Conference in expansion of research on human fertility; Mr. Barnett referred to Pope Pius XII's approval of the “rhythm method” as a technique of family regulation and the Pope's declared hope that science could make that method more secure. There was Roman Catholic interest in other aspects of the demographic problem. There might be wider areas of agreement than was commonly supposed. Dr. Baumgartner, speaking personally, said that during a trip last year through the Far East she had observed the difference between frank discussion of medical information on all other subjects and reluctance to talk about techniques of family regulation. She wanted to see this ended, and held out hope that it soon would be. The Secretary told his audience that he was certain that there would be a continuing and increasing interest in the population problem. At six p.m. the meeting was adjourned in order to listen to the President's televised press conference. 3 * Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Barnett and approved in S on November 29. 1 Not printed. 2 Secretary Rusk was President of the Rockefeller Foundation 1952-1960. 3 For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, pp. 830-838. 156. Editorial Note 156. Editorial Note The Ministerial Council of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) met in Paris November 27-28, 1962. Under Secretary of State George W. Ball headed the U.S. Delegation, and John M. Leddy, who succeeded John W. Tuthill as U.S. Representative to the OECD effective November 5, served as Alternative Representative. Fowler Hamilton was also a member of the U.S. Delegation. For telegraphic summaries of the Ministers' discussions on development assist-ance (Cedto 505 from Paris, November 28) and trade and aid (Cedto 507 from Paris, November 28), see the Supplement. The communique issued at the end of the meeting included accept-ance of the conclusions of the first annual review of the foreign assistance policies of the members of the Development Assistance Committee. It also “recognized the need for further concerted action to increase the volume and effectiveness of aid to developing countries and to relate it more closely to the development efforts of the benefitting countries themselves.” For text of the communique, November 28, see Department of State Bulletin , December 24, 1962, pages 979-980. On the same day, the Council also passed a resolution on the coordination of trade and aid; it is printed ibid., pages 980-981. Documentation on U.S. preparations for and participation in the OECD Ministerial Council meeting is in Department of State, Central Files 374.800 and 800.0000. 157. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 157. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Source Washington, December 26, 1962, 7:25 p.m. 412. Consider following principles on terms of aid as basic to meeting development needs of developing countries and achieving greater equity in aid contributions of DAC members. Believe they represent significant step forward but are sufficiently moderate to permit agreement by DAC members. Request you make text available to Secretariat and delegations promptly and urge most serious consideration by capitals with view to incorporation in recommendations of WP on terms. London should provide copy informally to Pliatzky, 1 WP Chairman. Assume text will be on agenda January meeting of WP. Statement of principles below does not represent or imply any change in existing US lending policies. "I. Introduction The major OECD/DAC objective of furthering the growth of developing countries requires recognition of the long-term need of most of these countries for net capital inflows over a period of years. Apart from a few developing countries with exceptional foreign exchange earning capacity and prospects, the present and prospective debt-servicing capacity for some years to come of these countries is not adequate to permit the whole or major part of capital inflows commensurate with their development needs and self-help efforts to be provided on commercial credit terms. If development needs are financed mainly or largely on commercial or other insufficiently liberal terms, therefore, many developing countries will assume debt burdens that are excessive and others will add further to debt burdens that are already too great. The consequences of excessive debt burden are: creditors are periodically required to roll over or consolidate debt as emergency meas-ures; reasonable and desirable development objectives may have to be abandoned; developing countries are encouraged to adopt lax attitudes towards debt repayment obligations; business confidence may be impaired with a possible resultant decline in private foreign investment; where creditors do not supplement debt rollovers with adequate aid on liberal terms, other donors of grant aid or loans on terms comparable to IDA terms are placed in the politically awkward and economically unjustifiable position of servicing, in effect, the credits on short term, with high interest or insufficient grace periods of the original lenders. Accordingly, in recognition of these problems, several principles and specific actions are proposed below for DAC consideration and adoption. II. General principles 1. Terms of governmental aid (including grants and loans) should take account of the limited debt-servicing capacity of the developing country, including its present and expected future capacity for effectively using domestic and external capital and the importance of its having available an adequate share of its current and prospective foreign exchange earnings for critical imports. 2. In the case of loans to borrowing enterprises, members should recognize the proper role of interest rates in the allocation of resources within the developing country and provide for interest rates (as well as repayment periods) to the ultimate domestic borrowing enterprise appropriate for the nature of that enterprise. Where the appropriate repayment terms to the lending country, as indicated by recipient country's debt-servicing capacity, differ from the appropriate terms for the enterprise, the donor should make an arrangement to provide for meeting both criteria. (A two-step loan procedure is one way; another which has been suggested by some governments would be to accompany loans on terms appropriate to the project with grant aid to permit debt-service by the government without excessive burden.) 3. Terms of aid should be sufficiently liberal as to allow the needed margin of debt-servicing capacity of the developing country for accepting financing from foreign private sources and international institutions. 4. Terms of aid of each donor should be sufficiently liberal to ensure normally a continuing net positive flow of capital from all external sources combined into individual developing countries. 5. Donors should pay special attention to the heavy debt burden effect of short term exporter credits and avoid overloading recipient countries. In particular, in order to diminish the likelihood of payments crises in receiving countries, donors extending official or guarantied private short term exporter credits should not reduce the level of such credits outstanding without replacement by at least a balancing amount of aid on liberal terms; and in recognition of the need for capital on liberal terms within limited availabilities of external financing, any increases in amounts of such export credits which a donor may provide above present levels outstanding should normally be accompanied by at least a balancing amount of new aid on very liberal terms. 6. The IDA, the U.S., and some other countries have made significant progress toward achieving the above goals. Other countries in order to make their capital assistance program compatible with an equitable sharing of the costs of development aid among all DAC members should move rapidly in this direction. III. Specific actions 1. Terms of aid of members of consortia, coordinating groups, and consultative groups should be discussed in these groupings with a view to achieving consistency with the foregoing principles as measured by effective repayment terms, taking into account loans, grants, and exporter credits. 2. The amounts and debt-servicing burden of exporter credits should also be discussed in consortia, coordinating groups and consultative groups. 3. The OECD Secretariat should make arrangements for continuing review of debt servicing burdens of developing countries and report periodically to DAC on specific countries that are approaching or already beyond a limit of debt that is reasonable in view of all relevant considerations. The cooperation of the IBRD should be invited. 4. DAC members should agree to discuss the debt-servicing problem of any developing country reported by this review as approaching a reasonable limit, and recommend course of action for donors. 5. Every donor should seek funding authority for significant proportion of its aid effort to be on very liberal terms consistent with the foregoing principles (including provision for grants or loans on terms comparable to IDA terms). 6. DAC should ask Secretariat, in collaboration, as appropriate, with IBRD, or other institution to undertake study of relevant indicators of debt-servicing capacity with view to recommending debt-burden measurement indicators.” Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 374.800/12-2662. Official Use Only; Priority; Verbatim Text. Drafted by R. Palmer (AID/IDOS); cleared by 12 officers from AID, State, and Treasury; and approved by Coffin. Repeated to all other DAC capitals. 1 Leo Pliatzky. 158. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to the President's Special Assistant (Dungan) 158. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to the President's Special Assistant (Dungan) Source Washington, March 5, 1963. SUBJECT Dave Bell on the Clay Committee 1 Dave seems to accept the fundamental premise of the Clay Committee: both military and economic aid ought to be concentrated in the countries which are able to use it effectively and in which visible good results will be achieved in a short span of time. All other countries should be removed from the list as fast as possible. I think this is basically an incorrect view. I don't quarrel with the proposition that the bulk of our aid ought so to be used. However, the needs of maintaining our position as a world power, and continuing to offer an effective alternative to communism all over the world, require that we maintain some active presence in a great many countries. Aid activity, military or economic or both, is usually the most effective way to do this. I recognize that in many of these countries the activities will produce little visible return, and in some of them it will be continuously difficult to justify because of the political behavior of the recipient governments, e.g., Cambodia or Algeria. Nonetheless, our continued presence is worthwhile. It gives us the only effective channel of influence to these governments. A judicious mixture of military and economic aid is a way of carrying on a continuing relation with two groups that are powerful and important in nearly every underdeveloped country: the would-be economic planners and the military. In every case it is much more difficult and costly to move in on a crisis if we have had no previous contacts than to expand our activity to meet a crisis, when in our judgment this is desirable or necessary. The conclusion of this line of argument is that if we are both to concentrate on successful and well-performing clients and maintain some continuing aid relation with as many countries in the underdeveloped world as we can, especially the countries who are not our allies and who are tempted to swing strongly against us, we may need a somewhat bigger rather than a smaller total aid budget. This might mean $600 million rather than $250 million in the contingency fund. This may appear to vitiate the argument, since it is asking for the moon. On the contrary, I think it states the facts to which the Congress, however reluctantly, must ultimately be persuaded. There is an alternative policy more consistent with the Clay Committee's outlook, but politically much less palatable. This is the policy which accepts the proposition that many countries will, in fact, get strong military and economic assistance from the Soviets, or even some from the Chinese, that they will be loudly leftist and even more loudly anti-Western and that we can safely accept the situation. I think this alternative position is, in any long-term context, even less realistic politically, although perhaps fundamentally sounder. C.K. 2 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Foreign Aid, Clay Report. Confidential. A copy was sent to McGeorge Bundy. 1 Regarding the Clay Committee, see Document 161 . Although not a member of the Clay Committee, Bell sat in on its sessions. 2 Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials. 159. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (McGhee) to Secretary of State Rusk 159. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (McGhee) to Secretary of State Rusk Source Washington, March 15, 1963. SUBJECTS Economic Aid: Diffusion vs Concentration of AID Programs At your Staff Meeting of January 21, 1 you expressed concern with the diffusion of our aid potential and asked that I study possibilities of further concentrating available resources on key countries or regions in concert with other DAC donor countries. The regional bureaus, INR and AID have participated with me in this study. Because of difficulties in obtaining statistics, the inquiry was restricted to economic aid (normally defined as excluding 1-5 year commercial credits) and broken into two parts: 1) Motivations of the DAC countries (excluding US) in extending aid, together with patterns thereof and possibilities of augmentation and greater concentration; and 2) attitudes of the recipient countries toward bilateral and multilateral aid, together with possibilities of developing a greater accent on “spheres of primary aid responsibility”. The attached memorandum (Tab A) summarizes the available data and the responses of the bureaus and AID and draws conclusions and certain operational implications. The summary of conclusions reached are that the present pattern of diffusion and bilateralism generally serves US (DAC) interests, although strict US interests might in some countries (particularly the emergent African states) be served adequately by smaller US aid programs and decreased administrative costs; that although there is a tendency toward diffusion on the part of the new aid donor countries with the most rapid rate of aid expansion (Germany and Japan), possibilities of increasing and concentrating aid outlays by these and other DAC countries (excluding US) exist within available mechanisms and can be exploited where a strong case of advancing national interests is established; that the coordinating group and consortia approaches of the DAC-OECD-IBRD are the preferred ones to critical key countries; and that there are no new or promising “spheres of dominant aid responsibility” other than those which now exist (e.g., the dominant roles of the present and former metropoles in Africa and the remaining colonial areas, and of the United States in Latin America and certain of the peripheral states of the Far East, Middle East and South Asia). Recommendations: 1. That no drastic change be made in present aid policy affecting the diffusion of aid among recipient countries. 2. That a more effective concentration of aid should be sought through a continuing and closer analysis of US security and developmental priorities among countries and projects, and the correlation between AID programs and these priorities, rather than through eliminating programs in certain countries to augment programs in others. 3. That in countries where no high priority interests exist, AID programs be carefully screened toward possible reduction but not necessarily elimination. 4. That increased administrative savings be sought in the administration of minor aid programs through the consolidation of aid missions in delegated posts, as is now done with 10 countries in Africa. 5. That we continue to urge other members of DAC to adopt policies consistent with ours and respect to diffusion, insofar as this is practical in the light of their national interests and capabilities. 6. That the attached memorandum be discussed, against the backdrop of these recommendations, at an early meeting chaired by you or the Under Secretary. 2 Attachment THE DISTRIBUTION OF DAC AID:DIFFUSION versus CONCENTRATION Overall Conclusions 1. The principal considerations bearing on the US (DAC) distribution pattern of economic assistance are: a) Effect on maximization of aid extended by others; b) Effectiveness of aid extended in achieving high priority US security and developmental objectives; c) Impact on such contributory factors as more efficient planning, use and decreased administrative costs; d) Immediate and longer-range political effects including encouragement of regionalism, improved relations between developed and undeveloped countries, and the non-Communist “community of free nations” (the North-South axis). The overriding consideration is to assure allocation of scarce aid resources, both by ourselves and others, in a pattern designed to maximize returns through greatest possible concentration on high priority countries and projects. 2. Aid on an extensive scale ($200 million annually or more) is restricted to five Free World countries: The US, France, Germany, the UK and Japan (in that order of magnitude). Although the US aid effort is tending to level out, the Western European and Japanese efforts are increasing and now constitute almost half of total DAC aid. We should continue to encourage further increases and reduce our aid correspondingly where this is possible. We must exert what influence we can on the distribution of aid extended by others so as to relieve or complement ours and assure maximum returns. We will be limited, however, in our ability to so influence others and must not press so far as to discourage their efforts or disrupt the existing generally satisfactory DAC procedures. Germany and Japan, which are increasing their aid on the largest scale, are trending toward distributing their aid widely for commercial reasons, just as our aid has in the past been widely distributed for a variety of reasons deemed to be in the national interest. 3. Except in Africa, the trend of aid in recipient countries is away from predominance by one donor country or metropole. Even if we wished to, we are doubtless powerless to reverse this trend. The remaining dominant “spheres of foreign aid responsibilities” among the donor nations appear to be relatively fixed for the foreseeable future. No donor nation is seeking or would appear willing to accept new “spheres of responsibility” or to relieve others of dominant aid responsibilities. It is therefore difficult to foresee how major aid responsibilities which the US now carries can be shifted to other donor countries or groupings in any significant magnitude, although this conclusion may be subject to reexamination as the EEC prospers and Continental Europe integrates politically. 4. Bilateral aid has proven to be a valuable instrumentality of US diplomacy and a primary leverage in influencing countries toward cooperative activities and sound development programs. Although we must encourage others to share our burden, we must take care to assure that this does not result in undue sacrifice in effectiveness or dilute the advantages of our bilateral approaches. There are also advantages to our continuing small US aid presences and programs in areas, such as the former colonial areas, since modest diffusions of aid in these areas make it easier politically for the recipient country to continue to accept aid under self-help criteria from a dominant donor. Similarly, multinational mechanisms may for the same reason assist us in pressing our objectives in areas of primary US aid responsibility, i.e., Latin America. 5. Regionalism among recipient countries can probably be accelerated more by diffusion of aid than by its concentration, whether from one or multiple sources, on an individual country. The position of a dominant donor in a particular country tends to isolate it from others in the region which receive less aid from the dominant donor. 6. Only the US is adversely affected through probable increased administrative costs involved in aid proliferation, although even in our case this can be minimized through regional missions, as is now done in Africa. Aid given by other donor countries normally does not entail costly aid missions. 7. A widely diffused US aid pattern probably serves broad US long range objectives of creating a “community of free nations” more effectively than would concentration on key countries. A persuasive case can be made for broader proliferation by other donor nations and an aid presence by donors in any country where there is a natural or potential basis for ties of an enduring and beneficial character, the sum total of which build toward greater interdependence among a community of free nations. The search for new markets and sources of raw materials, as well as political and strategic considerations, lead naturally to diffusion rather than concentration of aid. 8. The trend and emphasis of DAC aid will in the future undoubtedly be in the direction of wider distribution rather than concentration on exclusive or dominant spheres of influence. The consortium is a useful way of promoting such diffusion. Insofar as the consortium results in a group of donors' exerting leverages for better planning and developmental continuity, this mechanism provides some of the advantages of a dominant donor and none of the disadvantages. Further, through the consortium approach, small nations with specializations (i.e., Norway, fishing; Netherlands, flood control) can weld what might otherwise be scattered bilateral approaches into the continuum of a coordinated development program. 9. In future US studies of diffusion vs. concentration or “spheres of aid influence”, it is believed the point of departure should be to preserve the advantages of a wide distribution of aid through smaller and more efficient programs and missions (or regional missions) rather than to proceed on an assumption that US interests will be served by sharply curtailing existing US aid presences, thereby leaving vacuums for others (including the Bloc) to fill. 10. In actuality, there exists a purposeful concentration of DAC ( including US) aid in that somewhat more than 70 percent of the total is disbursed to some 20 countries and areas (see pp. 7-8). The problem of aid diffusion is therefore narrowed to somewhat less than 30 percent of all DAC contributions and the problem of its effectiveness revolves not on the question of the desirability of aid proliferation but on whether the pattern of aid diffusion effected by donor countries advances national interests sought to be advanced through aid programs, large or small. [Here follows extensive analysis of two major subjects: I. The Aid Effort of DAC Countries, and II. The Recipient Countries (Areas).] * Source: Department of State, Central Files,AID 1. Confidential. The source text, which was also addressed to Under Secretary Ball, was transmitted through S/S. A handwritten notation reads: “Secretary saw.” 1 No record of this staff meeting has been found. 2 Secretary Rusk initialed on the “Approve” line and drew an arrow to recommendation 6. Attached to the source text is a March 24 note from P.W. Kriebel (S/S-S) to U. Alexis Johnson, indicating that McGhee had asked the Secretary to call a meeting of “interested Department officers” on March 25 at 5 p.m. to discuss the question of diffusion vs. concentration of AID programs. The meeting, which took place in the Department of State on March 25 beginning at 5:13 p.m., was attended by McGhee, Johnson, and officers from INR, AF, and AID. Although not included on the attendance list, Secretary Rusk presumably also attended. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Books) No further record of this meeting has been found. 160. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Bell) to President Kennedy 160. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Bell) to President Kennedy Source Washington, March 15, 1963. SUBJECT Clay Committee Report and FY 1964 Foreign Aid Request The Clay Committee met yesterday and agreed on their first report, subject to a few textual changes. 1 Tentative plans are for the report to be transmitted to the President on March 21, with its public release shortly thereafter, for the President's foreign aid message to follow about a week later (say March 28th), and for testimony to begin the following week (say April 2nd). The present report of the Committee is a substantially improved document from last week's version. It contains most of the same critical and restrictive comments, but they are far better balanced by positive support for properly conceived and administration foreign aid programs. With respect to appropriations, the report is not very clear. It says essentially that under the Committee's recommendations, they believe that “ongoing programs” could be carried on for $500 million less than is now the case. Recognizing present commitments, the Committee does not consider that this much could be cut at once from present fund levels. Furthermore, they recognize that sound programs now under consideration and future program needs will add to the cost of the program. However, the statement is ambiguous enough to give rise to the danger that, either from an oversimplification in press reports or from further comments by Committee members, the $500 million figure in the report will be related to this year's appropriation of $3.9 billion. In that event, the figure of $3.4 billion may assume an unwarranted currency, with the danger of this indicating what next year's appropriation should be. The Committee report in fact expresses no specific views on the FY 1964 appropriation request. The Committee has in effect authorized General Clay to testify on its behalf, applying its general views to the specific conditions of the coming year. General Clay has not thus far given any firm indication of his views on the FY 1964 appropriation level. It is my impression that he may consider that an appropriation in the neighborhood of $4 billion might be a proper level—compared to $4.9 billion dollars in the Budget. The problem before us now is what specific figure the President should recommend to the Congress in his foreign aid message. There is general agreement that the recommendation should be reduced from the budget figure to reflect some expected carryover of unused lending authority. Together with some recent program changes, this would indicate a figure of $4,756 million (compared with $4,945 million in the Budget). The question in my opinion is not whether, but when, to propose a further reduction in response to the Clay Committee's views. There are two principal alternatives. 1. To recommend a lower figure in the President's message, in direct response to the Clay report, and justified as putting into effect the recommendations in the report so far as the President considers it feasible and desirable to do so at present. I recommend that this be done, and that the President propose a figure of $4,514 million—$75 million off MAP and $167 million off economic aid, compared to the present (reduced) budget figure. (Attached is a table showing the comparison in more detail.) 2 The advantage of this course is to give a direct and forthright response to the Clay report. The disadvantage is that it might result in a lower final appropriation. If this course is adopted, I recommend that you telephone General Clay before your message goes to Congress, in order to make clear your expectation that he will support a strong foreign aid program—and an appropriation as close to your figure as possible. 2. To transmit in the President's message the present (reduced) budget figure ($4,756 million), but to say in the message that the President has not had an opportunity to weigh the Clay report fully, and will communicate with Congress on the subject later. Then, when the Administration witnesses begin to testify, the President could send up his modified figure. The advantage of this course would be to permit more time to consider the significance of the Clay recommendations. Furthermore it would start the Congressional legislative process with a higher figure, and let the President's reduction in response to the Clay Committee appear to be part of the Congressional process. Since the process would start with a higher figure, Congress could take credit for a larger reduction. The disadvantages of this course would be that it might appear rather artificial and hesitant, and that the President's reduction in response to the Clay report, when it came, might seem rather small ($240 million). The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget join in recommending the first alternative. We need to decide between these two courses quickly since our “presentation books” must go to print within the next few days in order to be ready for the beginning of testimony the first week in April. David E. Bell 3 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM No. 159. Secret. 1 Reference presumably is to a draft of March 15. (Washington National Records Center, RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 67 A 1530, Clay Committee, FY 1963, Folder #1) 2 Not printed. 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Bell signed the original. 161. Editorial Note 161. Editorial Note When Fowler Hamilton resigned as AID Administrator (see footnote 1, Document 154 ), he recommended that President Kennedy create a permanent advisory group of private citizens on foreign assistance, which would make an ongoing study of the Agency for International Development and suggest steps to revive public support for its programs. The President followed through with the establishment of the Committee To Strengthen the Security of the Free World, headed by General Lucius D. Clay. President Kennedy's letter to Clay, December 6, outlining the terms of reference of this Committee, is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 67 A 1530, FY 1963, Folder #1. Other members of the Clay Committee, as it was commonly called, were Robert B. Anderson, Eugene R. Black, Clifford Hardin, Robert A. Lovett, Edward S. Mason, L. F. McCollum, George Meany, Herman Phleger, and Howard A. Rusk. For text of the White House announcement of the creation of this Committee on December 10, see Department of State Bulletin December 31, 1962, page 1007. White House announcements of January 29 and March 1, 1963, summarizing the first and second series of meetings of the Committee, are ibid., March 4, 1963, page 329, and March 25, 1963, page 431, respectively. For comments on drafts of the Clay Committee's work, see Document 160 . See also Forrestal's March 11 memorandum to McGeorge Bundy and Dungan, Komer's March 14 memorandum to Dungan, and Forrestal's March 19 memorandum to Kaysen, all in the Supplement. The Committee's 25-page report was entitled The Scope and Distribution of United States Military and Economic Assistance Programs: Report to the President of the United States from The Committee To Strengthen the Security of the Free World, March 20, 1963 (Washington, 1963). An extract from the report is also printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pages 1148-1163. George Meany dissented on the report. He conveyed his views in a March 19 letter to President Kennedy. (Washington National Records Center, RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 67 A 1530, George Meany) For text of the President's March 22 letter to General Clay, thanking the Committee for its “intensive and searching review” of foreign assistance programs and its recommendations, “including greater selectivity, stricter self-help standards, greater participation by the developed countries in aid efforts and continued improvements in administration,” see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963 , page 288. The Clay Committee was allowed to terminate without public announcement at the end of 1963. Background on the termination is in Clay's letter to Robert B. Anderson, December 3, 1963, and Bell's memorandum to President Johnson, January 6, 1964. (Both in Washington National Records Center, RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 67 A 1530, Clay Committee, FY 1963, Folder #2) Documentation on the Clay Committee's work, including stenographic transcripts of its meetings, is ibid., Lucius Clay; and Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Foreign Aid, Clay Committee. 162. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Food for Peace (Reuter) to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Gordon) 162. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Food for Peace (Reuter) to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Gordon) Source Washington, March 26, 1963. Few subjects have been more frequently considered, reviewed, and evaluated than that of local currencies generated as a result of the sales of agricultural commodities under Title I of Public Law 480. 1 Because these sales run from $1 billion to $1-1/2 billion equivalent per year, and account for better than two-thirds of the Food For Peace volume, this subject of the use of local currencies is of major significance in terms of the value of the Food For Peace program. I am firmly convinced that we are using and can use food in place of dollars advantageously in enough instances to make this an item of importance in the solution of our balance of payments problem. Nevertheless, a negative attitude stemming from the “disposal of surplus” psychology still persists and, it seems to me, restricts our view as to the value of these currencies. It was discouraging to me to see for the first time this morning the section on PL 480 in the preliminary draft of the current study on balance of payments. 2 I believe the approach here again reflects a basically negative attitude. The implication is that PL 480 hurts normal commercial sales and hence adversely affects our dollar position. From our experience over the last eight years, I do not think this is a justified position. The savings indicated in the current study would be something over $50 million. With a more imaginative approach to the balance of payments issue, I believe we can significantly increase this saving. Specifically, we are using food in place of dollars to generate local currency for U.S. needs. Last year we “saved” more than $150 million by using these currencies in place of appropriated dollars. By deliberately “selling” food in countries where we have currency needs we should be able to double this figure within a year. In addition there are indirect savings. “Cooley” loans 3 which can use almost $100 million equivalent a year do in fact cut off some dollar outflow by the private sector without stopping our overseas expansion. Economic development loans and military support items, to some degree, are also factors that can and do minimize dollar use while maintaining approved programs. There are distinct limitations but we have not yet reached these limitations. Actually, the overall use of food in place of the dollars that would otherwise be spent overseas could total at least a half billion a year. Our staff is working with Ed Fox, 4 Treasury people and Agriculture on this question now. Before the end of the week, I will send you a more detailed report and breakdown. 5 We are talking of potentially big figures and this, it seems to us, justifies further study. Since the establishment of P.L. 480, we have generated almost $6 billion equivalent in some 44 different currencies, and have disbursed, through last June 30, somewhat over $3 billion equivalent. A quick review of current reports indicates that at the present time, we have in the U.S. Treasury the equivalent of more than $2 billion in unexpended local currencies. A new approach we are presently studying may have a short-run dollar saving of some significance. While those Treasury local currency holdings are allocated, many of the funds (i.e., Reserves for program adjustments, market development funds, etc.) may not be dispersed for one or more years. We might consider “borrowing” these local currencies where U.S.-use amounts are not adequate for present U.S. needs. Paraguay, Greece and Chile are three countries that immediately come to mind where such action would save dollars immediately. Careful programming could replace many of these allocations with newly-generated local currencies which would then mean a permanent saving of the dollars. Because of your meeting on this question this afternoon, I did wish to send this preliminary memorandum quickly as a follow-up on our conversation. 6 Richard W. Reuter 7 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Balance of Payments, Cabinet Committee, 3/63#7/63. Official Use Only. A copy was sent to Kaysen. 1 Title I of P.L. 480 permitted foreign countries to use their own currencies to purchase U.S. agricultural products. 2 Reference presumably is to the study by the Cabinet Committee on Balance of Payments. See Document 10 . 3 Reference is to the so-called Cooley Amendment to P.L. 480 (P.L. 85-128, approved August 13, 1957; 71 Stat. 345), which provided that up to 25 percent of local currency proceeds would be made available for loans through the Export-Import Bank to U.S. private firms for business development and trade expansion and for activities increasing the consumption of U.S. farm products. 4 Not further identified. 5 No further report from Reuter to Gordon has been found, but Reuter forwarded a more detailed report and breakdown in a memorandum to Freeman, April 2; see the Supplement. 6 Neither the meeting nor the earlier conversation has been further identified. 7 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 163. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Fulbright) 163. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Fulbright) Source Washington, March 27, 1963. Dear Senator Fulbright : I want to thank you very much for your very thoughtful letter of February 11 1 in which you expressed concern—using Czechoslovakian economic penetration into Bolivia as an example—about Communist bloc economic offensives in less developed countries. The Department has carefully examined the proposal that the United States take measures to forestall the communist countries from providing, on an aid basis, consumer goods to less developed countries. The dangers of penetration through such offensives, which you very correctly point out, are not, unfortunately, presently recognized by some of the less developed countries. Until that recognition exists we will not be able to forestall the acceptance of aid from the Communist bloc and if the attempt were made as suggested, we would be put in the position of reacting to every communist initiative. We have consistently pointed out to the developing countries the “hidden strings” which are invariably attached to bloc offers. Unless the governments of the less developed countries can be convinced of the dangers of subversion resulting from an acceptance of bloc aid, any increases in United States aid which are aimed at precluding bloc economic penetration would instead act merely as supplements to bloc aid and would not eliminate the problems. We believe that our approach, together with the unfortunate experience that some developing nations have had with bloc trade and assist-ance, is paying dividends. In Africa, for example, the launching of our aid program has helped to convince the Sekou Toure Government of Guinea that there is a successful alternative to dependence upon Soviet bloc aid. In Latin America, there is increasing evidence that the goals of the Alliance for Progress are gaining acceptance and genuine understanding is growing of the fact that the United States is sincerely interested in the problems of her neighbors to the South. Despite Bolivia's past acceptance of Czech aid, there is resistance to the acceptance of future offers. Under our present foreign aid legislation American suppliers can sell their products to importers in aid-receiving countries with the United States Government paying the American exporter in dollars and, in the case of grant assistance, the foreign government depositing local currencies received from importers to a counterpart account. The commodities made available through our various programs include surplus agricultural commodities, a wide range of industrial goods, and at times a limited amount of consumer-type goods. We are, in this sense, already doing part of what you suggest. 2 Present legislation, however, does not permit the United States Government to use aid funds solely to meet or out-bid the Soviet bloc in a commercial trade offensive by matching or bettering bloc trade offers. There are obvious dangers to engaging in such a policy, both from an aid point of view as well as for commercial policy reasons. It would permit the bloc to blackmail the United States into increased aid and probably involve the United States in programs for which there would be little or no sound economic rationale. Some less developed countries might seek to increase United States aid offers by threatening to accept bloc offers. Additionally, to permit the commercial sale of United States goods at a fraction of their domestic price would subject the United States to accusation of dumping, or subsidizing exports—practices which we deplore when done by others. In view of the complexities of this subject, I would suggest, providing that you agree, that Mr. G. Griffith Johnson, Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, call at your office to discuss this problem in greater detail at your convenience. Sincerely yours, Dean Rusk 3 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, FT (EX) US. No classification marking. Drafted by H.H. Barger and D.J. James on March 19 and cleared by eight Department of State officers and AID/LA. 1 Not found. A March 14 memorandum from G. Griffith Johnson to Secretary Rusk, attached to the source text, indicates that Fulbright wrote in reaction to an INR memorandum of January 9, “Soviet Bloc Economic Overtures to Bolivia,” which he enclosed with his letter. This INR memorandum has not been found. 2 For text of a joint AID/State Circular A-241, February 14, which provided policy guidelines for AID administration in countries receiving Communist bloc aid, see the Supplement. 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original. 164. Summary Minutes of Meeting of the Interdepartmental Committee of Under Secretaries on Foreign Economic Policy 164. Summary Minutes of Meeting of the Interdepartmental Committee of Under Secretaries on Foreign Economic Policy Source Washington, April 11, 1963. PROBLEMS OF FOREIGN AID: ALTERNATIVE MEANSOF HELPING NATIONS TO ACHIEVE SELF-RELIANCE [Here follows Section I, a list of participants (21).] II. Problems of Foreign Aid: Alternative Means of Helping Nations to Achieve Self-reliance Under Secretary Harriman, presiding, asked AID Administrator Bell to make whatever statement he wanted before discussion of the paper AID had submitted for the meeting “Some Elements of AID Programs of Particular Relevance to the Interdepartmental Committee of Under Secretaries on Foreign Economic Policy.” 1 Aid Legislation Mr. Bell reported on the legislation for the mutual assistance programs for 1964. The President's message and firm recommendations went up April 2 2 and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs has held four days of open hearings, with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, Bell, and General Clay as witnesses. 3 The Committee will resume on April 23 after the Easter holidays in executive session and hearings will continue until the bill is completed. Appropriation Request . The President reduced his budget projection for the aid program from $4.945 billion as set forth in the January budget to $4.525 billion. The reduction reflects the recommendations of the Clay Committee and Bell's own recommendations after sitting with the Clay Committee and reviewing the country programs, as well as the President's estimate of the likely progress of legislation in the Congress. When asked by the Committee what his views were on the amount of funds that should be appropriated, General Clay refused to comment in open session. He will be recalled to closed session, and Mr. Bell thought that the General would say $4 billion or thereabouts, or possibly might say a range of $4 billion to $4.2 or $4.3. Mr. Bell thinks we can assume that the House Foreign Affairs Committee will report out a bill authorizing about what the General recommends and that for the remainder of this session of Congress we will be trying to get an appropriation of about that level. The Clay Committee's recommendations are essentially to the effect that the foreign aid program should be continued on somewhat sharper lines, that the interests of the US in various countries should be kept more in mind, and that somewhat stronger emphasis be placed on self-help measures. With these objectives, the President, the Secretary, and Mr. Bell have expressed agreement. Mr. Bell is not aware of any substantial differences between the Administration and the Clay Committee although the language of the report may give this impression. In many cases, the report is worded more negatively than conversations of the Committee indicated, especially with respect to India, Indonesia, Africa, and Latin America. AID finds no basic difficulty with the essential thrust of the Clay proposals. The Committee was unhappy over the existence of some of the commitments, such as a costly road in Burma, but it recognized that we must fulfill commitments. The Committee would like to see military aid reduced somewhat more rapidly than Secretary McNamara thinks it can be. This, however, is a difference in timing rather than a difference of attitude. Classification of Countries . There are no surprises, no unusual recommendations, in our proposals to Congress this year, Mr. Bell said. We are stressing the classification of countries, as reflected on pages 6-7 of the “Proposed Mutual Defense and Assistance Programs—FY1964”. 4 There are about 30 countries in which there are good prospects for achieving self-sustaining growth. A half dozen of those have reached the point of not needing economic assistance of soft terms. Others—India, Pakistan, Colombia, and Nigeria—have not yet achieved that status but are moving in that direction and are making substantial progress. There are another 12 or 15 countries (Chile and Brazil are examples) which have the potential for moving forward but there is a question whether governmental leadership is strong enough and clearly enough committed to economic programs to anticipate very rapid forward movement. In those cases the programs that go to Congress are essentially on a contingent basis. If these countries move forward, we would be prepared to help; if they do not, we would leave such funds uncommitted. Mr. Bell said that we do not expect to argue that there is a particular figure for the aid appropriation below which our national interests would be threatened. In Latin America, for example, we are asking for lending authority of $600 million. We will state to the Committee that we are not at all sure we will make loans up to that amount. If the Latin Americans conduct themselves as we would like to see them, there will be very effective uses for the $600 million and that is why we would like to have the authority. We are talking about the power to make loans, not about a specific program of accomplishment on which United States security would stand or fall. That is why Mr. Bell hopes that General Clay will express the need for a range of figures within which we can work. There is another group of countries which are essentially dominated by short-run external or internal security problems. Korea, Viet Nam, Laos, and Jordan fall into this classification. AID does not claim that these countries are in a position to make steady progress toward economic growth but it hopes they will move into that position in not too long a period. This is not impossible, as we can see in the case of Greece and Turkey. Finally, there is a third group of countries in which US participation is limited and secondary. Many African countries fall into this class, and a number of Asian countries. We are not in the process of establishing permanent economic programs in these countries. By and large, our aid simply augments that of other major donor countries and in most cases is confined to technical assistance. Sometimes we merely want to establish a US presence. Sometimes our efforts may forestall Bloc enterprises. In other cases, we may be able to acquire strategic facilities. In our legislative presentation, Mr. Bell said that stress was being given to self-help, the use of private resources (business, unions, cooperatives, farm organizations, etc.), and to increased participation by Western Europe and Japan in aid programs to the less-developed countries. More Effective Promotion of US Private Investment in LDC's Most of the discussion at the meeting centered around the first item posed in the AID paper—more effective promotion of US private investment in the less-developed countries. It was recalled that when this Committee discussed foreign aid two years ago, 5 three points had been made about the private sector: a) this phase of the aid program should have high priority; b) targets for US investment should be identified in country programs; and c) the need for centralization of this function in the US Government. How much progress had been made on these points? Importance of the Private Sector . Mr. Bell said there had been a good deal of change in the last two years. There is a substantially increased sense of the importance of using the private sector, although this may not be applied evenly by everyone in the aid business—State, Commerce, AID, and the Missions abroad. Organizational Arrangements . Also, there is much greater organizational unification than in the past. AID has underway an internal study of the organizational problems. In AID there are four main doors of assistance for American businessmen who want to make investments abroad and who are seeking government help: a) sharing the cost of investment surveys; b) investment guarantees; c) Cooley amendment loans; and d) AID can make dollar loans on such terms and conditions as it considers appropriate. Within AID, these functions are decentralized to the four regional offices on the theory that the Director for the aid program in a region should also be responsible for the private sector operations in that region. Moscoso has a deputy for private enterprise in Latin America. Also, centralized thinking and policy in this field is provided through Seymour Peyser, Assistant Administrator of AID for Private Enterprises. Private Enterprise Targets in Country Plans . As to identifying targets for private enterprise in country programs, essentially this relates to the attitudes of the various countries and doesn't yield readily to American initiatives. Where the attitude is skeptical of the good will of American investment, it doesn't change over night, and we have to keep plugging away. AID would like to see a tailored program for each country and a series of approach actions set up with consideration of priorities. It may be, for example, that we could have spent our time and effort more fruitfully in some countries than in pressing so hard for investment guarantee bilaterals. The secret to promotion of the private sector is to get it linked to a part of the country plan in which the government has a great interest; unless this is done, the countries don't regard private investment as a contribution to the plan. Mr. Bell thought the point of bringing the private sector into development planning was very important, and said that he would check on this. Development Banks . One mechanism that gets around some of the difficulties in programming for the private sector is the Development Bank, and it was suggested that this be looked into carefully. Use of Development Banks removes from our people the onus and responsibility for direct judgment on particular investments. The difficulty is that Development Banks have a tendency to move only on the cream of the investments and are negative as far as small businesses or risk investments are concerned. There is no realization that a sure-thing approach to lending is not necessarily a good way to move into economic growth. Commerce Activities . Commerce's efforts to promote closer working relations between American business communities in the developing countries and the Governments were outlined. These include establishment of investment promotion centers, production centers, and other mechanisms. Commerce has been talking to businessmen and to COMAP and is in hopes that a series of standing committees can be established to work up recommendations on specific problems, such as the use of local currencies, guarantees, aid to exports. The Commerce Department is also in a position to give more technical assistance in helping these countries devise ways to expand their exports. Multilateral Guarantee . We now have proposed to Congress that there be a new tax incentive for private investment in developing countries, and we have expanded guarantee authority for US investments. A question was asked as whether it wouldn't be well to have authority for a multilateral guarantee for foreign investments which would show concern for private investors other than Americans. A Treasury official present at the meeting thought the waters might be muddied if this were put forward now as a legislative proposal and that it would be better to try to make progress on movements that are already underway in the OECD on a multilateral guarantee and in the IBRD on arbitration. European Investment in Latin America . Senator Javits's idea for getting the Europeans to invest in Latin America was mentioned. 6 He would like to have Mr. Katz 7 give six months to this effort. One thing being considered is the establishment of a Committee with well-known names from all over the world. Some concern was expressed that the latter would just result in the cream of the investment being skimmed. Getting the Private Sector to Come Alive . Mr. Rostow gave some reflections coming out of the talks he had in India. 8 The whole basis of our aid program is government-to-government, but when that gets the economy moving, the private sector should come alive. We should encourage and help the private sector to expand rapidly as only when a country has its own private sector does it feel able to have private investment from abroad. India is now trying to increase the investment rate and this means radical expansion of capacity. In some sectors—steel and chemical fertilizers—the Indians have some organizational talent for such expansion. In other fields they don't have the kind of know-how that it takes for radical expansion of plant—the training of men and programming ahead of materials, orders, etc. These fields are in the private sector, and the Indians are looking for ways to organize technical assistance in the whole process of expanding plant. This probably means bringing in American management know-how on a contract basis. And this relates to getting to know the country's ambitions or plans for expansion. As other countries progress, we will run into this problem more and more. Where there are stabilization programs in order to get inflation under control through IMF procedures, we sometimes produce a general deflation in the private sector. This produces some very curious developments which we haven't thought through. Before a sensible policy is devised, we must have a notion of which private sectors need expansion and we must give more attention to the problem of “marrying” stabilization and development programs. The most fundamental thing, Mr. Rostow said, is to get movement in the private sector. The second most fundamental thing is to improve the climate for private investment. Statement of Policy on Private Investment . Asked whether there was a written statement of private investment policy, Mr. Bell doubted that anything exists which deals with the whole problem. AID has a booklet “Memo to Businessmen”, and there is a statement in the AID presentation to Congress. Probably Mr. Peyser's testimony, in two or three weeks, will be the most comprehensive statement. More Effective Utilization of All Available Resources in Supplying Technical Assistance Personnel Turning to the second item in the AID paper, Mr. Bell said that AID has begun to do a better job of working with the agencies in the government and with various elements of the private sector in supplying technical assistance personnel. AID was asked whether this referred to agencies which have traditionally been in the technical assistance field or also encompassed other agencies. Mr. Bell replied that AID is working not only with Agriculture, Labor and Interior but with such agencies as the Home Loan Board. A survey of resources was made by Jack Ohley. 9 Some representatives present opined that other agencies still aren't being used enough, such as Labor and Interior. As far as the tax area is concerned, Treasury had doubts about the US furnishing technical assistance with respect to tax policy as this is a very sensitive area, but can furnish technical assistance for tax administration. Mr. Bell thought there was an understanding that Latin American countries would go to the OAS for technical assistance on tax policy, although they could come to us for tax administration. The Budget Bureau asked about evaluation of the technical assist-ance rendered. There should be an evaluation of the competence and contribution and whether AID is getting the optimum for the price. Is this evaluation to be done by AID or by the agencies furnishing technical assistance? Mr. Bell said he couldn't give an answer on this. Other Donor Countries The DAC Forum Turning to the question of other donor countries, Mr. Bell said that some progress was made at the last DAC meeting. 10 General agreement was achieved that terms of aid should be adapted more to the balance-of-payments prospects of the countries being assisted, that donors should make their aid available on somewhat more comparable terms, and that the harder lenders should soften their loan terms. While we cannot look for very rapid changes growing out of this, the US will use the agreement as leverage in consortium meetings in the future to try to get the European countries to soften their aid terms. A real problem about terms of aid will center about the question of supplier credits. The European countries and the US are all becoming more sophisticated and enthusiastic about trying to guarantee or finance their exports. The French are an example. Their foreign aid is very soft—much of it in grants. But then they press ahead on terms like the loan just completed with Mexico, which is really a supplier credit. Mexico is in good shape and can stand it, but lots of other countries can't. If they sign up for more than they can handle, we may be called upon to bail them out. As to the quantities of aid from other countries, Mr. Bell said we don't have so much of a case, especially with the French and not much with the British. We do argue with the Germans that their contribution should be more. Canada and Italy are the worst offenders, and we may get them to do a little more, but not much. Future Meetings At the close of the meeting, the Chairman said he thought this group should consider how to mobilize the Departments so as to get the whole Administration effectively behind the foreign aid legislation. Mr. Bell agreed that this should have high priority. It was left that probably the first ten minutes of the next meeting would be devoted to that. 11 In the meantime, agencies were asked to give this some thought. On April 25, the Committee will discuss Export Opportunities for the Manufactured Products of Less Developed Countries , with the State Department taking the lead in the discussion. 12 On May 9, we plan to discuss United States Interests and Objectives in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development . The Chairman asked members of the Committee to consider subjects they would like to have aired in this forum. Suggestions should be sent to him. C.W. Nichols 13 Executive Secretary * Source: Department of State, E Files: Lot 64 D 452, Economic Affairs (General), Interdepartmental Committee of Under Secretaries on Foreign Economic Policy. Official Use Only. Presumably drafted by Ruth Donahue, who is listed as Recording Secretary, on April 19. 1 Dated April 3; for text, see the Supplement. 2 For text of this special message to Congress, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, pp. 294-303. 3 This testimony, which took place on April 5, 8, 9, and 10, is in Foreign Assistance Act of 1963: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Eighty-eighth Congress, First Session (Washington, 1963), Part 1. 4 This 75-page undated, preliminary report is in Department of State, E Files: Lot 65 D 68,ICFEP, April 11, 1963. The printed version, submitted to Congress in May, is Proposed Mutual Defense and Assistance Programs FY 1964: Summary Presentation to the Congress—Economic: A.I.D., Military: Department of Defense (Washington, 1963). 5 See Document 126 . 6 In December 1962, Senator Javits, Chairman of the Economic Committee of the NATO Parliamentarians, successfully urged the NATO Parliamentarians to approve European multilateral funding of foreign assistance to Latin America, supplementary to the Alliance for Progress, with a Latin American equivalent of the OEEC to administer the funds. 7 Presumably S. Stanley Katz, an AID loan officer. 8 Rostow visited India and Pakistan April 1-7. 9 Presumably John H. Ohly (AID). Ohly's name is not included on the list of participants at the meeting. 10 See Document 157 . 11 The minutes of later Committee meetings contain no discussion of the foreign aid legislation. 12 This meeting was postponed until May 23. 13 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 165. Current Economic Developments 165. Current Economic Developments Source Washington, April 16, 1963. Issue No. 673 [Here follow articles on unrelated matters.] DAC ADOPTS RESOLUTION ONTERMS AND CONDITIONS OF AID The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) moved forward at its high-level meeting April 2-3 on a subject which the US has long been pressing—terms of aid. 1 A resolution was adopted which recommends, in light of the increasing problem of the debt service burden of the less-developed countries, that DAC members move toward liberalization of their terms and seek a greater degree of comparability of such terms. A further discussion of tied aid, which some members wanted at this meeting, will take place probably at the next high-level meeting by which time the working party may have completed its study. This was the first DAC meeting to be presided over by the new Chairman, Willard L. Thorp of the US, formerly Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. All DAC members were represented: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, UK, US, and the Commission of the EEC. The US was represented by AID Administrator David Bell. Representatives of the International Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Inter-American Development Bank also participated in the meetings. Terms of Aid Resolution The resolution on terms of aid, based on an interim report prepared by the working party, 2 was not published although the communique reported in general terms on the DAC discussion and the substance of the agreement. 3 Specifically, the resolution recommended to the members of the Development Assistance Committee the following: That they relate the terms of aid on a case-by-case basis to the circumstances of each underdeveloped country or group of countries. Where aid is on a project basis and where the terms appropriate to the project differ from the terms appropriate to the country, that they should consider whether they can apply one of the following methods: to provide an appropriate “mix” of hard loans and soft loans or grants; to lend under a “two-step procedure” providing for soft loans to governments and lending on hard terms to projects; to lend projects on hard terms and provide separate financial aid for balance-of-payments relief. That they make it their objective in principle to secure a significant degree of comparability in the terms and conditions of their aid, and so far as possible to eliminate or reduce discrepancies between them. While this would not necessarily entail standard terms and conditions from all donors, it would involve a liberalization of the terms adopted by some members, whether in their individual aid programs or in concerted aid operations. For the purpose of implementing the above recommendations, the DAC agreed to the following: 1. It should be open to any DAC members or the Chairman to seek an exchange of information and views within the DAC framework, on a confidential basis, concerning any individual, underdeveloped country where it appears of particular importance or urgency to review the country's external debt position. 2. Concerted action will be undertaken to reduce disparities in the terms and conditions of aid. 3. The methods that the Committee will adopt in order to achieve such concerted action should be based on the following understanding: a) The recommendation would apply both to aid programs as a whole and to consortia and other particular aid operations. b) It would embrace not only the terms of aid but also the conditions of aid. c) Progress toward the agreed objective would be assessed as a part of the annual aid review, so far as concerns aid programs as a whole. d) In concerted aid operations covered by consortia and similar arrangements, the terms and conditions of aid would be for discussion and consultation among the donor countries in the light of this understanding, and in the light of the terms and conditions of their overall aid effort. e) This understanding would not necessarily involve standard terms and conditions from all donors, in view of their varying capacities and institutional backgrounds, but donors would be expected to seek any necessary legislative or budgetary provisions to implement the understanding. f) The efforts of the recipient country to play its full part in any such arrangements by adjusting its policies and planning arrangements to the extent necessary and possible to correct the situation would be given importance in the consideration of concerted arrangements for alleviation of its debt service problem. g) It would be open to any DAC member or to the Chairman to initiate consultation on these lines in further appropriate cases which are not at present covered by specific coordinating arrangements. h) In comparison of terms of finance effected in consortia, coordinating groups, etc., note should be taken of the amounts of guaranteed private export credits as well as public loans and grants. The working party was instructed to make a further study of the probable future trend in the annual debt service of the under-developed countries, and of the problem which this may present. Included in the study should be consideration of a paper to be prepared by the staff of the International Bank discussing the factors which determine a country's debt servicing capacity. Discussion The discussion of terms and conditions of aid was opened by AID Administrator Bell who endorsed fully the conclusions of the interim report of the working party, especially the gravity of the growing problem of the debt burden, the incompatibility of hard terms provided by some lenders with a recipient country's debt service capacity, and the need for greater comparability of terms through liberalization. Bell also argued for recognition of the two-step procedure as the preferred method to reconcile project and country requirements but, in light of majority preference, he agreed to the more permissive language incorporated in the resolution. He further supported use of consortia and consultative groups to discuss the problem of indebtedness, need for legislative and budgetary provisions allowing soft terms, and inclusion of the export credit problem in coordinated aid efforts. The most significant and welcome statement by others came from the UK, which gave full recognition to the debt servicing problem and expressed determination to ease terms. Specifically, the British representative indicated UK terms could be lengthened beyond the present customary 25 years and described several possibilities which the UK is considering to reduce the burden of interest charges, where such relief is needed. The Germans, who it was hoped would announce further steps towards liberalization of aid terms, failed to do so, although accepting the resolution. The French questioned the seriousness of increasing the debt-service burden of less-developed countries and noted that creating short-term indebtedness has the advantage of bringing the LDC frequently before such international forums as the IMF and Paris Club 4 to justify their policies. The French were effectively rebutted by the British and Belgians. The Netherlands, Canada, France and Portugal accepted the resolution only ad referendum. Tied Aid Prior to the meeting, the US had opposed introduction of new tied aid proposals at this meeting for two reasons. We felt there was a danger that the important and carefully worked out agreement on terms of aid which seemed virtually assured might be upset by introduction of new and separate issues on the subject of tied aid which the working party had not had adequate time to discuss thoroughly. We also felt that proposals on tied aid should have the same kind of careful analysis and consideration by the working party as did the terms of aid proposals. We agreed, however, to a preliminary discussion of the tied aid problem. At the April 2-3 meeting, the Dutch and Belgians put great emphasis on the importance of moving rapidly ahead with the study on tied aid. They argued that tying may be damaging in the long run to donors in balance-of-payments difficulties because it supports noncompetitive industries. Van Lennep of the Netherlands 5 made suggestions in the direction of a concerted movement toward untying aid and he even tried to link acceptance of the terms of aid report to progress on tied aid. The EEC had announced on March 4 a new untied aid policy, which the US has welcomed as evidence Community desire for liberal orientation of Europe. 6 The EEC confirmed its adherence to this new policy at the DAC meeting and Mr. Bell emphasized the importance which the US attributed to its being put into effective operation. The US restated its position of strong support for the principle of untied aid but recognition of the reality that economic conditions sometimes necessitate tying. The long US record of untied aid prior to the recent balance-of-payments difficulties was cited. Our representative stated US willingness to cooperate in the working party study, but voiced doubts on the feasibility of concluding the work by the July DAC meeting. Representatives of the other major donor nations cautioned against any optimism regarding agreement which would bind countries to untie their aid. The DAC instructed the working party to continue its consideration of the study of the problems of aid tying which had been prepared by the OECD Secretariat, 7 taking account of the views and proposals put forward in the preliminary discussion at the April 2-3 meeting, with the purpose of submitting findings and, if possible, recommendations on the subject to the next high-level DAC meeting, tentatively scheduled for July. [Here follow articles on unrelated matters.] * Source: Washington National Records Center, E/CBA/REP Files: FRC 72 A 6248, Current Economic Developments. Confidential. The source text comprises pp. 14-17 of the issue. 1 The meeting was held in Paris. 2 Neither the resolution nor the interim report has been found, but the recommendations in the resolution are summarized in this article. 3 For text of the communique, April 3, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 393-394. 4 Under the IMF's General Agreements to Borrow, founded in 1962, the Finance Ministers of the 10 wealthiest industrial IMF countries pledged to lend their currencies to the IMF up to specified amounts when supplementary resources were needed. The Paris Club is also known as the Group of 10. 5 Emile van Lennep, Treasurer-General in the Netherlands Finance Ministry and Chairman,EEC Monetary Committee. 6 Busec 411 to Brussels, March 21, stated in part that the Department of State was “encouraged by EEC announcement of new untied aid policy. Announcement representative of initiatives Commission can take to assert its leadership in Community and to develop liberal and outward-looking Community policies.” (Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 1 EEC) 7 This study has not been further identified. 166. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Bell) to President Kennedy 166. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Bell) to President Kennedy Source Washington, April 22, 1963. SUBJECT Congressional Presentation Strategy on the FY 1964 Aid Bill and its Relation to the Clay Report This memorandum seeks Presidential guidance on further handling of the Clay committee report in relation to the successful presentation to Congress of the President's FY 1964 aid bill. Thus far, following the President's lead, I have minimized our differences with the Clay report and stressed the area of agreement between the Administration and the Clay committee. I have indicated agreement on the “main points” or general thrust of the report and have pointed out that the reduction of the President's request from $4.9 billion to $4.5 billion was in large part a response to the Clay committee's recommendations. General Clay has expressed publicly the gratification of his committee for the President's action in reducing the budget request and implementing the committee's suggestions. Members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and press comment across the country have expressed pleasure with the Administration's response to the report and the apparent general agreement between the Administration and the report on the future nature of U.S. aid. We do, of course, have certain differences with the report and will face still other problems arising from it. They are principally the following: 1. There are differences on specific areas and countries, some of which are primarily matters of wording in the Clay committee report, with no practical adverse implications (e.g., comments on Africa), and some of which are real and worth disagreeing on. I believe the number of differences in this latter category are few, such as cutting our dollar aid to Nepal, military and economic aid to Iran, and military assistance to Burma. 2. While we are not clear on the precise application of the report's statement that U.S. aid should not go to state-owned enterprises which compete with private endeavors, we have stated our general agreement on this point. The Indian steel mill is the main object of the Committee's recommendation, and this issue will have to be faced soon; thus far, we are replying to questions by saying that the survey report has just come in and is being studied. 3. We would oppose any attempt to make the signing of an investment guarantee agreement a legislative requirement for U.S. aid to any country. This problem has been raised by the Clay report, but the committee is on our side of this argument. 4. We would wish to oppose any strict limitation on, or prohibition of, voluntary U.S. contributions to United Nations aid organizations. The Clay report's comment on this subject can be accepted as a general guideline, and we will get some support from the committee for our position. I propose the following future course of action concerning the presentation and the Clay report: 1. that we continue to support strongly the President's revised program and budget, indicating that they have taken the Clay report into consideration and that the Clay committee has expressed gratification and very large agreement with them. 2. that U.S. Government officials publicly should continue to minimize rather than maximize differences with the Clay report. 3. that legitimate differences which we have with the report should be defended where they are important and as they are raised by others before Congressional committees, emphasizing where possible that some differences are largely of timing and degree. 4. that, since General Clay is expected to specify or otherwise indicate next week a figure of at least $4.0 to $4.1 billion as the minimum need for FY 1964 appropriations, we attempt thereafter to focus Congressional and public consideration on the range between his figure and the $4.5 billion requested. The difference in figures should be explained on the grounds that the $4.5 billion figure is our interpretation of what is needed for U.S. and free world security, that we should have funds on hand for increased lending if Latin American nations perform properly and for demonstrating the continuation of serious U.S. commitment to the Alliance, that we can and should be trusted with the Contingency Fund requested, and that there may be a few countries where we propose to do more than the Clay committee might think minimally necessary. We should argue that any cut in the budget request would entail corresponding costs in the total contribution of the program to free world security. 5. that we seek ultimate authorization figures of approximately $4.3 billion from the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committees—roughly mid-way between the Administration's and General Clay's figure and possibly at the high end of his figures if he cites a range of $4.1-$4.3 billion—which allows both Committees to make some cuts. While the course of action beyond that point is now unclear, our intention should be to seek Congressional approval of an appropriation at Clay's bottom figure of $4.0 or $4.1 billion. If the President agrees with this course of action, I suggest he convey it to the leadership of the House and Senate, perhaps at its April 23 meeting, and to Chairman Morgan and possibly Chairman Fulbright at the same time, either personally or through Mr. O'Brien. This personal assurance to the chairmen of the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committees is considered necessary to assure them of the President's strong backing of a $4.3 billion figure from their respective committees. It may well be that the Senate figure will have to be slightly higher than that of the House Foreign Affairs Committee to reach an authorizing figure at this level. Also, there are strong indications that these committees will require assurances that the Administration will fight for a figure no lower than $4.0-$4.1 billion at the appropriations stage. They regard themselves, rightly or wrongly, as having been somewhat let down by the Administration in the final stages of the appropriations process last year and the year before. Whether this strategy will obtain the optimum appropriation remains to be seen. No one has proposed a real alternative, though some believe it will result in larger cuts than necessary. They point out that liberal legislators and humanitarian groups are disturbed with the Clay report and want the Administration to fight it. I agree that non-Administration officials and private organizations should not be discouraged from opposing the report if they so desire, since it is useful to have their criticism to balance the comments of others of opposite persuasion. While I agree also that the course of action proposed here would at least temporarily inhibit their support for the program, I believe our relations with these persons and groups will not suffer in the long run. Finally and concerning General Clay's testimony in executive session on April 25 before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, he has indicated quite clearly that he will abide by his promise to the President of supporting a figure of $4.0 to $4.1 billion. I had planned to speak with him once more before his testimony to urge him to support a range from his rock bottom figure ($4.0-$4.1 billion) to a higher one ($4.2 or $4.3 billion) which would allow more funds to be on hand for additional Alliance for Progress lending if Latin American nations perform properly, and for the Contingency Fund. Some argue, however, that the House committee will view Clay as “an Administration witness” and cut under any figure he cites, and therefore Clay should specify no figure and simply state his belief in an appropriation “something under $4.5 billion.” While the Committee extracted a promise from Clay at his last appearance to name a figure this time, an attempt could be made to have him avoid a definite figure if the President thought this desirable. The risk obviously is that if this were done, the House Committee might cut more rather than less from the President's request than if Clay named a figure. If the President believes that Clay's citing a specific figure now is desirable, or unavoidable in the light of his promise to the House committee, I recommend that I talk with him as planned, and that the President not meet with him until after his April 25 testimony. I think General Clay might feel that he was being pressed rather closely if the President reviewed the subject with him before his testimony. We would appreciate the President's guidance on the matters reviewed in this memorandum. David E. Bell 1 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, AID, 4/63-9/63. Confidential. Attached to the source text is a memorandum from Easum to Lawrence F. O'Brien, April 22, noting that Secretary Rusk was given a copy of Bell's memorandum that morning, had reviewed it briefly, and may have discussed it with the President at the NSC meeting. The summary record of the NSC meeting contains no discussion of Bell's memorandum. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings, 513th Meeting) Easum added that the President should read the memorandum prior to the leadership breakfast the next day. 1 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 167. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Bell) to President Kennedy 167. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Bell) to President Kennedy Source Washington, May 13, 1963. SUBJECT Coordination of Military and Economic Programs—NSAM 159, May 31, 1962 1 As directed in NSAM 159, I am forwarding a second report on the coordination of economic and military aid programs. 2 The first step in improving coordination has been to establish a programming framework and procedure that will facilitate the making of overall judgments about our military and economic aid programs. Substantial progress has been made in this direction; however, coordination is not just the initiation of improved techniques, although these are important. More basically, it is a different way of thinking—a fuller recognition that various elements of the total U.S. foreign assistance program are inter-related means to common long-run ends and that there can be a fungibility of resources to achieve these ends. The so-called “mix studies”, discussed more fully below, contributed at least as much toward fuller understanding of this inter-relatedness as toward more specific results. I. General Improvements in the Planning Process The greatest improvements in coordination of the economic and military assistance programs should come from the new format that has been established for progressively integrating the planning of military and economic assistance. The A.I.D. program guidance issued to the field missions last summer emphasized three key aspects of over-all planning: the importance of developing an explicit assistance “strategy” which defines realistic goals and relates proposed actions to these goals; the need to plan for several years ahead; and the importance of basing the assistance strategy on a comprehensive analysis of all aspects of a country's situation—social, political and military as well as economic. The military assistance guidance provides for continued MAP planning on a five-year basis, identifies more expressly situations where the primary purposes of MAP are in political areas rather than military security, and singles out certain economic considerations to be incorporated in development of military plans. The Country Team submissions of both economic and military programs take the State Department Country Guidelines as the statement of basic U.S. objectives. The revised program guidance has already had a considerable effect. The Country Assistance Programs submitted to A.I.D. by the field missions have, among other things, provided the basis for developing in Washington concise Country Assistance Strategy Statements. I believe that these provide a sharper focus than we had before in relating means to objectives, including both security and developmental objectives. Further improvements in planning economic aid are expected both through refinements of subsequent annual Country Assistance Program submissions and through the use of a more penetrating analytical programming document, the Long-Range Assistance Strategy (LAS) for selected key countries. It is expected that these more comprehensive studies will be carried out, with Washington assistance, in Turkey, Pakistan, India, Thailand, and Free China this year, as well as in some other countries where the “mix” question is less important. The broader, longer term emphasis of A.I.D. programming provides a better framework for considering military and economic programs together. Longer-term A.I.D. planning will facilitate the meshing of economic assistance programs with the Five-Year MAP Plans. More specifically, the total resources approach facilitates consideration of consumable maintenance requirements of commercial-type items, commonly financed under MAP, as a part of total requirements of the economy; examination of the budget as a totality will be encouraged rather than consideration of the military budget as an independent item. Also, the development of overall aid strategies provides a clearer basis for assessing the inter-relationships among different kinds of aid. Not only the approach but also the timing of A.I.D. programming is being revised to facilitate joint consideration of economic and military assistance programs. The annual updating of the Five-Year Plans has normally been accomplished in the spring while the annual A.I.D. submission has been prepared in late summer or fall. This year I am instructing the A.I.D. Missions, and the Country Teams in major “mix” countries to prepare the general portion of the annual A.I.D. submission for transmittal in June. Next year, we hope to further consolidate the economic and military programming process. This will permit consistency in emphasis and establishment of priorities among assistance activities appropriate to each country situation. More specific steps to improve the coordination of military and economic and assistance are still needed. Several of the “mix” studies have not yet been completed. Some of these can be combined with the LAS. Other special studies will be needed. II. Specific Steps for Improved Coordination of Military and Economic Programs The measures focusing specifically on the optimum balance of military and economic assistance programs have been the “mix” studies directed by NSC 2447. 3 These have had a qualified success over a rather extensive period of time. 1. The visit of the Shah assisted in bringing the “mix” study of Iran to a definitive conclusion. 4 The recommendations included a rather significant reduction in military forces to halt the rise in the Iranian defense budget. This recommendation was accepted at the expense of a commitment to a long-term Military Assistance Program designed to increase the effectiveness of the reduced forces with respect to both internal and external security. The latest reports from the field indicate that the Shah is planning to meet the conditions of force reductions and improved ability to use the new equipment effectively. 2. The Korean study has moved through several stages. A first step toward an ultimate 25% reduction in Korean forces has been recommended and has been endorsed by the Ambassador and by the Department of State. The recommended plan is to reduce forces by about 35,000 a year for two years, and to consider similar force reductions for two more years at a later date in light of ensuing developments. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have so far adhered to their position opposing such reductions. Various JCS studies of strategy in the Pacific theater are nearing completion and may affect the views of the Department of Defense. Meanwhile, political developments in Korea have made it inopportune to propose this action immediately. The Korean force reductions would not of themselves free significant Korean resources for economic development, but they would be a step toward putting a ceiling on Korean defense expenditures and perhaps open the door to further action in this direction. In addition, we propose to reinstate the program of having the Korean economy take over the production of certain items previously supplied by MAP, thus providing work for Korea and reducing the charge on the U.S. to some extent. 3. In Taiwan we expect to initiate shortly a Long-Range Assistance Strategy study which will develop a plan to phase out economic assist-ance. It will be combined with the results of JCS strategic studies in the theater and any review of policy regarding support of GRC forces. 4. A review of our program for the Philippine Republic would also seem desirable in light of strategic and political considerations that may emerge from the current studies. 5. The studies of the balance of military and economic aid in Greece and Turkey have been long in reaching a conclusion. They have demonstrated the highly complex problem of evaluating needs for U.S. bilateral aid to countries which are receiving economic support through OECD consortia and in which the requirement for MAP and local defense budg-ets depend in part on NATO force goals. Practical results have been steps to transfer to the Turkish economy the production of certain items heretofore supplied by the MAP and to reduce support for the military budg-et in Greece. The intensive work within the Executive Branch on these studies has, I believe, resulted in a heightened consciousness of the inter-relationship of military and economic programs. This factor, coupled with the limited availability of military assistance funds, has in effect produced a fairly good balance in our efforts. Further Aid Mix Studies Mix problems can be pursued further through two alternative approaches. A high-level inter-departmental working group could be established to review our politico-military strategy on a worldwide basis in light of anticipated developments in the political and weapons fields. The group would need to be at a high level because it would inevitably have to consider the specifics of defense arrangements and war plans, intelligence evaluations, and the most sensitive politico-military matters. The alternative approach would be intensified consultation between the Department of State and the Secretary of Defense, relying on the latter to provide his judgment as to worldwide defense requirements in relation to U.S. defense plans. The latter course seems to me to be preferable, and I am proposing a series of discussions between the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and myself to review these matters insofar as they affect MAP and economic assistance programs. We will then determine the need for further staff studies. Frank M. Coffin 5 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM No. 159. Secret. Komer's May 16 memorandum to McGeorge Bundy( Document 168 ) was attached to the source text. 1 Document 141 . 2 Apparently the first report, dated May 25, 1962 ( Document 140 ), antedated NSAM No. 159. 3 Document 130 . 4 The Shah of Iran met with President Kennedy and other senior U.S. officials in Washington April 11-13, 1962. 5 Printed from a copy that indicates Coffin signed the original above Bell's typed signature. 168. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 168. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Source Washington, May 16, 1963. McGB— I propose to sit on attached Memo for the President 1 until I have got it straightened out as indicated below. For my part, this is a d— bald-faced whitewash and Dave should be ashamed to let it get out of AID. When you add up five pages of words they total “no progress” at all. I have called Coffin and told him I'd sit on this report until he and Dave could concert with me on what kind of response they wanted from the President. I'd like to send back a rocket saying in effect this is simply not sufficient progress toward carrying out the NSC 2447 mandate and that more action is needed. Note also final page on “alternative approaches” to new mix studies. I'd emphatically opt for a new steering group rather than State/DOD consultation, and have told Frank so. 2 RWK 3 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM No. 159. Secret. 1 Document 167 . 2 In a memorandum to all staff who attended the White House staff meetings, May 17, Bromley Smith wrote that McGeorge Bundy proposed to discuss Bell's May 13 memorandum to the President at a staff meeting the following week. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM No. 159) No record of a White House staff meeting discussing Bell's memorandum has been found. 3 Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials. 169. Memorandum From the Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Hansen) to Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff 169. Memorandum From the Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Hansen) to Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff Source Washington, May 21, 1963. SUBJECT AID Administrator's report on NSAM 159 I believe that, by implication, the May 13 report of the AID Administrator on coordination of economic and military aid overstates the results achieved so far, and understates the basic problems which remain to be solved. It follows naturally that the report does not offer an adequate prescription of further steps to be taken on this front. First as to achievements: 1. The AID “country strategy” papers represent an advance on the economic side, and may progressively offer some basis for better economic-military coordination, but they do not address the economic-military question in any fundamental way. In most cases, the military aspect is not even mentioned. 2. The new military assistance guidance has singled out some selected areas where MAP serves political objectives—but in so doing it has perhaps further obscured the substantial political content of MAP in other countries. The whole question as to which programs should carry how much freight for specific policy objectives—and the priorities among the objectives themselves—are not resolved or even clarified very much in the new guidance. (And it is no secret that the State Department guidelines papers are very weak reeds on this score.) 3. The meshing of planning cycles for economic and military aid, which will begin to some extent this year, provides greater opportunity for integrated country planning, but does not in itself assure this result—especially when the planning is done under separate sets of policy guidance which are not based on a unified concept of goals, priorities, and overall program emphasis. Exhortation to the field for integrated planning loses much of its impact when the Washington guidance fails to exemplify this approach. 4. The NSAM 228 1 exercise speaks for itself on coordination of economic and military aid in Iran. 5. The “aid mix” studies on Korea, Greece and Turkey which were requested by the President almost 16 months ago, and were originally due last July, have not yet been submitted for NSC discussion. 2 The Korea study has produced a general consensus (except in JCS) in favor of a shift in emphasis from military to economic programs, but this consensus is most fragile since it is not based on a solidly-shared appreciation of the basic policy considerations. Thus we do not have any agreed-on policy yardstick for appraising new courses of action as they are proposed in the future. This leaves us improvising tactics without a strategy, at a very crucial point in Korean history. (This is not to argue that immediate steps to implement the overall shift of MAP guidance should be undertaken—obviously the current political situation must be resolved first.) The outstanding characteristic of the Greek and Turkish studies is that they have not adequately addressed the basic policy conflicts which underly the whole question of aid mix in those countries (NATO goals, etc.). While the report suggests that “a heightened consciousness of the interrelationship of military and economic programs” together with the limitations on MAP funds, have produced “a fairly good balance”, we are in fact still skirting the periphery of the substantive questions of aid mix in these countries. In short, we may in many of these cases be achieving the “right” figures for the wrong reasons or just because we have pressed hard in the budgetary process. Furthermore, the gradual trend toward lower MAP levels, which has been discussed for the “aid mix” countries, is not reflected in the current projections of program level for the next 5 year planning period. With respect to problems still unsolved: 1. Despite some meshing of time schedules, and increased exhortation to view these programs together, there is little indication of the actual process by which they are to be planned, reviewed or implemented on an integrated basis in the country teams. From the promulgation of policy on through the successive phases of planning, these programs are still running very largely on separate tracks—and are only “joined” if at all, at the point of final annual program determination. 2. Fundamental to this problem is the lack of an agreed framework of policy within which economic and military programs can be jointly planned in both Washington and the field in any meaningful sense. This is a prime area of concern for the AID Administrator, not only in terms of the pending “mix” studies, but in a more general and continuing sense as well. 3. The locus of aid policy and program decisions is one of the major problems of coordination which needs to be considered by the Administrator. The organizational and administrative relationships among State, AID and Defense, and the extent of responsibility each has for different aspects of aid policy, are matters which fall within the purview of NSAM 159. On this front, the Administrator by himself faces overpowering pressures, and the cause of effective coordination would be served by proposals that give the White House an opportunity to strengthen the Administrator's hand. 4. Related and important questions which need to be re-assessed are the key MAP planning role assigned to the Unified Commands, and the structuring of country team work in the total aid field. While the report admits that “more specific steps to improve coordination…are needed”, none of these basic problems are even mentioned, and no concrete steps are delineated. The projected future course of actions is extremely vague and limited. Further consolidation of program processes is of course desirable, but it is hard to visualize at this point, since the basic program planning proc-ess has not been indicated yet. To our knowledge, the review process for this summer and fall in Washington has not even been determined, much less longer range processes. Completion of the aid-mix studies, perhaps in combination with the LAS, and “other special studies” merely suggest some of the work to be done, but not a way of going about it. Only one real proposal is made , which is for a series of discussions between McNamara, Harriman and Bell instead of using a high level, interdepartmental working group. I would make four points about this proposal: 1. While using other terminology, it actually calls for an interdepartmental working group—the only difference being that it excludes the Executive Office circuit. 2. The subject for discussion is not clear, but by implication it would be fairly narrow in scope—U.S. military requirements as they affect MAP and economic aid programs. From this would flow “further staff studies”. But will the whole exercise be founded again on a separate and prior statement of military requirements, as the only real constant in the equation, or will these be subjected to constant challenge as they were in the “MAP-mix” enterprise (almost exclusively by White House/BOB participants). 3. To get a real assessment in which the variables include military as well as economic and political factors, Dave Bell may need all the allies he can get. This despite the Harriman and McNamara records of reasonableness on MAP. The real problem is to focus the dialogue on the fundamentals of the mix question, so that we end up not only with an agreeable set of figures for the moment, but a genuine policy consensus which can sustain a sensible balance in the future—or at least provide a valid yardstick for changing course again if that should become necessary later. Experience would suggest that Executive Office participation would help assure discussion in these basic terms. 4. Inter-agency discussions of the limited nature suggested raise special problems in view of the fact that we still lack basic policy decision on the mix question which the President presumably still wants to review. And since the agency heads are not yet accountable to any real established policy in this field, the settlement of key mix questions without further reference to White House views may not serve the President's interest. Kenneth R. Hansen 3 * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 65 A 481, White House, FY 1962. Secret. Attached to the source text is a May 22 memorandum from Komer to David Bell, which reads: "Here, with Ken Hansen's OK, is his acid comment on your reply to NSAM 159 (military-economic aid coordination). However politely phrased, the reply seems to add up to saying that not much has been done, nor is contemplated. "As I told Frank, I don't want to show a report like this to the President without checking tactics with you. Would you want, for example, a fairly tart reply from the President saying in effect ‘this isn't good enough; let's keep humping.' You could use this to back your hand on next moves.” 1 Entitled “Review of Iran Situation,” March 14. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM No. 228) 2 These studies were called for in NSC Record of Action No. 2447, Document 130 . Komer's comments on drafts of studies on these three countries are contained in his memorandum to Coffin, July 30, 1962. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Korea) 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Hansen signed the original. 170. Letter From Secretary of Defense McNamara to Secretary of State Rusk 170. Letter From Secretary of Defense McNamara to Secretary of State Rusk Source Washington, July 9, 1963. Dear Dean : The following statements by the President were issued as a part of National Security Action Memorandum No. 242, dated 9 May 1963: "It is essential that we make every effort to prosecute the program of selling U.S. equipment to allies.” "Not only will this decrease the net outflow of gold from this country, but it also ties in our military aid to foreign policy.” "Will you please assure that those concerned are properly informed, including appropriate Members of Congress, those concerned in other departments of government, as well as those in the Department of Defense.” 1 I have directed all appropriate elements of the Department of Defense to aggressively pursue the prosecution of such a program. In keeping with the President's expressed desire, I suggest that you advise appropriate personnel in your Department of the policy contained in the above quoted remarks. I further suggest that you enjoin those concerned to keep this policy clearly in mind as we seek solutions to the many difficult problems involved in prosecuting such a program. Sincerely, Bob * Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM No. 242. Confidential. A copy was sent to McGeorge Bundy. The source text is Tab A to an undated memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to Secretary Rusk. As summarized in Johnson's memorandum, McNamara's letter was an outgrowth of correspondence on military sales between McNamara and Bell. Bell's June 24 letter to McNamara, McNamara's June 28 reply, and McNamara's June 27 memorandum to William Bundy are Tab C. Tab D is printed as Document 171 . U. Alexis Johnson transmitted his memorandum to Rusk (with all its tabs) under cover of an undated memorandum to Bell asking for his concurrence. 1 The full text of NSAM No. 242 is Tab B to Johnson's undated memorandum to Secretary Rusk. The President issued NSAM No. 242 following receipt of a May 7 memorandum from Nitze, which offered reasons for the Australian Government's purchase of French Mirage airplanes. A copy of Nitze's memorandum is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 67 A 1530, Military Assistance, FY 1964. 171. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Secretary of Defense McNamara 171. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Secretary of Defense McNamara Source Washington, July 26, 1963. Dear Bob : I refer to your letter of July 9 regarding the importance of the sale of United States military equipment to our allies. 1 I received a copy of NSAM 242 of May 9 and it was circulated to our officers concerned, who have well in mind the President's interest in U.S. military sales programs to allies such as Australia. Even apart from the President's memorandum, we have of course strongly supported military sales programs which are not inconsistent with other foreign policy considerations. In this connection, I have in mind such questions as the degree to which military sales to any specific country could divert resources from higher priority economic development objectives, particularly where we are extending economic aid to that country, and the degree to which the arms which a country proposes to purchase are compatible with the objective of focusing its military resources on its internal defense as opposed to “arming against its neighbors”. I had not interpreted the President's memorandum as an injunction to disregard all such foreign policy considerations in pursuing these sales and I presume that it was not your intent that we should do so. Thus, in instances in which military sales would be made either for cash or on credit from sources such as the Export-Import Bank, I would expect that we would be given the opportunity to provide political guidance in relating these sales to other foreign policy objectives, while also taking into account NSAM 242. In other cases, where there is a potential competition for MAP funds between military sales and grant military assistance, I would hope that our two Departments could collaborate fully, taking into account my responsibilities under Section 622(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. As you know, I have delegated this authority to the Administrator of AID, 2 who acts in consultation with the Under Secretary and the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs. I expect, of course, to be brought into these matters directly when this seems called for. I would thus expect that Dave Bell would have the primary role in the coordinated consideration of the issues involved in such cases. The appropriate bureaus of the State Department would, of course, also continue to be involved. I am sure that we can thus continue to collaborate most effectively in pursuing the objectives desired by the President with respect to our military sales and other objectives. With warm regards, Sincerely, Dean 3 * Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM No. 242. Confidential. Copies were sent to McGeorge Bundy and Bell. The source text is Tab D to U. Alexis Johnson's undated memorandum to Secretary Rusk; see the source note, Document 170 . 1 Document 170 . 2 See CA-11942 to Chiefs of Mission of all AID recipient countries, April 24, 1962, in the Supplement. 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original. 172. Current Economic Developments 172. Current Economic Developments Source Washington, August 6, 1963. Issue No. 681 [Here follow articles on unrelated matters.] HIGH-LEVEL DAC MEETING CONSIDERSMAJOR ISSUES IN THE AID FIELD The second annual aid review of the OECD Development Assist-ance Committee, held at a high-level session July 24-25, 1 was characterized by free, honest discussion of basic issues and was unanimously regarded as being more successful than last year's meeting. 2 There was intensive discussion of major issues in the aid field, including levels, terms, coordination, technical assistance, the role of private enterprise, and measures to improve the effectiveness of aid. US viewpoints were effectively presented by AID Director Bell, who stressed particularly our concern over the increased US share in the total flow of aid and the lack of increase in the over-all volume despite the growing requirements of the less-developed countries. The session resulted in: a) reaffirmation of the London resolution on the common aid effort; 3 b) determination to examine the pipeline problem and study measures to reduce the increasing lag between commitments and disbursements; c) a rededication to the resolution of last April on the terms of aid; 4 d) a restatement of the Bonn understanding favoring untied aid to the extent possible but taking into account balance-of-payments considerations; 5 and e) agreement to arrange a schedule and procedures for more regional meetings. Levels and Adequacy of Aid The net flow of official financial resources from DAC countries in 1962 was maintained at but did not exceed the level of $6 billion which had been reached in 1961 as the result of an increase of over 20% compared with 1960. Official statements during the aid review suggested that the total this year is likely to be larger than in 1962. The countries which were most forthcoming to the US plea for a greater effort were the UK and Japan which indicated that the 1963 flow will be substantially higher than 1962. The Canadians also indicated greatly increased disbursements in 1963, estimated at $125 million, although there has been no basic policy review yet. The most pessimistic response came from the Italians who thought little expansion could be expected from them in view of the serious deterioration in their balance-of-payments situation the first half of 1963. Most delegates suggested that figures for any one year may be seriously affected by unusual special circumstances and that trends can be measured only in terms of longer than the annual period. In a discussion of the pipeline problem, the French called attention to slow drawdowns and lack of projects and suggested focussing attention on assistance in project preparation and planning. The IBRD observer made an effective statement on the Bank's experience with pipelines. He suggested that these are incident to an expanding aid program and imply no reason to diminish aid, and emphasized the Bank's technical assistance efforts in this connection. Terms of Aid Terms of aid were discussed in the light of the April resolution which had recommended, in light of the increasing problem of the debt service burden of the less-developed countries, that DAC members moved toward liberalization of their aid terms and seek a greater degree of comparability of such terms. (See page 14, April 16 issue.) 6 Director Bell vigorously restated the US position. While noting that the US is hardening its terms wherever appropriate, such as Greece and Taiwan, he emphasized our continuing concern about the debt service problem and the need for better comparability of terms. The British effectively presented their recent liberalization action. The UK has in some cases (notably for Pakistan and India) waived interest payments on new commitments over a seven-year period, cutting effective interest rates nearly in half. The French indicated progress this last year in extending Government loans to non-franc areas for the first time, in combination with exporter credits. Others pointed out improvements, described their limitations, and left the impression that considerable improvement had been made and that there was continued but slower progress toward the goals. The IBRD again made an effective presentation both on the debt service capacity problem and on the proposal now before the IBRD Board to lengthen maximum loan terms and thereby take up previously excluded projects. Several delegations pointed to possible abuses in the use of exporter credits. The French delegate, supported by others, stressed the responsibility of governments for such credits in view of the guaranties they typically offer, and thus broke ground for major work by the DAC on this matter. Tied Aid The meeting had before it a draft resolution on tied aid which contained substantive proposals unacceptable to the US. We felt that the limited progress thus far in the working party 7 reflected the current attitudes of the major countries and that it would be inadvisable to reach agreement on any tied aid resolution containing proposals which the US and other major members avowedly are unprepared to implement in the foreseeable future. A pre-meeting canvass by our delegation revealed little enthusiasm for the draft resolution but reluctance to take the lead in opposing it. We indicated that if others wished to go forward with a resolution we would concur in it only on condition it was clearly understood that the resolution was not binding on the US in any way in view of our balance-of-payments problems. Bonn had reacted negatively to the draft resolution which appeared pointed principally at the Federal Republic. Thus, in a pre-DAC meeting, the Six apparently agreed that the resolution should not be adopted. At the DAC meeting, the Japanese stated at the outset their inability to accept the full resolution and suggested elimination of some of the specific recommendations aimed at reducing the scope of tying. Citing the inability of the US to untie, the Germans then suggested postponing the resolution, and were joined by Italy, Japan, the UK and France. Director Bell countered the impact of remarks tending to put the onus of rejection of the resolution on the US by frankly stating that the US believed in the desirability of untied aid, had furnished untied aid in the past, is tying only in the light of its well-known balance-of-payments constraint, and is effectively limiting the adverse effects of tying in the LDC's. At the suggestion of the Dutch, the resolution was recommitted to the working party for future consideration in light of results of studies the working party is to make of measures aimed at reducing the scope and harmful effect of tied aid. Coordination Chairman Thorp raised a number of problems on aid coordination. The French delegate thought that, by and large, coordination needs are being met on a pragmatic basis by consortia, consultative groups, and the Paris Club. He ended by suggesting that there be further consideration of: a) countries with no looming problems, and b) countries with looming difficulties. As examples of what he meant, he referred to the Far East regional meeting and the meeting on Latin America at which Assistant Secretary Martin made a presentation. The French suggested, in the category of countries with no looming problems, that DAC might discuss tropical Africa next winter. The British suggested a review of experience with past coordinating activities, but cautioned about overburdening DAC machinery and overlapping with other organizations. Director Bell emphasized that although the US has departed from a strict matching formula in consortia, a rising US share of consortia contributions could not be justified and a declining share would often be appropriate. He also endorsed the idea of a review of past and current coordination activities. The Germans, Japanese and Belgians supported a more regular schedule of regional reviews. The consensus was in favor of such meetings, with the Belgians emphasizing “systematic reviews”, and the Chairman stressing the necessity of preparatory work to ensure substantive comment. The discussion indicated that reviews would be of value in identifying country problems. Technical Cooperation There was a general agreement with Chairman Thorp's statement on the importance of technical cooperation in the development process and the need for more attention to the essentiality of relating technical cooperation more closely to capital assistance. Mr. Bell called for increased attention to potential technical cooperation with specific emphasis on assisting LDC's to improve their development planning and assess long-run manpower needs. Statements of several delegates reflected concurrence on the importance of coordination at the field level, and the significance of the role of the UN resident. At the meeting of the technical cooperation working group earlier in the month, the US had announced a decision to cease the Third Country Training program. It was generally acknowledged that this was appropriate and that the bilateral programs of other DAC members could absorb the trainees. Role of Private Capital Discussion produced general endorsement of statements in the Chairman's report as to the important role of private capital in the development of LDC's and concern about the decline of direct and indirect private investment. Our delegation mentioned the International Bank's work on an arbitration convention and the Bank observer gave some details. The IDB also gave an effective statement of its activities along this line and prospects and discussed parallel financing with the EEC and others. The Germans reported that a draft law is now before the Federal Republic Parliament designed to encourage private flows. The Dutch urged increased pressure in OECD to push through a convention on protection of private property. They noted that the findings of the report on a multilateral investment guarantee produced no unsurmountable technical or legal difficulties and suggested that the November meeting might be an appropriate time to get a positive reaction thereon. The EEC proposed the IFC as a possible solution to the institutional arrangement. The French endorsed continuation of study of investment guarantees but made clear that the time of decision would find France reluctant, as it is fearful this might involve payment of compensation on old investments in former colonies. Mr. Bell expressed general concurrence in the desirability of a continuing study of a multilateral investment guarantee as one measure of stimulating private flow, but cited other possibilities. The observer from the IBRD said the Bank would be pleased to collaborate with the Secretariat on the study but confessed doubt as to the extent to which discussion of the institutional arrangements could go. The Chairman summed up the discussion by accepting the instruction to continue to search for ways of encouraging private flows. Effectiveness of Aid There was a general consensus that in considering effectiveness of aid more attention would be needed to standards of evaluation, and it was agreed that more should be done by DAC on this topic. The German representative suggested a two-pronged approach to evaluation: a) exchange of donor impressions in consortia, and b) establishment of a working group to study ways of setting standards for measuring effectiveness. The Chairman indicated that consideration would be given to the desirability of a working party on evaluation, and cited also the resources of the OECD Development Center. [Here follow articles on unrelated matters.] * Source: Washington National Records Center, E/CBA/REP Files: FRC 72 A 6248, Current Economic Developments. Limited Official Use. The source text comprises pp. 14-17 of the issue. 1 The session was held in Paris. 2 For text of an OECD press release issued at the end of the session, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 418-420. 3 See Documents 99 , 101 , and 102 . 4 The DAC communique issued on April 3 reads in part: “the Committee agreed that members should make it their objective in principle to secure a significant degree of comparability in the terms and conditions of their aid, and so far as possible to eliminate or reduce disparities among them. It was clear that in practice, though this would not necessarily entail standard terms and conditions from all donors, it would involve a liberalization of the terms adopted by some members, whether in their individual aid programs or in concerted aid operations.” (American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, p. 394) 5 An apparent reference to the understandings reached at the meeting of the Development Assistance Group in Bonn July 5-7, 1960. 6 Document 165 . 7 Documentation on the Economic OECD Policy Committee and its working party meetings is in Department of State, Central File E 3 OECD. 173. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to Secretary of the Treasury Dillon 173. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to Secretary of the Treasury Dillon Source Washington, August 23, 1963. Dear Doug : In connection with your letter of July 24, 1 I believe you will find the Department's reply to Secretary McNamara's letter of July 9, 2 which is attached for your information, useful in explaining our views on the promotion of military sales. To ensure that the objectives desired by the President are fully understood by posts abroad where this policy is to be applied, we are in the process of coordinating with AID and Defense a circular instruction to the field. I will be pleased to forward a copy of it to you when it is ready for transmittal. 3 With warm personal regards, Sincerely, George 4 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-3. Confidential. Forwarded to Under Secretary Ball for his signature under cover of an August 5 memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to Ball. The August 23 date was later stamped on the source text when it was sent to Secretary Dillon. 1 In this letter to Secretary Rusk, also attached to the source text and Johnson's memorandum, Dillon advised that the Department should send a circular containing the key paragraphs of NSAM No. 242 to the attention of some Country Teams abroad (including some MAAGs) because these teams could provide the “most direct help, both to the governments to which they are accredited and to U.S. defense industry representatives, in promoting sales opportunities.” 2 Documents 170 and 171 . A copy of the Secretary's July 26 letter to McNamara is also attached to the source text. 3 Text in CA-2258, August 26; see the Supplement. 4 Printed from a copy that indicates Ball signed the original. 174. Editorial Note 174. Editorial Note Under Secretary of State George W. Ball visited Europe November 9-20, 1963, to discuss foreign economic subjects with European leaders. He was in Paris November 9-10, Bonn November 10-13, London November 13-15, and Paris November 15-20. His meetings with British, French, and West German Foreign and Finance Ministers included consultations on foreign assistance and international development. Documentation on these talks is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2338-2339. Ball's bilateral discussions were preliminary to the meeting of the Ministerial Council of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which was held in Paris November 19-20, 1963. Ball headed the U.S. Delegation, and Ambassador John Leddy served as Alternate Head. Among other matters, the Ministers discussed the importance of maintaining foreign assistance at a high level to meet the increasing needs of developing countries and stressed the coordination of such aid to make it more effective. The Ministers also discussed preparations for the upcoming U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Documentation on U.S. preparations for the UNCTAD conference is scheduled for publication in volume XXV . A summary of this OECD meeting is in Current Economic Developments, Issue No. 689, November 26, 1963, pages 9-13. (Washington National Records Center, E/CBA/REP Files: FRC 72 A 6248, Current Economic Developments) For text of the communique, November 20, see Department of State Bulletin, December 16, 1963, pages 948-949. Documentation on U.S. participation in this Ministerial Meeting is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2340-2340A. 175. Editorial Note 175. Editorial Note During 1963, Congress strongly resisted the Kennedy administration's proposals for military and economic assistance. For background of these proposals, see Document 164 . At his news conference on August 20, President Kennedy remarked that the House of Representatives had already cut his request for $4.5 billion by $850 million, but he was somewhat heartened that the bill appeared to have bipartisan support for a $4.1 billion authorization. For the transcript, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963 , pages 629-630. Subsequently, however, the House of Representatives approved only $2.8 billion in foreign assistance, or $1.7 billion below President Kennedy's earlier request, and the Senate version called for about $3.3 billion. After Congress authorized only $3.0 billion in new funding, President Johnson issued a statement on December 14 urging Congress to increase the funding levels. For text of the President's statement, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64 , pages 55-56. Documentation on the Agency for International Development's efforts to defend and promote the foreign assistance program in Congress is in Washington National Records Center, RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 67 A 1530, Foreign Assistance Legislation, FY 1964. On December 16, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Foreign Assistance Act of 1963 (P.L. 88-205; 77 Stat. 379). He claimed in a signing statement that the $3 billion authorized in the legislation “reflects a dangerous reduction in funds and a consequent dangerous reduction in our security.” He also indicated that he had asked AID Administrator Bell “to put our foreign operations on a sounder basis—to insist on maximum effort by aid recipients—and to intensify our efforts to eliminate excess or ineffective personnel. We will resist reorganization for reorganization's sake—but we do intend to present to the Congress next year a more effective, efficient aid program.” For text of the statement, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64 , pages 58-59. On the same day, President Johnson called for the creation of an Executive branch committee under the chairmanship of Acting Secretary of State Ball to examine the foreign assistance program. Formally known as the President's Committee To Examine the Foreign Assistance Program, this group was asked to develop recommendations for the President by January 15, 1964. Documentation on the work of this committee is in Department of State, Central File AID (US) 1, and ibid., S/S Briefing Books: Lot 66 D 219, Executive Branch Committee on Foreign Aid. With the appointment of this interagency committee, final reports on military and economic aid planning, which had been mandated in NSC Record of Action No. 2447 ( Document 130 ) and NSAM No. 159 ( Document 141 ) and were still in preparation, were taken over by the interagency committee. This action was requested in a memorandum from Benjamin H. Read to McGeorge Bundy, January 7, 1964. Notations on the memorandum confirmed White House approval of the request. (Washington National Records Center, RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 67 A 1530, National Security Council) 176. National Security Action Memorandum No. 276 176. National Security Action Memorandum No. 276 Source Washington, December 26, 1963. MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Administrator, Agency for International Development SUBJECT Distribution of Foreign Aid Cuts The President will wish to review the program changes proposed in the FY 1964 foreign aid program as a result of Congressional action this year, 1 since the way in which these cuts are distributed may involve important foreign policy decisions. Therefore, AID and the Department of Defense should outline briefly the major changes proposed from the $4.5 billion FY 1964 presentation figure, with a brief recapitulation of the reasons for each. Any forced reductions in commitments or implied commitments should also be appropriately mentioned. I suggest that individual mention need be made only of changes over $10 million, e.g. a cut in a country program, lumping the remainder together in appropriate categories. The Department of State might submit any alternative recommendations with respect to these program changes which it feels required from the foreign policy point of view. I would like to be able to show these reports to the President by 7 January. McGeorge Bundy * Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM No. 276. Secret. A copy was sent to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. 1 See Document 175 . 177. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) 177. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) Source Washington, December 30, 1963. Dear George : I am writing this private letter to amplify my thinking about State Department policy control of the foreign aid program. You know the history of this. The coordination resided in Doug Dillon when he was Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, and moved up with him when he took your present job. Thereafter, Jack Bell and his people handled the matter under you (the so-called BFAC) and it was rather petering out by the fall of 1962 and tending to move somewhat into Jeff Kitchen's hands. Then, when Dave Bell took over from Fowler, the Executive Order specifically lodged the coordination authority in him 1 and it has been exercised by a group under the leadership of Hollis Chenery, with Joe Wolf acting on the military side. What I would say about this arrangement does not in any way reflect on the tremendous competence and national-mindedness of Dave Bell. But the plain fact is that there have been what seemed to be two substantial difficulties: a. Putting the military under a whole group of economic-minded people has meant that we have not had nearly as strong a political input as used to be the case when the coordination was in the State Department itself. A specific example, now out of date, would be the continuing pressures on us to sanction transfers from the military account to economic aid. More recently, and still true, we have found it very difficult to get proper clearance of credit sales activities even after these had the policy approval of the relevant Assistant Secretaries in the State Department, with Dave's people taking the position that they had a veto right down to the last million dollars of where money should be applied. Moreover, despite what Dave says about any failure in State Department influence being due to the Assistant Secretaries not doing their job, the fact is that any system that forces them to work through AID in order to reach our program inevitably tends to inhibit their influence and indeed their degree of knowledge and participation in the Military Assistance Program. I do not mean to suggest that one should lightly yield to the constant fears of an Ambassador or an Assistant Secretary, but there have been political factors that might well have affected the size and composition of specific programs more than has in fact been the case. I think we in ISA fairly well represent the State Department's position, but this is really no substitute for hearing it strongly expressed from the Department itself. I would even go so far as to say that the budget requests in the last two years might have been slightly higher had the Department's voice been heard loudly, although I say this believing that Bob McNamara would probably not agree. b. While I am not a full judge of what has gone on before the Committees on the Hill, my people who follow them closely confirm my impression that the economic program particularly has suffered through not having the hard-headed political interest and policy of the US constantly expressed. After Dean's opening blast, usually restricted by its being an open hearing, the matter devolves solely to the Assistant Secretaries and on occasion lower still. The kind of constant shepherding and personal intervention that I believe Doug Dillon used to provide in 1958-61 has simply not been present, and all the last-minute cannonades in the world cannot make up for that lack. Although Dave himself has always been thoroughly familiar with the Department's policy and positions, he is necessarily identified as predominantly economic in approach, and this has tended to obscure the often completely persuasive Realpolitik of particular programs. Thus, both conceptually and because of the practical difficulties stated above, I myself would be highly sympathetic to the creation of what might be called an “Under Secretary for Programs” within the Department. I prefer this title to Henry Owen's “Under Secretary for Economic Affairs” because the responsibility of the position should extend deeply into the military field and might well embrace a few other odds and ends of a non-economic character as well (science?). But the question is also one of personalities. When Dave got his present coordination authority in 1962, Alex Johnson was swamped and George McGhee would have been badly miscast in the coordination role. Now that you have Averell carrying a real share of the top load, I would myself think that Alex Johnson, with a lot of support from Jeff Kitchen and his people, could do this job admirably. It would, of course, mean that as a practical matter Dave Bell would move to No. 5 instead of No. 4 in the Department's pecking order, but this I would regard as virtually inevitable in the circumstances. The point is that Alex has the necessary force and knowledge to bring home the specific national interest of the country and the vital effect on foreign policy of cuts to the important swing Congressmen. I need hardly say that we would have utmost confidence in him from the standpoint of wise and effective policy guidance on the military assistance side, and this part would fit particularly naturally into the hitherto somewhat uneasy charter that Jeff Kitchen has had. This letter is obviously what we used to call in the War a “burn before reading” note. It really is not for me to suggest ways of reorganizing the Department, and I don't want to sound at all critical of Dave—who I think would actually benefit from having his hands freed to run the economic show alone and not have to worry his head constantly about the miscellaneous coordination problems. Yours ever, Bill * Source: Department of State, S/S Briefing Books, 1962-1966: Lot 66 D 219, Executive Branch Committee on Foreign Aid. Personal and Confidential. An undated note in the Secretary's handwriting to Ball, attached to the source text, reads: “A good statement of this point. DR‘ 1 Reference is to Executive Order 10973, November 3, 1961. International Investment and Development Policy International Investment and Development Policy 178. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, March 8, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 398.13/3-861. Official Use Only. Drafted by Martin on March 13. 179. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, March 17, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 398.051/3-1761. Official Use Only. Drafted by Plakias. 180. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Washington, March 17, 1961, 8:24 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 398.051/3-1761. Confidential. Drafted by Plakias and Walter M. Kotschnig (IO/OES) on March 17, cleared by Martin and David Wilken (E), Secretary of the Treasury Dillon, and Virginia Westfall (IO/OIA) in draft, and approved by Cleveland. Repeated to Brussels, Canberra, Copenhagen, The Hague, London, Ottawa, Paris, Pretoria, Rome, Stockholm, and Tokyo. 181. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, March 20, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 398.14/3-2061. Official Use Only. Drafted by Martin on March 21. 182. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) to Acting Secretary of State Bowles Washington, May 18, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 398.051/5-1861. Confidential. Drafted by Ruth S. Gold (E/OFD) and Richard N. Gardner (IO) on May 16 and concurred in by Achilles (S/O), Martin (E), Ball (B), Bell (B/FAC), Labouisse (ICA), and Hays (H). 183. Letter From the Managing Director of the U.N. Special Fund (Hoffman) to the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) New York, June 30, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 398.051/6-3061. Personal. 184. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) to the Managing Director of the U.N. Special Fund (Hoffman) Washington, July 10, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 398.051/6-3061. No classification marking. 185. Memorandum From the Managing Director of the Development Loan Fund (Coffin) to the Staff of the Development Loan Fund Washington, July 21, 1961. Source: Washington National Records Center,RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 65 A 481, Development Financing, FY 1962. No classification marking. Attached to the source text is a July 24 memorandum from Joseph S. Toner to Labouisse, noting that the memorandum was distributed to the DLF staff on July 21. The source text bears the handwritten marginal comment: “Noted H.L. by PYJ[ones].” Jones was Labouisse's Executive Assistant. 186. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball) to the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) Washington, August 12, 1961. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Economic Policy,OECD Development Center. Confidential. Transmitted through S/S. Copies were sent to David Bell, Kaysen, Labouisse, Edwin Martin, and John Bell. 187. Letter From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to the Belgian Finance Minister (Dequae) Washington, August 21, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 398.13/8-2361. No classification marking. Attached to the source text is an August 23 letter from Theodore L. Eliot, Jr., Dillon's Special Assistant, to Lucius D. Battle, indicating that Dillon had sent the enclosed letter to Dequae as well as to Karl Blessing (Belgium), Franz Etzel and Ludwig Erhard (Federal Republic of Germany), Wilfrid Baumgartner (France), Pierre Werner (Luxembourg), J. Zijlstra and M. W. Holtrop (Netherlands), and Paolo Emilio Taviani (Italy). Also attached is a copy of a note from Dillon to Hubert Ansiaux, Governor of the Banque Nationale de Belgique, thanking him for his support for the proposed multilateral borrowing scheme in the International Monetary Fund and enclosing a copy of the letter printed here for his information. All these letters were transmitted through the appropriate Embassies. 188. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball) to the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) Washington, September 9, 1961. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 286,AID Administrator Files: FRC 65 A 481, State Department, FY 1962. Confidential. The source text forms part of the daily log of the AID Executive Secretariat, September 12. 189. Editorial Note 190. Current Economic Developments Washington, September 26, 1961. Source: Washington National Records Center, E/CBA/REP Files: FRC 72 A 6248, Current Economic Developments. Unclassified. The source text comprises pp. 1-6 of the issue. 191. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy Washington, October 18, 1961. Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM No. 101. Confidential. 192. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, December 6, 1961. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, United Nations, General, 12/61. No classification marking. The word “Noted” is written on the source text in Bundy's handwriting. 193. Current Economic Developments Washington, January 16, 1962. Source: Washington National Records Center, E/CBA/REP Files: FRC 72 A 6248, Current Economic Developments. Confidential. The source text comprises pp. 13-15 of the issue. 194. Summary Minutes of Meeting of the Interdepartmental Committee of Under Secretaries on Foreign Economic Policy Washington, January 24, 1962. Source: Department of State, E Files: Lot 65 D 68, Interdepartmental Committee of Under Secretaries on Foreign Economic Policy. Official Use Only. Presumably drafted by Ruth S. Donahue who is listed as Recording Secretary. 195. Airgram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State Washington, February 28, 1962. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 398.051/2-2862. Confidential. Drafted by Klutznick, Seymour M. Finger, and David Tilson and cleared by Klutznick and Hefner. 196. Letter From the Managing Director of the U.N. Special Fund (Hoffman) to Secretary of State Rusk New York, March 1, 1962. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 398.051/3-162. No classification marking. Attached to the source text is a March 2 note from Swank to Cleveland, indicating that this letter was left with the Secretary by Hoffman during the latter's call on March 2. Secretary Rusk met with Hoffman and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Gardner on March 2 from 2:56 to 3:28 p.m., but no record of their conversation has been found. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Books) 197. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Gardner) to the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) Washington, April 16, 1962. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 398.13/4-1662. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Gardner. Attached to the source text is an April 19 note from Cleveland to Ball, remarking that Gardner's memorandum was worth reading and suggesting a meeting among Dillon, Leddy, and Ball on the Bank and Fund leadership question after Ball returned from abroad the first week in May. 198. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State New York, April 24, 1962, 8 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 398.051/4-2462. Secret; Limit Distribution. 199. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) to the Managing Director of the U.N. Special Fund (Hoffman) Washington, May 9, 1962. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 398.051/3-162. No classification marking. Drafted by Frank K. Hefner (IO/OIA) on April 5. 200. Current Economic Developments Washington, August 28, 1962. Source: Washington National Records Center, E/CBA/REP Files: FRC 72 A 6248, Current Economic Developments. Confidential. The source text comprises pp. 14-15 of the issue. 201. Editorial Note 202. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Washington, January 30, 1963, 12:40 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 398.051/1-3063. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Gardner and McKitterick on January 29; cleared by ARA (in substance), Wallner (IO), and Little (S/S); and approved by Secretary Rusk. Also sent to Rome. Attached to the source text is a January 29 memorandum from Wallner to Secretary Rusk, requesting the Secretary's approval of the telegram and recommending against a final appeal from Ambassador Reinhardt in Rome to Dr. Binay Ranjan Sen, Director General of the FAO, to declare the Cuban project unfeasible, because Sen would probably ignore the appeal. At most he would send a special investigator to Cuba who would probably report favorably on the project. “At best, we would have gained a month without changing the outcome and at the risk of drawing additional public and Congressional notice to this matter.” 203. Editorial Note 204. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions Washington, May 13, 1963, 9:08 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files,AID (IDA). Limited Official Use. Drafted and cleared by Bullitt (Treasury), Springsteen, and Read and approved by A. Evans Hiley (OC/DCT) and Jacob J. Kaplan (AID/IDOS). Sent to Canberra, Vienna, Brussels, Ottawa, Copenhagen, Helsinki, Paris (Embassy and USRO), Bonn, Rome, Tokyo, Kuwait, Luxembourg, The Hague, Oslo, Pretoria, Stockholm, and London. 205. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions Washington, May 29, 1963, 8:11 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files,AID (IDA). Limited Official Use. Drafted by Bullitt (Treasury), cleared by Kaplan (in substance), and approved by John S. Whitt (OC/DCT). Sent to Canberra, Vienna, Brussels, Ottawa, Copenhagen, Helsinki, Paris (Embassy and USRO), Bonn, Rome, Tokyo, Kuwait, Luxembourg, The Hague, Oslo, Pretoria, Stockholm, and London. 206. Editorial Note 207. Letter From the Vice President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Wilson) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) Washington, October 21, 1963. Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID(IBRD) 9. No classification marking. 178. Memorandum of Conversation 178. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, March 8, 1961. SUBJECT Expansion of IMF Resources PARTICIPANTS Mr. Frank Southard—IMF Mr. George Willis—Treasury Mr. James Tobin—CEA Mr. Robert Triffin—CEA Mr. Herbert Furth—Federal Reserve Board Mr. John Hooker—IMF Mr. Jack Pollock—IMF E—Edwin M. Martin As a result of the discussion there seemed to be general agreement that it would be desirable for Southard to prepare a US position paper for consideration by various agencies which would provide authority for the US to offer a standing line of credit to the IMF of about $2 billion to be matched by similar lines of credit from 8 to 10 of the other principal financial countries in the amount of about $4 billion. This credit could be drawn upon only when the country providing it was in surplus to make advances to countries in deficit. In return it could be demanded back from the Fund as the country whose funds had been advanced became in its turn a deficit country and needed to add to its resources. It was thought that while legislation would be required it might be easier if the Federal Reserve Board should be the source of funds. It was agreed that means should be sought for the Fund to give in return for monies it had drawn a note which could be counted as a reserve of the Central Bank. Southard thought no such proposal would succeed unless the US lobbied for it. The Europeans were exceedingly lukewarm. The Germans had come out with a rather favorable statement but immediately had been slapped at meeting of the Six for doing so without consultation. The French looked upon it as merely a device for strengthening sterling and would be very reluctant to participate, he feared. Even with our leadership, he was doubtful of success. I asked whether such a move would be expected to be accompanied by any significant change in criteria for IMF advances. He thought not and that the Europeans would strongly oppose it for the same reason that the less developeds would support it. The Europeans fear the IMF will go bankrupt in backing up deficits of less developed countries. In this connection he also answered this by saying that the general view was that present Fund resources were adequate to take care of the needs of the less developed countries and this move is essentially to support reserve currencies, particularly sterling. This does not preclude some modest changes in the willingness of IMF to make funds available automatically but they would be very modest. It will be necessary for the US to have a position of action by early April. * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 398.13/3-861. Official Use Only. Drafted by Martin on March 13. 179. Memorandum of Conversation 179. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, March 17, 1961. SUBJECT New York Daily News Editorial on Cuban Signature of Agreement with the United Nations Special Fund PARTICIPANTS Mr. Tim Smith, Office of Congressman Abner W. Sibal of Connecticut Mr. John N. Plakias, OES, Department of State Mr. Tim Smith was referred to this office by the Cuban Desk Officer. Mr. Smith stated that Congressman Sibal had received a letter from a worried constituent quoting a New York Daily News editorial concerning the signature by the United Nations Special Fund of an agreement with Cuba. Mr. Smith read excerpts of the editorial from the letter (copy of the editorial has been procured and is attached). 1 I replied that while I had not seen the New York Daily News editorial, it appeared to include similar information to that contained in the news item which appeared in the New York Times of March 12th. 2 In fact, both might have stemmed from a UN Press Release (SPF/115) of March 10, 1961 announcing the signature of a basic agreement by Cuba and the Special Fund. 3 I read to Mr. Smith the UN Press Release and stated that it specifically pointed out that no project for Cuba has been approved by the Governing Council of the Special Fund. In this connection I explained that the agreement which had been signed is what is known as a basic agreement which sets forth the conditions which would apply should the Governing Council approve projects for a given signatory country. It did not refer to a specific project but was a prerequisite for assistance through the Special Fund and the framework within which projects subsequently approved by the Governing Council would operate. Mr. Smith commented that it is to be assumed that Cuba would not have signed the agreement unless it intended to seek Special Fund assist-ance. I agreed that this was a logical interpretation. However, the Special Fund receives many requests and all are not recommended for approval, because certain ones do not qualify or for other reasons. Mr. Smith asked if the U.S. could withhold its approval and funds in the event the Special Fund submitted and recommended a Cuban project for approval by the Governing Council. I replied that the U.S. was only one of 18 members sitting on the Governing Council. Mr. Smith stated that he assumed that there was no veto provision in the Special Fund. I replied that this was my understanding. I then explained in some detail the processing procedures to which requests for Special Fund assistance were subjected before they might be finally recommended to the Governing Council. (This explanation was similar to that given Mr. Socas—please see memorandum of conversation of March 16.) 4 I explained that we had no knowledge of the requests made of the Special Fund by Governments. We would normally have knowledge only of those projects which the Managing Director recommended to the Governing Council in advance of the meetings of the Council which were generally held in May and December. In commenting on the number of requests which the Special Fund has received and the number of projects which had been approved, I quoted from the “Programme recommended by the Managing Director” to the December meeting of the Governing Council (Doc. SF/R.2 of November 4, 1960), which indicates that up to September 30, 1960, the Special Fund had received 254 requests. The number of projects approved as of December 31, 1960 totaled 115, to which the Special Fund had made allocations of $95,894,000. In answer to Mr. Smith's question on the Special Fund budget referred to in the news report, I replied by explaining that the Special Fund is financed by voluntary contributions as is the case with the UN Expanded Program of Technical Assistance. I described the pledging procedure to him and confirmed that the amount given in the press item was the same amount ($46.9 million) so far voluntarily pledged by governments to the Special Fund for the year 1961. I also described the U.S. 40% formula in matching contributions up to $100,000,000 for the Special Fund and the UN Technical Assistance Program combined. Mr. Smith seemed pleased to have the information which had been given him and requested that I send to him a copy of the UN Press Release only. He felt that with the background given him and the Press Release he would have sufficient information to explain the situation to the Congressman. * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 398.051/3-1761. Official Use Only. Drafted by Plakias. 1 Not printed. 2 A typed copy of the article is attached to the source text but not printed. 3 A copy of the press release is attached to the source text but not printed. 4 Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 398.051/3-1661) 180. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 180. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Source Washington, March 17, 1961, 8:24 p.m. 1742. Your 2304. 1 Subject: UN Capital Development Fund. 1. In light of information furnished by USUN and after full consideration of issues with Klutznick, Dept is prepared have you inform Boland 2 that he may include US among countries which he feels desirable participate Preparatory Committee and that US prefers to have him name these countries in plenary and ask governments concerned communicate to SYG within reasonable period (2 to 3 weeks) whether they are prepared to serve. 2. Dept favors this procedure because (a) it will make it unnecessary for US to make any statement at time announcement is made (b) it will permit consultations with friendly powers, particularly UK and Canada, to arrive at a common position regarding participation and (c) it will enable us by way of a formal communication to indicate clearly the basis on which we accept membership. 3. In discussions with other Dels you may indicate that in considering whether US would be prepared to serve on Committee US Govt will wish consider how useful Committee might be in affording sponsors and proponents of resolution opportunity express their views and objectives in more detail to US and other countries which had opposed or abstained on resolution and at same time afford US and latter group of countries opportunity to have their views better known and understood by proponents. 4. Communication to be prepared in Department will make it abundantly clear that US accepts membership only on clear understanding that it remains firmly opposed to establishment of a UN Capital Development Fund, that it would not feel committed in any way to contribute to such a Fund if established, and that it believes there should be a further exchange of views in Committee to see whether at this time drafting of statutes would in fact be a useful step to advance economic development of less developed countries. 5. This message being sent for info to selected missions in event questions raised their capitals. 6. Advise Dept any reactions received from Boland, UN Secretariat and other Dels. 3 Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 398.051/3-1761. Confidential. Drafted by Plakias and Walter M. Kotschnig (IO/OES) on March 17, cleared by Martin and David Wilken (E), Secretary of the Treasury Dillon, and Virginia Westfall (IO/OIA) in draft, and approved by Cleveland. Repeated to Brussels, Canberra, Copenhagen, The Hague, London, Ottawa, Paris, Pretoria, Rome, Stockholm, and Tokyo. 1 Dated February 28. (Ibid., 320/2-2861) 2 Frederick H. Boland (Ireland), President of the Third Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly, August 21-25, 1961. 3 Telegram 2563 from USUN, March 21, replied that USUN had disclosed the U.S. position to the other concerned delegations, Boland, and the U.N. Deputy Under Secretary and had received no new reactions and foresaw no problems. (Department of State, Central Files, 398.051/3-2161) 181. Memorandum of Conversation 181. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, March 20, 1961. SUBJECT Preparations for EPC Meeting and IMF Council Discussions PARTICIPANTS Mr. Robert V. Roosa, Under Secretary of Treasury for Monetary Affairs Mr. Walter Heller, Chairman, Committee of Economic Advisers Mr. Arthur W. Marget, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve Mr. Jack N. Behrman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce Mr. R. Henry Rowntree, Chief, Economics Division, Export-Import Bank Mr. John Leddy, Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, Treasury Mr. George Willis, Director, Office of International Finance, Treasury Mr. Edwin M. Martin, Assistant Secretary, State (I received a message late Friday, March 17, from Mr. Willis of Treas-ury that Mr. Roosa would have a meeting on Monday to consider new international financial arrangements. On Monday morning I received a message from Mr. Leddy that the meeting had been called because of concern by Secretary Dillon that a working group set up by CEA under Mr. Triffin to prepare for EPC meeting might get involved in international financial planning of the sort which was properly the responsibility of the NAC.) Mr. Roosa opened the meeting by saying that he and Secretary Dillon were concerned with two points. The first was that in any international discussions, formal or informal, it was imperative that the US representatives speak with a single voice derived from coordinated positions. If there were to be any actual negotiations, they would presumably be handled by representatives of State and Treasury. The second point was that, insofar as the United States took a substantive position on international financial questions in the course of the EPC meeting, it was important that these substantive positions be coordinated through the NAC, which was the established mechanism for this purpose. I inquired if it weren't possible that some of the issues involved were similar to those on which Mr. Southard was seeking guidance for use in IMF discussions of expansion of its resources. Mr. Roosa agreed that this was the case. It was, therefore, important not only to have instructions for EPC meeting but also for Mr. Southard on this particular subject. Mr. Heller indicated that the Triffin group, to which Mr. Roosa had made reference, would be meeting, starting Tuesday morning, March 22, to deal with the question of the coordination of internal financial policies of member governments. Its mandate was confined to this subject. It was agreed that there were two other subjects on which policy guidance was needed. One was the international financial mechanisms which were needed to deal with problems with particular reference to the role of the IMF and to the possibility of the US becoming a member of the EMA. This was clearly a NAC problem. It was left that Mr. Southard would be asked to prepare a paper on IMF aspects and State and Treas-ury on EMA aspects. It was also felt that there would need to be a consideration of how better exchanges of views could be organized, particularly among a more limited group of countries than EPC within OECD framework. It was felt that this paper should be drawn on the assumption that the US would not be able to join the EMA as it now exists. It was agreed that State and Treasury would collaborate on this paper. I proposed that the first step might be to send some ideas to Mr. Tuthill for comment. Mr. Leddy agreed and asked that Mr. Abrams or Mr. Renner 1 get in touch with him with respect to such a telegram as well as preparation of the paper. It was generally felt that the first problem would be the most likely subject for discussion in EPC and the other two might be more useful for informal conversation outside the meetings. It was agreed, however, that no formal decision could be taken on this point until the papers had all been seen. It was agreed that the three papers have relationships with each other and that it will be necessary to examine them together to ensure that they are properly related. It was agreed that this informal group, representing the NAC agencies at a higher level than the staff committee, but not an NAC body, would deal with paper #2 and with the coordination problem. It was agreed on my suggestion that we should wait until after the coordination had been achieved before deciding which parts of the package needed NAC approval. It was felt that the three papers should be ready for examination within two weeks. Neither Exim nor Commerce representatives played any part in the discussion. The Federal Reserve representative spoke strongly in favor of an active NAC role in the whole matter. The conversations were entirely friendly, though Mr. Roosa was firm on the need for clear US positions, even for exploratory conversations. (Immediately after the meeting I informed Mr. Renner of what had transpired and asked him to get in touch with Mr. Leddy. I also confirmed that he was attending the meeting of the Triffin group and suggested in view of the subject matter, he might want to take someone from E. He indicated he had already been in touch with Mr. Goldstein.) 2 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 398.14/3-2061. Official Use Only. Drafted by Martin on March 21. 1 Manuel Abrams, Officer in Charge, Economic Organization Affairs, and John C. Renner, both in EUR/RA. 2 Mortimer D. Goldstein, Assistant Chief (E/FN). 182. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) to Acting Secretary of State Bowles 182. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) to Acting Secretary of State Bowles Source Washington, May 18, 1961. SUBJECT UN Special Fund Project for Cuba The Problem The United States, as a member of the Governing Council of the United Nations Special Fund, will be required to act on a proposal by Paul Hoffman, Managing Director, that the Special Fund allocate $1,157,600 to an agriculture research project in Cuba. The Governing Council meeting will be held May 23-26, 1961. Discussion: As I explained in our conversation on Wednesday afternoon, 1 we have recommended that the least unsatisfactory course for the United States to follow is to work for deferral of the project on technical economic grounds. If a majority of the Governing Council cannot be secured for deferral, the fall back position of the United States should be a quiet negative vote on the grounds that our questions about the economic soundness of the project have not been answered. Following your verbal approval of this course of action, we have instructed our Embassies in various countries which are members of the Governing Council to seek support for deferral of the project. We have also informed Philip Klutznick, the United States Representative to the Economic and Social Council, of this decision. Dick Goodwin of the White House staff has seen this memorandum and has expressed approval of our recommendation. You may wish to inform the President when he returns to Washington, since it will almost certainly be the subject of considerable comment in the press when the Governing Council meets next Tuesday. The attached paper (Tab A) 2 has the concurrence of the bureaus listed below. ARA, too, agrees with the conclusions but wishes certain sections of the paper deleted, especially (a) the possibility of explaining a favorable vote on the ground, inter alia, that the benefits of the research project will not be immediate but will accrue to the free government that succeeds the present regime. They would explain the vote solely on the ground that projects should be examined on their economic and technical merits; (b) allusions to the benefits of the project to the Cuban people; and (c) the analysis of the likely foreign reaction to a U.S. effort to defeat the project. These sections have been retained in the paper in an effort to set forth all the possibilities and the merits and defects of each. The ARA memorandum is attached as Tab B.2 Recommendation: That you inform the President of our decision when he returns to Washington on Friday at your meeting with him on Friday. * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 398.051/5-1861. Confidential. Drafted by Ruth S. Gold (E/OFD) and Richard N. Gardner (IO) on May 16 and concurred in by Achilles (S/O), Martin (E), Ball (B), Bell (B/FAC), Labouisse (ICA), and Hays (H). 1 May 17. 2 Not printed. 183. Letter From the Managing Director of the U.N. Special Fund (Hoffman) to the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) 183. Letter From the Managing Director of the U.N. Special Fund (Hoffman) to the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) Source New York, June 30, 1961. Dear Chet , In view of the uncomplimentary references made by both Senators Bridges and Capehart on the Cuban project 1 I felt it was desirable to have a better understanding among some of our friends in Washington on why this project was included in our programme and also of its relationship to the whole of our programme. As a consequence, I spent a day in Washington and called, at their invitation, on Senators Humphreys and Aitken, on Representatives Walter Judd and John Rooney and also on Al Friendly and Roscoe Drummond. Enclosed is a copy of the memorandum which I left with them which might be of some interest to you. 2 I continue to believe that the United States missed a great opportunity in not supporting this project actively because it is clearly designed to help the Cuban people and not Dr. Castro, just as our projects in Formosa are designed, not to help Chiang Kai-Shek but the people of the Republic of China and those in Korea, not for the help of the military junta presently running Korea, but the Korean people. However, that is all water over the dam. I do believe in the future an opportunity will be missed unless we do emphasize the distinction between projects designed to help people and those designed to help governments, many of which are archaic. Best regards. Sincerely yours, Paul * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 398.051/6-3061. Personal. 1 Not further identified. 2 The 2-page memorandum and a 16-page attachment are not printed. 184. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) to the Managing Director of the U.N. Special Fund (Hoffman) 184. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) to the Managing Director of the U.N. Special Fund (Hoffman) Source Washington, July 10, 1961. Dear Paul : Many thanks for your letter. 1 As you know, I agree wholeheartedly with the viewpoints which you expressed in it and indeed which you and I have both been expressing with a great deal of consistency in the last few years. Although it does not show on the surface, the State Department policies are rapidly moving in the direction that you would feel is right, and I believe they will become much more apparent in the next six months. So many wrong habits are deeply ingrained here, but I am encouraged to think that we are moving ahead, perhaps with greater speed than we have a right to hope for. If you are coming to Washington in the next few weeks, do let me know, as I would like to see you and talk with you about several questions—nothing immediate, but important for the longer haul. I expect to be away in Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia from the 25th of July to the 11th of August. With my warmest regards, Sincerely, Chet 2 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 398.051/6-3061. No classification marking. 1 Document 183 . 2 Printed from a copy that indicates Bowles signed the original. 185. Memorandum From the Managing Director of the Development Loan Fund (Coffin) to the Staff of the Development Loan Fund 185. Memorandum From the Managing Director of the Development Loan Fund (Coffin) to the Staff of the Development Loan Fund Source Washington, July 21, 1961. SUBJECT Transition to the Program for International Development Although Congress has not yet passed the necessary legislation and the new Agency for International Development remains to be established, we have already, for all intents and purposes, embarked on the President's program for the Decade of Development. 1 The period which we are all now going through provides an opportunity for all concerned to contribute to the transition to the new program. I wish first of all to commend the staff for the many constructive activities which have recently been taken to facilitate the transition. We are offering to assist in the efforts soon to begin to evaluate the responses to the outgoing cable No. CG 1066 which has asked the field missions for preliminary recommendations on the aid approach to be taken in each country under the new program. 2 We are also identifying and preparing an inventory of policy and procedure decisions that will be required. We are cooperating in developing development lending procedures which will prevail in the period prior to the time when there is a final decision made by the new agency. We are also evaluating the backlog of loan applications we now hold. The actions which the DLF takes between now and when AID is established can have an important bearing on the shape of the new program. We can contribute to the solution of the many important policy and procedural questions that are involved in the transition to the new program. Conversely, we can also conduct ourselves in such a way to avoid prejudicing future policies and procedures. Finally, the development lending function continues to form a most important part of the economic assistance program of the U.S. Government—an importance which does not permit us to stand still. More specifically, DLF can contribute to the transition in the following three ways: 1. The DLF staff, which has developed an expertise in lending for economic development, should take the opportunity to distill from four years of lending experience considerations which should bear on the procedures and policies of the new Agency for International Development. 2. In responding to inquiries and new applications, it can couch its replies so as to indicate the new context and the new considerations which will be brought to bear in evaluating specific loans. 3. In evaluating proposals already on hand and in communicating with applicants, it can indicate the changed concepts and bases for evaluation that are now taking effect. In making our contributions it will be necessary to bear in mind the central features of the new AID program. Perhaps the most important of the new concepts is that each activity, whether of a loan or grant nature, will be undertaken as a part of a total country approach or program. In following the approach or program for each country, it will be necessary to relate each activity to a priority goal, program or national development plan. In selecting countries for assistance as well as activities to be supported, priority consideration will be given to those making a reasonable self-help effort in terms of mobilizing all available resources by means of sensible planning, budgeting and other measures; undertaking measures to reduce dependence on external resources; tapping the energies and spreading benefits of development to the entire population; and exhibiting honesty in the administration of public affairs. Moreover, we will be seeking ways to use particular financing as leverage for obtaining improvement along the following lines. In the case of loans, which will now be on a largely dollar repayable basis, we will need to consider the capacity of each economy to service debt rather than the character of each activity to be financed. There are a number of ways immediately available to us which can give us a basis for proceeding consistent with the criteria of the new program. The staff should keep in close touch with the materials developed in the course of Congressional consideration of the foreign aid program and specifically the funds programmed for the Fiscal Year 1962. Each staff member should familiarize himself with the red-covered presentation to Congress entitled “The Act for International Development—A Program for the Decade of Development; Objectives, Concepts and Proposed Program.” 3 In addition, as they become available, I suggest that the staff also obtain and read this year's testimony on the International Development and Security Act before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and in particular my statement on June 22, 1961 before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. 4 Additionally, the staff should take into account existing country commitments, which, of course, are tentative as to amount pending final action by the Congress (e.g., India). We must also have the views of the Department of State, ICA, the Program Development Task Force, and the field from the standpoint of the criteria enumerated above. In addition to the above guidelines, I am confident that the ingenuity of the staff, with which I have been impressed, will make it possible for us to make the turnaround and effectuate a rapid integration of our activities into the new foreign aid program. Frank M. Coffin * Source: Washington National Records Center,RG 286, AID Administrator Files: FRC 65 A 481, Development Financing, FY 1962. No classification marking. Attached to the source text is a July 24 memorandum from Joseph S. Toner to Labouisse, noting that the memorandum was distributed to the DLF staff on July 21. The source text bears the handwritten marginal comment: “Noted H.L. by PYJ[ones].” Jones was Labouisse's Executive Assistant. 1 In his special message to the Congress on March 22, President Kennedy referred to the 1960s as the “crucial Decade of Development.” For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, p. 205. 2 See footnote 2, Document 114 . 3 Not found. 4 Reference is to International Development and Security: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-Seventh Congress, First Session (Washington, 1961), Parts 1 and 2, and The International Development and Security Act: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Eighty-Seventh Congress, First Session (Washington, 1961), Parts 1-3. Coffin's testimony is ibid., Part 2, pp. 821-892. 186. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball) to the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) 186. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball) to the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) Source Washington, August 12, 1961. SUBJECT Proposal for United Nations Development Authority Despite the elimination of any specific commitment of United States funds from the proposal for a United Nations Development Authority, I continue to have serious reservations about the desirability of a US initiative along these lines. Before proceeding to crystallize our thinking on this proposal, I believe we must have satisfactory answers to the following questions: 1. Would the UNDA actually represent a significant addition to existing facilities in the field of development planning? At present, in addition to our bilateral arrangements and those of other countries, there are various multilateral devices available, including the IBRD and the UN Special Fund. Assistance in development planning can also be provided by certain regional organizations and by private foundations. Since there are obviously a limited number of personnel who possess real talent in this field, I think we have no assurance that a UNDA, even if created under favorable conditions, would possess the means to offer substantial assistance to the lesser-developed countries. 2. Would the UNDA proposal, as now formulated, actually be received enthusiastically by the lesser-developed members of the UN? There is also a strong possibility that the lesser-developed countries would make a strong drive to amend—and succeed in the effort—the proposal in order to create something in the nature of SUNFED. Might it not be dangerous to risk the prestige of the President of the United States on a proposal of this kind? 3. Is it not probable that a UNDA, because of its broader function and the larger sums of money involved, would be subjected to much stronger and less responsible political influences than has been true of the UN Special Fund? 4. Even if the UNDA could actually be established under optimum conditions, isn't there a strong possibility that its operation would prove to be a political liability to the US rather than an asset? We would face a continuing problem of priorities between UNDA-approved projects and other projects which we may wish to work out bilaterally. For example, we might arouse considerable political resentment in Country A if we should fail to offer to finance a UNDA-approved project in that country at the same time that we are engaged in financing projects in Countries B, C and D which have never received a UNDA stamp of approval. Automatic priority for UNDA-approved projects would be a “pig-in-the-poke” policy. On the other hand, the failure of the donor countries to give priority to UNDA-approved projects might backfire politically against the US and other donor nations. 5. Would other major donor nations support the UNDA proposal, and would they be willing actually to use it as a basis for a significant portion of their economic assistance? I suspect that the fact that UNDA has approved a particular project would be meaningless in the case of France. Germany, of course, is not a member of the UN. I suspect the United States would in the end be the only country channeling significant amounts of aid into plans approved by UNDA. 6. The foregoing questions seem to me to cast considerable doubt on the desirability of making the UNDA proposal a major Presidential initiative. But in addition there is an objection which I think may be even more important. In entrusting the AID program to a single agency we have sought to achieve both coherent administration and the effective utilization of foreign assistance in support of foreign policy objectives. It can be argued that the UNDA proposal itself represents the fulfillment of a foreign policy objective since it might serve to strengthen the UN. But at the same time there is no assurance that the plans proposed by UNDA would be consistent with the more precise requirements of our foreign policy, and certainly the existence of UNDA would tend in the direction of diffusing rather than concentrating the direction of our foreign assist-ance effort. It seems to me quite necessary that in the next few years we should think not merely in terms of the development of individual countries but of such matters as the effect of total development planning on world markets or even on the commercial interests of areas for which we have special responsibility. The proliferation of agencies to guide country planning by the creation of new instrumentalities such as UNDA would seem to make these objectives more difficult to achieve. George W. Ball 1 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Economic Policy,OECD Development Center. Confidential. Transmitted through S/S. Copies were sent to David Bell, Kaysen, Labouisse, Edwin Martin, and John Bell. 1 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 187. Letter From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to the Belgian Finance Minister (Dequae) 187. Letter From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to the Belgian Finance Minister (Dequae) Source Washington, August 21, 1961. Dear Mr. Minister : I have been following closely the plans which are being made for a multilateral borrowing arrangement in the International Monetary Fund, because I attach very great importance to this project. Reports which have reached me of the discussions which the financial officials of the European Economic Community had in Ostend on July 17 have been of great interest, 1 and I understand there will be further discussions early in September. I am writing this letter to let you know of my concern regarding certain aspects of the negotiations in the Fund. I am glad to learn that substantial agreement was reached at the Ostend meeting that the resources of the Fund should be strengthened so as to improve its capacity to deal with major pressures in the foreign exchange field, and that the best way to do this is by means of some sort of borrowing arrangement. I fully share these conclusions, which should pave the way for active negotiation in the Executive Board of the Fund following the Annual Meeting in Vienna. There are of course many details to be worked out, including matters such as the duration of loans, the rate of interest, repayment arrangements, the additional drawing rights to be acquired by lending countries, and the very important question of the amount which each country would agree to lend. I am most hopeful that the agreed plan will be completed by the end of the year so that legislative action can be taken early in 1962 in those countries such as the United States, where it is necessary. I understand that some officials who met at Ostend feel that the participating country should retain full discretion to decide whether it would loan to the Fund at a given time, and that no firm commitment should be given to the Fund by the countries participating in the borrowing arrangement. I feel strongly that our objective must be to create confidence that the Fund is equipped to meet major demands at a time of emergency, as it was able to do in the recent case of the United Kingdom. Frankly, I doubt that an arrangement which would leave it quite uncertain whether in fact participants would lend to the Fund would provide that much-needed confidence. The Fund is not now equipped to meet large demands. Following the drawings by the United Kingdom and India, the Fund's holdings of the eight currencies used in those drawings amounted to only $1.6 billion, plus $2.2 billion in U.S. currency and $2 billion in gold (excluding gold invested in U.S. bills). Also by the end of this year additional demands of at least $300 million probably will have to be met by the Fund. Yet firm assurance that the Fund will have adequate resources at its disposal is the best insurance that those resources will not have to be used. If the speculators and others who are keeping close watch of the balance of payments positions of the industrial countries conclude that the Fund does not have the resources to meet major demands, they will be much more likely to probe for weak spots. For these reasons I believe that any effective borrowing arrangement should provide for firm commitments by each participating country to lend to the Fund up to a stated amount of its own currency. At the same time operating safeguards should be included in the arrangement to protect participating countries against unreasonable demands for loans. There should be criteria to determine the selection of the currencies to be borrowed at a given time and their actual use thereafter, and there should be full consultation with the lending member. These questions probably cannot be worked out prior to the Annual Meeting. However, I hope that you and your colleagues in the EEC will continue to consider them with an open mind so that the Executive Directors after the Annual Meeting can undertake a full and unhampered negotiation. So far as concerns the Annual Meeting, I understand that Mr. Jacobsson's speech will probably include a careful statement of the progress being made in working out the borrowing arrangement. In my speech I intend to encourage the Executive Directors to proceed promptly with negotiations, and I hope that you and other Governors will find it possible to give similar encouragement. Since we agree on the objective of a borrowing arrangement, even though the details remain to be worked out, I believe it would be useful for the Governors at Vienna to approve a brief resolution. You are familiar with the draft prepared by Mr. Jacobsson which reads as follows: "The Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund hereby requests the Executive Directors to consider measures by which the Fund's holdings of currencies could be replenished, should this be appropriate, and to report thereon to the Board of Governors at an early date.” Adoption of a resolution of this kind would have the great advantage of indicating to the world in simple language that the Governors have thrown their support behind this effort. I should very much appreciate hearing your reactions to it. Of course, its adoption would be without prejudice to differences of view which still exist on various points of detail. In view of Governor Ansiaux's interest in these matters, I am sending a copy of this letter to him. Sincerely, Douglas Dillon 2 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 398.13/8-2361. No classification marking. Attached to the source text is an August 23 letter from Theodore L. Eliot, Jr., Dillon's Special Assistant, to Lucius D. Battle, indicating that Dillon had sent the enclosed letter to Dequae as well as to Karl Blessing (Belgium), Franz Etzel and Ludwig Erhard (Federal Republic of Germany), Wilfrid Baumgartner (France), Pierre Werner (Luxembourg), J. Zijlstra and M. W. Holtrop (Netherlands), and Paolo Emilio Taviani (Italy). Also attached is a copy of a note from Dillon to Hubert Ansiaux, Governor of the Banque Nationale de Belgique, thanking him for his support for the proposed multilateral borrowing scheme in the International Monetary Fund and enclosing a copy of the letter printed here for his information. All these letters were transmitted through the appropriate Embassies. 1 This meeting has not been further identified. 2 Printed from a copy that indicates Dillon signed the original. 188. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball) to the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) 188. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball) to the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) Source Washington, September 9, 1961. SUBJECT Proposal for an IDY I understand that the Secretary has referred to you the proposal developed by IO and S/P for a U.S. initiative in the 16th UNGA for making 1963 an International Development Year. 1 Meanwhile, I have discussed the matter in some detail with Harlan Cleveland. Our discussion covered both the merits of the idea and my reservations about it. A new idea emerged from this discussion which is acceptable to both of us—that the IDY proposal be converted into a proposal for an International Development Decade. We believe the “IDD” alternative has the following advantages: 1. All the arguments advanced in support of an IDY initiative would apply with equal or greater force to an IDD. 2. The particular activities and functions envisaged for the IDY could be carried on much more effectively if extended over a longer period of time. In fact, it would be difficult to try to cram some of them into a single year. An IDD would obviously give us a better opportunity to develop programs having real substance, as contrasted with “showcase” programs. 3. We have already strongly emphasized the need for thinking of economic development in long-range terms. In addition, President Kennedy has already referred to the 1960's as the “decade of development.” 2 There is no reason why 1963 should be regarded as having more significance than 1962 or 1964, for example. 4. An IDY proposal might be regarded by many of the underdeveloped nations as a mere gimmick, or the type that might have been expected to emanate from the Eisenhower Administration. On the other hand, an IDD proposal would probably have considerable attractiveness, since it would imply a commitment by the UN and the advanced industrial nations to concentrate on the problem of economic development for a long period of time, and would permit the evolution of new functions and institutions which might be impracticable within a single year. 5. The opportunities for developing genuine cooperation with other nations, possibly including even the Soviet Bloc, would be much better within the context of a decade rather than any particular year. On the basis of the foregoing considerations, I hope you will agree that the IDY proposal should be converted into an IDD proposal, and will join in making a recommendation to this effect. If the proposal is recast in these terms, I would also be inclined to favor having it mentioned in the President's speech at the UNGA. George W. Ball 3 * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 286,AID Administrator Files: FRC 65 A 481, State Department, FY 1962. Confidential. The source text forms part of the daily log of the AID Executive Secretariat, September 12. 1 This proposal is summarized in a memorandum from Cleveland to Secretary Rusk, August 30. (Department of State, Central Files, 398.00/8-3061) 2 See footnote 1, Document 185 . 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Ball signed the original. 189. Editorial Note 189. Editorial Note On September 25, 1961, President Kennedy addressed the U.N. General Assembly. Among a number of international issues covered in the speech was the President's statement that the United States “now proposes officially designating this decade of the 1960's as the United Nations Decade of Development.” Within that framework, he suggested, the U.N. development efforts could be expanded and coordinated. Following his address, McGeorge Bundy issued National Security Action Memorandum No. 101 to the Secretary of State, October 6, which provided a list of items in the speech for which the President wanted special implementation and reporting. Among these was Item D, which involved the promotion of the expansion and coordination of economic growth. (Department of State,S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316,NSAM No. 101) For the initial report on this item, see Document 191 . 190. Current Economic Developments 190. Current Economic Developments Source Washington, September 26, 1961. Issue No. 633 MOVE TO EXPAND IMF RESOURCESWINS BACKING AT VIENNA MEETINGS Representatives of the US and major European countries have reached basic agreement on a program to expand the resources of the International Monetary Fund. The proposal was set forth by Per Jacobsson, Managing Director of the IMF, at the September 18-22 meetings in Vienna of the Boards of Governors of the IMF, IBRD, IDA and IFC. Basically the plan calls for the US, UK, France, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, Luxembourg, Canada, and Japan to establish stand-by credits in their own currencies to the IMF. While the amount each country will provide is not yet fixed, the total is expected to reach $5-6 billion. The IMF would then have available sufficient amounts of francs, lira, deutsche marks, guilder, etc. as the case may be to meet any foreseeable demands on the Fund's resources, including hot money flows or balance-of-payments crises of the type the US faced last fall and the UK faced this spring and summer. At the moment, the IMF, after various transactions including a $1.5 billion drawing by the UK in various currencies (see August 15, 1961 issue) 1 is short of the European currencies, particularly deutsche marks and liras. Details of the plan including the amounts to be contributed remain to be negotiated by the Executive Directors of the IMF in Washington. Among the important questions yet to be resolved is the autonomy to be granted the IMF to dispose of the stand-by credits. Some countries, notably France and the Netherlands, have taken the position that the IMF should draw upon such loans only after consultations. The effect of this would be to give the lending country or countries a voice in the conditions that the IMF might establish before the recipient country would be granted assistance. The major aim of the plan is to ward off speculation by demonstrating that the defenses behind all the main currencies, including the dollar, are adequate. US Backs Expansion of the IMF Resources Representatives from Cyprus, Laos, Liberia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria, Portugal, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo were welcomed to the meetings for the first time by Secretary Dillon, who gave the principal address for the US. 2 He backed Jacobsson's proposals for an expansion of the IMF's resources. While he had no fixed opinions on the details of the multilateral borrowing arrangement, he emphasized four aspects; a) the aggregate amount committed should be large enough to add decisively to the Fund's resources; b) the additional resources must be promptly available in case of need; c) safeguards will be required to ensure effective consultation between the Fund and the lenders; and d) there must be no weakening of the policies that have guided the Fund in the use of its resources. US Reviews Its Balance of Payments Dillon devoted the bulk of his speech to an exposition of US economic policies. He said that the US was already on the road to recovery from the 1960 recession; the GNP is expected to rise from a recession low of $500 billion in the first quarter of this year to a total of $540 billion in the last quarter. Unused capacity and an ample supply of labor should avert any inflationary pressures that might otherwise develop. Dillon reiterated the Administration's determination to present a balanced budget in FY '63. We are resolute, he said, in our determination to maintain both a sound and an expanding economy so that the US may play its full part in the defense and the development of the free world and, at the same time, meet the requirements of an increasing population at home. Turning to the US balance of payments, Dillon noted that our merchandise trade surplus in 1960 amounted to $4.7 billion, whereas in 1959 it had been less than $1 billion. In the first half of 1961 our trade surplus was running at a seasonally adjusted annual rate of $6 billion. But the improvement in our trade surplus so far this year cannot be expected to continue in the months ahead, since it was accomplished more through a decrease in imports than through an increase in exports. The US is devoting considerable effort to bringing marketing opportunities abroad to the attention of the business community. Dillon also noted that the elimination of current payments imbalances can be greatly facilitated by the cooperation of surplus countries in pursuing liberal trade policies, in increasing long-term development assistance, and in sharing expenditures for the common defense in accordance with their capabilities. US Emphasizes Social Needs of LDC's Under Secretary of State Ball, who made the US presentation to the IBRD meeting, emphasized that economic development will have to be accompanied by other political, social, cultural and economic processes. 3 Economic development cannot serve its real purpose if its benefits are enjoyed exclusively by a wealthy elite, while the great masses remain in poverty. Nor can there be any assurance of lasting benefits from economic development in any nation where the government is the master of society and not its servant. Another major problem stems from the fact that the successful achievement of our humanitarian objectives depends to a considerable extent upon the ability of economic growth to keep pace with demographic developments. The prevailing rate of population growth affects not only the net rate of economic advancement, but also the volume of resources and the nature of the national programs required to achieve rapid development. Even under the best of circumstances, the less-developed nations will fight a losing battle, unless they can obtain, and use with maximum efficiency, a huge volume of capital and technical skills. In this context, the population explosion, if continued, will place an ever-increasing burden on the more advanced countries and international lending institutions. It will place a burden as well on the developing countries to achieve greater effectiveness in mobilizing internal resources for development. A further problem, too often neglected, is the total economic impact of the development revolution on the world as a whole. Any program for economic development may become an absurdity unless it reasonably takes account of world trading patterns and prospects. We are only at the beginning of a process in which the governments of the industrialized nations must take the lead in providing an orderly opportunity for the expansion of markets for the production of the under-developed nations. IDA to Solicit Additional Funds Eugene Black, President of the IDA and its parent organization, the IBRD, sounded the warning that IDA, the youngest of the international financial institutions, would be seeking more money. Black's basic theme was that, increasingly, underdeveloped countries with sound development programs and well-prepared projects needing finance had reached or were reaching their capacity to take on any more “hard” loans. Black noted that during the period 1956-1959 more than nine-tenths of the aid extended on other than “hard” terms came from the US and France. Other countries, during this period and since, have become substantial lenders to the underdeveloped world, but they have not yet brought themselves, to the extent that circumstances require, to extend their aid on other than conventional terms. Black expressed the hope that lending countries will step up the flow of official capital at very long term, with only a token interest burden, to avoid the kind of disruption that kills peoples' hope for orderly economic progress. The IDA was set up to meet the need for “soft” loans, but its total resources in usable currencies are less than $800 million. Black said that India and Pakistan alone could easily absorb the whole of this sum. The US, and somewhat more cautiously Britain and Italy, gave support to the idea of enlarging IDA's resources, although the UK stressed that it could do nothing more until its own finances were in better shape. The matter in all probability will be brought up for action during the course of the coming year. IDA in its fiscal year ending June 30, 1961 extended credits of just over $100 million for development projects in four member countries. The credits were extended on the following terms—50 years, without interest, and with a ten-year grace period. A service charge of 3/4 of one percent is levied. Loans signed thus far include a $60 million credit to India for highways; $19 million to Chile for highways; $13 million to Sudan for agriculture; and $9 million to Honduras for highways. Activities of the IBRD During the past fiscal year the IBRD extended loans totaling almost $610 million. There were 27 loans bringing the total number of the Bank's loans to 292 in 57 member countries. More than two-thirds of the Bank's lending is for basic investment in transportation and electric power. In the past few years loans for transportation have been slowly drawing ahead; this was markedly in evidence in the past year with transportation loans accounting for $311 million. Railway improvements made up the bulk of this total, including two large loans—$70 million to India and $80 million to Japan for the improvement and expansion of their rail services. Electric power loans for the year totaled $125 million and were widely spread throughout the world. In all, eight loans were made for this purpose; one in Africa (Uganda), two in Asia (Ceylon and Japan), three in Latin America (Colombia, Costa Rica, and El Salvador) and two in Europe (Norway and Yugoslavia). These loans will help to add an estimated one million kilowatts of capacity in the countries concerned. Loans for agriculture amounted to $126 million. This total was mainly accounted for by the loan of $90 million made to Pakistan as the Bank's contribution to the financing of the large irrigation works required to implement the settlement reached in the Indus Waters Treaty. The other loans for agriculture assisted agricultural credit in British Guiana and irrigation projects in Mexico and the Sudan. Industrial lending in the past year totaled $48 million, made up of loans for steel in Japan and for industrial development banks in India and Pakistan. The new loans for the year brought the cumulative total of IBRD loans to $5,669 million of which $4,320 million had been disbursed at June 30, 1961. Of the latter amount, $1,452 million had been repaid to the Bank or sold to other investors. The past year saw the highest level of activity yet reached by the Bank in providing assistance to its member countries through general economic surveys, which examine the development potential of the country concerned and recommend the main directions which planning and investment should take. The report of the general survey of Libya was published in October, the Tanganyika mission report in March, and the Venezuela mission report in May. A general survey of Uganda, begun last September, will be published in early 1962. A large general economic survey mission was sent to Spain, and recruitment began for a general economic survey mission which the Bank is sending to Kenya. To expand its technical assistance programs, Black announced in Vienna that the Bank is forming a group of highly qualified development advisers who will be available to member countries on request for extended periods of time. They will perform such duties as chief or senior economist of a general survey mission; resident economic or financial adviser to a government; member of, or adviser to, a planning office; administrator, or adviser to, the administrator of a development program; or simply an adviser on current economic and financial problems. The task of the development adviser is not to try to impose solutions but rather to illuminate the choices which governments must make if they are to proceed along the road to economic growth. The choices may be among the various economic sectors covered in a national program or among the various projects within a sector. In any case, the development adviser's job will be to present choices in orderly way, gathering cost data and identifying the benefits of projects so that the government can decide more confidently how fast to proceed and in what direction, given all the competing claims on its financial resources. IFC to Expand Scope of Activities The International Finance Corporation (IFC), another affiliate of the IBRD, was originally established to extend loans to private businesses principally in the less-developed countries. The IFC has recently amended its charter so that it is now able to make equity investments in new enterprises. During the fiscal year ending June 30 the IFC made investments of $6.2 million, which brought the cumulative total of its investments to $44.4 million. The IFC has recently made commitments to provide equity-type capital to two private financial institutions in Colombia. This will enable these institutions to expand their investment activities over a broadening range of local enterprises—chiefly smaller and medium-size concerns, which it is impractical for the IFC to finance directly. [Here follow articles on unrelated matters.] * Source: Washington National Records Center, E/CBA/REP Files: FRC 72 A 6248, Current Economic Developments. Unclassified. The source text comprises pp. 1-6 of the issue. 1 Issue No. 630. (Ibid.) 2 For text of Dillon's speech, September 20, see Department of State Bulletin, October 9, 1961, pp. 584-588. 3 For text of Ball's statement, September 19, see ibid., pp. 579-584. 191. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy 191. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy Source Washington, October 18, 1961. SUBJECT Follow-up on Your Address to the United Nations General Assembly—United Nations Aspects [Here follow unrelated items.] VII. United States Plan for United Nations Decade of Development (Item D of NSAM 101) 1 Subsequent to your speech, the Department has revised and cleared with appropriate Government agencies a detailed position paper on the United States initiative for strengthening the capacity of the United Nations to act in the fields of economic and social development (Tab C). 2 Our representative made a major speech which was very well received on October 6 in Committee II in which he outlined our proposal for a UN Decade of Development. 3 Consultations have been held at the General Assembly with friendly delegations and within the framework of the OECD in Paris and in London. Reactions have, on the whole, been positive. Our present concept is that the Secretariat of the United Nations in cooperation with the Managing Director of the Special Fund (Paul Hoff-man) would prepare and submit before the close of the present General Assembly detailed plans and recommendations for the organization and implementation of the UN Development Decade. Mr. Hoffman supports our proposals and stands prepared to act accordingly. We plan soon to introduce a resolution in Committee II embodying our objectives and assigning a particularly important role to the Special Fund. Dean Rusk 4 * Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM No. 101. Confidential. 1 See Document 189 . 2 Tab C, a position paper entitled “United States Economic and Social Initiative at the 16th Session of the General Assembly—Organization of United Nations Development Decade,” September 19, is not printed. 3 Reference is to U.S. Representative Klutznick's statement, which is printed in Department of State Bulletin, December 4, 1961, pp. 939-947. 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 192. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 192. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Source Washington, December 6, 1961. Ambassador Stevenson's memorandum for the President of November 13th 1 represents substantially the position of all government agencies involved—State, AID, USDA, and Food For Peace. The background paper and recommended action stems from a meeting which George McGovern initiated in New York on November 10th with the U.S. Representative on the Economic and Social Council, Ambassador Klutznick; Harlan Cleveland's office. A second meeting followed in Washington with all interested agencies represented, and instructions were sent on November 14th to the U.S. delegation to the FAO Conference in Rome. 2 Those instructions followed the action as recommended in Ambassador Stevenson's memorandum except for one point. The governing body, which will direct the multilateral distribution of commodities, will be elected jointly by FAO and the Economic and Social Council with each organization designating one-half of the members on the body, instead of entirely by ECOSOC. McGovern had initiated last April in Rome, with the approval of the President, State and USDA, an offer of $40 million in commodities toward an overall UN-FAO program of $100 million. This offer, first announced by President Kennedy at his press conference of April 22nd [ 21st ], 3 was officially ratified by the FAO Conference on November 24th. 4 It is understood that the experience of this initial multilateral program will enable us to decide whether at some future date the United States should push for a larger UN food program. So far as I can see, everything is progressing smoothly. There is no present need for direct Presidential action. I shall continue to keep in touch with the situation. Arthur * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, United Nations, General, 12/61. No classification marking. The word “Noted” is written on the source text in Bundy's handwriting. 1 Stevenson's November 13 memorandum, which is developed in two parts, a background paper and recommended actions, is printed in The Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson: Ambassador to the United Nations, 1961-1965, vol. VIII, pp. 148 - 150 . 2 Not found. 3 At his press conference on April 21, President Kennedy announced that the U.S. Government was prepared to contribute $40 million in food commodities toward an initial U.N. reserve of $100 million, which would be administered by the U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO). For the transcript, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, p. 307. 4 See Food and Agriculture Organization, Report of the 11th Session of the Conference, 4-24 November 1961. 193. Current Economic Developments 193. Current Economic Developments Source Washington, January 16, 1962. Issue No. 641 [Here follow articles on unrelated matters.] ACTIONS ON ECONOMIC ITEMS AT RECENT GENERAL ASSEMBLY Industrialization as a means to achieve more rapid economic development and the creation of a more favorable climate for the export trade of the underdeveloped countries were the principle themes underlying the economic resolutions adopted during the recent session of the United Nations General Assembly. It became clear early in the session that the changed voting pattern under the UN might lead to the adoption of resolutions completely unacceptable to the US. The decision was made, therefore, that in order to exercise a moderating influence the US would, without sacrifice of principle, view with sympathy the expressed wish of the majority. To a large extent this tactic was successful. We were not forced into any new major compromise to US interests during the session. UN Development Decade A number of resolutions were approved calling on the Secretary General and the subsidiary bodies of the UN to take specific action looking to the early achievement of industrialization in the underdeveloped countries and for the expansion of their export trade. Guiding principles to achieve these two major themes are contained in the resolution initiated by the US for a United Nations Development Decade (UNDD) and adopted unanimously by the General Assembly. 1 This resolution is basically a charter for economic development over the next ten years. It combines a call to action together with recommendations for: closer cooperation between the UN and its subsidiary bodies as well as with bilateral and other multilateral programs; a request to member governments to pursue policies designed to enable the less-developed countries to sell primary commodities at more stable and remunerative prices; measures to assist countries in the development of their country programs; support for diversification and industrialization; measures to increase the flow of development capital, both public and private, to the under-developed nations; establishment of aggregate growth targets for the under-developed countries and other similar policies. The US was unable to avoid the inclusion of two items in the resolution which may cause concern in the future. The most hotly debated issue was the proposal by the representative of Iraq that an increasing share of the profit from the exploitation and marketing of natural resources by foreign capital be made available to the host country. After several days of intense negotiations, agreement was reached on wording calling on member countries “to pursue policies designed to ensure to the developing countries an equitable share of earnings from the extraction and marketing of their natural resources by foreign capital in accordance with the generally accepted reasonable earnings on invested capital.” The UNDD resolution also contains a provision inviting the Economic and Social Council to accelerate its examination of and decision on principles of international economic cooperation. ECOSOC has the matter on its agenda for the spring session, and the USSR has circulated a draft for consideration. The decision which now must be made by the US and its allies is whether to oppose the adoption of principles on international economic cooperation as being unnecessary in view of individual resolutions already approved by the UN or whether a set of principles containing Western views should be submitted for ECOSOC consideration. At the moment the US inclines toward the latter approach since it is clear that the consensus of the UN membership is favorable to the adoption of a set of principles in one document. It is unlikely, however, that meaningful East-West agreement can be reached. As a corollary to the UNDD resolution (I) the Assembly also adopted a UNDD resolution (II) calling on member states to increase their contributions to the Special Fund and Expanded Program of Technical Assistance with the objective of reaching $150 million for 1962 and for the Special Fund to consider the advisability of establishing an information service on existing and future sources of development capital and assistance. 2 Program for Food Surpluses The other major initiative of the US was the proposed establishment of a $100 million program for the provision of food surpluses to food-deficient peoples through the United Nations system. The subject was first discussed and approved by the Food and Agriculture Organization in November. The US together with Canada submitted a proposal to the UN which, in addition to supporting the program as approved by the FAO, looked to the future when the program could be expanded in size and increasing emphasis placed on the use of food for economic and social development. Major opposition was encountered from the food exporting countries which wished to keep the program primarily one for meeting emergencies and limited to a three-year period. Many of the underdeveloped food importing countries were also fearful that an attempt was being made to substitute food for dollar aid. The resolution, as finally adopted, was more limited in purpose than the original US-Canadian proposal and reiterates throughout the necessity for maintaining safeguards for the protection of food exporting countries and for the development of agriculture in the developing countries. 3 United Nations Capital Development Fund With negative votes only from France, South Africa, the UK and the US, the General Assembly reaffirmed the mandate of the Committee on a UN Capital Development Fund and instructed the Committee to proceed with the drafting of a statute to establish the Fund. 4 The draft is to be submitted to ECOSOC in the first instance and then to the GA at its seventeenth session. In addition to the negative votes, seven countries abstained, but 70 countries voted favorably. [Here follow the remainder of this article and other articles on unrelated matters.] * Source: Washington National Records Center, E/CBA/REP Files: FRC 72 A 6248, Current Economic Developments. Confidential. The source text comprises pp. 13-15 of the issue. 1 Reference is to Resolution 1710 (XVI), adopted unanimously by the U.N. General Assembly on December 19; printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961 , pp. 153-156. 2 Reference is to Resolution 1715 (XVI), adopted unanimously by the U.N. General Assembly on December 19; printed ibid., p. 156. 3 Reference is to Resolution 1714 (XVI), adopted by a vote of 90-0 with 9 abstentions by the U.N. General Assembly on December 19; printed ibid., pp. 187-191. 4 Reference is to Resolution 1706 (XVI), adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on December 19; printed in U.N. General Assembly, Official Records: Sixteenth Session, Supplement No. 17 (A/5100) (New York, 1962), pp. 13-14. 194. Summary Minutes of Meeting of the Interdepartmental Committee of Under Secretaries on Foreign Economic Policy 194. Summary Minutes of Meeting of the Interdepartmental Committee of Under Secretaries on Foreign Economic Policy Source Washington, January 24, 1962. [Here follows a list of participants (16).] WAYS IN WHICH THE US MIGHT USE INTERNATIONALORGANIZATIONS MORE EFFECTIVELY IN THE FORMULATION AND EXECUTION OF FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY Presentation Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, made the presentation. We can start with the proposition that, whether pursued bilaterally or in one or another of the international economic organizations in which we participate (there are 49 to which we make regular contributions), our purpose is to put the resources that go beyond our borders in the service of our national aims, if we can figure out what the resources are and what our aims are. A standard canard used to be that we had to choose between bilateral and multilateral ways of acting. This sterile argument ran out of gas after about ten years. Now the canard is that we have to choose between one or another of the international organizations, for example, the UN versus the Latin American regional arrangements. This is a sterile assumption also, because we use such instruments as there are and as we use them for such particular purposes as seem to give the greatest advantage. There are a good many cases in which the multilateral arrangements served where bilateral arrangements wouldn't have served as well, although most of our relations will continue to be on a country-to-country basis. In the trade field the old idea was that the way to negotiate was bilaterally and apply the results to the rest of the world under most-favored nation treatment. This really didn't turn out to be a very good way of handling trade negotiations because it didn't take into account the advantage which could be obtained through reciprocal concessions from third countries. The result was that we devised GATT, with a kind of round-table procedure rather than an across-the-table procedure. Similarly in the payments field, both the EPU and in the IMF were considered a better way to provide short-term credit and monitor exchange restrictions than could be done on a country-by-country basis. In the aid field we found that the deep involvement inherent in an aid program—necessary aid if to be effectively used—the interference of outside people in public administration and budget processes (the very stuff of sovereignty)—was a problem that could be handled if we had adequate relations with a country but were difficult to work out with some countries—particularly sensitive newly independent ones. The working out of some functions with some countries directly through international agencies has become increasingly important. It also became possible to develop long-range financing in the multilateral field through the IBRD and the IDA faster than it was possible to present the proposal to the American people and Congress under a bilateral program. The problem for all of us is partly to prevent ourselves and our colleagues from getting so enthusiastic about one particular instrument that it becomes a substitute for all the other instruments that are available when we need all we have and probably others that are not invented yet. Our difficulty is that in the developmental field we have a staggering number of organizations involved in the affairs of a typical less-developed country. This proliferation has become a problem in itself. The number of organizations which are routinely found involved with the Ministry of Finance in country “X” is about 16, and in Latin America it gets up to 30, counting the American agencies, the international agencies and the regional agencies. You get a kind of competition between these organizations in the less developed countries. This puts on the LDC the burden of coordinating the developed countries—the very kind of burden the LDC can't support. Our problem in IO and also in the regional bureaus is first to develop some doctrine and agreement about what these organizations are supposed to be doing, what we want them to do, and what serves our interests for them to do. The problem in the development field is getting the receiving countries to get set up so they can coordinate the external input they require. What is the best way of doing that? One way is to have fewer competitive agencies trying to sell technical assistance. Part of that solution is coordination on our side of the dotted line. Part of it is developing in the receiving countries the capability of managing their own destinies—their economic planning and financial and personnel support for their plans. These two things need to be done: a) pulling together the external agencies so there are only two or three groups in each country instead of 16-30, and b) getting the receiving country itself able to make rational sense out of all of the input. (There should not be over-emphasis on health projects, for example, just because the WHO may be a better salesman than the FAO.) We are beginning to make a certain amount of progress on the UN side. The Committee of Eight has now been established, and the ECOSOC has addressed itself to this problem of coordination. The establishment of the OECD may do the same thing with respect to bilateral programs in these less-developed countries. If we can get both of these enterprises further along, we may end up with two groups operating in related fields—one in technical assistance and preinvestment, and the other in the bigger money operations that will have to be bilateral. The World Bank gets into it by consortia on the money side and the UN Special representative can perform on the multilateral technical assistance side. There has to be an idea as to whether the best channel of influence on countries in the development of their planning machinery is bilateral or UN agencies or some other form of multilateral arrangements such as the Pan American Union of the OAS. Since Mr. Cleveland's concern is with multilateral organizations, he concentrated on them. Each specialized agency has a budget and we are represented on all of the Executive Committees of the specialized agencies. The budgets come up at a moment when it is too late to do anything very much about them. Not only that, but the growth of the budgets for each specialized agency is really a matter of faith for most of the people going as delegates to these meetings. At Agricultural meetings, for example, the Ministers of Agriculture are present and of course they come to the conclusion that agriculture is more important than anything else. The “budget bureau nastiness” is not present at these meetings. The same thing is true in the health field and, in fact, of every specialized field. We are not tackling the over-all budget problem for these agencies as early as we could— i.e., when budgets are being developed instead of when it becomes a problem of confidence in the agency if any questions are raised . We don't really have in our hands the raw material with which to affect the budgets of these organizations. The reason is that the ambassadors and USOM's have regarded themselves as responsible for the bilateral relations with the country and regarded these multilateral operations as the responsibility of someone else, despite the fact that the US is a 40% stockholder. They regard the specialized agency operations as a foreign concern—as something even competing with their own programs—instead of thinking of themselves as responsible for the effective operation of FAO, WHO, etc., as they should be. Consequently, we don't get in Washington a flow of the meaningful information at the country level with which our representatives to these organizations could be intervening in the budget processes early enough to make any difference. We had a long discussion with the UK officials about this. Their Treasury is allergic to these increased budgets and said it couldn't afford more for this purpose next year. We asked if they had any ideas how to carry out the Chancellor's idea not to spend any more money but we didn't get the impression that they had thought through the implications on the financial side. Their budget people said that these increasing budgets are terrible and had to have a ceiling, but there seemed no practical way to effect this and the UK officials going to these meetings are going along with the budgets because there is nothing else to do. We need the assistance and cooperation both of the entire field establishment of the American Government and also of the American functional agencies—Agriculture, Public Health, etc. It is not going to be easy or very rapid, but it is extremely important that we get a better coordinated collection of UN agencies and a system for exercising our influence on their financial budget processes and their programming processes that is more effective than the present system. I believe these agencies as a group can be a very important facility for us in getting things done inside some of the less developed countries, particularly in Africa. Another thing that it is important to focus on is the development of a doctrine on the relationship between these UN agencies and some other things we are doing in the field. There is little or no documentation in this Government about the place of multilateral agencies (UN or other) in the Alliance for Progress. The Budget Bureau very properly has raised the question of whether what we put through the international organizations should be counted toward the $500 million target. There are the questions of what we do through the UN Agencies and what we prefer to do through the OECD on development planning, on technical assist-ance and on coordinating capital investment programs of various kinds. The fact that the capital investment program is coordinated and carefully planned does not necessarily mean that we have it under control. The Indus Valley is an example—this was really the first consortium. It was beautifully planned; the only trouble is that the cost estimates have gone up 60% and will go up 100%. We didn't really have this under control. The World Bank makes determinations about bids that are in excess of the planned estimates that we had agreed to without clearing back with the US Government. Discussion Mr. Hansen said we have been having a dialogue along this line. He was glad Mr. Cleveland, after having called the budget problems to our attention, put the emphasis on programming. The budget is strictly a place to convey decisions, it is a discipline of your operations. He has been completely frustrated in the sense that they were asked to approve budget requests and they found that even if they had questions to raise, the time that they should have been raised was a year or two ago. And when they asked what was really happening, except in a few cases, they were led to believe these things were normally growing and salaries were getting higher, etc. all bringing about a proportional increase. When they related it back to programming, they found no place where there was an evaluation. Mr. Hansen said he found in Iran that the only answer was to establish an Iranian Government office to coordinate the assistance going into Iran. This was the only way to get hold of the problem. There is another aspect which should be looked into at the same time—the question of evaluating the particular competence of various organizations. There are some elements of strategy we should think about. This came up in connection with the Alliance for Progress, with respect to housing and how to deal with it in the program. We could have a number of organizations go in and offer assistance in housing. This could get out of hand. It might be best for the US to say to these countries—if you want housing assist-ance, go to the IDB but not to AID and other sources. This could apply to other areas where we could nominate certain types of funds for certain things. This is appealing in the first instance, but when you turn it around and look at the capability of organizations to serve the need for this, you find if they don't have competition it gives rise sometimes to the worst elements of bureaucracy and is subject to influence and has disabilities. Another aspect of the question is where you are trying a large range of these activities you will find that some things are not susceptible to being handled by a multilateral organization because of problems of political interest or some other reason. One area of work where UN Specialized Agencies excel is in the pre-investment study. Mr. Hansen added that he hoped Paul Hoffman will emphasize that, e.g., geological surveys, things that do not get too deeply into national planning—as that is a political area. A UN agency in the administration of finance gives him the creeps, but there are other areas in which they have done a tremendous job. They can do resource studies and technicians can put together the standards of judgment that can be applied. But when the multilateral agencies get involved in the political procedures of a country, you get diminishing returns. We should analyze these things and decide where it is best to put the emphasis and there is no better time to do it than now, when we are trying to turn around a lot of attitudes. Mr. Cleveland said it is not only a question of deciding whether the FAO or some other UN agency is a good one to do the kind of thing that needs to be done, it is also a question of the country. It doesn't make sense in some countries, but in other countries you couldn't get inside except through a multilateral agency. Mr. Hansen said we need a strategy at different levels, different things. It is disheartening to see a US bilateral agency in basic competition with the IBRD or some other multilateral agency when we are in effect paying 40% of that agency's bill. Mr. Coppock asked if we aren't complicating things by getting European countries into the Latin American program? Why not let the Europeans be predominant in some other area? Mr. Cleveland replied that there is a broader question there. The primary thrust of discussion in the DAC is to discuss among themselves what they are going to do bilaterally. He wondered if DAC should not also consider what they are doing about the Special Fund as they are the major contributors to the Special Fund. Of course, there is a limit beyond which you can't go—setting up a kind of NATO caucus in the UN. Also, people talking in Paris may not be the kind that know the tactical situation, so maybe some discussions of this sort should be in New York. The caucus of the main contributors isn't broad enough. Mr. Coppock asked about the private groups that are providing technical assistance. If our Embassies or missions are to do a better job, shouldn't they take them into account too? Mr. Cleveland replied, yes, like the Ford Foundation and others. Mr. Coppock then added that if the technical assistance were put on a cash or loan basis rather than a grant basis, might not the recipient country take more responsibility, so that we could drop out of the picture to some extent? Mr. Cleveland said the essential problem is developing an administrative fiber in the other countries to do the thing that is too difficult for us. That is a difficult job. Mr. Hansen said there is the matter of sorting out where to ask for support and from whom. The relationship very soon breaks down when you have a lot of agencies in a country. You have, in effect, the FAO dealing with the Ministry of Agriculture, and you have other agencies dealing with other ministries. It is a question of the proper utilization of these people. The resident UN or specialized agency representative can't do much about it. It is hard to pull a man out if this kicks back and the Foreign Minister steps in. In Iran we tried an experiment that worked because we had a Central Planning Organization. The UN detailed people to the Central Organization and the Central Organization took the responsibility for detailing them to the other ministries and when they weren't needed, it pulled them back and reassigned them elsewhere—something an outside agency couldn't do. In talking with many resident representatives, Mr. Hansen found it was not just the problem of disengagement but also the quid pro quos required—space, secretaries, etc. They (the resident representatives) are inhibited unless there is a central place in the government to exert discipline. Mr. Coppock asked if there is any real effort to get from the missions abroad a real size-up of the programs going on there? Mr. Kaplan replied that a message was sent out early this year for the first time trying to get them to do something more than estimating what the various UN agencies would contribute to the country. We asked this year for an evaluation. We received very few answers before we had to get ready for the budget. Mr. Cleveland said that even in the Congo, the AID country study says that it (the country team) knows nothing about the technical assist-ance programs coming from the various specialized agencies. He doesn't know why not. Every country study as a matter of course should look at these technical assistance programs and regard them as ours as we are 40% stockholders. Mr. Kaplan said there is a problem of coordination between technical assistance and capital assistance as a whole. Much of the problem of coordination of technical assistance takes care of itself—the agricultural group works with the Ministry of Agriculture, the health group with the health organization. That coordination is less significant than coordination of all the assistance that is going in, what bilateral arrangements there are, whether technical assistance is outstripping the availability of capital. In some areas there is a serious shortage of technical assistance while large amounts of capital are going into a country. This is true of management services. Lots of LDC's have received much less technical assistance in training of managers and much more for training of people in agriculture, public health, etc. This is partly because of the availability of technicians and specialists in the agricultural and public health fields and partly because no specialized agency has managers. Mr. Ioanes asked what we should do that we are not doing now? Mr. Cleveland replied that the one most important ingredient is to use the field establishment of the US Government to work on this problem rather than just the Washington agencies. Use of this information in a logical fashion by delegates to all sorts of conferences and by resident representatives of the US with the various specialized agencies will mean that we can help manage these budgets rather than being in our present ineffectual position. There will be resistance to this—the reaction will be, “We are doing too much and shouldn't take this on.” Mr. Ioanes then asked how we can help in this area when you talk about planning and coordination in the field? Mr. Cleveland's reply was that Agriculture's case is most direct when we come to the FAO budget—it went up 40% and there was nothing the US could do about it. That budget had started two years ago. Mr. Coppock asked if anyone knew whether it is practical to get these reports in. Mr. Cleveland said he was not sure that doing it once a year is the right thing. It should be rounded up when the country book is done, but it may be more complex than that. He thinks there is an opportunity here and spoke about it in a session with regional assistant secretaries a couple of days ago. He said he is trying to build a basis of consent for a strong instruction to go out. Mr. Hansen remarked there might first be an across-the-board approach on a minimum level. It might be that we should pinpoint particular areas to be worked on intensively, including having a group to look into the programs—go to these key countries and make evaluations. Mr. Cleveland said this is right. We might get some kind of a private organization—such as Rand—to investigate this problem in some of the key countries and perhaps take a whole new look at some of the specialized agencies. The specialized agencies go on from year to year without any one saying whether or not they should be doing this at all. For example, the Atomic Energy Agency was set up on two basic assumptions—one that uranium would be in short supply and the other that there would be commercial use of atomic power before long. Both assumptions were wrong, but we still have the agency.IO has a study going on that. Joseph D. Coppock 1 Executive Secretary * Source: Department of State, E Files: Lot 65 D 68, Interdepartmental Committee of Under Secretaries on Foreign Economic Policy. Official Use Only. Presumably drafted by Ruth S. Donahue who is listed as Recording Secretary. 1 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 195. Airgram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 195. Airgram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State Source Washington, February 28, 1962. A-206. Subject: Special Fund Project in Cuba. Ref: Department's A-84; 1 USUN 2906. 2 In its numerous discussions with Special Fund officials on the Cuban project, USUN has included the four points cited in refairgram. The Department will recall that in his statement to the Governing Council in May 1961, in which the four points cited in refairgram were made, Ambassador Klutznick concluded by saying: “We are confident that the project will not proceed until the staff has satisfied itself (emphasis supplied) about the questions we have raised and is certain that the project can be completed successfully to the ultimate benefit of the Cuban people.” Following this statement, the Governing Council approved the project, despite reservations by the US and several other members on the technical matters cited by Ambassador Klutznick. Subsequently, the staffs of the Special Fund and FAO made a thorough examination of the questions we raised and concluded that there are no technical, administrative or economic obstacles to successful implementation of this project. The Special Fund has assured USUN, however, that the project would be discontinued if new circumstances arise which would make its successful implementation appear doubtful. The carefully drafted operations agreement includes safeguards to give the Special Fund the authority to do this. With respect to the four specific points raised by the Department, USUN has the following comments: 1. The Special Fund is convinced that the Cuban Government will cooperate in implementation of this project (despite their attitudes toward IAIAS) because they have cooperated fully to date and appear anxious to see this project proceed expeditiously. As noted in USUN A-157, 3 the FAO is likewise convinced of this point. 2. The Special Fund feels that the aftermath of a revolution invariably brings about important personnel changes in any government. Both the Special Fund and FAO are convinced, however, that the Cuban Government will assign the qualified personnel needed by this project. 3. With respect to the question of livestock slaughter and other misuse of resources, the Special Fund reviews each project request on its merits and in relation to other requests received. Whatever the completely accurate facts were it is the judgment of Fund and FAO they do not justify failing to go ahead with long run project calculated to benefit Cuban people. 4. The Special Fund and FAO are convinced that this project will not overlap or otherwise be inconsistent with any other activities underway in Cuba. As noted above, the question of whether there is a real need for this project and whether this need is more urgent than the needs of other countries interested in Special Fund assistance was assessed by the FAO and the Special Fund on the basis of a careful on-the-spot study of the project request and a solid review on the one hand, and an examination of other project requests received, on the other. The existence of needs generally not pertinent this matter. Special Fund can only act upon requests of governments. USUN is fully aware of the issues raised by this project and shares the Department's view that in terms of our present policy toward Cuba, it would be desirable to eliminate it. However, this project was properly processed in accordance with the regulations of the Special Fund, to which the US is committed, and there is no legitimate way of stopping it. If we go much further in attempting to eliminate this project, the standing of the Special Fund as a truly international institution will be compromised. Moreover, we would destroy Paul Hoffman as an international figure who enjoys the full confidence of the SYG and of the underdeveloped countries. It must be remembered that FAO has complete record of completing all preliminary work necessary this project. It must also be remembered other countries have interest and are not uninformed. Any unaccountable delay or failure to act reasonable time before Governing Council meeting May can set stage for developments that could be tragically counterproductive US objectives. Furthermore, Hoffman is now responsible for working out the program for the UN Development Decade, a proposal originating with President Kennedy, which may have a profound effect on the future economic and social work of the UN and its specialized agencies. If we damage Hoffman's standing, we destroy one of the greatest assets we have in the United Nations and in our relations with Asian, African and Latin American countries. Consequently, USUN is convinced US should not push this matter further. Stevenson * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 398.051/2-2862. Confidential. Drafted by Klutznick, Seymour M. Finger, and David Tilson and cleared by Klutznick and Hefner. 1 Airgram A-84, February 22, noted with concern USUN's position set forth in airgram A-157 (see footnote 3 below) and offered several arguments for urging Hoffman to delay signing the Cuban project. (Department of State, Central Files, 398.051/1-3162) 2 Telegram 2906 from USUN, February 27, argued that the Cuban project could not be delayed beyond early May. It also urged the Department to try to accelerate the hearings on the bond issue and get them out of the way as soon as possible, and asked it to consider utilization of an Italian firm for execution of the Cuban project, including Italian lira for payment. (Ibid., 398.051/2-2762) 3 Dated January 31. (Ibid., 398.051/2-2862) 196. Letter From the Managing Director of the U.N. Special Fund (Hoffman) to Secretary of State Rusk 196. Letter From the Managing Director of the U.N. Special Fund (Hoffman) to Secretary of State Rusk Source New York, March 1, 1962. Dear Mr. Secretary , Since President Kennedy, in his eloquent address at the United Nations, proclaimed the decade of the 1960s as “The United Nations Development Decade”, an effort has been underway at the United Nations to intensify substantially and speedily its activities in the economic and social fields. Acting Secretary-General U Thant has assumed personal leadership. He has strengthened the Economic Policy Board to assure effective coordination of development activities within the Secretariat. He has sought and obtained assurances of full cooperation from the Specialized Agencies. The Secretary-General has placed on me primary responsibility for obtaining the necessary financial support for an expanded pre-investment programme. The needs for 1963 can be stated very simply. For 1962 we have contributions and pledges for the Special Fund and the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance of approximately $100 million. For 1963 we must have $150 million. The minimum requirement of the Expanded Programme is $50 million; of the Special Fund $100 million. This I am prepared to document if desired. I am reasonably confident that the target figure of $150 million can be reached provided the United States contributes the $60 million it has conditionally pledged. The condition is, of course, that $90 million be obtained from other sources. There is no question in my mind that $90 million can be obtained from other sources—that is not the problem. The problem is securing from the United States Government a sensible administrative decision as to which contributions from other sources, particularly recipient Governments, can be counted for matching purposes. Five types of contributions are made by the recipient Governments. Each of these is a crucial contribution to development, representing the mobilization of scarce material resources by the low-income countries themselves for the success of vital projects. Here are the five types of contributions: a) Voluntary contributions to Special Fund gross resources, centrally collected and audited. (matched by the US Government) b) Local operating costs, amounting to 15% of expert costs—centrally collected and audited and merged with gross resources to form an unidentified part of Governing Council allocations, which are administered by the Executing Agency. (matched by the US Government) c) Cash counterpart contributions, centrally collected and audited and merged with gross resources to form an unidentified part of Governing Council allocations, which are administered by the Executing Agency. (not matched by the US Government) d) Cash counterpart contributions which are administered by the Government or jointly with the Executing Agency but are not processed through the Special Fund accounts and are not merged with gross Special Fund resources. (not matched by the US Government) e) Counterpart contributions in kind, consisting of services, facilities and plant provided by the recipient Government as an integral part of the project, appraised and evaluated by the Special Fund. (not matched by the US Government) The question as to which of the three forms—((c) through (e) above)—the counterpart financial contribution will take is decided by the Special Fund entirely on the basis of operational considerations. So far as the Governments are concerned the costs are the same, whether the contribution is in cash paid over to the Fund, in cash controlled by the Government, or in the form of services or physical facilities, and the cost is in all cases determined and specified in the contract (plan of operations) with the Government. The distinction presently made by the US Government in determining which type of contribution it will consider in making its matching voluntary payments to the Special Fund, based on the form in which the contribution is made, is arbitrary and appears to be illogical. The legislation authorizes matching of local costs payments, and all counterpart provisions are of course made in respect of local currency costs. A question might arise concerning the evaluation or appraisal of counterpart turned over in kind to the project, though, if desired a detailed and impartial appraisal of the value of such contributions could easily be arranged. There can be no question concerning the amounts of cash which have been made available by the Government, as these are a matter of accounting record. It is especially difficult to follow the distinction made by the United States Government between local operating costs (15% of experts' costs) paid by the recipient Government, which are matched, and other counterpart cash paid over to and administered by the Special Fund. Both are paid in respect of local costs; both are centrally collected and audited, and thus meet the requirement in the fine print of the legislation; both are taken into the gross resources of the Fund, form part of the earmarking from the Governing Council and their disbursement is completely controlled by the Fund. There is, in short, no distinction between the way in which these two forms of counterpart cash are handled by the Fund. Acceptance by the United States Government of one form of counterpart cash payment for matching at the exclusion of other forms gives rise to a number of anomalies, some of which are listed below: —Governments are required to make two cash counterpart payments instead of one: the first amounting to 15% of expert programme costs (in order to obtain US matching); the second to cover the balance of counterpart obligation as determined by the Fund. This requirement is not understood by the Government, and makes for double bookkeeping locally and at headquarters. Cash payments, when received, have to be identified as to category, which further complicates the matter. —Certain projects do not have an expert component per se, or the expert component is in the form of consulting contractors, so that the expert component can only with difficulty be identified. Nevertheless, in order to obtain US matching, the Fund has attempted to make these determinations. —Projects executed by the IBRD normally and for good reason involve contracts between the Government and the consulting firm direct, under which the IBRD uses Special Fund financing to reimburse the Government (as a maximum) for that portion of the total contract cost which was in foreign exchange. All local currency costs are paid to the firm by the Government from its own resources. In order to obtain the US matching payments the Special Fund was for a time attempting to identify expert programme costs, assess the government 15% for local costs, receive the money from the Government, pay it to the IBRD, which would then use it to reimburse the Government for a portion of the local costs it was paying the firm. This is the reductio ad absurdum of the whole arrangement, and the Fund has given it up, and foregone the US matching payments in such cases. Governments cannot understand why their counterpart payments must be subdivided; there is no difference in treatment of the two payments by the Fund; there is no difference in their value either to the Government or to the Fund, except that the United States Government had decided to match one and not the other. In your consideration of how these contributions by recipient Governments should be classified for matching purposes may I suggest that there are two additional and very important issues involved in your decision—first, obtaining the maximum amount of development possible from the dollars invested by the United States and second, strengthening the United Nations. Proof that more development can be obtained per dollar by channelling, as far as possible, aid through the United Nations rests in a very simple set of figures. The Governing Council of the United Nations Special Fund to date has approved 205 projects calling for total expenditures of $415 million. The United States contribution to these projects is approximately $70 million, or less than 17 per cent. The fact that the United Nations will be strengthened by increasing its capacity to assist the less-developed countries in speeding their development is obvious. It has shown up in votes in the United Nations time and again when efforts have been made either to weaken or destroy the United Nations. In closing may I say that we at the United Nations are eager to make a reality of the United Nations Development Decade, further that we want to get started now, and finally, that we are very much in need of your help. Sincerely yours, Paul G. Hoffman * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 398.051/3-162. No classification marking. Attached to the source text is a March 2 note from Swank to Cleveland, indicating that this letter was left with the Secretary by Hoffman during the latter's call on March 2. Secretary Rusk met with Hoffman and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Gardner on March 2 from 2:56 to 3:28 p.m., but no record of their conversation has been found. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Books) 197. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Gardner) to the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) 197. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Gardner) to the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) Source Washington, April 16, 1962. SUBJECT Luncheon Conversation with John Leddy I had a long overdue luncheon today with John Leddy, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs. We covered the following subjects of current interest to IO: 1. Senior appointments in IMF and IBRD . The most immediate problem here is the retirement of H. Merle Cochran, the American who is the number 2 man in the IMF. This job is part administrative, part substantive. Frank Southard, the agreed Treasury-State choice to succeed Cochran, indicated reservations about taking the assignment and Jacobsson also suggested that someone else would be desirable. Leddy said that two “banker-types” from within the Federal Reserve system had been suggested but that he thought the number 2 man in the Fund should be a person of broader background, sympathetic to the needs of less developed countries. Ambassador Riddleberger suggested on a recent visit to Washington that he would be interested in the job. Treasury is favorable to this idea. I agreed with Leddy that the number 2 man should be more than a financial technician and that Riddleberger might fill the bill. 1 Our conversation then turned to the top jobs in the IMF and IBRD. Leddy apparently had not considered George Ball's interesting suggestion that the United States might vary the traditional formula and seek to have an American as Managing Director of the IMF and a European as President of the IBRD. This turnabout would constitute recognition of the increasing US interest in IMF as a supplement to our weakening Reserve position and the European increased ability to mobilize capital for the IBRD. Leddy pointed out that the decision on Cochran's replacement was tied up with this problem because the US could not have the number 1 and number 2 man in the IMF. He suggested that Cochran's replacement should not be given the normal long-term appointment but should be appointed only until the end of Jacobsson's term (two years) in order to take care of this problem. Concerning the top job in the IMF, I suggested that Jacobsson's successor should be someone a good deal more flexible and sympathetic to new devices to deal with the free world liquidity problem. I suggested that this problem was not yet acute but that it could become difficult later on in this decade if gold production continued to lag substantially behind the growth in world trade. I pointed out further that Britain's entry into the Common Market would aggravate the liquidity problem by weakening and perhaps eventually destroying the sterling area, so that the overseas members of the area would gradually transfer their sterling balances into other currencies. In short, we face a prospect of an aggravation of the British payments problem as well as the prospect of a long term US payments problem and some means might have to be found to take pressure off the dollar and sterling as the two reserve currencies of the free world by some institutional innovation beyond the recent Vienna agreement which would provide real “collective security” in free world financing. Leddy said that the Treasury did not think there was a liquidity problem now but agreed there might well be one as the decade proceeds. I suggested that someone like Sir Oliver Franks, who appears to be impressed with the liquidity problem, might be the sort of person who should succeed Jacobsson at the Fund. Leddy said Franks' name had come up in connection with the Bank and was regarded in some circles as “too unorthodox” on monetary matters. As for the IBRD, Leddy indicated that Black's recent medical reports had been good and that no information had come to him which would indicate that Black would leave the IBRD before the end of his term in 1963 to take up a post as “Finance Minister” at the UN. Leddy mentioned Malagoddi as an able Italian banker who might be considered for the IBRD job. 2. UN Development Decade . Late in February I sent Leddy copies of the circular telegram we sent to US missions to specialized agencies urging them to take up with members of the Secretariats possible ways in which the agencies could implement the development decade. 2 I asked Leddy just how the financial agencies (IMF, IBRD,IDA, IFC) might fit into the development decade concept. In the course of our conversation the following principal points emerged: a. The activities of IDA might be expanded. IBRD officials are already taking soundings about increasing the capital of IDA from $1 billion to $4 billion. They would like to get this proposal approved in principle in the next Board of Governors meeting in September. The practical case for doing this now is that most of the IDA's loanable capital is already committed so that the agency will run out of useable funds within another year or so. I observed that there were good political reasons for moving this year on an increase in IDA's resources—it could be billed as a measure to advance the Development Decade and help forestall any further attempt to press the UN capital fund idea. We also agreed that if IDA resources could be expanded to $4 billion the agency could take a more sympathetic view than it now takes toward projects in the field of social infra-structure, e.g., education, housing, and health. b. The IBRD development advisory services might be related to the Development Decade. I suggested that we might find some way in which the expansion of this effort might be linked with similar efforts on the part of the Special Fund and the regional commissions and presented as part of progress in the Development Decade. c. Consideration might be given to ways in which the UN financial agencies could be integrated in the field more effectively with other UN agencies. I emphasized that the US was trying to use the weight of the Development Decade concept to influence the Specialized Agencies to relate their efforts in the field more effectively in support of total country programs and in this connection to make greater use of the resident representatives. So far, however, all the talk about coordination did not appear to apply to the financial agencies. Leddy seemed rather vague about all the UN efforts which had recently been taken in the direction of greater coordination but promised to have his staff look into this question. d. The Bank might place further emphasis on loans for research and demonstration projects in areas of science and technology which promise special benefits for less-developed countries. I asked Leddy if he might look into the possibility of having the Bank put greater emphasis on projects in fields like desalinization, solar energy, etc., pursuant to that part of the Development Decade resolution which emphasized the importance of possible scientific breakthroughs. In conclusion I noted that it might be advisable for Leddy to identify a member of his staff who could work closely with us in implementing the Development Decade. At this point I have the feeling that no one in his shop is really interested, which is unfortunate, since Treasury will have a lot to say when US position papers are drafted which have financial implications. Leddy said he would have his deputy, John Bullitt, take charge of the subject and that further down the line we could look to a Mr. Hirschtritt as a point of contact. * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 398.13/4-1662. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Gardner. Attached to the source text is an April 19 note from Cleveland to Ball, remarking that Gardner's memorandum was worth reading and suggesting a meeting among Dillon, Leddy, and Ball on the Bank and Fund leadership question after Ball returned from abroad the first week in May. 1 In the margin next to this sentence is a question mark, presumably written by Cleveland. 2 This circular telegram has not been further identified. 198. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 198. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State Source New York, April 24, 1962, 8 p.m. 3503. Special Fund and Cuban project. Deptel 2768. 1 Hoffman has agreed subject to condition herein after set forth to try to hold project until August 1 latest. He insists if this is to be done he must have assurances SecState or equivalent he will not be called upon for further extensions. Dept must appreciate hazards involved for Hoffman and Special Fund. These have been carefully reviewed and Hoffman deserves commendation as well as protection he asks. Await Secretary's assurance so matter can be finalized. Have personally reviewed situation and urge if we must have extension to August 1 assurance be given. 2 Plimpton * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 398.051/4-2462. Secret; Limit Distribution. 1 Telegram 2768 to USUN, April 20, requested a delay in signing of the Special Fund project agreement with Cuba beyond the Governing Council meeting in May and the present session of Congress without implying that the United States would have no further objections to signing after that time. Although aware that a delay in signing might put strain on Hoffman and weaken the Special Fund, the Department feared that signing at this time could spark public and Congressional reaction, which could seriously endanger the Special Fund, the U.N. bond issue, and other U.S. initiatives in the United Nations. (Ibid., 398.051/2-2762) 2 The decision on the Cuban project was extended again into early 1963; see Document 202 . 199. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) to the Managing Director of the U.N. Special Fund (Hoffman) 199. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) to the Managing Director of the U.N. Special Fund (Hoffman) Source Washington, May 9, 1962. Dear Paul : The Secretary has asked me to reply to your letter of March 1, 1962, 1 wherein you discuss the future course of the Special Fund and especially your desires for additional matching by the United States Government of contributions made by other recipient governments. As you know, we indicated that Departmental staff would examine carefully your proposals in the light of the new initiatives connected with the Decade of Development and previous Congressional guidelines expressed in legislation governing our contributions to the Special Fund. Our preliminary examination leads us to the conclusion that we should explore the possibility of matching the cash counter-part contributions which are centrally collected and audited, and administered by the Special Fund. These contributions—although project costs—appear to be somewhat similar to the local operating costs which are also centrally collected and audited and merged with the gross resources. However, I have asked that more data be secured on the types of costs covered by such contributions and the extent to which countries receiving Special Fund assistance provide this type of contribution. It is our belief that cash counter-part contributions which are not processed through the Special Fund accounts and counter-part contributions in kind should not be matched. This belief is predicated on intent of Congress which has been rather clearly expressed. One of the ways in which the Congress intends to retain control of the matching contribution is that of matching funds deposited into the central accounts of the Special Fund. The stipulation in the AID legislation that we may only match “assessed and audited local costs” is another measure of control which cannot very well be exercised on contributions administered by governments or counter-part contributions in kind. Further, I believe the Department must present a well justified case to the Congress so as not to cause a recurrence of the moves made several years ago to reduce the matching proviso to a lesser percentage. As we move ahead on this proposition I must indicate the concern felt by a number of us about the large cash balances now existing in the Special Fund. I realize that many of the Special Fund projects require considerable time in terms of negotiating operations agreements and getting projects going, which in some cases may require three or four years to complete. However, given the close scrutiny now being made of the programs and budgets of all international organizations, I would hope that you might find ways to speed up the initial phases of the implementation process. I recall during your recent visit that one of the suggestions we discussed was the possibility of utilizing private contractors who might move ahead on projects which cannot now be handled by executive agencies within the UN family. 2 Unless such a forward movement occurs, it is my feeling that we might need to reexamine the level of the cash payments we will be making to the Special Fund. Such a re-examination would not mean any decrease in the amounts made available but might influence the timing of our payments. I would appreciate your informing me of your thoughts on this score and of actions we might take to be of assistance. Sincerely yours, Harlan Cleveland 3 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 398.051/3-162. No classification marking. Drafted by Frank K. Hefner (IO/OIA) on April 5. 1 Document 196 . 2 An apparent reference to Hoffman's call on the Secretary on March 2; see the source note, Document 196 . 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 200. Current Economic Developments 200. Current Economic Developments Source Washington, August 28, 1962. Issue No. 657 [Here follow articles on unrelated matters.] ECOSOC SESSION SHOWS SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS An outline of goals for the UN Development Decade, a call for an international conference on trade and development, and a proposal for a group of experts on commodity and trade problems of the less-developed countries were the major actions taken by the UN Economic and Social Council, which met in Geneva July 3-August 3. The general atmosphere at this session was an improvement over last year. There were only a few limited flare-ups between the Soviet and US representatives. The active and on the whole constructive role played by a group of developing countries—India, Yugoslavia, Ethiopia, and Brazil—was in contrast to last year when the US was responsible for most initiatives. The US can justly claim credit for having helped contribute to an agenda which compelled a good, hard look at problems rather than leaving a great deal of time for political maneuvering. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson's attendance for ten days was a stimulating and constructive force. It was proof of US determination to elevate the work of the Council and brought a greater understanding of our activity. On the economic side, the Council's discussions were dominated by two main themes—the UN Development Decade and the holding of a UN conference on trade and development. Within the context of the discussions on these subjects, the traditional preoccupation of the Council—commodity problems, rate of growth, need for industrialization, inadequacy of capital—were given the usual attention. Underlying much of the debate was evident concern as to the effect on other countries of the European Common Market. Development Decade The idea of a Development Decade has taken hold, particularly among the less-developed countries. They resisted Soviet bloc attempts to play it down. The item was introduced by the Secretary General in a well balanced talk. He was followed by Ambassador Stevenson who placed considerable emphasis on the importance of the human factor in economic development. Two competing resolutions were put forward: one by Brazil, Ethiopia, India, Senegal and Yugoslavia, the other by Denmark, El Salvador, and the US. Our delegation took the lead in combining the two. The resulting resolution was subject to protracted negotiation, first with the sponsors of the other resolution, then with many Western powers and finally with Poland and the Soviet Union. (When the Soviet delegation found it could not sabotage or avoid a resolution, it tried, unsuccessfully, to include in the resolution a mechanism for a ten-year world-wide plan modeled after bloc kind of planning.) The final resolution was of an umbrella character with fourteen points embracing some mention of practically every UN program. 1 A principal operating clause requested the Secretary General to prepare a program consisting of detailed phased proposals for action with respect to the basic factors of economic growth. Among other things, the resolution calls on member governments to give particular attention in the first years of the Decade to industrial development; improved access to world markets for the developing countries; stabilization of commodity prices; an increased flow of development capital; the development of human resources through adequate programs for education and training, nutrition, health, public administration and housing; and exploration and exploitation of natural resources aimed at establishing a raw material and energy basis for economic development. Other action recommended for the Decade include steps designed to secure prompt attainment of the present goal of $150 million yearly for the UN Special Fund and the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance; an appeal for full support by participating governments to the Freedom-from-Hunger Campaign of the FAO, and an expression of hope that resources will be provided commensurate with the role envisaged for the UN in the Development Decade will be made available. The resolution was approved unanimously, but at the request of the USSR, separate votes were taken on the paragraphs dealing with the $150 million target, the Freedom-from-Hunger Campaign and the World Food Program, and the role envisaged for the UN. On these paragraphs the USSR and Poland abstained. By a separate resolution the Council established a “Special Committee on Coordination with particular emphasis on the United Nations Development Decade.” 2 The Committee is to be composed of eleven members of the Council and TAC and will keep under review priority areas on projects relating to objectives of the Decade. [Here follow the remainder of this article and articles on other matters.] * Source: Washington National Records Center, E/CBA/REP Files: FRC 72 A 6248, Current Economic Developments. Confidential. The source text comprises pp. 14-15 of the issue. 1 Reference is to Resolution 916 (XXXIV), passed unanimously by the U.N. Economic and Social Council on August 3, for text, see U.N. Yearbook, 1962, pp. 234-235. 2 Reference is to Resolution 920 (XXXIV), passed unanimously by the U.N. Economic and Social Council on August 3; for text, see ibid., pp 235-236. 201. Editorial Note 201. Editorial Note Adlai E. Stevenson sent a long memorandum to President Kennedy on September 14, 1962, in which he urged support for a U.S. proposal to increase the capital of the International Development Association from $1 to $4 billion over the next several years. The International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which included the IDA, were going to discuss this proposal at its upcoming annual meeting in Washington. Stevenson argued that the IDA would require these additional reserves in the near future and that the increase would provide a unique opportunity to ask the Western European countries and Japan not only to spend more money on economic development but to provide it on easier lending terms. Stevenson's memorandum is printed in Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson: Ambassador to the United Nations, 1961-1965 , volume VIII, pages 289-291. Regarding the IMF-IBRD annual meeting, see Document 62 . 202. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 202. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Source Washington, January 30, 1963, 12:40 p.m. 2043. Following is summary interview January 29 between Secretary of State and Paul Hoffman concerning Special Fund Project in Santiago de las Vegas: 1 Hoffman informed Secretary he had decided against sending investigator study feasibility Special Fund Projects Viet Nam and Cuba and felt had no alternative but to proceed with signing plan of operations for Cuban project. Repeated importance insulating Special Fund from cold war logrolling and his regret that US continued oppose Cuban project. 2 Conceded signing project agreement would inevitably attract adverse publicity which would hurt Special Fund as well as support for US participation in UN system. But as international civil servant he was under mandate to carry out decisions Governing Council once technical questions raised by US about feasibility project had been resolved, which in his view they had been by FAO. Hoffman then informed Secretary that Special Fund intended cable FAO January 30 saying that authorization to sign project agreement would be given if FAO confirmed that three remaining technical prerequisites fulfilled, i.e., Cuba deposit necessary local currency, assurance freedom of movement foreign technicians, and availability physical facilities. In reply Secretary declared anything related to Cuba was major issue for US. Cuba had brought world to brink of nuclear incineration and continued pose grave foreign policy problem. Hoffman, as international civil servant, had to reach own decision on problem. US, for its part, would continue make known its opposition to project. For Embassy Rome: Please advise Dr. Sen of position Secretary took with Paul Hoffman. He should understand that we can neither approve, acquiesce in or remain silent concerning this project after it is approved. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 398.051/1-3063. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Gardner and McKitterick on January 29; cleared by ARA (in substance), Wallner (IO), and Little (S/S); and approved by Secretary Rusk. Also sent to Rome. Attached to the source text is a January 29 memorandum from Wallner to Secretary Rusk, requesting the Secretary's approval of the telegram and recommending against a final appeal from Ambassador Reinhardt in Rome to Dr. Binay Ranjan Sen, Director General of the FAO, to declare the Cuban project unfeasible, because Sen would probably ignore the appeal. At most he would send a special investigator to Cuba who would probably report favorably on the project. “At best, we would have gained a month without changing the outcome and at the risk of drawing additional public and Congressional notice to this matter.” 1 No other record of this interview has been found. 2 U.S. Alternate Representative Jonathan B. Bingham had told Hoffman on the telephone on January 7 that the United States would continue to oppose the Cuban project. Thereupon Hoffman became “very upset” and “said, in most vehement terms,” that “any such decision by US would be ‘stupidest possible' in view of oft-repeated US position that special fund must be kept free of political considerations.” (Telegram 2639 from USUN, January 8; Department of State, Central Files, 398.051/1-3063) 203. Editorial Note 203. Editorial Note On February 13, 1963, Paul Hoffman signed the plan of operations that allowed the agricultural project in Cuba to proceed. Hoffman approved the project after receiving confirmation from the Food and Agriculture Organization about technical points he had raised. The plan of operation included provision for three phases, the first of which would determine whether suitable working arrangements would permit the implementation of the second and third phases. Later the same day, Secretary Rusk made two statements that reiterated U.S. objections to the U.N. project. For texts, see Department of State Bulletin , March 11, 1963, pages 357-358. When Paul Hoffman was shown the first of the Secretary's two statements, he remarked it was “another instance ‘stupidity' US in this matter. Stated that, if he felt project was against US national interest, he would have resigned rather than permit project to proceed.” (Telegram 3028 from USUN, February 13; Department of State, Central Files, AID (UN)) Additional documentation on the issue is ibid., UN 13-1 and AID (UN). For the Congressional testimony on February 18 by Richard N. Gardner, who reviewed the U.S. position on the Cuban project, see United Nations Special Fund: Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-eighth Congress, First Session (Washington, 1963), passim. 204. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions 204. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions Source Washington, May 13, 1963, 9:08 p.m. 1957. Re Circular Telegram 1904. 1 Assistant Secretary of Treasury Bullitt (U.S. Executive Director, IBRD/IDA) held meeting May 10, 1963 as discussed Reftel. Bullitt described over-all target for Part I countries of $250 million per annum for 3 years, payment commencing 1965. Informed group of U.S. willingness make final offer of $100 million as its share, conditional on $250 million package actually being reached. Also indicated willingness four other large countries make following contributions: UK $30.7 million; Germany $24.4 million; France $19.4 million; Italy $10 million. Total of 5 countries $184.3 million, leaving $65.7 million to be found among remaining 13 Part I countries. Stated belief that certain members of group would feel improvement their financial and economic position since 1959 when IDA shares first negotiated would warrant increase in their relative share. Reiterated importance U.S. attached to reaching rapidly $250 million total and emphasized need for early action in view decreasing availability IDA resources for new commitments and tightness of legislative schedules in several countries. Group agreed to have a follow-up meeting May 27 to review responses by governments. In discussion, Bullitt avoided tying individual country subscriptions to precise formula but noted that increase from present level IDA subscriptions roughly $150 million per year to proposed level of $250 million per year would require minimum increase by factor of 1.66 in other's contributions and urged those in an improved position to consider greater increase. Addressees again requested in any discussion of aid or related matters and otherwise as appropriate, stress IDA as tested IBRD affiliate to channel resources into economic development on soft terms and express hope that constructive attitude will be taken on question of new resources. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files,AID (IDA). Limited Official Use. Drafted and cleared by Bullitt (Treasury), Springsteen, and Read and approved by A. Evans Hiley (OC/DCT) and Jacob J. Kaplan (AID/IDOS). Sent to Canberra, Vienna, Brussels, Ottawa, Copenhagen, Helsinki, Paris (Embassy and USRO), Bonn, Rome, Tokyo, Kuwait, Luxembourg, The Hague, Oslo, Pretoria, Stockholm, and London. 1 Circular telegram 1904, May 7, outlined the purpose of the upcoming May 10 meeting, which was to discuss progress on the amount of subscriptions by Part I countries to the replenishment of IDA resources and to see which ones might be able to increase their share because the United States, United Kingdom, and Netherlands were seeking to reduce their share. (Ibid.) The Part I countries were Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, the Netherlands, Norway, Union of South Africa, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Belgium and Luxembourg were not yet Part I members but had recently applied for membership. 205. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions 205. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions Source Washington, May 29, 1963, 8:11 p.m. 2047. Re: Circular Tel 1957. 1 Assistant Secretary Bullitt held follow-up meeting mentioned reftel May 27 with IDA Part I Representatives. Pledges toward $250 million per annum target made at meeting total $233.37 million, subject to varying conditions. Total does not include amount hoped for from Kuwait ($3.36 mil.) or from Luxembourg (about $0.25 mil.). Following table in four columns: country; share of present subscriptions in percent; share of $250 million based on present percentage; amount pledged. Australia 2.64; 6.60; 6.46; Austria 0.66; 1.65; 1.00; Canada 4.96; 12.40; 12.40; Netherlands 3.64; 9.10; 3.75; South Africa 1.32; 3.30; 1.33; Denmark 1.15; 2.88; asterisk; Finland 0.50; 1.25; asterisk; Norway 0.88; 2.20; asterisk; Sweden 1.32; 3.30; 5.00; France 6.94; 17.35; 19.40; Germany 6.94; 17.35; 24.20; Italy 2.38; 5.95; 10.00; U.K. 17.19; 42.98; 30.70; U.S. 41.97; 104.93; 100.00; Japan 4.40; 11.00; 11.00; Belgium 2.97; 7.43; 3.50; Luxembourg 0.13; 0.33; dash; totals; 100.00; 250.00; 233.37; asterisk—aggregate of $4.63 million; end table. Major problem is Belgian and Dutch pledges which substantially below minimum necessary to make $250 million target feasible. Belgians proposed $3.5 million and indicated would not go above actual Dutch contribution. Proportionate Dutch contribution would be $9.1 million; Dutch proposed $3.75 million on basis earlier standing instructions and noted difficulty in obtaining further commitment due caretaker government. Further direct approaches Belgians and Dutch planned which are subject separate messages Brussels and Hague. 2 Total $12 million for two countries seems reasonable. View low Austrian pledge, Secretary Dillon seeing Austrian Ambassador Tuesday, June 4 and has written Minister of Finance directly. Swedish pledge represents 150% increase and was warmly welcomed by Bullitt; other Scandinavians, however, contemplating reduction their aggregate contribution to point where their subscriptions plus Sweden would only total proportionate increase for whole group. Bullitt called in Baron Nauckhoff, Swedish Commercial Counsellor who represented Sweden at meeting and requested him urge G.O.S. to urge Denmark and Norway to maintain share. Efforts also being made through Danish IBRD/IDA Director representing group to keep Norwegian and Danish Contributions up to level of proportionate increase. UK Director's (Pitblado) assistance being enlisted this effort, as well as to seek some increase in Australian pledge and further move toward proportionate increase by South Africa. Reasonable prospects for greater-than-proportionate increase by Japan and U.S. officials urging $15 million target on Japanese IBRD/IDA Director. 3 Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files,AID (IDA). Limited Official Use. Drafted by Bullitt (Treasury), cleared by Kaplan (in substance), and approved by John S. Whitt (OC/DCT). Sent to Canberra, Vienna, Brussels, Ottawa, Copenhagen, Helsinki, Paris (Embassy and USRO), Bonn, Rome, Tokyo, Kuwait, Luxembourg, The Hague, Oslo, Pretoria, Stockholm, and London. 1 Document 204 . 2 Neither message has been found. 3 The IDA Part I members agreed during the summer of 1963 to increase IDA's resources by $750 million over a 3-year period. The Federal Republic of Germany pledged the largest increase, and significant increases were pledged by France, Italy, Japan, and Sweden. The United Kingdom, South Africa, and the Netherlands made the largest reductions in share. (Letter from Bullitt to Ball, September 26; Department of State, Central Files, AID (IDA)) 206. Editorial Note 206. Editorial Note When the annual meeting of the Governors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development convened jointly in Washington with the International Monetary Fund, the International Finance Corporation, and the International Development Association September 30-October 4, 1963, the Bank had a new president, George Woods, and the Fund a new managing director, Pierre-Paul Schweitzer. The main subjects at the meeting were international liquidity and the loan policy of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. For text of the speeches by President Kennedy and Douglas Dillon at the meeting, which focused on liquidity, see Department of State Bulletin, October 21, 1963, pages 610-619. Regarding the Bank's loan policies, in his address on September 30, Woods proposed expansion of the Bank's lending activities, especially for the financing of agricultural credit and new industries, long-term financing for the import of individual items of industrial equipment and spare parts, and new facilities in the field of education, and more flexible lending terms. In his address to the Bank on October 2, Under Secretary of State Ball particularly welcomed Woods' “suggestion that the Bank may, in appropriate cases, modify the terms of its lending so as to lengthen grace periods and extend maturities” as well as his flexibility and “willingness—indeed his eagerness—to explore new ground.” For text of Ball's speech, see ibid., pages 619-623. The major subjects at the meeting were summarized in Current Economic Developments , Issue No. 686, October 15, 1963, pages 14-18. (Washington National Records Center, E/CBA/REP Files:FRC 72 A 624, Current Economic Developments ) 207. Letter From the Vice President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Wilson) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) 207. Letter From the Vice President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Wilson) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) Source Washington, October 21, 1963. Dear George : 1 Once or twice lately you have emphasised to George Woods and to me how important it is in your view that all the capital exporting countries should be fully aware of the indebtedness and debtservicing problems of the borrowing countries. You may be interested to know what the Bank is at present doing in this regard. In the first place, our staff, as a matter of routine, produces reports on the economic situation and prospects for each of the countries to which we make Bank loans or IDA credits. These reports contain all the available debt information about that country and they also contain an analysis of the debt burden. Secondly, four or five times a year we prepare reports on the external public debt of a selected group of countries—each debtor country appears once a year. I enclose copies of our last two reports of this kind. They contain statistical information only, without any analysis and, like the country reports referred to above, they show scheduled amortization and interest payments for the next fifteen years. Both these reports are circulated to the Executive Directors of the Bank among whom, of course, all the DAC countries are represented. In addition, a copy of the external public debt statistical report is sent to the DAC Secretariat in Paris. All the above material is collected from the borrowing countries. We also receive information from the creditor countries about their claims. Under a special “exchange of information” arrangement, the Bank receives six-monthly statements from each of the fourteen major creditor countries on their scheduled receipts of amortization and interest, during the next ten years, from the public and private sectors in each debtor country. We process this information here and circulate, to the creditor countries only (and also to the DAC Secretariat), figures showing the total debt position of each borrowing country. I enclose our latest version of this report for your information. 2 Finally, the Bank staff occasionally undertakes comprehensive analyses of the debt servicing burden and debt servicing ability of all or most of the borrowing countries. One such analysis was published in 1958 and another in 1960. 3 We are now up-dating the earlier publications and the new study should be completed in a few months' time and will be available to the UN Conference on Trade and Development. 4 All this may sound quite impressive, so I should add that we are not satisfied with the scope or form of our information and we are actively considering how it might be improved. 5 I am sending a copy of this letter to John Bullitt. Yours sincerely, G. M. Wilson * Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID(IBRD) 9. No classification marking. 1 The salutation was handwritten by Wilson. 2 Not printed. 3 Neither found. 4 The U.N. Conference on Trade and Development was held in Geneva March 23-June 16, 1964. 5 In this October 24 reply, Ball thanked Wilson for the information on the Bank's monitoring “of the debt position of the borrowing countries and the problems encountered by these countries in servicing such debts,” and noted he was encouraged by the Bank's consideration of “further improvements” in its activities. (Department of State, Central Files, AID (IBRD) 9) Trade and Commercial Policy Trade and Commercial Policy 208. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy Washington, March 17, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 394.41/3-1761. Confidential. Drafted by Selma G. Kallis (E/OT/TA) on March 2. 209. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate in Geneva Washington, March 22, 1961, 9:23 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 394.41/3-2261. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Herbert F. Propps (E/OT/CPT) on March 22; cleared by Edelen M. Fogarty (E/CSD), Joseph E. Jacques (E/OR), Frank P. Butler (E/OT/CPT), Leonard Weiss (E/OT), and Thelma E. Vettel (FE); and approved by Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Martin. Repeated to Karachi, London, New Delhi, Ottawa, Paris, Hong Kong and Tokyo. 210. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, April 5, 1961, 11 a.m. Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149, January-April, 1961. Secret. Drafted by William C. Burdett (EUR/BNA). The meeting was held at the White House. The typed notation “uncleared” appears on the source text. 211. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, April 21, 1961. Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149, January-April 1961. Official Use Only. Drafted by Avery F. Peterson (FE) on April 21 and approved by S on April 4 and by the White House on April 5. The meeting was held at the White House. Attached to the source text is a May 4 note from Raymond S. Perkins (S/S-RO) to Battle (S/S) recommending the memorandum be repeated to Tokyo, London, and Hong Kong. The recommendation was approved and sent to the White House. 212. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, April 28, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 394.41/4-2861. Official Use Only. Drafted by Paul A. London. 213. Editorial Note 214. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State Tokyo, May 4, 1961, 7 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 411.006/5-461. Confidential. Repeated to Kobe. 215. Editorial Note 216. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions Washington, June 10, 1961, 9:08 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 394.41/6-1061. Official Use Only; Verbatim Text. Drafted by Emerson M. Brown (E/OT/TA), cleared by Ball and Nicholas A. Veliotes (S/S-RO), and approved by Sidney B. Jacques (E/OR). 217. Editorial Note 218. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, June 21, 1961. Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149, May-July 1961. Confidential. Drafted by Richard L. Sneider (FE/NA) and approved in S and B on July 14 and at the White House on July 20. A longer memorandum of this conversation, prepared by James J. Wickel (LS/I), is scheduled for publication in volume XXII. 219. Letter From Members of Congress to President Kennedy Washington, June 22, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 411.006/6-2461. Limited Official Use. The source text is a copy of identical letters, one signed by 33 Senators on Senate Committee on Appropriations stationery and the other signed by 122 Representatives on House Armed Services Committee stationery. 220. Editorial Note 221. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (Hays) to Senator Edmund S. Muskie Washington, July 5, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 411.006/6-1961. No classification marking. Drafted by Virginia H. McClung (E/OR/CSD) on June 29 and cleared by Warren M. Christopher (B) and Florence K. Kirlin (H). 222. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Consulate General in Geneva Tokyo, July 12, 1961, noon. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 394.41/7-1261. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Repeated to the Department of State as telegram 122, which is the source text. 223. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy Washington, August 28, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 394.41/8-2861. No classification marking. 224. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy Washington, September 11, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 394.41/9-1161. Confidential. 225. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball) to President Kennedy Washington, September 22, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 394.41/9-2661. Confidential. 226. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball) to the President's Deputy Special Counsel (Feldman) Washington, September 25, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 411.006/9-2561. Confidential. Transmitted to Feldman under cover of a memorandum from Battle, September 26. (Ibid., 411.006/9-2661) Ball also sent a copy to President Kennedy under cover of a September 29 memorandum, which urged a delay in the escape clause announcement until after tariff negotiations in Geneva had been completed. He emphasized: “action at this time approving the tariff increase might seriously jeopardize the development of our international textile agreement as well as the tariff negotiations presently underway in Geneva.” (Ibid., 411.006/9-2961) 227. Paper Prepared by the President's Special Assistant (Petersen) Washington, October 4, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 411.004/10-461. Confidential; Limited Distribution. Transmitted to Ball under cover of an October 4 memorandum from Petersen, which indicated that several other agencies also received copies of the paper (Kennedy Library, Petersen Papers, Trade Policy, 1961) 228. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Trezise) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball) Washington, October 10, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 411.0041/10-1061. Confidential. Drafted by Trezise. 229. Paper Prepared by the President's Special Assistant (Petersen) Washington, October 17, 1961. Source: Kennedy Library, Petersen Papers, Trade Legislation, 1/13/61-11/5/61. No classification marking. Transmitted to Ball under cover of an October 18 memorandum from Petersen. 230. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball) to President Kennedy Washington, October 23, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 411.0041/10-461. Confidential. Secretary Rusk forwarded this memorandum to President Kennedy under cover of a memorandum. (Ibid.) 231. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Japan Washington, November 1, 1961, 7:23 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 400.0041/11-161. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by William T. Nunley (B) on November 1, cleared by EUR/NA and William H. Brubeck (S/S) and approved by J. Robert Schaetzel (B). Also sent to Hakone for Secretary Rusk who was attending first meeting of the Joint United States-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs November 2-4. The committee's purpose was to promote, among other things, closer cooperation and consultation on economic affairs between the two countries. The committee was established after an exchange of notes between Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Kosaka following Prime Minister Ikeda's June 20-23 trip to Washington. 232. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State Tokyo, November 13, 1961, 8 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 411.9441/11-1361. Confidential. 233. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France Washington, November 23, 1961, 2:23 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 394.41/11-2361. Official Use Only; Priority. Drafted and approved by Ball and cleared by Lawrence Pezzullo (S/S). Also sent to Brussels, Bonn, Rome, The Hague, Luxembourg and repeated to Geneva for GATT. 234. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, November 30, 1961. Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential. Drafted by Herman H. Barger and approved in U on December 1. 235. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State Tokyo, December 5, 1961, 8 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 411.006/12-561. Confidential. Repeated to Kobe. 236. Editorial Note 237. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to Secretary of Agriculture Freeman Washington, December 11, 1961. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subject Series, Trade, General, 10/61-12/61. No classification marking. Drafted by Ball. 238. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State Tokyo, December 12, 1961, 7 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 411.006/12-1261. Confidential; Priority. 239. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, December 21, 1961. Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Official Use Only. Drafted by Vettel and approved in U on January 19, 1962. Attached to the source text is a note from Battle (S/S) to Freeman (U), January 17, 1962, requesting his approval of the memorandum prior to its distribution. 240. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions Washington, January 30, 1962, 8:09 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 411.004/1-3062. Official Use Only. Drafted by Trezise (E), Leonard Weiss (E/OT), and Selma G. Kallis (E/TA) on January 29; cleared by Philander P. Claxton (H), Leonard Wilson (P), and Myer Rashish (White House); and approved by Trezise. Sent to 34 Embassies and Consulates and pouched to all other missions except Moscow, Budapest, Prague, Bucharest, and Sofia. 241. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, February 9, 1962. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 394.41/2-1062. Confidential; Eyes Only. Ball sent this memorandum to Rusk under cover of a February 10 memorandum that reads in part: “Since dictating the attached memorandum a couple of days ago Mike Blumenthal has succeeded in concluding the negotiation of a long-term textile agreement in Geneva. This agreement has been reached, however, on an ad referendum basis and it has been made clear on behalf of the Japanese and several other governments that final approval will depend on our willingness to yield on the equalization fee.” (Ibid.) 242. Editorial Note 243. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Kennedy Washington, February 26, 1962. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 394.41/2-2662. Confidential. Transmitted under cover of a similar memorandum, February 26, from Ball to Secretary Hodges. 244. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Trade Agreements (Walker) to President Kennedy Washington, February 26, 1962. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 394.41/2-2662. Confidential. Drafted on February 20. This memorandum was another enclosure submitted to President Kennedy under cover of the February 26 memorandum from Ball to Secretary Hodges (see the source note, Document 243). 245. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Kennedy Washington, March 29, 1962. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 411.006/3-2962. No classification marking. 246. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany Washington, March 31, 1962, 2:22 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 411.004/3-3162. Secret. Drafted by Robert M. Beaudry (EUR/WE) on March 31, cleared by Leonard Weiss (E/OT) and Arthur A. Hartman (U) in substance, and approved by Trezise (E). Repeated to Brussels for the Embassy and USEC. 247. Editorial Note 248. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, June 9, 1962, 10:30 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 411.004/6-962. Confidential. Drafted by Douglas MacArthur II and approved in S on June 15. 249. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Kennedy Washington, August 21, 1962. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 411.006/8-2162. Confidential. Drafted by Ball on August 21. 250. Message From Foreign Secretary Home to Secretary of State Rusk London, August 21, 1962. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 411.414/8-2462. Confidential. Transmitted under cover of a letter from Lord Hood, the British Charge, to Secretary Rusk, August 24. 251. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions Washington, September 27, 1962, 5:25 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.0041/9-2762. Unclassified. Drafted by Selma G. Kallis (OTF) on September 26, cleared by John Bertram Rehm (L/E) in draft, and approved by Leonard Weiss (OTF). Sent to 30 posts and pouched to all others except Moscow, Budapest, Prague, Bucharest, and Sofia. 252. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy Washington, October 12, 1962. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 411.006/10-1262. No classification marking. Drafted by Bayless A. Manning (U) and cleared in substance by W. Michael Blumenthal (E) and Herman Barger (E/OTF). A typed notation on the source text reads: “Withholding approval. See Press Release from W.H. 10/22/62.” The attached press release is printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, p. 805. 253. Letter From President Kennedy to Christian A. Herter Washington, November 15, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, Herter Papers, Herter Appointment. No classification marking. The date is handwritten on the source text as the date the letter was received. 254. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Johnson) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) Washington, November 29, 1962. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 400.11/11-2962. Confidential. Drafted by Gerald A. Pollack (E/OTF/FN) on November 29 and concurred in by Herman Pollack (A) and Theodore Hadraba (E) in draft, Leonard Weiss (E), Bernard Norwood (E/CPT), and Mortimer Goldstein (E/FN). 255. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to the President's Deputy Special Counsel (Feldman) Washington, December 5, 1962. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 411.006/12-562. Confidential. 256. Report by the Cabinet Committee on Balance of Payments to President Kennedy Washington, January 24, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, Herter Papers, Balance of Payments. Official Use Only. Copies were attached to a January 29 memorandum from Dillon to members of the Cabinet Committee on Balance of Payments. For further documentation on the balance-of-payments problem, See Documents 1 ff. and 40 ff. 257. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to President Kennedy Washington, January 24, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, Dillon Papers, Memoranda to the President. No classification marking. 258. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, January 29, 1963, 3 p.m. Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Vettel on January 29 and approved in U on February 18. The source text is labeled “Part III of III.” 259. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions Washington, January 29, 1963, 7:37 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 411.006/1-2962. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution; No Distribution Outside Department. Drafted by Stanley Nehmer (E/OR), cleared by W. Michael Blumenthal (E), and approved by Ball. Sent to Bonn, Brussels, Canberra, Geneva, The Hague, London, Paris, Rome, and Tokyo. 260. Letter From Senators Warren G. Magnuson, Henry M. Jackson, and Clair Engle to President Kennedy Washington, February 20, 1963. Source: Department of State, Central Files, INCO-POULTRY US. No classification marking. 261. Editorial Note 262. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, February 25, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Trade Policy, 1962. No classification marking. 263. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk and the Under Secretary of State (Ball) Washington, February 28, 1963. Source: Department of State, Central Files, FTU 4 US/TEA. Confidential. 264. National Security Action Memorandum No. 224 Washington, March 4, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Trade Policy, Trade Expansion Act, March 16, 1963-April 30, 1963. Confidential. 265. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Kennedy Washington, March 4, 1963. Source: Department of State, Central Files, INCO-WOOL US. Confidential. Drafted by Ball. 266. Record of Meeting Washington, March 5, 1963, 4-5:20 p.m. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Trade Policy, Trade Expansion Act. Confidential. Drafted by Kaysen on March 6. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room in the White House. The time of the meeting is from the President's Appointment Book. (Ibid.) 267. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to Senator Clair Engle Washington, March 6, 1963. Source: Department of State, Central Files, INCO-POULTRY US. No classification marking. Drafted by Under Secretary Ball on March 6. The source text bears Ball's initials as drafter, but it was drafted in E and forwarded to Ball under cover of a February memorandum from Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs Johnson who recommended that Ball sign the proposed reply. Also attached to the source text is a February 25 memorandum from P. W. Kriebel (S/S-S) to Marilyn H. Moninger (E), which requested that a response to the three Senators' letter of February 20 (Document 260) be ready for Ball's signature by 5 p.m. on February 26, specifically refuting the statement in the letter that U.S. poultry exports to Germany have been reduced to “nearly nothing.” 268. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Kennedy Washington, March 7, 1963. Source: Department of State, Central Files, INCO-WOOL US. Confidential. Drafted by Ball. 269. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Kennedy Washington, March 7, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Trade Policy, Trade Expansion. Confidential. 270. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Counsel (Feldman) to President Kennedy Washington, March 8, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Trade Policy, Trade Expansion Act. No classification marking. 271. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Kennedy Washington, March 8, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Trade Policy, Trade Expansion Act. Confidential. 272. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Kennedy Washington, March 9, 1963. Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Wool. Confidential. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: “All other copies burned.” 273. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Italy Washington, April 6, 1963, 3:56 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, INCO-WOOL IT. Confidential. Drafted by A. Eugene Frank (EUR/WE); cleared by Stanley Nehmer (OR), Emory C. Swank (S) and Warren E. Slater (S/S-S); and approved by Galen L. Stone (EUR/WE). Also sent to London. 274. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Kennedy Washington, April 17, 1963. Source: Department of State, Central Files, INCO-COTTON. Official Use Only. Drafted by Ball on April 17. Copies were sent to U, S/S-S, Governor Herter, and the White House for Kaysen. 275. Memorandum From the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (Herter) to President Kennedy Washington, May 1, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Trade Policy, Trade Expansion Act, 5/1/63-5/15/63. No classification marking. In preparation for the President's May 2 meeting with EEC Commissioners Jean Rey and Robert Margolin, Carl Kaysen forwarded this memorandum to President Kennedy under cover of a memorandum, May 1, that reads in part: “There may be some virtue in your not pressing our balance of payments problems as hard with them as you did with Mansholt. We are getting into the kind of bargaining atmosphere in which if we indicate too much eagerness on our part it may redound to our disadvantage.” 276. Memorandum for the Record Washington, undated. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Trade Policy, Trade Expansion Act, 5/1/63-5/15/63. No classification marking. The source text, labeled “Draft,” bears no drafting information. 277. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy Washington, May 4, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Trade Policy, Trade Expansion Act, 5/1/63-5/15/63. Confidential. 278. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions Washington, May 4, 1963, 5:32 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, FT7 GaTT. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Selma G. Kallis (E/OT) on May 3; cleared by James H. Lewis (TA), W. Michael Blumenthal (E), Richard D. Vine (EUR/RPE) in substance, and Herter; and approved by Leonard Weiss (OT). Repeated to all NATO capitals except Reykjavik, Athens, and Ankara, and to Bern, Canberra, Stockholm, Tokyo, Vienna, Wellington, Cairo, Helsinki, Karachi, Lima, Montevideo, New Delhi, Pretoria, and Rio de Janeiro. 279. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the European Communities Washington, May 7, 1963, 5:41 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, FT 7 GATT. Confidential; Emergency. Drafted by Kaysen, cleared by Herter by telephone and Benjamin H. Read (S/S), and approved by Ball. Repeated to Bonn, London, Luxembourg, Paris, Rome, and The Hague. 280. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, May 9, 1963. Source: Department of State, Central Files, FT 7. Secret. Drafted by Imhof and approved in S on May 16. 281. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the European Communities Washington, May 17, 1963, 7:37 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, FT 4 US/TEA. Confidential. Drafted by Barbara C. Fagan (EUR/RPE); cleared by Bernard Norwood (STR), Leonard Weiss, and Robert M. Beaudry (EUR/WE) in substance; and approved by Stanley M. Cleveland (EUR/RPE). Also sent to the EEC capitals and Geneva. 282. Editorial Note 283. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Counsel (Feldman) to President Kennedy Washington, July 30, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, Feldman Papers, Wool. No classification marking. 284. Memorandum From the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (Herter) to President Kennedy Washington, August 2, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, Herter Papers, Memoranda to the President. Limited Official Use. 285. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball) and Marquis Childs Washington, August 14, 1963, 4 p.m. Source: Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. Childs was chief Washington correspondent for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. 286. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Ball to President Kennedy Washington, undated. Source: Department of State, Central Files, INCO-WOOL 4. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Joseph A. Greenwald on August 20 (E/OT) and cleared by G. Griffith Johnson. Sent to President Kennedy under cover of a memorandum from Benjamin H. Read to McGeorge Bundy. 287. Letter From Secretary of Commerce Hodges to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, September 20, 1963. Source: Department of State, Central Files, FT(EX) US. No classification marking. 288. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 1, 1963, 4 p.m. Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Vettel on October 2, and approved in U on October 7. The source text is labeled “Part III of IV.” 289. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 10, 1963, 10:30 a.m. Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential. Drafted by Meade and approved in U on October 15. The meeting was held in Ball's office. The source text is labeled “3 of 3 parts.” 290. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Kennedy Washington, November 12, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, 11/8/63-11/20/63. Confidential. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: “Taken from President's week-end reading 11/16-18/63 Tab 6.” 291. Memorandum From the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (Herter) to President Johnson Washington, November 27, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, Herter Papers, Memoranda to the President, USTR. No classification marking. Lyndon B. Johnson became President following the assassination of President Kennedy in Dallas on November 22. 292. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions Washington, December 3, 1963, 6:58 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, INCO-POULTRY US. Limited Official Use; Immediate. Drafted by Michael W. Moynihan (STR) on December 2 and approved by William M. Roth (STR). Sent to Brussels for the Mission to the EC and the Embassy, Geneva for the delegation to GATT, Athens, Bern, Bonn, Buenos Aires, Canberra, Copenhagen, Dublin, The Hague, Lima, Lisbon, London, Luxembourg, Madrid, Ottawa, Paris for the Embassy and USRO, Rio de Janeiro, Rome, Stockholm, Tel Aviv, Tokyo, and Vienna. 293. Memorandum From the Deputy Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (Roth) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, December 24, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, Herter Papers, Subject Files, Disparities (Tariff), Box 8. Confidential. 294. Memorandum of Conversation LBJ Ranch, Texas, December 28, 1963, 3:15 p.m. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2354. Confidential. Drafted by Finn and approved in S and U on January 1, 1964, and in the White House on January 8, 1964. The full text of this memorandum is printed in vol. XIII, pp. 242-248. 295. Letter From the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (Herter) to the Deputy Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (Blumenthal) Washington, December 30, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, Herter Papers, Subject File, Michael Blumenthal, Box 7. Personal and Confidential 208. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy 208. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy Source Washington, March 17, 1961. SUBJECT Possible Need for Increased Authority to Offer Tariff Concessions in Negotiations Under General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) In your special message of February 6 to the Congress, 1 you stated that in negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the United States would seek the fullest possible measure of tariff reduction by foreign countries as a means of helping to correct the balance-of-payments deficit. In these negotiations, the United States will have to offer tariff concessions to other countries in order to obtain from them tariff concessions which will provide improved market opportunities for United States exporters. Unfortunately, the authority available to our negotiators to offer reductions in United States tariffs is not sufficient to assure achievement of the results we need to obtain in these important negotiations. If necessary, I will submit recommendations to you in the course of the negotiations for augmenting this authority. At this time, I want to explain the background and bring to your attention the potential seriousness of the situation. On May 27, 1960, the interagency trade agreements organization issued formal announcement of the intention of the United States to participate in these negotiations together with a public list of United States import products on which tariff concessions might be considered. 2 Because of the careful selectivity exercised in its preparation, the list represented only 26.3 percent of our total imports in 1959 from the countries with which we contemplate negotiations. The trade agreements legislation provides that the Tariff Commission shall conduct an investigation of the products on the public list and with respect to each item, report to the President, for his information, the level below which individual duties could not be reduced without causing or threatening serious injury to domestic industry. Although there is nothing in the legislation to prevent the President from reducing duties below the level (peril point) found by the Tariff Commission, if he does so, he is required to report his reasons to the Congress. The Tariff Commission found, in its peril point investigation, that the duties on products accounting for nearly one-third of the trade coverage of the list could not be decreased without causing or threatening such serious injury. In light of the known views of the Eisenhower administration against breaching peril points in trade agreement negotiations, the interdepartmental Trade Agreements Committee (TAC) did not recommend any reductions in rates of duty which would have breached peril points. The TAC had been prepared, however, prior to receipt of the peril points, to recommend reductions on many products important to the negotiations on which the Tariff Commission subsequently reported the peril point to be the existing tariff level. The recommendations of the TAC on offers to be made in the negotiations were approved by the President on January 6, 1961. 3 The limitations resulting from the Tariff Commission's adverse peril point findings have reduced the trade coverage of the approved offers to only 18 percent of our total imports from countries with which we expect to negotiate. The statutory authority of the President in these negotiations is not great, authorizing him to make reductions in duty of no more than 20 percent of the existing duty, by stages, except in the case of certain duties in excess of 50 percent ad valorem or below 10 percent ad valorem where the authority is somewhat greater. Since we will seek from other countries tariff reductions of much greater depth than we will be able to offer in return, we need to be able to make reductions on as broad an amount of trade coverage as possible. In the case of some countries we will be able to offer concessions on less than one percent of our imports from them, with the result that the negotiations would be either very meager or without any basis at all. The reduced bargaining potential with the European Economic Community (EEC), where the attrition caused by peril points is nearly 38 percent, is particularly serious. It is possible that the EEC will agree to settle for less than full reciprocity on the offer it has already made to reduce its future common external tariff by 20 percent provided adequate reciprocity is offered by other countries in return. There is a serious risk, however, that the negotiating power available to the United States negotiators will not be sufficient to induce the EEC to implement its offer fully, and that we will be unable to accomplish our objective of furthering the interests of the United States by securing the lowest possible level in the new EEC common external tariff as well as substantial tariff reductions by other countries. If we find that increased authority is required in order to permit our aims in these negotiations to be accomplished, the only feasible course would be to breach some peril points on a selective basis. In such event, recommendations would be submitted to you as to the particular products on which the breaching of peril points in these negotiations would be in the national interest. You will receive, in due course, the recommendations of the interagency Trade Agreements Committee on requests for authority to offer tariff concessions on articles selected from the supplementary list, issued by the Committee on November 23, 1960, 4 of additional products on which tariff concessions may be considered in these negotiations. Although the authority of the United States negotiators will be increased somewhat if you approve recommendations with respect to articles on this supplementary list, it will be impossible, because of the limitations of the supplementary list itself, to enhance the negotiating authority sufficiently to have a significant effect on the problem here described. Dean Rusk 5 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 394.41/3-1761. Confidential. Drafted by Selma G. Kallis (E/OT/TA) on March 2. 1 See Document 2 . 2 For text of announcement, see Department of State Bulletin, June 13, 1960, pp. 968-972. The interagency trade agreements organization was also referred to as the interdepartmental Trade Agreements Committee (TAC). 3 Not further identified. 4 For text of the supplementary list, see 26 Federal Register 15; the Department of State Bulletin, January 30, 1960, pp. 161-162, briefly describes corrections to the supplementary list. 5 Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original. 209. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate in Geneva 209. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate in Geneva Source Washington, March 22, 1961, 9:23 p.m. 1508. For ResDel GATT. Dept considering possibility multilateral consideration in GATT framework of problems of trade in cotton textiles and apparel. Problems U.S. industry now being urgently considered by President's Advisory Cte on Textiles. 1 U.S. industry draws attention approximate doubling of total imports cloth, apparel and other textile products (on yardage basis) last two years and seeks across-the-board import quotas by country and by product as only effective means coping with low-wage imports without undue prejudice interests traditional suppliers. Industry problems being analyzed here, and various approaches being explored. Rapid rise certain U.S. cotton textile imports seems attributable in part Western European trade barriers. Restrictions cotton textile exports LDCs have been discussed Cte III. Advantages this forum include liberal terms reference and support of Cte work by LDCs. WP Market Disruption also discussed these restrictions, but in context efforts define “market disruption” and find multilateral solution problems caused by abrupt increases in imports. LDCs (India and Pakistan) appeared reluctant recognize or deal with problems in this Cte, fearing further restrictions; EEC (France) also not forthcoming, apparently because of unwillingness liberalize toward Hong Kong, Japan and others. Textile trade problems also related Japan Art XXXV question, now about to come before special WP. Under circumstances, ResDel requested ask Wyndham White's views regarding: (1) progress made to date on GATT-ILO study of textile industry and earliest date by which Market Disruption Cte might issue textile portion its report on social, economic and commercial factors underlying market disruption problems and (2) most appropriate framework for early multilateral consideration in GATT of problems world trade in textiles and apparel. On latter point, our preliminary thought is that if there is to be GATT meeting this matter, most appropriate framework would be joint meeting Committee III and Committee on Avoidance of Market Disruption. Emphasize to Wyndham White that no U.S. position reached and that his views being sought at this stage so that they may be taken into account in arriving at U.S. position. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 394.41/3-2261. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Herbert F. Propps (E/OT/CPT) on March 22; cleared by Edelen M. Fogarty (E/CSD), Joseph E. Jacques (E/OR), Frank P. Butler (E/OT/CPT), Leonard Weiss (E/OT), and Thelma E. Vettel (FE); and approved by Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Martin. Repeated to Karachi, London, New Delhi, Ottawa, Paris, Hong Kong and Tokyo. 1 On February 16, President Kennedy appointed several members of his Cabinet to a committee to study problems in the U.S. textile industry and to offer solutions to these problems. Members included the Secretaries of the Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, and Labor, and Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Ball. (Current Economic Documents, Issue No. 618, February 2, 1961, pp. 1-4; Washington National Records Center, E/CBA/REP Files: FRC 72 A 6248, Current Economic Developments) 210. Memorandum of Conversation 210. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, April 5, 1961, 11 a.m. THE PRESIDENT'S MEETINGS WITH PRIME MINISTER MACMILLAN WASHINGTON, APRIL, 1961 SUBJECT International Economic Problems: Commercial Policy and Aid Matters PARTICIPANTS United States The President The Secretary of State The Secretary of the Treasury Ambassador Bruce Mr. Walter W. Heller Mr. McGeorge Bundy Mr. George W. Ball Mr. Foy D. Kohler Mr. Charles E. Bohlen Mr. William C. Burdett Mr. James W. Swihart United Kingdom The Prime Minister Lord Home Ambassador Caccia Sir Norman Brook Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar Sir Robert Hall Honorable Peter Ramsbotham Mr. John Russell Mr. D. B. Pitblado Mr. Philip de Zulueta Mr. A. C. I. Samuel Mr. John Thomson Mr. Ball referred to the Commonwealth arrangements regarding tropical food stuffs which caused us trouble because of Latin America. He hoped that we could approach this matter together. The President explained that we were going to have an extremely difficult battle on reciprocal trade legislation. Last time the bill passed the House by only one vote. Now there were depressed conditions. The textile industry had moved to the South which had traditionally supported free trade. 35-40 Congressmen were coming to see him next week. Reciprocal trade would be the most important battle of the next two years. Some of the arguments used by the opponents were soundly based. We must organize those who benefit from free trade. Those who are hurt are already organized. It would help us a great deal on this question if the UK could do something about deciduous fruit. This matter was of particular concern to six Senators from the Northwest who supported us on reciprocal trade. Mr. Ball said that he would be glad to furnish the UK with a memorandum on the subject. The President next referred to the difficulties occasioned by the growth in imports of textiles from Hong Kong. These imports had gone up 400% and are now equivalent to those from Japan. Something must be done or there could be a disastrous effect on the reciprocal trade legislation. Pakistan was also somewhat involved. The President said he would like us jointly to see if something could be done voluntarily. Commenting on the problem of fruits the Prime Minister said the British interest was to avoid ruining the Federation of the West Indies and having it taken over by a Castro-type regime. Mr. Ball observed that it would help if something could be done about peaches and pears which he did not think involved the Federation. The Prime Minister replied that he thought this could be straightened out. He added the matter of textiles was terribly difficult. Great Britain had voluntary quotas from Hong Kong and Pakistan but these were about to run out. If the West gives aid to new countries to set up industries, they are bound to manufacture. What do we do with these products? For example, Lancaster had shifted from the manufacture of textiles to high-grade machinery. The British Government had spent much money to change the type of manufacture. The problem arises when a new source comes so quickly into the market. This upsets things politically and then one cannot get things done. He would like to have the Hong Kong matter studied. The Prime Minister asked whether it would be possible to obtain a voluntary quota. Lord Home said it had taken the British three years. Mr. Ball reported that when in London last week he had spoken with Mr. Gorrell Barnes of the Colonial Office and they had reached an understanding that the British would send over a mission next week to look at the total economic problem of Hong Kong not only the commercial policy aspects. The broader problem the Prime Minister had mentioned, Mr. Ball said, was pre-occupying us very much. He hoped it might be handled through the DAG. There should be coordination and planning regarding the type of development we would support and also regarding the burden of absorbing imports. [Here follows discussion of aid to undeveloped countries.] * Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149, January-April, 1961. Secret. Drafted by William C. Burdett (EUR/BNA). The meeting was held at the White House. The typed notation “uncleared” appears on the source text. 211. Memorandum of Conversation 211. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, April 21, 1961. SUBJECT Call on the President by the Japanese Economic Mission PARTICIPANTS The President Mr. Sato Kiichiro (introduced by Ambassador Asakai) and members of the Japanese Economic Mission Mr. Avery F. Peterson, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs The President met the Delegation in the Cabinet Room at 3:20 and spoke with them for ten or twelve minutes. He was assured by Ambassador Asakai that all present spoke English. The President was introduced to and shook hands with each member of the Delegation and inquired regarding the individual's business connections. The President was fully briefed and effective in his conversation. He said the Administration recognized that Japan lived by trade and that the Administration proposed an expansive policy rather than a restrictive one. He indicated, however, that domestic pressures were often against imports and that beneficiaries of foreign trade were seldom articulate; the cotton growers in North and South Carolina who did good business with Japan remained mute, while his neighbors in the textile industry were vociferous in their complaints. The President said he had been studying the textile situation and had for two weeks in his office a chart showing imports. This (which an aide produced within a minute or two) showed that Japan by its own efforts had kept the volume relatively level at some 180-odd million yards but that others, notably Hong Kong, had been unrestrained in their exports which moved steadily up on his chart to 187 million yards. Something needed to be done to correct this inequity, according to the President. The President said that he hoped for closer economic relationships between the United States and Japan and between the United States/Japan and Europe, adding that he hoped also that a basis for such relationships could be maintained in the other American Republics. When some of the visitors were identified as being in the radio-television and heavy electrical industries, the President said laughingly that in the United States these occupations were mostly the bailiwick of Republicans, nevertheless, he got along pretty well with them. The President did not mention anything about continued import restrictions on Japan. Mr. Sato's brief acknowledgment expressed great appreciation on the part of the delegation for the President taking time out of what must be an exceedingly harrowing schedule to greet the Japanese mission. The President shook hands with each of the visitors, the Ambassador and a representative of the Embassy when he took his leave. * Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149, January-April 1961. Official Use Only. Drafted by Avery F. Peterson (FE) on April 21 and approved by S on April 4 and by the White House on April 5. The meeting was held at the White House. Attached to the source text is a May 4 note from Raymond S. Perkins (S/S-RO) to Battle (S/S) recommending the memorandum be repeated to Tokyo, London, and Hong Kong. The recommendation was approved and sent to the White House. 212. Memorandum of Conversation 212. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, April 28, 1961. SUBJECT US Concern at the Rejection of the US Agricultural Package by the EEC Representatives at GATT XXIV:6 Negotiations PARTICIPANTS Mr. George W. Ball, Under Secretary for Economic Affairs Mr. Louis Scheyven, Ambassador of Belgium Mr. Willy van Cauwenberg, Commercial Minister Mr. Roger Coustry, Agricultural Attache Mr. Leonard Weiss, OT Mr. Paul A. London, RA Mr. Ball called in the Ambassador of Belgium, Mr. Scheyven, on April 28, to present him with a note expressing United States concern at the rejection by the EEC negotiators at Geneva of the US agricultural package. 1 Mr. Ball wished to discuss with the Ambassador the important problems that could result should the EEC Commission continue to maintain such a posture. Mr. Ball explained that we were delivering the aide-memoire to the Ambassador of Belgium because we understood that Mr. Spaak would be chairman of the EEC Council of Ministers meeting on May 2. We were arranging through our posts in the other five member countries and our Brussels Mission to the EEC to communicate the aide-memoire to the other Council members. Mr. Ball explained that our agricultural package had been developed only after careful consultation at a high level with the Department of Agriculture. We had hoped that the package would permit the successful conclusion of the XXIV:6 negotiations 2 in Geneva, or at least that it would be possible to go forward on the basis of the package into the Dillon Round 3 on the assumption that differences in the agricultural field would be worked out while the Dillon Round was in progress. Mr. Ball recognized that the Commission wished to keep some flexibility in order to facilitate the development of a common agricultural policy, but he said that the Commission's attitude in rejecting the US proposals without apparently giving them serious consideration jeopardized the whole structure of the GATT. Mr. Ball emphasized the importance of the Dillon Round to the United States and particularly to the continuation of our liberal trade policies. He noted that should difficulties in the agricultural area at this time lead to a failure to use our negotiating powers in a new round of negotiations, protectionist pressures in the United States will be strengthened and this would endanger the continuance of our liberal trade policies and the extension of the Reciprocal Trade Act, which comes up for renewal in Congress next year. Mr. Ball said that he could not emphasize too strongly the importance to us of an outcome in the XXIV:6 negotiations that would permit us to go forward into the Dillon Round. In closing Mr. Ball said again that he hoped Mr. Spaak and the Council of Ministers would take note at the May 2 meeting of the great importance the United States attached to a change in the Commission's stand on our agricultural package. Ambassador Scheyven said that he did recognize the seriousness of our concern with this problem and undertook to communicate our aide-memoire to the Belgian Chairman of the May 2 Council Meeting. * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 394.41/4-2861. Official Use Only. Drafted by Paul A. London. 1 For text of the April 28 note, see the Supplement. 2 Article XXIV, paragraph 6 of the GATT provides that Contracting Parties can renegotiate external tariff rates to compensate for increases or decreases in their bound rates of duty often caused by the imposition of a single, common unified rate. (55 UNTS 272) 3 Named after Secretary of the Treasury C. Douglas Dillon. The Dillon Round was held in Geneva May 29, 1961-July 16, 1962. 213. Editorial Note 213. Editorial Note On May 2, 1961, President Kennedy announced a 7-point program to help the U.S. textile industry. He asked the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Treasury, and State, the Small Business Administration, and Congress to carry out specific tasks: to promote an expended program of research, tax and investment incentives, financial aid for plant modernization; to correct domestic cotton pricing system to help U.S. textile producers; to pass legislation providing assistance to industries hurt by increased imports; to explore escape-clause provision for 12 textile products; and to convene a multilateral conference of textile countries to expand trade. For text of Kennedy's statement, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961 , pages 345-346. These proposals were discussed in circular telegram 1707, April 29, to the Embassies in Paris and Brussels and to representatives in Geneva attending the GATT negotiations. This lengthy telegram stated, among other things, that “in the past several months considerable public attention has focused on the domestic textile situation, which involves wide range of problems resulting from rapid technological change, consumer preference shifts, and increasing international competition.” It went on to explain that the administration recognized the serious problems facing the U.S. textile industry, but that to impose unilateral import quotas and other controls on foreign companies, advocated by the U.S. textile industry, could lead to “serious economic, political, and even security problems.” Therefore, the preferred policy would promote “bilateral and multilateral international cooperation.” (Department of State, Central Files, 411.006/4-2961) 214. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State 214. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State Source Tokyo, May 4, 1961, 7 p.m. 3174. Depcirtel 1717. 1 Presidential textile announcement featured prominently all Tokyo papers May 3 and 4. Articles cite seven point nature President's program with most space devoted proposed international conference. Editorial reaction mixed. Mainichi takes favorable view (“let's convene international conference”), while Yomiuri alleges Japan textile industry expressing “deep concern” over President's plan, but deferring judgment on proposed conference to permit sounding out view other textile producing countries during international cotton federation meeting opening Osaka May 8. Nihon Keizai makes guarded observation that while “details U.S. plan not fully available no basis yet for pessimism.” FonOff and MITI in preliminary reaction stated they very much appreciate U.S. decision not adopt unilateral import quotas. Government spokesman also expressed general approval to idea international conference although indicating detailed reaction could only be determined after learning proposed terms reference. FonOff also stated it important that consideration Japan's 1961 cotton textile quota increase request not be delayed. According textile industry, decision on 1961 quota levels must be reached by end of this month if Christmas orders for commodities such as velveteens and certain secondary products, e.g. gloves, blouses, knitted goods, trousers not to be adversely affected. Japanese Embassy Washington will be instructed by FonOff in next few days press U.S. for temporary quota increase pending final USG decision on Japan's request for over-all 30 percent increase. Reischauer * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 411.006/5-461. Confidential. Repeated to Kobe. 1 Circular telegram 1717, May 2, informed posts of President Kennedy's upcoming textile announcement to be delivered on May 4. (Department of State, Central Files, 411.006/5-261) 215. Editorial Note 215. Editorial Note From May 15 to 19, 1961, Contracting Parties to the GATT at the 18th session in Geneva made several important decisions. These included convening a November meeting at the ministerial level to address three problems: 1) tariffs as a hindrance to free trade, 2) elimination of tariff and non-tariff protection in agriculture, and 3) lowering barriers to international trade for less-developed countries. In addition, a decision was made to provide technical advice and trade policy assistance to newly independent countries. (Report of U.S. Delegation to 18th Session of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Geneva, Switzerland, May 15-19, 1961, dated July 10; Department of State, Central Files, 394.41/7-1061) Beginning on May 29, the United States participated in the second phase of the GATT Tariff Conference in Geneva which marked the beginning of the Dillon round of negotiations, despite a failure to reach a settlement with the EEC under Article XXIV, paragraph 6. This article allowed member countries to renegotiate “bound” duties—those established from a single, common tariff to replace the several tariffs of the member countries—in order to obtain appropriate compensation for possible increases in rates of duty. ( Current Economic Developments , Issue No. 624, May 23, 1961, pages 17-19; Washington National Records Center,E/CBA/REP Files: FRC 72 A 6248, Current Economic Developments ) 216. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions 216. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions Source Washington, June 10, 1961, 9:08 p.m. 1995. This message addressed Geneva and missions all countries represented on GATT Council except Prague. 1. GATT Council meeting called for June 16 at US request to consider convening international conference principal textile exporting and importing countries. US initiative taken pursuant to directive to Department contained in sixth point President's textile program announced May 2 and following recent trip by Under Secretary Ball to Europe 1 during which he held informal exploratory discussions several governments, Executive Secretary GATT and Secretary General OEEC. Department has also informed Embassies various other interested countries regarding US plans and intends continue keep them informed. 2. Reaction US initiative generally favorable and we confident GATT Council will take affirmative view US proposal. Nevertheless, in interest avoiding misunderstandings or delays by governments in instructing their representatives on GATT Council, missions requested solicit host government support for GATT sponsorship international textile conference and ask that GATT Council representative be instructed accordingly. Geneva being separately requested canvass GATT Council representatives. In view discussions already held by Ball, approaches by Bonn Brussels London Ottawa Paris Rome left mission's discretion. Repeat report Geneva for GATT. 3. Suggested text draft note follows: Verbatim text As part seven-point program of assistance US textile industry, President has directed Department of State arrange call conference principal textile exporting and importing countries. Purpose of conference is seek international understanding which will provide basis for trade that will avoid undue disruption established industries. President's program recognizes national interest in expansion of world trade and successful development of less developed countries. US regards GATT as appropriate international institution to sponsor conference. Accordingly, US has requested meeting of GATT Council June 16 to consider convening international textile conference. US solicits support BLANK Government for this proposal. US stands ready consult further with Blank Government in this matter as arrangements for conference worked out. End verbatim text. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 394.41/6-1061. Official Use Only; Verbatim Text. Drafted by Emerson M. Brown (E/OT/TA), cleared by Ball and Nicholas A. Veliotes (S/S-RO), and approved by Sidney B. Jacques (E/OR). 1 Ball visited several European countries May 15-June 4, 1961. For the memorandum of conversation with European officials, May 29, see the Supplement. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1874A) A summary of the highlights of his trip is in Current Economic Developments, Issue No. 625, June 6, 1961, pp. 12-13; Washington National Records Center, E/CBA/REP Files; FRC 72 A 6248, Current Economic Developments) 217. Editorial Note 217. Editorial Note On June 20, 1961, Secretary Rusk held several conversations with Japanese officials on a number of topics regarding U.S.-Japanese relations. One of these conversations on liberalization of trade and payments is scheduled for publication in volume XXII . 218. Memorandum of Conversation 218. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, June 21, 1961. SUBJECT U.S.-Japanese Trade and Textile Problem PARTICIPANTS Japan Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda Foreign Minister Zentaro Kosaka Koichiro Asakai, Japanese Ambassador to the United States Kiichi Miyazawa, Member of the Upper House of the Japanese Diet Shigenebu Shima, Deputy Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Toshiro Shimanouchi, Counselor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Interpreter United States The President The Secretary of State George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Walter W. Rostow, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Paul Nitze, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Affairs Edwin O. Reischauer, United States Ambassador to Japan Walter P. McConaughy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Richard L. Sneider, Officer-in-Charge, Japanese Affairs The President said that he had informed the Prime Minister in his private meeting of his Administration's intention to maintain a liberal trade policy. However, he anticipates a very tough fight on this question, particularly since the interests benefitting from exports are quiet, while the protectionist elements are vocal and the textile industry particularly well-organized. The President said he had pointed out to the Prime Minister that the United States recognizes Japan buys more from us than it sells to the United States, that he is conscious of Japan's need for trade, and that he in particular realizes Japan has suffered from the voluntary quota program on textiles instituted in 1957. Mr. Ball mentioned that he had informed the Prime Minister of our multilateral textile proposals, and the Prime Minister had said that Japan was prepared to cooperate fully with the United States in this endeavor. The Prime Minister expressed fears that the importing countries would gang up on the exporting countries in the multilateral talks. The President commented that the best protection for the exporting countries would be an effort to provide a mechanism for orderly expansion of their markets. Under these circumstances, individual countries would not be hurt such as Japan had been by its unilateral restrictions. Mr. Ball mentioned that he had spent that morning with representatives of the importing nations in order to get the agreement of these countries, which have not accepted any substantial amount of textiles from Japan, to increase their imports immediately on a phased basis. We hope to get their initial agreement, as a basis for the Geneva discussion, to the accept-ance on a liberal basis of textile imports. This would provide a larger, rather than smaller, market for Japan. The Prime Minister said the Japanese considered such arrangements favorable. * Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149, May-July 1961. Confidential. Drafted by Richard L. Sneider (FE/NA) and approved in S and B on July 14 and at the White House on July 20. A longer memorandum of this conversation, prepared by James J. Wickel (LS/I), is scheduled for publication in volume XXII . 219. Letter From Members of Congress to President Kennedy 219. Letter From Members of Congress to President Kennedy Source Washington, June 22, 1961. Mr. President : On Monday 1 Members of Congress met with Mr. Ball and received their first information on the details of the Under Secretary of State's proposed international negotiations on certain textile products. Our feeling is unanimous that the Under Secretary is proceeding on the basis of an erroneous understanding as to the nature of the industry, and of the gravity of the textile and apparel import problem. It is the considered opinion of all of us in the Senate and House alike that Mr. Ball's program will insure the continued deterioration of the U.S. industry. The State Department's plan has several basic defects which doom it to failure. These are (a) it pertains solely to cotton textiles, and excludes wool, silk, and man-made fiber textiles and apparel; and (b) it is built on the 1960 level of imports, except for a possible 30% rollback for Hong Kong; would increase Japan's exports to the United States, and assure every country an automatic annual increase in export potential of all textiles and apparel to the United States. Your seven-point program for the textile industry, as we understood it here in the Congress, was forthright and included all of the industry's products. Mr. Ball has indicated that he considers it impossible to negotiate an international understanding on that basis. In effect, Mr. Ball has come to the conclusion that he cannot discharge the directive contained in Point 6 of your May 2 announcement. We in the Congress prefer your program to the Under Secretary's. Members of Congress in both Houses have followed carefully your public statements concerning your intentions in behalf of the textile industry. We understood you to mean that you were determined to achieve an over-all solution of the industry's problems. In all candor, Mr. President, we must respectfully advise you of our considered opinion that Mr. Ball has devised a piecemeal and entirely inadequate program which is not in accord with your own pronouncements, and which can succeed only in embarrassing the Administration in its programs relating to trade. If you are convinced, Mr. President, that Mr. Ball's program is the only one that can be attempted, it is our advice that it would be better to abandon the effort now. His program leads to no real solution and will only compound the injury which we in the Congress feel must be remedied. We know that this is also your objective. Sincerely and respectfully, 2 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 411.006/6-2461. Limited Official Use. The source text is a copy of identical letters, one signed by 33 Senators on Senate Committee on Appropriations stationery and the other signed by 122 Representatives on House Armed Services Committee stationery. 1 June 19. 2 Lists of the signatories from each House are attached to the source text; not printed. For an attached memorandum of conversation between Feldman and Jacques, June 23-24, which provides additional context for the origins of these letters, see the Supplement. 220. Editorial Note 220. Editorial Note On July 7, 1961, a telegram was transmitted to Under Secretary Ball who was in Tokyo for the DAG meeting. This telegram cited President Kennedy's response to the June 22 Congressional letter to him. The telegram stated that the President's June 30 response was sent to Representative Vinson, Senator Pastore, and all the petitioners, and then quoted the text as follows: "Thank you for your letter on textile negotiations now being conducted by State Department. I have noted your concern and that of your colleagues over possibility that State Department's efforts arrange international conference may not fully meet problems of industry. "The import problem, I am sure you will agree, must be considered in context our total interest, both foreign and domestic. It should be borne in mind that contemplated negotiations are designed as one of series efforts assist textile industry. Our objective is to assist industry overcome all handicaps which it faces. "State Department is being instructed to get best possible relief, not only for cotton but other fibers. I am also asking State Department maintain close liaison with Congress and industry in this matter.” (Telegram 30 to Tokyo, July 7; Department of State, Central Files, 411.006/6-2461) 221. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (Hays) to Senator Edmund S. Muskie 221. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (Hays) to Senator Edmund S. Muskie Source Washington, July 5, 1961. Dear Senator Muskie : Thank you for your letter of June 19 to Under Secretary Ball, 1 concerning the State Department's efforts to organize a multilateral agreement on textile trade. Mr. Ball greatly appreciates your understanding of the foreign policy implications of the manner in which the United States decides to handle its problem of low-cost textile imports. Mr. Ball and those working with him on the textile problem were much encouraged by the preparatory meeting last week (June 21-23) with representatives of other major textile importing countries. They found that the nations of the European Economic Community recognized that the time has come for them to relax their trade restrictions against imports from low-cost countries. This recognition is a basic prerequisite to our efforts to induce the low-cost countries to exercise some restraint so as to avoid disruption in import markets. There was also a recognition that the advanced nations have a common responsibility for providing growing opportunities for trade by the developing countries in a reasonable and orderly manner. At the conclusion of the conference, the participants joined in proposing an early meeting of textile importing and exporting countries directed toward some form of international action which would, in the agreed language of the meeting, (a) “significantly increase access to markets which are at present subject to import restrictions”, (b) “maintain orderly access to markets where restrictions are not at present maintained”, and (c) “secure from exporting countries a measure of restraint in their export policy so as to avoid disruptive effects in import markets”. Although the exact dates are not yet set, we expect the meeting to be convened in the last part of July. The staff which is engaged in preparations for the meeting is reviewing various possible formulas for achieving the orderly development of trade and will examine S. 1735 with interest in this connection. The Department is cognizant of the hardship existing in textile communities in Maine. The situation of such communities is a most important element underlying its efforts to bring about more orderly textile marketing conditions and a measure of restraint on the part of low-cost exporting nations. Either Mr. Ball or Mr. Warren Christopher, who has been appointed to represent the United States in the international meeting and is in charge of preparations for it, will be happy to meet with you or to supply any further information on the subject which you may wish. Sincerely yours, Brooks Hays 2 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 411.006/6-1961. No classification marking. Drafted by Virginia H. McClung (E/OR/CSD) on June 29 and cleared by Warren M. Christopher (B) and Florence K. Kirlin (H). 1 In this letter, Senator MUSKIE, disappointed by recent U.S. negotiations to resolve problems in the textile industry, urged Ball to press for a significant roll-back in imports of cotton textiles. MUSKIE believed that “there may not soon be another opportunity comparable to this for securing substantial relief for the domestic textile industry.” (Ibid.) 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 222. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Consulate General in Geneva 222. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Consulate General in Geneva Source Tokyo, July 12, 1961, noon. 10. From Ball. Geneva for John Evans, information to Department for Martin. Deeply concerned about state Dillon Round negotiations due to meagerness US offers. I feel it is essential this situation be brought to attention of the President, including indication extent to which limited character of our offers stems from peril point proposal. Suggest you prepare draft memorandum from Secretary to President which would set forth in simple terms danger extensive withdrawal by EEC and UK of offers tentatively made, in view inadequacies US offers; consequences such restrictive action for free world economy; impact minimal results Dillon Round on US exports, etc. I will want to discuss general problem with Wyndham-White immediately upon my arrival Geneva and then go over draft memorandum with you. After transmittal this draft memorandum to Washington I want Martin and Schaetzel to put it in final form, with particular reference steps which might be recommended to President to improve US offers in order to avoid downward spiraling of Dillon Round negotiations. Reischauer * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 394.41/7-1261. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Repeated to the Department of State as telegram 122, which is the source text. 223. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy 223. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy Source Washington, August 28, 1961. SUBJECT Acceptance of the Arrangements Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles There is transmitted herewith for signature an instrument of accept-ance of the Arrangements Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles done at Geneva July 21, 1961. 1 In accordance with Point 6 of your Textile Program, announced May 2, 1961, the Department of State arranged for a conference of principal textile exporting and importing countries to “seek an international understanding which will provide a basis for trade that will avoid undue disruption of established industries”. At a 16-nation meeting, which was called in Geneva by the Secretariat of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, an ad referendum agreement was reached July 21, 1961 on a short-term multilateral arrangement for the 12-month period beginning October 1, 1961, and on procedures for developing a long-term multilateral arrangement. Under the short-term arrangement, if the United States finds that imports of cotton textiles are disrupting its markets, it may call upon the exporting country or countries concerned to restrain exports of those textiles at specified levels but not lower than those which prevailed during fiscal year 1961. If the requested restraint is not exercised, the United States may decline to accept imports at any higher level. The short-term arrangement also authorized similar action respecting imports of non-cotton textiles which frustrate the arrangement for cotton textiles. The multilateral arrangement specifically authorizes bilateral arrangements on terms other than those in the multilateral arrangement. With respect to a long-term multilateral arrangement, a Provisional Cotton Textile Committee, composed of representatives of all countries which accept the Geneva Arrangements, is scheduled to meet in October, 1961, and, by April 30, 1962, to recommend provisions for a long-term arrangement. You have legal authority to accept the Geneva Arrangements. Dean Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 394.41/8-2861. No classification marking. 1 Not printed here. For an extract from this agreement, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961 , pp. 1238-1240. 224. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy 224. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy Source Washington, September 11, 1961. SUBJECT Need for Additional Bargaining Authority in Geneva Tariff Negotiations 1. When the Trade Agreements Act was extended in 1958 1 authority was sought to cut tariffs by an additional 20% over a four-year period. This authority was requested primarily in order to enable the United States Government to negotiate reciprocal concessions with the Common Market. This was necessary in order to minimize possible disadvantages to our trade as a result of the internal tariff reductions of the Common Market which under the Rome Treaty would have amounted to 30% over the same period. 2. Under the authority granted by the 1958 extension legislation, the United States initiated a round of tariff negotiations in Geneva. Unfortunately, in the bureaucratic process of developing bargaining offers for these negotiations, the Eisenhower Administration threw away most of its chips. First, it made the decision to restrict the commodities for possible negotiation to a very limited list. This list comprehended only 26.3% of our imports from the countries with which we plan to negotiate. Second, the Tariff Commission further limited the Administration's bargaining authority by setting highly debatable peril points for a large number of commodities. The Tariff Commission's action appears to have been taken without serious regard to economic data. 3. As a result of these two bureaucratic actions, the United States Delegation at the Geneva Conference was authorized to offer tariff concessions on only 18% of total US imports from the countries with which we were negotiating. In the case of several countries, the limit of our bargaining authority was reduced to around 1% or less of our imports from these countries. 4. Meanwhile, both the Common Market and the United Kingdom had approached the Geneva negotiations in an entirely different spirit. Both the Common Market countries and the United Kingdom had indicated that they were prepared to make 20% across-the-board reductions in their tariffs on industrial items, subject to certain specified exceptions. 5. They made it clear that they were prepared to go forward with these reductions (on a most-favored-nation basis) even though the United States did not make reciprocal concessions to the same extent. They recognized that the United States had put up with quantitative limitations on their part during the post-war years of the dollar shortage. They recognized also that the United States was having balance of payments difficulties. Finally, they wished to minimize discrimination against the United States resulting from the establishment of the Common Market and the European Free Trade Association. 6. But while adopting this flexible and statesmanlike view, they were reluctant to go forward with their 20% across-the-board offers if there was too great a disparity between their offers and those of the United States. In other words, while they did not insist that the United States reciprocate fully, they did feel that they must obtain at least partial reciprocity in order to withstand their own domestic political pressures. 7. Our present dilemma is, therefore, that we have so hamstrung our own negotiators that they do not have the authority to make the concessions needed to satisfy even the modest requirements of reciprocity which the European nations are expecting. As a result, there is grave danger that both the Common Market and the United Kingdom will withdraw from their initial, generous positions and reduce their offers substantially below the original 20% across-the-board proposals. If this occurs, we shall lose the chance to minimize the discrimination against our producers which the external tariffs of the Common Market will otherwise create. 8. I need not emphasize to you the difficulties that this will cause us in working toward an adequate modus vivendi with the Common Market. Nor need I emphasize the advantages that we would gain in the Trade Agreements fight next year if we could show that, by using the authority provided by the 1958 extension legislation, we had succeeded in obtaining a 20% across-the-board reduction in both the Common Market and the United Kingdom industrial tariffs. 9. The measure of our difficulty is shown by the fact that the Common Market's offers to the United States in the industrial area alone cover more than $347 million, or 60% of our requests in this area, while our offers to the Common Market countries cover only $153 million, or less than one-fourth of their requests. Much the same situation prevails with the United Kingdom. Annex A provides further details. 2 10. Faced with these disturbing facts, we requested our Delegation to the Geneva Conference to cull the list of peril point items on which concessions had been requested by the Common Market and the United Kingdom and to extract those items that might be included in additional offers at a minimum political risk. This operation has now been completed and our Delegation has produced a list of items with a total trade value of $130 million for the EEC and the UK, as indicated in the attached List I.2 11. In view of the gross inadequacy of our present offers and the critical importance of successfully concluding the Geneva negotiations, I strongly recommend that we authorize our negotiators at Geneva to increase the United States offers to cover the additional trade items indicated in List I, even though this involves disregarding peril point findings on these items. Our negotiators would use this authority only to the extent they feel it necessary in order to obtain the kind of concessions from our European friends that we require. 12. This action would be clearly within your authority. Under the terms of the law you are not bound by the peril points. The law merely requires that you notify Congress of the items with respect to which peril points have been disregarded. This notification does not have to be given, moreover, until thirty days after a trade agreement has been concluded. If we proceed with this course your report to the Congress would probably not be required until about the middle of December, since it is presently planned to complete the Geneva negotiations by about the middle of November. 13. I recommend one additional measure for increasing our offers to the EEC and the United Kingdom. At my request the United States Delegation had assembled a list of items on which the Tariff Commission found peril points which coincide exactly with existing tariff rates. On these items, as shown in the appended List II, 3 the United States would be able to offer tariff bindings at present rates, without breaching peril points and without the necessity of reporting to the Congress. Offers for bindings on these commodities were not originally included in our offer lists, because they were thought to be of little value in obtaining reciprocal concessions. But I now feel that they should be included for whatever benefit they may bring, little as it may be. 14. By increasing our offers through the inclusion of all or part of the suggested list of peril point items we should, with good luck, be able to insure not only the 20 percent across-the-board reductions by the Common Market and the United Kingdom but also obtain reductions on certain specific items of special interest to American producers. In this way we could demonstrate to the Congress and the American people that by the extensive use of trade agreement authority we are able to minimize the discrimination resulting from the Common Market. We could then pave the way for future trade agreement authority in new legislation enabling us to bring about the further reductions in the external tariff of the Common Market as the Common Market moves progressively into effect. This is, of course, the fundamental basis upon which next Spring's trade agreement fight must be founded. Recommendation: 15. I recommend, therefore, that we move promptly to enlarge the bargaining authority of our negotiators. I suggest that you ask Secretary Hodges, as Chairman of the Trade Policy Committee, to convene a meeting of that Committee as quickly as possible to review the list of items on which it is proposed to make new offers. I suggest also that you make clear to the Trade Policy Committee that they should resolve doubtful cases in favor of granting our negotiators the necessary increased bargaining authority, with the understanding that the negotiators will use that authority only if they deem it necessary in order to achieve the results we need. I recommend you also make clear that if any items are deleted, substitutions should be made covering a comparable amount of trade. Since there are compelling reasons for concluding the negotiations in Geneva by October 31, I suggest that the Trade Policy Committee be asked to report to you on this matter not later than September 22. Dean Rusk 4 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 394.41/9-1161. Confidential. 1 P.L. 686, approved on August 20, 1958; 72 Stat. 673. 2 Not printed. 3 Not printed. 4 Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original. 225. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball) to President Kennedy 225. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball) to President Kennedy Source Washington, September 22, 1961. SUBJECT Request for Authority to Make Additional Offers to the European Economic Community and the United Kingdom In accordance with your instructions, the Departments of Commerce and State have reviewed the list of items appended to the memorandum of September 11 from Secretary Rusk, 1 for which authority was requested to make tariff reduction offers below peril point levels established by the Tariff Commission. In this joint review agreement has been reached between the two Departments with respect to certain modifications of the list, as set forth in a letter which the Secretary of Commerce transmitted to you today. 2 There is attached for your approval a revised list of commodities 3 reflecting the modifications agreed to between the two Departments. Of the 66 items contained in the previous list, 58 have been retained without change, two items have been wholly deleted, three have been modified by exclusion of certain parts, and three have been made subject to a condition. On the other hand, three new items have been added to offset the deletions. Trade coverage has been increased by $7.3 million for the EEC and by $3.3 for the U.K. You will recall that the memorandum of September 11 also recommended that the United States Delegation be given authority to offer tariff bindings at present rates on a second list of commodities, which would not involve any breaching of peril points. The Department of Commerce has also concurred in this recommendation. Recommendation: I recommend that you authorize the United States Delegation to the current tariff conference in Geneva to make additional offers of tariff reductions or tariff bindings to the EEC and the U.K., as indicated in the attached lists and to the extent deemed necessary by the Delegation in order to achieve significant and substantial reductions in the tariffs of the EEC and the U.K. Your approval is requested at your earliest conven-ience since we are trying to conclude the negotiations as soon as possible. 4 George W. Ball 5 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 394.41/9-2661. Confidential. 1 Document 224 . 2 Not found. 3 Two attached lists are not printed. 4 On September 26, President Kennedy approved Under Secretary Ball's recommendation. (Memorandum from Bundy to Rusk, September 26; Department of State, Central Files, 394.41/9-2661) 5 Printed from a copy that indicates Ball signed the original. 226. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball) to the President's Deputy Special Counsel (Feldman) 226. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball) to the President's Deputy Special Counsel (Feldman) Source Washington, September 25, 1961. SUBJECT Escape Clause Proceedings on Carpets The State Department is separately forwarding its departmental view regarding the escape clause proceedings on carpet. I believe, however, that there are reasons not emphasized in the official Department statement that have special relevance to other matters with which we are both very much concerned. As you well know, the two countries that would be affected by a general affirmation of the Tariff Commission's recommendations are Belgium and Japan. In deciding the issue, it is important that the President be aware of the following considerations: I CONSIDERATIONS WITH REGARD TO BELGIUM The Belgian Government has made it clear that it would strongly resent the application of the escape clause so as to increase duties on Belgian carpets. The Belgian Ambassador in Washington has made strong representations to this effect. The Belgian position has also been made clear to us in Europe. At the moment our relations with Belgium are already strained, and at a time when we need solid European support for our Berlin policy. Even before the Lumumba fiasco, the Belgians felt—rightly or wrongly—that we had a heavy responsibility for pushing them prematurely out of the Congo. Within the last week Belgian bitterness toward the United States has been intensified by the UN military action against Katanga, which had long been a rich feudal province of the great Belgian banking and mining interests. While reluctantly accepting Congo independence, the Belgians had hoped to maintain their essential interests in Katanga. Today they see the last vestige of those interests threatened by our vigorous support of the Adoula Government and by our endeavors to bring about a reintegration of Katanga into the Congo through an Adoula-Tshombe settlement that would necessarily mean the elimination of Tshombe's Belgian advisers and officers. When this event comes to pass—and it is settled American policy to hasten the event—the Belgian people will quite likely regard this as a final humiliation brought about as a result of American influence. These are only some of the elements that contribute to Belgian unhappiness with our current activities. As is the case with other small nations, Belgium is feeling left out of the Four-Power Berlin talks. Foreign Minister Spaak, who has been most helpful to us in the past, is very prickly as a result of the Big Four treatment of his talk with Khrushchev. Leaving aside its unhappy consequences for our foreign political interests, a decision to increase tariffs on Belgian carpets would have the following effects on other aspects of our commercial policy: A. Effect on Textile Agreement. At the last meeting of the EEC Ministers, Belgium blocked a decision that the EEC should sign the Geneva textile agreement on the ground that it wanted to await the outcome of the carpet proceeding. We succeeded in having this action reversed, and we understand the EEC is to sign the agreement today (Monday). But Ambassador MacArthur in Brussels had to take a strong line at the top level to obtain this reversal. Belgium's reluctant agreement to go along with the one-year textile agreement is, of course, only the first stage of the battle. I had a hard time persuading the Belgian representative to play ball with us during the Geneva conference, and an intransigent Belgium can make it difficult for us to work out a longer-range textile agreement that will meet our interests. Belgium is a member of the EEC and none of the other members has any real interest in a long-term agreement. If the escape clause proceeding is permitted to operate against Belgian carpets, we can confidently count on Belgium's being in an obstructionist mood. B. Effect on Current Tariff Discussions in Geneva. The carpet action may have an effect of even greater importance on the current round of tariff negotiations in Geneva. As you know, we are strenuously working to obtain concessions from the Six regarding their common agriculture policy which will meet the requirements of our own agriculture. When Secretary Freeman was in Brussels recently, it was made clear to him that in the event the President approved a tariff increase on Belgian carpets the Belgian Government would drag its feet on agreeing to concessions on the part of the EEC that would make the common agriculture policy palatable to US interests. Secretary Freeman was told in effect that the Belgians would regard the President's decision on carpets as a test of our commercial liberalism. The proposed increase in carpet duties is relevant to the current tariff negotiations in Geneva for an additional reason. As you know, we are seeking to obtain a 20% reduction in the common external tariff of the EEC on industrial items. It is for this reason that we have recently obtained authority from the President to disregard “peril points” on a number of items in order to provide our negotiators with more bargaining power. An increase in carpet tariffs would not only invite a reaction from an influential EEC country, which might result in the withdrawal or holding back on the 20% reduction offer, but it would actually operate to reduce our bargaining position. Our carpet concessions cover a trade of some $28 million. If the President increases the tariffs on this trade by adopting the escape clause recommendations of the Tariff Commission, the United States will be required, under GATT rules, to give compensation in a corresponding amount. The net effect of this would mean that our offers in the current Geneva negotiations would be reduced by $28 million. This would materially detract from the effect we are hoping to achieve by the “peril point” actions. II CONSIDERATIONS WITH REGARD TO JAPAN If relations with Belgium are difficult, our relations with Japan are even more sensitive in the particular area of commercial policy. [ 3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] 1 The Japanese Embassy here has made strong representations to us in connection with the pending carpet action. Similar representations have been made to Ambassador Rei-schauer. The carpet problem was also put up to Christopher when he was in Tokyo. In the light of these considerations, I urge you to call the following considerations to the President's attention before a final decision is made on the carpet proceeding: A. Effect on Bilateral Textile Agreement with Japan. The coming into effect and operation of the bilateral textile agreement just concluded with Japan are subject to certain specific conditions. One of these conditions is that cotton fabrics from Hong Kong shall be restrained at or about the level of imports into the United States during US fiscal year 1961, and that imports of secondary products such as household made-up goods, apparel and knitted goods shall be reduced to 30% or more below the level of 1960. At the present moment we cannot be at all sure of obtaining a firm agreement with Hong Kong. The most we can do is to try to induce Hong Kong to join the Geneva agreement by threatening action to enforce restrictions unilaterally if Hong Kong refuses to do so. The Hong Kong authorities are sophisticated and they may call our bluff. They know that under existing law our authority to act unilaterally is far from clear. They may or may not be persuaded to accept the Geneva agreement by our assertion that Congress will provide the necessary legal clarification in January—and that in the meantime we are prepared, if necessary, to enforce restrictions anyway. The Japanese are well aware of our dilemma. They have had a legal opinion on Section 204 2 prepared by an American lawyer. They have been needling our Consul General in Hong Kong regarding the slow progress of the Hong Kong negotiations. If handled diplomatically, I think they will accept whatever solution we work out for limiting Hong Kong imports—whether by an agreement or by a promise to enforce restrictions either now or as soon as our authority to do so is cleared up in January. But if we embarrass the Ikeda Government again by an increase in carpet tariffs, it may be difficult to hold Japan to the present bilateral agreement. In these circumstances the Japanese may use our difficulties with Hong Kong as a basis for requesting some further concession under the bilateral agreement. B. Effect on Long-Term Arrangement. As in the case of Belgium, we shall need Japanese cooperation in working out a long-term textile arrangement. The Japanese are not presently in a cooperative mood. They will be even less so if we now initiate an action for an equalization fee on cotton. (I am suggesting in another memorandum to you that this action be temporarily postponed.) The carpet action would be interpreted in Tokyo as one further evidence of our illiberalism. It would, moreover, appear to the Japanese as quite irrational for us to strain their patience further over only a few million dollars in trade. After all, the Japanese are running a balance of payments deficit with us which will amount this year to about $900 million. C. Effect on US-Japanese Economic Committee Meeting. When Prime Minister Ikeda was here last June the President gave him substantial assurances of our determination to pursue liberal commercial policies toward Japan. The proposal to create a US-Japanese Economic Committee was put forward in our attempt to recognize Japan's importance as a major industrial power and to strengthen our ties with a nation on which we must rely as a major source of strength in Asia. The Committee is having its first meeting, as you know, early in November and we have a vital interest in insuring that it meets in a propitious atmosphere. While there is no intention of discussing the textile problem at the meeting, the harrowing experience of the textile negotiations, which seriously weakened the government's position, will have a definite effect on the climate of the proceedings. A decision to increase tariffs on Japanese carpets—coming just before the meeting—would seriously prejudice its outcome. We would do well to remember that it was only fifteen months ago that Communist-inspired mobs in Tokyo caused the cancellation of President Eisenhower's visit. President Kennedy's friendliness and understanding manifested during Prime Minister Ikeda's trip went far to repair the damage, and Ambassador Reischauer's brilliant efforts in Tokyo have contributed to a further improvement in relations. But in the vital area of our commercial relations with Japan, disillusionment is setting in. The Japanese have the impression that we talk a good game but do not play it. I certainly cannot be sanguine about the prospects of improved Japanese-US relations if we take further actions against Japanese imports—particularly at a time when the Japanese Government is being forced to take Draconian measures to deal with an alarming trade imbalance. III THE MERITS Both the Belgians and Japanese are aware of the fact that the US carpet industry's difficulties derive not from imports but from the domestic production of machine-tufted rugs. This, as you know, is also the view of the executive agencies of our own Government. Since the carpet industry cannot make a persuasive case for escape clause relief, both the Belgians and Japanese will be inclined to construe an upholding of the Tariff Commission's recommendation as another action directed against them. Under such circumstances we can count on their being extremely skeptical of our protestations of liberal intentions in the future. George W. Ball 3 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 411.006/9-2561. Confidential. Transmitted to Feldman under cover of a memorandum from Battle, September 26. (Ibid., 411.006/9-2661) Ball also sent a copy to President Kennedy under cover of a September 29 memorandum, which urged a delay in the escape clause announcement until after tariff negotiations in Geneva had been completed. He emphasized: “action at this time approving the tariff increase might seriously jeopardize the development of our international textile agreement as well as the tariff negotiations presently underway in Geneva.” (Ibid., 411.006/9-2961) 1 Not attached but identified in Battle's September 26 memorandum to Feldman (see the source note above) as telegram 842 from Tokyo. (Ibid., 611.9441/9-1261) The telegram is scheduled for publication in volume XXII . 2 Section 204 of the Agricultural Act of 1956, P.L. 540, approved on May 28, 1956, authorizes the President, as he deems necessary, to negotiate agreements with foreign nations limiting any of their agricultural exports into the United States and limiting U.S. imports of any agricultural commodity. (70 Stat. 200) 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 227. Paper Prepared by the President's Special Assistant (Petersen) 227. Paper Prepared by the President's Special Assistant (Petersen) Source Washington, October 4, 1961. PROPOSALS FOR 1962 UNITED STATES FOREIGN TRADE AND TARIFF LEGISLATION The President's authority to enter into trade agreements with other countries for the reciprocal reduction of tariffs and other import restrictions will expire in June 1962. The trade agreements program has always rested on two quite distinct bases: on the need for buttressing our international political and security aims with suitable economic meas-ures; and on the grounds of increasing this country's economic well-being through international trade. The relevance of the trade program to our political and security aims is more direct and immediate than it has ever been in the program's 27-year history. The creation and enlargement of the European Economic Community pose a basic issue: whether the tremendous economic potential of this area will be used in harness with the resources of the United States, Japan and the other free world countries toward common political and security aims; or whether, despite the desires and intentions on both sides of the Atlantic, the newly created preferential trading area will draw the enlarged EEC and its overseas associates into a separate political force. This memorandum concentrates upon the trade issue, 1 taking the larger political and security considerations as given. Even on these more restricted economic grounds, however, four major questions are involved. 1. How does the US propose to ensure reasonable access to the European Economic Community for its exports and those of other countries in whose well-being we have a major interest? 2. In this process, how can trading opportunities be widened in the other markets of the free world? 3. How do the industrialized nations propose to promote a constantly growing market for the exports of the less developed countries? 4. And, finally, how does the US propose to secure the benefits of increased foreign trade without serious injury to segments of the domestic economy? Major Changes Proposed We propose that the President receive renewed authority over a five-year period to negotiate trade agreements reducing present rates of duty by as much as 50 per cent. The authority should be sufficient to enable a broader type of bargaining with the European Economic Community. It will be necessary to change the peril point procedure. To avoid serious injury to domestic producers, an appropriately revised escape clause should be supplemented with a program of trade adjustment assistance. With these basic modifications, the main outlines of the legislation would go on unchanged. The principle of reciprocity in the negotiation of trade agreements and gradualism in putting reductions into effect would remain. While the general approach would involve broad reductions, the problems of certain groups of producers would receive special consideration. Domestic industry will continue to have an opportunity to be heard. The Basic Negotiating Authority On its present timetable, the European Economic Community will have eliminated substantially all its tariffs and other import restrictions on trade among its members at an early date, no later than 1969 and probably much sooner. From now on, goods from outside the Community will face a growing measure of discrimination. This will develop even though it is anticipated that the EEC will in the 1961 GATT negotiations make a 20 per cent reduction in its external tariffs on manufactures without equivalent reciprocal grants by the US. Now the United Kingdom has declared its intention to enter the EEC and gain tariff-free access to the markets of the Continent. Probably most of the other members of the OEEC will eventually join, increasing the effective discrimination against the outside world. The resulting union will have a population 43 per cent greater than that of the US and exports more than twice as large. Last year the US sent one third of her merchandise exports, nearly $6.7 billion, including $2.1 billion of agricultural products, to the OEEC countries. The external tariff of the EEC thus affects access to what is potentially the world's largest single market. If we fail to protect our access to Europe's markets, we risk a shrinkage of our favorable merchandise trade balance which was $4.7 billion in 1960. Moreover, we would not diminish the incentive to a large flow of US direct investment in Western Europe provided by the existence of a high tariff wall. Both considerations would aggravate our vexing balance of payments problem and propel us toward the last resort of import restrictions, which would induce retaliation and permanently cost us the economic leadership of the free world. If we fail to achieve reciprocal tariff reductions with the EEC, we cast away a powerful tool for restraining inflation and encouraging innovation in the American economy. The timetable of EEC is not absolutely fixed, and the evidence is that the process of internal tariff reduction may well be completed in three to four years. The faster the pace of internal reduction, the greater the degree of tariff discrimination. The President's authority to negotiate tariff reductions and the period within which he is authorized to do so should relate to these basic considerations. To insure some time flexibility on the part of the United States the President should have authority to enter into trade agreements over a five-year period although in fact, with the acceleration of the internal tariff reductions of the EEC, negotiations may have to be completed within two or three years. To insure a minimum of discrimination against our products, the President must have authorization to reduce all US duty rates by 50 per cent. Even this authority may not be sufficient to achieve a “tolerable” level of discrimination and a larger quantum of authority may be needed. (The authority here recommended is thought to be the maximum politically possible of achievement.) Any negotiation sufficient to accomplish our objectives will probably have to involve commitments on both sides to cut tariffs broadly on large groups of products. As for the EEC, that organization would find it impossible to reach agreement among its six countries on a single list of offers and demands in individual products. On the side of the US, we are pushed toward the same pattern. Our broad objective is to ensure that the EEC market is available to the export interests not only of this country but also of other nations not in a position to bargain effectively, such as those of Latin America. Even if the interests of domestic exports were our sole concern, it would be hard to pick the products critical to our exporting interests. The EEC offers a new, dynamic opportunity for US exporters, whose full implications will not generally be understood until the US has tested the market. This negotiating authority could provide the vehicle for major enlargements of the market opportunities of the less developed countries in the industrialized areas. The need for this enlargement is critical. Foreign aid is a costly substitute for foreign trade. Furthermore, the development of the EEC raises the possibility that goods of the associated territories of its members will enter the Community duty-free while competing products of other less developed countries face the external duties of the EEC. The United States should use its trade agreements authority in seeking multilateral agreements among the industrialized countries to promote access for products such as those of tropical agriculture and the growing volume of manufactures likely to come from the developing areas. Peril Point Provision For the United States to win the necessary general reductions in the EEC's external tariffs, we shall have to agree to equally general cuts. These might involve significant average reductions in large groups of our tariff rates, with some limits on the way in which we (and other nations in the agreement) achieve the average. We must change both the substance of our peril point and the escape clause provisions and the procedure by which we apply them if we are to enter upon this kind of negotiation. Under the present procedures and criteria, the peril point findings of the Tariff Commission have ended any hope of further substantial reductions. This blockage grows from procedures and criteria which are basically unreliable and illogical. The Commission must make findings on a great number of products in a relatively short period of time. These findings involve difficult predictions subject to a low degree of accuracy even if the Commission had full information. It must pretend to set the peril points on particular products of integrated industries, independent of what happens to tariffs on other products. It must estimate the threat of injury to an industry without knowing what new exporting opportunities may be created for that same industry by the international bargain to come. It is natural that, in the absence of a clearly defined tariff reduction goal, the Commission feels free to resolve all areas of ignorance and uncertainty about the effects of imports in favor of a finding that a rate below the existing level may result in injury. In addition, however, the possibility of broad negotiations renders the definition of serious injury which governs peril point and escape clause provisions, inappropriate in any case, especially incongruous. At present, the peril point and the escape clause require the US to take account of the domestic production of every individual product, even if the industry is a multi-product industry. In negotiations of broad scope, however, many US industries can anticipate a broad liberalization in their export opportunities even as they face a like liberalization in import competition; significant shifts in the composition of production, therefore, are bound to occur. Some of these shifts will take place within industries and some across industries. The critical question is and ought to be whether, on balance, US labor and US productive facilities will be or have been idled in the process. The thrust of our proposed amendments would be to find injury only where such idling of labor and facilities occurs and to offer adjustment assistance of various kinds to speed the necessary shift. The following sequence illustrates the negotiating procedures which could be employed under the proposed authority of the President: 1. A proposal would be framed under which the US would agree tentatively with the EEC, Japan and other industrial countries to reduce our respective tariff rates, for instance, by some average percentage. To deal with some of the “hard core” trade problems of which we are already aware, we and the other countries would reserve a limited number of products for special treatment. The average reduction, according to the agreement, might have to be reached separately for each of a number of broad categories of products. 2. Subsequent to the negotiation of this tentative agreement, a suitable schedule of rate reductions would be fixed tentatively after hearings, and the Tariff Commission would determine whether serious injury would ensue for a US industry if these particular rates were adopted. The criteria of injury applicable in peril point proceedings would be the redefined criteria of the escape clause. 3. Peril point findings by the Tariff Commission might indicate that the tentative weighted average reductions could not be reached for some groups without threat of injury. These findings would then be taken into account by (a) reducing these items no further than was possible under the peril point finding, (b) reducing the items beyond the peril point with or without instituting an investigation which may lead to a program of adjustment assistance for the vulnerable portions of the affected industry, (c) proposing other tariff reductions to the Tariff Commission for peril point findings to serve as offsets to deleted items, or (d) renegotiating the targets of the tentative international agreement to conform with the peril point restraints. This procedure plus the new criteria for injury would greatly improve the peril point process. In the process of fixing a peril point for each individual commodity, the Commission would examine the effect of the whole tentative bargain on each industry or segment of the economy, i.e., the effects of specific proposed reductions on all competing imports and the new opportunities for exports created by the reciprocal concessions of other countries. Escape Clause and Adjustment Assistance A new test of serious injury, the idling of an industry's capital and labor directly and substantially due to increased imports, would govern the Tariff Commission's deliberations in escape clause proceedings. The present practices of taking an increase of imports as itself an indication of injury and defining the facilities producing a single product as an industry should be discarded. Neither feature reflects the conditions of true economic injury, nor the way in which American industry typically responds to economic change. However, there should be more remedies available than just tariff increases when the Tariff Commission finds that injury has occurred under this more appropriate standard. The President should be authorized to accept or reject the Commission's recommendations as at present, but he should also be able to invoke adjustment assist-ance for the injured industry, either with or without the temporary relief of import restrictions. Adjustment assistance, administered by the Departments of Commerce and Labor and any other appropriate agencies, should include such types of aid to firms in affected industries as assistance in labor retraining programs, low interest loans for financing new equipment, and special amortization privileges. Workers should be aided through the provision of moving expenses, retraining and extended unemployment benefits and early retirement privileges. The above proposals cover the major ingredients of the recommendations for the trade agreements legislation. Many subsidiary aspects of this legislation have not been covered in this paper. Moreover, it is expected that the proposals with respect to trade agreements legislation will constitute only a part, albeit the most important, of a broader set of policies in the field of trade some of which may require legislative action independent of the trade agreements legislation. * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 411.004/10-461. Confidential; Limited Distribution. Transmitted to Ball under cover of an October 4 memorandum from Petersen, which indicated that several other agencies also received copies of the paper (Kennedy Library, Petersen Papers, Trade Policy, 1961) 1 It does not deal directly with problems of trading with the Soviet Bloc or maintaining orderly commerce among the Western nations in the face of Soviet economic aggression. However, the contribution it proposes to the general strength and solidarity of free world trade would serve as a vital indirect influence. [Footnote in the source text.] 228. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Trezise) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball) 228. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Trezise) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball) Source Washington, October 10, 1961. SUBJECT Comments on Petersen's Trade Legislation Proposals There are two considerations that we think bear upon the Petersen trade legislation paper. 1 First, as a tactical matter, the Petersen proposal suggests that we begin, so to speak, with a minimum position. The theory is that by pre-senting a familiar concept, the peril point, and a well-known framework, the old Trade Agreements Act, we can hope to get a much improved and substantially more workable trade policy law. If enacted, it is argued, the Petersen proposal would give the Executive Branch a considerable range of negotiating authority. Further, its procedures would put the Tariff Commission in a position in which it would be usually awkward and difficult to find that peril points had been reached, since we would already have completed an extensive negotiation with our major trading partners. At worst, the President could always breach peril points if the Tariff Commission acted contrary to this expectation. Even if all this is granted, there is a preliminary question as to whether it is tactically advisable to ask for a small package. Petersen, and I believe Ray Vernon and Stan Metzger, evidently are persuaded that nothing more can be obtained from the Congress and that to ask for more would be to risk an explosion on the Hill that would ruin the prospects for acceptable trade legislation. The other side of the argument, of course, is that by beginning low you insure that Congress will give you the rock bottom minimum. If you offer Congress the peril point and other features of the past, it will be driven to improve on all the protectionist aspects of the legislation and thus to leave us worse off than we are now, if that is possible. The other point is strategic in nature. It is forcefully represented to me by the staff in E that the problem with our present trade agreements law is not only that restrictive features have been added to it over the years but that there has also grown up an environment of hypercaution and negativism about trade policy that is associated with the existing law. Thus, in preparing for the current Dillon round of negotiations (which had been advertised to the Congress as promising to be the largest and most complex tariff negotiations in our history), the Trade Agreements Committee whittled away at the preliminary negotiating list until it represented only but 26 per cent by value of the relevant 1959 imports. The whittling process reflected, in part, the prospect that items would be peril pointed by the Tariff Commission anyway and, in another part, the prevailing and pervasive negativism of the other Departments, built upon ten years of an increasingly protective atmosphere surrounding the trade agreements law. When the Tariff Commission was brought in, the list was further cut to about 18 per cent of our 1959 imports by value, this, of course, directly on the basis of peril points. I am advised that when we have completed these negotiations, which as I say have been represented in hyperbole to the Congress, the net reduction in our tariffs will be in the order of 2 to 3 per cent. With this background, the staff people who have lived with this problem over the years feel very strongly that the time has come for a clean break, that unless we can get a law which in its language and spirit suggests a forward movement, tariff reductions of any significance simply will not be feasible. They argue that retention of the peril point concept in the law implies in a larger sense the retention of the negative bias that has progressively strangled the trade agreements program over the past decade. Thus, the Petersen proposal, even if enacted into law without restrictive amendments, would not give us the basis for a trade program suited to the requirements of 1962 and thereafter. In the E view, therefore, the issue is not merely tactical. Although we feel that it would be dangerous to begin with a proposal designed in part to placate protectionist sentiment, since Congress quite likely would not stop there, we also feel that legislation built around the peril point and serious injury approach would in fact merely perpetuate a situation that has grown up in which a workable trade policy is not practicable of achievement. We would recommend, therefore, that the Department hold out for a strong beginning position: broad tariff reduction authority; no peril point; and adjustment assistance to be the normal response to an injury finding. * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 411.0041/10-1061. Confidential. Drafted by Trezise. 1 Document 227 . 229. Paper Prepared by the President's Special Assistant (Petersen) 229. Paper Prepared by the President's Special Assistant (Petersen) Source Washington, October 17, 1961. The alternative which has been suggested is to defer submission of a trade bill for the time being, presumably until the 1963 session of the Congress. There are some persuasive arguments in favor of this view. One is that the full implications of the expanded EEC have not yet sunk in among Americans and that another year would be helpful in rousing them both to the extraordinary challenge and the extraordinary opportunity created by the enlarged Community. A second argument is that the negotiating situation between Britain and the EEC will be much clearer a year hence; and, as a corollary, that it will be much more obvious what statutory powers the United States will need in order to deal with the EEC. Still a third argument turns on the asserted risks of submitting legislation of this sort in an election year. If it were decided to postpone, according to the proposal, this would not be done in any casual or laconic way; the President would make a major statement emphasizing the need for closer economic ties with the EEC, observing that this would require a major statutory overhaul, and noting that the time was not yet ripe for deciding exactly what changes would be needed. Despite the persuasiveness of this view, I do not recommend such delay. My reasons are these: First, any delay will be interpreted as a prelude to retreat. However artfully the President's statement may be, the public impression will be one of vacillation and uncertainty. Groups in support of liberal policies in the foreign economic field will lose heart and momentum; the protectionists will gain in strength and will use the added year to gain even further. Second, I see no clear reason to suppose that a year's delay will make the American public more willing to take a bolder approach toward ties to the EEC. True, there may be more heightened interest and education about the Community a year hence than today. But if the United States were not already in motion toward closer economic ties, the interest could easily take a dangerous isolationist and nationalist form. This is a case in which our tone toward the EEC has to be set clear and early, not only by a speech but by action on the part of US leaderships. My third point has to do with the plausibility of the view that we will be in a better position to gauge our negotiating needs a year hence than we are at the present time. This position presupposes that we cannot hold serious negotiations with the EEC until about June 1963. I question the realism of that view. Already we are being dragged into one aspect or another of the EEC negotiations, with or without powers of negotiation. We are already deep in negotiations over the treatment of tropical product imports by the EEC, and, if we were not already in those negotiations, mounting pressure from Latin America would probably push us in very soon. We are already being drawn into discussions of the EEC treatment of temperate agricultural items such as wheat and feed grains; once again, we would be forced into these discussions by the mounting fear of some exclusionary deal if we did not move into them of our own accord. As I read the record, therefore, the notion that we can hold aloof from the EEC negotiations for another 21 months seems grossly unrealistic. As for the election-year versus election-off year timing issue, there is little to be said on this point. All years are bad years for trade legislation. Election years may be worse than off years. On the other hand, the 88th Congress may be poorer in composition than the 87th from the viewpoint of trade legislation. This is an issue on which honest judgments will differ but no judgment can claim much in the way of superiority as a basis of action. The need to maintain the momentum and support of public groups on the side of a liberal trade policy seems more important than the need to avoid an election year. * Source: Kennedy Library, Petersen Papers, Trade Legislation, 1/13/61-11/5/61. No classification marking. Transmitted to Ball under cover of an October 18 memorandum from Petersen. 230. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball) to President Kennedy 230. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball) to President Kennedy Source Washington, October 23, 1961. In the attached memorandum 1 I have set forth a proposal for dealing with the trade agreements problem. This suggests an alternative to the course of action recommended by Mr. Petersen. Mr. Petersen has sought to design a new trade program within the basic framework of the old reciprocal trade agreement program. I believe that this is the wrong approach. I think that the old trade agreements program was well suited to the conditions of the trading world which has existed until recently, but in today's world that program is substantially bankrupt. Even if Mr. Petersen's proposals were adopted by the Congress without further watering-down I do not believe they would be good enough. Mr. Petersen's proposals are, in my view, too little and too soon. Within the next year the conditions of a whole new trading world will be largely established. A new trading community in Europe, with a larger population and over twice the imports of the United States, will be emerging. The pattern of world trade in such temperate-zone products as wheat, coarse grains, and dairy products will be undergoing radical alterations. The trade arrangements for tropical products such as cocoa, coffee, and oilseeds may be subject to similar far-reaching changes. These developments will unlock new political pressures from various directions—from US exporters, from Latin American countries, from the British Commonwealth, and from the European Economic Community itself. My earnest suggestion—arrived at after considerable soul-searching—is that we announce the general directions of a new policy appropriate to the changed conditions of the trading world, but that we hold off the drafting and introduction of an explicit legislative proposal until 1963, which will not be an election year. The principles which the American people must be prepared to accept are these: We shall have to give up the item-by-item tariff negotiating approach of the past and shall have to negotiate for a major across-the-board reduction on our import restrictions and those of the European Economic Community, aimed at opening both economies further to one another's exporters. At the same time, we must find a coordinated way of opening the markets of all industrial nations to the expanding industrial exports of developing countries. We shall have to develop an assistance program for a limited number of domestic industries which may have difficulty in absorbing the adjustment impact. And we shall have to negotiate explicit international trading arrangements in a number of key agricultural products. By next fall, if we use the intervening year wisely the American people should be much better prepared to accept the need for major changes of this sort. They will see and, I hope, begin to understand the shape and implications of the new trading world. We ourselves will have a great deal clearer conception of the exact legislative tools that are needed. Against the background of this understanding we can ask Congress in the Spring of 1963 for the necessary legislation with far greater assurance of success. This course seems to me preferable than to attempt to obtain legislation next Spring that will be inadequate for the problems that will confront us. There is no compelling reason why we should ask for new legislation immediately on the expiration of the negotiating powers provided under the 1958 extension. Existing agreements will remain in effect even though the authority lapses. There is a further consideration of great importance. If we seek legislation next Spring we shall run grave risks of confusing the Congression-al debate with the sensitive and difficult negotiations in which we shall be engaged in Europe. The negotiations to expand the Common Market to include not only the United Kingdom but other Western European countries will be of major concern to the United States. It is essential that you and the Executive Branch have as much maneuvering room as possible in order to influence those negotiations in a way beneficial to the whole complex of our national interests. But we may seriously compromise that maneuvering room if we must, at the same time, engage in a debate on trade policy. We can count on the protectionists doing everything possible to tie your hands and to try to force the United States to take positions in the European negotiations that run counter to our long-range interests, both political and economic. These are only certain of the considerations that have led me to recommend against an immediate decision to begin the trade fight next Spring. In the attached memorandum I have attempted to argue the case fully as well as to suggest in some detail a course of action that I recommend you follow. 2 George W. Ball 3 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 411.0041/10-461. Confidential. Secretary Rusk forwarded this memorandum to President Kennedy under cover of a memorandum. (Ibid.) 1 For text of the enclosed memorandum from Ball to President Kennedy, October 23, see the Supplement. 2 Not printed. 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Ball signed the original. 231. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Japan 231. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Japan Source Washington, November 1, 1961, 7:23 p.m. 1215. Central theme Under Secretary Ball's speech to National Foreign Trade Convention on November 1 1 is necessity adapting US trade policies and business practices to radically new trading world now emerging. Speech cleared with White House and Petersen. For purposes illustration, speech places heavy emphasis on opportunities and problems arising from European Economic Community and prospective British adherence thereto. Japan mentioned only once, in context of Japan's economic weakness during early post-war period. Therefore, Japanese may possibly be disturbed by preoccupation of speech with Western Europe and failure emphasize US-Japanese trade relations. If Embassy or US delegation at Hakone detects any evidence such Japanese disturbance, Japanese should be informed: 1. Western European emphasis deliberate for it is on enlarged Common Market, its implications and policies, that our new commercial policy must rest. Speech therefore omits significant reference to problem of LDC's as well as US-Japanese relationship. These problems encompassed however in penultimate quoted paragraph this telegram. 2. Department considers major premises and conclusions of speech apply to Japan as well as Western Europe. If deemed advisable you may wish to cite following excerpts from speech which apply to US trade with entire free world, including Japan: First excerpt: “In blunt terms, we dare not turn our backs on the logic of our own economic position. For almost thirty years we have led the world toward freer trade. If at this late date we should yield to the importunings of those who would shelter the low-wage industries in our economy and penalize the most efficient, let us be quite clear about the consequences. We would set off a chain reaction of retaliation and counter-retaliation that would do irreparable harm to the whole Free World but would hurt us most of all. We would give up any claim to a role of leadership in the Free World. We would deny the strength and vitality of the economic system for which we stand.” Second excerpt: “In concentrating upon the paramount problem—the problem of the European Common Market—I do not wish to overlook the fact that our new legislation must also establish a basis for continuing an open trading world with other nations. Of course, to the extent that the United States and the Common Market lower their trade barriers as a result of the negotiations between them, they will also be expanding the opportunities of others. For any such reductions in trade barriers must, of course, be on a nondiscriminatory basis. Yet authority to negotiate directly with other countries also will be needed, to increase the mutual opportunities of all nations and to weld a close-knit trading system in the Free World.” Third excerpt: “We are engaged at the moment, as all of us are constantly aware, in a struggle that can determine the future of mankind—or, indeed, if mankind has any future at all. In that struggle we must make certain not only that we are economically and industrially strong, but that the Free World is united as closely as possible in pursuit of our common purpose.” Full text being carried Tokyo USIA wireless file. Bowles * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 400.0041/11-161. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by William T. Nunley (B) on November 1, cleared by EUR/NA and William H. Brubeck (S/S) and approved by J. Robert Schaetzel (B). Also sent to Hakone for Secretary Rusk who was attending first meeting of the Joint United States-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs November 2-4. The committee's purpose was to promote, among other things, closer cooperation and consultation on economic affairs between the two countries. The committee was established after an exchange of notes between Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Kosaka following Prime Minister Ikeda's June 20-23 trip to Washington. 1 For text of Ball's address, see Department of State Bulletin , November 20, 1961, pp. 831-837. 232. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State 232. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State Source Tokyo, November 13, 1961, 8 p.m. 1466. Dept please pass White House, Treasury, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, Council Econ Advisers for Secretaries Udall, Freeman, Hodges, Goldberg, Under Secretary Fowler, Dr. Heller, Messrs. Feldman and Hatcher. Hakone. 1 1. Summary As seen from Tokyo on basis week's perspective and close study of outpouring of interviews, articles, and commentaries in Japanese press, radio and TV, Embassy believes Hakone conference should be accounted great success. In its symbolic purpose Hakone provided dramatic demonstration to millions of Japanese overriding importance of U.S.-Japanese relationship. In Hakone's substantive aspects we believe Japanese Govt derived real sense that, as President and Ikeda intended, genuine and equal consultations have taken place on economic matters of mutual concern. We would estimate that effect of these consultations will prove very helpful to our interests in fields of Japanese public opinion, in domestic political situation, and in development of GOJ's fiscal and economic policies. 2. Impact on Japanese public opinion, setting of conference in bringing together principal political officials both governments concerned with economic affairs outside capitol city for two and half days frank talk across table on each other's problems and policies was dramatic in itself. Press, radio, and TV followed and have continued report on Hakone as matter highest interest in Japan. While some editorial comment has criticized lack of specific results, such as U.S. commitment refrain from protectionist actions limiting Japanese exports to U.S. markets, on whole press has been satisfied with outcome. Public deeply impressed as well as flattered by “unprecedented participation of so many Cabinet members of both countries in conference” (words used in para 21 of communique at specific request Prime Minister Ikeda). Furthermore, press has made public fully aware of satisfaction of GOJ members of committee, and Japanese public has been deeply flattered and impressed by statements of President, Secretary Rusk, and other Cabinet officers on Hakone following return U.S. Del. 3. Of particular benefit to U.S. image in Japan was “sincerity” U.S. members of committee as it came through in press summaries of conference, in communique, in private meetings in press interviews, and as climaxed by TV interview of Secretary Rusk. Impression of friendliness toward Japan on part U.S. Cabinet members was most helpfully furthered by such extracurricular performances as Secretary Udall's climb of Fuji, post-conference meetings and interviews of other Cabinet officers, and activities of Cabinet wives whose personal charm and interest in Japanese culture were widely publicized in Japan. 4. Effect on domestic political situations . One of most important effects of Hakone was its significance for future of Ikeda administration. Prior to conference, Ikeda's position was sagging as combination of serious disequilibrium in Japanese payments, apparent upsurge trade protectionism in U.S., and formation regional economic groupings excluding Japan. These developments threatened to undermine twin pillars of Ikeda's policy: partnership with U.S. and program to double national income within decade. Seepage of confidence in Ikeda and his policies was showing signs of developing into threat to domestic political stability. 5. At Hakone Ikeda very skillfully made his unofficial presence evident to Japanese public. By attending opening session and by private talks with Secretary Rusk, Ikeda reminded Japanese public that joint committee sprang from Kennedy-Ikeda talks last summer and conveyed impression that successful meeting was one of fruits of his U.S.-Japan “partnership” diplomacy. In so doing he limited political mileage Agriculture Min Kono and Trade Min Sato obviously hoped to get from active participation in discussion. At same time he managed preserve party and Cabinet unity to unusual degree in Japan and neither Kono nor Sato espoused different positions from those officially expressed in GOJ talking papers. Kono, who seemed resentful and disgruntled at start of conference, was later reported to be thoroughly satisfied with outcome and with his role. On balance it appears to us Ikeda gained most from conference in terms domestic political situation and that whatever subsequent favorable developments on economic scene can be attributed to it will strengthen his position as party leader. 6. At very least Hakone has won time for Ikeda. While there are obvious limits to continued decline in Japan's reserves and tempo its economic activities beyond which Ikeda could not hold line or hope preserve his own political position, his immediate problem is to slow down excessive import push, to apply deflationary brakes, and to do both in ways which do not appear to represent bankruptcy his policies of partnership with U.S. and national income doubling. Concepts of partnership and cooperation Hakone has strengthened have, we feel, greatly assisted Ikeda in giving him room to turn around as he adjusts economic policies to slower growth patterns. Over week-end 2 Ikeda, in press conference, found it possible to refer almost casually to prospective measure of financial retrenchment and to next year's growth rate as “somewhere” between three percent and ten percent. Fact that he could do so with little public outcry and with complete absence factional sniping inside his own party owes much to Hakone conference. Hakone may in fact have succeeded in producing indispensable factor for Ikeda's survival beyond next spring, providing means to reinforce U.S.-Japan partnership while disengaging Ikeda from albatross of overly specific national income statistics and from personal identification with slogan of “9.2 percent annual growth over next three years.” 7. Implications for GOJ policies . At Hakone itself, acrimonious debate of narrow, specific issues was largely avoided while major policy problems were debated openly, frankly, and in friendly and respectful manner. Conference avoided opposite dangers “honorable picnic” with no substance which Japanese feared and hard bargaining session on specific problems with likelihood unimpressive results and impairment usefulness of committee from U.S. standpoint. In Japanese commentaries, major theme of discussion has clearly emerged as balance of payments problem both sides. Japanese public has been made aware its side argued that U.S. must allow and encourage greater imports from Japan to pay for steeply rising exports from us, and that U.S. countered that GOJ should regulate imports through more careful domestic economic policies, that over-all U.S.-Japan accounts (i.e., including invisible and capital items) gave much better picture, and that Japan must take approach of multilateral rather than bilateral balancing. 8. We would judge that inside GOJ Japanese believe that at Hakone they impressed U.S. members of committee with importance of U.S.-Japanese trade to both countries, with need to expand Japanese exports to sustain economic growth, and with significance of Japanese economy in free world trade and in aid to developing countries. We believe U.S. side was very effective in putting across its viewpoint. U.S. Delegation succeeded admirably in avoiding morass of conference debate on specific U.S.-Japan trade problems and in focusing on major issues (see Embtel 1349). 3 In discussion problem of balance of payments management, U.S. Delegation brought home to senior officers GOJ importance of U.S. international responsibilities rather than concern for commercial interests, as basis for U.S. necessity for large surplus ordinary current account. Further, in discussion trade problems, while laying suitable stress on realities of U.S. situation and admitting possibility future difficulties, U.S. Del appeared to convince Japanese of continuing dedication Kennedy administration to liberal trade policies and prospect therefore of continued orderly expansion Japanese exports to U.S. 9. How long friendly aura diffused from Hakone will remain depends both on U.S. actions and on actions GOJ obliged take in dealing with internal economic problems of “overheating” and inflation and with external difficulties stemming therefrom. Statements of Chairman Heller and other U.S. members may help Econ Planning Minister Fuji-yama and Finance Minister Mizuta in shaping politically acceptable but forceful measures to dampen and control boom. Possibility still remains real, however, serious political difficulties could result if reduction in growth rate too steep, if unemployment should increase too noticeably by next summer, or if resort to emergency financial assistance from U.S. and IMF has to be much greater than now foreseen. 10. In circumstances, Japanese political leaders will unquestionably be watching closely in immediate future for demonstration of spirit of Hakone in U.S. economic policy decisions affecting Japan. Possibility of number of tariff increases adversely affecting Japan as result of recent escape clause recommendations by Tariff Commission poses obvious immediate danger. While Hakone may have given GOJ Cabinet members better concept U.S. problems in trade field, impression of sincere U.S. dedication to liberal trade policy would hardly survive series of protectionist actions following closely on Hakone conference. Reischauer * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 411.9441/11-1361. Confidential. 1 See the source note, Document 231 . 2 November 11 and 12. 3 Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 411.9441/10-2961) 233. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France 233. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France Source Washington, November 23, 1961, 2:23 p.m. 3005. Embassy deliver Friday 1 following letter from Under Secretary Ball to Minister of Government who will represent addressee country at GATT Ministerial Meeting. USEC also deliver mission. Begin verbatim text . Dear Mr. Minister: I am looking forward to the prospect of seeing you in Geneva next week during the GATT Ministerial meeting. 2 In addition to the matters that may be presented during the formal sessions of the GATT I should like to have an opportunity to talk with you about the problems raised by the continued failure to bring to a conclusion the Geneva tariff negotiations. These problems are of deep concern to the United States. The issues that prevent the satisfactory conclusion of the negotiations seem now to have assumed such a character that they can be resolved only by agreement among responsible ministers. I greatly fear that unless we can reach such an agreement during the early days of next week the situation may get out of hand. I am sure you will agree that it is to our mutual political and economic interests to complete these negotiations at the earliest possible date. On our part, we are presently perfecting plans for the presentation of a new liberal trade program to Congress. Without the assurance of a satisfactory conclusion to the present round of tariff negotiations we can hardly go forward with this initiative. I would hope, therefore, that I might have the opportunity in Geneva of meeting privately with the responsible ministers of the Six member countries EEC and a Commissioner of the European Economic Community in an effort to resolve the differences still remaining between the Community and the United States concerning these negotiations. I am sending this letter to you in advance of the meeting so that, if you share the sense of urgency I have expressed, you might arrange for authority from your own Government to make whatever decisions are necessary for a mutually satisfactory solution to the present stalemate. Sincerely yours, End verbatim text. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 394.41/11-2361. Official Use Only; Priority. Drafted and approved by Ball and cleared by Lawrence Pezzullo (S/S). Also sent to Brussels, Bonn, Rome, The Hague, Luxembourg and repeated to Geneva for GATT. 1 November 24. 2 A summary of the meeting, held November 27-30, 1961, is contained in the Report of the U.S. Delegation to the 19th Session of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, February 13, 1962. (Department of State, Central Files, 394.41/2-1362) 234. Memorandum of Conversation 234. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, November 30, 1961. SUBJECT Status of Tariff Negotiations PARTICIPANTS Mr. Freeman, Secretary of Agriculture Mr. Duncan, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture Mr. Ball, Under Secretary Mr. Petersen, Special Assistant to the President Mr. Barger, OT Under Secretary Ball and Mr. Petersen reported on the discussions in Geneva regarding the tariff negotiations. Under Secretary Ball indicated that the EEC is evidently embarked on a policy of establishing self-sufficiency in agricultural production while liberalizing in the industrial sector. He noted that the pressures in this direction were increasing and probably resulted from the fact that the industrial sector feels that it can meet foreign competition successfully. He reported that he had taken a hard position in trying to move the EEC Ministers to be more forthcoming in the Dillon round and the Article 24:6 negotiations but that the Ministers indicated they were powerless to move although personally they were so disposed. As a result of these talks, he doubted that the agricultural package could be improved. He was also concerned that the longer the negotiations continue the greater the danger is that the EEC will pull back on the offers on the industrial items. This is particularly affected by the fact that as the U.K. gets closer to association with the EEC the incentive to generalize the U.K.-EEC concessions will decrease. Under Secretary Ball suggested that one possible way of handling the impasse was to seek a rebinding of current concessions and to keep the way open for negotiations after the common agricultural policy is established. Secretary Freeman indicated that he was concerned that if we concluded the current negotiations we would be giving away our bargaining position in trying to get a better bargain on agricultural items in the post CAP period. He suggested that the President is the only one who can decide on whether or not we should conclude the negotiations on the present basis. Mr. Petersen pointed out that if the negotiations are not concluded when the new trade legislation is sent up to the Hill, Congress could refuse to give any further authority since it could say that we were not successful in using the current authority with the EEC. Under Secretary Ball suggested two possibilities as a way out of the current impasse: one would be to seek a slight improvement in the agricultural package and sign it pretty much as it is, or, secondly, to have Secretary Freeman and Under Secretary Ball go to the EEC Ministerial Meeting in Brussels on December 4 and 5 and try to push the EEC once more toward a more acceptable agricultural component of the agreement. Subsequently, a meeting was set up for Secretary Freeman, Under Secretary Ball, Under Secretary of Commerce Gudeman and Mr. Petersen to meet with the President at 11:00 A.M. on December 1. 1 * Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential. Drafted by Herman H. Barger and approved in U on December 1. 1 President Kennedy met off the record with Freeman, Petersen, Ball, and others on December 1 from 11:18 a.m. to 12:17 p.m., but no further record of this meeting has been found. (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Books) 235. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State 235. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State Source Tokyo, December 5, 1961, 8 p.m. 1625. Embtel 1554. 1 I was called yesterday to FonOff by Vice FonMin Takeuchi who protested forcefully proposed equalization fee on cotton textiles. 2 In strongest terms Takeuchi pointed out that while Japanese cotton textile exports to US were $71 million in 1960, Japan bought $251 million of raw cotton from US in 1960-61 crop year. Should equalization fee be imposed, he maintained, it would do irreparable damage to Japanese cotton textile exports to US. At one point he said if fee imposed, bilateral textile agreement would be dead and it would be too late for further cooperative efforts regarding world cotton textile trade. Takeuchi stressed following points which also developed in talking paper: (1) GOJ cooperated with US in adhering to short-term Geneva arrangement and participating conference on long-term arrangement. Interests US cotton textile industry would be fully safeguarded by such arrangements. Equalization fee would subject Japanese exports to double restriction which clearly inconsistent with Geneva cooperative spirit. (2) US cotton product imports FY 1961 in terms raw cotton only 3 percent of American cotton crop while US exports of cotton products in raw cotton equivalent were larger than imports. Therefore, US should not argue that cotton textile imports adversely affect US cotton price support program or export program. (3) Export subsidy is domestic measure to make US raw cotton competitive in world market. Solution, therefore, is domestic problem and should not be at expense cotton textile exporters to US. Moreover, percentage US grown cotton in textiles exported from Japan to US has been as low as 21 percent. Unreasonable that equalization fee be imposed on textiles manufactured from raw cotton grown other countries. (4) Equalization fee would on average be tantamount to 10 percent increase in ad valorem duties on cotton textiles, and would reduce Japanese cotton textile exports to US by one-half making system of voluntary export restraints meaningless. Neither enlargement of quotas nor increased flexibility among categories could compensate for such losses. Takeuchi maintained that confidential letter 3 (exchanged in connection 1962 US-Japan bilateral regarding application nondiscriminatory equalization fee) means only that imposition equalization fee would not make arrangement inoperative. [ 1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified ]Agreement does not mean, as has been suggested, that GOJ agrees, or has abandoned right to object. Japanese business interests will actively oppose fee at Tariff Commission hearings. Moreover, confidential letter commits US to “consider taking appropriate action to remedy an adverse effect which might result therefrom,” and Takeuchi stressed that FonOff wished to know as soon as possible what action US plans to take if fee imposed, because remedial action, if delayed until effects of fee are felt, would then be too late to be effective. Regarding long-term Geneva arrangement, Takeuchi said no progress can be made in negotiations while serious doubts exist about worth of agreement in view possible US action. While GOJ will make every effort to conclude long-term arrangement, FonOff believes it would be extremely difficult to secure industry cooperation if fee imposed. On basis press reports from Washington regarding President's press conference, Japanese now assuming that referral to Tariff Commission merely pro forma and determination in effect actually made. Some of FonOff claims outlined above are of course exaggerated, but both government and public reacting strongly to this “undercutting” of textile agreement and “reversal” of Hakone spirit. 4 I would appreciate any guidance Dept can supply on how to respond to FonOff protest, particularly to insure [garble] properly coordinated with stand Dept taking in reply to any representations made by GOJ Embassy there. Also need to reply specifically to Takeuchi's formal query re US plans for consultation with GOJ in case imposition of equalization fee approved. Talking paper being pouched. Reischauer * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 411.006/12-561. Confidential. Repeated to Kobe. 1 Telegram 1554 from Tokyo, November 24, conveyed the negative reactions expressed by Japanese Government officials and businessmen over the U.S. proposal to impose an equalization fee on cotton textiles from Japan. (Ibid., 411.006/11-2461) 2 In a letter to Ben D. Dorfman, Chairman of the U.S. Tariff Commission, November 21, President Kennedy asked the Tariff Commission to investigate a duty on cotton imports. See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961 , p. 736. 3 Not found. 4 See Document 232 . 236. Editorial Note 236. Editorial Note On December 7, 1961, the Department of State, reacting to the Japanese Government's protest of the President's November 21 request for a Tariff Commission investigation on the establishment of an equalization fee on cotton textiles from Japan, sent telegram 1465 to the Embassy in Tokyo. This telegram, serving as guidance, outlined several points with which to respond to the protest, and is scheduled for publication in volume XXII . 237. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to Secretary of Agriculture Freeman 237. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to Secretary of Agriculture Freeman Source Washington, December 11, 1961. Dear Orville : As you know, a week ago I brought our experts back from Geneva and Brussels to make a complete review of the tariff negotiations. They have restudied the entire problem as carefully—and, I hope, as objectively—as possible and have prepared the attached memorandum. 1 This memorandum shows conclusively, I believe, that we have no practical alternative but to close the negotiations substantially on the basis of the last package offer from the EEC. If we do not do so promptly—and the 111 Committee meets toward the end of this week—I think we must surely anticipate that the EEC will withdraw its offers and the whole negotiation will collapse. Without overstating the consequence of such an event I think it could very well mean the destruction of the GATT and a return to anarchy in our international commercial relations. The memorandum I have sent to you makes clear that the overall results of the negotiations, if we were now to accept the EEC offer, would be highly advantageous for the United States. Except for the 30 percent of agricultural trade covered by the Common Agricultural Policy, the results are not disadvantageous even with respect to agriculture. As to that 30 percent, I am convinced that the best we can do is to try to preserve our rights and obtain the agreement of the EEC nations to negotiate regarding these products when they have reached a larger measure of agreement among themselves regarding their Common Agricultural Policy. Concretely I would propose the following course of action: 1. Go back to Geneva with a request that the EEC obligate itself to negotiate with respect to rice after the Common Agricultural Policy is decided upon, as it has offered to do with respect to corn, sorghum and poultry. 2. Seek joint approval of a declaration along the lines of the one attached, recognizing the special circumstances of the 1960-1961 negotiations and looking forward to new negotiations when the EEC has worked out its Common Agricultural Policy. 3. Upon receiving agreement regarding these two points, accept the EEC package. I am convinced that this program is the best course for us to follow under all the circumstances. We have carefully considered the possibility of trying to mobilize support from other countries and we have concluded that nothing would be gained by such an effort. Certainly the United Kingdom would not join with us in trying to exact a better deal from the EEC at a time when it is desperately trying to negotiate entrance into the Common Market. On the contrary, it would simply withdraw its industrial and agricultural offers from us (which on the whole we consider quite advantageous) and would then make its own deal within the EEC and avoid generalizing the benefits under the most-favored-nation principle. The same is undoubtedly true of the other EFTA countries. If one eliminates the EFTA countries there are no trading nations left that have any effective bargaining power with the EEC. Canada, Argentina, etc., are trying to ride on our coat tails rather than the other way around. Nor do I think there is any chance at all that we could obtain any firmer commitments to assured access to the EEC market for the products that are to be covered by the Common Agricultural Policy. The EEC is having an enormously difficult time arriving at a Common Agricultural Policy and the member nations are simply not going to complicate their lives by postponing the effective operation of the policy through offering us assured access over even a limited period of time. These represent the conclusions we have come to after the most sober and careful review of the situation with our experts who have been on the firing line conducting the negotiations and who are most familiar with the views of the EEC and its member nations. I would not think, however, that the long-range result would necessarily be unfavorable even for our trade in those commodities to be covered by the Common Agricultural Policy. We would certainly pursue negotiations with the Europeans vigorously and persistently, after they arrive at a measure of agreement regarding the form and operation of the Common Agricultural Policy. I would hope also that we would be able to obtain sufficient new powers through the new trade legislations to give us the ability to make better industrial concessions in order to obtain concessions on the agricultural side. I recognize that you face a difficult problem in attempting to explain the closing of the negotiations to American agricultural interests. I do not believe, however, that the problem is an insuperable one. I had a discussion the other day with Mr. Herschel Newsom and Mr. Joseph Parker of the Grange. After reviewing the situation with them, I found them quite understanding of our predicament. I should be very glad to see any representatives of farmers' groups that you might suggest. Nor do I believe that the political consequences are likely to be too serious for our trade bill. We could certainly make a very good showing on the industrial side. Even in the case of those Congressmen primarily interested in tobacco and Common Agricultural Policy products a careful explanation, coupled with a promise to pursue a vigorous negotiation at an appropriate later date, should in many cases be effective. I am sending copies of our memorandum to the other interested Departments. I spoke with Doug Dillon before he left for Europe and he expressed complete sympathy with the point of view I have outlined in this letter and strongly endorsed the need for an immediate closing on the basis of the offers we have received. Against the background of his long experience, not only with the current negotiation but with events preceding it and with the structure of the Common Market itself, he was quite categorical in stating that in his view the European nations would not—and indeed could not—negotiate at this time for maximum variable levies for CAP items nor would they be prepared to give us any assured access to the EEC market for such items for even as much as a year. I understand that he passed these views on to the President. I am advised that the Department of Commerce also joins in the views expressed in the memorandum. I am looking forward to our discussion this afternoon in the hope that we can bring this matter to a resolution. I would hope that we could arrive at an understanding between us, but if not I believe it essential that we discuss it with the President tomorrow. We must get some word to the 111 Committee when they meet later this week or I think we shall be in very bad shape. As you know, the Council of Ministers is meeting on December 22 and this seems to me to be our last clear chance to dispose of this long and painful negotiation. The President is intending, I believe, to outline his new trade program in the State of the Union message. I am sure he will be reluctant to do so unless the Geneva negotiation has been closed out first. Yours ever, George W. Ball 2 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subject Series, Trade, General, 10/61-12/61. No classification marking. Drafted by Ball. 1 This memorandum has not been found. Freeman and Ball discussed the conclusion of the Dillon Round of tariff negotiations on the telephone on November 22. Ball conveyed to Freeman his belief that ending the tariff negotiations were vital to carrying out President Kennedy's proposed plans for a new trade program. (Memorandum of telephone conversation; Kennedy Library, Ball Papers,GATT, Telcons, 4/12/61-8/14/62) In another telephone conversation, October 2, Ball and Wyndham-White discussed concluding the tariff negotiations quickly in order to avoid the possibility of the EEC seeking U.S. concessions. (Memorandum of telephone conversation; Department of State, Central Files, 394.41/10-261) 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 238. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State 238. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State Source Tokyo, December 12, 1961, 7 p.m. 1681. Reference: Deptel 1465. 1 I gave Vice Minister Takeuchi US reply on cotton textile equalization fee today as outlined reftel. After thanking me for information, Takeuchi said that FonOff could probably present written response along following lines, which I could report to Washington in meantime if I wished as preliminary FonOff views: 1. GOJ is scheduled begin discussions in Geneva during December on long-term cotton products trade agreement in preparation January multi-national meeting. Unless GOJ knows whether US will impose equalization fee in spring it will find it difficult to discuss long-term trade agreements in Geneva in January. US should recognize that there is close connection between two questions. Takeuchi added that some Japanese felt Geneva setting premature since would be better to wait to see how recently concluded short-term bi-national and multi-national agreements work out. At US urging, however, Japan had agreed to meet. 2. Uncertainty re possible imposition equalization fee already affecting Japanese export trade. Cancellations on orders for delivery after May have occurred while unusually high number of orders received for delivery prior May. Net effect is serious disturbance cotton textile industry regardless of what ultimate decision on fee may be. 3. GOJ has given thought to possible remedies in event fee imposed but feels that even if remedy found which would provide for maintenance present over-all level of cotton product sales, imposition of fee would produce disruptions orders within industry, resulting in hardships on various segments. Moreover, if certain segment unable export for six months or a year pending remedial action its sales contacts would be interrupted with losses which would be impossible calculate. Takeuchi expressed strong view that because of these considerations would be far better start US-Japan consultations immediately even though ultimate decision on equalization fee will not be known for several months. He maintained such consultations at this time would give opportunity for US side gain clearer picture of problems face by Japanese in connection equalization fee. Takeuchi emphasized that he understood problem US faces (he remarked in passing it would be more equitable lower cotton prices to domestic consumers in US than to penalize foreign products which in many cases contain little or no US cotton) but said impression developing in Japan that after providing for protection US cotton industry in bi-lateral and multi-national agreements US now wished provide double protection through equalization fee. Reischauer * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 411.006/12-1261. Confidential; Priority. 1 See Document 236 . 239. Memorandum of Conversation 239. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, December 21, 1961. SUBJECT Proposed Equalization Fee on Cotton Textile Imports under Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act PARTICIPANTS Mr. Koichiro Asakai, Ambassador of Japan Mr. Tadao Kato, Counselor, Embassy of Japan Mr. George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State Mr. W. Michael Blumenthal, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs Miss Thelma E. Vettel, Special Assistant to the Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs The Ambassador called at his request. He referred to the current Tariff Commission investigation of the possible imposition of an equalization fee on the raw cotton content of cotton textile imports under Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act. The Ambassador said that the President's request for such an investigation was embarrassing to the Japanese Government, following so soon after the Hakone meeting of the Joint U.S.-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs. He said that if the fee were imposed (as feared by the Japanese in view of the President's subsequent statement to the press), it would be tantamount to an increase of 10 to 30 percent in ad valorem duty on Japanese cotton textile exports to the United States. In light of the understandings between the two countries, discussions regarding compensation (or remedial action) would be called for should the fee be imposed. The Ambassador expressed the strong view that discussions of such compensation would be undesirable. He hoped to avoid possible acrimonious discussions of this kind, saying that textile discussions once a year were enough. In his view it would be difficult to agree on compensation which would be equitable for both the United States and Japan. He urged that, instead of negotiating such compensation, the Japanese industry be permitted to enjoy the level of export to the United States of the past five years (about $70 million). He emphasized that the level should not be decreased. He said that in his judgment the United States could find a way to make an adjustment of the raw cotton price differential without assessing this “tax at the time of importation,” and could permit Japan to enjoy the level of trade of the past five years without asking it to try to reduce textile exports. He pointed out that the Japanese Government had requested a small increase in exports to the United States. He was urging that the level remain the same and not be cut back, and that, at the same time, the United States not impose the equalization fee. The Ambassador said the foregoing represented his personal views and that he was recommending this position to his government. He asked that careful consideration be given to these points. The Under Secretary responded that we had already instructed Ambassador Reischauer to indicate to the Japanese Government that this was not a decision. The President had instructed the Department of Agriculture to explore means of taking care of the raw cotton price differential. From the viewpoint of the industry the maintenance of the two-price system, causing high textile prices, would not be healthy. The Tariff Commission has been asked to study the situation; Agriculture is also studying it. The Under Secretary expressed regret that this had not been explained in advance. An unfortunate impression had been created in Japan. The Under Secretary expressed the hope that a satisfactory way could be found to take care of the inequities suffered by the domestic industry without the imposition of the equalization fee. The Ambassador complimented the Under Secretary on his statement of December 12 before the Joint Economic Committee regarding the Common Market. 1 He said the Japanese had had the impression that the Common Market was disturbing to the United States and had had misgivings that the United States, in order to appease protectionists, might introduce measures against certain third markets which might be disadvantageous to Japan. The Under Secretary responded that the United States is committed to a policy of non-discrimination. * Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Official Use Only. Drafted by Vettel and approved in U on January 19, 1962. Attached to the source text is a note from Battle (S/S) to Freeman (U), January 17, 1962, requesting his approval of the memorandum prior to its distribution. 1 Not found. 240. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions 240. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions Source Washington, January 30, 1962, 8:09 p.m. 1332. Depcirtel 1309. 1 Following is guidance for mission use in official and public discussions new U.S. trade legislation. 1. New trade bill sent Congress by President January 25 represents watershed in U.S. foreign economic policy. It is most important development in U.S. trade policy since 1934 and makes marked advance beyond present trade agreements program. It complements new look in foreign aid policy and is intended give U.S. the means to take fullest part in building economically strong and progressive free world. If Congress provides President with legislation requested, result will be to fix U.S. course for indefinite future squarely in direction liberal, multilateral, expanding world trade system. Legislation placed before Congress would give President far-reaching and flexible authority further reduce U.S. tariffs beyond anything previously authorized in trade agreements program; it would open prospect for mutual reduction and even elimination tariffs between two largest economic units in world, U.S. and European Common Market; it would generalize tariff concessions multilaterally and would progressively widen trade opportunities for less developed countries. Forthcoming great national debate on trade issue will present to American people, as never before, stake they have in international trade. It will thus develop basis of informed opinion for carrying out dynamic international trade policy by USG. 2. New statement of purposes in bill illustrates advance made in developing forward-looking concept of objectives of liberal trade program. It sets forth essential general welfare, foreign policy and security purposes of U.S. trade policy, and objective of promoting these purposes through international trade agreements affording mutual benefits. It refers explicitly to strengthening of economic and political relations with EEC and other foreign countries, assistance to LDC's, and countering of Communist economic penetration. 3. Proposed bill gives President four separate authorities for reducing tariffs. (a) He may reduce U.S. duties by one-half, over a five-year period, on any product, in negotiations with trading partners around world. (b) He may reduce in an agreement with EEC to any level, including zero, duties applicable to categories of commodities in which U.S. and Common Market account for 80% or more of world trade. He has similar authority reduce tariffs to zero with respect agricultural commodities in Common Market negotiations, but without limitation of foregoing 80% formula. (c) He may reduce or eliminate U.S. duties on tropical agricultural and forestry products not produced in substantial quantity in U.S., provided Common Market takes comparable action. (d) He may eliminate U.S. duties now established at 5% or less ad valorem or equivalent. Foregoing authorities represent greatest ever previously requested or provided in trade legislation. In 1934 and 1945 President was granted authority reduce then existing rates by 50%. Subsequent new grants of authority were 15% in 1955 and 20% in 1958. In new bill, President would have not only basic 50% authority but substantial additional authority as well. He would for first time be authorized eliminate duties completely under specified conditions. 4. Tariff cutting powers will be exercised within most favored nation framework. As under present legislation, new bill explicitly requires generalization of tariff concessions, including those made to EEC, to all other countries except Soviet Bloc. We are thus not proposing construct exclusive club with Western Europe. Intent rather is to press forward with large scale reduction tariff barriers to trade, benefits of which will be available all free world countries. We expect give impetus to steadily increasing volume total international trade from which all participants will gain. 5. Legislation would exclude from tariff negotiation power of President only those few commodities previous subject of national security or escape clause provisions present Trade Agreements Act. Petroleum only item covered by national security provision while following 11 commodities are subject escape clause: women's fur felt hats and hat bodies, dried figs, watches, bicycles, toweling of flax, hemp or ramie, spring clothespins, safety pins, clinical thermometers, lead and zinc, stainless-steel table flatware, and cotton typewriter-ribbon cloth. Such reservation reflects current practice, under which items under national security or escape clause action are not offered as concessions. As noted para 7 below, bill contains time limit for termination escape clause actions, including existing ones listed above, in which case items would then be available for negotiation. Apart this minor restriction, President, as now, will have discretion which commodities or categories of commodities he will offer for negotiation. Legislation puts this in explicit terms in order make clear to Congress and public that tariff cutting authority is discretionary. Among items which might be put on reserve list are those where benefit concession, if granted, would go largely to country not participating in negotiations or unwilling provide adequate compensation. 6. New legislation modifies substantially so-called “peril point” provision of expiring trade law. As in past, President will furnish Tariff Commission with list commodities or categories proposed as subjects tariff negotiation and Commission would be required give its judgment as to economic effect of reduction or elimination duties on competitive industries. Under proposed law, however, there would be no provision, as in present legislation, calling for Tariff Commission to establish the tariff below which the President could not reduce duty without causing serious injury domestic industry. Furthermore, new legislation drops provision in present act which requires escape clause investigation if Tariff Commission finds that “peril point” should be rate of duty above existing level. In addition, criteria which Tariff Commission would take into account in advising President are more stringent than under present legislation. These criteria are “probability significant idling production facilities, prolonged and persistent inability of firms to operate at profit, and unemployment or underemployment of workers.” Tariff Commission advice not binding on President. 7. Other safeguarding provisions in new bill likewise represent considerable advance over previous legislation. Legislation includes for first time executive branch proposal that adjustment assistance be used as means coping with competitive impact of imports. Expectation would be that adjustment aid—loans, technical assistance and tax benefits for firms, extended unemployment insurance, retraining, and relocation allowances for workers—would be principal means deal with problems individual firms and workers. Bill also provides escape clause under which increased tariffs or other import restrictions could be imposed. However, such relief is clearly labelled in legislation as “extraordinary” and is to be used only (a) when types of assistance described above for firms and workers are not sufficient to mitigate difficulties involved; (b) when difficulties to be remedied are widespread in the industry concerned as whole as distinct from individual firms and workers; (c) after other, more stringent criteria than under existing legislation are met, namely “significant idling of productive facilities, etc.” Finally, tariff or other extraordinary relief, if granted, would not be for period to exceed four years, subject to extension by President. In connection with last point, escape clause actions already in effect for three years at time new trade bill comes into force would be terminated after another year unless President extends period. If such escape clause action is so terminated, item concerned need no longer be withheld under reserve list (see para 5 above) and could be included in negotiations. It is expected these provisions would substantially remove irritant in our international trade relations represented heretofore by escape clause. We would expect fewer instances of petition for tariff relief from imports and comparatively few cases in which extraordinary relief would be considered relevant form of assistance. 8. While new bill defines President's authority for trade agreement negotiations, it does not specify precise way this authority would be used internationally. Such negotiating plan for new round tariff reductions will have to be worked out with other countries and is subject of GATT Working Party which was established at GATT Ministerial Meeting last November. Working Party now not expected to meet until late spring or early summer. On assumption President obtains authority requested, we would hope Working Party would work out techniques for some type across-board tariff reductions. We would not expect new tariff negotiations themselves begin until some time in 1963. While bill provides different authority in relation to negotiations with EEC as distinct from other countries, we anticipate we will negotiate with EEC and with other contracting parties at same time in broad multilateral negotiation under GATT and that results will be reflected in customary single agreement under GATT, under which concessions granted by one party to agreement would be automatically extended to all others. In this one large negotiation we would utilize, in different combinations with different countries, various types of authority under the act. 9. Though emphasizing positive elements in program and bold U.S. initiative in advancing liberal trade principles, Missions should make clear this is not unilateral program for increasing access for foreign products to U.S. markets. It is instead basis for reciprocal program whose implementation for free world benefit requires lowering of tariff barriers by all trading countries and opening of new market opportunities for products of LDC's as well as industrialized countries. Statements by President and other high Governmental officials have made abundantly clear that through this program U.S. intends seek improved access for its exports abroad in exchange for concessions by U.S. and that we mean see to it that tariff concessions made to us are not frustrated by quotas or other restrictive devices. In acting upon President's proposals Congress will undoubtedly register its own intent that authority is to be utilized this manner. Accordingly other countries should clearly understand that extent to which President's new authority can be utilized in final analysis depends on their willingness enter wholeheartedly into new round tariff negotiations with view exchanging meaningful tariff concessions on broad range commodities. 10. It is of utmost importance that other countries respond positively to new initiative of President. Question has been raised here, notably by Chairman Mills of Ways and Means Committee, how we know other countries are interested in negotiating with us on basis provided in bill. We intend reply that informal discussions with various representatives of other Governments, including EEC, as well as sentiments strongly expressed in GATT Ministerial Meeting indicate general readiness undertake further tariff negotiations and on across-the-board basis. Missions may feel free respond along same line if question comes up. Ball * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 411.004/1-3062. Official Use Only. Drafted by Trezise (E), Leonard Weiss (E/OT), and Selma G. Kallis (E/TA) on January 29; cleared by Philander P. Claxton (H), Leonard Wilson (P), and Myer Rashish (White House); and approved by Trezise. Sent to 34 Embassies and Consulates and pouched to all other missions except Moscow, Budapest, Prague, Bucharest, and Sofia. 1 Not printed. (Ibid., 411.00/1-2462) 241. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to Secretary of State Rusk 241. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to Secretary of State Rusk Source Washington, February 9, 1962. I am seriously concerned that we may be pressing the Japanese too far in trying to placate various domestic interests. You will recall that the Hakone meeting took place just two months after a long drawn-out and bitter negotiation for a temporary cotton textile agreement. Ambassador Reischauer reported at the time that the atmosphere in which that agreement was negotiated weakened the position of Prime Minister Ikeda personally and undermined the strength of his Government. The Hakone meeting apparently had the effect of eliminating most of the ill feeling. It also gave Mr. Ikeda a substantial boost. Unhappily, a series of events following that meeting have led some of the Japanese newspapers to question whether anything like a “Hakone spirit” ever really existed. These events include the following: 1. At the instance of the Administration, the Tariff Commission has undertaken an investigation which may lead to a recommendation for an equalization fee for cotton textile imports. This would add what would amount to an additional tariff on cotton textile imports computed on the basis of 8-1/2¢ a pound of raw cotton content. Japanese textile imports into the United States are presently frozen at a level below that of 1960 by the existing bilateral agreement. The Japanese estimate—I do not know how accurately—that the equalization fee would reduce imports 50 percent. The news of this investigation has blown up a considerable storm in Japan and has proved again a considerable embarrassment to the Ikeda Government. 2. In November the Japanese believed that they had been assured of the opportunity to participate in bidding for a part of the AID fertilizer procurement for South Korea. At the last moment they had to be disabused of this belief. 3. In the past, our restrictive procurement policy in Japan was not applied to purchases of petroleum products for use by our military forces stationed there. Recently, however, the Defense Department announced that it was discontinuing purchases from a major Japanese supplier. The decision (based on our concern over Soviet crude oil sales abroad) unfortunately was announced in a press release which dealt only with the Japanese refinery concerned. It again produced additional resentment. 4. The Ikeda Government will shortly have to face up to introducing into the Diet the agreement for the settlement of the GARIOA account amounting to $490 million. This is a highly unpopular action and will undoubtedly create a good deal of unpleasant debate. The cumulative effect of these actions is accentuated by the exist-ence of a serious Japanese balance of payments problem which has necessitated substantial domestic retrenchment and deflation. The bilateral trade account between Japan and the United States was unfavorable to Japan last year in the amount of about $700 million and Japan's global balance of payments deficit amounted to $650 million. The present situation is sufficiently serious to be a cause for concern. However, we are about to make it considerably worse by two escape clause actions that are expected to be announced some time this month. In spite of opposition from the State and other Departments, the decision has been made by the President to grant tariff increases under escape clauses on two products of which Japan is a major exporter: Wilton rugs and carpets and sheet glass. Japanese Wilton rug imports into the United States amounted last year to $8.4 million. The Japanese Wilton rug industry is concentrated almost entirely in the already seething Osaka textile area, which has been seriously inflamed by the bitter negotiations that preceded the short-term textile agreement. Sheet glass is also a major item of trade. Imports of Japanese sheet glass into the United States amounted last year to $4,250,000. The Japanese Government has made repeated representations to us with regard to both of these escape clause actions, as has the Belgian Government, which is also affected by both of them. The heckling that the Attorney General received at the hands of students a day or two ago is symptomatic of the instability of Japanese opinion. 1 The Japanese will see in the two escape clause actions a further frustration of the prospects of “economic cooperation” evoked by Hakone. They can hardly overlook the fact that practically every decision affecting Japanese trade that we have taken since then has been adverse to their interests. I am sorry to have to bother you with this matter, but I have been unable to persuade the President that we should not grant the Wilton carpet and sheet glass escape clauses. I have heard rumors that the carpet industry may have been given the impression some time ago that they would receive the relief they requested. Sheet glass, unfortunately, is principally produced in West Virginia. The President has a special interest in alleviating the depressed conditions in that state, in view of his firsthand experience there during the primary campaign. Quite understandably the President is anxious to demonstrate that escape clauses are not wholly meaningless in order to encourage support for the trade bill. There are at the moment two other escape clauses pending. These cases concern mosaic tile and baseball gloves. They also affect Japan, although their impact would be relatively slight. However, there is little domestic mileage in either of them, and a tentative decision has been taken to reject the escape clause actions in those two cases. At the moment we are attempting to negotiate a long-term textile agreement in Geneva. The Japanese have made a proposal that, we are hoping, may form the basis for a definitive agreement. However, the Japanese insist that final acceptance be held up until they see whether we are going through with the equalization fee on cotton textiles. At some point, we shall certainly have to yield on the equalization fee if we are to get the textile agreement concluded. How seriously the granting of escape clauses on Wilton carpets might affect the ultimate conclusion of a textile agreement, I cannot say. Both Wilton carpets and textiles involve Osaka interests which are politically powerful. I have written this memorandum both to inform you and with the thought that you may wish to discuss this whole question with the President. Perhaps it would be wise to wait until after the Attorney General returns, since he will undoubtedly have been made aware of the Japanese sensitivity at repeated evidences of apparent American protectionism. I talked with him about the problem before he left and told him that I would make sure that the prospective escape clause actions were not taken while he was still in Japan. My own ability to influence the decision on these matters has been impaired by the fact that I have of necessity felt compelled to oppose all escape clause actions, since I have not seen one yet in which an adequate economic case had been made for the claims presented. This consistent opposition has, I am afraid, given my position an appearance of pig-headedness and negativism. George W. Ball * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 394.41/2-1062. Confidential; Eyes Only. Ball sent this memorandum to Rusk under cover of a February 10 memorandum that reads in part: “Since dictating the attached memorandum a couple of days ago Mike Blumenthal has succeeded in concluding the negotiation of a long-term textile agreement in Geneva. This agreement has been reached, however, on an ad referendum basis and it has been made clear on behalf of the Japanese and several other governments that final approval will depend on our willingness to yield on the equalization fee.” (Ibid.) 1 Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy visited Japan February 4-10, as part of a worldwide good will trip February 1-28. 242. Editorial Note 242. Editorial Note On February 16, 1962, the White House released the text of the long-term cotton textile arrangement agreed upon by the Cotton Textile Committee of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade held in Geneva January 29-February 9. Valid for 5 years beginning October 1, the arrangement was similar to an earlier one in effect from October 1, 1961, to October 2, 1962, which “enabled importing countries threatened by or subject to market disruption in any of 64 categories of cotton textiles to restrain imports to the level of fiscal year 1961.” This new arrangement, however, allowed any importing nation threatened by or subject to market disruptions to “freeze imports for 1 year to the level of the first 12 of the preceding 15 months.” The freeze could be extended for another year if market conditions persisted but a maximum 5 percent increase per year was the limit. For full text of the White House announcement, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962 , pages 1411-1412. 243. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Kennedy 243. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Kennedy Source Washington, February 26, 1962. SUBJECT Conclusion of GATT Tariff Negotiations I am transmitting herewith Memoranda from the Chairman and the Alternate Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Trade Agreements (TAC) 1 recommending that you approve the results of tariff negotiations with the European Economic Community and with other countries including the United Kingdom, and that you authorize the termination of certain bilateral trade agreements suspended in 1947 when the countries concerned acceded to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The signing of the agreements is now scheduled for March 5 at Geneva, with publication of the results the following day, March 6. This timing is governed by our interest in announcing the results of the Geneva negotiations before the opening on March 12 of the hearings on the Administration's trade bill in the House Ways and Means Committee. Your approval is requested in time to enable our representatives at Geneva to sign on March 5. The negotiations thus far concluded over all countries with which we negotiated at Geneva except Spain. Due to a late start by the Spanish these negotiations cannot be completed in time for signing on March 5. When they are completed, a further memorandum requesting your approval will be sent to you. I recommend that you approve the recommendations as set forth in the Memoranda from the Chairman and the Alternate Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Trade Agreements. George W. Ball 2 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 394.41/2-2662. Confidential. Transmitted under cover of a similar memorandum, February 26, from Ball to Secretary Hodges. 1 The memorandum from the Chairman of the TAC is printed as Document 244 . The memorandum from the Alternate Chairman was not attached. 2 Printed from a copy that indicates that Ball signed the original. 244. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Trade Agreements (Walker) to President Kennedy 244. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Trade Agreements (Walker) to President Kennedy Source Washington, February 26, 1962. The Interdepartmental Committee on Trade Agreements herewith recommends that the President approve the results of United States negotiations thus far concluded in the 1960-61 Tariff Conference, held in Geneva under the sponsorship of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Because of the scope of the negotiations and the complexity of some of them, the conference was held in two separate phases. The first, which commenced on September 1, 1960, was concerned primarily with negotiations held under Article XXIV:6 of the GATT with the European Economic Community (EEC) for a new single schedule of tariff concessions in the General Agreement to replace the previously existing separate schedules of the EEC Member States: the Benelux countries (Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands), France, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy. The second phase, which began on May 29, 1961, was concerned with the reciprocal exchange of new concessions among interested contracting parties, and with the accession of new contracting parties. Concurrently with the major negotiations in both phases, there were a number of renegotiations pursuant to Article XXVIII and certain other provisions of the GATT. In these negotiations the United States obtained compensatory concessions for changes that several other countries had made in previously granted concessions. On its side, in turn, the United States paid compensation for certain changes which it had made since the last tariff negotiations in 1956. In the first phase, United States negotiators dealt with tariffs involving nearly $2 billion of United States exports. In the second, they dealt with export-import trade of some $2.2 billion. (Annex 1 1 contains a more detailed breakdown of the trade involved.) Pending completion of other countries' negotiations among themselves, the United States proposes to enter into formal bilateral agreements with the EEC and the United Kingdom, and such other countries as are prepared to do so promptly in order that the larger part of the results of negotiations may be made public in the United States. When all negotiations are concluded, the results, including those bilateral agreements of the United States that are now to be proclaimed and made public, will be incorporated into a multilateral GATT protocol. This will include the consolidated schedules of tariff concessions of the individual countries. XXIV:6 Negotiation The major negotiation of the first phase was that with the Commission of the EEC arising in connection with the establishment of the common external tariff of the Common Market. This negotiation was a complex one, involving as it did the replacement of four separate and widely-differing tariff schedules by one new schedule. According to GATT provisions, this single schedule is to maintain the general level of concessions provided for in the composite prior schedules of the Member States, and the purpose of the negotiation was to assure that this obligation was complied with. The United States had a large stake in this negotiation. Approximately $1,028 million of United States trade entered the Community in 1958 under tariff classifications on which the rate commitment had been negotiated in past years with the United States by Member States, plus an additional $611 million under commitments negotiated by them with other countries. These figures are exclusive of United States trade in products within the domain of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the EURATOM. The difficulty encountered by the United States and other major exporters of agricultural products in finding a basis for dealing with the EEC's projected Common Agricultural Policy, coupled with the unprecedented and complex nature of the negotiations, led to slow negotiations which were settled finally only at the time agreement was reached in the reciprocal negotiations and with the intervention of the special representative of the President, Mr. Petersen. The result of the XXIV:6 negotiation is three-fold: First, for the bulk of United States trade, the EEC granted concessions on trade of $1,677 million in the base year, or on more than 60 percent of its imports from the United States. Of this, $1,583 million is in the form of direct bindings to the United States, representing a 60 percent increase in the trade covered by direct bindings. Further, there was also an improvement in the average rate level; increases in previously bound rates affecting $300 million were offset by new bindings at lowered rates affecting $530 million. Second, for products on which the CXT rate of duty has not yet been determined, principally manufactured tobacco products and refined petroleum products, accounting for about 3 percent of United States exports, it was agreed that existing national tariffs would be maintained until such time as the CXT rate is determined, when it would be examined under the usual Article XXVIII procedures. Third, for products to be put under the variable import fee system of the Common Agricultural Policy, agreement was reached on formulae postponing the final negotiation on them and providing certain interim safeguards. This agreement covers wheat, corn, rice, grain sorghum, and poultry, accounting for about 10 percent of our total exports to the Community area. In addition the EEC subscribed to a Joint Declaration envisaging renewed negotiation in future for more satisfactory rates on various products, notably tobacco, vegetable oils and chemicals. The remaining 15 percent of United States exports not dealt with is accounted for almost entirely by products under the jurisdiction of the European Coal and Steel Community. A more detailed explanation of the Article XXIV:6 exercise is contained in Annex 2 which has attached to it the agreements reached in the over-all settlement with the EEC. Reciprocal Phase In the reciprocal phase (or so-called “Dillon Round”) for the exchange of new concessions, which commenced on May 29, United States negotiators reached satisfactory agreements with the EEC and the following 16 countries: Austria, Cambodia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Haiti, India, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Portugal, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Of these, Cambodia, Israel and Portugal are newly acceding countries. Negotiations are still under way with Spain, which also expects to accede. The only other outstanding negotiation is with Sweden, and this appears to be nearing conclusion. Details on the results of these negotiations are included in Annex 3. Annex 3(a) contains a country-by-country description of the agreements reached. The bilateral lists of the concessions obtained by the United States are attached as Annex 3(b). The lists of the concessions granted by the United States are attached as Annex 3(c). In the final protocols these concessions will be combined. In reciprocal negotiations with all countries, the United States obtained direct concessions covering trade amounting to $1,206 million. The figures used in each instance are for the latest year for which import statistics were available as of the time of negotiations with the country concerned, usually 1959 or 1960. Annex 1 shows in tabular form the trade coverage of concessions obtained from each country. In addition to these direct concessions, the United States trade will benefit, to an as yet undetermined extent, from concessions which other countries are granting each other. In exchange, the United States granted concessions covering base year imports of $1,003 million from the countries with which the concession was directly negotiated. United States concessions in the reciprocal phase covered $1,725 million in terms of imports from all sources in 1960. United States imports of the products on which concessions were granted are shown in Annex 1. Participation of the less-developed countries in the reciprocal phase was limited. In its negotiations, both in this phase and in the renegotiations undertaken by many of the less developed countries, the United States made a gesture in taking into account their needs by accepting agreements balanced in their favor in terms of strict trade coverage. It was unable within the framework of policy laid down under existing legislation, however, to accede to their wishes for completely unreciprocated concessions. The most significant of the reciprocal negotiations was that with the EEC. The United States made direct concessions to the EEC covering imports of $597.4 million which represented 59 percent of those granted by the United States. In exchange, the EEC made direct concessions to the United States covering imports of $750.2 million or more than 62 percent, in terms of trade coverage, of the concessions obtained by the United States in the second phase of the conference. EEC statistics subsequent to 1958 are not available. However, by projection from United States export figures, the 1960 value of the EEC concessions is estimated at about $1 billion, as against a 1960 value of $795 million for the United States concession. A recapitulation of the combined results of XXIV:6 and the reciprocal negotiations with the EEC, in terms of what the United States yielded in return for what it obtained, net basis, may be graphically presented as follows: U.S. Grants EEC EEC Grants to U.S. Increase in Bound Trade 446 769 Improved Duty Rates 549 977 The foregoing may be projected into 1960 (estimated) by increasing all figures by one-third. Negotiations with the United Kingdom were second only to the EEC and accounted for 17 percent of the concessions obtained by the United States and 18 percent of the concessions granted by it. As the result of an unusually cautious approach to the selection of offers taken by the United States Government during the 1960 preparatory period, and of an unprecedented and economically questionable number of “peril point” determinations by the Tariff Commission, United States offers were limited in scope and of generally poor quality because of the exclusion of many key products. This, coupled with the 20 percent reduction limitation of the trade agreements legislation, led to individual offer lists which in many cases lacked appeal to the other countries negotiating. Partly because of this, the majority of the individual negotiations were small. Early in the negotiations it became apparent that these limited offers would not enable the United States Delegation to obtain the concessions it had hoped for on the basis of the linear offers both the EEC and the UK had indicated a willingness to make. In an effort to improve the negotiating situation, especially with the EEC, the Department of State requested Presidential authorization to make additional offers by breaching peril-point determinations of the Tariff Commission on products dutiable under 27 tariff paragraphs. Such authorization was communicated to the Delegation on September 25, 1961. The additional authority covered imports amounting to $164 million in 1958, of which slightly more than half was for offer to the EEC. Of this United States negotiators used $76 million as direct concessions to the EEC and $7 million to the United Kingdom, with total trade affected amounting to $152 million. A list of the products on which peril-point determinations were exceeded is contained in Annex 4. In addition, there were several products on which the Tariff Commission found as “peril-points” rates of duty higher than existing rates. Under the trade agreements legislation the Tariff Commission automatically initiates escape-clause investigations. In view of this, and in accord-ance with earlier experience, no attempt was made to negotiate the increased rates. Annex 5, attached, contains a list of the products involved, and an explanation of their current status. Under the trade agreements legislation, the President is required to report to the Congress on each case in which a concession exceeds the “peril points” found by the Tariff Commission or in which he fails to negotiate the higher rates when “peril points” are found above the existing rates. The statute requires that the President send to the Congress a copy of the agreement in each case in which the finding of the Tariff Commission is not followed, together with reasons for the action. A separate draft communication to the Congress is being submitted to the President for this purpose. It will show the President's action to have been fruitful and eminently justified. As part of the reciprocal negotiations, the United States proposed to Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, France, Canada and the United Kingdom that pre-GATT bilateral agreements, in suspense since 1947, be altogether terminated. This proposal was generally acceptable to the delegations of the several countries but the matter had to be referred to capitals. Canada, the only Government replying thus far, does not wish to take the suggested action. Presidential authorization for the termination of these bilateral agreements, on the part of the United States, is hereby requested against such time as decisions are reached by the other governments to which the proposal was made. In the negotiations, it was found desirable for technical reasons to offer a rate of duty of 9 percent for one item on which Presidential authority to offer 9.2 percent had been obtained. This situation is explained in Annex 6, as is a correction of a typographical error. A number of concessions which had been authorized for offer were not made. These items, covering total imports of $815.8 million, were not used in the negotiation either because countries for which they had been earmarked were not ready to negotiate, or else were not prepared to make counter-offers sufficiently large to warrant their use. A summary of these unusual [unused] offers is attached as Annex 7. United States Compensation Negotiations During the conference, the United States Delegation treated with several countries concerning their claims for compensatory concessions for actions taken by the United States Government since 1956 that had the effect of impairing concessions previously granted on 12 products. The President's approval has been sought separately on the negotiations which were completed as of November 24, 1961. Since then settlements have been reached with the United Kingdom and Italy. A recapitulation of the claims made and agreements reached is included in Annex 8(a). Renegotiations of Changes in Concessions Made by Other Countries The United States negotiations on changes being made by other countries in previous concessions involved 14 countries: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Ceylon, Finland, Haiti, Indonesia, Japan, Netherlands Antilles, Pakistan, Peru, South Africa, Sweden and Turkey. These renegotiations ranged from small ones involving one to four items to entire tariff schedules covering a total of several hundred tariff items. United States trade involved in the individual negotiations ranged from less than $100,000 to more than a $100 million and totalled about $220 million. The United States obtained compensatory concessions in exchange totalling about $202 million. A tabulation showing, by country, the trade involved is contained in Annex 8(b). Action Remaining If the President approves the recommendations in this memorandum, the final steps will be taken formally to conclude the negotiations and give effect to their results. The President will be requested to issue a full power for the signature of the bilateral trade agreements and eventually a protocol embodying the results of the 1960-61 Tariff Conference and separate protocols for the acceding countries. The putting into effect as domestic law of the United States obligations embodied in the agreements requires the issuance of a Presidential Proclamation. Herman Walker 2 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 394.41/2-2662. Confidential. Drafted on February 20. This memorandum was another enclosure submitted to President Kennedy under cover of the February 26 memorandum from Ball to Secretary Hodges ( see the source note, Document 243 ). 1 None of the annexes is printed. 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 245. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Kennedy 245. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Kennedy Source Washington, March 29, 1962. In replying to a question at your press conference this morning regarding the recent escape clause actions on glass and carpets, 1 you justified the decisions, in part, by the problems of our own balance of payments. 2 I think it might be preferable in dealing with questions such as this in the future if this justification were not employed. We have taken the position with the rest of the world that we are seeking solutions of our balance of payments through non-restrictive measures. For that reason we are asking the cooperation of other nations in expanding our exports and developing international trade. We have been urging with some success that other countries follow lines of policy similar to ours. To the extent that we justify restrictive actions, such as tariff increases, on balance of payments grounds we impair the effectiveness of our position. These actions should continue to be defended, it seems to me, with the argument that imports were exacerbating already serious unemployment in the affected industries. This is the basis on which I shall explain the tariff actions to the Europeans while I am in Europe during the next few days. George W. Ball 3 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 411.006/3-2962. No classification marking. 1 On March 19, President Kennedy signed Proclamations 3454 and 3455 increasing the duties on woven carpets and sheet glass, effective after the close of business April 18. On March 27, he issued Proclamation 3458 delaying the effective date of these proclamations until June 17. A summary is in Department of State Bulletin , April 16, 1962, pp. 649-650. 2 At his March 29 press conference, President Kennedy recognized that his decision to raise tariffs on glass and carpets would burden foreign producers. He argued however, “our unemployment is substantially greater than theirs, their balance of payments situation is substantially better than ours—in the case of Belgium, they've been adding gold rather than losing it, their unemployment rate is half of ours.” ( Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962 , p. 277) 3 Printed from a copy that indicates that Ball signed the original. 246. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany 246. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany Source Washington, March 31, 1962, 2:22 p.m. 2692. For Under Secretary. Following is an informal translation of a letter to Under Secretary from Spaak dated March 27. Letter received March 30 from Belgian Ambassador. "Dear Mr. Ball: I have received your letter of March 19 1 and wish to thank you for the trouble you have taken in writing it to me. I presume that you desire from me my sincere impressions. I would not conceal from you that the measure taken by the Government of the United States to increase the customs duties on glass and carpets has caused a very great reaction in my country and has even resulted in press articles extremely disagreeable for the United States. What has struck everyone, if you will permit me to mention it, is that this action was taken a few days after an agreement had been reached between the Common Market and the United States. Even if it is not exact, one cannot overcome the impression of a great number of my compatriots that the United States has waited for the success of the Dillon negotiations to take vis-a-vis Belgium extremely prejudicial measures. My colleague, the Minister of Foreign Commerce, is strongly protesting what has happened before the European Community which seems to have promised him its support. This affair is going to have certain ramifications, and I consider that regrettable. It would be in my view highly desirable that the Government of the United States review its position. Accept, dear Mr. Ball, best wishes. (Signed) P. H. Spaak.” Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 411.004/3-3162. Secret. Drafted by Robert M. Beaudry (EUR/WE) on March 31, cleared by Leonard Weiss (E/OT) and Arthur A. Hartman (U) in substance, and approved by Trezise (E). Repeated to Brussels for the Embassy and USEC. 1 Not found. 247. Editorial Note 247. Editorial Note On May 31, 1962, Secretary of State Rusk wrote Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak expressing the hope that the United States and Belgium would be able to resolve the carpet and glass dispute through some form of compensation. This letter, along with other documentation tracking the developments of the consequences following the President's March announcement of the increase in duties, is printed in volume XIII . On June 4, despite U.S. efforts, the EEC Council took retaliatory action against certain U.S. imports in reprisal for the U.S. decision to increase duties on carpets and glass. The Council suspended the concessions it had made during the Dillon Round negotiations on U.S. exports to the EEC of polystyrene, polyethylene, synthetic and artificial clothing, and varnishes and paints. ( Current Economic Documents , Issue No. 652, June 19, 1962, pages 3-5; Washington National Records Center, E/CBA/REP Files: FRC 72 A 6248, Current Economic Developments ) For additional documentation on this issue, see volume XIII . 248. Memorandum of Conversation 248. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, June 9, 1962, 10:30 a.m. SUBJECT Carpets and Glass PARTICIPANTS Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak Ambassador Scheyven, Belgian Embassy Baron Rothschild, Chef de Cabinet to Mr. Spaak The Secretary Ambassador MacArthur The Secretary said that before joining the others he wanted to say a few words about the carpets and glass problem. We greatly regretted the action that we had been obliged to take with respect to these two items and we equally regretted the EEC action in the form of retaliation. 1 Belgium, the Secretary explained, had been the victim of a conjuncture of circumstances that had forced us to increase tariffs on carpets and glass. In the first place there was substantial unemployment in these two industries, which had suffered serious injury as a result of a substantial increase in imports. Another aspect of the problem which he wanted to mention most confidentially to Mr. Spaak was the need for the Administration to get the necessary Congressional support for the President's Trade Expansion legislation. This was truly a most far-reaching and indeed almost revolutionary bill in terms of our traditional rather conservative approach to trade. Although the Administration was pleased with the extent to which it had been able to muster wide support, there were some hard-hitting opponents who had charged that the Administration had in the past ignored peril points and escape clause action and that the features in the new bill designed to give legitimate security to American industry would be similarly ignored. It had been necessary to give evidence of the Administration's will to act and the items, by unfortunate coincidence, had been ones in which Belgium was primarily interested. While regretting this, the Secretary emphasized again that both the carpet and glass industries were in serious condition and the action had been justified. As to the future, the Secretary believed that we must let matters stand where they now are and consider the matter closed. We had taken action that the EEC countries had felt injured them and they had retaliated instead of negotiating compensation. Therefore, we would withdraw our compensation offer and the negotiations, which had been terminated by EEC retaliation, would end. Mr. Spaak said that he understood the situation but asked whether, in the case of carpets, it would not be possible to establish some “contingent” (quota). He explained that several thousand families in the Courtrai area would be unemployed because substantial segments of the carpet industry which traditionally had supplied the American market could not survive. He said this fact had created particular “emotion” with the public and with Foreign Commerce Minister Brasseur and also with Finance Minister Dequae, who came from Courtrai. Mr. Spaak believed it was most important for the President to obtain passage of his Trade Bill, but at the same time hoped something might be done in the case of carpets to permit the industry to survive. The Secretary replied that for the moment he did not believe it possible to do anything. As to the future, we would see. * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 411.004/6-962. Confidential. Drafted by Douglas MacArthur II and approved in S on June 15. 1 See Documents 245 - 247 . 249. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Kennedy 249. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Kennedy Source Washington, August 21, 1962. SUBJECT Present State of the Textile Import Problem As we recognized in our discussion last night, 1 the textile industry is acutely aware of the fact that once the trade bill is passed its bargaining power will be greatly diminished. It is, therefore, using the Senate action on the trade bill as the occasion for a last minute effort to squeeze out maximum concessions to insulate the American market from foreign competition. The industry is mounting pressure through its Congressional supporters along three lines: 1. It wants the structure of multilateral agreements that has been worked out for limiting cotton textile exports either to be made more rigid or preferably junked in favor of mandatory unilateral quotas; 2. It wants favorable action on its request for a cotton equalization fee now pending before the Tariff Commission; and 3. It wants some form of quota limitation on woolen textile exports as well as cotton. I Short and Long Term Cotton Textile Agreements The short-term agreement worked out at Geneva last year expires September 30. Meanwhile, the member nations have agreed on a new five-year agreement. Apart from Great Britain, none of the nations has definitively committed itself to sign the new agreement, and presumably signatures will not be received until after the Trade Expansion Act is finally passed. The Governments concerned wish to make sure that nothing is done through the Trade Expansion Act or otherwise that would impose further burdens or limitations on cotton textile imports into the United States. Both the short-term and long-term agreements provide for some administrative discretion in imposing restraints on imports, since, before requesting that imports from a particular country be limited, the Administration must find that additional imports would be market disruptive. In practice, you have told the industry that the agreements will be so administered as to limit imports to six percent of domestic production. This was explicitly stated in your letter to Carl Vinson. 2 During the first few months of the short-term agreement there was a certain amount of slippage primarily for three reasons: First, adequate administrative machinery had not yet been established, and no one had any experience in operating the mechanical arrangements. Second, it was not until June 18, 1962 that Congress provided us with the authority to impose restraints on countries not members of the agreement. Third, the foreign governments themselves did not fully understand how the agreement worked and there were questions about its interpretation which have since been cleared up. In spite of this slippage, however, which resulted in shipments at an annual rate well over six percent during the early months, we are confident that for the whole year of the short-term agreement imports will not exceed the six percent limit you set in your letter to Chairman Vinson . The Department of Commerce has now perfected its administrative apparatus and by August 6 over 75% of the import movement of cotton textile products had been put under restraint. There should be no serious problem of slippage under the long-term agreement which comes into effect on the first of October and runs for five years. In the case of one or two of the countries where the base under the long-term agreement has been slightly inflated due to the slippage it may be necessary to negotiate some downward adjustment of that base. However, this should not be too difficult once the long-term agreement has become operative. In short, I see no reason why we cannot maintain the six percent import ceiling you have promised. II Cotton Equalization Fee The objections to the imposition of any cotton equalization fee are the following: 1. It would have disastrous consequences for our relations with a number of textile producing countries—particularly Japan. The Japanese have made this issue a test of our good faith. They have been among the principal victims of almost every trade action we have taken during the past year and are in a highly sensitive mood. At the same time, they are acutely aware of the fact that US-Japanese trade in 1961 benefitted our balance of payments by a net $700 million. 2. Imposition of the cotton equalization fee would destroy the long-term agreement. There is no question about this. The leading textile-producing nations have put us on notice that, if we impose the equalization fee, they will reject the long-term agreement. (In this connection, we should not be misled by statements of some members of the industry that they would prefer the equalization fee to the long-term agreement. These two devices would not accomplish the same purpose. The equalization fee would principally operate to restrict the import of primary processed textiles such as yarn and grey goods. It would not materially affect the rate of importation of household textiles or of apparel since the raw cotton content is a much smaller proportion of the value of those products. Thus, if we were to impose the equalization fee and let the long-term agreement go down the drain, we would inevitably be confronted with a situation of greatly expanded exports of apparel and finished textiles and anguished demands for the imposition of quotas. In other words, we would be back where we started from eighteen months ago.) 3. The imposition of an equalization fee would require the United States to provide compensation in the form of tariff concessions on other products with respect to over $200 million of annual trade, since cotton tariffs are bound under earlier trade agreements. As a consequence we would begin the operation of the Trade Expansion Act by using up a substantial part of your authority to make tariff concessions without receiving any quid pro quo. On the other hand, if we were to fail to make adequate compensation, our trading partners would be entitled under GATT rules to retaliate against us by increasing tariffs on other products of their own choosing, as they did in the case of carpets and glass. 4. The equalization fee is a logical monstrosity. It does not make sense for the United States Government to maintain high cotton price supports which result in an artificially high price for cotton on the domestic market; pay an export subsidy in order to make it possible for cotton exporters to sell at the world price; and then put a tariff on cotton textile imports to equalize the raw cotton cost to American textile producers. The cotton textile industry would be better advised to terminate its alliance with the large cotton farmers who oppose a compensatory payment system. Even if the textile producers had the protection of an equalization fee, they would be pricing cotton textiles out of the market as against the competition of man-made fibers. III Woolen Textiles There are several reasons why we cannot negotiate a multilateral woolen textile agreement: 1. Unlike cotton textiles, where there are a large number of low-wage countries that export to the United States, our woolen textile imports are concentrated in three countries: the United Kingdom, Italy, and Japan. Our trade with the United Kingdom is of long standing and reasonably stable. We cannot deal with the United Kingdom as though it were a low-wage producer pouring disruptive imports into our market, as we dealt with the cotton textile-producing countries. Imports from Italy have been rising over the last two or three years due to the modernization of the Italian industry. But again we cannot treat Italy as though it were Hong Kong. 2. Any attempt to negotiate a wool agreement at this point would mean the death of the long-term cotton textile agreement . When we first began negotiating the cotton textile agreement, the United Kingdom, Italy, Japan and certain other countries put us on notice that they were participating in the negotiations only on the condition that the principle of the agreement would not be extended to other fibers on other products. Present Rate of Imports . New high import duties became effective on January 1, 1961. These had the effect of imposing restrictions on woolen fabrics imports almost at the level of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff. Since those new duties came into effect, imports have never regained the 1960 peak. They are presently running at an annual rate just slightly above the 1961 level, and one-third under the 1960 level. Raw Wool Tariff . As in the case of the cotton textile industry, our wool textile producers face the problem of high raw material costs. The United States is the only major manufacturer of wool textiles that imposes a protective duty on raw wool imports. Since we import more than two-thirds of our raw wool requirements, the logical point at which to tackle the problem is the tariff on raw wool. Here again the solution could best be found through some form of compensatory payment to wool producers. If we go on increasing the tariff on woolen textiles—or if we impose some restrictions that have the same price effect—we shall simply be pricing woolen textiles out of the domestic market by encouraging the development and production of man-made fibers. Unfortunately, the woolen textile industry persists in aligning itself on the side of the raw wool producers. It follows this course not only to improve its political leverage but also because a part of its tariff protection has been justified as a compensation for the raw wool tariff and the industry feels that there is some concealed extra protection for it in this compensatory element. International Wool Study Group . In order to lay the basis for a fresh approach to this problem, we have arranged a meeting of the International Wool Study Group this coming November. However, in order to induce other nations to attend that meeting we had to assure them that we were not going to use it as the occasion for proposing an international arrangement. Recommended Course of Action . During the course of the day we shall be in touch with Secretary Hodges and try to work out an agreed position for you to take when you see the textile industry representatives. I would expect that we can report this to you when we meet this evening. Meanwhile, I hope you will not find it necessary to make any firm commitment to Senator Kerr with regard to woolen textile imports since the problem requires more analysis than we were able to give it last night. George W. Ball 3 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 411.006/8-2162. Confidential. Drafted by Ball on August 21. 1 On August 20, the President held two off-the-record meetings with Ball and others from 4 to 6:25 p.m. (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Book), but no further record of these discussions has been found. 2 For the President's letter to Representative Vinson, June 27, see the Supplement. 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Ball signed the original. 250. Message From Foreign Secretary Home to Secretary of State Rusk 250. Message From Foreign Secretary Home to Secretary of State Rusk Source London, August 21, 1962. We have been very disturbed by the progress through Congress of the Bill which would double the duty on lightweight bicycles with curved frames. I understand that the Senate is expected to vote on it very shortly, and that, if this vote is favourable, the Bill will become law unless it is vetoed by the President. In itself this would be a severe blow to the British bicycle industry, which has been doing a valuable trade in these machines with the United States. But what disturbs me even more is that this Bill is only the latest of a series of obstacles put in the way of our exports to the United States. I have in mind the difficulties we have experienced over glass and carpets, the wool tariff, the valuation for duty on chemicals, the duties on bottled whisky, certain aspects of the “Buy-American” Campaign, and so on. The cumulative effect of all these measures, particularly if the latest Bill is added to them, is to raise serious doubts about the United States Administration's ability to withstand protectionist pressure from domestic industry. We here have made no secret of our admiration for the lead you have given the world by advocating liberal trade policies. If, however, public opinion in the United Kingdom decided that the United States Government were themselves unable in practice to apply these policies, the reaction would be very serious, and would not be confined to the commercial firms chiefly concerned. This is something which both of us are anxious to avoid, and it is this which prompts me to address this message to you. I know that you have done everything you can to oppose this Bill, and I am most grateful. If it should be passed by Congress despite your efforts, however, I do most earnestly beg of you to do everything possible to see that it does not become law. 1 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 411.414/8-2462. Confidential. Transmitted under cover of a letter from Lord Hood, the British Charge, to Secretary Rusk, August 24. 1 On September 4, in a letter to Lord Hood, Secretary Rusk informed him that the bill to revise the tariff on lightweight bicycles was passed over on objection in the Senate and that no further Senate action had yet been taken. “Let me assure you,” he concluded, “that we are closely following the legislative proceedings on this bill and will do everything we possibly can.” (Ibid.) 251. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions 251. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions Source Washington, September 27, 1962, 5:25 p.m. 537. House Senate conferees September 26 approved final form of trade bill with following principal changes in bill as passed by Senate (Depcirtel 484): 1 (1) Senate receded on its amendment which would have continued President's authority to extend MFN treatment to Poland and Yugoslavia. Thus Act will require denial of trade agreement benefits to “products, whether imported directly or indirectly, of any country dominated or controlled by Communism.” Ways and Means Committee report makes clear Committee contemplated that, in addition to those countries and areas designated pursuant under existing legislation, Poland and Yugoslavia will be designated under new Act. (2) Senate receded on its amendment which would have permitted President to include in agreements negotiated under special EEC authority not only EEC but also any EFTA member countries designated by him. Thus special authority can be used only in negotiating trade agreements with EEC, as originally proposed by Administration and passed by House. (3) Senate receded on an amendment which would have authorized President, when he finds it in national interest, to increase tariffs to any extent necessary or impose other import restrictions to any extent necessary. However, conferees agreed retain other Senate amendments somewhat strengthening House provision on President's authority to take action against foreign import restrictions adversely affecting U.S. trade interests. Agreed bill now goes to House and Senate for final action which expected next week. 2 Ball * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.0041/9-2762. Unclassified. Drafted by Selma G. Kallis (OTF) on September 26, cleared by John Bertram Rehm (L/E) in draft, and approved by Leonard Weiss (OTF). Sent to 30 posts and pouched to all others except Moscow, Budapest, Prague, Bucharest, and Sofia. 1 Dated September 19. (Ibid. 411.00/9-1962) 2 The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 was enacted on October 11, 1962. (P.L. 87-794; 76 Stat. 872) For excerpts, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962 , pp. 1383-1396. 252. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy 252. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy Source Washington, October 12, 1962. SUBJECT Recommended Veto of H.R. 8938 on Bicycle Tariffs H.R. 8938 was passed by the Congress on October 5 and is now before you for consideration. This bill has the effect by reclassification of doubling the duty on half our imports of bicycles. The bill has been consistently opposed by the Department of Commerce, the Department of State, and other Executive agencies. I strongly recommend that you veto H.R. 8938. The reasons for my opposition are that: —The Bill is an example of unilateral tariffmaking by special legislation, and as such is contrary to the new Trade Expansion Act. —In doubling bicycle tariffs, the Bill will likely produce prompt retaliation by the United Kingdom, the Common Market countries, Japan and Austria—retaliation of the kind recently generated by escape clause action on carpets and glass. This retaliation will adversely affect United States exports at a time when we are trying to increase them. —The Bill will undermine confidence in United States negotiated tariff commitments, and prejudice the bargaining position of your Chief Negotiator in the upcoming crucial negotiations with the European Economic Community. —The bicycle industry has made no effort to show that it is suffering serious competitive injury from imports; in the absence of such injury, unilateral action on this tariff will violate an existing international agreement of the United States. —The industry has not availed itself of the administrative remedies open to it under the tariff laws. A proposed draft of veto message is attached. 1 Dean Rusk 2 Notation: If Congressional adjournment permits, a “pocket veto” is available. 3 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 411.006/10-1262. No classification marking. Drafted by Bayless A. Manning (U) and cleared in substance by W. Michael Blumenthal (E) and Herman Barger (E/OTF). A typed notation on the source text reads: “Withholding approval. See Press Release from W.H. 10/22/62.” The attached press release is printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962 , p. 805. 1 Not attached but presumably the draft veto message was the same as, or very similar to, the White House Press Release. 2 Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original. 3 The notation is in unidentified handwriting. Because the second session of the 87th Congress had adjourned, the President's disapproval was a “pocket veto” of the bill. 253. Letter From President Kennedy to Christian A. Herter 253. Letter From President Kennedy to Christian A. Herter Source Washington, November 15, 1962. Dear Mr. Secretary : In requesting that you accept the responsibility of serving as Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, 1 I believe it appropriate that I indicate to you the importance with which I view this assignment, the scope of the task, and the goals toward which our efforts should be directed. As you know, I accorded to the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 the high priority, the non-partisan support, and the unqualified commitment which must be provided legislation which affects the vital security interests of the United States both here and abroad. I requested and received authority from the Congress not only to pursue agreements on trade and tariffs which would accommodate our national needs for expanding markets and thereby contribute to our economic strength and growth, but also to create entirely new reciprocal trading arrangements which would measurably contribute to the economic, political and military strength and solidarity of the free world. Notable among these broader purposes is the determination to build a more closely-knit Atlantic Community, to accord to other industrialized countries outside the Common Market such as Japan and Canada a role in world trade commensurate to their importance as partners in the struggle with world communism, and to afford the less-developed countries the consideration and access to markets and sources of supply which will hasten their development under circumstances of free choice. Thus, the importance of this task and the scope of interest and endeavor of the Special Representative transcends the particulars of negotiations on trade and tariff matters. This work goes to the very heart of the many policies and programs, domestic and foreign, which will help to shape the world environment in which the United States must maintain initiative, command respect, and provide leadership. Accordingly, I shall look to the Special Representative to advise and assist me directly in helping to shape our international trade and economic policies as well as spearheading the major negotiating effort abroad which lies ahead. To this end, the Special Representative will necessarily be accorded a central role in the formulation of trade policy. He will chair the new Cabinet-level interdepartmental committee which will replace the present Trade Policy Committee. He will be directly responsible for preparing the proposed objectives and strategies for negotiations and for directing those negotiations while they are in process. In a broader sense he will become, along with the Secretaries of State and Commerce, one of the top policy officials of the U.S. Government in shaping and achieving our international objectives in the commercial, trade, and economic fields. I am confident that we fully agree on the broad purposes and goals sought in this program; that we fully share the sense of urgency and determination with which this effort must be pursued; and that we appreciate the magnitude and difficulty of the task. It is on this basis that I have sought to enlist your efforts to the historic task which presents such opportunity and challenge for our country. Sincerely yours, John F. Kennedy * Source: Kennedy Library, Herter Papers, Herter Appointment. No classification marking. The date is handwritten on the source text as the date the letter was received. 1 Chapter 5, Section 241 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 confers on the President the authority to appoint individuals to this position. The law specifies that the Special Trade Representative's primary responsibility is to “seek information and advice with respect to each negotiation from representatives of industry, agriculture, and labor, and from such agencies as he deems appropriate.” ( American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962 , p. 1390) 254. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Johnson) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) 254. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Johnson) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) Source Washington, November 29, 1962. SUBJECT Meeting of Messrs. Ball, Bell, Dillon, and Gudeman on November 30, 1962 to discuss the Commerce Department's proposed export expansion program Introduction In the Treasury's submission of September 28 to the Cabinet Committee, the payments projections for 1964 indicated an over-all U.S. deficit of $1 billion rather than our stated objective of equilibrium. In view of the shortfall, Commerce undertook to prepare a detailed program designed to raise the export level, presently projected at $23.2 billion. The report under review (Tab A) contains the recommendations that have resulted from Commerce's work. 1 The Commerce program comprises twelve major elements, summarized below. With a few exceptions, the program presents no problems for us. Commerce has not shown, however, how the program's elements, singly or in combination, can be expected to contribute to the necessary $1 billion increase in exports, but such a showing is probably not feasible. Commerce estimates that, to carry out the program, $4.05 million in supplemental appropriations will be needed for FY 1963 and that appropriation requests for FY 1964 will have to be increased by $13 million. Recommendations A. We recommend that the following proposals should be particularly supported as offering special promise for export gains: (1) Expanding the number of overseas trade centers; (2) Subsidizing American exhibitors at overseas trade fairs; (3) Promoting private trade missions abroad; and (4) Bringing foreign buyers to the United States under the reverse trade mission program. B. We recommend opposing the following proposals: (1) Establishing a separate commercial service; (2) Submitting the proposal for a separate commercial service to the Cabinet Committee on the Balance of Payments; (3) Giving the National Export Expansion Coordinator explicit or implicit supervisory authority over Ambassadors; and (4) “Reversing” our approach to government representation of business abroad, if that means departing from our policies, as stated by Secretary Rusk, of not “participating in actual sales or giving unfair competitive advantage to one American company over another.” C. On the Commerce proposal for a tax incentive, we recommend: (1) Explaining its implications with regard to GATT and our commercial policy relations with other countries which cause us concern; and (2) Urging study of other possible tax incentives which do not have adverse GATT implications and hold more promise. Details of the Commerce Program 2 1. Tax incentives . Allow deduction of export marketing expenses when computing income taxes at 120 percent of outlays rather than 100 percent. (See p. 5 of Tab A.) 3 2. Export financing . Provide an additional $1 billion for medium-term export financing, improve administrative procedures, and revise priorities (p. 5). 3. Expanded domestic and overseas service . Reconstitute the Overseas Commercial Service, now under State, as a separate service (p. 7). 4. Trade centers . Establish centers in the twenty top markets for U.S. exports (p. 8). 5. Changed orientation of trade fair program . Instead of constructing new pavilions, subsidize participation by U.S. companies at specific fairs (p. 9). 6. Trade missions . Encourage U.S. business groups to finance their own missions abroad (p. 10). 7. Reverse trade missions . Bring foreign buyers to trade shows in the United States, if necessary at government cost (p. 11). 8. Overseas market studies . Expand work on market studies, with a larger role to be played by trade association or industry groups (p. 12). 9. Government representation . Make the National Export Expansion Coordinator responsible for assuring government representation for the interests of particular businesses overseas in specific transactions (p. 12). 10. Regional Export Expansion Councils . To support these Councils and make them more effective, provide additional funds for rejuvenating field offices and expanding the staff of the National Export Expansion Coordinator (p. 13). 11. Promotional “tactics .” Introduce an “E” award program, a nationwide, state-by-state export contest, and an export symbol (p. 14). 12. Enlarging the National Export Expansion Coordinator's staff . Provide the Coordinator with a staff of 25 “Senior Foreign Trade Advisors” (p. 16). Comments The following comments deal only with the major issues raised by the Commerce paper. Proposal for a Separate Commercial Service 4 1. This is a matter to be resolved jointly between State and Commerce, and should be eliminated from the proposals. The Cabinet Committee on the Balance of Payments is an inappropriate forum for discussion of the Commerce proposal, inasmuch as it relates to the jurisdiction over services of the Department of State abroad, from which the proposed separate commercial service would be withdrawn and transferred to Commerce. 2. There is no apparent need for a separate overseas commercial service. (a) The present joint State-Commerce commercial program, under an agreement between the two departments signed on November 15, 1961, has been in operation only some seven months—too short a time to judge its performance. (b) The present arrangement permits realization of all the advantages that Commerce sees in a separate service. It does not, in any way, preclude expanding the overseas service staff, increasing its quality and effectiveness, and enlarging the scope of its activities. (1) Commerce presently had primary responsibility for nominating and training expert personnel. (2) Commerce already participates fully in budgeting procedures and in administrative and communications matters. (3) State has already taken steps to assure the full support of our overseas missions to export expansion efforts. 3. The present arrangement preserves a unified operation abroad, and is thus preferable to a separate service reporting directly to different bosses in Washington. 4. Commerce is on record as favoring a commercial specialty within a unified Foreign Service. 5. Commerce's proposal may be based on the hope that a separate service would be able to attract larger appropriations from Congress than has the present organization. Congress rejected Commerce's request for increases in commercial positions in FY 1963. However, the composition of appropriations committees and the past treatment of requests for overseas commercial positions give us reason to believe that future requests for this purpose would receive no better treatment for a separate service than for the existing organization. Proposal for Improved Governmental Representation 1. Commerce would subordinate Ambassadors to the National Export Expansion Coordinator in representing U.S. business interest abroad. We believe that the Ambassadors must retain principal jurisdiction over commercial matters in their respective countries, so that such matters can be coordinated with other aspects of U.S. foreign policy. There is nothing in this Ambassadorial role, however, which precludes the Export Expansion Coordinator from defining broad policy objectives and providing specific guidance. 2. Commerce states that our approach to government representation in helping U.S. business win contracts “must be reversed.” It is already our policy to do as much as other countries, short of acting as agents for U.S. firms or giving an unfair competitive advantage to one American company over another. We must certainly intensify our general efforts, but should not reverse ourselves on these qualifications, to which Commerce itself adheres in its dealings with U.S. business. Proposal for a Tax Incentive 1. Commerce has orally confirmed that it contemplates overexpensing of only those export marketing expenses that exceed the level of a recent, and as yet undefined, base period. This has the advantage of providing an incentive for export promotion without permitting windfall profits as a result of expenses which, more or less, would have been made in any event. 2. Commerce suggests that additional export marketing expenses be deducted at 120 percent instead of 100 percent when income taxes are computed. As a result, such expenses would cost a profitable company only 37.6 cents per dollar after taxes, compared with 48 cents per dollar for all other deductible business expenses. 3. There is international precedent for such an incentive measure. Australia permits the deduction of all export promotion expenses at 200 percent, and New Zealand at 150 percent. This results in after-tax export promotion costs of 30 cents and 25 cents per dollar, respectively, by profitable firms in each country, compared with 65 cents and 50 cents, respectively, for all other deductible expenses. 4. Adoption of a tax incentive would conflict with our objective of getting foreign countries to drop their export subsidies. (In a letter of October 4, 1962 to the President, Secretaries Hodges and Wirtz, Chairman and Vice Chairman of the President's Advisory Committee on Labor-Management Policy, said: “Our Government must continue and intensify its efforts to obtain the elimination or reduction of subsidies which aid export industries of foreign countries and place American industry at a disadvantage in world trade.”) 5. The proposed incentive would violate the GATT if it led to lower foreign than domestic prices for the same American goods. It would be difficult to deny that the proposed incentive is a subsidy within the meaning of GATT Article XVI:4. In particular, it is generally considered that this article applies to the remission of direct taxes calculated in relation to exports. 6. Considering the important position of the United States in world trade, the tax incentive might touch off an export subsidy race. 7. It is doubtful that the incentive, as proposed by Commerce is large enough to have a significant effect on exports. If it does prove to be too small and if it is therefore enlarged, the dangers of a GATT violation and subsidy race would be increased. * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 400.11/11-2962. Confidential. Drafted by Gerald A. Pollack (E/OTF/FN) on November 29 and concurred in by Herman Pollack (A) and Theodore Hadraba (E) in draft, Leonard Weiss (E), Bernard Norwood (E/CPT), and Mortimer Goldstein (E/FN). 1 For text of the Department of Commerce's proposal for an Export Expansion Program, November 8, see the Supplement. 2 Requires new legislation. [Footnote in the source text.] 3 Requires new legislation. [Footnote in the source text.] 4 For a point-by-point rebuttal of Commerce's arguments for a separate service, see Tab B. [Footnote in the source text.] 255. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to the President's Deputy Special Counsel (Feldman) 255. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to the President's Deputy Special Counsel (Feldman) Source Washington, December 5, 1962. Dear Mike : I have your note this morning 1 regarding the President's interest in a specific program for meeting the commitment to maintain wool textile imports at no more than 17-1/2%. On the basis of my personal memorandum to members of the Cabinet Textile Committee, dated November 23,1 and the discussions at the Cabinet Textile Committee meeting on November 30, 2 the Committee, as I understand it, reached the following conclusions: 1. Neither a multilateral international agreement nor individual bilateral agreements providing for voluntary restraint are feasible with respect to woolen textiles. Any effort to negotiate such voluntary arrangements would be not only futile but extremely prejudicial to our larger program of negotiations contemplated by the Trade Expansion Act. 2. The imposition of mandatory quotas on woolen textile imports would not only undermine our efforts to enlarge our foreign markets by eliminating quota restrictions on American agricultural products but would subject us to claims for compensation in the form of tariff concessions on other goods in an amount approaching $250 million a year. 3. The only practicable way to achieve the necessary restriction on woolen imports is through a well-designed system of tariff increases utilizing the powers granted by the Trade Expansion Act. In the light of these conclusions, I would suppose that the program I set forth in my memorandum of November 23 would still stand. That program, in essence, was as follows: 1. Mr. Herter should be requested to give attention to the wool textile problem as one of the first tasks to be undertaken by the President's Special Representative for Trade Negotiations. The assignment of this responsibility to Mr. Herter is required by the Trade Expansion Act. The statutory language requires that the Chief Representative conduct “each negotiation” under the Act, and there is no available solution that does not involve the use of the authority granted by that Act. 2. The Commerce Department should immediately undertake a detailed study and analysis to determine the exact nature and extent of the import pressure and recommend the tariff increases necessary to restrict imports to the required level on a category by category basis. Quite possibly the President will wish to request the staff of the Tariff Commission to participate in this study. 3. The International Wool Study Group is meeting in Plenary Session beginning December 10th. We are seeking that Group's expression of a continuing interest in the avoidance of disruption in world wool textile markets. The meeting will not itself result in any agreement but it should set the climate in which a negotiation can be conducted. 4. The Special Representative should, as soon as practicable, visit Europe to undertake preliminary discussions with a view to working out a deal for tariff increases on woolen textiles. Although undertaken within the GATT rules this would be a special negotiation undertaken with only those countries with which we have bindings on our relevant woolen textile tariffs. 5. Upon the completion of the Study Group meeting in December, we should set in motion the machinery for a special negotiation under section 201 of the Trade Expansion Act 3 with regard to import duties on wool textiles. This procedure would involve the publication of a list of the articles—wool textiles upon which we want higher duties plus other articles upon which we would cut tariffs as compensation—to be considered during such a negotiation. The list would be submitted to the Tariff commission for advice concerning the probable economic effect of tariff modifications with respect to each article. Public hearings would be held simultaneously by the Tariff Commission and an interagency trade committee. When the Tariff Commission makes its recommendation based upon its hearings and when the President receives a summary of the hearings held by the interagency committee, he may then initiate the negotiation. While the statute gives the Tariff Commission six months to make its findings, this process could be speeded up in this instance since the list of articles would not be broad and the White House interest in quick resolution could be brought to bear. I recognize that the above program may cause disappointment in Congressional circles. But, as was made abundantly clear in the discussion of the Textile Committee, there is no cheap, quick, or easy way to achieve the required restraint on woolen textile imports. The situation is wholly different from that prevailing with regard to cotton textiles and—even with the best of luck—we shall be able to meet our commitment to restrain woolen textiles only at substantial cost to our political and trading interests. The suggested program is the best I have been able to devise. It is awkward and costly, but any alternative I can think of would be far worse for us in every way. Sincerely, George * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 411.006/12-562. Confidential. 1 Not found. 2 No record of this meeting has been found. 3 Under Section 201 (a) (1) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, the President had the authority to “enter into trade agreements with foreign countries or instrumentalities thereof” after June 30, 1962, and before July 1, 1967. ( American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962 , p. 1383) 256. Report by the Cabinet Committee on Balance of Payments to President Kennedy 256. Report by the Cabinet Committee on Balance of Payments to President Kennedy Source Washington, January 24, 1963. SUBJECT Program for Expansion of U.S. Commercial Exports The Committee has reviewed all of our programs designed to achieve a reasonable equilibrium in the balance of payments of the United States. It concludes that good progress has been made in our programs for reducing or offsetting U.S. Government expenditures abroad and for strengthening the international monetary system so as to protect the dollar against strains arising from large international movements of short-term funds. These programs must be vigorously followed up. In the Committee's judgment, however, we must look mainly to exports for substantial further reductions in our basic payments deficit. Government and business together must make vigorous efforts to increase our commercial surplus—the excess of exports of goods and services over imports—to a level adequate to cover our necessary net payments abroad for defense, economic assistance, and private investment. This task is not easy. It can only be accomplished through a broad and determined national effort. At present, our exports account for only 4 percent of our gross national product, whereas Italy exports about 12 percent of GNP, Germany about 15 percent and the United Kingdom over 16 percent. Our businessmen must do more. But government can in many ways provide leadership, point out export opportunities and help sales. We have established new, and have expanded existing, programs—notably in the Department of Commerce and the Export-Import Bank—to do this. However, the Committee has concluded that additional sales promotion efforts by the business community and the U.S. Government are now required if we are to achieve our goal of balance of payments equilibrium within a reasonable period. These efforts must, of course, occur against the backdrop of continued policies to ensure that our products are competitive with those of other nations and have fair access to their markets. This means continued price stability, as well as continuous improvement of our products. It also means vigorous negotiations on tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade with other nations—particularly those of the European Common Market. Especially important over the long run will be a successful outcome of negotiations under the Trade Expansion Act. An Action Program to Promote Exports Bearing in mind that government cannot itself increase exports, but can only lead the way and provide assistance to the thousands of U.S. businessmen on whose efforts achievement of balance of payments equilibrium depends, the Committee recommends adoption of the following action program: 1. Export financing. Pursuant to your directives at the beginning of your administration, the Export-Import Bank has improved existing facilities and, in cooperation with a large group of private insurance companies, has formed the Foreign Credit Insurance Association (FCIA), which provides completely new export-credit insurance facilities. These programs must be and are being continually reassessed to assure their maximum effectiveness and their continued adaptation to changing circumstances. During recent months, the Bank, in cooperation with Treasury, Commerce, and the FCIA, has sought out and carefully reviewed comments and specific suggestions from major commercial banks and exporters as to the adequacy and usefulness of these programs, and a number of significant improvements in the coverage and administration of the programs have been adopted. The latest such improvements, announced early in January, are a general reduction in rates charged for FCIA coverage combined with a revised classification of countries for rate-fixing purposes and the offering of an optional coverage for political risks only. Accordingly, American exporters now enjoy credit facilities which are believed to be the equal of those anywhere in the world. In addition, the Bank and the FCIA, in cooperation with the Department of Commerce, must now make a major and continuing effort to bring these facilities to the attention of banks and businessmen throughout the country. This effort is already under way, but must and will be further broadened and intensified. Effective promotion of these new facilities will do more than simply inform businessmen of the export-financing aids now available: it can also be a major tool for making them better aware of the potentialities of foreign markets. 2. Export promotion. The Department of Commerce and American embassies and consulates abroad have long provided an array of different types of services designed to aid individual American exporters in locating potential foreign markets and successfully selling their products abroad. Among these are the development of U.S. export opportunities, the preparation of general and specific market analyses, the provision of credit information, and help in contacting foreign business firms. Broader and more intensified efforts are now called for in these areas, as well as to get companies already exporting to do a better job; to persuade top management that exporting should become one of its major concerns; to interest new firms in the potentialities of the export market; and to intensify our marketing efforts. A. Promotion at home. The first task is to see that top management gives greater attention to exports. This is a task to which the Administration at all levels must devote itself. Major responsibility must rest with the Department of Commerce, particularly with its Bureau of International Commerce. The export expansion activities of this Bureau and other parts of the Department of Commerce must be substantially increased in strength. It is also proposed that the Office of the Export Coordinator be strengthened, that a number of export sales promotion officers be appointed, and that the Department of Commerce field staffs devoted to trade promotion be doubled in strength. The roving export sales promotion officers should supplement the efforts of the expanded Commerce field offices in bringing to the attention of every exporter and potential exporter the profit and growth opportunities to be found in exporting. Information on potential export markets has been available, but not in the depth businessmen require. Much more detailed surveys of markets for particular products are needed. Trade associations and industry groups could supplement the efforts of individual government experts in evaluating the markets for a particular product in a number of countries, with a portion of the expense borne by the Government. These studies need to be sharply and rapidly expanded. B. Promotion abroad. Related both to the task of promotion abroad, and to that discussed above, is a proposed increase in the budget for the overseas commercial services. It is on our commercial officers overseas that the continuing, day-to-day, responsibility of reporting on export opportunities and market potential rests. It is they who must lay the groundwork and establish contacts for the special teams of Washington experts or businessmen who come to seek out specific export opportunities. When firms have been interested in exporting, the task remains of actually getting American salesmen overseas with samples and order books, and foreign buyers here with check books. To this task, existing programs can make a direct contribution, and should be expanded. Through participation in trade fairs, the dispatch of trade missions, and the establishment of trade centers, a wide variety of American goods can be shown abroad to the maximum number of potential buyers. (a) Trade Fairs . Up until now, trade fairs have been utilized primarily to sell the United States, rather than to sell our products. Only in FY ‘63 has the Department of Commerce been given money for trade fairs specifically planned to sell U.S. goods and services. The $1.6 million granted by Congress will permit Commerce to mount or prepare for pavilion-type exhibits in seven major cities, selected on the basis of probable export opportunities. More American business firms can be persuaded to exhibit at trade fairs on a continuing basis, provided government initially assumes a share of the expense. (For example, the first year the government might pay 75% of the cost of participation by a particular firm, the second year 37-1/2%, and the third year nothing. This procedure would encourage a maximum number of U.S. companies to explore the market.) The amount provided for this program next year should be more than doubled. In addition, a small appropriation should be provided to pay for mobile trade fairs, as recently authorized by the Congress. (b) Trade Centers . Trade centers (miniature merchandise marts) have already been set up in London, Bangkok and Frankfurt. A fourth will be opened in Tokyo this spring. The trade center makes it possible for an American manufacturer to test the sales appeal of his goods in a foreign market at relatively low cost, serves as a magnet to attract potential buyers, distributors and agents, and can bring about direct sales far in excess of the government's expenditures for the trade center. But the significance of the trade center is not to be measured in terms of on-the-floor sales. Properly programmed, it generates continuing interest in U.S. goods by month-after-month demonstration of the fact that “there is always something new and wonderful” coming from America. With proper follow-up by the exhibiting exporter, the volume of repeat sales should substantially exceed the initial orders taken in the center. It is important to establish trade centers in another seven top export opportunity markets, in addition to the five already authorized, as soon as practicable. (c) Trade Missions . An increasing number of specialized trade missions are necessary. Such missions are composed of business people representing one industry or segment of industry seeking export opportunities in their own particular field in places which market surveys have determined to have the highest potential. Some missions will also be needed to introduce U.S. businessmen to growing markets in newly-independent countries. In these missions, industry supplies the men but the government pays their travel expenses. With the funds appropriated, Commerce has been able to mount about a dozen such missions annually. In the fall of 1962 Commerce sponsored the first industry-organized trade mission. This differs from previous missions in that the industry selects the mission's members, and it or the members pay their own expenses. The mission is briefed in Washington by the Department of Commerce, the facilities of the Foreign Service are utilized to make appointments and plan itineraries overseas, and a Commerce represent-ative accompanies the group. On its return, the mission reports to the Department of Commerce, with the understanding that its findings will be used for the benefit of all in the industry, whether they are members of the sponsoring association or not. The cost of such missions to the government is substantially less than that of an official government mission. Two other trade associations have already taken the initiative to form missions, others have expressed interest. It is hoped that as many as sixteen of these missions might be formed through industry groups, and the National Association of Manufacturers and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce have already agreed to help Commerce in doing so. (d) Foreign Buyers Program . Another technique of export promotion which has proved successful in many other countries is to bring foreign buyers to the exporting country. Selected foreign buyers should be brought to this country for such events as the furniture show, the housewares show, the appliance show, etc. The American businesses which will benefit should bear all of the costs of such a program, although in certain cases it may be desirable for the government to pay part of the costs. Particular efforts will be made to get American business to advertise its shows overseas. A major part of the modest cost of this operation lies in determining what items should be promoted, where they should be promoted, and following up to ascertain the exports resulting. Conclusion The budgetary costs of the program outlined above are very small when contrasted to the importance of achieving equilibrium in our balance of payments. A table showing the amounts which have been included for this program in the Budget is attached as Annex I. 1 Adopting the above recommendations will not guarantee the increased export effort we need—only American business can do that; but failure to adopt them would be to avoid a small cost and accept a high risk—one that we should not and need not take. Douglas Dillion * Source: Kennedy Library, Herter Papers, Balance of Payments. Official Use Only. Copies were attached to a January 29 memorandum from Dillon to members of the Cabinet Committee on Balance of Payments. For further documentation on the balance-of-payments problem, See Documents 1 ff. and 40 ff. 1 Not printed. 257. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to President Kennedy 257. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to President Kennedy Source Washington, January 24, 1963. SUBJECT Suggested Course of Action to Implement the Export Expansion Program The program submitted to you by the Cabinet Committee involves a modest increase in expenditures, approximately $11 million, for the purpose of improving our export expansion program. These funds are contained in the budget requests which you have forwarded to the Congress. The chief difficulty in obtaining acceptance of this program will be with Congressman Rooney who has been consistently averse to any personnel increases in non-political activities abroad. Without some special effort on your part it is certain that he will sabotage this program. I recommend that you arrange to see Mr. Rooney at the White House on this matter at an early date, either alone, or with Secretary Hodges and me present. The object would be to point out to him the extreme gravity of our balance of payments situation and the contribution which can and must be made by expanded exports. This being the case, any doubts about the efficacy of a modest program such as has been recommended must, in the overall national interest, be resolved in favor of acceptance of the full program. I would also suggest that you formally approve the report of the Cabinet Committee on Export Promotion, and forward it to Commerce, State and the Export-Import Bank for prompt implementation preferably accompanied by a brief memorandum indicating your personal interest in export expansion. 1 It could then be transmitted to the Congress in the most appropriate fashion for use in the appropriation hearings, stressing that it has your full support, as well as that of the entire Cabinet Committee on Balance of Payments. This should give Mr. Rooney an adequate excuse to reverse his long-standing position on this matter. Since appropriation hearings will start very soon it would be helpful if you could see Mr. Rooney some time next week. Douglas Dillon 2 * Source: Kennedy Library, Dillon Papers, Memoranda to the President. No classification marking. 1 On January 29, President Kennedy sent a brief memorandum to Secretary Dillon and all the members of Cabinet Committee on Balance of Payments, informing them that he had read the memorandum on the Export Expansion Program and that “it has my full support and I would like you to give top priority to carrying out its recommendations, in view of the importance of exports to our balance of payments.” (Kennedy Library, Herter Papers, Balance of Payments, 1963) 2 Printed from a copy that indicates Dillon signed the original. 258. Memorandum of Conversation 258. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, January 29, 1963, 3 p.m. SUBJECT Wool Textiles PARTICIPANTS Mr. Koichiro Asakai, Ambassador of Japan Mr. Akira Nakashima, First Secretary, Embassy of Japan Mr. George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State Mr. W. Michael Blumenthal, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs Mr. Robert W. Barnett, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Far Eastern Economic Affairs Miss Thelma E. Vettel, Special Assistant to the Director for East Asian Affairs The Ambassador said that when the Japanese applied voluntary controls to cotton textiles, they were apprehensive about the possibility that these restrictions would be applied to woolen textiles. The U.S. gave assurances that this was not intended. He pointed out that Article 1 of the LTA 1 recognized that the cotton textile industry had “special problems.” At the London meeting of the International Wool Study Group assurances were received from the U.S. that it was not considering the extension of the LTA to wool textiles. On various occasions the Japanese Embassy has discussed this question with the Department and has always been assured that the U.S. was not thinking of the extension of restrictions to wool textiles. Recently, however, the Ambassador said, the Japanese Government had received reports from Geneva that the U.S. was thinking of a formula for curtailing imports of woolen goods. This had caused embarrassment to the Japanese Embassy, which was under the impression that the U.S. assurances still stood. The Ambassador had received instructions to obtain the Under Secretary's thinking on this matter. The Under Secretary confirmed the Ambassador's recollection that the U.S. had been very explicit regarding this matter. He pointed out, however, that the U.S. had a practical problem with respect to increased imports of wool textiles. He said that Mr. Blumenthal had been discuss-ing with Mr. Wyndham White (the Executive Secretary of the GATT) the possibility that something might be worked out which would provide some relief of the pressure from increased imports but which would also result in a reduction in U.S. duties on raw wool and the compensating duties on wool textiles. A meeting in Geneva is planned for early February for the purpose of working out the matter, but not necessarily to apply the LTA to wool textiles. The Ambassador asked if the U.S. was thinking of a quota system. The Under Secretary replied that we are disturbed by the problem but are open minded. He pointed out that woolen tariffs are already high. Mr. Blumenthal recalled that at the London meeting we had said we did not come to propose restrictions or to propose an extension of the LTA. Various countries, including Japan, had suggested that one of the problems was the cost of the fiber, which was related to the tariff on raw wool. We had laid out the problem to Mr. Wyndham White but made no suggestion as to how it might be handled. The consultation meeting of exporters in Geneva on February 4 is designed to explore various solutions, and if at a certain point in the discussions the U.S. should, upon invitation, send a representative, it would be with an open mind. The Ambassador expressed some surprise. He said his Embassy had repeatedly told Tokyo that the U.S. did not have restrictions in mind; he said the Japanese did not want to see the U.S. enter into discussions of a formula similar to the LTA. Mr. Blumenthal said that Mr. Wyndham White thought this problem sufficiently important in relation to the forthcoming tariff negotiations that it should be explored with the exporters. Such a meeting has been set at Geneva. What will happen after that meeting is not known. Perhaps the discussions will be expanded to include the U.S. The Ambassador said the Japanese do not want questions of import restrictions to pile up, one by one. He asked that Japan be told as soon as possible the line of U.S. thinking. The Under Secretary explained that we have a problem, but no solution at the moment. The problem is that imports have increased since 1955 from 10 to 20 percent of domestic production. We would be glad to keep the Ambassador advised after the Geneva meeting as to what our actions will be. There is a possibility for considerable reductions in raw wool tariffs and in compensatory duties on wool textiles. The Ambassador said the Japanese were surprised to hear of these developments regarding possible U.S. wool textile import restrictions. Mr. Blumenthal explained that from the U.S. point of view, the problem at the London meeting was to point out that we had a serious problem. A possibility mentioned there was a “standstill” on imports for a period of time plus a lowering of our raw wool duties. The U.S. has made no proposal but was desirous of exploring with the exporters some mutually agreeable formula and that the “standstill” idea was one possibility which, while we had not officially proposed it, we were interested to explore. * Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Vettel on January 29 and approved in U on February 18. The source text is labeled “Part III of III.” 1 The Long-Term Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles (LTA) was signed in Geneva under GATT auspices by 19 countries in 1962. Its purpose was to ensure orderly development of the cotton textile trade to allow for growth of exports while not damaging markets of importing countries. 259. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions 259. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions Source Washington, January 29, 1963, 7:37 p.m. 1336. For Ambassadors. Re: Wool textile import problem. 1. Nature of Problem a. Wool textile imports (defined as wool tops, yarn, woven and knit fabrics, apparel, and miscellaneous items) into US have risen to point where they represented estimated 20 per cent of domestic consumption in 1962 as compared to 10 per cent in 1955. (Similar figures for cotton textiles estimated 6-7 per cent in 1962 and 2 per cent in 1955.) b. Imports in 1962 estimated at $225 million as compared with previous peak of $182 million in 1960. c. About three-fourths of wool textile imports from Italy, Japan, and UK in descending order of importance. Hong Kong fourth. Other EEC members rank next in importance. d. Increase in imports in 1962 over previous peak of 1960 occurred in items constituting 93 per cent of total wool textile imports. Major increase in apparel, with Italy as major supplier of increased apparel import items. 2. Administration's Commitment a. US wool textile industry claims imports causing serious disruption and entitled to relief under President's 7-point program of May 1961. b. Administration committed itself to industry in August 1962 to hold wool textile imports to level which would prevent disruption to domestic industry. 3. Alternative Courses of Action President's Cabinet Textile Advisory Committee has considered various alternatives in effort implement commitment, as follows: a. Impose import quotas . Inconsistency this course action with basic foreign economic policy, probable retaliation, effect on Kennedy round, precedent for other industries, have ruled this course out of consideration at this time. b. Raise tariffs . Such action would have to be comprehensive, increases for some items would have to go beyond Smoot-Hawley levels, and would involve granting substantial compensation. Wool textile industry has opposed this course as not being able to do job effectively or fast enough. c. Negotiate bilateral agreements with three major suppliers . This would not prevent others from increasing their share of US market, as indeed is happening with some LDC's—e.g. Hong Kong, which already in fourth place in US market. d. Negotiate international agreement such as cotton textile arrangement . Major exporting countries made it clear when agreeing to Long-Term Cotton Textile Arrangement (LTA) that this not precedent for similar agreements in other fields. Pending Action by GATT At direction of President's Cabinet Textile Advisory Committee, Dept has discussed with Wyndham White, Exec Secy GATT, problem and above alternative courses. Recent meeting of International Wool Study Group in London had indicated that GATT was proper forum for discussion problem faced by US re wool textiles. Although Wyndham White believed there would be great difficulty in securing agreement from other governments, he felt it was necessary, in view commitment which has been made by Administration and fact some action will be taken by US in any event, to sound out UK, Japan, and EEC re possibility multilateral approach to this problem involving limited number of countries. He felt that an indispensable part of such approach would be action by US to reduce raw wool duties accompanied by corresponding reductions in specific duties on wool textiles. This sounding out now in proc-ess on highly confidential and informal basis. Meeting of these countries will be held in Geneva February 4. On basis this meeting, it is possible that US will be invited to participate at similar meeting ten days to two weeks later. (Canberra note Australia not involved in February 4 meeting but Wyndham White now in process of advising Australians of current discussions.) Action by Addressee Posts At this stage, Ambassadors are not being requested to approach host government. In view delicacy problem, it is essential to keep matter as quiet as possible at this time. Foregoing has been transmitted for background and to permit Ambassadors to clarify situation if matter is raised. Points to be stressed by Ambassadors in any comments should include: a. US has serious problem re wool textile imports, and Administration is committed to provide some relief. b. No decision on specific program has been made, but in view reactions at London Wool Study Group that GATT is relevant forum for discussion such problem, we have raised matter with Wyndham White. c. Latter strongly argued for multilateral action generally along lines alternative (d) above and offered to sound out key countries. d. US believes opportunity to discuss question with exporting countries subsequent February 4 meeting highly desirable. e. Completely negative attitude by others might have effect of forcing US into position which would be adverse to implementation of objectives of Trade Expansion Act. f. USG has no fixed ideas at this stage re best means of multilateral action but willing to develop approach with exporting countries cooperatively. Foregoing message is being sent to Bonn, Brussels, Canberra, Geneva, The Hague, London, Paris, Rome, and Tokyo. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 411.006/1-2962. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution; No Distribution Outside Department. Drafted by Stanley Nehmer (E/OR), cleared by W. Michael Blumenthal (E), and approved by Ball. Sent to Bonn, Brussels, Canberra, Geneva, The Hague, London, Paris, Rome, and Tokyo. 260. Letter From Senators Warren G. Magnuson, Henry M. Jackson, and Clair Engle to President Kennedy 260. Letter From Senators Warren G. Magnuson, Henry M. Jackson, and Clair Engle to President Kennedy Source Washington, February 20, 1963. My Dear Mr. Secretary : We are writing to you, and to Secretary of Agriculture Freeman, regarding present restrictions on the entry of American poultry into the markets of the European Economic Community. These result, we are advised, from Regulation No. 22 of the E.E.C. adopted at Brussels on April 4, 1962. 1 The poultry producers of our states have made it clear that the effect of the present E.E.C. policy is to price U.S. poultry out of Community countries. The background of this, according to the Department of Agriculture, is that poultry meat consumption in Community countries has been increasing much more rapidly than production in recent years. There was an increase of net imports into the area from 29 million pounds in 1955 to 181 million in 1960. In the same period, U.S. exports of frozen poultry to the E.E.C. rose to 93 million pounds from 0.1 million pounds. In 1961, the 128 million pounds of fresh and frozen poultry the United States shipped to the Federal Republic of Germany accounted for 85 per cent of the 150 million pounds shipped to the entire Community area. Now, however, according to our poultry producers, exports to the Federal Republic of Germany have been reduced to nearly nothing since August 1, 1962, the effective date of the E.E.C.'s increased tariff restrictions. We are sure you appreciate the fact that the American poultry industry operates without any price support or production control program, and seeks only an opportunity to compete fairly within the Community's markets. It would be most helpful to have a report on your schedule for pursuing this problem with the E.E.C. and its member governments, with particular reference to whatever provisions of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 2 and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade you may contemplate invoking. With high regards. Sincerely, Warren G. Magnuson Henry M. Jackson Clair Engle * Source: Department of State, Central Files, INCO-POULTRY US. No classification marking. 1 For a summary of Regulation 22, adopted by the Council of the EEC, January 14, 1962, and enacted April 4, 1962, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962 , p. 589. 2 See footnote 2, Document 251 . 261. Editorial Note 261. Editorial Note On February 25, 1963, Under Secretary Ball, feeling misunderstood over his involvement in the administration's commitment to limit wool textile imports, spoke with Carl Kaysen on the telephone explaining his role: "On this wool thing, I am a little annoyed and disturbed because the President now is sending me various messages through Feldman, through the Secretary, and so on, to the effect that after all this was my commitment as much as his; that I was present when it was made and so on. I was not present when it was made, and if there is anything I have done over the last two years it's to fight it alone, a rear-guard action against the wool and the whole textile business. Now, this is one of Mike's operations—you know, to say to the President: ‘Well, after all, George told you to do it, and so on.' What happened was that after the commitment was made I simply said ‘I don't know how in the hell we'll do it, but we'll do our best.' This is the only thing one could say. But now I find myself in a position where I am getting blamed for getting him into misguided commitment, which couldn't just be further from the truth. I don't know quite how to handle that; I'll have to give some thought to it.” (Memorandum of telephone conversation, February 25; Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Balance of Payments, 1963) 262. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to Secretary of State Rusk 262. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to Secretary of State Rusk Source Washington, February 25, 1963. I was concerned when you told me of the President's comment to you on Thursday morning that I had been present when the commitment was made to the woolen textile Congressmen. This is a misunderstanding. To the best of my recollection—and I am confident of my memory on this point—I have never been present at any meeting with the President when he talked about woolen textiles with any member of Congress or the textile industry, and I have consistently advised against any commitment on woolen textiles. Obviously, I regard a promise of the President as a solemn undertaking and will do whatever he feels is justified to carry it out. At the same time, it would trouble me deeply if I thought the President felt I had misled him into a promise that can be carried out only at great cost. Once the Administration had given its commitment in Mr. Feldman's letter to the industry dated August 7, 1962, 1 I did tell the President that we would try our best to find ways and means to keep it. But I also made it clear that this was going to be very difficult and costly. How the Commitment was Made The facts are as follows: When the Cabinet Textile Committee was first established early in 1961, I was the one member who insisted that the textile problem not be approached as a whole since the cotton situation was clearly different from that of wool. In all of the dealings that I had with the representatives of the industry and with the Congress, I carefully avoided any promise that we would do more than study the problem of woolen textile imports. As you will recall, this was one of the points on which Congress complained; over 150 Congressmen and 40 Senators joined in letters to the President protesting my handling of the question. In July, 1961, in order to avoid the need to impose mandatory quotas on cotton textiles—which all of the other members of the Cabinet Committee were pressing to do—I offered instead to negotiate a multilateral textile agreement. Such an agreement was unprecedented and not easy to achieve—particularly since it had the effect of waiving any compensation claims by the exporting nations. At that time, I made it clear to the members of the Industry Committee present at Geneva—as well as to the President's Cabinet Committee on Textiles—that the type of agreement worked out for cotton could not be utilized for textiles from any other fiber. A cotton textile agreement was possible for one reason only. The markets of the old industrialized countries of Europe and America were being disrupted by low-wage textile products from less-developed countries. The economically advanced countries therefore had a common interest in developing a protective device against these imports which they could, by common action, impose on the less-developed countries. I was able to negotiate the cotton textile agreement only because the special situation of cotton textiles permitted me to organize the Atlantic nations into a common front to bring the low-wage producers into line. The situation with respect to woolen textiles is wholly different. Here the increase in our imports comes almost entirely from three countries—the United Kingdom, Italy, and Japan. The situation of wool, unlike that of cotton, does not permit us to make common cause with the industrialized countries. Instead, we would have to restrain imports from countries that are our principal allies and customers. In view of our heavily favorable trade balance with the UK and EEC our bargaining position would be very poor. I made these points emphatically clear to the Cabinet Textile Committee on every occasion when the matter of woolen textile imports arose. I may add that during this whole time I was under great pressure from other members of the Committee to expand the scope of the Administration's commitments to all sectors of the textile industry. Those other members did not have to face the responsibilities of negotiation or the realities of maintaining an overall commercial policy favorable to the United States national interest. On July 16, 1962, the National Association of Woolen Textile Manufacturers wrote the White House indicating that the Board of Directors of the Association had recently adopted a resolution calling, among other things, for quantitative limitations, by categories and by countries of origin, on imports of wool textile and apparel products. Mr. Feldman prepared a draft reply to the Association's letter that would have committed the Administration to holding woolen textile imports to the fiscal year 1961 level. He discussed this matter over the telephone with an officer of the Department who was then in New York. That officer strongly advised Mr. Feldman against such a commitment and warned against the inclusion of such language in a letter to the Association. There is a discrepancy in the recollection of this conversation. Mr. Feldman advises me that, after considerable discussion, the State Department officer agreed to the compromise language which was finally incorporated in the reply that was sent on August 7. The State Department officer has a different recollection. He recalls that he recommended against that language, suggesting an alternative formulation that did not include an express commitment. In any event I was not personally consulted on this matter and knew nothing about any letter to the woolen textile industry until after it had already been sent. Mr. Feldman's letter to the wool textile industry contained the following commitment: "Limitation of textile imports to prevent market disruption is an essential element of Administration policy. We intend to implement this policy with regard to all textiles, and particularly to prevent market disruption such as would result from an increase over current levels of import .” As I recall, I requested a meeting with the President, which was held on August 20 , 1962. 2 In the course of that meeting I reviewed both the cotton and wool problems, pointing out the difficulties posed by the commitment which the Administration had made in the August 7 letter. A larger meeting was held with the President on the following day. 3 At that time I pointed out that, if we tried to impose restraints on woolen textiles we would jeopardize the Long-Term Cotton Textile Agreement. My notes—and my recollection—indicate that I made three additional points: (1) that the situation of wool textiles was unlike that of cotton and that, in my opinion, a multilateral agreement was non-negotiable; (2) that any quantitative restrictions on wool textiles would require massive compensation; and (3) that the nations participating in the Cotton Textile Agreement had expressly stipulated that they would not enter into a wool textile agreement. However, since it was felt that some action was necessary, I agreed that when the accessions to the Long-Term Agreement were completed we would try some exploratory probing. Meanwhile, the President would advise interested members of Congress that we would try to hold imports at or below “current levels” but without specifying the exact percentage or how it would be done. On August 24 , the President met with certain Congressmen interested in the textile problem, 4 and an even larger meeting was held about a week later. 5 I was not present at either meeting, but, prior to the second one, the President telephoned me in New York to say that he was meeting with a group of textile Senators and Congressmen in about five minutes. We discussed various points that he should make with regard to cotton textiles. When the question of woolen textiles was raised, I replied that since a commitment had already been made there was little the President could do other than to try to make it clear that “current levels” did not mean 15% but something over 17%. I said that I did not know how we would be able to carry out the Administration's promise, but we would do our best. That is the story so far as the making of the commitment is concerned. To the best of my recollection, I was never present with the President when woolen textiles were discussed with any Congressmen or Senators. The President, however, remembers otherwise and I have more respect for his memory than for mine. Until the time that the commitment was made to the industry, I did my best to argue against it. Thereafter, I always tried to make it clear that its fulfillment would be difficult and costly. If, however—as I fear is the case—the President feels that I did not adequately warn him about the difficulties of keeping the commitment, then the fault is mine in not being sufficiently clear and explicit. Efforts to Fulfill Commitment I think the record shows that the Department has tried, in good faith, to keep the Administration's promise with respect to woolen textiles—while at the same time seeking to keep the cost within reasonable limits. Early in May, 1962, the Cabinet Textile Committee appointed a subcommittee comprised of representatives of the Departments of State, Commerce and Labor to examine what we might do with regard to the woolen textile import problem. At an early meeting of that subcommittee, the State Department representative proposed that we utilize the International Wool Study Group as a forum for exploring this problem on an international basis. Mr. Feldman opposed this course of action on the ground that it would merely provide a forum for discussion and not a means of negotiation. Upon becoming further acquainted with the difficulties, he later agreed to a meeting of the Wool Study Group. In October the Management Committee of the Wool Study Group finally agreed—reluctantly and over loud objections from the EEC and UK, who suspected our intentions—to call a meeting for December. This accorded with our desire to do nothing precipitous regarding wool until the necessary nations had finally signed the Long-Term Cotton Textile Agreement. Meanwhile, the Trade Expansion legislation had, at Congressional insistence, been revised so as to transfer responsibility for trade negotiations from the State Department to the Chief Negotiator. As soon as Governor Herter was appointed, I reviewed the woolen textile problem with him. I suggested means for providing further protection to the woolen textile industry through tariff increases. However, we recognized that this would be unpopular with the industry. During the Wool Study Group meeting in December, Mr. Blumenthal of the State Department, tried to lay the basis for a possible future international agreement on wool textiles. He found it very heavy going. Nevertheless, following the meeting, I proposed to Governor Herter, Secretary Hodges, Secretary Wirtz, and Mr. Feldman that we undertake an exploratory probe—offering as bait a possible reduction in the United States tariff on raw wool. Since Mr. Feldman did not feel that we were in position to promise such a reduction, it was agreed that the United States Government would not itself approach foreign governments but that Mr. Eric Wyndham White, Executive Secretary of the GATT, would be asked to undertake some soundings on our behalf. These explorations, conducted as discreetly as possible, still produced a violent reaction from Europe, the United Kingdom, and Japan. The reaction was compounded by the fact that the proposal leaked to the European press. Since then the gratuitous comment at the final press conference of the outgoing Assistant Secretary of Commerce, Mr. Hickman Price, that the Administration was definitely planning to take action to restrict wool textile imports, has exacerbated an already bad situation. Recently, the atmosphere of strain in the Western Alliance since President De Gaulle's press conference 6 has introduced a new element. The French are threatening to drag their feet regarding the undertaking of any trade negotiations. The British are concerned at any action on our part that might further jeopardize their export earnings. The Japanese are threatening to withdraw from the Cotton Textile Agreement. In our talk with the President this week we should make clear the costs and dangers involved in going forward with a program of restraining woolen textile imports at this time. Among those costs and dangers are the following: 1. Action to restrain woolen textiles would produce an explosion of anger and resentment that would play into the hands of those opposing our policies. The French are already using the fact that the United States may try to restrain woolen textile imports to cast doubt on the sincerity of our efforts to liberalize trade. This is part of a general campaign to discredit American intentions with regard to Europe. 2. The British would likely regard such an American move as justification for their making a discriminatory deal with the Continent—if such a deal can be negotiated. 3. Intelligence information suggests that, if we attempt to restrain woolen textiles the Japanese would be likely to torpedo the Long-Term Cotton Agreement. That agreement is a house of cards; the withdrawal of one major producing country would bring down the entire structure. 4. The effect of an action to restrain woolen textile imports would create major domestic political problems. The United States would be faced with compensation claims on over $200 million worth of trade. This compensation takes the form of concessions in tariffs on other industrial and agricultural products. The industrial and farm interests affected by these concessions are not likely to take this lying down. The Administration would, therefore, be in position of robbing one industrial or agricultural sector for the benefit of another. 5. The effect on negotiations under the Trade Expansion Act would be calamitous, but hard to appraise with precision. At the best , it would greatly complicate Governor Herter's efforts. Not only would the United States have to use up substantial authority to pay compensation, but the atmosphere of the negotiations would be seriously prejudiced. At the worst , it might make it impossible to use the Trade Expansion Act powers with any major effect. The French would seize our wool textile action as an excuse to justify the maintenance of high restrictions against American agricultural products. They would almost certainly be joined by the Italians who stand to lose the most by woolen textile restraints. Our exports not merely of poultry but of wheat, feed grains and all other agricultural products would be jeopardized. I am not overstating the dimensions of the problem. If our dilemma is fairly presented to the Congressmen and Senators involved, they should be willing to forego pressure for restraint action—at least for the time being. They will not like it—but they should, at least, recognize the problem. Certainly the changed climate in Europe has added a new factor not present when the original commitment was made. Nor is this a case where grave injustice is being done. The woolen textile industry is showing record earnings. The most important companies in the industry make both cotton and woolen textiles; thus they have already greatly benefited from the Long-Term Cotton Agreement. They cannot say that the Administration has done nothing for them. 7 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Trade Policy, 1962. No classification marking. 1 Not found. 2 See footnote 1, Document 249 . 3 On August 21, the President met with Ball and others from 6 to 7:05 p.m. (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Books) No further record of this meeting has been found. 4 No record of this meeting has been found. 5 No record of this meeting has been found. On August 31, however, President Kennedy met off-the-record with 17 Senators, including Senator Pastore and Representative Vinson who had earlier, in a letter of June 22, 1961, to President Kennedy, expressed their concern about problems in the U.S. textile industry and the President's plans to address them. The congressional letter is printed as See Document 219 ; for President Kennedy's response, Document 220 . 6 On January 14, French President Charles de Gaulle, in response to a question posed to him at a news conference, rejected the United Kingdom's application for full membership in the EEC. For an excerpt of his response, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963 , pp. 441-443. 7 None of the major incidents that Ball cites in this memorandum has been documented. However, documents alluding to the Feldman letter to the wool industry of August 7, 1962, and the August 20, 21, 24, and 30, 1962, meetings are included in the Supplement. For further information about these meetings, see Ball's March 9 memorandum to the President, Document 272 . 263. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk and the Under Secretary of State (Ball) 263. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk and the Under Secretary of State (Ball) Source Washington, February 28, 1963. The preparations for our negotiations with Europe under the Trade Expansion Act are already under way and will be increasing in tempo and scope. I am very much concerned that we do everything we can to bring these important negotiations to a fruitful conclusion. In order to do this, we must make sure that all the energies and skills available in the government for this task are coordinated and focused on it. The Secretary of State has the responsibility of providing Governor Herter, the Trade Negotiator, with broad foreign policy guidance and I want to be sure that the Department is organized to enable him to perform this task adequately. Further, the Department must be continuously aware of the need for putting these negotiations in their proper relation to our other ongoing negotiations in Europe in the military, monetary and political spheres. In this connection, I urge that all our European embassies be made aware of the great importance that the government attaches to these negotiations and their own heavy responsibility for them. I suggest you re-examine the staffing of our major European embassies with these responsibilities in mind and strengthen them wherever necessary to enable them to perform these tasks effectively. I consider it equally important to bring all trade negotiations with the European countries into connection with the over-all negotiation we are entering into, so that no uncoordinated individual arrangements on particular products or with particular countries are made. I would like the Under Secretary of State to assume personal responsibility for the State Department's activities in this sphere and to keep me closely in touch with the progress of activities and any problems that may arise through the Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. John Kennedy * Source: Department of State, Central Files, FTU 4 US/TEA. Confidential. 264. National Security Action Memorandum No. 224 264. National Security Action Memorandum No. 224 Source Washington, March 4, 1963. MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Treasury The Secretary of Agriculture The Secretary of the Interior The Secretary of Commerce The Secretary of Labor Governor Herter (for information) The Secretary of State (for information) SUBJECT Coordination of U.S. Efforts Under the Trade Relations Act 1. We are engaged in major activities of a military, financial, trade and diplomatic nature centering on the European countries, in addition to carrying on a large volume of more routine discussions and negotiations with them. In particular, and of high importance, we are already preparing for our first round of negotiations under the Trade Expansion Act. While the Secretary of State has the primary responsibility for the conduct of foreign policy, all of you are involved in one way or another in aspects of our relations with Europe. I think it is necessary that all our relations with Europe be conducted in a unified way and related to a central strategy aimed at the advancement of U.S. interests. Governor Herter is charged with conducting the trade negotiations and related trade matters. The success of these negotiations, given their scope and implications for the future, is of the highest importance. Since many aspects of policy for which each of you has some responsibility bear on our trade relations and hence the trade negotiations, it is particularly important that these activities be coordinated with those for which Governor Herter has responsibility. 2. In accordance with the responsibilities of the Secretary of State, he should be the point of coordination for all important statements and actions bearing on relations with Europe. I have asked the Under Secretary to assume responsibility for this function in behalf of the Secretary of State, and I should like you to make suitable arrangements to keep him informed of your activities in this area, and for getting his views as to how they fit into our total foreign policy efforts. I have asked Carl Kaysen of my staff to be in touch with the Under Secretary to keep me informed on these matters. In this way I hope to assure that the many issues of policy involved in the totality of our relations with Europe will be properly coordinated in order to insure that the trade negotiations will proceed, with the best prospect for their success. John F. Kennedy 1 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Trade Policy, Trade Expansion Act, March 16, 1963-April 30, 1963. Confidential. 1 Printed from a copy that indicates Kennedy signed the original. 265. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Kennedy 265. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Kennedy Source Washington, March 4, 1963. SUBJECT Some Points in Connection with the Wool Textile Problem I understand we are going to have a chance to review the problem of wool textile imports tomorrow. In connection with that discussion, several points have special relevance: 1. The major companies leading the fight to restrict wool textile imports have already been the principal beneficiaries of the Cotton Textile Agreement . 1 There is no longer a separate wool textile industry. Most US textile companies manufacture all fibers including cotton, wool and synthetics. The ten largest textile companies, which are the moving force in pressing for wool textile protection, are primarily cotton textile manufacturers. Half of their activities consists in manufacturing cotton textiles. Another third consists of the production of textiles from man-made fibers. Wool textile manufacture is only a small part of their total activities. These are the companies that have been the major beneficiaries of the Cotton Textile Agreement that we negotiated at Geneva. 2. An attempt to impose wool textile restrictions could well mean the collapse of the Cotton Textile Agreement—and the companies know it . The Japanese have already threatened that if we try to restrict wool textile imports, they may withdraw from the Cotton Textile Agreement. Hong Kong would not be far behind. That would bring down the whole house of cards. Yet it is far more important to the major textile companies to have the Cotton Textile Agreement than to have restrictions on wool textile imports. 3. From the point of view of the United States economy, wool textile production is far less important than either cotton or synthetic fiber textile output . The figures for 1962 indicate that, of the labor force employed in producing textiles, 60 percent worked on cotton textiles. Man-made fibers occupied 25 percent. Woolen textiles constituted only 15 percent of the total. 4. Wool textile imports are presently running at a rate of only 17 percent of domestic consumption—rather than 20 percent as has been stated . An inter-agency committee has just reviewed the statistics we have been using. Their report, which is (Tab A) 2 attached, shows that, while no ratio is completely accurate, the most reasonable method of computation indicates that imports are now running at a rate of 17 percent of domestic consumption. Under this same method of computation, imports were running at the rate of 15.7% in 1960, the year which registered the previous high, at the time Mr. Feldman's letter was sent to the woolen industry on August 7, 1962. 3 5. The textile industry is making lots of money and is not in any trouble . Recent financial statements of textile companies are in stark contrast to the persistent complaints of textile industry executives that the industry is being seriously injured by imports. The year 1962 was at least as good as 1960, and there was a full recovery from the textile recession of 1961. Virtually all companies showed increases in sales in 1962 over previous years. Burlington, the largest company in the industry, became the industry's first billion-dollar company in 1962. Net earnings after taxes increased substantially in 1962 and dividends were increased or extra dividends declared. The attached table showing comparative company results illustrates this point clearly. (Tab B)2 6. The world political scene has substantially changed since the wool commitment was made . I do not need to expand on this. General De Gaulle's press conference of January 14 4 has materially altered prospects for the liberal trading world which we envisaged. The very countries that would play the key role in any restriction of wool textile imports are the countries most affected by General De Gaulle's action. In view of these developments, we have more riding on the success of the Trade Expansion Act negotiations than ever and cannot afford to jeopardize our general position with a limited restrictive move in wool. George W. Ball 5 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, INCO-WOOL US. Confidential. Drafted by Ball. 1 Reference is to the Long-Term Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles; see footnote 1, Document 258 . 2 Not printed. 3 Not found, but See Document 262 . 4 See footnote 6, Document 262 . 5 Printed from a copy that indicates Ball signed the original. 266. Record of Meeting 266. Record of Meeting Source Washington, March 5, 1963, 4-5:20 p.m. The President held a meeting on wool textiles for an hour and a half on March 5. Present were: Secretary Rusk, Under Secretary Ball, Mr. Blumenthal, Secretary Hodges, Governor Herter, Mr. Gossett, and Messrs. O'Brien (3/4 hour), Feldman, Donahue and Kaysen. Secretary Ball began by outlining the problem in accordance with his memorandum. 1 We have a commitment to the industry, but we could carry it out only at enormous cost to other U.S. interests, especially the general trade negotiations. He sketched the history of our effort since August. The wool study group met to explore the possibility of an international agreement. The major exporters concerned are the UK, Japan and Italy. However, the situation is quite different from that in cotton textiles, in which the major industrialized countries shared our interests, and in which we were able to compensate the underdeveloped countries by opening up European markets to them somewhat. Therefore, the need for some “sweetener” was recognized and it was suggested that we combine a quota arrangement with a cut in raw wool tariff. There were discussions between Mr. Blumenthal and Eric Wyndham White, after which Wyndham White conducted exploratory talks in Europe. He received a loud and uniformly unfavorable response. It was the Department's conclusions that (1) no agreement was feasible; (2) unilateral quotas would lead to large demands for compensation and great interference with the trade negotiations; and (3) a probable Japanese withdrawal from the cotton textile agreement, 2 which would kill that agreement. Secretary Ball noted that the cotton textile agreement was achieved without any compensation. Further, the same firms were involved to a substantial extent in cotton and wool, and the cotton textile agreement was worth much more to them than any wool textile agreement would be, if in fact it were achieved. Secretary Rusk asked whether we could settle on the present or slightly higher level of imports and the President thought this might be a good idea. Secretary Ball said that the exporters chiefly concerned, viewed this as an important item and they would not be satisfied. Mr. Feldman quoted Senator Pastore to the effect that any quota arrangement, even if it increased the permissible level of imports to 25 percent, was worthwhile. There remained the possibility of combining this with reduced tariffs on both wool and cotton textiles. The counter argument to this was purely emotional. Governor Herter disagreed. There was a very strong negative reaction in Europe to the threat of quotas. He has had many discussions with the Community and with Heath, Errol and Maudling in England, and indirectly with the Japanese. Every country he has approached showed strong negative reactions, and expressed the view that any quota proposals were inconsistent with our desire to make progress on the Kennedy round. Further, such proposals would raise large demands for compensation. The President, however, thought that a limitation on future growth was much easier for other countries to accept than a rollback. He contrasted Feldman's proposal 3 with what we did on carpets and glass. Governor Herter responded that the wool industry just has not been hurt, and that in this respect the situation differed sharply. The President raised some question about the method of computing the level of imports, and Mr. Feldman indicated that this was not an issue. Secretary Hodges showed a list of woolen manufacturers that had failed, and Secretary Ball pointed out that a private study of failing woolen manufacturers showed that imports were irrelevant to failure in 16 out of 18 cases examined. The President observed that, if he had made no commitment, there would be absolutely no doubt in his mind as to what he would do, but since he had made the commitment, we should try our best to meet it. The question was: Should we try to sell Feldman's proposal? In response to Secretary Rusk's question, Mr. Feldman said that the proposal would satisfy both Senator Pastore and the New England wool industry. The President again asked whether we could sell the proposal. Governor Herter pointed out that as far as the tariff part of it was concerned, the regular procedure involved hearings by the Tariff Commission, etc., and would take about six months. The quota problem would have to be treated separately, and he doubted that there was a legal basis for imposing a quota. The only one available was a Tariff Commission finding of injury to the industry, which he was confident would not be made. After some discussion of the significance of the legal problem, it was agreed that, while there was a technical barrier, it was not substantively important. Either new legislation could be passed, which could be done readily, or the cotton textile agreement could be amended to include woolens. Here, however, the problem arose as to whether or not such an attempt would blow up the cotton textile agreement. The President again repeated that it was unfortunate that he had made the commitment and asked again how we could make it effective. Secretary Rusk observed that if we rule out the finding of a threat to national security, he was doubtful that we could meet any agreement on anything worthwhile. Secretary Ball went over the history of the cotton textile agreement, and the market disruption theory on which it was based, and pointed out again there was no comparable situation in wool, no comparable line-up of interests, in which we and the other industrialized countries face a common problem. Further, there were now no quota restrictions on trade in industrial products among the major industrialized countries. This was the result of a long and consistent effort on our part, and an attempt to introduce quotas on woolen goods would undo this effort. Secretary Rusk remarked that the inability of the industry to show injury made our bargaining position very weak. In response to a renewed question by the President, Governor Herter said that he thought any effort to do more than we had done would have undesirable results. First of all, the cotton textile agreement would break up. Then we would be faced with a breakdown of our whole trade negotiation position and no possibility of maintaining our agricultural exports to Europe. Governor Herter suggested that it might be possible in the context of the general Kennedy round negotiations next year to treat wool as a special case and get some protection for it. This would have the advantage of merging the compensation problem with the general compensation problem in the broader framework. To isolate wool textiles in advance would simply not be useful. Secretary Ball endorsed that suggestion as being hopeful. In response to the President's question of why we could not do wool first, Governor Herter repeated his doubts that we could achieve an agreement even with a great effort, as well as pointing out the probable adverse effects on our whole negotiating position, by undermining the philosophy of our trade policy. The President then asked what he should say to Senator Pastore, and Mr. Feldman asked what Governor Herter should say to the industry committee tomorrow. Secretary Ball suggested that our response should contain two elements. First, we should show that we have made an enormous effort to meet the commitment, and explain in detail what it has been. Second, we should point out that next year, in the context of the over-all trade negotiations, there is some prospect for success in achieving something for woolens. Mr. Feldman suggested that it might also be useful to ask Wyndham White to come here to give the industry his assessment of the situation directly. Mr. Donahue urged that some feasible interim action be taken, if only another effort to negotiate through Wyndham White. Mr. Feldman agreed that a further effort to show good faith was useful. Secretary Ball pointed out that we had already done as much as possible through White, and that another round of failures would do us no good; we must not be in the position of mendicants. Mr. Feldman suggested that it might be useful to have White come in any event, and give the industry the notion that we are waiting for a final judgment on his discussion with them. He suggested Governor Herter say this to the textile group tomorrow. Secretary Rusk pointed out the great change in the international atmosphere since the commitment was made: failure of the UK to get into the Common Market, and our present difficulties with the French. Mr. Blumenthal, in response to a question from Secretary Ball, explained to the President that two separate efforts had been made in the past. First, he personally had led a delegation of twenty industry and fifteen government people to London, and achieved total failure. In response to the President's question as to what industry wanted, Secretary Ball said an OEP determination that quotas were justified on national security grounds. If this were done, the combination of compensation and retaliation that would ensue would leave us helpless to do anything on the Kennedy round. Secretary Rusk added that since no one would believe that national security was involved, it would undercut the whole basis of our position with respect to trade negotiations. The President agreed that the national security argument was weak. He thought, however, it might be useful to hold out some form of hope to the industry tomorrow; to point out what we have done and what perhaps can be done next year; and to indicate that we are watching the situation now. There was some discussion of the techniques of breaking the bad news, and it was agreed that Mr. Feldman would produce a memorandum for the use of all involved which would summarize both the efforts we have made and what we might do. Secretary Ball suggested that we warn the governments concerned quietly that a further sharp increase in wool imports next year might prove troublesome to us in the Kennedy round negotiations. It was agreed that such a warning might be useful. The President summarized the main points to be covered by Mr. Feldman as follows: A detailed account of our efforts to meet the commitment, an explanation of the new situation that has arisen in the UK and EEC since the commitment was made, and its effect on our ability to negotiate, the difficulties in negotiating a woolen agreement now in relation to the risk of failure of the cotton agreement, the fact that we are watching and have warned the governments concerned, and, finally, the possibility of achieving some relief in the Kennedy round negotiations. C.K. 4 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Trade Policy, Trade Expansion Act. Confidential. Drafted by Kaysen on March 6. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room in the White House. The time of the meeting is from the President's Appointment Book. (Ibid.) 1 See Document 262 . 2 Document 242 . 3 Not further identified, but See Document 262 . 4 Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials. 267. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to Senator Clair Engle 267. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to Senator Clair Engle Source Washington, March 6, 1963. Dear Senator Engle : Your letter of February 20, 1 which was signed also by Senator Magnuson and by Senator Jackson, expresses your concern that the European Economic Community's import regulations for poultry will “price US poultry out of Community markets”. I share your concern. We have been carefully watching this development for at least a year and no problem has received more high-level attention. The President has sent letters to Chiefs of State. Secretary Rusk and I have each strongly pressed the case for poultry exports with Chiefs of State, Foreign and Economic Ministers, and other high-level officials of the European governments concerned. Our Missions abroad, acting under strong instructions from Washington, have sought every opportunity to try to promote a satisfactory solution, from the point of view of American poultry interests. These efforts have been closely coordinated with parallel efforts by Secretary Freeman and the Department of Agriculture. In spite of all this, I am sorry to report that we can so far report only very limited success. The EEC has now undertaken to re-examine the application and scale of certain of the charges applied to poultry imports. To prepare for the review, the United States Government and the EEC officials recently met in Brussels for a detailed examination of the technical issues. It is likely that the EEC Commission will recommend certain changes favorable to imports. We expect the EEC Council of Ministers to consider these questions early this month. Action in the EEC Council will, however, require unanimity, and there is reason to fear that at least one member state of the EEC may object to modifications of the import system for poultry. United States exports of poultry to the Federal Republic of Germany (our major market in the EEC) have seriously declined since last August, but they have not yet been reduced “to nearly nothing”, as your letter suggests. Our total exports of poultry to the Federal Republic increased from 137.7 million pounds in 1961 to 152.3 million in 1962. Of the 1962 figure, 38.5 million pounds were shipped to Germany during the last five months of 1962 when the common agricultural policy for poultry was in effect. Also, as of August 1, 1962, (the effective date of the common agricultural policy), stocks of poultry in Germany amounted to some 88.2 million pounds. The existence of these stocks undoubtedly contributed to the decline in US exports in the past several months. I am under no illusions, however, as to the disastrous effect of these greatly increased import charges if they are not promptly revised. They will make it difficult or impossible for US poultry exporters to compete with EEC poultry producers. We are, therefore, planning to make use of every practicable measure to secure their reduction. If the present line of effort does not succeed, we shall try to find a solution through the forthcoming negotiations under the Trade Expansion Act. I am sending a similar letter to Senators Magnuson and Jackson. Sincerely yours, George W. Ball 2 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, INCO-POULTRY US. No classification marking. Drafted by Under Secretary Ball on March 6. The source text bears Ball's initials as drafter, but it was drafted in E and forwarded to Ball under cover of a February memorandum from Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs Johnson who recommended that Ball sign the proposed reply. Also attached to the source text is a February 25 memorandum from P. W. Kriebel (S/S-S) to Marilyn H. Moninger (E), which requested that a response to the three Senators' letter of February 20 ( Document 260 ) be ready for Ball's signature by 5 p.m. on February 26, specifically refuting the statement in the letter that U.S. poultry exports to Germany have been reduced to “nearly nothing.” 1 Document 260 . 2 Printed from a copy that indicates Ball signed the original. 268. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Kennedy 268. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Kennedy Source Washington, March 7, 1963. SUBJECT Your Discussion on Wool Textiles with Senator Pastore and Other Members of Congress In their meeting with Governor Herter I understand that the wool textile industry representatives kept repeating two assertions that are not accurate. You may wish to set this record straight. FIRST ASSERTION: The Administration has failed to carry out the President's Seven Point Program of Assistance to the United States Textile Industry of May 2, 1961 . 1 The points of that program and the performance are as follows: Point 1. Department of Commerce to launch an expanded program of research. Performance . Commerce asked Congress for funds for this purpose last year but the bill died. Commerce has reapplied for the funds this year. Point 2. Revision of existing depreciation allowances on textile machinery. Performance . New and much more favorable depreciation schedules were promulgated in October, 1961. Point 3. Small Business Administration to assist cotton industry to obtain modernization financing. Performance . Measures to this end were taken in Spring and Fall of 1962. Point 4. Correction of differential due to two-price cotton system. Performance . Administration is supporting legislation to this effect. Such legislation is currently pending before House Committee on Agriculture. Point 5. Adjustment Assistance for industry injured by imports. Performance . Such arrangements have been provided under the Trade Expansion Act. Point 6. Calling of conference of textile exporting and importing countries to seek an international understanding “which will provide a basis for trade that will avoid undue disruption of established industries.” Performance . The State Department was able to negotiate, first, a Short-Term and, then, a Long-Term World Cotton Textile Agreement that has checked the flow of cotton textile imports and effectively prevented market disruption. With the exception of the Japanese voluntary arrangements, no previous administration had ever provided quantitative limitations on textile imports before. The World Cotton Textile Agreement is, in fact, without precedent for any industrial product, and it was achieved without having to penalize other US industries through the payment of any compensation. Many wool textile companies have greatly benefitted by this agreement since they are also producers of cotton textiles. SECOND ASSERTION: The Administration has not seriously tried to negotiate a wool textile agreement. This is just not true. By the use of great pressure we convened a meeting in London last December of all countries interested in the wool textile trade. During that meeting we urged a solution to the United States textile problem. Our efforts met a completely negative reception. Thereafter we undertook—utilizing the good offices of the Executive Secretary of the GATT, Mr. Wyndham White—to work out a voluntary arrangement with the exporting countries. Again, the reaction was uniformly adverse. We have gone far enough to recognize the impossibility of obtaining a negotiated agreement. To restrict wool textile imports by unilateral action would result in prohibitive costs in compensation; would, quite likely, bring down the entire structure of cotton textile production; and would poison the international atmosphere for the forthcoming trade negotiations under the Trade Expansion Act. George W. Ball 2 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, INCO-WOOL US. Confidential. Drafted by Ball. 1 See Document 213 . 2 Printed from a copy that indicates Ball signed the original. 269. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Kennedy 269. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Kennedy Source Washington, March 7, 1963. SUBJECT Your Conversation with Senator Pastore Regarding Wool Textile Imports Mr. Feldman called me tonight to discuss the possible steps that the Administration might take in order to show some further effort toward meeting the import problem of the woolen textile industry. I told Mr. Feldman I thought that the Administration had already developed a very creditable record of action on behalf of the textile industry. I have pointed out the extent and character of this action in another memorandum I have just sent you. 1 Mr. Feldman and I agreed, however, that we would take one further step. This would consist of Secretary Rusk calling in the ambassadors of the principal woolen textile importing countries—principally the United Kingdom and Italy. On careful reflection I strongly advise against calling in the Japanese Ambassador in view of the fact that the Japanese Government has told us that it is planning to challenge our method of administering the Cotton Textile Agreement in the GATT. We have too much riding on that agreement to put it in jeopardy by a Japanese withdrawal. Secretary Rusk would say to the ambassadors that the Administration is under great pressure from the woolen textile industry who are feeling the effects of a sharp rise in wool textile imports. This pressure could become so severe as to compel restrictive action. In view of the fact that the principal exporting nations have already made emphatically clear that they reject a multilateral agreement for wool textiles, the Secretary would suggest that they help to ease the domestic pressure in the United States by advising their industries to show restraint in the buildup of the volume of their exports. I have discussed this course of action with Secretary Rusk, and he concurs. I am under no illusion that this will satisfy the wool textile industry or that it will have a serious effect on imports. But it is the most we dare do under all the circumstances. George W. Ball * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Trade Policy, Trade Expansion. Confidential. 1 Document 268 . 270. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Counsel (Feldman) to President Kennedy 270. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Counsel (Feldman) to President Kennedy Source Washington, March 8, 1963. SUBJECT Meeting with Senator Pastore I met with Senators Pastore, MUSKIE, McGee, Talmadge, Kennedy, and Church at 5 o'clock yesterday. They expressed their disappointment with the meeting held between Governor Herter and representatives of the wool industry, and we discussed in general terms the problems of the industry. At the conclusion of the meeting, Senator Pastore asked that Secretary Rusk call in the Ambassadors from the United Kingdom, Italy, and Japan and seek an agreement with them for quantitative limitations upon the imports of wool textiles. I have asked Under Secretary Ball for his reaction to this suggestion. He strongly recommends against any attempt to negotiate with these nations. He does, however, believe it feasible to have Secretary Rusk call in the various Ambassadors, explain to them the pressures from the wool textile industry, and suggest to them that they do whatever is possible to obtain the consent of their wool textile industries to a limitation upon exports to the United States. He is confident that it is not possible to reach any firm agreement on any terms, and an effort to do so will result in a loss of prestige to the United States. You might also tell Senator Pastore that we are instructing our Ambassadors abroad to make similar representations to the governments to which they are accredited. Myer Feldman 1 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Trade Policy, Trade Expansion Act. No classification marking. 1 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 271. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Kennedy 271. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Kennedy Source Washington, March 8, 1963. SUBJECT Objectives and Strategy for the Trade Expansion Act Negotiations Mr. Blumenthal is leaving for Europe at the end of the week as head of the American component in a Working Group being set up in the GATT to plan for the forthcoming trade negotiations. The recommendations of this Working Group will be considered by a Ministerial Meeting of GATT beginning May 16, 1 at which time the American side will be led by Governor Herter. Immediate Objectives We hope by the end of May to reach an agreement in the GATT covering the following points: (a) The commencement of tariff negotiations as early as possible in 1964; (b) The main elements of a negotiating plan and the framework of the negotiations; (c) An undertaking that separate negotiations would begin this summer looking toward special arrangements to cover certain key agricultural commodities, including grains. Longer-Run Objectives We should seek to improve access terms for American exports and assure greater certainty of access over the long run, by negotiations that include the following major elements: (a) Full participation in the negotiations by the United States, the U.K., the EEC, Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the principal less-developed countries; (b) Deep across-the-board tariff reductions, using to the maximum the fifty percent authority provided by the Trade Expansion Act; (c) The restriction to a minimum of items and categories to be excepted from the full fifty percent across-the-board reduction; (d) Effective arrangements for safeguarding access for United States agricultural products to the markets of Europe. The achievement of this last objective will depend in particular on the avoidance of substantial increases in Common Market price support levels for grains. Decisions Necessary to a Successful Negotiation 1. If we are to have reasonable hope of achieving our objectives—taking into account protectionist pressures in other countries and the opposition of General De Gaulle's policies—we must make a firm decision to use the Trade Expansion Act authority to the maximum. Moreover, we must make it clear to our trading partners that that is, in fact, our resolute intention. This involves on the domestic side a willingness to withstand the pressures and complaints of industries that will oppose thorough-going tariff reductions. 2. We must recognize that, particularly with respect to agriculture, our negotiators will face a very tough job. The United States can succeed in protecting access for our agricultural products only if we are prepared to put our own agricultural support and import policies on the international bargaining table. This means that our internal price support policies for such key commodities as grains may become the subject of international agreement along with the internal price support policies of other major countries. Basic Strategy 1. We shall not achieve our objectives easily. We can already foresee difficulty with several major countries, even with regard to our short-term objectives. Canada and Japan have expressed doubt about their ability to face the competition resulting from deep linear tariff reductions—and other countries no doubt share the same fear. We believe, however, that these countries can probably be brought along if there is the promise of full and effective participation by the EEC. 2. As in other matters, France is the problem within the EEC. It must be the principal object of our diplomatic effort in the next few weeks. 3. French agreement is an essential condition to successful trade negotiations. Under the terms of the Rome Treaty, the member nations of the EEC are required to work towards a common commercial policy in their relations with the rest of the world. That means that the EEC must negotiate with a single voice on the basis of a position agreed by all six members. After January 1, 1966, the other Common Market countries will be able to override a French veto because majority voting will then apply to EEC commercial policy decisions. But until that time, the French can effectively block EEC participation in the negotiations by refusing to participate themselves. 4. The essence of our tactical problem is how to exert pressure on France to acquiesce in a Community decision to participate in far-reaching trade negotiations—and to participate on a basis that meets our essential requirements. We have little bilateral leverage on France, but leverage does exist within the EEC framework. The principal element working in our favor is that—either for economic or political reasons, or both—the UK, Italy, Germany, and the Benelux countries all desire successful negotiations. 5. The leverage of the Five over France is that the French need certain actions that can only be taken by the agreement of the whole EEC. These include the signature and ratification of the Convention associating most of ex-French Africa with the EEC, the establishment of a special relationship for Algeria, continued progress on the common agricultural policy, and further movement this summer toward completion of the customs union of the Six. 6. At present, the French are saying to the Five: “If you don't give us what we want with respect to these matters, we shall see to it that there is no Kennedy Round.” Our problem in the next few weeks is to work with the Five to use these French demands to extract a French agreement. We must persuade the Five to say to the French: “Unless you agree to full participation in the Kennedy Round, you will not receive any satisfaction in the EEC.” 7. The leverage of the Five is, however, a wasting asset. We must encourage the Five—especially Italy and The Netherlands—to use their bargaining power with France now. They will be less able to hold out against de Gaulle in the EEC as time passes, since each country desires to make progress on EEC matters in its own self-interest. 8. It is unrealistic to expect that France can be pinned down now on all the details of the Kennedy Round. At the same time, a simple agreement “in principle” will not be enough. We must try to extract commitments that are as specific as possible, on such crucial points as the undertaking of substantial linear tariff reductions and the inclusion of agriculture in the negotiations. 9. Our strategy for the next few months must, therefore, be directed at bringing pressure on France by pressing the European Community as a whole to come to an early decision about its participation. We should try to accomplish the greater part of the strategic plan by the end of the Ministerial Meeting in May. George W. Ball * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Trade Policy, Trade Expansion Act. Confidential. 1 The GATT Ministerial meeting was held in Geneva May 16-22. 272. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Kennedy 272. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Kennedy Source Washington, March 9, 1963. SUBJECT Lessons from the Wool Textile Experience I have been giving hard thought to the question of how we got into the wool textile predicament. Leaving aside questions of substance, I think there may be lessons in procedure to be learned by all of us who had a part in putting you in an awkward situation. This requires a brief analysis of the manner in which the relevant decisions were made. First Commitment—Letter of August 7, 1962 1 Until August 7, 1962, the Administration had given no firm promise to either the wool textile industry or to the Congressmen and Senators interested in that industry. The Seven-Point Textile Program of May 2, 1961, 2 provided merely that the Department of State would call a conference to “seek an international understanding which will provide a basis for trade that will avoid undue disruption of established industries.” Thereafter—over the strenuous objections of the industry, which wished to present a massive united front to the Administration—I insisted upon treating separately with the cotton textile producers and the producers of wool and man-made fiber textiles. All that we ever promised the wool textile producers was that we would keep their situation under careful study and observation. Early in May, 1962, the Cabinet Textile Committee 3 appointed a subcommittee to examine what should be done with regard to wool textile imports. (At that time, imports were not sharply rising although the industry was putting on incessant pressure.) This Committee recommended that we utilize the International Wool Study Group as a forum for exploring this problem on an international basis and as a means for relieving industry pressure. I had hoped that the problem could be left to rest on this basis. Nevertheless, I took great pains on several occasions to advise the Cabinet Textile Committee that the international situation of wool textiles was totally different from that of cotton and that I did not see how a wool textile commitment could ever be fulfilled if one were made. On July 16, 1962, the National Association of Woolen Textile Manufacturers called attention to a resolution of the Board of Directors of the Association demanding mandatory quotas. Mr. Feldman prepared a draft reply to the Association's letter that would have committed the Administration to hold woolen textile imports to the fiscal year 1961 level. He discussed this matter over the telephone with Mr. Blumenthal of the State Department, who was then in New York in the midst of the Coffee Agreement negotiation. There is a discrepancy in the recollection of this conversation. Mr. Feldman believes that after considerable discussion, Mr. Blumenthal acquiesced in the language that was finally incorporated in the reply that was sent on August 7. Mr. Blumenthal is equally clear that he recommended innocuous language, warned about the implications of a specific commitment and—although told by Mr. Feldman that the White House had decided a stronger commitment was needed—ended the conversation under the impression that he had made his point with Mr. Feldman and that no specific commitment would be given. Obviously, this was a case of honest misunderstanding on both sides. Mr. Blumenthal did not call me immediately because he believed the matter was in hand. He felt he had prevented the making of a specific commitment and so reported to me on his return to Washington the following week. I was, of course, aware that during this period Mr. Feldman was under strong pressure from the industry and from Congress and that his position was not an easy one. As sent, the letter of August 7 contained the following commitment: "Limitation of textile imports to prevent market disruption is an essential element of Administration policy. We intend to implement this policy with regard to all textiles, and particularly to prevent market disruption such as would result from an increase over current levels of import.” When this language came to our attention several days later, I requested a meeting with you which was held on August 20, 1962. In the course of that meeting, we reviewed both the cotton and wool problems, and some of the difficulties involved in a wool commitment were pointed out. A larger meeting was held with you on the following day (August 21). Just prior to that meeting, I sent you two memoranda which were discussed during the course of the August 21 meeting. One was a memorandum entitled “Present State of the Textile Import Problem.” 4 The third section of this memorandum headed “Woolen Textiles” is attached as Tab A. The second was a memorandum entitled “Woolen Textile Problem” 5 which is attached as Tab B. The meeting on August 21 was attended by Mr. Sorensen (since Mr. Feldman was at that time abroad), as well as by the Secretary of Commerce and (I believe) Larry O'Brien. In the course of that meeting—held in the Cabinet Room—we discussed the arguments contained in the memorandum at Tab A regarding the non-negotiability of a multilateral woolen textile agreement. It was also pointed out that any non-negotiated quota arrangements would involve heavy compensation. The meeting was dominated, however, by the strong feeling that we had to do something substantial for the wool textile interests in order to keep their support for the Trade Expansion Act. There was considerable discussion as to the meaning of the expression “current levels” in the August 7 letter, and Mr. Sorensen suggested that we need not adopt the 15 percent figure which the industry was pressing. It was generally agreed that a figure something over 17 percent was defensible under the August 7 language. In the course of the meeting, the State Department was pressed very hard to undertake negotiations. I explained again that a multilateral agreement was not possible. However, in view of the need for some action, it was agreed that—after all accessions to the Cotton Textile Agreement had been obtained—we would undertake some exploratory discussions. Second Commitment—Meetings with Congressmen and Senators My records indicate that you met with Senator Pastore and perhaps one or two other Senators on August 24 and that you met with a larger group on August 30. As you know, I do not recall being present at either meeting. Just prior to the August 30 meeting, you telephoned me in New York to say that you were meeting in five minutes with a group of Senators on the textile problem. We quickly reviewed the pending cotton textile questions. When we reached wool textiles, I remember telling you that since it was agreed that we must go forward with the August 7 commitment, I would do my best to see what solution could be found—although I could not say what might be feasible. You know, of course, of the measures that have been taken in the search for a solution. Lessons from Experience From this experience, the following lessons seem to me to emerge: 1. The August 7 commitment was made in too much of a hurry. A matter of this importance should have been cleared with the full Cabinet Committee and language explicitly agreed upon. This would have permitted the question to be appealed to you before irreparable action was taken. 2. The August 21 meeting should have been carefully prepared with a full advance written presentation of the arguments on both sides. This was, in part, my own fault since the memoranda which I sent you (Tabs A and B) were only a partial statement of the problem. 3. I feel I was myself at fault for not having come to you directly at an earlier point and expressed my concern at the implications of the gradual broadening of our textile commitments. This extends beyond the narrow scope of wool textiles. During the course of the last two years, we have progressively yielded our freedom of action: (a) We have moved from a generalized commitment in the Seven-Point Program to call an international conference to consider measures against “undue disruption”, to a multilateral agreement against market disruption. (b) We have then translated “market disruption” in the case of cotton textiles into an agreement to hold imports at six percent no matter how healthy the domestic market might be. (This is the source of our current serious problems with the Japanese which offer a threat to the whole structure of the Cotton Textile Agreements.) In the case of wool, we have suffered the same creeping erosion: (a) We have turned an agreement to prevent “market disruption” into an agreement to prevent “an increase over current levels of imports”, and (b) We have turned this commitment into a commitment to a specific 17-1/2 percent figure. This gradual extension and erosion of our commitments could have been prevented by tighter procedures. In the future, any alteration of an existing commitment should be brought before the full Cabinet Textile Committee—with the right of appeal. Moreover, it should be presented to that Committee in writing with a full opportunity for the presentation of written comments. 4. Finally, since it is difficult for anyone not in intimate and continuous touch with our dealings with other countries to assess the feasibility of arrangements involving them, I think you would be better protected if trade matters—as other foreign policy matters—were jointly screened through your own National Security Advisers as well as your advisers on domestic political problems. George W. Ball 6 * Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Wool. Confidential. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: “All other copies burned.” 1 Not found, but See Document 262 . 2 See Document 213 . 3 At the urging of Secretary of Commerce Hodges, President Kennedy set up a Cabinet committee to study the textile problem. Established February 16, 1961, the committee consisted of Hodges as chairman, Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon, Secretary of Agriculture Orville L. Freeman, Secretary of Labor Arthur J. Goldberg, and Under Secretary of State Ball. 4 Document 249 . 5 Dated August 21, 1962; see the Supplement. 6 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 273. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Italy 273. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Italy Source Washington, April 6, 1963, 3:56 p.m. 1980. Secretary spoke briefly and in low key to Italian Charge today informing him that despite serious problems confronting US wool textile industry and domestic political pressures, President had decided not take action re wool textile imports at this time. This reflects President's determination that we proceed toward trade liberalization pursuant to Trade Expansion Act. In order wool textile import problem not interfere with preparations for trade negotiations, Secretary pointed out it would be helpful if GOI might use its influence with its industry to prevent any substantial increases in exports during this period. Emphasized this approach did not represent a change in US economic philosophy but was designed deal with an immediate domestic problem. Also made clear he not suggesting GOI had any obligations curtail exports but its cooperation would be helpful. Secretary commented in similar vein to British Ambassador. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, INCO-WOOL IT. Confidential. Drafted by A. Eugene Frank (EUR/WE); cleared by Stanley Nehmer (OR), Emory C. Swank (S) and Warren E. Slater (S/S-S); and approved by Galen L. Stone (EUR/WE). Also sent to London. 274. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Kennedy 274. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Kennedy Source Washington, April 17, 1963. SUBJECT Cotton Textiles You mentioned the other day that Robert Stevens had been complaining again about cotton textile imports. You asked for a memorandum covering these two questions: I. What would have happened to cotton textile imports if the Geneva Cotton Textile Arrangements had not been negotiated? II. What is the relevance of the current level of imports in relation to domestic consumption (7.2% in 1962) in view of our efforts to hold imports to 6%? I What Would Have Happened If We Had Not Negotiated the Cotton Textile Arrangements Since the Long-Term Arrangement became effective last October first, we have taken almost 160 actions to restrain cotton textile imports from seventeen countries. This means that some two-thirds to three-quarters of our cotton textile imports are under control not only with regard to overall levels but also as to the spacing of shipments throughout the year . This has involved, where necessary, import embargoes which have tied up substantial quantities of goods from such countries as Hong Kong, Portugal, and Taiwan, resulting in losses to American importers, to say nothing of the strains on our international relations. No other Administration has ever come close to doing so much for the domestic textile industry. Although the industry has been complaining for a decade, the Geneva Cotton Textile Arrangements were without precedent. By blood, sweat, and arm-twisting we achieved an agreement to which twenty-one countries have acceded. (Two others may accede soon.) Had we resorted to mandatory unilateral quotas—for which the industry was clamoring—the United States would have incurred compensation claims on a quarter billion dollars of trade—and have been the net loser in the economic war that would almost certainly have followed. I have no doubt that the intelligent leaders of the textile industry know they have gotten a good deal—but gratitude does not come easily and their teeth grow longer with each success. Before he died, Spencer Love of Burlington Mills wrote me a letter of thanks for the Geneva negotiations, but the gesture was not characteristic of the industry. You will recall that when we first undertook the Geneva negotiations, industry spokesmen were prophesying imminent doom unless imports were checked. Mr. Stevens himself told me that the cotton textile industry would “be destroyed” if we could not find a means to stop the growth of imports. Last September Mr. Seabury Stanton, Chairman of the Northern Textile Association, estimated that, without the Geneva arrangements, imports would by then have reached double the present levels. A current article in Fortune 1 suggests that the figure might well have been three times current levels. Interestingly enough the Fortune article implies that the industry engaged in a certain deliberate overstatement of its predicament. It quotes Kenneth Fraser, the Financial Vice President of J. P. Stevens, as saying: “The stress so many of us put on imports has had a depressing effect on textiles and hasn't helped us with the financial community. But it was a calculated risk; we finally got Washington to do something.” The Geneva arrangements put an effective brake on imports. The textile industry knows that it will not again be faced by a sudden and disruptive tide of imported cotton goods, such as occurred during the four years preceding 1961 when imports rose from 2 to 6% of consumption. We imported $700,000 worth of cotton textiles from Hong Kong in 1956. In 1960—the year preceding the Geneva negotiations—our imports from Hong Kong totalled $64 million. The United States will not tolerate another Hong Kong situation in cotton textiles. This has been said clearly and firmly to foreign governments. They understand this and have reluctantly accepted it. But by the same token we cannot afford to disregard the spirit in which we were able to secure agreement to the Geneva arrangements. To date, twenty-one Governments have been persuaded to participate on the understanding that importing nations would request restraints on imports only when those imports threatened disruption of the market for specific categories of textile products. The arrangement is not a license for us to act arbitrarily and we shall be in trouble if we do. Under the terms of the agreement any government may withdraw on 60 days' notice. If any major producing country were to pull out, the whole structure would come tumbling down. In that event, our domestic industry would be left without protection, even from disruptive imports—unless the Administration were prepared to assume the fantastic costs of imposing unilateral import quotas. It is, therefore, essential that we administer the agreement with sensitivity to the reactions of the other members—which means that we can't press any harder than we are already doing. II Relation of Current Level of Imports to Domestic Consumption But, in spite of this, I see no reason why our cotton textile industry should not live happily and prosperously under these arrangements. A little slippage from the 6% should not be cause for alarm. After all, many textile companies (including J. P. Stevens) had their highest sales in history in 1962. The passage of legislation to eliminate discrimination resulting from the two-price system for cotton would be another major benefit provided by your Administration to the textile industry. Half of our imports of cotton textiles are presently affected by the two-price system. Elimination of this discriminatory system should greatly relieve the pressure of imports—and make the 6% level much more realistic . Meanwhile, I hope that the industry will stop watching the monthly figures and look at the longer-term trends. The 6% figure makes sense only if regarded as an average over the five-year term of the Geneva arrangements. While domestic sales were slightly off during the early months of this year because purchasers were hoping—no doubt mistakenly—that the elimination of the two-price system would be reflected in some decrease in textile prices, imports fluctuated widely. In January, they were at the lowest point in over a year because of the dock strike; in February, they were double the previous months. Whether at the level of 6% or 7% or 7.2%, cotton textile imports are not building appreciably. In fact, in dollar value they are not much higher than exports. A little more concentration on developing exports would not only be good for the industry, but help our balance of payments. After all, if the domestic industry feels put upon, it should compare its fate with that of the British textile mills. U.K. imports have risen to over 40% of domestic production as the result of a systematic rationalization of the industry coupled with a deliberate government policy to assist the less-developed areas in the Commonwealth. And the total British economy has benefitted by the release of skilled labor into the electronics industry. In connection with our conversations with the textile industry you may get some comfort from Sherman Adams' report of a colloquy between President Eisenhower and George Humphrey. Adams writes: "George Humphrey had pointed to what he called critical unemployment in the Pittsburgh area because of Japanese competition in the electrical instrument industry. Eisenhower asked him if it were not possible for American businessmen to make some sacrifices in such a situation in the interests of world peace. "No,' Humphrey said candidly. ‘The American businessman believes in getting as much as he can while the getting is good.' "Maybe that's the trouble with businessman, George,' Eisenhower said seriously.” 2 George W. Ball 3 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, INCO-COTTON. Official Use Only. Drafted by Ball on April 17. Copies were sent to U, S/S-S, Governor Herter, and the White House for Kaysen. 1 Richard J. Whalen, “The Durable Threads of J.P. Stevens,” Fortune, April 1963, pp. 110-176. 2 Firsthand Report, by Sherman Adams. [Footnote in the source text.] 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Ball signed the original. 275. Memorandum From the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (Herter) to President Kennedy 275. Memorandum From the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (Herter) to President Kennedy Source Washington, May 1, 1963. SUBJECT Your meeting with EEC Commissioners Rey and Marjolin You will be meeting the two Commissioners tomorrow morning at 10:30. George Ball and I will accompany them. 1. Who are they? Jean Rey is the E.E.C. Commissioner responsible for the Community's External Relations—a sort of Foreign Minister for the Community. He shares responsibility for the Trade Negotiations with Marjolin. A Belgian Liberal (i.e. moderate conservative) and former Minister, Rey is a middle-of-the-roader, pro-European and anti-De Gaulle; but like Hallstein he is strongly committed to making the Community work. He favors a liberal, outward-looking Community and is basically pro-American, but he bitterly resented our carpets and glass decision, on which he felt betrayed, and is making this trip partly to restore good relations. Robert Marjolin , Vice President of the E.E.C. Commission, is responsible for economic and financial policy in the Commission. He is an old friend and associate of Jean Monnet. He made the mistake of running for office in the last French elections on an anti-Gaullist (Socialist) ticket, and losing. 2. Why are they coming? The visit is primarily a probing operation. Rey and Marjolin will try to determine how firm is the United States position on the forthcoming trade negotiations. They will be reporting next Tuesday to the Council of Ministers of the Six. The Council will then determine the position of the Community at the GATT Ministerial Meeting later this month. 3. Our position on the trade negotiations We have received substantial support both from outside the Community and within it for the basic principles of our position: a. A 50% across-the-board tariff cut with strictly limited exceptions; b. Substantially equivalent cuts in agricultural protection—whether tariff or non-tariff; c. The negotiations to cover reduction of non-tariff barriers. d. Less-developed countries would be expected to participate on a basis consistent with their economic development and would not be required to give full reciprocity. Our objective for the GATT Ministerial May 16 is a firm decision to begin tariff negotiations in the Spring of 1964 on the basis of these principles. The French are the principal problem. They have not yet shown their hand and apparently want to avoid being isolated as they were in January. But they are doing everything they can to throw road-blocks in the way of a rapid decision on the kind of negotiations we want. However, the other Five are apparently ready to use their considerable bargaining power on internal Common Market issues to bring the French along. Our strategy is to keep the pressure on the Community for a basic E.E.C. commitment at the GATT Ministerial this Spring; and to work with the E.E.C. Commission (which negotiates for the Common Market in GATT) and with the Five to keep the pressure on the French. This strategy has been successful to date despite a French effort to divert attention from the central issue by emphasizing the fact that the United States tariff has more high rates than the Community tariff. But any sign we were wavering on the eve of the GATT Ministerial could weaken the common front of the Commission and the Five and help the French forestall a clear-cut decision by the Council of Ministers. 4. What you should tell them on the trade negotiations a. The United States is firmly committed to the success of the forthcoming negotiations. A substantial reduction of trade barriers and a higher level of international trade is in the interest not only of the United States but of the Community, which is more dependent on international trade than we are. b. The attitude the Common Market takes in the forthcoming negotiations is regarded here as a crucial test of the long-term intentions of the Community. The position of the Six at the GATT Ministerial will be viewed in that light. c. A substantial cut in industrial tariffs is only possible on the basis of a linear cut staged over a five-year period, with strictly limited exceptions. A decision on this point at Geneva is essential if we are to get on with the job of preparing real negotiations. d. Special problems (like high and low tariffs and non-tariff barriers) will have to be dealt with on their merits in the course of the negotiations but should not hold up agreement on the basic linear cut. e. Agriculture must be fully included in the negotiations if they are to provide a balance of concessions for all concerned. The techniques can be flexible, but the objective must be clear. 5. Poultry You should tell them that a decision by the Common Market Council of Ministers to reduce the gate price for poultry (as the Commission has proposed) is most important to prevent this problem from continuing to poison our relations with the Community. Christian A. Herter * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Trade Policy, Trade Expansion Act, 5/1/63-5/15/63. No classification marking. In preparation for the President's May 2 meeting with EEC Commissioners Jean Rey and Robert Margolin, Carl Kaysen forwarded this memorandum to President Kennedy under cover of a memorandum, May 1, that reads in part: “There may be some virtue in your not pressing our balance of payments problems as hard with them as you did with Mansholt. We are getting into the kind of bargaining atmosphere in which if we indicate too much eagerness on our part it may redound to our disadvantage.” 276. Memorandum for the Record 276. Memorandum for the Record Source Washington, undated. The President met in his office on May 2 at 10:30 with Messrs. Robert Marjolin and Jean Rey of the EEC Commission. They were accompanied by Governor Herter and Secretary Ball. After an exchange of greetings the President opened the discussion by observing that the Trade Expansion Act had represented a fairly radical step. It was a departure from our past method of doing things and it had taken a great deal of effort to persuade Congress that this was a worthwhile thing to do. The President realized we all would have particular problems with applying this method but he hoped for sufficient give and take on both sides so we could have a successful and beneficial negotiation. Mr. Marjolin agreed that the principles of the Act were good and that we would make something out of it. There were important problems of detail that remained to be dealt with but he was confident that they could be dealt with successfully. The President remarked on the importance of unanimity among the Six in their approach to the problem and hoped that there could be unanimity. He thought on both sides we should commit ourselves to as large-scale reductions as possible and be prepared to face the domestic complaints as they arose. He observed that it was a curious fact that harm to business that arose from domestic competition was more or less accepted while harm from import competition was viewed as something that had to be defended against. This, of course, was contrary to the economic logic of competition. On our own part, we are prepared to go as far as our legal authority allows in the trade negotiations. We have made that position clear; the President said he knew that Chris Herter would not have accepted the appointment if he was not convinced that we were prepared to go to the limit of our power in this negotiation. Commissioner Rey observed that there had been very good cooperation between the U.S. and the Commission. This was true at the level of relations between the Commissioner and Governor Herter and it was true at the working level. The Commission staff had lively discussions with Blumenthal and technical discussions were going ahead well. The President turned to the question of the international monetary mechanism and whether it was equal to the needs of world trade. He observed that he had just received the other day a minister from Guinea. Like most of the less-developed countries Guinea was practically bankrupt. In fact Latin America, Africa, and Asia were essentially in this position and the U.S. balance of payments position was poor as well. This raised the question of whether too many countries were striving after surplus and whether this was not dangerous. Was not the West as a whole in danger of letting money master national purposes instead of letting broader purposes determine the monetary mechanism? Commissioner Marjolin responded that the surplus of the Six was declining. Their trade balance was moving toward a better equilibrium than that of the U.S. Wages in these countries were rising some ten per cent per year and this rate of rise was still continuing in France, Germany and Italy and perhaps to only a slightly less extent in Holland. M. Marjolin expressed his confidence that in two years or so more the dollar will be in a sound position. The President agreed that so far as trade went, Marjolin's observations were sound. On the other hand, one had to look not only to trade but other items. We expected our net loss on tourist account alone to be $1.5 billion next year. When the military burdens were considered, in addition, it was clear that we had to earn a bigger trade surplus to account for them. He did not mention investment because this was something he thought we ourselves had to deal with. In these balance of payments matters our loss was Europe's gain. Everybody can't have a surplus, yet if the U.S. responded by taking restrictive measures this could bring in Europe and the rest of the world the kind of desperate situation we had in the 20's and 30's, which would be disastrous. Marjolin responded that Europe was not fighting to keep its surplus. It did not want a deficit indeed, but that is as far as it went. The U.S. basic deficit including short-term capital movements was not so big. In the face of rate of expansion, of demand in the EEC, the increasingly good economic conditions in the U.S., and the effect they would have on capital movements, Marjolin was confident the problem would be met. However, he agreed with the President that the international monetary system needed reform. The gold exchange standard was a fragile mechanism and it could not withstand any serious shock. While he was not an outright advocate of Triffin, he thought there was a good deal of merit in Triffin's ideas. He admired the accomplishments of Messrs. Dillon and Roosa in defending the dollar, but he thought we must go beyond what they have done. It is clear that we must have a situation in which the monetary system is the servant of the economy and not vice versa. The President returned to the question of trade as a means toward other goals. For us it clearly had to earn enough for tourists and defense. It cost us about $3.5 billion annually on balance of payments account. M. Rey asked whether U.S. investment in Europe should be stopped. The President responded that he would be glad to see the Europeans do it. D'Estaing has threatened several times to do this and the President rather wondered when he would. Marjolin warned the President not to count on d'Estaing doing it and Rey added that the Commission would not do it. The President asked what the present state of the poultry problem was and Marjolin referred to the Commission proposal of the Council of Ministers and described it as a good proposal for which the Commission would have to fight hard. The President responded that he would describe it as at best a moderately good proposal. He thought that the Europeans would by now be willing to do what we asked in respect to poultry in order that they would not have to listen to us talk about it any more. There was a certain amount of further discussion of poultry and the conversation turned to the Italian elections. The President indicated that he thought that they might have no effect on the Community but feared they might have some effect on NATO. * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Trade Policy, Trade Expansion Act, 5/1/63-5/15/63. No classification marking. The source text, labeled “Draft,” bears no drafting information. 277. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy 277. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy Source Washington, May 4, 1963. SUBJECT Reprise With your permission, and at your pleasure, may I return to the subject of the relation between our balance of payments position and what we seek in the trade negotiations? If you have already had enough, stop here. Your discussion with Messrs. Marjolin and Rey of why we need to increase our already large trade surplus further in order to meet our military and tourist outlays (among others) was clear, and from our point of view, convincing. We are providing Europe both with income that does not register in the trade account, e.g., tourists and investments, and with military services which we pay for and they do not, and the benefits of aid expenditures for which we still pay a disproportionate share. It is the fact that we must either finance these outlays by our trade surplus or reduce them. The Europeans should understand this, and it should affect their attitude toward the trade negotiations. However, despite all this, it may not be helpful to our negotiating position to emphasize these truths. The negotiations under the Trade Expansion Act are carried on by a Commission which must act under instructions from six governments. The competence of the Commission is essentially economic. In our dealings with it, our arguments and theirs are couched in economic terms. The best argument we can make in these terms in that successful trade negotiations, resulting in the greatest possible reduction of barriers, are in the economic interests of both the U.S. and Europe. It is easier to make this argument because the negotiations involve not only the U.S. and the Six, but the rest of the world as well. An argument that goes further and speaks to the U.S. need for the trade negotiations to result in a better balance of payments position for us, and rests on broader political and military security grounds, may prove too much. First, it would suggest that we are in a weak position and it is so important for us to try to succeed that the Europeans can toughen their bargaining terms. An analogy that may be helpful is the position of a man selling a house. If he tells the prospective buyer that he is in a tough financial shape and must get a very good price for the house, it is as likely to weaken as to strengthen his bargaining position. Further, such arguments by us may be used, especially by the French, to support the view that we are seeking more from Europe in the trade negotiations than we are willing to give. While we can put the negotiations in their broader context, the Europeans in their discussions with each other need not. The French are already making this kind of argument in Europe, with some effect. Since the relations between the French and the other five within the Commission are crucial to the decisions that the Commission makes on the trade negotiations, we do not want to provide them with what may look like evidence that the French position is correct. The same problem would arise in any discussion you might have with the Finance or Economic Ministers of individual countries, since they, too, would see the problem from their own viewpoint. The broader argument may be appropriate with Foreign Ministers, or even more so with heads of governments, who can instruct Finance Ministers and Economic Ministers on the political values to Europe of a successful negotiation. Even with them it is risky. In the narrower context of arguments about economic benefits, it is decidedly two-edged, and seems to me as likely to work against as for us in the bargaining process. C.K. 1 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Trade Policy, Trade Expansion Act, 5/1/63-5/15/63. Confidential. 1 Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials. 278. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions 278. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions Source Washington, May 4, 1963, 5:32 p.m. 1891. As Missions aware, Administration's position is that negotiating plan for proposed GATT trade negotiations should provide for substantial and equal linear tariff reductions by advanced countries on industrial products and on those agricultural products subject to fixed tariffs, with limited exceptions. Reductions would be made in no less than five annual stages. At April 22-27 meeting of GATT Working Party on Tariff Reductions (WP), EEC pressed for alternative formula (termed “ecretement” plan) which they claim more suitable because of differing structures of U.S. and EEC tariffs (see below). This plan unacceptable to U.S. and meeting ended without decision on negotiating plan. Issue remains to be resolved at GATT Ministerial (May 16-22) 1 or later. In WP discussion, we took position we cannot accept ecretement as basic plan though prepared consider on their merits special cases in which wide disparities in tariff may create special problems. We do not believe, however, problem of high and low tariffs is of great consequence. Our opposition to ecretement is based on conviction it not in interest of industrial countries generally as well as not in U.S. interest. To ensure this fully understood by governments concerned, missions addressed requested explain U.S. position to responsible officials, drawing on following, which summarizes U.S. statement at WP meeting: 1. Apparent for some years to all participating countries that old item-by-item tariff bargaining no longer adequate. Limited results reached in lengthy 1961 tariff negotiations provided confirmation that new technique of across-the-board, linear reduction required. This not practicable for U.S. under previous legislation. GATT Ministerial meeting November 1961 endorsed linear principle. TEA legislation 1962 designed provide President with powers necessary to enable him to negotiate on broad basis necessary for substantial trade liberalization. U.S. intention to use new authority for linear reductions was widely known through 1962 and was widely endorsed by other countries. At March 1963 WP meeting U.S. proposal for equal linear reductions received wide support. 2. Although no precise details proposed by EEC, under ecretement proposal aim would be to reach arbitrarily set targets, e.g. zero duties for raw materials, 5 percent for semi-manufactures, and 10 percent for finished products. Rates in excess these levels would be reduced by half the difference between present and target levels. Result overall would be considerably less tariff reduction than under U.S. proposal since there would be no reduction of any industrial rate which is 10 percent or less and even a 100 percent ad valorem rate would be reduced by only 45 percent. On 25 percent ad valorem rate, reduction would be only 30 percent. Since almost all EEC tariffs and large majority of U.S. tariffs are at or below 25 percent, the benefits to other countries would range from 0 to 30 percent for the largest part of their manufactured exports compared to 50 percent proposed by U.S. 3. Rationale for ecretement is apparently that while average levels of CXT and U.S. tariff roughly equivalent, most CXT rates are in 15 to 25 percent range (because most highs and lows eliminated in averaging process which established CXT) whereas U.S. tariff has greater spread of rates. Following summary shows frequency distribution of U.S. and EEC rates on dutiable goods: Tariff Range ( Percent ) 1 Percentage Distribution by Count of Tariff Rates Percentage Distribution by Volume of Trade 1 US EEC US EEC .1 to 10.0 22 21 54 38 10.1 to 20.0 37 65 29 57 20.1 to 30.0 19 14 10 5 Above 30.0 22 1 7 - Since this count covers raw materials and semi-manufactures as well as finished goods, above table does not permit any definite conclusion as to amount of U.S. or EEC trade in industrial products that would be excluded from negotiations under ecretement proposal requiring no reduction of rates now 10 percent or less on such products. However, we believe reasonable conclude substantial amount of trade would be unaffected under ecretement plan whereas linear formula would result in reductions throughout. Also note that in 10.1 to 20.0 percent range, negotiations under ecretement plan would result in rates of 10 to 15 percent for industrial goods whereas U.S. linear formula would reduce rates to 5 to 10 percent. In higher rate brackets as well, rates under ecretement plan would be higher than under linear formula. 4. Ecretement plan is unacceptable to U.S. for following reasons: (a) Since basic objective of negotiations is to increase trade, formula chosen should be designed accomplish this end. As generally confirmed by examination results earlier negotiations, greater tariff reductions result in greater trade increases than do smaller tariff decreases. Therefore greater trade stimulation can be expected from U.S. linear formula than from ecretement plan. (b) If establishment of uniform competitive conditions, which ecretement plan presumes, were basic objective of negotiations, harmonization of all factors, including wages, social charges, etc., would be necessary. (c) In past, some high U.S. rates were peril-pointed, and therefore not reduced, precisely because imports were large despite high rates or were affecting sensitive industries. The larger the reduction of these rates, the greater should be the interest from viewpoint countries desiring expand their exports. (d) Under ecretement plan bulk of reductions by both U.S. and EEC would be substantially less than 50 percent linear reductions proposed by U.S. (see paras 2 and 3 above). (e) “Low” rates which would not be reduced under ecretement plan can be highly trade restrictive, e.g. U.S. exporters consider EEC 9 percent rate on precious metal jewelry highly protective. (f) Country cutting high tariff may well be at greater disadvantage, i.e. making greater concessions, under linear approach, than low tariff country. (g) Ecretement plan would lead to pressures to increase to target levels rates already below those levels, e.g. U.S. 6-1/2 percent rate on automobiles. (h) Ecretement plan negates basic philosophy of linear approach to reciprocity. (i) Arbitrary levels for various categories of products have no logical basis. Why limit plan to industrial products? Why not include agricultural products in zero group with other primary products? (j) Provisions of TEA and Congressional intent as defined in legislative history of Act preclude negotiations on basis ecretement plan. Act requires us obtain mutual trade benefits. Ecretement plan would not yield mutual benefits to U.S. On industrial products, U.S. (and many other countries) would do more tariff cutting than EEC. (k) Our basic authority is limited to 50 percent reductions for rates above 5 percent. We could not seem to commit ourselves to greater reductions which would be required to meet ultimate ecretement “targets”. Also we cannot commit ourselves as to what authority we might have under future legislation. 5. Conclusion: For practical and substantive reasons cited, U.S. sees no possibility negotiating on ecretement basis or other generalized plan based on unequal tariff reductions. Thus we consider basic plan should provide for substantial equilinear reductions with minimum exceptions. In course of negotiations on this basis, U.S. prepared consider on merits case where it is asserted reciprocity can only be achieved by uneven reductions. Any country disadvantaged in exchange of reductions should be entitled to appropriate credit. Depending on facts this might be U.S. or another country. Ball * Source: Department of State, Central Files, FT7 GaTT. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Selma G. Kallis (E/OT) on May 3; cleared by James H. Lewis (TA), W. Michael Blumenthal (E), Richard D. Vine (EUR/RPE) in substance, and Herter; and approved by Leonard Weiss (OT). Repeated to all NATO capitals except Reykjavik, Athens, and Ankara, and to Bern, Canberra, Stockholm, Tokyo, Vienna, Wellington, Cairo, Helsinki, Karachi, Lima, Montevideo, New Delhi, Pretoria, and Rio de Janeiro. 1 The GATT Ministerial meeting was held in Geneva. 279. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the European Communities 279. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the European Communities Source Washington, May 7, 1963, 5:41 p.m. Busec 484. Deliver Ambassador Tuthill 9 A.M. You should obtain appointment first thing Wednesday 1 morning with Rey and deliver following letter from Governor Herter. You should also see to it that Marjolin receives a copy prior to opening of Council meeting Wednesday, and make such other use of letter as you deem appropriate: Begin text: Dear Mr. Rey: Subsequent to our discussion regarding the prospects and timetable for the trade negotiations, 2 I again reviewed these questions with the President. I told the President of the suggestion that the basis of tariff cuts might be left open to be worked out over a period of months. His view is that it is difficult for the United States Government to commit itself to broad-scale negotiations and set the machinery of the Trade Expansion Act in motion without having agreement with the EEC regarding the general basis upon which the reduction of tariffs is to take place. I myself feel that we should seek to reach an agreement during the May Ministerial meeting regarding the nature of the linear cut and the disposition of the tariff disparity problem. I am confident that this can be worked out. As I have emphasized to you in our several discussions of this subject, we are conscious of the fact that in your view the problem of highs and lows 3 is one that requires some attention. We agree that this is a matter which must be examined. We are convinced that once we establish the principle of an equilinear cut as the basis for negotiations we can then deal with the question of highs and lows. The nature of the rules for exceptions is, of course, an important related problem that will require further discussions between us. I think, nevertheless, that it would be possible to reach agreement at the Ministerial meeting on the basic negotiating rule while leaving for further discussion the precise rules that are to govern exceptions. I say this assuming that we are agreed that the exception list in any case must be very limited and subject to individual confrontation and justification. I found our discussions very useful and I greatly appreciate your coming to Washington. I shall look forward to the opportunity for further exchange of ideas with you in Geneva. Sincerely yours, (s) Christian A. Herter End text FYI: Department will send you no later than tomorrow indications, for your background information, regarding possible formula for reaching agreement high-low problem with EEC. End FYI. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, FT 7 GATT. Confidential; Emergency. Drafted by Kaysen, cleared by Herter by telephone and Benjamin H. Read (S/S), and approved by Ball. Repeated to Bonn, London, Luxembourg, Paris, Rome, and The Hague. 1 May 8. 2 For a position paper summarizing the principal trade issues, which was prepared for the May 2-3 Rey/Marjolin talks, see the Supplement. See also Document 275 . 3 Reference is to the ecretement proposal; See Document 278 . 280. Memorandum of Conversation 280. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, May 9, 1963. SUBJECT The Tariff Negotiations PARTICIPANTS U.S. The Secretary Mr. William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary, EUR Mr. Johannes V. Imhof, EUR/WE French Ambassador Alphand M. Bruno de Leusse, Minister Ambassador Alphand said that the atmosphere surrounding the forthcoming tariff negotiations 1 was a matter of concern. He said that there was no desire on the part of France to become protectionist. The French economy had prospered greatly under the liberalization of the past four years. The French welcomed liberalization not only within the Six but also in relations between the Six and others. However, there might be trouble with the formula proposed by the U.S. for these negotiations. The U.S. formula was too rigid. The U.S. had high tariff peaks and the linear reduction would disarm the EEC while certain U.S. commodities would remain protected. French experts believed the EEC formula would be compatible with U.S. legislation and that its employment would not require a new authorization from Congress. The Secretary asked whether the EEC formula would require commodity by commodity or sector by sector negotiations. Ambassador Alphand said neither would be required. The formula called for a tariff on finished products at 10 to 15 per cent, semi-finished products at 6 to 10 percent and a zero duty on raw materials within a certain period of time. Ambassador Alphand said that he did not wish to go further into the details of the proposal. If it was necessary to go into details to remove misunderstandings, Messrs. Wormser and Clappier could come here for such discussions. The point he wished to stress was that a disagreement on the formula to be employed should not be allowed to rekindle a political controversy. If the EEC formula did not agree with ours this did not mean that France wishes to destroy the Atlantic Alliance. Mr. Tyler asked why it was necessary to advance a new formula at this stage. He noted that our formula made allowances for exceptions and for discussions of tariff peaks. He said he feared that the proposal of an alternative formula at this stage would be considered a political maneuver and that there would be a political reaction here, particularly in Congress. Ambassador Alphand said that the Trade Expansion Act was an important and beneficial piece of legislation. It was, however, a U.S. law, and the other countries had not been consulted. Mr. Tyler pointed out that the formula proposed under the TEA had been known for a long time. Ambassador Alphand said that the EEC proposal was compatible with U.S. legislation. Also, the formula had been advanced originally not by the French but by the Germans. He briefly explained how the EEC proposals would work: As a first step, the difference between the tariff goals in the EEC formula and actual tariffs would be cut in half. In reply to a question by the Secretary, Ambassador Alphand said that the zero duty applied only to industrial raw materials, not to agricultural products. On agriculture there should be a worldwide agreement. Ambassador Alphand concluded his presentation by reiterating that differences on method should be seen as what they are and should not be allowed to give rise to a political controversy. The Secretary said that he would wish a briefing on this subject. He noted that Mr. Ball had been closely concerned with these problems. The Secretary said that the balance of payment aspects must also be considered. For example, U.S. tourists abroad contributed heavily to the balance of payments picture. Ambassador Alphand said that from a practical point of view it was clear that U.S. exports could not be increased without a corresponding increase in European exports. * Source: Department of State, Central Files, FT 7. Secret. Drafted by Imhof and approved in S on May 16. 1 Reference is to the GATT Ministerial meeting held May 16-22 in Geneva. 281. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the European Communities 281. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the European Communities Source Washington, May 17, 1963, 7:37 p.m. Busec 504. Brussels also for Embassy, Paris also for USRO. Pelt 1 of Dutch Embassy just returned from The Hague made following points in discussion of trade negotiations with Department officers. He stressed he was describing situation as he saw it from point of view of one who was essentially in sympathy U.S. objectives in trade negotiations. He also implied his views reflected those of Van Oorschot 2 and other “liberals” in Dutch administration. 1. “Ecretement” proposal has attracted considerable support from business and general public as well officials. Support is result primarily of belief equal linear cut biased in favor of U.S. and that negotiations on this basis would leave U.S. with more bargaining power for future because it would still have some relatively high tariffs. 2. Compromise EEC position for GATT Ministerial was best obtainable at this time. Essential for U.S. to present convincing case for linear cut and to be sufficiently flexible to take account of high tariff problem if agreement is to be achieved on equal linear cut. If we make good enough case, Germans and Dutch would be able to harden their positions in support of ours. At moment, U.S. has lost initiative and must find means to regain it. 3. One important key to U.S. regaining initiative is for U.S. to be as specific as possible as soon as possible on our intentions re exceptions. We explained inability commit ourselves on specific exceptions prior to completion internal procedures. Pelt said he understood this but said would be big help if U.S. could make official proposal setting percentage ceiling on exceptions. 4. Most Dutch officials convinced French do not want any negotiations and are using “ecretement” proposal to bloc them. If this tactic fails, French will attempt create other obstacles. 5. French have taken position Commission's authority to act for EEC under Article 111 3 is limited to tariffs and Commission not author-ized to deal with non-tariff barriers. Van Blankenstein, 4 who accompanied Pelt, stated French are taking position that para-tariff and non-tariff barriers are not matters which fall within common commercial policy and therefore remain subject to unanimity during full transitional period and presumably afterwards. Pointed out this would provide French with permanent veto in non-tariff field and could prevent agreement necessary to final settlement in negotiations. Van Blankenstein also said, however, Dutch hopeful of defeating French on this point. 6. U.S. should not expect EEC to take any initiative in field of agriculture. U.S., therefore, would have to put forward specific proposals on agriculture. 7. Both Mansholt and Linthorst-Homan 5 convinced failure of negotiations would precipitate internal crisis resulting in breakup of EEC. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, FT 4 US/TEA. Confidential. Drafted by Barbara C. Fagan (EUR/RPE); cleared by Bernard Norwood (STR), Leonard Weiss, and Robert M. Beaudry (EUR/WE) in substance; and approved by Stanley M. Cleveland (EUR/RPE). Also sent to the EEC capitals and Geneva. 1 Adrian S. Pelt, Secretary General of the World Federation of U.N. Associations. 2 Not further identified. 3 For text of Article 111 of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1957 , pp. 467-468. 4 Not further identified. 5 J. Linthorst-Homan was the Ambassador of the Netherlands Mission to the EEC in 1958. 282. Editorial Note 282. Editorial Note At the GATT Ministerial meeting held at Geneva May 16-21, 1963, U.S. and EEC representatives compromised on their disagreement on the rules that should govern tariff reductions for the Kennedy Round GATT negotiations scheduled to begin May 4, 1964. The Ministers agreed that the tariff negotiations would be “based upon a plan of substantial linear tariff reductions with a bare minimum of exceptions,” reflecting the U.S. view. At the same time, they declared that “in these cases where there are significant disparities in tariff levels, the tariff reductions will be based upon special rules of general and automatic application,” reflecting the EEC position. The conference established a Trade Negotiation Committee (TNC) to reach agreement on the details of the negotiating rules by August 1, 1963, effectively postponing a resolution of the two opposing tariff plans. The text of the Ministerial resolution, “Principle and Procedures for Conducting Comprehensive Trade Negotiations Beginning at Geneva, May 4, 1964,” is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pages 1126-1129. The U.S.-EEC accommodation is discussed and summarized in Current Economic Developments , Issue No. 676, May 28, 1963, pages 1-6. (Washington National Records Center, E/CBA/REP Files: FRC 72 A 6248, Current Economic Developments ) 283. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Counsel (Feldman) to President Kennedy 283. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Counsel (Feldman) to President Kennedy Source Washington, July 30, 1963. SUBJECT Wool textile imports Attached are letters from Burlington Industries which report the results of discussions between leaders of the U.S. wool textile industry and leaders of the British textile industry. 1 Senator Pastore requested the meeting in order to call to your attention the progress made in these discussions. The American industry was unwilling to accept the State Department statement that it was impossible to arrange an international agreement on wool like the international agreement on cotton. From the letters written to you and to Senator Pastore, it would appear that the United Kingdom would be amenable to such an arrangement. Senator Pastore may also wish to discuss the report of his Subcommittee on Textiles. They held hearings in May, and they filed a report on July 18. The report recommends: (1) the negotiation of an “effective international agreement to limit imports of wool textiles and apparel products;” and (2) if such agreement cannot be negotiated, then “the United States must take unilateral action to insure that the defense-essential wool textile and apparel industries are not irreparably damaged by the unrestrained flood of imports.” As a matter of fact, wool textile imports have increased markedly during the past year. In May 1962, they stood at 13.6 percent; in May, 1963, they stand at 19.3 percent. Secretary of State Rusk met with the British and Italian Ambassadors on April 6 to request that they exercise voluntary restraints on their exports of wool textiles to the United States, but received a negative response from them a month or so later. Recommendation It seems to me that the only response that can be made to the presentation by Senator Pastore is: (1) We will seek to exploit the assurances received by the American industry from their counterparts in the United Kingdom. This will mean conferring with Alan Green of the United Kingdom Board of Trade on the mutual interest of the U.S. and the U.K. in an international agreement. If the U.K. reaction is favorable, we will request the Italian and Japanese Governments to join us in a meeting. This will take approximately 2 months, and it must be attended with the greatest possible secrecy. (2) We cannot take unilateral action at this time. This would be in conflict with our trade expansion program, it would mean compensation in the neighborhood of $200 million, and it would doom negotiations in the Kennedy round. (3) There are minor steps that we are taking to reduce wool textile imports. For instance, imports from the Virgin Islands will be reduced to a fraction of their present volume for 1964. Reductions in effect already will make the total about 6.5 million linear yards for the last 9 months of 1963. They will be 2.8 million linear yards for 1964. We will also give consideration to preventing the circumvention of the tariff regulations by putting braid on the wool. The ad valorem tariff on wool fabrics is between 50 percent and 100 percent. However, by put-ting braid on the fabric it is reduced to 42.5 percent. To evade the tariff, importers have the braid attached and then take it off after it has been imported. Senators Saltonstall and Kennedy have introduced legislation to make the fabric dutiable at the higher rate even when it has braid attached to it. I believe we can support the legislation to close this loophole. Myer Feldman 2 * Source: Kennedy Library, Feldman Papers, Wool. No classification marking. 1 Only one letter from Vice President Robert P. Lyon to Feldman, July 25, is attached to the source text. In this letter, Lyon confirmed their telephone conversation of the night before. He informed Feldman that Alan Green, Minister of State in the Board of Trade, was the most sympathetic as well as the most appropriate British official to contact to discuss restrictions on wool products into the United States. Lyon added, “the United Kingdom government would in all probability accept an invitation if extended by the United States to meet and discuss with the United States and others in an international meeting the subject of restriction on imports of wool textile products into the United States. I believe it is fair to say that the United Kingdom government now awaits such an invitation.” 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 284. Memorandum From the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (Herter) to President Kennedy 284. Memorandum From the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (Herter) to President Kennedy Source Washington, August 2, 1963. SUBJECT Poultry “Retaliation” The EEC Council of Ministers, meeting on July 30, 1 once again failed to provide relief for U.S. poultry imports into the Community. As it announced, the Council merely instructed the EEC Commission “to renew contact” with the United States “with a view to exploring the possibilities of agreement” and to report back to the Council in September. In sum: the Council itself took no decision to reduce the present poultry restrictions; it did not give a useful negotiating instruction to the Commission; it again procrastinated. I believe we must abandon our effort to seek relief through consultation or negotiation and must compensate for the recent EEC restrictions on poultry by our withdrawing from the EEC equivalent tariff concessions. In the light of interagency deliberations, I recommend the following actions and target dates: 1) August 5—Through our missions abroad, we give notice to the EEC Commission, to the individual EEC member states, to other affected governments, and to the GATT Executive Secretary of our intention to withdraw tariff concessions of benefit to the EEC and indicate the timetable we have in mind for carrying out there withdrawals. 2) August 7—We announce the scheduling of public hearings on items with respect to which we are considering withdrawing concessions. 3) September 5—Public hearings, ending about September 10 (4 working days). 4) September 16—Presidential proclamation, effective in 30 days, withdrawing concessions on articles involving about $46 million of U.S. imports from the EEC. At the time of issuing the proclamation, we would inform the GATT contracting parties in accordance with GATT procedure. 5) October 16—The withdrawals would go into effect. The list of items which we would consider for withdrawal accounted for slightly more than $100 million of U.S. imports from the EEC in 1962 (list attached—Tab A). 2 After receiving public views on this list, we would select for ultimate withdrawal items involving trade of approximately $46 million. The list of eligible items has been formulated by interagency committees to satisfy the following criteria: 1) We proceed in accordance with GATT Article XXVIII. Under this Article we are limited to increasing duties on a most-favored-nation basis on items on which tariff concessions were initially negotiated with the EEC or individual EEC member states. (We cannot impose quotas or discriminate against the EEC in duty increases.) 2) Items eligible for withdrawal should involve U.S. imports supplied principally by the EEC. Where non-EEC trade is affected, compensation will have to be offered. 3) The impact of withdrawals should affect trade of all EEC countries, but with emphasis on France and Germany. 4) The withdrawal list should include both agricultural and industrial items, should not include items likely to cause undue hardship for U.S. producers or consumers, and should not be deliberately protective. Christian A. Herter 3 * Source: Kennedy Library, Herter Papers, Memoranda to the President. Limited Official Use. 1 For a summary of this meeting, see Bulletin of the European Economic Community, No. 9/10-1963, pp. 37-39. 2 Not printed. The list contained 19 items. 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 285. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball) and Marquis Childs 285. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball) and Marquis Childs Source Washington, August 14, 1963, 4 p.m. Childs: I have been looking a little bit into the retaliation on the chickens and I was told by one of your admirers on the Hill that you felt this was a very ill-advised course and counseled against it. Ball: Oh no, not at all. As a matter of fact, I told the President the other day that I was all for it. Childs: I'm disappointed in you. What's the matter with you? Ball: Well I think that at some point…. I would hope that as a result of our getting into the business of examining the withdrawal of concessions, that we can really pull the Europeans back to a position where they are going to face this thing rationally. They have really been…in a very irresponsible fashion here and they have let their own lobbies dominate them. We are not going to start a trade war. I think this thing is blown up out of proportion, partly because there has been too much talk about it on this side, but even more important because it has become a play between the Germans and the French with two agricultural lobbies working at times against one another and at times with one another. But what is going to happen, is that these problems have to be faced at the political level and the Europeans have really refused to face this at the political level; they have left it at the level of secretaries of agriculture who are always going to be…in a situation of this kind. Childs: Don't you think it can become a trade war? Ball: No. I don't think so. In the first place, we have no intention of letting it become a trade war and the Europeans are not going to in my opinion, because they will have enough responsibility once they get a little sense of shock. But you know I would feel a little more concern about this if we hadn't been through the…glass experience where the shoe was on the other foot, and we were excoriated all over Europe for raising these rates even though they went through…procedures. Childs: And they retaliated. Ball: And they retaliated. And that was all right; that was part of the game. I hate to see this thing go on a retaliation route because it makes no sense from the point of view of commercial policy, but I think it is the only way we have of bringing this matter to a decision at the political level and giving the government a club to beat their agricultural lobbies over the head with and for that reason, I think it is very important that from time to time we take a tough line. And while the chickens are…is not a big item in total trade, it is only at the most something like $50,000,000 and it is probably a vanishing market anyway, because the Europeans are going to acquire the same technology of producing chickens on an assembly line basis as we are. Childs: Well, of course, they are. Ball: Nevertheless, I think it is useful to have a confrontation at this point on an item which is at least symbolic of what the larger problem is going to be. The European market for the Department of Agriculture is extremely important and if the European governments are going to let their price structure and their regime of protection of agriculture be fixed at the level of the most inefficient producer, which is the situation here that I think…for a very bad time and we might as well face that now as later. The net result of all this pulling and hauling is very likely to be that this thing will be raised up to the proper political level and I'm not sure we will save the poultry, but I think we will have saved some other things. Childs: Yes. They are now in a position, however, to take up a trade war and this is what de Gaulle would like, don't you think? Ball: I think he might like it, but the Germans would hate it. Their problem is this and I don't think de Gaulle really wants it either. I think that he talks a kind of…game, but there is a good deal of—particularly among the larger European producers—there is a good deal of sense…liberal trading world and there is always a latent French protectionism, but it is nothing like as strong as it used to be and the Germans who are the real offenders in many ways on the chicken side. The industrial Germans, of course, are by definition liberal traders, so that the pressures in Germany are going to be for a liberalization and they are going to want to avoid a trade war. We've got to have a crisis here and this is a good point to have it, I think. I would just as soon that it came now and sort it out. I don't think it is going to have great consequences but I do think it is going to act as a kind of restraint on the lobbies and what it is going to mean is that governments are going to look at these things politically at the right political level sooner than they might otherwise and not just leave them to the level of Ministers of Agriculture, Secretaries of Commerce and what not. Childs: Yes. Well, of course, I know it is…these farm lobbies are so powerful everywhere, including here. Ball: That's all right. Childs: Now the thing that Freeman has been lobbying around up there on the Hill about this. He got up that telegram…53 Senators. 1 Ball: Yes. I think, but then again I mean he's just being the counterweight to the Ministers of Agriculture in Europe. Up to this point, this has been a case where the lobby on one side has been against the lobbies—combined lobbies—on the other, and I think the time has got to come when this thing has to be settled by the political leaders—the governments, because you can't have a commercial policy problem these days in this kind of interdependent world that doesn't become a political problem when big nations are involved. This just has to be looked at as a political problem. Childs: You know I saw your friend Jean Monnet in June and I have never seen him, George—I have seen him many times—I have never seen him so agitated. I brought up the chickens, chickens, chickens. Ball: I know. Childs: He is usually so calm. Ball: He sees the chickens as creating a source of friction between the government of the United States. Of course, sitting where I sit—much committed as I am to the idea of a United Europe, nevertheless, the point of view of protecting American commercial interest—this is one we really couldn't take lying down. Too much has been talked about it—said about it and I think we have tended, perhaps to make too many speeches. Nevertheless, I think the principle of the thing is absolutely right. I don't see how we can avoid moving on it. Childs: What I couldn't help but feel was that he doesn't understand the pressures over in this country. I said, Jean, the next thing you will get is the feed grain. He said you can't go on expecting to export all that agricultural produce to Europe. If we can't, Jean, we will be out of Europe. Ball: Well, the real problem is that down the line, if you look far enough, there is bound to be a certain probable reduction in American agricultural exports to Europe or at least they wont increase at the rate they have been increasing, simply because they have gone up very fast since the war. Since the agricultural technology hit here before it hit Europe and whether or not there had been a common market, we would be facing problems in our agricultural exports because we have now reached a point where over here one farmer can produce ten times what a farmer could produce in pre-war days and it is beginning to happen in Europe. Childs: It is happening in France right now. Ball: Now there are two trends and it is really quite interesting that one counteracts the other. On the one hand Europe is going to begin to apply the new technology and greatly increase productivity and that would tend to move Europe to self sufficiency, but at the same time counteracting the fact that as the standard of living in Europe rises, the Europeans are going to shift their diet from direct cereal consumption into protein consumption. In other words, instead of eating pasta as they do in Italy which is simply the cereal grain cooked, they are going to eat meat and the fortunate thing is that quite a bit of American agricultural export is…. A cow is extremely interesting in that it takes something like 5 lbs. of grain to produce a pound of meat, so then if you have a big counterpart…and since cereals are one of the major exports, the total amount of cereal is going to go up with the rising standard of living. Childs: I see. This is a possibility. Jean talked about a World Food Conference. Ball: We may have to have. And so De Gaulle may be trying to use the threat of torpedoing the liberal trade policy or even torpedoing the Common Market, unless the Germans agree to a common agricultural policy. We get caught in this bind—right in the middle of this thing to some extent. This is part of the difficulty. [Here follows discussion unrelated to the poultry problem.] * Source: Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. Childs was chief Washington correspondent for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. 1 Not further identified. 286. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Ball to President Kennedy 286. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Ball to President Kennedy Source Washington, undated. SUBJECT Wool Textiles In accordance with your memorandum of August 12, 1 the Embassy in London was instructed to discuss the proposal for an international agreement on wool textiles with Alan Green, Minister of State in the Board of Trade. Mr. Green is on holiday in Rhodes and will not be back in London until September 20. The President of the Board of Trade, Mr. Erroll, is also abroad, until August 26. In the absence of these Ministers, the Embassy discussed the matter with Sir Richard Powell, Permanent Secretary of the Board of Trade, emphasizing the importance the United States attaches to the initiation of steps looking toward an international arrangement on wool textiles. Powell informed the Embassy that Alan Green had met with representatives of the British wool textile industry several weeks ago, had agreed to consider their views and, approximately one week ago, had told them by letter that, after careful consideration of their proposals, Her Majesty's Government maintained its view in opposition to an international wool textile arrangement. Powell pointed out that Green's reply could not be interpreted as encouraging the belief that the British Government would give favorable consideration to an approach by the United States regarding an international wool textile arrangement. In response to a reiteration of U.S. views by the Embassy, Powell stated that the decision communicated by Green was taken at the Ministerial (political) level. We understand that the U.K. position has been passed on to the U.S. trade press by the British Embassy. In light of the consistent opposition of the United Kingdom and other exporting countries to an international agreement covering wool textiles, I believe consideration should be given to steps by the Administration to initiate a Tariff Commission investigation of the wool textile situation under Section 332 of the Tariff Act of 1930. We continue to be handicapped both internationally and domestically by the lack of an objective analysis of conditions in the wool textile industry. The domestic industry insists that injury from imports is a fact. On the other hand, importers and exporting countries maintain that no injury has been demonstrated; they expect us to follow established procedures to determine whether there is serious injury or the threat of serious injury from increased imports. Any efforts to help the industry through domestic programs are stymied by the absence of an independent and thorough study such as the Tariff Commission makes under various provisions of the U.S. legislation. Only after a factual analysis has been made by the Tariff Commission will we be likely, in my view, to make progress internationally or domestically toward the solution of the wool textile problem. The proposal for a Tariff Commission study and report has been made in the past and has been opposed by the domestic industry, which adamantly refuses to re-initiate the action itself. Consequently, the domestic industry would probably not consider reference to the Tariff Commission as responsive to their situation. In the circumstances, I suggest that you might wish to have Mr. Feldman talk with the interested Senators, lay before them the information on the U.K. position received through Embassy London, point out the impasse which has again been reached, and suggest a Tariff Commission report as a sound basis for further efforts to help the domestic industry. If some support for this approach were generated, you could then direct the Tariff Commission to undertake the industry study. 2 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, INCO-WOOL 4. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Joseph A. Greenwald on August 20 (E/OT) and cleared by G. Griffith Johnson. Sent to President Kennedy under cover of a memorandum from Benjamin H. Read to McGeorge Bundy. 1 Not found. 2 Printed from an unsigned copy. 287. Letter From Secretary of Commerce Hodges to Secretary of State Rusk 287. Letter From Secretary of Commerce Hodges to Secretary of State Rusk Source Washington, September 20, 1963. Dear Mr. Secretary : I am pleased to attach for your information the report of the White House Conference on Export Expansion which was held on September 17-18, 1963. For your convenience, I am also attaching a summary which reflects the highlights of the reports of the several Committees. The report is only a beginning. We plan to hold little “White House Conferences” in all parts of the country starting next week so that the export expansion story can be brought home to Americans everywhere. May I thank you once again for your cooperation and support. The enthusiastic reports we have been receiving from members of the Conference on the way in which it was conducted and the results which have been achieved are indeed gratifying. We will now move forward promptly to develop appropriate action programs. I am looking forward to your continued cooperation in this most important task. Sincerely yours, Luther H. Hodges Attachment HIGHLIGHTS OF THE REPORT ON THE WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON EXPORT EXPANSION 1 It is remarkable that so much was accomplished in the two short days devoted to the White House Conference on Export Expansion. The employment of the committee technique enabled the Conference to produce a wide variety of significant recommendations. It is a tribute to the caliber of the conferees that these complex problems were so ably pre-sented for our consideration. Although the Conference participants represented many diverse interests and deliberated in eleven different groups, their conclusions blend and complement one another. While each Committee recognized and carried forward its individual task, reference was made to policies under consideration by other Committees when it was felt their relationship was significant. I should like to mention the most important of these. Several Committees strongly urged that an export tax incentive based upon increases in exports is of the highest priority in the Export Expansion Program. The Committee on “Tax Policies and Export Expansion” developed specific recommendations in this regard. Some members of the Labor Committee felt we should concentrate on the elimination of the tax subsidies of other countries instead of recommending a U.S. tax incentive program, but this represented the view of a small minority. While one Committee had responsibility for studying commercial representation overseas, several Committees addressed themselves to this subject. It was the general view that since the Department of Commerce has primary responsibility for trade promotion, it should also have responsibility for the selection, training, appointment, and assignment of all Commercial Officers. One Committee bluntly stated that the Export Expansion Program would only be a success if the Department of Commerce had direct control over all commercial programs overseas. Each of these Committees recognized that the Ambassador, as the President's representative for all overseas programs, would be in charge in the field. Several Committees noted the need for more active participation in commercial work by Ambassadors themselves. They also urged more intimate relationships with the U.S. business community, greater assist-ance and support, and suggested means for bringing this about. Another topic of general interest concerned U.S. trade with the Soviet bloc. The views of a number of Committees were reflected in the recommendation that the U.S. re-examine the extent to which there might be an expansion of trade with the bloc in the light of the changing world situation. Several of the Committees urged the strengthening of the Department of Commerce's information services. They noted the importance of attacking non-tariff barriers as well as seeking tariff reductions in the forthcoming Geneva negotiations. A number of Committees also recommended equalization of ocean freight rates and simplification of AID procurement policies. It was felt that present AID regulations distort normal commercial practices and divert business from U.S. exports. Three Committees also called attention to the beneficial relationship between foreign investment and U.S. exports. A number of the Committees discussed ways and means of achieving an early and rapid increase in U.S. exports. It was the consensus that a strong attack on this problem must be directed on a person-to-person basis to non-exporters. It was recommended that the Department of Commerce and its National and Regional Export Expansion Councils mobilize their resources to maximize this personal effort. [Here follows a long summary of the most significant findings and recommendations.] * Source: Department of State, Central Files, FT(EX) US. No classification marking. 1 Secretary of Commerce Hodges presided over the conference, which involved the participation of many members of the Kennedy administration, including most of the Cabinet. President Kennedy addressed the conference on September 17, followed by remarks by Secretaries Hodges, Rusk, Dillon, Freeman, and Wirtz. Special Trade Representative Herter delivered a luncheon address the same day, after which the conference divided into 10 committees, each examining separate components of a successful export expansion program. The President's address as well as the talks given by Rusk and Herter are printed in Department of State Bulletin , October 14, 1963, pp. 595-605. 288. Memorandum of Conversation 288. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, October 1, 1963, 4 p.m. SUBJECT Woolen Textiles PARTICIPANTS George W. Ball, Acting Secretary of State Ryuji Takeuchi, Ambassador of Japan Thelma Vettel, Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of East Asian Affairs The Ambassador said that rumors were circulating in Tokyo to the effect that the United States is approaching Italy and the U.K. on a plan to conclude an international agreement on wool textile imports after the pattern of the cotton textile arrangement. He said that the Japanese would not like such an arrangement and were concerned about the possibility of such a proposal. They fear that one day the U.S. may approach Japan saying it has agreement with Italy and others and asking Japan to join. The Acting Secretary said that there had been great pressure from the American industry to do something about wool textile imports. This was a matter of considerable discussion within the Administration some time ago. Mr. Ball said that not very long ago representatives of the American wool textile trade returned from the U.K. reporting that some sectors of the British trade would favor an international agreement. The U.S. Government therefore inquired of the British Government if they would be prepared to consider an international agreement; the British Government's response was negative. He said that we had not discussed this with the Italian Government, although we may have reported to them. Mr. Ball said that developments in wool textile imports continue to be a matter of concern. He said that we have again been advised informally by the American trade that they have been in touch with the British, Italian and French wool textile trade and that there is sentiment in Europe favoring some arrangement. The Acting Secretary said that the U.S. has no present plans to try to press for any kind of arrangement. If, however, it were to become clear that the British and Italian Governments were inclined to go along with an international arrangement, we would find ourselves in a difficult position to avoid it. Therefore, the Acting Secretary could not say that the U.S. would never come to the Japanese Government with such a proposal. The Ambassador said he hoped that Japan would not be placed in the position of being the last to know of any such plan. Mr. Ball said we would keep the Ambassador fully informed. He pointed out that the initiative had been that of the U.S. industry. He wondered if the U.S. industry had been in touch with the Japanese industry—as they had with the British and Italian Governments. The Ambassador believed the Japanese industry had not been approached. The Acting Secretary wondered why the Italian industry would favor such an arrangement. The Ambassador said his information was that the Italian industry as a whole opposed such an arrangement but that certain members of the industry are resigned to it. With the “Kennedy Round” in the offing and pressures from the U.S., some of the Italian trade reportedly believe it may be better to acquiesce now and get a better deal. The Ambassador said he did not feel very sure about Italy, but felt more sure about the British. He thought perhaps that it would be best for Japan to speak out. He emphasized again that the Japanese do not want to be the last to be informed and find themselves cornered. The Acting Secretary assured the Ambassador that if the matter reached the governmental level he would be kept informed. The Ambassador indicated that, without referring to anything the Acting Secretary had said, he intended to warn his Government that it must not be too optimistic on this matter. He also indicated that he might recommend that his Government tell the outside world that it opposes a wool textile agreement. The Ambassador commented that the cotton textile agreement, with its detailed and restrictive provisions, was very difficult to handle in Japan, and to add a wool textile agreement would be most difficult. He expressed the view that such a proposal would constitute the worst possible propaganda for the U.S. * Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Vettel on October 2, and approved in U on October 7. The source text is labeled “Part III of IV.” 289. Memorandum of Conversation 289. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, October 10, 1963, 10:30 a.m. SUBJECT Kennedy Round PARTICIPANTS U.S. The Under Secretary J. Robert Schaetzel, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Joseph A. Greenwald, E/OT Frazier Meade, EUR/BNA UK Sir Richard Powell, Permanent Secretary, UK Board of Trade John E. Chadwick, Commercial Minister, British Embassy Replying to Sir Richard Powell's query about the prospects for the Kennedy Round, Mr. Ball said he was reasonably optimistic. Sir Richard said the British thought the clouds looked very ominous from France, particularly on the question of disparities. The French would attempt to avoid being seen as wreckers of the Kennedy Round but they would not help it towards a successful conclusion; they would probably be content to see it fail. Mr. Ball said he had found Couve de Murville somewhat—if vaguely—encouraging on the Kennedy Round prospects when he talked to him a few days ago. However there was always the possibility of a pronouncement from the Elysee. When Sir Richard asked what the French attitude was towards agriculture, Mr. Ball said de Murville had indicated he thought some progress could be made at least on dairy products, with the more difficult problems to be resolved later. Sir Richard asked how important the U.S. considered the timing of the Kennedy Round. He personally thought the U.S. slowness in submitting its list of exceptions might delay the Kennedy Round until autumn, 1964. Mr. Ball replied that the U.S. did not feel bound to a schedule and Mr. Schaetzel said the U.S. wanted to keep moving but not to press ahead too fast. As Mr. Ball said, the French had asked us not to push too hard. * Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential. Drafted by Meade and approved in U on October 15. The meeting was held in Ball's office. The source text is labeled “3 of 3 parts.” 290. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Kennedy 290. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Kennedy Source Washington, November 12, 1963. SUBJECT United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Mr. Bundy has called my attention to your interest in the United Nations Trade Conference which is scheduled to last for three months in Geneva beginning in March of next year. We have been concerned about this conference for some time since it may provide a forum in which some well-intentioned people—encouraged by others less benign—can do considerable mischief. On the other hand—wisely managed—the breakage could be minimized and a degree of useful education achieved. Background The conference is the resultant of two forces: the discontent of the less developed countries with the GATT, which they regard as an institution run by and for the benefit of the great trading nations; and the tactical interest of the Soviet Union in undermining the GATT primarily for political purposes. The dislike of the less developed countries for the GATT has been fermenting over a period of years. There has long been talk of a competing organization based on a rejection of the orthodox ideal of a multi-lateral, non-discriminatory trading world that would focus on the special requirements of the less developed countries. At the same time state trading does not fit comfortably with multi-lateralism, and the Kremlin has seen possible paydirt in an effort that might create discomfort for the West. These forces first came together in support of a common objective during the 1961 General Assembly of the UN when the idea of a world trade conference began to acquire momentum. At the July 1962 ECOSOC meeting—following an Afro-Asian Bloc meeting on trade in Cairo—the US delegation decided that such a conference could not be blocked. It, therefore, used its discretionary authority to move from frontal opposition to an acceptance of the inevitable—in the hope of gaining some influence over the content and timing of the conference. In spite of US delaying tactics, it did not prove feasible to postpone the conference beyond 1964. In its preparatory stage, Dr. Prebisch 1 has been the most determined and articulate promoter of the conference. During the past year there have been several sessions of a preparatory committee consisting of representatives of 32 nations. The Soviet Union made a diligent effort to assure that the conference agenda would include East-West trade, disarmament and other Bloc propaganda interests. But for the time being it has apparently concluded to accept the indications that the conference would concentrate on the trade problem of the less-developed countries. The conference agenda as it now stands puts major emphasis on measures to increase the export earnings of the developing countries. The most serious questions likely to emerge concern proposals to use commodity agreements to improve earnings from the sale of raw materials and a proposal that the economically advanced countries extend preferential treatment to the imports of manufactures from the developing countries. This latter device—which is the newest steed in the LDC stable of hobby horses—could turn out to be a particularly fractious beast. In addition to these substantive measures we shall also need to cope with efforts to supplant GATT by a new UN trade organization that would include the Bloc and be heavily biased to serve the interests of developing countries. Alternatively the LDCs may seek to create a separate organization to compete with GATT. All of these proposals will need careful watching. Commodity Agreements as a Subsidy Mechanism During recent years the LDCs have clamoured for a widening range of commodity agreements as the panacea for their foreign exchange problems. Early in your Administration, you shifted the traditional U.S. position from doctrinaire opposition to measured support of commodity agreements. There is, however, an irreconcilable difference between the LDCs view of commodity agreements and our own. We look upon commodity agreements—in the limited number of cases where they are feasible—as a device to avoid cyclical price fluctuations for raw materials and thus as a means to help assure stability for the foreign exchange income of primary producing countries. This is not, however, the favored view of the developing countries, which tend to look on commodity agreements as devices to peg world prices well above existing levels and thus provide the producing countries with a subsidy—which they might use to finance their development requirements. (On the domestic scene we do, of course, accept that philosophy in our own agricultural price support programs.) This conflict in philosophy holds the seeds of embarrassment for us. At a recent conference in Geneva for the purpose of drafting a commodity agreement on cocoa the United States could have been caught in a serious bind if the producing countries (led by Ghana) had not insisted upon demanding a ridiculously high minimum price. Had the developing countries been less foolish, we would have been under heavy pressure to agree to a minimum price that would have been violently opposed by our industrial cocoa consumers. In that event, we might have been left with an agreement that Congress would have refused to ratify. I foresee no need to change our established position at the Geneva Conference. We should continue to support commodity agreements at reasonable price levels where appropriate for stabilization purposes. The Stickiest Issue—The Preference Question The basic economic argument underlying the preference proposal is, abstractly stated, sound enough. In an almost perfect world, the economically-advanced countries should progressively concentrate on the production of sophisticated and capital-intensive industrial products, leaving an increasingly wide area of simple labor-intensive products to be supplied by countries in the early stages of industrialization. Under a regime in which the principle of comparative advantage could operate freely, the less-developed countries would thus be able to exploit what is in most instances their sole advantage—an abundant supply of low-cost labor—while the economically-advanced countries exploited their advantages in capital, technology, and skilled labor. The purpose of the Trade Expansion Act is to move toward this kind of regime, but it implicitly recognizes that we do not live in an almost perfect world. Progress in this direction must therefore be kept within the bounds of political reality and it cannot always be in a straight line. Experience has shown that domestic pressures accumulate in direct proportion to the increasing share of our domestic market claimed by the LDCs. I need only recall our experience with cotton textiles, electronic equipment, etc. to make the point. In their preoccupation with their export problem, spokesmen for the less-developed countries have been deflected from the objective of gaining increasingly liberal access for their goods in the markets of the industrialized countries. They are demanding preferential treatment particularly for their manufactures. How should we deal with this demand? I believe we have little to gain and much to lose by encouraging them to pursue a manifestly unrealistic objective. Experience should have taught us by now that the way to create bitterness is to permit the burgeoning of aspirations that are ultimately frustrated. The Biblical observation that “hope deferred, maketh the heart sick” applies as much to countries as to individuals. Already we have incurred considerable enmity by our need to administer in a rigid manner a cotton textile agreement that we had originally merchandised to the developing countries as a device for assuring the measured growth of their exports. I have concluded, therefore, that we should be reasonably candid with our less-developed friends. This is contrary to bureaucratic instincts, for there is a strong prejudice against saying things that may create even temporary unhappiness. But if we were to behave in too bland a manner with this issue, we would diminish our credibility on other issues. More than that, we would run grave risks of embarrassing the Kennedy Round on the home front. Already the trade associations have gotten wind of the United Nations Trade Conference. They are uttering increasingly loud cries of alarm. I can think of nothing the protectionists would like better than the opportunity next Spring—just before the beginning of the Kennedy Round and at the start of a Presidential campaign—to be able to accuse the Administration of lending a sympathetic ear to proposals that would grant preferences in the American market for “the cheap labor products of Asia”—or that would give Hong Kong a preference over New England in the markets of third countries. What kind of a spectacle would we make, if—at the moment we were trying to dampen down the fires in the United Nations meeting at Geneva—we felt compelled to assure the United States Congress that we abhorred preferences? All of this does not mean, of course, that we should turn a deaf ear to the concerns of less-developed countries. On the contrary, we should do them the honor of regarding them as adult by raising the discussion to the plane of political reality. The problem after all is basically one of education and persuasion. In this spirit I have arranged with Dr. Prebisch to have conversations in depth with him on my return to Washington. I hope also, between now and the end of the year, to have a series of quiet talks with the principal moving spirits behind the UN conference. Most of these men are likely to be in New York during this period in connection with UN business. I intend in these discussions to lead away from the preference proposal toward more fruitful approaches to the problem of industrial exports. I am helped in this endeavor by the fact that this problem has not come to me as a fresh idea. I have been beating the drum on the issue for years. During 1961, for example, I made at least five speeches to call attention to this critical problem. Dr. Prebisch told me the other day that my views on this issue were well known and deeply appreciated by the economists in the developing countries. Suggested Tactics for Dealing with Preference Issue Meanwhile, we must be prepared to discuss this question during the OECD Ministerial meeting next week. We must also develop a tactic for the conference itself. 1. At the OECD meeting, we shall make clear that the US Government has long taken the lead in searching for means to solve the difficult problem of increasing the exports of the developing countries. We can do this persuasively since I have taken a strong line on this question during the last two ministerial meetings of the OECD. 2. We shall also demonstrate that the US record on this issue is, in comparison with most other NATO countries, quite respectable. We are having figures prepared to show that the US has discriminated far less against industrial exports of the developing countries than have the countries of the European Community. (In spite of the special preferences that France extends to the French Community countries, her record, in statistical terms, is bad.) 3. While urging the NATO countries to improve their acceptance of the LDC imports we shall make it clear that we do not regard industrial preferences as a fruitful approach to the problem. One must distinguish, of course, between two quite distinct kinds of preferences: (a) those accorded by a metropolitan power to a specific group of countries that formed part of an earlier colonial system and (b) preferences that are extended impartially to all developing countries. The former is, of course, a relic of colonialism, and it is not what the developing countries are talking about. 4. This point is fundamental and we shall insist that there be no ambiguity with regard to this distinction. 5. In discussing the general principle of preferences we shall point out that they are both undesirable and unnecessary. If industry is to have a healthy growth in a developing country, it must be of a kind that will make use of that country's natural advantages. For most developing countries the sole natural advantage consists of an ample supply of low-cost labor. In most cases this should be adequate to assure markets for labor-intensive goods—provided only that the advanced countries would eliminate restrictive and discriminatory measures. 6. The prime responsibility of the advanced countries should, therefore, be to hasten the erosion of that framework of discrimination which has been built up against imports from developing countries, and we shall advocate that the NATO nations make an effort to improve their record with regard to discrimination before the Conference next spring. 7. At the same time, we shall suggest that the NATO nations encourage regional arrangements among developing countries. The advantage of such regional arrangements—whether customs unions, free trade areas or even regional preferential systems—is that they permit the building of mass markets for the developing countries. They can thus provide conditions for efficient industrial growth at a minimum cost in economic dislocation. To achieve useful results, however, we shall have to recognize that such regional arrangements require a considerable measure of common planning to avoid redundant production and to achieve an intelligent allocation of industrial tasks. 8. I propose to emphasize regional arrangements because I have considerable mistrust of encouraging another idea put forward by Dr. Prebisch—that each developing country accord preferences to the industrial goods of all others. I do not believe that this would be likely to result in an effective allocation of resources; on the contrary it could seriously distort investment patterns with little benefit to anyone. 9. Obviously, these are only some of the measures that are available to broaden the markets for industries and developing countries and I would not rule out other approaches. I am, however, suspicious of gimmicks—particularly when the problem should be soluble by a rigorous adherence to the principles of non-discrimination in which we have invested so much time and effort for the last three decades. The Conference and Its Relations to the GATT It is too early to put forward a detailed plan of action for the American delegation at the Conference. The line to take will depend, in considerable part, on the attitude not merely of the developing countries but also of our NATO allies. At the moment I can recommend only one controlling principle: that we display patience but do not talk nonsense. We must, of course, be concerned to preserve the GATT against efforts to transform it into a debating forum for special interests or to supplant it with a more diffuse organization. Fortunately, I think this problem is manageable. Already there are signs that the more stable leaders in the developing countries are having second thoughts on the value of the GATT, and I am confident that with a steady American policy we should have little difficulty in saving it from serious impairment. George W. Ball 2 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, 11/8/63-11/20/63. Confidential. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: “Taken from President's week-end reading 11/16-18/63 Tab 6.” 1 Raul Prebisch, Argentine economist; Director General of the Latin American Institute for Economic and Social Planning. 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 291. Memorandum From the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (Herter) to President Johnson 291. Memorandum From the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (Herter) to President Johnson Source Washington, November 27, 1963. As you indicated in your conversations in Brussels several weeks ago, preparations for the Kennedy Round are going ahead on schedule. Public hearings on the tariff schedules begin on Monday, December 2. There are in addition, however, a number of problems relating to these negotiations that we would like to bring to your attention. Some of these are of immediate concern and some relate to future conversations you may have with European Heads of State. In order to bring you up to date on these matters, both immediate and longer range, we attach a progress report. Should you have any question about any of these items, or should you wish to discuss negotiations in a more general way, I am available at your pleasure. Christian A. Herter 1 Attachment 2 THE TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 1. National and International Implications The trade negotiations will be a test of the Atlantic Community's will to cooperate in the economic field. Failure to negotiate a significant reduction in trade barriers could do incalculable harm to the unity and strength of the Free World. It could lead to a return to nationalistic protectionism both here and in Europe, tending to stifle the opportunities for expansion of our foreign trade and our economy. For the European Economic Community it could be a crisis more serious than the one caused by the rejection of the U.K.'s application for membership. The French have shown considerable reluctance to enter into meaningful negotiations. The West German Government appears genuinely interested in having the negotiations succeed. It has taken the position that further progress on internal Common Market decisions must be synchronized with decisions of the European Economic Community in the Kennedy Round. The Germans thus hope to trade German approval of the remaining agricultural regulations, which the French want, for French cooperation in cutting tariffs in the Kennedy Round, which the Germans want. There are many who believe that if these issues cannot be resolved in a manner that causes EEC cooperation in the Kennedy Round, centrifugal forces would set in which could in time destroy the Common Market. 2. Resolution of GATT Ministers, May 1963 3 The first important step towards the negotiations took place at the Ministerial Meeting of the GATT in May 1963. This meeting brought to a head a disagreement between the U.S. and the EEC on the general plan of the negotiations. The U.S. stood for broad cuts of all tariffs by an equal percentage, with a minimum of exceptions. The EEC, largely at French initiative, argued that the objective should be harmonization of the tariff systems of the industrialized countries, which would require that high tariffs be reduced by a greater percentage than low ones. This approach would result in greater concessions by the U.S. than the EEC, since the U.S. has more high tariffs than the EEC, though our average tariff levels are about the same. The Ministerial resolution which emerged from this meeting set the following guidelines for the negotiations: a. The basic tariff cutting plan should be across-the-board, deep and equal cuts, with limited exceptions subject to confrontation and justification. Special rules, however, should be adopted to deal with disparities in tariff levels that are significant in trade terms. b. Agricultural products were to be included with the object of developing access to world markets and expanding trade. c. Non-tariff barriers to trade as well as tariffs should be covered in the negotiations. d. It was recognized that barriers to exports of less-developed countries must be lowered wherever possible, though the LDC's could not be expected to give full reciprocity in their own tariff cuts. e. May 1964 was set as the date for opening the negotiating conference. A Trade Negotiating Committee was established to make preparations for that conference. 3. Negotiating Progress to date The Trade Negotiating Committee and its subcommittees have held numerous meetings since the Ministerial meeting, but little progress has been made in agreeing upon negotiating rules. The main issues continue to be disparities, agriculture, and the less-developed countries. a. Disparities On disparities, the EEC continues to press for a rule which would encompass so many tariff items as to require the U.S. to make substantially larger cuts overall than the EEC and to result in a considerable erosion of the across-the-board reduction principle. The French have taken the most adamant position on this issue. The U.S. has strongly resisted this and has gained the support of practically all the other GATT Contracting Parties. b. Agriculture On agriculture, the EEC has not yet been prepared to work on meaningful preparations, insisting that it must wait until the regulations of its own Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) are established. The six EEC countries have not yet agreed on regulations for meats, rice and dairy products. For cereals (which constitutes the most important U.S. agricultural export to the EEC) no decision has been taken on the critical issue of the common price level. As a practical matter, these internal decisions also establish the level of protection against imports. Since the EEC's internal difficulties in securing agreement on agricultural policy are so great, there are grave doubts as to whether it can or will be willing to negotiate changes in its agricultural regulations even after they are adopted by the EEC Council. In fact, there have been signs for some time that the EEC would prefer to separate agriculture entirely from the general tariff cutting rules of the negotiations, which in effect is what happened in the previous Dillon Round. Most recently, Vice President Mansholt of the EEC Commission has put forward a proposal for general treatment of agricultural products in this round. Under the Mansholt negotiating plan the EEC would first agree on the remainder of its common agricultural policy. After this is done the EEC would offer to bind the then existing level of protection if all countries would do the same. Negotiation of reductions in levels of protection are specifically ruled out except in special circumstances. Further, under the proposal the EEC apparently would also withdraw without compensation all existing tariff bindings on agricultural products. In our view this plan would effectively remove the possibility of significant relaxation of agricultural trade restrictions in the course of this negotiation. Our feeling is therefore that this plan is incompatible with the Ministerial decision of last May. Perhaps the most important recent development relating to agriculture has been Mansholt's proposal for settlement of the very sensitive question of EEC common grain prices. This has long been an issue particularly between France, whose grains prices are relatively low (though considerably higher than U.S. prices), and West Germany, whose prices are high. To date, the EEC has been a heavy importer of grains, many of them from the U.S. If the common EEC price were set much higher than the current French price, there is a very real danger that much extra production would be stimulated within France, and U.S. grain exports would consequently fall. The price level now proposed by the Commission, which is almost midway between the French and German prices, would in our opinion artificially stimulate such extra production. A great deal of pressure has built up within the EEC to settle at least the rice, meats, and dairy regulations by the end of this year or early next. The Mansholt grains proposal has also won considerable support, though its chances for early implementation are lower. The Germans, to whom agreement on these arrangements would be a significant concession, appear to be willing to seek, as a quid pro quo for their agreement, France's cooperation in the Kennedy Round. We feel that the U.S. must at the earliest possible opportunity pre-sent to the EEC and its member governments, forcefully and tactfully, its view on both the Mansholt grains price proposal and agricultural negotiating plan. We also wish to encourage the Germans to use their adherence to agricultural regulations as a lever with which to secure France's agreement to a reasonable approach on disparities and the linear cut. We hope that Chancellor Erhard's visit to you later this month will give you an occasion to make these points, especially since the Chancellor apparently wishes to discuss agriculture and the Kennedy Round. A more complete paper on this subject will be ready for you shortly. In the meantime, our embassies have been instructed to impress upon the EEC governments and the Commission our desire for consultations before any decision on these points are taken. c. Less Developed Countries The GATT negotiations, as well as the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development which will begin a few months earlier, will also be focal points for the steadily mounting pressure from developing nations for more favorable treatment of their trade in industrialized countries. The GATT Ministers, recognizing the special problems of these nations, agreed in principle to reduce barriers to their exports and to demand less than full reciprocity from them in the negotiations. While the deliberations since last May have explored a wide variety of measures to implement these principles, the developing nations have concentrated their demands upon new tariff preferences by the industrialized countries for their exports. They contend that such preferences are necessary to stimulate their export trade in manufactures upon which they feel they must rely for foreign earnings and domestic growth of their economies. Even though the economic benefits of such preferences have yet to be clearly established, virtually every industrial nation except the United States now appears to be looking favorably on this request, primarily on political grounds. Our reluctance to join them has been conditioned largely by the fact that most preference proposals would require revisions in our law, since the Trade Expansion Act requires that U.S. tariff concessions be made on a most-favored-nation basis, and, further, that they would in all likelihood involve the products of certain domestic industries already sensitive to import competition. Thus far we have merely indicated a willingness to consider the many implications of these schemes. On the more affirmative side, we have held that a broad and deep tariff cut, accompanied by concerted measures to remove other trade barriers by all industrial nations and supplemented by financial and other assistance, will go far toward improving trading prospects of these countries. 4. Domestic Preparations—Public Hearings Formal domestic preparations for the negotiations began on December 2 with the opening of public hearings by both the Tariff Commission and the interagency Trade Information Committee, as required by the Trade Expansion Act. The Tariff Commission will report to you by April 21, 1964, its advice as to the probable economic effect of U.S. tariff reductions on the various domestic industries. The Trade Information Committee hearings, which are chaired by a member of the Special Representative's Office, will concentrate on the foreign trade restrictions whose reduction would be of greatest benefit to U.S. exporting industries. Its report will be available to you at about the same time as the Tariff Commission's. 5. Exceptions The opening of the hearings will probably usher in a period of increasing pressure on you, your staff, and various executive departments to make commitments to withhold particular items from the general tariff reduction. As noted above, the GATT Ministers resolved that such exceptions should be kept to a bare minimum, subject to “confrontation and justification.” The Trade Expansion Act requires that any item on which special trade restrictions are in force under the “escape clause” or “national security” provisions of our laws must be excepted. Certain others involved in past escape-clause cases must be excepted under certain circumstances. The decision on excepting any items apart from these few mandatory ones rests, by law, in your hands, after taking into account the advice of the various agencies. The Office of the Special Representative will gather information from sources within and without the Government, will weigh the advice of the Tariff Commission, and will present you with recommendations on this score, probably in the late spring of next year. A preliminary decision on exceptions may be made at that time, but in order to permit a meaningful process of “confrontation and justification,” we would recommend that no hard and fast decisions on exceptions be made until after this process is completed. We shall be able to negotiate changes that we want in other countries' exceptions lists only by being prepared to make changes in our own. This course would have the additional benefit of enabling you and other members of your Administration to resist the inevitable pressure for advance commitments on exceptions. We have drafted a directive (attached) 4 from yourself to the heads of the agencies involved in the trade program which describes the procedure to be followed on exceptions and deals with the question of advance commitments. 6. Escape Clause Reviews Another issue that will come before you for decision in the coming weeks is whether to have the Tariff Commission investigate the consequences of reduction or termination of the special “escape-clause” protection now in force. Other countries and our own importers look to us to conduct these investigations as a sign of our good faith in liberal trade. The domestic industries involved oppose such investigations as creating uncertainties which upset their business. Decisions have now been made on two of the eight current escape-clause cases. President Kennedy last month decided not to alter the tariff on clinical thermometers on the basis of an investigation by the Tariff Commission, and this week you agreed that the Tariff Commission should make a further investigation of watches. Our office will make further recommendations to you on the remaining items over the next several months. Prior consultation with your staff, however, will enable us to be certain that political implications are taken into consideration in our recommendations. 7. Public and Congressional Advisors The Trade Expansion Act requires the Special Representative to “seek information and advice with respect to each negotiation from representatives of industry, agriculture, and labor.” We propose that you should establish a Public Advisory Committee to the Special Representative composed of about 35 distinguished persons in these fields. They would meet with us periodically to express their views on the various issues that arise in the course of preparing for the negotiations. Once the negotiations begin next year, some of them may go to Geneva as public advisors to the delegation. We have cleared with the various agencies a list of names proposed as members of this committee, and an order establishing the committee will be sent to you for approval very shortly. The Act also stipulates that two members of the House Committee on Ways and Means and of the Senate Committee on Finance shall act as Congressional delegates to the negotiations and be members of the U.S. delegation. The members of Congress who have been selected are: Honorable Cecil King, Democrat of California Honorable Thomas Curtis, Republican of Missouri Honorable Herman Talmadge, Democrat of Georgia Honorable John Williams, Republican of Delaware We have consulted with these gentlemen on numerous occasions and plan to keep them informed of developments concerning the negotiations. 8. Office of the Special Representative The position of Special Representative for Trade Negotiations was created by Congress in order to assign responsibility for directing the trade negotiations and their preparation to someone within the President's own Office. By Executive Order, President Kennedy designated the Special Representative to advise and assist him in the administration of trade agreements carried out under the Trade Expansion Act and certain other authorities. He also delegated to the Special Representative the duty of seeking advice and information on proposed trade agreements from various executive departments and other sources. The Special Representative therefore acts as the channel to you of information and advice on the trade agreements program from the agencies within the Executive Branch. Policy decisions in the field of trade agreements and the recommendations made to you by the Special Representative are, as a rule, based upon decisions taken by the Trade Executive Committee made up of senior representatives of seven agencies. The Special Representative has a small staff of his own, however, which constitutes a separate agency within the Executive Office of the President and which is of course at your call at all times. * Source: Kennedy Library, Herter Papers, Memoranda to the President, USTR. No classification marking. Lyndon B. Johnson became President following the assassination of President Kennedy in Dallas on November 22. 1 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 2 Confidential. 3 See Document 282 . 4 Not printed. 292. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions 292. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions Source Washington, December 3, 1963, 6:58 p.m. 1006. Pass USIA. Following will be released by Herter Office Noon E.S.T. December 4: The United States notified the Executive Secretary of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade today that it will suspend tariff concessions on brandy, trucks, dextrine, and starches. Higher tariffs on these articles will go into effect on January 7, 1964. This action is being taken to restore the balance of tariff concessions upset by restrictions imposed on poultry imports by the European Economic Community. The new rates will apply to imports of these articles from any source. The original tariff concessions on them, however, had been negotiated with member states of the European Economic Community. These nations account for 94 per cent of United States imports of the affected articles. A GATT panel recently determined that the value of United States trade affected by the restrictions on poultry amounted to $26 million. 1 The value of imports from the European Economic Community that will be affected by the higher United States tariff corresponds to this figure. Following the announcement of the suspensions, Christian A. Herter, Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, stressed that “The tariff concessions are suspended, not withdrawn, and they can be reinstated at any time that there is an agreement with the European Economic Community to restore reasonable access for United States poultry.” Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, INCO-POULTRY US. Limited Official Use; Immediate. Drafted by Michael W. Moynihan (STR) on December 2 and approved by William M. Roth (STR). Sent to Brussels for the Mission to the EC and the Embassy, Geneva for the delegation to GATT, Athens, Bern, Bonn, Buenos Aires, Canberra, Copenhagen, Dublin, The Hague, Lima, Lisbon, London, Luxembourg, Madrid, Ottawa, Paris for the Embassy and USRO, Rio de Janeiro, Rome, Stockholm, Tel Aviv, Tokyo, and Vienna. 1 On October 28, at the request of the United States and the EEC, the GATT Council of Representatives established an expert panel to determine the dollar value of the injury to the United States of the German tariff increase on poultry imports. The figure of $26 million, announced November 21, 1963, after both sides had presented both written and oral arguments, was well below the U.S. calculation of $40 million, but somewhat greater than the EEC estimate of $16 million. As a result of the GATT finding, the United States suspended concessions to the EEC equal to $26 million. (Current Economic Developments, Issue No. 689, November 26, 1963, p. 7; Washington National Records Center, E/CBA/REP Files: FRC 72 A 6248, Current Economic Developments; also, GATT Press Release “Report on the Panel on Poultry,” GATT/819, November 21, 1963) 293. Memorandum From the Deputy Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (Roth) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 293. Memorandum From the Deputy Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (Roth) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Source Washington, December 24, 1963. SUBJECT The Disparities Issue The Ministerial Compromise At the May Ministerial Conference, 1 the EEC proposed that tariffs be reduced by 50 percent of the difference between existing rates and certain minimum levels—namely 10 percent for manufactured goods, 5 per cent for semi-manufactures, and zero for raw materials. The U.S., on the other hand, pressed for an across-the-board cut of 50 per cent. The Community based its objection to a uniform percentage cut on the existence of many more high duty items in the U.S. tariff schedule than in the EEC schedule. There are, for example, over 900 items in the U.S. schedule with rates at least of 30 per cent compared to only a handful for the EEC, even though the median U.S. duty (between 13 and 14 per cent) is about the same as that for the EEC (between 12 and 13 per cent). According to the EEC, the existence of these high U.S. rates raises three major difficulties for a linear rule. 1. An equal cut in high U.S. and middle level EEC rates will increase U.S. exports to the EEC much more than EEC exports to the U.S. (It is simultaneously maintained that cuts in the larger number of low U.S. rates are not worth much in terms of an increase in EEC exports because those duties are already only a minor obstacle to trade.) 2. A larger share of exports from third countries will be diverted to the EEC. 3. The U.S. will end up with many more high rates and thus more bargaining power for future tariff negotiations than the EEC. The U.S. maintained that there are neither general analytical nor empirical reasons to support these arguments of the EEC. However, the most effective argument against the EEC harmonization scheme was that it greatly reduced the depth of the average cut. A cut on all items of 50 percent between existing rates and a 5 percent floor results, for example, in an average reduction of only 30 per cent for the EEC and 33 percent for the U.S. U.S. negotiators believed that a major (but inarticulated) reason for the Community's harmonization suggestion was a desire to keep the average tariff cut much less than 50 per cent. The resolution finally adopted by the Ministers was a vaguely worded compromise between U.S. and EEC views. The negotiations are to “be based upon a plan of substantial linear tariff reductions,” but in cases where “there are significant disparities in tariff levels, the tariff reductions will be based upon special rules of general and automatic application.” It was further specified that the term “significant” means “meaningful in trade terms” and that the purpose of the special rules is to reduce the disparities. Report of the Trade Negotiations Committee Little progress has been made since May in settling the disparities issue with the EEC. Most countries other than the EEC have agreed upon a general approach to the problem but the Community has not negotiated seriously on the matter. The views of the majority of GATT members are outlined in a December report of the Trade Negotiating Committee. The main points in the majority position are as follows: 1. As a first step in identifying significant disparities, attention should be given only to items where the high duty is not less than a certain minimum percentage (e.g., 30 per cent) and exceeds the rate on the same item in other countries at least by a certain number of percentage points, (e.g., 10 percentage points). Under a 30-10 rule, the EEC could invoke 850 disparities against the U.S. compared to about 10 that the U.S. could claim against the EEC. The U.S. import value of the items invoked against the U.S. is $484 million ($123 million with the EEC), whereas U.S. exports of these items approximates $800 million ($125 million to the EEC). 2. Only the tariffs of the U.S., the EEC, and the U.K. should be used for the identification of high rate items. 3. Besides cut-off and point spread criteria, most members agreed that additional qualitative criteria were necessary to determine whether a disparity is “meaningful in trade terms.” The following were suggested: (i) For a significant disparity there must be substantial exports from the high duty country to the low tariff country. (Since the adjustment to disparities is to be a cut of less than 50 per cent by the low tariff country, this criterion is necessary to minimize the trade damage to third country exporters into the low tariff country. It is also the only case where the bargaining power argument has force. Interpretation of this rule to mean that the high duty country must be either the first or second supplier to the low duty country reduces the number of EEC disparities against the U.S. under 30-10 rule by 50 per cent and the volume of U.S. exports to the Community by about 10 per cent.) (ii) A disparity is not significant unless the total imports into the low country from all sources are substantial. (A requirement that total imports exceed $250,000 reduces EEC disparities against the U.S. by 40 per cent, but cuts the volume of U.S. exports only a negligible amount.) (iii) A disparity is not significant in trade terms if there already are substantial imports into the high duty country. (A requirement that total imports on any item be less than $1 million reduces EECdisparities against the U.S. by 13 per cent and the volume of U.S. imports by 73 per cent.) (iv) Disparities are not significant if the low country does not produce the item. (There are only a few dozen of these items in the EECdisparity list against the U.S.) (v) Disparities are not significant if the low country maintains quota restrictions. (vi) Disparities are significant only if the low country is a principal supplier to the high tariff country. (A first or second supplier interpretation of this rule reduces the number of EEC disparities against the U.S. by 34 per cent and the volume of U.S. import trade involved by 45 per cent.) Comment The advantage of a high cut-off level (the U.S. has pushed for 60 per cent) coupled with an arrangement whereby the low rather than the high duty country departs from the linear cut is that the trade coverage subject to special treatment is minimized. It is precisely in high duty items that the U.S. does not have a comparative advantage and, therefore, the volume of U.S. exports on which less than the linear cut is made tends to be small. For example, if the EEC cuts only 20 per cent on all the U.S. disparities it can claim under the unqualified 30-10 rule and 50 per cent on all other items, its average cut will still be 48 per cent. Securing the accept-ance of such criteria as (i), (iii), and (vi) above not only would reduce the direct trade effects of the disparity issue substantially more but also would minimize the possibility of restrictive actions by third countries who are adversely affected by the Community's smaller cut on disparity items. EEC Council Decisions on Disparities At the Council meeting just concluded 2 the EEC rejected the cut-off criterion. Instead, it adopted an arithmetic criteria whereby for manufactures and raw materials the high rate must be at least twice the low rate and also be separated from the low rate by at least 10 percentage points. For semi-manufactures, only the 2 to 1 ratio would apply. However, the Council did agree to the notion that disparities should be identified only with reference to the U.S., the EEC, and the U.K. On the matter of the six qualitative criteria the results appear to be as follows: (i) Rejected the general application of the “substantial exports from high to low” rule but offered to deal with third countries adversely affected on an item-by-item basis. (ii) Accepted the rule that disparity not significant if total imports into low country not substantial. (iii) Rejected the general application of the “substantial imports into the high country” rule. However, the EEC agreed to examine cases where there are substantial imports from the EEC into high country that represent important fraction of domestic consumption in high country. (iv) Agreed to exclude disparities where low [country] has no current production but added qualification that no production must be planned. (v) Rejected the rule that low country must not have quantitative restriction in order to claim a disparity. (vi) Rejected the “low must be a principal supplier to high” rule, but apparently willing to exclude items where there is large intra-EEC trade. Preliminary analyses of the 2-1 plus 10 points rule indicates that, even without the special treatment for semi-manufactures, the EEC could invoke about 1100 disparities against the U.S. The U.S. could, however, claim 550 against the EEC. Trade coverage data on these items is not yet available but it is likely to be considerably greater than that involved in the 30-10 rule. Furthermore, the total number of disparities that can be invoked against the U.S. may be much larger than 1100. There may be hardly a U.S. (or EEC and U.K) item on which some GATT member does not have a duty that is less than one-half of it as well as below it by at least 10 percentage points. By the same token, the value of U.S. exports on which a less than 50 per cent cut will be made is likely to be considerably larger, especially since no longer will just high duty industries be involved. In addition, the qualitative criteria accepted will make much of the identification procedure an item-by-item hassle. It thereby will prolong the negotiations and complicate the “end-of-the day” balancing procedure. Finally, the special treatment for semi-manufactures (merely 2 to 1 without a 10-point spread) seems tailor-made to provide an additional element of protection for such sensitive EEC industries as aluminum, paper, and steel. William M. Roth 3 * Source: Kennedy Library, Herter Papers, Subject Files, Disparities (Tariff), Box 8. Confidential. 1 See Document 282 . 2 The EEC Council meeting was held in Stockholm September 11-12. 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 294. Memorandum of Conversation 294. Memorandum of Conversation Source LBJ Ranch, Texas, December 28, 1963, 3:15 p.m. SUBJECT Brussels Negotiations—Kennedy Round (Part 1 of 5) PARTICIPANTS [Here follows an extensive list of participants. President Johnson, Secretary Rusk, Under Secretary Ball, and Christian Herter were accompanied by 8 U.S. officials; Chancellor Erhard and Foreign Minister Schroeder were accompanied by 12 German officials.] The meeting opened at 3:15 p.m. At the President's request, Secretary Rusk started the discussion by asking the Chancellor and Foreign Minister Schroeder for their evaluation of the recent EEC talks at Brussels. Foreign Minister Schroeder described the situation that existed at the time of the Brussels meeting. It had been agreed on May 9 that there would be a synchronized program of negotiations. For the Federal Republic that meant that there would be not only internal development within the Common Market, especially agriculture, but also outward development looking toward the Kennedy Round. This situation culminated in the Brussels negotiations. Mr. Schroeder went on to say that difficulties existed at Brussels because the interest of France and some other participants related more to agriculture than to the Kennedy Round, and also because it was obviously impossible to lay down specific positions regarding the Kennedy Round at this early point. There was therefore a danger that the negotiations could fall apart before any decisions were reached. The French had come to recognize, however, that the Federal Republic was serious about the importance of the Kennedy Round. As a result, the French position has become somewhat better. Reasonable compromises were achieved, Mr. Schroeder felt, both in agriculture and in the Kennedy Round position. The change in the French viewpoint, the Foreign Minister continued, was illustrated by the latest meeting between General De Gaulle and the German Ambassador in Paris. De Gaulle said to the Ambassador that the Kennedy Round was an Anglo-Saxon matter but because of the German attitude France would take a different view than before. Secretary Rusk asked when that conversation had taken place. The Foreign Minister said that it had occurred a few days before the recent Brussels talks. The Foreign Minister continued that the Rome treaty and its implementing regulations provide not only for internal development within the Common Market but also for consideration of its external aspects. World trade and external conditions must also be considered by the Common Market nations. Disparities had been the most difficult question to resolve at Brussels, Mr. Schroeder said. The Germans were able to bring about agreement on a new two-to-one formula. This would mean, according to German experts, a reduction in the number of disparities: previously the number would have been twelve hundred US items and a few for the Europeans, whereas now the ratio would be about four to one—eight hundred US to two hundred European. This is the conclusion of German experts. The Foreign Minister emphasized that there are a number of details which are not yet clear. The EEC Commission directive is not yet available. When this is available more detailed discussion can be useful. Nevertheless, German experts believe that sufficient agreement was reached at Brussels to enable the Commission to formulate a position for the Kennedy Round. The French position is definitely more favorable than before. The Foreign Minister repeated that Chancellor Erhard had succeeded in convincing De Gaulle in November that the Kennedy Round was as important or more important to Germany than the agricultural regulations. The French now clearly recognize this, as illustrated by recent statements by Pompidou and Giscard. In summary the Foreign Minister expressed the belief that the Brussels compromise had been fairly good in balancing Community and Kennedy Round interests. Foreign Minister Schroeder said he would like to add one thought. No decision was taken on cereal prices. This is to be done in April 1964. The Mansholt Plan 1 will be the basis of consideration but it will not be accepted without change in the establishment of Common Market cereal prices. Mr. Schroeder noted that the French and other Community members object to some portions of the Mansholt Plan. Mr. Schroeder also said that the Germans had got a clause inserted in the agreement on this subject which would make agricultural policy more negotiable; this had not been easy to do in view of the Common Market agricultural regulations on the one hand and the preparations for the Kennedy Round on the other. Governor Herter said that the US had followed the Brussels negotiations closely, had realized the difficulties faced by the Federal Republic both in its own agricultural problems and in the French position, and was most appreciative of the efforts made by the Federal Republic at Brussels to insure consideration of the position of third parties. Governor Herter noted that the US is handicapped by not having the text of the arrangements agreed to at Brussels. Governor Herter went on to say that what was most satisfying in Foreign Minister Schroeder's comments was the point that agricultural matters would be subject to negotiation. It would have been most difficult for the US had it been presented with a fait accompli. As regards disparities the initial analysis by the US indicates that the new formula presents many complications. The new formula would by this analysis add 250 items to the US list of disparities and nearly 500 to the European list; this complicates rather than simplifies the problem. Governor Herter expressed the view that US experts should meet with Common Market experts and attempt to reach agreement on the facts. The problem of disparities could then be worked out. Governor Herter stressed the difficulty of this problem for the United States and said that it would be difficult to say that the US is pleased by the new formula. Under Secretary Ball agreed that it is highly desirable for experts on both sides to get together and agree on the facts. A common understanding could thereafter be developed. Mr. Ball added that if the German analysis is correct, the Brussels agreements represent a step forward. Foreign Minister Schroeder said it is unfortunate Mr. Lahr, 2 one of the senior experts of the Foreign Office, was not present for these discussions. The Foreign Minister said he could only sum up the results as he understood them but he could not of course prove his points. Governor Herter noted that the EFTA countries consider the Brussels formula unacceptable. Their reasons are not clear but they obviously feel that there are very many complexities to be worked out. Chancellor Erhard said that he has a great interest in this problem. Governor Herter and he in a sense had baptized the child at the GATT conference earlier this year. The Chancellor added that he wants the Kennedy Round to be a success. The Chancellor went on to say that the Federal Republic had relatively little interest in the Common Market regulations but was highly interested in expanding trade as much as possible. Nevertheless it must take its partners into consideration. The Federal Republic feels that it has succeeded in getting adequate agreement in preparation for the Kennedy Round. It had also succeeded in getting the interests of EFTA, Commonwealth nations and other third parties taken into account in the agricultural regulations. The Chancellor noted that less developed countries are also concerned by the EEC agricultural regulations. The Chancellor commented that the GATT negotiations will bring forth some solid opposition to the EEC regulations. The Chancellor said that he is not afraid of this opposition and that he believes positive results can be achieved. Chancellor Erhard went on to say that it is possible to get lost in details. Foodstuffs which affect the entire world raise larger and more general problems; worldwide agreements are called for. This however is contrary to the thinking of the EEC. Nevertheless this is a worldwide problem and the EEC is not the only factor. Regarding disparities the Chancellor said that the point is not their number. Again there is a danger of being lost in detail, especially at the GATT conference. The Federal Republic will pursue this problem in Brussels and with the United States, on the basis of factual criteria. Then there will be a sound basis for proceeding. The Chancellor commented that there is not only the matter of the number of items involved but also a difference of trade value. Dr. Westrick noted that economic criteria had also been discussed at Brussels; complete information on the criteria adopted at Brussels is not available and this information may explain the difference in the number of disparities mentioned earlier in the conversations. [Here follows discussion of the Common Market and European integration.] * Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2354. Confidential. Drafted by Finn and approved in S and U on January 1, 1964, and in the White House on January 8, 1964. The full text of this memorandum is printed in vol. XIII, pp. 242 - 248 . 1 See Document 291 . 2 Not further identified. 295. Letter From the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (Herter) to the Deputy Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (Blumenthal) 295. Letter From the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (Herter) to the Deputy Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (Blumenthal) Source Washington, December 30, 1963. Dear Mike : First of all, let me thank you for your extremely kind Christmas letter, which I appreciated deeply. Certainly insofar as you and your family are concerned, I want to reciprocate every good wish for the New Year and to express the hope that working together we can make real progress in the field to which we are now devoting ourselves. I have just returned from the meetings with Erhard at the LBJ Ranch in Texas. My own participation in those meetings was limited to a short morning session with Schroeder, Westrick and Carstens, 1 and then the full afternoon meeting with Erhard, et al., at which there was considerable discussion with regard to the progress of the Kennedy Round as well as the importance of what had taken place in Brussels in relation to further political reunification in Europe. In the morning session, I had made it clear that the principal question which we had to ask related to the German interpretation as to what had taken place in Brussels, and whether or not the agricultural agreements, as well as the disparity agreement which had been reached, were subject to negotiation. In regard to the former, Westrick said he wished he could give us a firm answer, but that this could not be done until the Germans had themselves studied what had actually been decided upon in Brussels. This they were unable to do because even Lahr (who was not with the delegation) did not himself possess the text of their agreements. For instance, Westrick cited the fact that during the last hour of the conference, the Germans had offered some twelve amendments to the mandate for the Commission, all of which he believed had been accepted, but none of which were yet incorporated in any document. In other words, it was very difficult for us even to approach any detail since neither side was confident enough of the validity of what had been reported to them to be able to discuss from texts. One very astounding thing did develop, however. It was obvious (and this was confirmed in the afternoon session) that the Germans were really very pleased at the outcome of the Brussels meeting. They thought that the agreement on disparities was a great step forward, with which we ought to be delighted. It turned out, however, that they had been led to believe that the new disparity formula would apply to only some 800 items for the U.S. and 200 items for the EEC, whereas the 30-10 formula applied to over 1100 U.S. items and only a handful of EEC items. They did not know how these figures had been arrived at, nor whether the calculation was made after the four trade criteria to be applied to the disparity formula had been agreed to. Here we quickly found that there was no use discussing the matter, since from our initial information these figures made no sense whatever, and it would be impossible to discuss disparities until agreement had been reached as to what we were talking about. Furthermore, the Germans had no idea whatever that Switzerland and other EFTA countries were unhappy about the new formula. In fact, our bringing out what seemed to be some obvious objections caused a real dent in the euphoria which seemed to pervade the Germans as to the over-all success at Brussels. The afternoon session began with a long summary by Schroeder as to what, in his opinion, had been accomplished. This, I am sure, will be going forward to you as soon as it has been written up by the State Department note takers. I commented quite briefly on Schroeder's summary, saying that we had been rather shaken in the accuracy of the reports we had received as to what had been agreed upon when we found ourselves differing so widely with the German delegation on the matter of disparities. I also commented on how greatly we appreciated the position which the Germans had taken on almost every issue, even though they had not always been successful in carrying their point. I then referred to my real gratification at Shroeder's remark that the agricultural decisions reached with regard to rice, dairy products and meat were most certainly subject to negotiating at Geneva, although as a practical matter I was sure that the Commission would feel that it had no mandate to go any distance beyond the preliminary agreement reached and the recommendations which would later be adopted to implement those agreements. Schroeder then pointed out the importance which the Germans attached to the so-called escape clause whereby a review of the regulations became practically mandatory should third nation import interests be seriously affected. None of us were too clear as to just what that escape clause meant or how it would be interpreted by the Commission, and it is obvious we will have to get some real clarification on this point before too long. After George Ball had commented at some length on the political implications of the Brussels agreements, and expressed our satisfaction that they seemed to constitute a real step forward toward unification, he then expressed our reservations on detailed matters which could not be clearly expressed at this time because of our inability to work from accurate knowledge as to what had taken place. Then Erhard expressed himself at considerable length, not alone on the political implications, but on the general principals which had been adopted. He expressed some doubt as to how far agreement will have been reached on grain prices by April 15th. However, with regard to some of the matters on which we obviously had serious reservations, he stated he was sure that other nations would have similar reservations, mentioning in fact Great Britain and the other Commonwealth countries and the EFTA nations, and said that it would not hurt his feelings if in Geneva there appeared concerted opposition to some of those matters which the Germans themselves did not like which would force a reconsideration by the Ministers of these agreements. This was practically an open invitation to try to organize opposition to some of the decisions of the EEC, and my own interpretation of what he said, confirmed by George Ball, was that this would also apply to possible agreement on grain prices which might be fixed in April. This was, in my opinion, an extremely important statement of his. I might add that when I was saying goodbye to Erhard, he said that if, as he thought probable, we would have some very difficult problems to resolve at a political level later on in Geneva, he would himself be perfectly willing to come to Geneva again, and while not taking part in official negotiations, sit in a back room and try once again to play the role he played at the May Ministerial meeting in Geneva. 2 In most of the above, there is not too much substance, except an indication of a degree of flexibility with regard to the negotiations which is, I think, really encouraging. However, throughout the whole discussion De Gaulle's attitude was referred to several times and I am certain that the Germans do not feel that the agreements reached in Brussels have necessarily off-set the possibility of a disruptive attitude by De Gaulle at a later date. With regard to the knotty problem of agriculture, one thing emerged which I hope you will give some thought to. Erhard himself referred to his own conviction that in grains the outside world would continue to ship from 10 to 13 million tons to the EEC in the future regardless of any increase of any grain production in France. He based this on the continuing need for feed grains as the demand for meat continued to increase. It occurred to me, although I have not mentioned this to anyone except Roth and Hedges here, who both concur, that we might be able to solve the access problem by linking the escape clause adopted to a specific figure such as 10-13 million tons, so that action would become mandatory by the Commission and the Council if the import of grains fell below that figure. This, to my mind, would be infinitely preferable to any effort to secure specific access quota, which as we know would meet serious opposition on the part of the Commission, as well as the French. Before too long you will be hearing more from us on the subject of agriculture, but we are having real difficulty in reconciling the positions of Agriculture, State, and ourselves in order that we may have a clear-cut Government line to follow. There are two random thoughts which deserve some consideration on our part. If, as now seems probable, the whole disparities issue becomes more and more involved and unmanageable, we should be giving consideration to the original Swedish proposal which, as I understand it, would mean cuts of 50% in all tariffs of 30% or above, and would then move down one percentage point with each point below 30, at which tariffs now stand, ending up with a 25% cut at 5% or a 21% cut at 1%. According to our computations, this would end up with a 39% over-all cut by the United States and 35% by the EEC. It would, of course, mean a smaller cut for the low tariff countries, but as between ourselves and the EEC would, I think, be soluble politically in this country. Whether or not any of the trade criterias could be applied to such a formula, I do not know, but its very simplicity has a great appeal. The second thought follows on top of the first. If we had a bottom cut off of 5% a la ecretement and this were agreed to as a general rule, except where perhaps a principal supplier wished to receive further reductions below this level, we could then solve our oil problem. The bright ideas which we advanced from the point of view of listing oil and so getting it out of the exceptions category is not taking too well with the Interior Department or the OEP. Insofar as the principal supplier is concerned, this is clearly Venezuela, which is not apt to join the GATT negotiations. Canada supplies only 1/8th of our imports. Both of the above may be disturbing thoughts, but I think we ought to give them a good going over. You will undoubtedly have received a good deal more information than this letter contains by cable before you receive it. However, it carries with it all sorts of good wishes for your Japan trip as well as good luck in the very important negotiations which will be taking place in Geneva very soon thereafter. I doubt whether anything of profit could come out of meetings in Geneva until after the Ministerial meeting in Brussels, which I think is on January 15th, at which point there may be a good deal of hassling as to what was really agreed to under the pressures of last week. If there is to be anything like a Ministerial meeting, please be sure to set it after the last two weeks in February, since I have made a solemn promise to take those two weeks off with my wife and this, as you know, constitutes a much stronger obligation than any that might appertain to the success of the Kennedy Round. I am sure you understand. With my warmest regards, As ever, Christian A. Herter 3 * Source: Kennedy Library, Herter Papers, Subject File, Michael Blumenthal, Box 7. Personal and Confidential 1 A memorandum of this conversation is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2354. 2 See Document 282 . 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. Economic Defense Policy Economic Defense Policy 296. Editorial Note 297. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, March 14, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 460.509/3-1461. Confidential. Drafted by Dozier and approved by Edwin M. Martin and Wilson T.M. Beale, Jr. 298. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Bohlen) to the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) Washington, April 7, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 460.119/5-161. Secret. Drafted by James L. Colbert on April 7. Attached to the source text is a covering memorandum from Edwin M. Martin to U. Alexis Johnson, May 8, stating Martin's dismay that the Department of Defense was holding up licenses for certain exports to the Soviet Union, allegedly, in part, because of the Laotian situation. Martin suggested that Johnson, as the new coordinator of relations with the Department of Defense, “may wish to inquire into these hold ups.” 299. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, May 18, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 100.4/5-1861. Confidential. Drafted by Martin on May 22. 300. Editorial Note 301. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations Washington, June 28, 1961, 7:31 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 460.509/6-2171. Official Use Only; Priority. Drafted by M.S. Young (OR/ECD); cleared by McLaughlin (RA), Colbert (SOV), Katz (EE), Turpin (B/CEA), Cash (GER), Volin (paragraph 4) (Agriculture), and Sweeney (paragraph 5) (Commerce); and approved by Clarence T. Breaux. 302. Memorandum From Secretary of Commerce Hodges to Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, September 18, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 460.509/9-2061. Confidential. Attached to the source text is a 2-page cover memorandum from Harold C. Vedeler (EE) to Thompson (U), September 20, recommending peaceful trade with the Soviet bloc and resumption of trade licenses for Poland and Yugoslavia. 303. Letter From Secretary of Commerce Hodges to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, October 20, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 400.119/10-2061. Confidential. Attached to the source text is a February 20, 1962, covering memorandum with a handwritten note by Robert B. Wright (E/MDC), stating that no reply was necessary. 304. Summary Minutes of Meeting of the Interdepartmental Committee of Under Secretaries on Foreign Economic Policy Washington, January 10, 1962. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 59, E Files: FRC 71 A 6682, Item 53, ICFEP, January 10, 1962, Problems of Trade with Communist Bloc. Secret. Presumably drafted by Ruth S. Gold, who is listed as the Recording Secretary on the list of participants. 305. Record of Actions Taken at the National Security Council Standing Group Meeting Washington, January 26, 1962. Source: Department of State,S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Standing Group—January 26, 1962. Secret. No record of the NSC Standing Group meeting has been found. 306. Letter From Secretary of Commerce Hodges to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) Washington, February 14, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Trade Policy, East-West Trade. Secret. Copies were sent to the President and the Secretary of Defense. 307. Current Economic Developments Washington, February 27, 1962. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 59, E/CBA/REP Files: FRC 72 A 6248, Current Economic Developments. Secret. The source text comprises pp. 1-4 of the issue. 308. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Trezise) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, April 20, 1962. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 460.509/4-2062. Secret. Drafted by Robert B. Wright (E/MDC) on April 20. Transmitted through Ball. The date is handwritten on the source text. 309. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to the National Security Council Washington, July 10, 1962. Source: Johnson Library, Vice President's Security File, NSC, East-West Trade, July 10, 1962. Secret. Carl Kaysen, the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, transmitted this paper along with Hodges' letter to the President (Document 310), a memorandum from Rusk to the National Security Council (Document 311), and a memorandum from Hodges to the National Security Council (Document 312), with an explanatory memorandum to the President, July 17, stating, among other things, that the Departments of State, Commerce, and Defense had reached agreement on policy language, but that Rusk and Hodges disagreed on policy and on the meaning of the language. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings, 1962, 503rd NSC Meeting) 310. Letter From Secretary of Commerce Hodges to President Kennedy Washington, July 10, 1962. Source Jonson Library, Vice President's Security File, NSC, East-West Trade, July 10, 1962. Secret. Transmitted to the President along with Rusk's memoranda to the National Security Council (Documents 309 and 311) and Holdges' memorandum to the National Security Council (Document 312) with an explanatory memorandum by Kaysen, July 17. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings, 1962, 503rd NSC Meeting) 311. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to the National Security Council Washington, July 16, 1962. Source: Johnson Library, Vice President's Security File, NSC, East-West Trade, July 10, 1962. Secret. Transmitted to the President along with Rusk's memorandum to the National Security Council (Document 309), Hodges' letter to President Kennedy (Document 310), and Hodges' memorandum to the National Security Council (Document 312), with an explanatory memorandum by Kaysen, July 17. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings, 1962, 503rd NSC Meeting) 312. Memorandum From Secretary of Commerce Hodges to the National Security Council Washington, July 16, 1962. Source: Johnson Library, Vice President's Security File, NSC, East-West Trade, July 10, 1962. Secret. Transmitted to President Kennedy along with Rusk's memoranda to the National Security Council (Documents 309 and 311) and Hodges' letter to the President (Document 310), with an explanatory memorandum by Kaysen, July 17. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings, 1962, 503rd NSC Meeting) 313. Summary Record of the 503d Meeting of the National Security Council Washington, July 17, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings, 1962, 503rd NSC Meeting. Secret. The source text, presumably drafted by Bromley Smith, Executive Secretary of the NSC, bears 16 handwritten emendations. An attached attendance list, not printed, indicates that 27 persons attended the meeting which took place beginning at 5 p.m. in the Cabinet Room of the White House. 314. National Security Council Record of Action No. 2455 Washington, July 17, 1962. Source: Department of State, S/SNSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council. Secret. Taken at the 503d NSC meeting (see Document 313). 315. Current Economic Developments Washington, July 31, 1962. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 59, E/CBA/REP Files: FRC 72 A 6248, Current Economic Developments. Official Use Only. The source text comprises p. 17 of the issue. 316. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Secretary of Commerce Hodges Washington, August 9, 1962. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 400.119/7-2062. Secret. Drafted by Robert B. Wright and James L. Colbert (EUR/SOV) on July 27. A copy was sent to Carl Kaysen. The source text is Tab A to a July 30 memorandum from G. Griffith Johnson (E) through Under Secretary Ball and Executive Secretary Brubeck to Rusk, which explained the need to call Hodges' attention to NSC Action No. 2455 (Document 312) because “Hodges' letter was almost certainly written before he received NSC Action 2455.” (Department of State, Central Files, 400.119/7-3062) 317. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Secretary of Commerce Hodges Washington, September 5, 1962. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 460.509/8-1762. Secret. Drafted by Trezise and Clarence T. Breaux (E/MDC) on August 23, and retyped in S/S on September 1. 318. Letter From Secretary of Commerce Hodges to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, September 12, 1962. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 460.119/10-1962. Secret. 319. Editorial Note 320. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Brubeck) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, December 4, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Trade Policy, East-West Trade Policy Subjects, East-West 4/63-7/63. Secret. 321. Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) Washington, April 19, 1963. Source: Department of State, Central Files, AV 1 Com Bloc-US. Secret. On May 1, Harriman sent this memorandum and two statements on civil air transport relations between the United States and the Soviet bloc and on U.S. policy toward bloc civil aviation activities in the free world with a covering letter requesting comments to the Departments of Commerce and Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Aviation Administration, Civil Aeronautics Board, and the Bureau of the Budget. The replies, May 14 (Department of Commerce), undated (Central Intelligence Agency), May 20 (Bureau of the Budget), May 24 (Civil Aeronautics Board), and June 21 (Federal Aviation Administration and Department of Defense), are ibid. 322. Memorandum From President Kennedy to the Export Control Review Board Washington, May 16, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subject Series, Trade, East/West. Secret. The Export Control Review Board consisted of the Secretaries of Commerce (Chairman), State, and Defense. Regarding its establishment, see Document 300. 323. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Senator Jacob K. Javits Washington, July 22, 1963. Source: Department of State, Central Files, STR 7. No classification marking. Drafted by Robert B. Wright on July 2 and retyped on July 10. 324. Report Prepared by the Policy Planning Council Washington, July 26, 1963. Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, Economic Policy, 1963. Secret. A July 29 covering memorandum from Walt Rostow to Rusk reads as follows: “Although you had a chance to read and hear discussion on an earlier draft of this paper, you may wish to have this latest version at hand which incorporates suggestions made at your planning session on July 18, 1963.” A July 29 cover letter from Rostow to Ambassador Kohler in Moscow states that the paper was prepared in the Policy Planning Council in response to a request by the President for a review of present U.S. policies. The paper was based on views developed in discussion of an informal group drawn from the interested geographic bureaus and the Bureaus of Economic Affairs and Intelligence and Research. “It has gone through a fairly extensive review process in the Department, including a session of the Secretary's Policy Planning meeting, and appears to have general support.” Kohler's comments and his endorsement of the recommendations in Part III of this paper are contained in telegram 474 from Moscow, August 7. (Ibid., Central Files, STR 7) A handwritten note on the title page of the report reads: “Basis for Draft Report to President—See WR memo to Secy. 8/9/63.” That memorandum has not been found. 325. Memorandum From David Klein of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, August 14, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subject Series, Trade, East/West. Secret. 326. Minutes of the Meeting of the Export Control Review Board Washington, August 15, 1963. Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, Economic Policy, 1963. 327. Memorandum From the Export Control Review Board to President Kennedy Washington, August 15, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Commerce, 1963. Secret. 328. Memorandum From David Klein of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, September 7, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subject Series, Trade, East/West. Secret. 329. Memorandum From President Kennedy to the Export Control Review Board Washington, September 19, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subject Series, Trade, East/West. Secret. 330. Editorial Note 331. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Export Control Review Board Washington, October 21, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subject Series, Trade, East/West, 10/63-11/63. Secret. 332. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Kennedy Washington, October 25, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subject Series, Trade, East/West. Secret. 333. Report Prepared in the Department of State Washington, December 6, 1963. Source: Department of State, Central Files, STR 5. Secret. No drafting information is on the source text. There are two covering memoranda to the source text: One memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Johnson to Under Secretary of State Ball, December 6, requests approval for transmittal of this report to McGeorge Bundy, and the approval line on the memorandum is signed. The second memorandum from Benjamin H. Read, Department of State Executive Secretary, December 18, transmits this report to Bundy. 334. Editorial Note 296. Editorial Note 296. Editorial Note In his Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union of January 30, 1961, President Kennedy said that “we must never forget our hopes for the ultimate freedom and welfare of the Eastern European peoples.” He asked Congress to amend the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, commonly known as the Battle Act (P.L. 82-213, approved October 26, 1951; 65 Stat. 644), to allow him more discretion in using economic tools “to help reestablish historic ties of friendship” with Eastern Europe. He also said he hoped “to explore with the Polish Government the possibility of using our frozen Polish funds on projects of peace that will demonstrate abiding friendship for and interest in the people of Poland.” ( Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961 , page 26) President Kennedy submitted the proposed bill with letters to President of the Senate Lyndon B. Johnson and Speaker of the House of Representatives Sam Rayburn on February 21. (Department of State Bulletin, March 27, 1961, pages 444-445) The bill permitted grant aid to any nation, excluding the Soviet Union and the Communist-held areas of the Far East (Communist China, North Korea, and North Vietnam). In his statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in support of the bill on April 25, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Ball referred to the possible use of accumulated Polish currency as an example of such aid. (Ibid., May 22, 1961, pages 775-776) The Senate amended and passed the bill on May 11 (S.1215, 82d Cong.). It was referred to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on May 15, but the House of Representatives failed to act on it. 297. Memorandum of Conversation 297. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, March 14, 1961. SUBJECT COCOM List Review PARTICIPANTS UK—Sir Patrick Reilly, Deputy Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office Mr. John Mason, Foreign Office Mr. J.O. Rennie, Commercial Minister, British Embassy US—Assistant Secretary Martin Mr. W.T.M. Beale, Economic Minister, American Embassy, London Mr. William B. Dozier, BNA Sir Patrick said that the US Aide-Memoire of March 3 on the current COCOM list review had caused him much concern. 1 He thought that there clearly should have been more coordination between our two governments, and noted that the US was mainly concerned with UK attitudes, while the UK was troubled by the number and nature of the US proposals. Mr. Martin said that while subsequent agreement had been reached on some points, our delegations were still at odds with respect to twenty-three items. He was disturbed that there had been no UK discussion related to the COCOM criteria and wondered if we were in disagreement on the criteria. Sir Patrick said that there was real disagreement but only with respect to the interpretation of the criteria. He said that UK views differ somewhat from those of the US with regard to the whole question of the state of the Soviet technology—particularly in light of advances in Soviet rocketry, whether an item should properly be on the munitions list or not, and also what to do about items still on the drawing board and not yet in production. The UK looks at the last mentioned as a national security matter and not one for COCOM. An added problem for the UK was that HMG was under very great internal political pressure to increase trade with the Soviets. Sir Patrick said that they deplored the difference of opinion not so much in terms of magnitude of trade but rather in terms of friction in US/UK relations, and they would very much like to see a solution found. He suggested that the two countries plan to get together bilaterally and at an appropriate level well in advance of the next annual review. He added that he was not yet ready to suggest a date for such a meeting. Mr. Martin agreed that it was desirable to have bilateral talks before the next annual review. He thought that May or June might be an appropriate time. By that time we would have completed our review of US/Soviet bloc economic relations, and would be in a better position to sit down with the UK and discuss COCOM policy. Sir Patrick said, with respect to the current list review, that he hoped both delegations could be instructed to make a big effort to find common ground in order to avoid a US/UK clash. For their part, the UK delegation was being instructed to meet the US point of view wherever possible, even where in the delegation's view the matter at hand was contrary to the criteria. He concluded by saying that in the future he personally would keep a close eye on COCOM developments. Mr. Martin said that he was encouraged by Sir Patrick's statements, and that we too would provide further instructions to our COCOM delegation. 2 He agreed that we should keep in close touch on this matter. * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 460.509/3-1461. Confidential. Drafted by Dozier and approved by Edwin M. Martin and Wilson T.M. Beale, Jr. 1 The 15-nation Coordinating Committee on Export Controls (COCOM) reviewed International Lists defining strategic items over which participating governments exercised control of exports to the Communist bloc in Paris October 1, 1960-April 15, 1961. The aide-memoire of March 3, 1961, was handed by Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Martin to Denis A. Greenhill, Counselor of the British Embassy in Washington. (Ibid., 460.509/3-361) It stated U.S. concerns aroused by the statement of the British COCOM delegate in Paris on January 30 on control proposals under discussion in COCOM arising from advances in Western technology and by British resistance to adding items to the embargo list and expanding current definitions. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., 460.509/2-161) 2 Topol 1296 to Paris, March 15, instructed the U.S.COCOM delegate to discuss the unresolved area with the British COCOM delegate and recommend possible modification of the U.S. position that might provide a basis for settlement. (Ibid., 460.509/3-15671) [text not declassified] The Department of State amended the lists of the Mutual Defense Assist-ance Control Act of 1951 (Battle Act), removing certain items and adding new ones, to reflect the changes resulting from the COCOM review. For some indication of these changes, see Department of State, The Battle Act in New Times, Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951—Fifteenth Report to Congress (Washington, March 1962), pp. 1-2. 298. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Bohlen) to the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) 298. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Bohlen) to the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) Source Washington, April 7, 1961. SUBJECT Report on Meeting with Secretary Hodges, April 7, 1961 1 As you requested, I attended the meeting this morning which had been arranged by Secretary Hodges to discuss the question of export licenses to the USSR and to the bloc. Mr. McGeorge Bundy attended, and Mr. Gilpatric and Mr. William Bundy were there from Defense. Various Commerce, Defense and State staff members also participated. Basically, the discussion covered two points: (1) The pending export license cases which the Department has appealed. 2 (2) The future procedure for handling agency disagreements on licensing cases. As to the pending cases , I argued for approval along the lines of your letter and Ed Martin's briefing memorandum. I urged that the basic NSC policy guidance should be followed, and emphasized in particular that we felt that cases such as these should be looked at in terms of whether they would have a substantial impact on the war-making potential of the USSR and the Soviet bloc. The question of whether the same items were available elsewhere should be given considerable weight. I said that I thought that if we embarked on a policy with respect to trade which widened the gap in this area between ourselves and our allies, there would be no compensating national security interest which would be served. I also mentioned that a negative position on these cases would conflict with the Administration's general position of favoring the expansion of peaceful trade. Finally, I said that it was very important to rectify the present situation where there was considerable uncertainty on the part of American businessmen and Soviet bloc purchasers, as to what could be licensed. Mr. Hodges referred to Ambassador Thompson's telegram, and advised that he would be prepared to approve the applications for transfermatic machines for automotive production, on the understanding that (a) Defense's position was changed to one of approval and (b) Defense advised Congressman Lipscomb of their change in position. It appeared that Defense was ready to revise its position on these machines. Regarding the two cases for the USSR about which you wrote to Mr. Hodges on March 27, 1961 (technical data re. nylon 66 and carbon bisulphide), Mr. Hodges said that he would approve the license for the latter, but that Commerce had a question on the former, and would want to check further on Dupont's willingness to permit use of the process. On the case of the research equipment for Poland, Mac Bundy and I argued at length for approval, on the grounds that this equipment would be for research basically in non-military fields. The matter was left that the Defense Department would take another look at its position, and if it withdrew its objection to issuance of the license, Mr. Hodges indicated he would approve. As to the future procedure , Mr. Hodges said that he was sending forward a proposal to the President for an Executive Order, setting up a Board of Export Review (to be chaired by the Secretary of Commerce with participation at the Secretary level) to deal with all export license cases in which there was disagreement among agencies in the present interagency staff committees. His main concern was that the U.S. Government act and speak as one on these matters. He emphasized that, once a license was granted, it should not be revoked. He was also anxious to set up a procedure which would ensure that agency's reservations and dissents were thoroughly thrashed out, and agreement reached on a case. He wanted to end the practice where an agency's non-concurrence with a decision was noted for the record, but not pursued (except perhaps at a later date, as in the ball bearing case). He also said that he thought we should have no more instances where agency's views on cases under review were ventilated to the Congress or the press. There was no disagreement with these objectives. There was considerable discussion as to whether the proposed Board of Export Review would operate by unanimous or majority vote, and it was the consensus that agreement would have to be unanimous (in view of the right of access of Cabinet officers to the President), with all split cases going to the President. It was Mr. Hodges' thought that there would only be about four cases a year which would have to be reviewed by the Board, but I rather think that, on the basis of the Department's past experience with Defense and Commerce, we would have more cases than that. There seems, however, some promise of a new viewpoint on these matters in Defense, which should make the Board's and the President's task easier. In any event, I told Mr. Hodges that the Department would want to be given an early opportunity to review the proposed Executive Order to set up such a Board. We are arranging to obtain copies of the draft Order. Copies of this memorandum are being sent to Mr. Ball, EUR, E and L. * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 460.119/5-161. Secret. Drafted by James L. Colbert on April 7. Attached to the source text is a covering memorandum from Edwin M. Martin to U. Alexis Johnson, May 8, stating Martin's dismay that the Department of Defense was holding up licenses for certain exports to the Soviet Union, allegedly, in part, because of the Laotian situation. Martin suggested that Johnson, as the new coordinator of relations with the Department of Defense, “may wish to inquire into these hold ups.” 1 In a March 31 letter to Acting Secretary of State Bowles, Secretary of Commerce Hodges proposed that the Secretaries of Commerce, Defense, and State, and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs meet to discuss outstanding cases of licenses for exports to the Soviet Union and Poland on April 7 at 10 a.m. (Ibid., 461.119/3-3161) 2 Acting Secretary Bowles appealed a Department of Commerce recommendation to deny export licenses in three cases pending Hodges' review: a Van de Graaf accelerator for Poland and nylon 66 and carbon bisulphide technical data for the Soviet Union. In urging the granting of these licenses, Bowles referred to “our basic interest at this time in establishing more normal relations with the Soviet Union” and “our wish to expand United States economic relations with Poland.” (Letter from Bowles to Hodges, March 27; copy attached to Hodges' reply of March 31, cited in footnote 1 above) 299. Memorandum of Conversation 299. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, May 18, 1961. SUBJECT Commerce Advisory Export Board PARTICIPANTS Mr. Myer Feldman, The White House, Chairman Secretary Hodges, Secretary of Commerce Dr. Jack Behrman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce Under Secretary Fowler, Treasury Assistant Secretary Duncan, Agriculture Deputy Assistant Secretary William Bundy, Defense Assistant Director Turner, Budget Assistant Secretary Edwin M. Martin, State After thirty minutes of relatively amicable discussion of the Executive Order proposed by Commerce 1 the following was agreed: 1. The Board would consist of only Commerce, State and Defense, but other agencies, and in particular Agriculture and Treasury, would be called upon to participate when matters of direct interest to them were up for discussion. 2. When the Cabinet Member or Acting Cabinet Member could not attend his representative could attend but his Department's views must be conveyed in a document signed by the Cabinet Member or Acting Cabinet Member. 3. There would be no change in the Executive Order making the Cabinet group advisory to the Secretary of Commerce since it was not desired to suggest in the Executive Order that the President would deal with things like individual license cases. Secretary Hodges agreed, however, that there should be a minute of record that he would take no action to grant or deny a license without unanimity among the interested Cabinet Members. 4. It was agreed to amend Section 3 to make clear that any interested Cabinet Member could propose a matter for discussion by the group to the Chairman and not just the Secretary of Commerce. Mr. Feldman said a revised order would be distributed and he hoped it could be issued early next week. At the conclusion of this discussion Secretary Hodges said he wanted White House views on the question of publicity for licenses. He was under heavy pressure from Congressman Moss to provide routine publicity on the name of the company, product and country of destination for all of the 12,000 licenses issued each month. After sampling business opinion and securing views from State and Treasury, Commerce had agreed that such a routine publication should not be made. There was a serious problem of releasing competitively valuable information. There was also the problem that many companies feared local public opinion if it became known they were selling to bloc countries. Trade might dry up materially. It was pointed out that such license information is highly misleading since in the case of bloc countries it is usually a “fishing license” and 70% of the licenses are not followed by shipments. Commerce has no information on actual shipments so could not publish these only. The consensus of the group was to support Commerce but Mr. Feldman had reservations, feeling substantially that the competitive argument was not important and you should release anything which there were no strong reasons for concealing. It was understood, of course, that such information would always be made available to Committees of Congress on a confidential basis and the companies were always free to release information if they chose. It was agreed that Secretary Hodges would prepare a document on the subject and discuss it with Mr. Salinger. At a subsequent rump session Behrman, Bundy and I discussed some current cases with the following results: 1. Bundy apologized profusely when told that the letter to Lipscomb on automobile machine tool cases had not been dispatched in spite of the fact that there had been a Laos cease fire since May 11. He stated he recognized, in response to my comment, that this was rather a peculiarly political condition for Defense to have established but said it was proposed to his Secretary on a day when the Laotian situation was quite critical and his Secretary had accepted it. 2. Bundy said he had instructed a letter be prepared removing Defense objections to the licensing of the accelerators to Poland. 3. Behrman said they still had very conflicting views on nylon 66 and had not made up their minds. 4. Behrman took up a letter from Bundy on synthetic rubber2 and stated that Secretary Hodges was not willing to approve on the basis of such a letter with its very grudging approval from a Defense standpoint. We persuaded Bundy that the letter did contain phrases which could be taken out of context and used to seriously embarrass politically the Secretary of Commerce. Bundy agreed to withdraw the letter and redraft it confining his comment to saying that any larger quantities would raise difficulties. On this basis Behrman agreed to see that the license was issued. 5. Behrman discussed a Defense letter on a boiler for the Soviet Union to be shipped by the Canadian subsidiary of a US company in which Defense had argued against the shipment but then agreed to approve it in view of the Canadian angle. 2 I concurred in feeling this was a very unfortunate letter to have in the files. Bundy agreed that he would not have recommended denial on the basis of the technical arguments contained in the letter and, therefore, the Canadian angle was irrelevant. Behrman agreed to see that the license was issued. There was also some general discussion of Defense comments on the proposed Commerce instructions to examining officers and the way the burden of proof problem should be handled. This was somewhat inconclusive but it was generally agreed that the US strategic list should be reexamined and that presumption of denial should only mean that the burden of proof is on the applicant or agency who seek approval, not that such cases would normally or usually be denied. A particularly valid reason for granting such licenses would be availability from other sources. There was also a brief discussion of the COCOM situation and of the review State was making at the request of Rostow of Soviet economic relations. Bundy firmly reaffirmed his belief that the basic COCOM criteria was right and the problem was of relating items to that criteria. * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 100.4/5-1861. Confidential. Drafted by Martin on May 22. 1 The draft executive order, “Administration of the Export Control Act of 1949,” April 17, was prepared in the Bureau of the Budget at the request of the White House. Arthur B. Focke, General Counsel of the Bureau of the Budget, sent it by letter to Secretary of State Rusk for his consideration on April 17. Brooks Hays (for the Acting Secretary of State) replied to David E. Bell, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, on April 27. Hays recommended revision of the draft executive order to provide for submission of disputes to the President by the Board or a disagreeing member and for composition of the Board's membership to include Agriculture and Treasury only when a particular problem involved their interests directly. (Both ibid., 400.119/4-1761) Regarding Executive Order 10945, see Document 300 . 2 Not found. 300. Editorial Note 300. Editorial Note Executive Order 10945, “Administration of the Export Control Act of 1949,” was signed by the President on May 24, 1961, establishing the Export Control Review Board, a Cabinet committee consisting of the Secretaries of Commerce (Chairman), State, and Defense. (Department of State Bulletin , June 12, 1961, pages 934-935; 26 Federal Register 4487) Its purpose was to assure high-level consideration of trade control policies and actions and to obtain agreed action among Departments chiefly concerned with advising the Secretary of Commerce, in accordance with the Export Control Act of 1949, as amended. (50 USC App. 2021, 2024) 301. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations 301. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations Source Washington, June 28, 1961, 7:31 p.m. Topol 1850. Ref: Polto 1744, 1 Polto 1758 (Item 3). 2 Wireless file EUR 104 and SEF 2 of June 22 carried text Commerce press release on same date re change in US export licensing policy to permit cash sales of subsidized surplus agricultural commodities to EUR Sov bloc. 3 May inform EconAd revision has no special significance other than tidying up of various administrative limitations affecting exports non-strategic goods to EUR Sov bloc and permitting commercial sales on competitive basis with other exporting countries. Possible sales in free world by US exporters in past have been affected by efforts to deny these commodities to Sov bloc, including transshipment controls, etc., which have affected markets for the commodities in free world as well as bloc countries. Executive Branch policy denying cash sales subsidized agricultural commodities to EUR Sov bloc at world market prices based on Cabinet decision 1954 as result public and Congressional outcry over proposed butter sales to USSR which at subsidized prices would have been lower than prices to American consumers. This decision modified by CFEP in 1956 and only required administrative action to alter export licensing policy. Such action has been under consideration for some time. It is difficult to anticipate quantitative effect of liberalization since number of factors would influence bloc purchases from US. In general, market prospects would appear to be better in other East EUR countries than in USSR. However, significant purchases by the former could not be expected without extension long-term credits, which precluded to most by law. EE countries import cotton, feed grains, fats and oils. USSR is net importer of edible fats and oils, and imports some rice. While it imports relatively small quantities of wheat from Canada and considerable cotton from Middle East, USSR is net exporter of both commodities. In exercising licensing authority Commerce will observe reasonable safeguards to assure that these commodities are not transshipped to Communist China, North Korea, North Viet Nam and Cuba. Where evidence indicates strong likelihood of transshipment to such destinations, will not approve licenses. Exporters will be required to supply commitments from importers in the bloc countries that the commodities will not be reexported to another destination. However, it is recognized that maintenance of effective destination control with respect to these countries poses certain practical difficulties. In any event, in considering licenses Commerce will take into account quantities involved in relation to requirements of country concerned, insofar as can be determined. Any possible applications for East Germany would of course be disposed of in accordance with established US policy toward East Germany. Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 460.509/6-2171. Official Use Only; Priority. Drafted by M.S. Young (OR/ECD); cleared by McLaughlin (RA), Colbert (SOV), Katz (EE), Turpin (B/CEA), Cash (GER), Volin (paragraph 4) (Agriculture), and Sweeney (paragraph 5) (Commerce); and approved by Clarence T. Breaux. 1 In Polto 1744 from Paris, June 22, Finletter recommended informing the NATO Economic Advisers' Committee of the change in export licensing policy reported in Topol 1850. (Ibid., 460.509/6-2261) 2 Dated June 26. (Ibid., 375/6-2661) 3 Not found. 302. Memorandum From Secretary of Commerce Hodges to Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara 302. Memorandum From Secretary of Commerce Hodges to Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara Source Washington, September 18, 1961. The recent 90-1 vote in the House, approving Resolution 403 for investigation of export control administration (copy of Resolution attached), the recently announced hearings by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, 1 and the favorable report by the House Commerce Committee on H.R. 8465 providing for embargo of trade with Cuba 2 all reflect the very strong sentiment in Congress—and the country—against trade with Soviet bloc countries. The comments of House members on H. Res. 403 are recorded on pages 17433 through 17444 of the Congressional Record . The precise tactics utilized in bringing about adoption of the Kitchin Resolution can, perhaps, be correctly interpreted as motivated in some measure by “political antagonisms” or “recrimination” against the Administration—perhaps influenced by the Rules Committee battle early in this session of Congress; and perhaps influenced by other factors such as the redistricting of a Congressional District in North Carolina to the disadvantage of the present incumbent who introduced Resolution No. 403. Having acknowledged the probable influence of these political factors, I would now set them to one side. It would be a very serious mistake for us to attribute this development in the Congress to purely “political factors.” We should now dwell on what I consider to be the crux of the case so far as the Administration is concerned; that is, the facts and merits regarding the administration of the Export Control Act during the past several months. So far as announced formal policy on exports to Soviet bloc countries, the Administration has pretty much continued to “do business as usual,” notwithstanding the Berlin developments. We have continued to author-ize exports of non-strategic goods to the Soviet Union and her satellites with the only announced policy change in recent months having to do with subsidized agricultural products, a decision which was made prior to the present Berlin crisis. Our unannounced policy has been stricter than we have told the Congress and the public. Congressman Bloomfield (page 17444 of the Record) makes the categorical statement we are actually shipping subsidized agricultural products. Even though we are not, Secretary Rusk and I in conference with various Congressmen refused to say we would not ship. As Secretary Rusk will recall, I felt weeks ago we should announce publicly that we would not ship subsidized agricultural products to the Soviet bloc. However, we have withheld such an announcement in view of our negotiating problems with NATO allies as well as with the Russians. We must recognize that our decision not to announce that we would definitely not ship subsidized agricultural commodities to the Soviet bloc countries has contributed to the Congressional sentiment with regard to trade with these countries. 3 Unfortunately, our continued “announced” policy on exports has not made sense to the average citizen who hears about it and reacts to what he hears—comparing our export policy with the Berlin developments and the action taken in recent weeks to strengthen our military forces. As you know, we have been more critical recently in our review of license applications. We have cut down on our specific approvals, with the knowledge and approval of the President. We have authorized shipment of subsidized agricultural commodities to Poland, but this has been under express statutory authority of Congress (Public Law 480). 4 We have in the last few days held up all licenses for Poland and Yugoslavia, also at present on an unannounced basis. We expect in the Department of Commerce to keep on being very critical of approval of export licenses unless and until the international situation greatly improves, or the Review Board and the President decide otherwise. Assuming the continuance of the present international crisis with no appreciable worsening or improvement, I think we should consider whether we should advise the President to decide and announce within the next two or three weeks, that no licenses for export of goods to Soviet bloc countries will be approved “for the time being.” 5 If there is an appreciable worsening in the international situation, then such a decision and announcement should not be delayed for two or three weeks. I am aware of the understanding recently reached by the four-power working group on a series of countermeasures to be taken individually by any of the countries as a response to any one of a series of harassments by the Soviets. 6 Under this understanding, the countermeasure is supposed to match the harassment in degree of impact. To me, this approach leaves us in the position of merely “reacting” to whatever strings the Soviets wish to pull at a given time. I recognize that we must give careful regard to our relations with the NATO allies, to their own trade policies, and to the great desirability of trying to obtain unity of action among the Western allies. It may be that resolute and determined action on the part of the United States (at the highest level) against continued trade with Soviet bloc countries would have a compelling influence with our NATO allies beyond what is now assumed, but on this point I must, of course, defer to the State Department. In any event, we come back to our own responsibilities in administering the Export Control Act. We, of course, want to (1) make decisions on specific license applications which are not now and will not later prove to be against the national interest; and (2) apart from the actual merits of individual decisions, we must try to administer the law in such a way as not to lose necessary confidence and support of the Congress and the public. If we lose necessary Congressional and public support of the manner in which the Export Control Act is administered, it will do us little practical good later to believe that “we nevertheless were right!” The Export Control Act expires June 30, 1962. It has regularly been enacted and extended for two-year periods. There is already definite danger that some drastic and undesirable changes will be made in the law at the next session which could have the effect of greatly restricting desirable flexibility now permitted under this statute. With respect to hearings on export control administration before either the House Committee or a Senate Committee, it is important that our three Departments coordinate our testimony, and I assume each of us is designating an individual as liaison for our Department on this matter. Copy of this memorandum is being sent to the President for his information. Luther H. Hodges * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 460.509/9-2061. Confidential. Attached to the source text is a 2-page cover memorandum from Harold C. Vedeler (EE) to Thompson (U), September 20, recommending peaceful trade with the Soviet bloc and resumption of trade licenses for Poland and Yugoslavia. 1 H. Res. 403, 87th Cong., introduced by Representative A. Paul Kitchin (D.-N.C.) on August 3 and approved on September 7, created a select committee to investigate administration of the Export Control Act of 1949. It is not attached to the source text, but a copy is attached to a letter from Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations John S. Hoghland 2d to Kitchin, Chairman of the House Select Committee on Export Control, October 9. (Ibid., 460.119/9-2861) 2 H.R. 8465, 87th Cong., introduced by Representative Paul G. Rogers (D.-Fla.) on August 2. In hearings before the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, August 29 and September 1, the cigar manufacturers of Tampa and the Department of State opposed the bill. The Committee reported the bill to the House of Representatives on September 14 (H. Rept. 1182, 87th Cong.) where it passed by voice vote on September 15, but the Senate did not act on it. 3 At an unofficial session of the Export Control Review Board on August 15, with the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, and Secretary of Agriculture Freeman present, Secretary of Commerce Hodges, Secretary of State Rusk, and Secretary of Defense McNamara decided not to license the export of subsidized agricultural commodities to the Soviet bloc and not to announce this decision. They also decided to exercise extreme care in granting licenses for exports to the Soviet bloc in order to be certain that exports would be clearly non-strategic. (Memorandum from Behrman to Borton and Hockersmith, August 16; Washington National Records Center, RG 40, Department of Commerce, Executive Secretariat Files: FRC 69 A 6828, Office of the Secretary, Commerce, International Affairs, Export Controls) 4 Reference is to the Agricultural Trade and Development Assistance Act, approved July 10, 1954, as amended, commonly known as P.L. 480; 7 USC 1691 et seq. 5 In a memorandum of September 22 to Secretary of State Rusk, via George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, and to Secretary of Defense McNamara, via George Roberts Vance, General Counsel, Secretary of Commerce Hodges stated his “understanding of the President's statement to us in the White House 9/22/61 that we should hold up until further notice on granting export licenses for possible shipments to Poland, Yugoslavia.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Trade Policy, East-West Trade) 6 Reference is to countermeasures for meeting the threat to West Berlin; documentation on the Berlin crisis is in volumes XIV and XV . 303. Letter From Secretary of Commerce Hodges to Secretary of State Rusk 303. Letter From Secretary of Commerce Hodges to Secretary of State Rusk Source Washington, October 20, 1961. Dear Dean : In response to your letter of October 9, 1961 1 on my proposal to institute improved export controls regarding the use abroad of United States exports in goods intended for the Soviet bloc, I have issued instructions to place before the Advisory Committee on Export Policy at an early date a policy statement and the specific lists, or appropriate summaries thereof, required to implement that policy. Following such discussion, if then desired, I shall schedule the matter for consideration by the Export Control Review Board. I hope that these two actions will provide adequate opportunity for examination of relevant foreign policy considerations but will not unduly delay moving ahead with the program. You will recall that on October 3, 1961, I also sent to Secretary McNamara an identical letter on this problem. On October 11, a response was received from Deputy Secretary Roswell Gilpatric concurring in the proposal and offering assistance in the technical sphere. Enclosed are copies of his letter and a reply. 2 At this time, however, I do wish to clarify several apparent misunderstandings which are reflected in your letter. You appear to have been advised that present United States controls already “afford us a large measure of protection” in this problem area. To the contrary, I have found that controls governing such misuse of United States exports have been so tightly drawn in the past as to have little real application and to have been so inadequately disseminated as to be unknown to broad areas of the United States and international trading community. These are additional underlying reasons why I consider the present situation to be untenable and to require prompt action to improve and extend such controls. Your letter also implies that the purpose of this effort is “to impose the United States level of controls, beyond Coordinating Committee (CoCom) controls, on non-U.S. origin goods.” This was certainly not my intent, and I do not know on what basis such a statement is made. Had such been my intent, I would have clearly so indicated in setting forth in my initial letter the reasons which led me to initiate a further control effort. As you know, the Export Control Act of 1949 (as amended) is not dependent upon the activities of COCOM although, in many instances, particular United States controls are to varying degrees made ineffective by the absence of supporting controls by CoCom. The present control problem is one which has been examined within the Department of Commerce at various times over many years. A principal reason for the inadequacy of past controls in this area appears to have been the inability to absorb a significant increase in license application workload under past staffing conditions. I feel that I must undertake such additional controls as are needed to carry out the basic objectives of the Act and must somehow find the means to handle such additional workload as may be involved in fulfilling that responsibility. I take this stand not only in matters involving the national security but equally in implementing important foreign policy objectives and in protecting the domestic economy in short supply situations. My first priority in the present effort is to ensure that our exports are not used abroad to frustrate the intent of that Act and our policies thereunder. I hope these statements will dispel the faulty understanding of my intent reflected in your letter. Lastly, you have noted, I have already recognized that my proposal has foreign policy implications. The basic adverse impact, of course, falls on United States firms, United States subsidiaries and licensees abroad and certain other Free World firms. Some of the adverse reaction of these groups may well spill over into the foreign policy field. If there are truly serious disadvantages to the proposal from a foreign policy standpoint, let us examine them fully in the course of the ACEP and ECRB discussions of the proposal. Since the proposal basically concerns the promotion of our national security, I hope that there will be no request to modify the proposed program to any serious extent except on the basis of quite clear evidence of significant adverse impact on truly important United States foreign policies. Sincerely yours, Luther H. Hodges * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 400.119/10-2061. Confidential. Attached to the source text is a February 20, 1962, covering memorandum with a handwritten note by Robert B. Wright (E/MDC), stating that no reply was necessary. 1 Secretary of State Rusk's letter of October 9 replied to one from Secretary of Commerce Hodges of October 3, which proposed export controls for U.S. components of items produced abroad for export to the Soviet bloc countries and Poland. Rusk stated that extension of U.S. controls ran “the risk that the adverse effect upon our relations with our friends and allies would outweigh the advantages to be gained.” He suggested that the Advisory Committee on Export Policy discuss Hodges' proposals and then he would like to consider them again from the standpoint of foreign policy. (Ibid., 400.119/10-361) 2 Not printed. 304. Summary Minutes of Meeting of the Interdepartmental Committee of Under Secretaries on Foreign Economic Policy 304. Summary Minutes of Meeting of the Interdepartmental Committee of Under Secretaries on Foreign Economic Policy Source Washington, January 10, 1962. [Here follows a list of participants.] PROBLEMS OF TRADE WITH COMMUNIST BLOC Under Secretary of Commerce Gudeman opened the presentation by calling attention to the tables in the secret report submitted by Commerce entitled US Economic Relations with the Soviet Bloc. 1 He noted that in 1960 US total exports amounted to $18,834 million of which only $193.4 million were to Eastern Europe. The largest portion—$143.1 million—was to Poland and this was due to the PL-480 arrangement. Russia itself accounted for $38.4 million. On the import side, total US imports amounted to $14,654 million of which $80.9 million or six-tenths of one per cent, were from Eastern Europe. The tables show that the bulk of the imports from the bloc come from Czechoslovakia, Poland and the USSR and that they consisted chiefly of meat and meat products, furs, glass and glass products, platinum and benzine. Leading US exports to the bloc were wheat, barley, cotton, iron and steel mill products, and textile, sewing, and shoe machinery. Another table shows the various countries and what they get from and ship to the bloc, indicating dependence on the bloc by some of these nations. Assistant Secretary of Commerce Behrman then made the major presentation. He thought discussion should focus on three major things: a) the assumptions on which we base our activities with the bloc; b) the policy objectives we hope to achieve; and c) specific techniques we might employ to achieve these objectives. Basic Assumptions . Mr. Behrman listed some of the basic assumptions which underlie our approach to the problem. 1. Russia apparently wants a type of coexistence but on her own terms. 2. Russia will continue using trade to exert economic pressures. 3. A relaxation of the US position toward the bloc would be followed by an even greater relaxation of Western Europe and the less developed countries. 4. Russia is not interested in contracts with the usual commercial advantages but wants to get technological advances from the West and to avoid dependence on the West. 5. If we gain what we want in the way of trade with the bloc, it may be at the expense of other trade. 6. Russia will continue to pose problems for us by penetrating the LDC's, and Russia's capacity to do this will increase. We thus face a different sort of problem in interesting these countries in trading with the West. 7. Trading patterns are changing rapidly and we face a new kind of competition. 8. We cannot stop Russian efforts to expand its trade with other countries and it would be undesirable to try to stop them. Objectives . Mr. Behrman called attention to the objectives as listed on page 4 of the above-mentioned report. He noted particularly the following: To support the growth of free international trade and to maintain such trade on a fair and competitive basis. To accelerate the economic growth and maintain the economic preeminence of the US and its Allies. To promote sound and progressive economic and political growth of the newly emergent free nations and of friendly less-developed countries. To maintain the preeminence of the US and its Allies in technological and scientific research, development and production. These and the other objectives can be narrowed down to specific objectives which may point the way on techniques. To try to force the Soviet bloc to trade on our terms (i.e. on an open market basis). We can do this better by waiting for them to come to us than by our seeking them out. To provide an alternative to the LDC's to trading with the bloc. This might involve commodity stabilization agreements. To achieve a maximum agreement on controls by NATO countries on trade with the bloc. To establish a means of relieving the burden on the LDC's and others caused by any interdiction of trade coming out of situations such as that in Berlin. (This would apply to countries other than LDC's such as Italy, Greece, Iceland, Turkey, and Yugoslavia.) Techniques . Mr. Behrman then outlined a number of techniques which might be employed to obtain these objectives. 1. We should try again in NATO to get agreement on trading rules with the Soviet bloc. We should decide whether there is any hope of the Russians trading according to rules not incompatible with Western practices. 2. Commerce feels it is necessary to continue very strong pressure on COCOM to maximize the area of agreement or we will have to relax our unilateral controls. We must also consider whether there should be revision of Treasury controls of subsidiaries in Western Europe and whether we want to exercise control over them. These things must be examined, keeping in mind what the effect of such pressure and controls on subsidiaries would be on our relations with our Allies. 3. We should consider whether we are directing our control efforts in the wrong area. What Russia wants is capital equipment and technology, and we may have been putting too much emphasis on specific commodity imports rather than on technological data, including transfer of the latter from Western Europe. We may not have paid enough attention to component parts. We have perhaps not been sufficiently attuned to the matter of prototypes and samples. In considering this, Commerce thinks we need studies of the technological aspects of some industries and the uses made of technology in bloc countries. For example, Commerce found that a substantial part of the licenses for Yugoslavia are for electronic materials. We do not know what Yugoslavia is doing in electronics. Commerce has begun a study. 4. We should consider relaxing our unilateral controls of items not controlled multilaterally. 5. Tightening of enforcement. This has begun to be more important in terms of Cuba and Latin American countries. We are studying integrating all countries into one system instead of having classes of countries. We haven't had the same ability to check on shipments to Cuba as on those to the bloc. 6. A program to induce trade of LDC's to the West. This might be through a trading corporation or through preclusive buying. We should consider this even on a discriminatory basis if necessary. Discussion Should We Tighten or Relax Controls? Mr. Martin commented that there seemed to be some ambiguity in the presentation. On the one hand, it was implied we should extend controls across the board and on the other, that we should trade more with the bloc. Mr. Behrman explained that he did not mean across the board but that controls should be extended to some industrial items that are not so directly related to strategic uses. He was thinking of a broader base of controls on such things as plant prototypes which the bloc could later send to the LDC's. Mr. Behrman said that it seemed to him that we should get the maximum multilateral agreement we can on controls and then minimize the negative aspect of our controls, putting as much positive emphasis as we can on peaceful trade, such as consumer goods, and try to push through trade rules that open the way to this trade for us. In other words, we should tighten up on the technological data but loosen up in the other area. Trade Terms . With respect to Mr Behrman's remark about forcing the bloc to trade on free market terms, the question was asked whether we had not tried that. It was stated that this had been pushed at the end of World War II and discussed in 1956, but it did not get anywhere. Mr. Martin said that the State Department did a very thorough study on this last spring for the White House. 2 Our stumbling block has been how to persuade the Soviets to desert their dogmas to do this. Motivation for Soviet Trade . Mr. Fowler stressed on several occasions that trade with the bloc is not trading in the commercial sense, that we are dealing with a political system, and that the trade will have political consequences for the West. When we sell Russia packaged know-how in a non-military area, Russia can pull its people off this research and put them to work on missiles. Moreover, our trade enables the bloc to penetrate the LDC's more successfully. They use our prototypes to manufacture plants which they can then offer to the LDC's. Mr. Martin noted that while a great deal of Soviet interest in trade is political, there seems to be some interest in trade for economic benefits. Soviet economists seem to be leaning now to the view that they can benefit from foreign trade and see some future in it for their country. Mr. Ball said that so far as we can tell there is mixed motivation on the part of the USSR. The commercial is one component (particularly with Western Europe). Another component is economic warfare objectives; another, building up their war machine; and still another, improving their relations with the LDC's. In shaping up a policy we, in concert with our Western Allies, should try to see what we can do to counter the components which are not commercial in character but not counter those which are commercial. Attitude of our Allies . Mr. Ball observed that there are obvious limits to what we can obtain from the Western trading nations in the way of agreement on controls of trade with the bloc. It will be the least common denominator of their appreciation of the problem. If we talk about departing from the strategic concept and getting into a concept that has to be redefined as the mobilization base or something more than that, we have to consider the realities of getting agreement on it. Unilateral action by the US is hopeless. Mr. Martin said that when he was in London he talked with the bankers and they could not understand our viewpoint. They have been trading with Russia for years and think they are getting the best of the deal. They see nothing but a commercial proposition. British officials are coming here next month to talk with us about trade controls and they will take the attitude that since this is a missile age, the controls we are asking are no longer relevant. This City of London view is typical of the view all over Western Europe. Mr. Ball noted that the conditions on each side of the Atlantic are quite different. Our dependence on our exports is very low. We are concerned about our balance of payments, but we are not in as desperate straits as the UK where everything depends on trade. We must recognize that there is a difference in approach. To the UK, trade with the bloc is important to its ability to live. To the US, it is a drop in the bucket. To them, it is asking a lot to give up trade with the bloc; to us, it is nothing. Asked if the British did not realize that they would be building up the bloc so that it would compete with them in some instances, Mr. Martin said this did not trouble them. The UK has been doing business that way for centuries. It sold textile machinery until now it has to get out of textile manufacturing itself. The British just regard that as progress. Mr. Fowler asked whether the British recognize, apart from the military consequences of strategic items, that they enable the Soviets to beat us in the less-developed countries and the consequences of this from the free world standpoint. Mr. Martin replied that the British think that the Soviets can squeeze out what they need for this purpose in any case. Elements Which US Must Consider . Getting back to the basic issue of whether we should try to trade with the bloc or cut off trade, Mr. Martin said that we should weigh the value of what we get from the bloc and what the value of trade is to the bloc. Mr. Ball said two things should be considered: First, what does the Soviet Union get out of trade in terms of technical knowhow and goods? Second, what advantage does it get out of trade as pure economic warfare—the ability to disrupt markets and to penetrate the economies of other countries? There is some advantage to keeping these two things separate as they are really quite different. Mr. Martin cited Secretary Rusk's thinking (as stated to Kitchin Committee) 3 that it is important to keep the channels of trade open as a possible means of reorienting the attitudes of the Russian people. If our consumer goods go to Russia, they will create a greater demand in the USSR for better products. Mr. Fowler said that if there were a central strategy board representing the West and acting in concert and taking these and other things into consideration, he would feel more secure about developing more trade with the bloc. We need a coordinated free world approach to the problem of trade and economic relations with the Sino-Soviet bloc or with any of its individual components. Significance of the Sino-Soviet Situation . Mr. Martin called attention to the fact that there may be a very great significance in the present Sino-Soviet relations. The split looks deep and it may be long-term. We have not drawn conclusions as to what this means for economic policy as yet, but it probably opens up some trade possibilities of political significance. We should be sufficiently flexible to influence this situation in the US interest. Mr. Ball said that we will probably want to take a look soon at policy on trade with China. Joseph D. Coppock 4 Executive Secretary * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 59, E Files: FRC 71 A 6682, Item 53, ICFEP, January 10, 1962, Problems of Trade with Communist Bloc. Secret. Presumably drafted by Ruth S. Gold, who is listed as the Recording Secretary on the list of participants. 1 Dated January 2; a copy is filed with the source text. 2 Reference presumably is to the paper entitled “US Economic Relations with the Soviet Bloc;” for text, see vol. V, Document 71 . 3 Reference is to Secretary of State Rusk's testimony before the House Select Committee on Export Control in executive session on October 25, 1961. Portions of his testimony relating to possible economic countermeasures in the Berlin crisis are quoted in telegram 3230 to Paris, December 6, 1961. (Department of State, Central Files, 460.009/12-661) A copy of his statement is Tab 1 to the memorandum from Kohler (EUR) and Martin (E) to McGhee (M), January 25. (Ibid., S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Standing Group—January 26, 1962) 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 305. Record of Actions Taken at the National Security Council Standing Group Meeting 305. Record of Actions Taken at the National Security Council Standing Group Meeting Source Washington, January 26, 1962. [Here follows Item 1 on Iran.] Item 2— Status of NSC 5704/3, “U.S. Economic Defense Policy,” approved September 16, 1957 , 1 and NSC Action No. 2304-b, approved October 5, 1960 2 (Mr. Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, was present for this Item.) (a) Noted that the Secretary of State will initiate a review of the subject policy paper with a view to its possible recision and replacement by a new policy document. (b) Noted that the Secretary of State will circulate the Presidential decisions taken following a recent meeting on export trade policy with respect to licensing exports to the Soviet Bloc. 3 [Here follow Item 3 on Proposal of Communist China to Buy U.S. Wheat, Item 4 on Albania, and Item 5 on Laos.] * Source: Department of State,S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Standing Group—January 26, 1962. Secret. No record of the NSC Standing Group meeting has been found. 1 Text in Foreign Relations, 1955-1957, vol. X, pp. 495 - 498 . 2 Text ibid., 1958-1960, vol. IV, pp. 213 - 214 . 3 See footnote 1, Document 306 . 306. Letter From Secretary of Commerce Hodges to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) 306. Letter From Secretary of Commerce Hodges to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) Source Washington, February 14, 1962. Dear George : This refers to your letter of February 6 about our policy in connection with export control of licenses to the Soviet Bloc. 1 I think your letter goes much too far in indicating that there was an agreement which would return us to judging license applications under criteria related only to the Bloc's war-making potential. You refer to a meeting with the President on January 24. George, you know this meeting, which was not over one minute's duration, did not lay any facts before the President, except that you and I wanted to get his quick thinking on whether we should relax our controls in view of the apparent easing of tensions with the Soviet. I confirmed to the President later the following paragraph: "Our Administration's policy on export licenses to these areas is still not as clear-cut as I'd like to see it, but following your suggestion the other day (meaning January 24), we are relenting somewhat on the tight scrutiny we had been employing for the last few months.” I do not think that this gives any reason for your taking and circulating it that we had agreed with the President on any new approaches. May I suggest that we review completely the criteria which should guide us. Meanwhile, I am still holding up certain requests for licenses on carbon black, tire cord and fabrics, and other items recently recommended for approval by the ACEP. Since the responsibility for making the final decision on licenses rests with the Secretary of Commerce, I would like to say that I believe the Secretary or his representative should be present when any discussions are had on the policy affecting export licenses, so that we can be of one mind as to the criteria employed under our controls and, equally important, as to what is said and done publicly. We must keep in mind that we publicize these licenses daily, and remember that the two investigating committees of Congress are maintaining close scrutiny of these lists. In this connection, I would like to say that before we change radically any approval of licenses, it would be our idea to notify in writing both of the congressional committees as to what we are doing. Sincerely yours, Luther H. Hodges * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Trade Policy, East-West Trade. Secret. Copies were sent to the President and the Secretary of Defense. 1 In his February 8 letter to Hodges, Ball stated that the NSC Standing Group had agreed on January 26 “that it would be helpful if I were to set forth and circulate the decision taken by the President in the meeting which I arranged with him and which you attended January 24, 1962 following a meeting of the Export Control Review Board on January 23. In the meeting with the President it was agreed that the decision of August 25 to tighten up in the application of the strategic criteria had been carried farther than the President wished at this time. He felt that the type of proposed denials under review by the Export Control Board indicated a trend toward the application of export control criteria which went farther than he thought desirable.” Ball suggested that “we should return to the testing of license applications against the agreed strategic criteria, i.e. criteria related to the bloc's war-making potential only, as was done prior to August 25.” (Ibid.) No other record of the January 23 meeting has been found. Regarding the meeting with President Kennedy on January 24, Hodges stated that “the President has instructed us to ease up on the rather tight controls we have had on the items going to the Soviet Bloc, leaving the judgment and decision as to what is to be approved up to us, of course. He intimated that the situation was somewhat improved, and that we might safely, until further notice, pursue this policy.” (Memorandum from Hodges to Behrman, January 26; Washington National Records Center,RG 40, Department of Commerce, Executive Secretariat Files: FRC 70 A 6114, Office of the Secretary, Alphabetical Folder U-V) 307. Current Economic Developments 307. Current Economic Developments Source Washington, February 27, 1962. Issue No. 644 US-UK HOLD EAST-WEST TRADE TALKS Representatives of the US and UK held bilateral talks on East-West trade controls in Washington February 19-23. Discussion centered around interpretation of the embargo criteria of the Coordinating Committee on Export Control (COCOM). The British put forth three principles which they would like to have accepted in the interest of uniform interpretation of the COCOM embargo criteria. Application of these principles, in the British view, would lead to a reduction of at least 50% in the coverage of International List I (embargo). The British were very anxious to have further technical discussion on their proposed interpretive principles as they applied to particular items, despite lack of full agreement on the principles themselves. The US finally agreed to participate in more detailed talks in London the week of March 19 on the understanding that both sides would be prepared to give a preview of their probable positions for the 1962 COCOM List Review which begins in early May. In addition to discussing COCOM issues, the US took the opportunity to make additional representations for UK support of our proposed embargo on wide-diameter pipe and related oil pipe equipment which is now before NATO. UK Wants List Reduced The discussions began with an exchange of views on Western objectives in economic relations with the Soviet bloc. The UK expressed agreement that certain aspects of East-West trade should be approached with caution and that certain controls are needed. These controls, however, must continue to make practical sense in light of the current assumptions of nuclear war and the latest estimates of the bloc's economic capacity. The British representative said that his Government was prepared to accept the existing criteria and was not raising any question about the COCOM Atomic Energy List, Munitions List or the existing arrangements for military and commercial security; but the UK Government believes that International List I is out of date in important respects as it now stands and could be substantially reduced both as to number of items and their scope. The British noted the considerable differences in approach between our two governments at the last COCOM List Review and expressed a desire to avoid a repetition of such a dispute at the List Review commencing in May. The British argued that, in light of their domestic political pressures, it was necessary for COCOM controls to be “defensible in terms of the latest strategic thinking which included general and lively insistence that a healthy economy is the cornerstone of our defenses.” In this regard, the UK suggested three principles for interpretation of the strategic criteria. First, the British believe that the common pattern of use of a product, rather than the alleged pattern of use in the Soviet bloc, should determine whether it is to be regarded as of principally military application. A particular type of equipment should not be embargoed merely because its use in the bloc is believed to be mainly military. The bloc use may be predominantly military because in these countries military needs come first and there may not be enough of the equipment to meet civilian requirements as well. The only logical way to judge a case, in the British view, is by reference to the pattern of use in industrialized countries generally. An example of this principle is the use of electronic computers. The second principle the British advanced is that the importance of an item should be taken into account as well as its description in evaluating it against the criteria. What really matters is the current significance of the item in waging war or in producing military equipment. The type of thing the British have in mind here is jacketed containers for storage of liquefied gases. Their final principle is that the control of equipment should be relaxed when such equipment has been in normal commercial use for so long that the “know-how” could be considered common property. The British believe there are a number of items, especially in the electronics category, which become less and less important strategically as commercial uses grow. After a certain period, say two to four years, varying with the type of equipment, any embargo loses its justification. US Reshapes Principles The US was able to agree to a considerable extent with the UK position on the second and third of the interpretative principles proposed but not on the first principle. We informed the British that we would be disposed to rephrase the three principles suggested along the following lines: a) that the pattern of use of a product in the Soviet bloc should determine whether it is to be regarded as having principally military applications: where the pattern in the bloc is obscure, the pattern of use in the most nearly comparable Western experience should be the guide; b) that COCOM should avoid the listing of items which, while meeting the criteria, are of minimal strategic importance to the bloc; c) that the items which are controlled solely for reasons of COCOM criterion (b) should be re-examined periodically to establish whether they should continue to be embargoed and whether the use of a time period cut-off is appropriate. Following discussion of individual points made by the US, the British representative reached the conclusion that the UK could agree with much of what we said. But there were still a number of unresolved issues. We do not believe that we can prepare for the contingency of nuclear war to the exclusion of extended large-scale conventional warfare. Later high-level discussion of this important policy issue through other channels is planned. The US could not go along with the British view that the pattern of use of an item in the Western industrialized countries rather than the possible use in the Soviet bloc should determine military use under the present COCOM criteria. Finally, we could not defend anything approaching a 50% reduction in the number of embargoed items on List I. The US representative noted that we are approaching the 1962 COCOM List Review as an “up-dating” of the list to reflect advances in technology and changes in the Soviet bloc supply situation as it bears on military production. We assume that this is likely to result in a few additions, a few deletions, and possibly somewhat more numerous redefinitions which cannot be clearly characterized as one or the other. This approach is not, in our thinking, different in concept from that which governed in the last two annual COCOM reviews. While we do not visualize a major extension of the COCOM list on the one hand, neither do we contemplate a major contradiction as proposed by the UK. Pipe Embargo Discussed Apart from the COCOM list talks, discussions were also held on the US proposal now before NATO for an embargo on oil pipe and equipment. Emphasis was placed on the potential effectiveness of such an embargo since both sides agreed that differences in the assessment of the military importance of the pipeline system rested on differing concepts of the types of possible warfare. An agreed US-UK-French military position on the significance of Soviet pipelines is expected to be reached in talks beginning March 12 to develop annual intelligence estimates for NATO planning. The British argued that a pipe embargo would not be effective since by putting aside the construction of gas lines, which represent about half of Soviet pipe requirements, the Soviets could finish oil lines from their own resources without delay. Our representative replied that data on Soviet pipe production were too sketchy; that we should not assume the Soviets would abandon already begun gas lines; that major adjustment of planning always resulted in delays; and that the inclusion of pumps, valves, fittings, and other related equipment in the embargo would increase Soviet difficulties and the probability of delay. We informed the British that we feel strongly about a pipe embargo and thought that other NATO countries were prepared to agree to such an embargo if the UK changed its position. The British representative promised to report our views to his Government but doubted that the British position will change. He understood that the British Ministers were not prepared to accept any additions to the COCOM embargo list unless reasons therefor are especially strong. [Here follow articles on unrelated matters.] * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 59, E/CBA/REP Files: FRC 72 A 6248, Current Economic Developments. Secret. The source text comprises pp. 1-4 of the issue. 308. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Trezise) to Secretary of State Rusk 308. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Trezise) to Secretary of State Rusk Source Washington, April 20, 1962. SUBJECT Problems with Commerce on Export Control Policy and Operations (Meeting with Secretary Hodges April 24, 1962) We have had continuing differences with the Department of Commerce on export control matters for close to a year. These differences are making it increasingly difficult to conduct day-to-day business on an efficient basis. Significant policy divergences are involved. These divergences were reviewed briefly with the President on January 24 when it was agreed that the tightened application of the strategic criteria undertaken in August 1961 could be eased. The Department of Commerce has not, however, made any significant change in its pattern of export licensing actions. Thus there appears to be frustration on all sides; Secretary Hodges would like to operate under a tighter control policy, but, since he does not have agreement on it, has done nothing but to hold cases he thinks should be denied; the Commerce staff and the interagency advisory committee, operating under the existing policy guidelines, continue to recommend approval for cases which they know Secretary Hodges will not approve; American businessmen are frequently unable to get a decision of any kind; and the State Department is left in the difficult situation of representing to other countries a policy which does not exist in fact. These problems fall into two parts—policy issues and licensing case questions. I. Policy Issues The basic policy issue is that Commerce would replace the present long-standing policy of selective export controls with the policy of economic warfare against the Soviet bloc going far beyond the control of strategic exports. Commerce has made its views explicit in a proposed revision of the present economic defense policy (NSC 5704/3). The National Security Council Standing Group on January 26, 1962 1 assigned to the Department of State rather than the Department of Commerce the responsibility for initiating a review of NSC 5704/3 (Tab A). The draft State Department report to the Standing Group is at Tab B. The Commerce revision is at Tab D and NSC 5704/3 is at Tab C. 2 While the Department has recognized the need to provide on a contingent basis for tightening trade controls against the Soviet bloc, in collaboration with our allies, in response to specific Soviet actions or threatened actions, this is quite a different thing from embracing a policy of continuous economic warfare. To do the latter would almost completely ignore the positive side of our East-West policy—to seek through peaceful means to develop as broad a range of contacts as possible between the Soviet bloc nations and the West, to encourage greater independence of action on the part of the Soviet-dominated countries of Eastern Europe, and to increase American influence in that area. A policy of selective trade relations has contributed and still can contribute to the attainment of this aim of penetration in the countries of the Soviet bloc. The actions that would follow from the Commerce Department's revised statement of economic defense policy would, in the unlikely event the policy were supported by Western industrialized countries, serve instead to tighten and to extend economic interdependence within the Soviet bloc by further limiting relationships between the bloc countries and the free societies of the West. The effect would be to lessen the stake of the Eastern European countries in relaxing tensions with the West. A policy of very greatly expanded trade controls would seem particularly pointless in light of repeated intelligence evaluations that even with the cooperation of the European industrial states and Japan such a policy would have only a comparatively limited immediate impact on the Soviet bloc and a marginal effect on its long-term growth. Within the basic policy divergence, there are several specific issues: There are differences with respect to the present strategic criteria, Commerce wishing to reinterpret and amend them to bring a wider range of items, including clearly non-strategic items, under embargo. Such a change would greatly complicate our negotiating problems in COCOM. Commerce would also propose to follow a general rule of denying U.S. exports “regardless of whether it is demonstrated that the same kinds of items are available to the Soviet bloc from other countries”. This policy would penalize American businessmen and the American economy without having any impact on the Soviet bloc. Along the same lines, Commerce wants to tighten U.S. controls over advanced technology, even in the non-strategic area, including controls over its use by friendly countries. Finally, Commerce proposes greatly tightening controls over trade with Poland presumably based on the assumption that Polish assurances concerning re-exports cannot be considered valid. II. Licensing Case Questions The particular cases which have been held by the Secretary of Commerce are illustrative of the policy differences described above. These cases fall into three broad categories—cases related to the tire industry (Tab G), cases related to the petrochemical industry (Tab H), and cases involving technical data (Tab I). They were all discussed at the Advisory Committee on Export Policy (ACEP) meeting of February 8. In a number of cases the ACEP Chairman, with the concurrence of all members, recommended approval. In other cases the ACEP Chairman deferred recommendation pending clarification of the petrochemical policy and of the technical data policy (in actual fact pending review of basic economic defense policy). The Secretary of Commerce, however, has not yet authorized the issuance of export licenses for the cases recommended for approval; nor has further action been taken on the cases de-ferred for policy clarification. Since some of these cases date back as far as August 1961, there have been increasing complaints from American businessmen over their inability to get action of any kind. Subsequent to the February 8 ACEP meeting a number of other cases falling into the same three categories have come up for discussion in the Operating Committee (OC). Final decision on these cases should be consistent with the action taken on the earlier cases in the respective categories, and these cases have therefore been held for ACEP or ECRB (Export Control Review Board) consideration. State has likewise appealed denial recommendations on two other cases not falling into any of the foregoing categories. One involves interpretation by Commerce of the ECRB decision of January 23, regarding pulp and paper machinery, in a manner broader than was believed intended by the ECRB (Tab J). The other involves denial of a commodity of a non-strategic type simply because other types in the same chemical family are strategic, an action inconsistent with established licensing guidelines (Tab K). In all cases correct application of the established licensing guidelines (Tab E) would result in approval. * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 460.509/4-2062. Secret. Drafted by Robert B. Wright (E/MDC) on April 20. Transmitted through Ball. The date is handwritten on the source text. 1 See Document 305 . 2 Tab A is the NSC Standing Group Record of Action; Tab C, NSC 5704/3, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1955-1957, vol. X, pp. 495 - 498 . Tabs B and D-K are not printed. 309. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to the National Security Council 309. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to the National Security Council Source Washington, July 10, 1962. SUBJECT Review of Export Control Policy The Department of State and Commerce have had recurring differences during the past year over the licensing of exports to the European Communist bloc. There are now pending and we are in disagreement with regard to a number of applications for licenses to ship commodities and equipment to the USSR and to other Eastern European countries. Neither these applications as a group nor our total trade with the bloc are quantitatively important. The dollar value of the goods represented by the applications is approximately $2,400,000. Our total sales to the European Soviet bloc in 1961 came to $133,000,000, of which sales to the USSR amounted to $42,600,000. Nevertheless, trade is an instrument of our over-all policy toward the bloc and export licensing should be consistent with that policy. I believe that the pending license applications should be approved. The articles and equipment covered by the applications qualify for approval under our policy and the licensing criteria developed under that policy (see Enclosures 1 and 2). That is, either they are non-strategic by our own definitions or the items themselves and the know-how involved are available to the Soviet bloc in the same or substantially the same form from Western Europe or Japan. If we were to deny the applications, it would have negligible consequences for the material strength of the Soviet bloc. There is another and I think a decisive point involved. Denial of these applications would work at cross purposes with our attempt to establish sober communications with the USSR and the Eastern European bloc. The underlying premise for our export control policy has been, of course, that trade is one of the few means for influencing the peoples of the Soviet Union toward a national attitude that will tend to make the USSR a more responsible and peaceful member of the international community. I developed this premise at some length before Representative Kitchin's Subcommittee last October. I think that it remains the soundest basis for export control policy. This is all the more so because the Russians appear to attach a psychological importance to our export control procedures that is quite disproportionate to the small amounts at issue. There is a tendency, unfounded as it may seem to us, for the Soviets to view our operations in the field of trade as indicators of our over-all attitudes. At a time when we are engaged in a series of diplomatic discussions with the Soviets about Berlin and other matters, nothing is to be gained by giving the Russians a misleading impression of our point of view about the kind of relationship we hope ultimately to have with them. On the contrary, so long as the Soviets are in a mood for rational conversation, it is important that we avoid actions in trade control policy or elsewhere which seem to the Soviets to belie our expressed readiness to maintain normal contacts of all kinds with the USSR as long as these are possible. Ambassador Thompson during his recent visit expressed the opinion that Soviet policy may now be at a crossroads, that it can move either toward detente or toward increased pressure against the West, and that our export control policy may well have a bearing upon the Soviet choice. The Ambassador recognized that we cannot attempt to affect Soviet decisions at the expense of our vital interests. We may not be able to affect the outcome at all. But he feels, and I agree, that we should not risk tipping the balance by actions in matters that are not otherwise of genuine strategic significance. Our friends and allies are entirely opposed to an increase in the severity of existing trade controls at this time. As a practical matter, domestic political forces in Western Europe and Japan leave the governments there with little ability to strengthen the control mechanism. The United States should therefore have no illusions that restrictions by us would be effective in preventing such trade between the Soviet bloc and the rest of the free world. I believe that the recent Congressional discussion in the course of extending the Export Control Act was on the whole more helpful than otherwise. The amendments that were adopted do not require that we give up any of the flexibility we have had in operating our export control policy (Enclosure 3 analyzes the several amendments in the light of the Congressional discussion). 1 Congressman Kitchin's amendment, which would have created a presumption of denial of export license applications, was revised and in practical effect reversed in conference. This was at the specific request of the Executive Branch which objected strongly to the change of policy that the amendment would have required. In order to clarify our export control procedures for the future, and in line with the request of the National Security Council Standing Group Meeting of January 26, 1962, I have had reviewed our economic defense policy as set forth in NSC 5704/3. I believe that this policy continues to be consistent with and applicable to our objectives. I have taken the opportunity of this review, however, to propose simpler language and so far as possible to bring policy up to date with the current situation. The resulting redraft is shown as Enclosure 1. I have also attached as Enclosure 2 the Statement of “Criteria and Licensing Policy” which has been the agreed basis for day to day decisions at the staff level in the Departments of State, Commerce and Defense. I recommend that the statement of economic defense policy, and the licensing criteria and policy that apply to it, be affirmed. At the same time, I recommend that the license applications which, under existing criteria and policy, have been recommended for approval at the staff level now be granted. Dean Rusk Enclosure 1 2 UNITED STATES ECONOMIC DEFENSE POLICY General Policy U.S. Economic Defense Policy must be viewed as an instrument of our overall policy toward the bloc and of our total national strategy. Furthermore, it should incorporate the major governing elements of security trade control policy as it has been defined by the present Administration. These governing elements are as follows: 1. The security of the United States and the Free World countries continues to be threatened by the Sino-Soviet bloc. We thus should apply against the bloc such economic defense measures as will retard the growth of the bloc's war-making potential and reduce its unity. There can be flexibility in determining the degree of severity of the controls, but it is important to retain controls in such form that they can be available for use as an instrument of policy during a crisis situation, and provide a means of putting pressure on Soviet bloc leaders when their demands become intolerable and of forcing them, short of a resort to arms, to realize our determination and the need to reconsider their own course of action. 2. While it is necessary to maintain a system of economic defense measures, it is equally necessary to maintain or expand such contacts with the USSR and countries of the bloc as will influence them over the long-run to become more responsible and peaceful members of the community of nations. Trade relations are an important channel of communication with bloc countries. The courses we take should be based on the assumption that the maintenance of commercial contacts and trade between the Free World and the European Soviet bloc may have positive advantages during this period of tension and watchfulness, and that such trade should be encouraged except where it would directly increase the military strength of the bloc. The decision either to restrict or to promote such trade should be coordinated with decisions in other fields of our foreign relations so that foreign trade policy may serve our overall foreign policy goal. 3. There are forces making for fragmentation within the bloc. When an opportunity presents itself, as in the case of Poland, trade and economic relations can become an active instrument for the promotion of United States policy interests in relation to bloc cohesion. Economic defense measures should therefore be applied on a selective basis to support United States policy with respect to encouraging and assisting the bloc countries of Eastern Europe to achieve increased self-determination and more active pursuit of their own national interests. 4. To be of greatest effectiveness, the economic defense system should represent the cooperative efforts of the principal trading nations and should be coordinated with the larger system of military and political alliances. In order to be realistic and effective, the economic defense measures which the United States should adopt should be coordinated to the extent possible with those of Free World countries. In the trade control field our allies are interested, generally speaking, in limiting controls to commodities of reasonably clear and direct military significance and entertain a strong reluctance to enlarge the area of restrictions. This fact rules out economic warfare except at a time of high crisis. 5. The system of trade control should be selective and should concentrate on the denial of commodities or technology which would directly increase the net military strength of the bloc, narrowly defined. The Soviet economy is at an advanced stage of development with a virtually independent military capability, and we cannot hope to erect an absolute barrier to Soviet advances in military production. We can make it more difficult or more time consuming for the Soviets to make certain kinds of progress. From this standpoint, the trade control operation is closely akin to the basic objective of our national defense policies—namely, the preservation and if possible the widening of our margin of military advantage. Based on the foregoing principles the courses of action to be followed in the export control field are outlined below. Courses of Action 6. Seek to maintain a multilateral security trade control structure and control measures developed thereunder, making appropriate and timely adjustments in those measures to reflect changes in the military vulnerabilities within the Sino-Soviet bloc as a whole and within its members, or to improve cooperation and increase effectiveness; and continue our efforts for better understanding and support of the multilateral control objectives, criteria, and procedures essential to an effective export control program. 7. Seek to maintain and, as necessary, extend the bilateral arrangements with Free World countries (non-CG countries) to obtain support for multilaterally agreed controls. 8. Maintain toward the European Soviet bloc United States export controls over multilaterally agreed items and over such other materials, equipment, technology and services as can be so unilaterally controlled by the United States as to achieve a worthwhile adverse impact on the war potential of the European Soviet bloc; and take all appropriate meas-ures as will effectively enforce these controls and prevent their frustration. 9. Approve, as a general rule, the shipment from the United States to the European Soviet bloc of commodities not controlled under the foregoing paragraph, and, where appropriate in support of U.S. policy, remove the requirement of specific licenses for such shipments to selected countries or to the entire European Soviet bloc. 10. Make appropriate and timely unilateral adjustments and seek appropriate multilateral adjustment in the scope and severity of controls maintained toward the bloc countries of Eastern Europe on a selective basis in line with the objectives of encouraging and assisting these countries to achieve increased self-determination and greater pursuit of their own national interests. 11. Continue to seek the adoption of effective measures to enforce the agreed scope and severity of the multilateral controls. Increase the scope and effectiveness of multilateral exchanges and cooperation in the enforcement field. 12. Seek a close association with NATO and other security alliances on export controls, and where feasible, obtain their consideration and advice on appropriate economic security problems toward the end of promoting Western cohesiveness and building an instrument that can be used in a crisis situation as evidence of Western determination in the face of Communist pressure. 13. Maintain the current level of United States unilateral export, import and financial controls applied against Communist China, North Korea and North Vietnam and take all appropriate actions effectively to enforce those controls toward Communist China, North Korea and North Vietnam and to prevent their frustration. At such time as it is judged to be in the United States interest to do so, the controls toward Communist China should be revised. Enclosure 2 3 CRITERIA AND LICENSING POLICY With particular reference to the Soviet bloc, the ACEP structure was used to establish the criteria according to which items would be classified as strategic. Under presently agreed criteria, an item is considered eligible for strategic listing if it falls within one of the following classes: (a) Materials, equipment, services and technical data which are designed especially for or which, in the judgment of the U.S., are intended or expected to be used by the Sino-Soviet bloc principally for the development, production or utilization of arms, ammunition, implements of war (including BW and CW) and atomic energy materials. (b) Technical data and materials and equipment which incorporate advanced technology or unique technological know-how, the acquisition of which may be reasonably expected to permit a significant advance in Sino-Soviet bloc military-industrial technology over the level of development already achieved or expected to be achieved within the following two years; or (c) Materials, equipment and services for which the Sino-Soviet bloc has a deficiency which is critical in relation to its present and future military-industrial capabilities and which it is not expected to overcome within the following two years; and technical data (incorporated or unincorporated) the acquisition of which would be significant in remedying such deficiency. Similarly, licensing policy applicable to individual commodities or classes of commodities, including technology, has been determined along detailed lines, but these can broadly be summarized as follows: (a) Commodities, including technology, found to meet one or more of the strategic criteria, and under international embargo, have applied to them a licensing policy of “presumption for denial”. (b) Commodities, including technology, found to meet one or more of the strategic criteria and not under international embargo but whose denial by the United States unilaterally would or might impose a worthwhile adverse impact on the war potential of the Sino-Soviet bloc likewise have applied to them a licensing policy of “presumption for denial”. (c) Commodities, including technology, found to meet one or more of the strategic criteria but whose denial by the United States alone would not impose a worthwhile adverse impact on the war potential of the Sino-Soviet bloc have applied to them a licensing policy of “presumption for approval”. (d) Commodities, including technology, found not to meet one or more of the strategic criteria have applied to them a licensing policy of “presumption for approval”. In determining final action on an application, of course other factors are taken into consideration which might lead to denial of a license for a commodity under “presumption for approval”, or vice versa. * Source: Johnson Library, Vice President's Security File, NSC, East-West Trade, July 10, 1962. Secret. Carl Kaysen, the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, transmitted this paper along with Hodges' letter to the President ( Document 310 ), a memorandum from Rusk to the National Security Council ( Document 311 ), and a memorandum from Hodges to the National Security Council ( Document 312 ), with an explanatory memorandum to the President, July 17, stating, among other things, that the Departments of State, Commerce, and Defense had reached agreement on policy language, but that Rusk and Hodges disagreed on policy and on the meaning of the language. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings, 1962, 503rd NSC Meeting) 1 Not printed, but see footnote 1, Document 310 . 2 Secret. 3 Confidential. 310. Letter From Secretary of Commerce Hodges to President Kennedy 310. Letter From Secretary of Commerce Hodges to President Kennedy Source Washington, July 10, 1962. Dear Mr. President : The recent passage of the Export Control Act 1 calls for a reassessment of the use of export controls to achieve U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives. Two major changes were written into the Act: That the United States should make every effort to obtain maximum agreement among its military Allies on expanded export controls; That the control system should take into account the “economic significance” of exports to the Bloc. The first provision could imply the use of the entire gamut of political, military and economic persuasions to achieve maximum controls. The second could lead to a virtual embargo of exports in that almost any additional goods provided to the Soviet Bloc will per se add to its economic potential. The central questions are whether and how the export control system can contribute to U.S. national security; the answers depend on the nature of the threat: 1. If the Soviet Bloc poses a military threat to the Free World, as U.S. policy currently assumes especially in periphery countries around the Bloc, certainly the maximum agreement with our military Allies on trade controls is desirable. If the Bloc poses a threat to the Free World through either economic penetration in the less-developed countries or a more rapid economic growth within the Bloc which permits a commitment of increased resources to aggressive acts of military, political, economic, cultural, or propagandistic nature, then a control system restricting trade which will add to this potential is certainly desirable. Therefore, the use of our economic and political power to obtain maximum agreement on expanded controls by the Allies would be in order, as the new Act urges. Obviously, maximum agreement would not mean total embargo, for many items contribute so little to economic potentials that controls would be too costly and unwieldy to impose. Rather, the objective should be the maximum delay of growth of the Soviet Bloc at the least cost to other objectives. This greater control should be imposed over advanced technical data, prototypes, on entire plants which break significant economic bottlenecks, and on capital equipment which substantially reduces the drain on research and development by the Bloc. Little control would be imposed on consumer goods, which would directly raise the standard of living of the Bloc and would continually demonstrate to their people that such amenities come from the Free World. What capital equipment or technical services are exported should be done so as to increase the people's understanding of the source of these items. 2. If, on the other hand, controls by the United States which are not concurred in by its Allies and which are over and above the current military-oriented controls have no appreciable adverse impact on the economic potential of the Bloc, balance of payments and other considerations would suggest that we abandon all controls other than those imposed under multilateral arrangements (COCOM). It would then be desirable to seek the maximum outlets for the sales of non-military goods in the Bloc in competition with other Free World suppliers. The means of increasing such sales would include an exchange of Trade Missions, the establishment of a Trade Center in Moscow, the signing of a bilateral trade agreement, and other trade promotion devices. If this approach were to be taken, it would obviously be to our advantage to negotiate our new posture with the Bloc so as to obtain concessions for the relaxation of our controls and the introduction of trade promotion arrangements. Adoption of the first approach—that of persuading our Allies to invoke tighter controls—would pose no serious problems with Congress, but it raises most difficult problems of negotiation with our Allies. Our intelligence suggests that our Allies would take hardly any step in the direction of economic defense measures, and our current negotiations at COCOM demonstrate that they desire to relax current controls. However, the American business community is not convinced that the European business community is eager for an uncontrolled expansion of trade with the Bloc. The assertion by the European businessman that he sells to the Bloc because of government policy and that by European government officials that they cannot control trade because of pressure from the business interests simply do not jibe. We need considerably better intelligence than we have to determine the type and weight of tactics needed to persuade our Allies to become more restrictive. Once this intelligence is gathered, we could determine more accurately the cost in other economic and political relationships with our Allies of pressing for tighter controls. Also, only after a strong attempt in this direction, could we convincingly demonstrate to Congress that the failure to expand controls did not rest on the shoulders of the Administration. If the second approach—that of relaxing controls—is adopted, our Allies will find us more compatible bedfellows but also more competitive. The Congress on the other hand, and probably the public, would be ill-satisfied with an unexplained adoption of a policy which apparently does not coincide with the intention expressed in the Export Control Act. Therefore, the best possible explanation will be needed of the proposition that controls over non-military items contribute little or nothing to national security or foreign policy objectives of the United States and/or the collateral proposition that economic cooperation with the Bloc (and economic competition in third areas) will gradually mellow the Bloc and draw her into closer association with the Free World. The present policy of control over items contributing to the military-industrial mobilization base of the Bloc plus unilateral controls by the United States accords with neither of the above approaches and leaves both the Congress (and some of the public) and our foreign Allies (and some U.S. businessmen) dissatisfied. It also possibly gains nothing in our relations with the Bloc. It therefore seems to me that we have chosen the least potentially successful policy—that of seeking neither maximum adverse impact on the Soviet economy nor the maximum economic trading contacts with the Bloc for commercial and political advantage. Once the decision is made on these basic approaches, a series of pending cases (including $4.5 million of technical data and equipment in production of tires and petrochemicals and other items and $43 million in automotive machine tolls) and procedural questions will be resolved. Respectfully, Luther H. Hodges * Source Jonson Library, Vice President's Security File, NSC, East-West Trade, July 10, 1962. Secret. Transmitted to the President along with Rusk's memoranda to the National Security Council ( Documents 309 and 311 ) and Holdges' memorandum to the National Security Council ( Document 312 ) with an explanatory memorandum by Kaysen, July 17. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings, 1962, 503rd NSC Meeting) 1 Export Control Act of 1949, as amended by P.L. 87-515, approved on July 1, 1962; 76 Stat. 127; 50 USC App. 2021-2032. Airgram CA-298 to Belgrade, July 9, summarized the amendments as follows: 1) amendment to Section 1 of the Act broadened the scope of controls to exports of economic significance as well as those of military significance; 2) amendment to Section 2 called for U.S. cooperation with its allies to the maximum extent possible, and the formulation of a unified trading policy by the non-Communist world; 3) amendment to Section 2 called for conduct of U.S. trade with Communist-dominated countries so as to further U.S. national security and policy objectives; 4) amendment to Section 3, a compromise amendment, required a finding to deny a license, while the original proposal required a finding to grand one; and 5) amendment to Section 5 made willful violation of the Act a felony rather than a misdemeanor, and increased penalties accordingly. In this form the Act was extended for 3 years. (Department of State, Central Files, 400.119/7-962) 311. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to the National Security Council 311. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to the National Security Council Source Washington, July 16, 1962. SUBJECT Addendum to Memorandum of July 10 on Export Control Policy In discussions with the Departments of Commerce and Defense occasioned by my memorandum of July 10, 1962 for the National Security Council, it was agreed that the restatement of United States Economic Defense Policy should more explicitly reflect the recent changes in the language of the Export Control Act. I would therefore recommend that the paragraph in enclosure 1, which has the agreement of the Departments of Commerce and Defense, be substituted for Paragraph 8 under Courses of Action in the Statement of United States Economic Defense Policy (enclosure 1 to my memorandum of July 10). The Department of Commerce considered that it was necessary to retain the clause in the present NSC 5704/3 providing for unilateral U.S. control to “serve other U.S. policy objectives.” It is understood that this clause is intended to cover those few special cases (such as scrap iron) on which we have a “moral” position of not participating in exports to the Soviet bloc, irrespective of what other countries do, although the item is not otherwise covered by the language of the enclosed paragraph. It also seems desirable to carry through with the “economic potential” concept set forth in the revised paragraph in enclosure 1 by adding a fourth criterion to the “Criteria and Licensing Policy” (enclosure 2 to my memorandum of July 10). Such a new criterion is included as enclosure 2. The criterion covers actions such as that undertaken to deny pipe and pipeline equipment in an attempt to limit the Soviet potential for disrupting the pattern of free world oil supply. Thus this new criterion is intended to carry out the intent of Congress to assure that U.S. exports do not contribute to Soviet economic potentialities which could be damaging to the national security and welfare. This new criterion has likewise been agreed by Commerce and Defense. Finally, while no change seems necessary in criterion (b) of the “Criteria and Licensing Policy” relating to technical data, there is agreement that special effort should be used to assure that controls over technical data adequately protect the national security and welfare. Dean Rusk 1 Enclosure 1 8. Maintain toward the European Soviet bloc U.S. export controls over multilaterally agreed items and over such other materials, equipment, supplies, technical data and services—including plants, proc-esses, designs, production equipment and production materials—as will make a significant contribution to the military or economic potential of the Soviet bloc, or can effectively serve other United States policy objectives judged by the U.S. control authorities to warrant the use of unilateral controls; provide for denial of all such items the export of which would prove to be detrimental to the national security and welfare of the United States; and take all appropriate measures as will effectively enforce these controls and prevent their frustration by or through non-Communist countries. Enclosure 2 d. Materials, equipment and particularly technical data making a significant contribution to Soviet bloc activities which disrupt essential free world economic arrangements in such a way as to prove detrimental to the national security and welfare of the United States. * Source: Johnson Library, Vice President's Security File, NSC, East-West Trade, July 10, 1962. Secret. Transmitted to the President along with Rusk's memorandum to the National Security Council ( Document 309 ), Hodges' letter to President Kennedy ( Document 310 ), and Hodges' memorandum to the National Security Council ( Document 312 ), with an explanatory memorandum by Kaysen, July 17. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings, 1962, 503rd NSC Meeting) 1 Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original. 312. Memorandum From Secretary of Commerce Hodges to the National Security Council 312. Memorandum From Secretary of Commerce Hodges to the National Security Council Source Washington, July 16, 1962. SUBJECT Export Control Policy As stated in the memorandum from the Secretary of State, 1 the Departments of State and Commerce have had recurring differences over licensing of exports to the USSR and other Eastern European countries. Pending resolution of this difference in policy view, I have withheld final action on some 59 export license applications. These applications have a total value in excess of $4.8 million. Of this total, approximately $4.4 million involve commodities and $.4 million technical data. (Attachment 1 gives further summary detail on the commodities and technical data in question.) 2 I agree completely with the Secretary of State that these pending applications, and indeed our total trade with the Soviet bloc, are “quantitatively” unimportant. Precisely because the amount involved cannot be regarded as significant to the U.S. economy the Administration has, in a sense, an extra burden to show that the United States is not making a “qualitative” contribution to the buildup of the Soviet bloc economy—at the ultimate expense of this country and our allies. In fact, one of the real difficulties confronting us in administering the Export Control Act is the consistent pattern which Soviet bloc countries follow in their trading efforts with the United States. There is little or no indication that I am aware of that the Soviet bloc is genuinely interested in trying to establish a continuing and significant trade with the United States in consumer-type goods produced in the United States in exchange for goods produced in those countries. Rather, the whole pattern is the opposite. The evidence available to me is overwhelming that the Soviet bloc is interested primarily in obtaining machinery, technical data and technically advanced commodities for the purpose of enabling the Soviet bloc to develop its own capacity to produce what it wants rather than expand the scope of a continuing, peaceful trade with the United States. I am completely in accord with the often expressed premise that trade is one of the few means for influencing the Soviet Union toward a more responsible and peaceful attitude in the international community. I believe the United States should, therefore, endeavor to expand trade with the Soviet Union and other bloc countries. However, where items under control are involved which are, at best, in the gray area, I believe their export to the Soviet bloc should be authorized on the basis of a reasonable possibility the Soviet Union will indeed be influenced to a more responsible and peaceful attitude—not on the basis of a mere expression of hope on our part. Perhaps the most serious problem in our control of exports to the Soviet bloc is the disparity of controls between the United States and our allies. On practically every one of the applications on which there is strong interagency disagreement the primary reason usually cited for authorizing the export is the fact similar items are available to the bloc from other Western nations. Thus, more often than not, the apparent availability of a similar item from a European source becomes the main reason for authorizing the export from the United States. If there is no possibility of persuading our allies to increase their trade controls, as has been indicated by the Secretary of State, then we are left with the problem of administering whatever level of unilateral controls is deemed appropriate, notwithstanding the position of our allies. In my opinion, we should not set our export controls at the lowest level represented by our allies, and we should not reach the same result indirectly by a process of attrition, that is by approving export applications simply because our allies have not joined us in effective multilateral control of those items in question. At least we should not deliberately follow such a course without establishing a clear record that we have done everything reasonably possible since January 1961 to persuade our allies to much closer agreement with us on the extent of export controls. I therefore suggest that the level of controls on which we should seek to achieve agreement is that described in Attachment 2. 3 The above comments relate to what I would term the “substance” of the issue, apart from the factor of Congressional or public opinion. The latter, of course, deserves careful consideration in view of the recent amendments to the Export Control Act and the investigations of export control during the preceding months by both House and Senate Committees. Relevant to the issue of multilateral controls, Section 1 of the Export Control Act now has the following language: "The Congress further declares that it is the policy of the United States to formulate, reformulate, and apply such controls to the maximum extent possible in cooperation with all nations with which the United States has defense treaty commitments, and to formulate a unified commercial and trading policy to be observed by the non-Communist-dominated nations or areas in their dealings with the Communist-dominated nations. The Congress further declares that it is the policy of the United States to use its economic resources and advantages in trade with Communist-dominated nations to further the national security and foreign policy objectives of the United States.” Both the House and Senate Committees investigating export control administration expressed strong concern over the lack of effective multilateral control of exports to the Soviet bloc. The floor debate preceding enactment of this amendment gave further emphasis to this same concern. I think the Administration should, as a part of a desirable and necessary defense of whatever is done in administering the Export Control Act, establish a record of doing something additional during the coming months to get agreement with our allies on more effective multilateral controls. From the standpoint of relevance to deciding individual export license applications, the recent amendment to Section 3 of the Act is the most important. The new language added is as follows: "Such rules and regulations shall provide for denial of any request or application for authority to export articles, materials, or supplies, including technical data, from the United States, its territories and possessions, to any nation or combination of nations threatening the national security of the United States if the President shall determine that such export makes a significant contribution to the military or economic potential of such nation or nations which would prove detrimental to the national security and welfare of the United States.” As a statement of Congressional intent and policy, the important factor written into the Act by the above quoted language is the economic criterion. Here again, both House and Senate investigating committees expressed strong concern that the Administration should give proper regard to the economic factor in administering export controls. (No one had any particular question about export control of military items.) Under the above quoted language, the President has, in a legal sense, very broad administrative discretion in determining what shall be authorized for export and what shall be denied. It is a matter of executive discretion as to what nation or nations are threatening the national security. It is a matter of administrative discretion to determine whether an export makes a contribution to the military or economic potential of another nation and whether that contribution is “significant.” And, finally, it is a matter of administrative discretion as to whether in any event the export, if authorized, would prove detrimental to the national security and welfare of the United States. Notwithstanding the broad legal authority of executive officials under the above quoted language, the Export Control Act should be administered in such a way as to obtain the support of a majority of the Congress. If this is not done, the reaction is likely to be quick and decisive in further restricting executive discretion by changing the Export Control law or in prejudicing other legislative programs of the Administration. (In writing to the House Committee my comments on the proposed amendment to Section 3, I stated in effect that the Administration was following the standard implicit in the amendment, that is, we were not authorizing for export any items which make a significant contribution to the military or economic potential which would prove detrimental to the national security of the United States. 4 In making this statement, I had in mind those applications which have not been approved as well as those which have been approved.) I cannot agree with the distinguished Secretary of State that the recent Congressional discussion on the Export Control Act was helpful to the Administration. Nor do I agree with the interpretation implicit in the Secretary's memorandum that the recent changes in the Act reflect a Congressional intent that export controls should be administered in a less restrictive manner than has been the case for the last few months. I gather the very opposite impression from a reading of the floor debate on these amendments and from the action in Congress during the past several months. (Attachment 3 consists of pages from the Congressional Record giving the floor debate on extension of the Export Control Act, including the proceedings in the Senate when the first Conference Committee Report was rejected, and the discussion in both the Senate and House when the final Conference Report was approved.) 5 To carry out the requirement now contained in Section 3 of the Export Control Act, the Departments of State, Commerce and Defense have agreed that paragraph 11 of NSC 5704/3 should be revised as shown in Enclosure 1 of Secretary Rusk's memorandum of July 16. 6 In our appearances before the Senate and House Committees investigating the administration of the Export Control Act, as well as our appearance before the Senate and House Banking and Currency Committees in connection with the extension of the Act we did not convince the Committee members that we should have less export control. I believe it would be unfortunate, and unwise, to adopt a policy of export control which will almost assuredly subject the Administration in the coming months to time-consuming and harassing investigations which the Senate Committee has not yet concluded and for which purpose the House Select Committee is seeking additional funds. In addition, I think there would be a definite possibility that further direct legislative action regarding export controls would be taken at this session of Congress if there is any discernible lessening at this time of restrictions on exports to the Soviet bloc. I would like further to suggest a course of action which, if successful, would achieve a positive gain for the United States and which, if not productive of concrete results, would nevertheless put the Administration in a position of having a record of doing all that could reasonably be expected in administering the Export Control Act. I suggest that: (a) The United States endeavor to negotiate a commercial agreement with the Soviet Union and other European Soviet bloc countries. On our part we would offer to guarantee to permit exports of listed items. In return, we would seek to obtain, for example, settlement of outstanding debts, agreement on patents, agreement on measures to eliminate the threat of Soviet dumping of commodities such as oil, as well as agreement to export to us items in which we might have an interest. (b) That with respect to the area of trade not subject to export control, we undertake in Soviet bloc countries, where arrangements can be worked out, an export expansion program, including trade missions, trade centers, and the like. (c) That pending efforts as above described, and under present conditions, the United States continue its present level of export controls as administered during recent months by the Department of Commerce, as modified to include the field of technical data. L.H.H. Attachment 2 7 SUGGESTED LEVEL OF MULTILATERAL EXPORT CONTROLS Maintain toward the non-Communist countries export controls over materials, equipment, supplies and technical data (including plants, processes, designs, components, parts, production equipment and production materials) in specific areas, as is required to prevent such items from making a significant contribution to the military or economic potential of the Communist countries such as their ability to initiate aggressive actions or engage in economic activities inimical to the national security and welfare of the Free World. The following are examples: 1. Electronics 2. Chemical—including petrochemical 3. Transportation 4. New materials 5. Advanced Research and Development 6. Aircraft 7. Electrical—advanced types 8. Metal working machinery 9. Pipeline and pipeline equipment 10. Steel industry It should be noted that such controls and actions would not necessarily be imposed on all segments or elements within a specific category. For example, in the metal working machinery category it would be intended to cover only those types embodying recent technological advances, fully automated precision quality production machines. * Source: Johnson Library, Vice President's Security File, NSC, East-West Trade, July 10, 1962. Secret. Transmitted to President Kennedy along with Rusk's memoranda to the National Security Council ( Documents 309 and 311 ) and Hodges' letter to the President ( Document 310 ), with an explanatory memorandum by Kaysen, July 17. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings, 1962, 503rd NSC Meeting) 1 Document 309 . 2 Not printed. 3 Attachment 2 was not with the source text, but is printed below. 4 Hodges' letter has not been found. 5 Attachment 3, excerpts from the Congressional Record, was not with the source text. The first conference report (H. Rept. 1949, 87th Cong.), extending the Export Control Act of 1949 for 1 year without amendment, was rejected by the Senate on June 28. The second conference report (H. Rept. 1955, 87th Cong.), which was approved by the Senate on June 29 and the House of Representatives on June 30, contained the bill enacted with the President's approval on July 1. 6 Document 311 . 7 Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Trade Policy, East-West Trade, 6/2-3/63. Secret. 313. Summary Record of the 503d Meeting of the National Security Council 313. Summary Record of the 503d Meeting of the National Security Council Source Washington, July 17, 1962. East-West Trade Policy Secretary Rusk introduced a discussion of U.S. export control policy by commenting on the thankless task which the Secretary of Commerce had been given by Congress in making him responsible for the administration of the Export Control Act. Secretary Rusk, in reviewing the existing situation, pointed out that U.S. trade with the Soviet Bloc was very small, but that the Congress continued to have an unusual interest in this subject. He cited changes in the law adopted by the Congress this session which had an effect on the implementation of the Export Control Act. He emphasized that Congressman Kitchin had been successful in adding to the definition of trade to be controlled and the concept of trade contributing to the economic potential of the Soviet Bloc. Secretary Rusk said that everyone in the Administration agreed on the general policy to be followed in licensing exports to the Bloc, but trouble always arose when judgments had to be made on individual cases. Trade with the Soviet Bloc is not only a problem for us domestically, but has important multilateral aspects. For example, the UK wants to expand its trade with the Soviet Bloc and reduce the number of items which cannot be traded freely to the USSR. Our allies, he continued, are heavier traders with the Bloc, and, therefore, they will not support us to the extent we wish on limiting or controlling this trade. In addition to the economic reasons, our allies differ with us in principle in that they have basic doubts as to the value of conducting what they describe as economic warfare against the Bloc. Secretary Rusk proposed that no effort be made now to decide our long-run policy, but that we should decide to deal favorably toward the 59 pending export license applications referred to in the letter of July 16, 1962 from the Secretary of Commerce. 1 He again referred to the present situation in which we are confronting the USSR on Berlin. He said the Soviet Union is now faced with a choice of moving toward peace or toward war in the immediate future. His recommendation was that we not yield at all on Berlin, but we should convey to the Soviet Union our flexibility in other fields, for example, in an easier export license policy. In the event that the Berlin crisis is resolved, Secretary Rusk said we should immediately examine the entire question of trade with the Soviet Bloc. The President pointed out that our export control policy is more strict than the limitations placed on our allies by the COCOM list. He also noted that the Soviets do not want to buy from us goods which are peaceful, and, therefore, not controlled, but they continue to insist on trying to buy goods which they want for their own purposes. Secretary Dillon, in response to a question from the President, recalled that when Khrushchev was in the U.S. no increase in trade with the USSR resulted from the conversations at that time because the USSR wanted to make all its purchases on credit. 2 Mr. Dillon said we could easily expand our trade with the USSR if we granted credit as is being done by our allies in Europe. He said that the Soviets would be prepared to settle their lend-lease accounts if we gave them credits. He recounted the staged irritation of Khrushchev involving our disinclination to sell the Russians a complete shoe manufacturing plant. In response to the President's question, Mr. Kohler said that the Russians would probably be willing to pay us $300 million in settlement of the lend-lease accounts if we provided substantial credits to them. It was pointed out that credits to the Soviet Union are controlled by the Johnson Act 3 which would have to be changed if we decided to extend credit to the Russians. Secretary Hodges, in defending his position of denying the majority of the pending export license applications, said that the U.S. was now selling very little to the USSR. He said the Russians were picking and choosing things they want, with the result that we were helping to build up their economy. He urged that we try once more to persuade our allies to join us in strict control of trade with the USSR. If this attempt failed, he urged that we negotiate bilaterally with the Russians in an effort to increase vastly our trade with them. He viewed present policy as getting us nothing and at the same time exposing us to serious Congressional criticism. Secretary Dillon said that the new policy agreed to by State and Commerce, in effect, meant that we were throwing away the existing Economic Defense Policy even before we sought to persuade our allies to go along with implementing strict trade control measures. In his view the new proposal goes directly against Congressional wishes expressed this session. The new paper omits several parts of the old paper which he felt should be kept. He recommended that the existing paper be reaffirmed after modifying it in order to meet the legislative changes approved by Congress. Mr. Ball said that the State Department could live with the existing paper. He urged, however, that we not attempt to persuade our allies to follow us in a policy of strict control of exports to the USSR. He doubted that our allies would be persuaded and the only result would be that our failure would hurt us with Congress and hurt us in other countries. In fact, it might produce in Congress a strong reaction against our allies. He concluded by saying that in his opinion recent legislative changes require no change in our existing export control policy. Secretary Rusk said that general language was very difficult to draft. He added that he had agreed upon the earlier rules governing implementation of our policy, but that at the time of the Berlin crisis we had made the rules much more restrictive. He believed that we should now return the licensing rules to the level existing prior to the Berlin crisis. He agreed that if the Defense Department said in a specific case that the goods involved were of strategic importance to the USSR, then such a license should be denied. However, if the goods did not seriously affect the military potential of the USSR, he believed the license should be granted. Secretary McNamara said that the Defense Department agreed with everyone that goods involving the military potential of the USSR should not be exported, but called attention to the differing views on whether it was in the U.S. interest to assist in building up the USSR economy. Secretary Rusk called attention to the mutual benefit of trade with the Bloc. Although our trade is very little, Europe's trade with the USSR is of real benefit to the West in that it increases the economic health of the European countries. The President asked whether we want anything from Russian trade other than gold, and the answer was no. He then suggested we approach our allies in order to meet Congressional pressure. Following this approach, we would talk to the Russians about trade in general, and if they were uninterested, we would continue the present unsatisfactory situation. Mr. Ball said that if we deny the pending licenses, the Russians will conclude that we do not want to trade with them. The subject of trade has always been of great importance to them, even though the amount of trade is very little. He said that our trade this year with the USSR is about half of what it was last year. He then proposed that we talk to our allies about a “fair trade practice” agreement which we would then present to the Russians. His suggestion was that we meet the requirement to talk to our allies by attempting to take the problem of trade out of the cold war area. To do this, he would seek to draft a trade pact with rules. The purpose would be to induce the Russians to trade in a fair way in the West rather than using trade as an instrument of their foreign policy. The President summarized the discussion by directing that the existing Economic Defense Policy paper be revised to the extent necessary to reflect recent changes in the law made by Congress. Trade for the next two months with the Soviet Union would continue about as it was prior to the Berlin conference. As soon as we knew what was going to happen in Berlin, we would then review our policy. At some point we would tell the Russians frankly that if they keep asking for the same type of goods as they have in the past, it would be very difficult for us to increase substantially peaceful trade with them. Following the meeting and after the President left, Secretary Rusk and Secretary Hodges discussed for fifteen minutes the pending export license applications. Their agreement is reflected in the Record of Action of the meeting, i.e., most pending licenses will be approved and the export to the Soviet Bloc of automotive manufacturing machinery will be denied. * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings, 1962, 503rd NSC Meeting. Secret. The source text, presumably drafted by Bromley Smith, Executive Secretary of the NSC, bears 16 handwritten emendations. An attached attendance list, not printed, indicates that 27 persons attended the meeting which took place beginning at 5 p.m. in the Cabinet Room of the White House. 1 Document 312 . 2 Reference is to the visit to the United States by Soviet Chairman Nikita S. Khru-shchev September 15-27, 1959. 3 P.L. 73-112, approved April 13, 1934, 48 Stat. 574, as amended, 18 USC 955, prohibited financial transactions with any foreign government in default in its obligations to the United States. 314. National Security Council Record of Action No. 2455 314. National Security Council Record of Action No. 2455 Source Washington, July 17, 1962. U.S. Economic Defense Policy a. Discussed the memoranda presented by the Departments of State and Commerce. 1 b. Noted the President's directive that the State and Commerce Departments add to the statement of U.S. Economic Defense Policy contained in NSC 5704/3 any language considered necessary to reflect pertinent legislation approved by the Congress this year. c. Agreed that no major review of NSC 5704/3 was necessary at this time. d. Noted the President's decision that for the next few months, until further review, the level of export controls would be that existing prior to August 1961. Pending export license applications will be decided in accordance with this decision. e. Agreed that licenses for export to the Soviet Bloc of automotive manufacturing machinery would be denied. f. Agreed that as a complementary approach to U.S. economic defense, an effort should be made in an appropriate Allied forum, OECD, the economic committee of NATO, or other suitable forum, to draft a Western code of fair trade practices for presentation to the Soviet Bloc. g. Noted that the State and Commerce Departments, taking into account the results of action initiated under f. above, will keep the U.S. economic defense policy under continuing review. * Source: Department of State, S/S NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council. Secret. Taken at the 503d NSC meeting (see Document 313 ). 1 Reference is to four papers, Documents 309 - 312 , transmitted to President Kennedy with an explanatory memorandum by Kaysen, July 17. The word “Defense” has been crossed out on the source text and “Commerce” typed in, in accordance with a July 23 memorandum (filed with the source text) to all holders of NSC Action No. 2455. 315. Current Economic Developments 315. Current Economic Developments Source Washington, July 31, 1962. Issue No. 655 [Here follow articles on unrelated matters.] COCOM COMPLETES 1962 LIST REVIEW The Coordinating Committee on Export Controls (COCOM) has completed its annual review of 1962 of the international lists. Changes will be effective October 1. The lists define strategic items over which the Free World exercises control of exports to the Soviet bloc. The major part of the review was devoted to the electronics category of the embargo list. This reflects the strategic importance of advancing electronics technology in today's age of rocketry and space exploration. The results of the review, which was conducted in Paris April 1-July 13, 1962, are highly satisfactory from our standpoint. There were no significant differences of opinion with the British similar to those which characterized the review last year. This was due in large part to successful high-level policy discussions with the UK here in February and subsequent bilateral working level meetings in London. (See page 1, February 27, 1962 issue.) 1 Agreed Changes The participating countries in the 1962 list review took some 90 actions affecting 74 items as defined in International List I (embargo), List IV (watch list) and the Munitions List. New important items added to the embargo list include: electric arc devices, electron beam welders, some 15 fluorocarbon compounds, gravity meters, and special batteries or power sources. Most of these new items embody advanced technology and in the US are related to production for or use in military and space exploration programs. The only new item of consequence we had proposed for embargo and which did not get acceptance was multifuel engines. Jig borers, forging hammers, and picric acid were deleted from the embargo list as were certain type of transistors and magnetic metals, in view of the unanimous judgment of COCOM that they no longer meet the strategic criteria for embargo. Many more items were redefined. Embargo coverage was narrowed for 22 IL-I items, expanded for 17 items, and clarified for 6 items. Twelve of the 67 IL-I items discussed were left unchanged after an exchange of views in COCOM on strategic considerations. 2 [Here follow articles on unrelated matters.] * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 59, E/CBA/REP Files: FRC 72 A 6248, Current Economic Developments. Official Use Only. The source text comprises p. 17 of the issue. 1 Document 307 . 2 Further documentation on the COCOM 1962 List Review is in airgrams Polto A-157, July 23, and Polto A-208, July 31, from Paris. (Department of State, Central Files, 460.509/7-2362 and 460.509/7-3162) A detailed report on the 1962 COCOM List Review was enclosed in a letter from Dutton to Kitchin, September 20, and in Rusk's letters to Vice President Johnson and interested Congressional committee chairmen, September 27. (Ibid., 460.509/9-2062 and 460.509/9-2762) For Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act (Battle Act) Lists, promulgated October 1, 1962, reflecting the changes in the International Lists, see Department of State, The Battle Act Report, 1963, Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951—Sixteenth Report to Congress (Washington, December 1963), pp. 16-20. 316. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Secretary of Commerce Hodges 316. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Secretary of Commerce Hodges Source Washington, August 9, 1962. Dear Luther : Thank you for your letter of July 20 giving some further thoughts on the matters discussed at the National Security Council meeting on July 17. 1 Since receiving your letter, we have also received the National Security Council Record of Action (NSC Action 2455) of the Council meeting of July 17, 1962. The Record of Action conforms with my understanding of the agreement reached on that occasion with regard to the nature of the approach to our Allies, namely, that as a complementary approach to economic defense an effort would be made in an appropriate Allied forum “to draft a Western code of fair trade practices for presentation to the Soviet Bloc”. In this connection, we have already undertaken work within this Department on the question of a code of fair practices, and are reviewing that work at the moment as a basis for further discussion with the other interested agencies. It seems quite clear that the receptivity of our Allies to the proposal for establishment of a code of fair practices in East-West trade will depend on their initial understanding and support of our concern at the need to develop uniform ground rules covering the conduct of Allied trade with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Bloc. It will be necessary to obtain their agreement at a high level on the desirability, as a general matter of foreign policy, of agreeing upon such principles. In this connection, I agree with your suggestion that at an appropriate time preliminary high level approaches be made bilaterally to prepare a favorable reception for our formal multilateral approach. Only following agreement by the NATO countries as a group would it be possible fruitfully to consider such specific matters as the development of uniform rules to cope with disruptive pricing practices, the resale of primary commodities, inadequate arbitration, patent and copyright procedures, and the lack of reasonable access by businessmen. I think you will agree that these are all rather complicated and diverse matters which will involve considerable study in order to coordinate an Allied position thereon. As to the appropriate international forum for these projected discussions, it would seem to us that the NATO Council of Economic Advisers (ECONAD) would be initially the suitable and logical place for such discussions with our principal Allies. As you know, with the exception of the question of strategic trade controls, the ECONAD is the forum in which questions of economic relationships between NATO countries and the Soviet Bloc have been discussed—for example, Soviet oil, oil pipelines, credits to the Soviet Bloc. If we meet with some success in NATO, we could then consider broadening our approach to other forums. We will be taking up with your Department shortly our detailed proposals for the code of general trading practices. With warm personal regards, Sincerely, Dean 2 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 400.119/7-2062. Secret. Drafted by Robert B. Wright and James L. Colbert (EUR/SOV) on July 27. A copy was sent to Carl Kaysen. The source text is Tab A to a July 30 memorandum from G. Griffith Johnson (E) through Under Secretary Ball and Executive Secretary Brubeck to Rusk, which explained the need to call Hodges' attention to NSC Action No. 2455 ( Document 312 ) because “Hodges' letter was almost certainly written before he received NSC Action 2455.” (Department of State, Central Files, 400.119/7-3062) 1 In his July 20 letter to Rusk, Hodges called for a U.S. approach through the Consultative Group in Paris “to get our Allies to agree to improve the level of multilateral export controls toward the Sino-Soviet bloc, as proposed at the NSC meeting on Tuesday, July 17.” He suggested discussions in the Consultative Group for joint action on expanding trade in consumer goods with the Soviet bloc or arranging U.S. bilateral trade agreements with Soviet bloc countries for trade not under multilateral controls. He also suggested a commercial code of trade behavior. (Ibid., 490.119/7-2062) 2 Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original. 317. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Secretary of Commerce Hodges 317. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Secretary of Commerce Hodges Source Washington, September 5, 1962. Dear Luther : This is in response to the suggestion in your letter of August 17 about the possibility of negotiating an expansion of multilateral controls on trade with the Soviet bloc. 1 I realize that the National Security Council on July 17 discussed the idea of a determined effort to get our Allies to agree to a higher level of multilateral export controls, but I am not aware of any agreement having been reached that a special attempt along those lines should be made, nor does NSC action 2455 record any such agreement. In my judgment, we could not at this time obtain agreement in COCOM on an expansion of export controls. Prevailing attitudes in Western Europe and Japan on Soviet bloc trade, when coupled with the rule of unanimity in the Coordinating Committee, make it clear that negotiations would be fruitless. At a time when we are engaged in talks with the Soviets on matters of major political importance, I would not wish to undertake trade control negotiations which I believe could not succeed and which would seem likely to have an adverse impact on our bilateral talks with the Soviets and add to the differences among the NATO Alliance countries. In saying this, I wish to add that should the situation in Berlin or elsewhere take a marked turn for the worse, I would expect that NATO would promptly take up the imposition of selected economic countermeasures as one of several important indicators to the Soviets of the unity of the Western nations in the face of a crisis. As you know, last year NATO agreed in principle on a total economic embargo on the Soviet bloc in the event of blockage of access to Berlin and on air countermeasures in the event of significant air corridor harassment. As I wrote you on August 9 we have been proceeding under NSC Action 2455 to develop a code of fair practices. 2 We have now sent you a draft of such a code and I hope to have your views on it in the near future. 3 With warm personal regards, Sincerely, Dean 4 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 460.509/8-1762. Secret. Drafted by Trezise and Clarence T. Breaux (E/MDC) on August 23, and retyped in S/S on September 1. 1 In his August 17 letter to Rusk, Hodges proposed negotiations on expansion of trade in the NATO Council of Economic Advisers and on expansion of the level of export controls in the Consultative Group. (Ibid.) 2 Document 316 . 3 The draft Code of Fair Practices in International Trade was sent to Hodges on September 5 under cover of another letter from Rusk requesting “views and suggestions before proceeding further in discussion bilaterally with other NATO countries.” (Department of State, Central Files, 460.119/9-562) 4 Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original. 318. Letter From Secretary of Commerce Hodges to Secretary of State Rusk 318. Letter From Secretary of Commerce Hodges to Secretary of State Rusk Source Washington, September 12, 1962. Dear Dean : Thank you for your letter of September 5th on negotiation with other countries of expanded controls over, and a code of fair practices on, trade with the Soviet bloc. 1 As you will recall in the discussion at the July 17th meeting of NSC, I coupled the approaches to our Allies on these two issues. I have since that meeting reported to both Congressman Kitchin and Senator Dodds and stated in my press conference today that we would seek multilateral agreement with our Allies on these aspects of trade with the bloc. These statements were in accord with my understanding of the discussion at the NSC, in which the President told the two of us to see what could be done towards multilateral agreement on both expanded controls and peaceful trade, even though it appeared that we might not succeed. I, of course, accept your judgment as to whether now is the appropriate time to seek an expanded level of controls with our Allies, particularly to offset the economic warfare thrust of the bloc. But I had a clear understanding from the NSC discussion that we would seek an appropriate time for such discussions. It was my further clear understanding that after the multilateral discussions, setting the limits of beneficial trade, we would seek to develop an agreed code of fair practices for trade with State-trading countries. I am glad to have the suggested code which you sent and am having it examined by my staff. I am asking Dr. Behrman to pursue the technical aspects of the code with Assistant Secretary Johnson. 2 Sincerely yours, Luther H. Hodges 3 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 460.119/10-1962. Secret. 1 See Document 317 and footnote 3 thereto. 2 A memorandum attached to the source text from Ruth H. Kupinsky (EUR/RPE) to Cleveland (RPE), October 19, indicates that Jack N. Behrman, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for International Affairs, discussed East-West trade with Nathaniel McKitterick (OES) and Walter M. Kotschnig (IO), “suggesting that we use ECE to develop studies on trade between market economies and state trading companies, on the assumption that we look to an expansion of trade.” 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Hodges signed the original. 319. Editorial Note 319. Editorial Note The Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 had an impact on U.S. export control policy. On October 23, President Kennedy proclaimed U.S. interdiction of offensive weapons to Cuba, effective October 24. The Department of Commerce continued to allow shipments only of nonsubsidized foodstuffs, medicines, and medical supplies on humanitarian grounds as well as gift parcels of limited value to Cuba, but held up, for the time being, approval of all licenses for shipment to Soviet bloc countries and Yugoslavia, except general licenses for moving goods of no strategic value and gifts. It did nothing about licenses already issued, all of which were valid for 6 months. (Memorandum from Edward Gudeman, Under Secretary of Commerce, to Kaysen, October 23; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Trade Policy, East-West Trade) President Kennedy lifted the naval quarantine of Cuba on November 20, but the policy in effect since October 1960 discouraged all shipments to Cuba other than specified food and medical supplies, and from September 6, the cargoes of American vessels and planes going to Cuba were subject to the same regulation and control that applied to American vessels and planes going to European Soviet bloc countries. (Revision of Transportation Order T-1 to include Cuba, signed by Secretary of Commerce Hodges, September 6; Washington National Records Center, RG 40, Department of Commerce, Executive Secretariat Files: FRC 69 A 6828, Office of the Secretary, Export Control (Sept. through Dec.)) President Kennedy had prohibited imports from Cuba from February 7, under authority of Section 620(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. (Department of State Bulletin , February 19, 1962, pages 283-284) Documentation on U.S. discouragement of international trade, shipping, and aviation to Cuba, is scheduled for publication in volume XI . 320. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Brubeck) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 320. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Brubeck) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Source Washington, December 4, 1962. SUBJECT Revision of U.S. Economic Defense Policy—NSC 5704/3 Under cover of a memorandum dated October 24 to Assistant Secretary Johnson, 1 Mr. Kaysen transmitted a copy of a memorandum directed to you from Under Secretary Fowler of the Treasury commenting on the proposed revision of Paragraph 11 of NSC 5704/3 recommended in my memorandum of September 17. 2 We still consider the proposed revision of Paragraph 11 to be in accordance with the National Security Council Record of Action 2455 of July 17, and urge it be promptly circulated as an amendment to NSC 5704/3. Under Secretary Fowler's memorandum suggests that the United States should make “a more vigorous approach to our Allies for a more effective [and he makes clear, a more comprehensive] 3 multilateral economic defense program” and that the revision of NSC 5704/3 should reflect this objective. Under Secretary Fowler's viewpoint is based in part on the amended Section 2 of the Export Control Act (the so-called Javits Amendment). Secretary Rusk has dealt specifically with the issue of a new approach to our Allies for a broadened control program and with the interpretation of the amendment to Section 2 of the Export Control Act. I am enclosing for your information and for use at your discretion with Under Secretary Fowler copies of relevant letters from Secretary Rusk to Secretary Hodges and to Senator Keating concerning these points. 4 In summary, these letters set forth a Department position along the following lines. The annual review of the international strategic lists in the Coordinating Committee (COCOM) is the principal means of carrying out the intent of Congress that the United States should “formulate, reformulate, and apply such [export]controls to the maximum extent possible in cooperation with all nations with which the United States has defense treaty commitments.” Any consideration of an expanded multilateral export control program of the comprehensive nature described by Mr. Fowler must take account of the basic non-negotiability of such proposals in the absence of a very much worsened international climate. The lines of development in East-West relations growing from the Cuban confrontation seem today even less likely to support a broad new economic warfare approach than was the case in early September when Secretary Rusk dealt with this question in his letter to Secretary Hodges. With respect to the more explicit requirement in the amendment to Section 2 of the Export Control Act that the United States should “formulate a unified commercial and trading policy to be observed by the non-Communist nations”, the Department has proposed and transmitted initially to Commerce for comment under cover of the Secretary's letter to Secretary Hodges of September 5 a draft “Code of Fair Practices in International Trade”. It should be recognized that progress has been made, to the extent warranted by the circumstances and practicable at the time, on all the four points enumerated by Mr. Fowler on pages four and five of his memorandum, even though they have not been presented in an over-all package program. We do have a coordinated program with our Allies for the utilization of economic sanctions in the event of blockage of access to Berlin and with respect to Cuba, even though these measures may not be as extensive as we would prefer. (Indeed, Mr. Fowler himself performed a valuable service in handling the four power negotiations in Paris and Washington last year on Berlin countermeasures.) We do have an agreement developed in NATO which lays the basis for the limitation of sales of large diameter pipe to the Soviet bloc. We have discussed in NATO the problem of Soviet oil sales and NATO countries have agreed to a policy of caution and restraint with respect to imports of Soviet oil. We also have in NATO a recognized opening to discuss other commodity problems that may involve questions of excessive dependence on bloc materials or supplies. We have over the years made a very great effort to obtain recognition of the United States position on the extension of credits to the Soviet bloc, and have an agreed system of reporting, periodic review and discussion in NATO. It is surely fair to say that the entire array of our efforts to enlist cooperation from our Allies in aid programs for less developed countries represents the kind of effort at “preventing, countering, checking or minimizing Sino-Soviet bloc economic penetration and subversion of uncommitted or less developed countries” which Mr. Fowler mentions in his third point. There is also an established program in NATO for periodic review and discussion of the Soviet economic offensive, an arrangement which makes possible the discussion of potential danger spots. Finally, there is agreement to discuss in ECONAD the kind of program concerning trade with the Soviet bloc visualized in Mr. Fowler's fourth point, and this Department's draft trade code looks in the direction of developing a United States position for such a discussion. The achievement of the kind of comprehensive program outlined by Mr. Fowler would depend upon gaining the full support of our Allies. Since there are very real differences on their part with both the underlying policy justification and details of such a program, we believe our best course is to continue to pursue more limited objectives. We would conclude, therefore, that the NSC policy, amended as we have suggested, will for the present continue to provide an adequate basis for our efforts in the economic defense area. William H. Brubeck 5 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Trade Policy, East-West Trade Policy Subjects, East-West 4/63-7/63. Secret. 1 Not printed. (Ibid.) 2 Reference is to a memorandum from Fowler to Bundy, October 23. (Ibid.) The September 17 memorandum from Brubeck to Bundy proposed revision of NSC 5704/3 identical to the text in enclosure 1 to Rusk's July 16 memorandum to the NSC, Document 311 . (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies, Department of State, 9/17/62-9/30/62) 3 All brackets are in the source text. 4 Reference is to two letters from Rusk to Hodges, September 5; see Document 317 and footnote 3 thereto; and to a letter from Rusk to Keating, August 28, not printed. 5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature above which are unidentified handwritten initials. 321. Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) 321. Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) Source Washington, April 19, 1963. MEMORANDUM ON CIVIL AVIATION POLICY TOWARDSINO-SOVIET BLOC It is necessary to bring up-to-date our policy statement on bilateral civil aviation relations with the Sino-Soviet Bloc in view of developments since the previous policy statement adopted in 1957 by the National Security Council was withdrawn last year. 1 While we assume that in the foreseeable future there is unlikely to be an improvement in our relations with the Bloc of sufficient importance to warrant consideration of a bilateral civil aviation agreement, we should be ready for such a contingency. The attached policy statement (Tab A) provides for that contingency and incorporates considerations militating for and against an agreement on our side and on the Bloc side. 2 The second draft policy statement (Tab B) has been developed because NSC 5726/1 has been withdrawn and we need comprehensive policy guidance in the area of Bloc civil air activities abroad. Our experience with the Congo, the Sudan, and Cuba suggests strongly to me that we need a basic policy statement against which to measure and develop programs of action, particularly in Africa and Latin America, related to Bloc civil air activities in the Free World. It is felt that such a policy must rest on the following premises and rationale: (1) That Bloc inroads in the civil aviation area are undesirable because they can enhance, sometimes in substantial measure, the Bloc's capabilities to attain its military and political objectives in the developing countries, and (2) For both political and economic reasons, our capabilities to prevent such inroads are limited and therefore must be applied with circumspection on the basis of a carefully defined system of priorities. While the dangers from Bloc moves in this field can be indiscriminately exaggerated, our experience amply demonstrates that they can afford opportunities for Bloc political gains beyond those provided by other forms of Bloc presence. In a crisis situation such as occurred in the Congo and in Cuba, the lack of air traffic rights handicapped the Bloc in supporting footholds it had gained through other means. Equally serious is the possibility that Bloc influence in, and control over, air facilities within a country could enable it to act quickly and decisively at a time of internal political crisis. Beyond these critical potentialities, civil air access to the LDC's tends to enhance the Bloc's prestige and to facilitate its over-all program to develop close political and economic bonds with specific developing countries. Bloc experience in Guinea and Ghana, however, indicates that civil aviation activities can boomerang. When the Bloc undertakes to support a civil aviation program that is uneconomic to begin with, it runs the risk of being saddled with the costs and the onus of responsibility when the program fails and disillusionment sets in. More generally, in any attempt to establish a broad international civil aviation network in competition with the West, the Bloc operates under the considerable disabilities of its relatively inferior equipment and of prospectively thin traffic routes. In regard to our own limitations, we must recognize first that among the non-aligned developing countries the negotiation of an exchange of air rights with the Bloc frequently is viewed as an assertion of their recently won sovereignty and an evidence of balanced neutrality. Additionally, an offer of Bloc civil aviation assistance can appeal to a strongly felt need irrespective of its justification for improved transport facilities within and through these countries. We could attempt to consider such offers whenever they are made but such an across-the-board effort would be politically burdensome and would create serious distortions in our economic assistance programs. These circumstances point to the need for flexible and carefully modulated measures in this field. Our civil aviation program in developing countries will be most successful in limiting Bloc penetration to the degree that they are consistent with over-all economic assistance criteria. We cannot, however, limit our actions in this field solely to measures justified by these criteria . Our approach should be based on the following principles: 1. We should use diplomatic means to discourage other Governments from entering into civil aviation agreements with the Bloc, stress-ing the dangers involved and our unfavorable view of such actions. At the same time, we should make sure that the developing countries have a clear understanding of where their self-interest in fact lies and an accurate measure of their bargaining strength in any negotiation with the Bloc. 2. Through our own programs and through actions developed jointly with our allies, we should seek to encourage the development of national air services that meet the transportation development needs of the country concerned and fit into feasible regional services. Such programs would tend to fill vacuums that Bloc civil aviation offers seek to exploit and thus would provide the developing countries with effective self-interest grounds for rejecting civil aviation ties with the Bloc. 3. We should limit our preemptive efforts to those countries where such programs would be politically feasible and strategically dictated. Concurrent with the process of obtaining the concurrences of the other interested agencies, work will be started to formulate action programs designed to achieve our objectives in anticipating and in contravening Sino-Soviet Bloc civil air activities. * Source: Department of State, Central Files, AV 1 Com Bloc-US. Secret. On May 1, Harriman sent this memorandum and two statements on civil air transport relations between the United States and the Soviet bloc and on U.S. policy toward bloc civil aviation activities in the free world with a covering letter requesting comments to the Departments of Commerce and Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Aviation Administration, Civil Aeronautics Board, and the Bureau of the Budget. The replies, May 14 (Department of Commerce), undated (Central Intelligence Agency), May 20 (Bureau of the Budget), May 24 (Civil Aeronautics Board), and June 21 (Federal Aviation Administration and Department of Defense), are ibid. 1 Reference is to NSC 5726/1, “U.S. Civil Aviation Policy toward the Sino-Soviet Bloc,” December 9, 1957, printed in Foreign Relations, 1955-1957, vol. IX, pp. 490 - 503 . 2 Tabs A and B are not printed. 322. Memorandum From President Kennedy to the Export Control Review Board 322. Memorandum From President Kennedy to the Export Control Review Board Source Washington, May 16, 1963. The Secretary of Commerce has raised two important questions about our present trade with the Soviet Union which I think worth serious high-level examination. 1. Do we now deal with the Soviet Union on the export of technically advanced machinery and equipment in a manner which adequately protects U.S. interests? Where a national security issue is presented, we of course deny an export license. There are, however, many cases in which no clear security issue arises and yet we know that the Soviets are using American machinery and equipment as a basis for copying our technology. Are we being adequately compensated in these sales? Is there any method of organizing these transactions which would secure a better quid pro quo than the present method of leaving it to the individual seller to secure the best price he can in the transaction, in the light of the fact the Soviet Union does not ordinarily respect the patent and copyright arrangements on which we rely in our commercial transactions with other nations? 2. Should we reconsider the whole of our trade with the Soviet Union in the light of trade between Western Europe and the Soviet Union and its European satellites? Considering the character and volume of that trade, would a generally less restrictive policy be more in keeping with the interests of the United States? How much possibility is there for a significant broadening of trade that is consistent with our security interests? Would this possibility be such as to justify a general negotiation on trade and commercial matters with the Soviet Union? 3. I would like the Export Control Review Board to examine these questions and report its findings to me in ninety days. John F. Kennedy 1 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subject Series, Trade, East/West. Secret. The Export Control Review Board consisted of the Secretaries of Commerce (Chairman), State, and Defense. Regarding its establishment, see Document 300 . 1 Printed from a copy that indicates Kennedy signed the original. 323. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Senator Jacob K. Javits 323. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Senator Jacob K. Javits Source Washington, July 22, 1963. Dear Jack : I regret the delay in making this further reply to your letter of May 22, but as I indicated in my response of May 28, 1 the question you raise requires an answer in some depth. Enclosed is the report which you requested on the steps taken to implement Section 3(b) of the Export Control Act as amended July 1, 1962. 2 After reviewing this report, I am satisfied that given the far greater magnitude of trade carried on with the Soviet bloc by our Allies as compared with our own trade with the bloc, as well as the differing political evaluations of that trade by individual Western governments, the United States has been remarkably successful in obtaining as substantial a multilateral control policy as now exists. It is, however, a compelling fact that without itself having a significant stake in East-West trade, the United States cannot expect to have a determining voice in the manner in which such trade is carried on by other major Western countries under present world conditions. Since the enclosed report includes a full and frank discussion of the complex problems we would face now in attempting to negotiate with other Western countries a uniform policy on trade with the Soviet bloc countries, I would appreciate it if you would regard the report as not being for public dissemination. With warm personal regards, Sincerely, Dean 3 Enclosure 4 REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 3(b) OF THE EXPORT CONTROL ACT OF 1949 AS AMENDED JULY 1, 1962 The amendment to Section 3(b) of the Export Control Act of 1949 provides a clear endorsement of the principle that our efforts in the East-West field should be carried out to the maximum extent possible on a multilateral basis. This amendment has two aspects which are commented on separately. The first is the provision that the United States should formulate, reformulate and apply export controls to the maximum extent possible in cooperation with Allied nations. The major means whereby we pursue this objective is through the Consultative Group and Coordinating Committee (CG-COCOM) operation and the annual list review procedure. The purpose of the annual COCOM list review is to keep the International Lists currently valid by adjusting them to new technological, military and economic developments in the Sino-Soviet bloc and the free world. It provides this Government with an opportunity to propose the addition of important new items to the International Lists, provided that they can be justified under the applicable criteria. In the 1962 review the United States was successful in obtaining agreement for the addition to the embargo list of the following new items: electrical arc heaters, electron beam welders, some fifteen fluorocarbon compounds, gravity meters, and special batteries or power sources. Most of these new items embody advanced technology and in the United States are related to production for or use in military and space exploration programs. Only two whole items and two partial items were deleted from the embargo list; the United States itself proposed deletion of these items on the grounds that they were no longer significant. Forty-five items were revised or clarified, seventeen of these revisions resulting in net expansion of embargo coverage. The COCOM annual review is scheduled to begin in October of this year. Careful preparations are being made for this review by canvassing all available American research developments and intelligence in order to identify the technologically advanced items of strategic significance that should be brought under multilateral control. While we cannot be certain what negotiating problems may be faced this year, the Department intends to make every effort to further the interests of this Government consistent with the objectives of United States policy in this field as set forth both in the Export Control Act and the Mutual Defense Assist-ance Control Act of 1951. With respect to the second provision of the amendment requiring the formulation of a “unified commercial and trading policy to be observed by the non-Communist nations”, 5 the situation is not as clear cut as is the case with respect to the COCOM negotiations. With respect to COCOM and Battle Act strategic controls it is fair to say that we do have a unified policy although there may be differences in detail on the merits of embargoing particular commodities. In the area of trade and economic relations with the Soviet bloc beyond the scope of strategic controls, however, the fact is that the United States has a more restrictive policy than do other Western nations. The United States denies the export to the Soviet bloc of a wider range of commodities and technology than do other major trading countries. We maintain a complete embargo on trade with Communist China, North Korea and north Viet-Nam. We do not permit United States flag vessels to engage in voyages to those areas. Our controls on trade and shipping with Cuba are more sweeping than the controls of other friendly countries. American law in effect prevents the extension of credit to the Soviet bloc and requires the payment of a higher level of import tariffs on goods of Soviet bloc origin. The entry of certain types of furs from the Soviet Union is prohibited by United States law. To achieve uniformity on the basis of the policies and practices of our Allies, assuming we wished as a matter of policy to do so, would require changes in American laws. Alternatively, to attempt to achieve uniformity on the basis of present American policy and practices would require a major policy confrontation with other Western countries. Given the economic and foreign trade problems that some of these countries face, they are aggressively pursuing the expansion of trade with the Soviet bloc, and they consider that this has political as well as purely commercial or balance of payment advantages. While United States policy toward trade is permissive, it also is based on the assumption that the continuation of a pattern of mutually advantageous trade relationships with the Soviet bloc is to the interest of the West. The question is, therefore, whether there is a redefinition of East-West economic relationships which would be advantageous, which would fall somewhere between our policy and that of our Allies, and which might be negotiable with them. In studying the possibilities for such a proposal, we are considering the concept of a code which might set forth standards to be sought by market economy countries in their trading relations with the state trading countries of the Soviet bloc. The objective of achieving agreement on such a standardized pattern of trading relations with the Soviet bloc nations is unquestionably a highly desirable one. Whatever attempts we make to this end, however, must be viewed against the background of the present state of trading relationships between Western countries and Soviet bloc nations. The principal compelling fact is that the other major industrialized countries of the Western world carry on trading relationships with the Soviet bloc at a much higher level than is the case with respect to the United States, and with far less predisposition to restrict exports. The exports of the Western European countries to the Soviet bloc run at a rate of over $2 billion annually while the United States exports are only a twentieth of that. Western European (and Japanese) exports to the Sino-Soviet bloc rose to $2.8 billion in 1962 and imports to $2.9 billion. United States exports to the bloc were only $125 million and imports $79 million. The exports of all free world countries to the Soviet bloc exceeded $5 billion. In these circumstances and under present conditions in East-West relations, the United States would be in a very difficult position to persuade other major trading countries that they should make any sweeping changes in their methods of trading with the Soviet bloc. From their standpoint, while there may be some complications in carrying on trade with state-trading countries, the amount of trade that takes place indicates that the Western countries have been reasonably successful in overcoming those difficulties. Without a significant stake in East-West trade the United States cannot expect to have a determining voice in the manner in which such trade is carried on by other Western trading countries. The trade of other free world countries, moreover, is carried on without the apparatus of restriction and control over both strategic and nonstrategic trade which already characterizes United States trade with the Soviet bloc. As long as the other industrialized countries of the West are satisfied with the conditions under which their trade with the Soviet bloc takes place, there is no compelling reason for them to impose new or different standards or regulations, especially if such action is unlikely to increase the level of trade. At the same time, so long as other countries are unwilling to adopt rules on exports as stringent as those enforced by the United States, American controls will inevitably have a limited effect. Unless the commodities embargoed by the United States are subject to identical international control or are uniquely American in their availability, the Soviet bloc can obtain what it wishes from other supplying countries. In these circumstances and recognizing that in the absence of a marked worsening of international relations a change in the attitude of other countries is unlikely, the problems of achieving a general agreement on a common code of trade practices appear very formidable indeed. Nevertheless, the Department intends to have discussions on this problem with our Allies in the future and has been actively working on the elements of a standardized code which might be negotiable. We cannot, however, be optimistic about the prospects for making a useful settlement in this area. Although we face the general negotiating problem outlined, we have on certain issues sought an accommodation with Allied countries in an area beyond the limitations of the present COCOM system. This has been the case on such questions as the supply of wide diameter pipe to the Soviet Union, the problem of credit terms to the Soviet bloc, Soviet penetration of less developed countries, and specialized world commodity problems such as petroleum in which Soviet capabilities are a significant factor. We will continue to make further efforts at reaching multilateral agreements over and beyond the COCOM control when the situation warrants such efforts. In summary, it must be recognized that there are manifold issues involved in the carrying on of economic and commercial relations with the Soviet bloc during the present stage of East-West relationships. Concurrently, it must also be recognized that almost without exception the objectives which we seek in terms of a more regularized Western trading policy towards the bloc would require a strengthening of governmental control in one form or another by other cooperating nations. Given the present attitude of Western European countries towards East-West trade, we could not expect to obtain full Western European acceptance and application of any pattern of economic relationships with the Soviet bloc that might contain elements of economic warfare, even if that aim were considered by this Government to be desirable. United States policies are kept under continuous examination to assure that they contain the proper balance of restraint and permissive contacts which are so highly necessary as a means of working towards a long-term assumption of responsible patterns of conduct by the Soviet Union and other Soviet bloc countries. As is recognized in the amendment to the Export Control Act, our only prospect for effectiveness in seeking coordinated trade policies is to work with our Allies on a mutual basis. While there is some indication of an increased awareness on the part of our Allies and the less committed countries of Soviet objectives and capabilities in the economic field, it must be emphasized that given the present attitude of Western European countries on East-West trade it would at best be very difficult to obtain their cooperation in a uniform trade policy. So long as we are enabled to preserve a flexible and balanced approach to these problems under existing legislation, we should continue to be able to make some progress towards United States objectives. * Source: Department of State, Central Files, STR 7. No classification marking. Drafted by Robert B. Wright on July 2 and retyped on July 10. 1 Both letters are attached to the source text, but not printed. 2 Section 3(b) of P.L. 87-515, approved July 1, 1962, added the following paragraph to Section 2 of the Export Control Act of 1949: “The Congress further declares that it is the policy of the United States to formulate, reformulate, and apply such controls to the maximum extent possible in cooperation with all nations with which the United States has defense treaty commitments, and to formulate a unified commercial and trading policy to be observed by the non-Communist-dominated nations or areas in their dealings with the Communist-dominated nations.” (76 Stat. 127) 3 Printed from a copy that indicates that Rusk signed the original. 4 No classification marking. Prepared on July 10. 5 This phrase should read “by the non-Communist-dominated nations.” 324. Report Prepared by the Policy Planning Council 324. Report Prepared by the Policy Planning Council Source Washington, July 26, 1963. U.S. POLICY ON TRADE WITH THE EUROPEAN SOVIET BLOC I. The Problem The President has directed an Inter-Agency examination of two questions relating to our trade with the USSR: 1 "1. Do we now deal with the Soviet Union on the export of technically-advanced machinery and equipment in a manner which adequately protects U.S. interests? Where a national security issue is presented, we of course deny an export license. There are, however, many cases in which no clear security issue arises and yet we know that the Soviets are using American machinery and equipment as a basis for copying our technology. Are we being adequately compensated in these sales? ‘Is there any method of organizing these transactions which would secure a better quid pro quo than the present method of leaving it to the individual seller to secure the best price he can in the transaction, in the light of the fact the Soviet Union does not ordinarily respect the patent and copyright arrangements on which we rely in our commercial transactions with other nations? "2. Should we reconsider the whole of our trade with the Soviet Union in the light of trade between Western Europe and the Soviet Union and its European satellites? Considering the character and volume of that trade, would a generally less restrictive policy be more in keeping with the interests of the United States? How much possibility is there for a significant broadening of trade that is consistent with our security interests? Would this possibility be such as to justify a general negotiation on trade and commercial matters with the Soviet Union?” Although phrased in terms of the commercial possibilities and security interests involved in trade with the USSR, these questions are intimately concerned with our over-all political relations with the Bloc. Trade policy toward the European satellites is a necessary element in the examination. For the same reason, our policy on trade with Communist China and Cuba can be excluded, as being greatly subordinated to a separate body of political factors affecting our relations with these areas. The President's questions, therefore, pose all the basic issues involved in our controls on trade with the European Communist Bloc. What are these controls achieving and what are they failing to achieve? What are the major stakes we have in this policy? Is this an “expendable” policy from the standpoint of the U.S. and under what circumstances; is it a “saleable” commodity to the USSR, and in what sense? These are broad issues because the political significance attached to our trade restrictions has been disproportionate to the trade itself. For a number of years now, we have attempted to maintain, virtually in isolation, a posture tantamount to economic warfare. A change in this stance would therefore carry considerable meaning. In essence, the problem comes down to this: how can the U.S. most effectively use trade policy as an instrument in the conduct of its affairs with the USSR and Eastern Europe? II. Operational Conclusions 1. The major issues in our trade control policy are political—not strategic, economic, or commercial. Neither full access to, nor complete denial of, trade with the U.S. can affect Soviet capabilities to wage war—either hot or cold war. Nor can either trade situation affect in any meaningful sense the performance or potentialities of the Soviet economy. And from the U.S. side, the economic and commercial significance of trade with the USSR, whether free or restricted, is negligible. It is in this context that the President's questions must be answered. 2. With regard to the narrow question of compensation for U.S. technology, there are no convincing grounds for attaching special significance to the technological components of Soviet imports, or for believing that the U.S. represents a particularly unique source for such imports. Above all, the amount of present U.S.-Soviet trade is so small that there is no practical need to question the assumption that compensation secured by individual sellers in private transactions is adequate to meet the requirements of the national interest. Beyond this it must be recognized that so long as the U.S. operates within the framework of its existing control system there is no realistic possibility of our finding “any method of organizing these transactions [with the USSR] 2 which would secure a better quid pro quo than the present.” The USSR would be unresponsive to any U.S. initiative to secure a negotiated arrangement, and would treat unilaterally imposed conditions designed to secure greater compensation for U.S. exports as an extension of the control system. Thus the first question posed in the President's directive becomes a part of the second. 3. The question of the liberalization of present U.S. trade policy toward the Bloc involves an assessment of what this policy accomplishes—strategically, economically, and politically—weighed against what would be accomplished by a change in policy. 4. In assessing the strategic and economic consequences, there are two governing considerations: (a) the European Communist Bloc comes close to being a self-sufficient, closed economy; and (b) the Bloc's trade with the industrial West takes place with our allies and not with the U.S., and for this reason is largely beyond our power to affect. 5. Even under conditions of a maximum interdiction of East-West trade, the USSR would have the capability (a) to maintain and probably to improve in its own favor the present balance of world power, (b) to preserve its internal social and political order, and (c) to continue relatively rapid economic growth. The most that can be said for trade with the industrial West as a whole is that it provides a useful element of flexibility to Bloc planning and perhaps adds a lubricating quality to the complicated process of innovation and technical change in Bloc industry. But this trade cannot exercise a determining influence on the Bloc's economic performance or prospects. In these terms U.S. trade alone, which is all that is relevant to this review, takes on negligible strategic and economic significance. Present U.S. trade with the Bloc is small enough to be completely disregarded. If the U.S. removed restrictions and traded with the Bloc on the same basis as does Western Europe the trade would expand. Payments difficulties, however, would set sharp limits on this expansion. At maximum projected levels, the USSR would obtain moderate and marginal advantages from this trade. For the U.S., the whole affair would continue to be of very minor economic significance. 6. The U.S. controls system has political and psychological significance disproportionate to the trade itself. a. From the standpoint of the U.S., the system has become intricately interwoven into our over-all strategic thinking about the cold war and in our over-all cold war posture. Trade denial is looked upon as an effective weapon of cold war, regardless of how large or how small the quantities of goods involved may be, on the simple assumption that since the U.S. is richer than the USSR any trade between the two must necessarily help the USSR more than the U.S. and hence must improve the relative power position of the USSR. Trade denial has also come to be an important symbol of our cold war resolve and purpose and of our moral disapproval of the USSR. The trade controls issue has an important place in our continuing efforts to arouse the free world to common action and policies against the Communist threat. We have sought to induce non-communist states to hold trade to a minimum, not only on grounds of denying help to the Communists to build their power, but on the grounds that increased trade would carry real and immediate dangers to free world participants in that trade. b. From the standpoint of the USSR, the political significance of U.S. restrictive policies have been out of all proportion to their impact on the Soviet economy or strategic position. The principal reason for this is that they serve as a symbol of U.S. unwillingness to grant the USSR full respectability as an equal in the post-war world order, a symbol that the U.S. dares to discriminate against the USSR under contemporary conditions. Less important but nevertheless real reasons for Soviet dissatisfaction can be found in: the Soviet belief that without U.S. restrictive policies, large-scale trade based upon credit financing and highly beneficial to USSR could be developed; in the Soviet desire to be sure of “the best” in its technological imports; and in Soviet faith that the expansion of trade would give it important leverage, through the American business community, over U.S. policies. c. From the standpoint of the European satellites, the U.S. controls policy symbolizes their economic, and hence political, dependence on the USSR. In practical terms, denial of trade with the U.S. is of even less economic importance than in the case of the USSR. Yet the regimes see U.S. controls as an obstacle to creating new alternatives to total economic reliance on the USSR. This is of particular importance at the present time when the USSR is making strenuous efforts to impose supranational planning and “division of labor” arrangements on the satellites, the result of which would be an even greater subordination of their economies and national identities. 7. The political role played by the U.S. control policy under static cold war conditions is so significant that the policy would be difficult to do without, or even to modify, as long as those conditions continue. In a situation of unyielding confrontation between the U.S. and the USSR, there can be no question of giving quarter, psychological or otherwise, to the enemy. A change in the policy in such circumstances would constitute an important shift in the over-all U.S. political stance, and would impair U.S. effectiveness in holding up its end of the cold war. Moreover a change under static conditions would be difficult to justify to the American public and to the Congress. 8. The usefulness of the restrictive policy is, however, solely the product of a static situation in the cold war. All the criteria that underlie and justify the policy are the criteria of warfare in the traditional sense. These criteria presuppose that for the time being at least we cannot protect ourselves or promote our interests by normal methods, that we are in a position where we have no choice but to resort to “the continuation of politics by other means.” 9. In a situation of cold war movement, the governing considerations would be completely different. All of the peculiar values that attach to the control policy, except in-so-far as it affects items of direct strategic importance, would fall away. At the same time, the control policy would be particularly useful, and almost uniquely so, as a means of furthering the movement process. —Controls could be given up without affecting the existing power balance. There would be no increase in Soviet strength nor loss in U.S. strength. —Controls would be an enticing inducement for the USSR. In them the U.S. has one of the few commodities which it can afford to give up that the USSR would be interested in buying. —Unless the U.S. should be willing to give up controls, the movement process would necessarily be of short duration. The Soviet leaders have made clear they equate “peaceful relations” with “trade relations;” they would insist on consideration of controls in any serious negotiations; and they would consider U.S. attitudes on this issue as a decisive test of U.S. intentions. —The “concession” made by the U.S. through lifting its controls, unlike other concessions, would be revokable at will. At the same time, once a new start had been made on trade, the U.S. for the first time since the war's end would be able to employ on a continuing basis the potentialities of trade as an instrument for political bargaining and for meaningful communication with the USSR. —Lifting controls under conditions of cold war movement would increase the effectiveness of the Western alliance. It would eliminate irritants and frictions that have arisen between the U.S. and major allies over the controls and would enable the U.S. to employ the capital previously expended to hold the trade line on more constructive undertakings to strengthen the alliance. 10. The exact circumstances under which the U.S. should be willing to negotiate an end to its control system cannot and should not be spelled out in advance. It must be a matter of political judgment based on both objective and subjective considerations. On the one hand, there would need to be concrete evidence of Soviet interest in generally improved relations with the U.S. and of Soviet willingness to take, on the basis of mutual concessions, the specific steps necessary to effect this improvement. On the other hand, the situation should be such as to indicate that discussion of the trade issue would be a logical and fruitful, perhaps necessary, means of adding significant momentum to the forward movement that had been gotten underway. As a rule of thumb, it can be said that the U.S. should wait for the USSR to raise in the course of serious negotiations the trade question. If at that time the USSR had already agreed to the settlement of one or more of the dead-center issues between us, and showed at the same time a genuine desire to proceed with a serious and fruitful discussion of other matters, including those that most closely press in on immediate U.S. security interests, the U.S. should agree to a mutual review of “obstacles to improved trade and general intercourse” between the two nations. Final modification of the system, which could only be effected after necessary discretionary authority had been granted the President, would be left to a later and more decisive stage in the negotiation process. 11. Should the U.S. negotiate an end to its control system, it would need do so not in terms of a simple abandonment of the system but in terms of replacing it with another. Despite the likely absence of any large volume of trade between the U.S. and the Bloc, even under relaxed conditions, it would not be in either our commercial or political interests to allow transactions to fall again under the exclusive control of U.S. private traders, on the one hand, and Soviet state traders, on the other. We would need to cover trade with a government-to-government arrangement that would (a) reserve the right of the U.S. to deny items of direct strategic importance (i.e., items on the COCOM list); (b) insure maximum protection for such U.S. commercial interests as patent rights and copyrights, (c) provide safeguards against Soviet abuses like dumping, and (d) permit the U.S. to change the volume and condition of trade as political considerations made desirable. The principal advantage the U.S. would gain from a change in its trade policy would be the one-shot impetus that would be given to a movement of the USSR toward policies and conduct more compatible with U.S. interests. However, assuming no early renewal of cold war conditions, the U.S. might find that it had exchanged a limited and wasting asset for a still limited but growing asset. The main hope for such a fortuitous turn would lie in the possibility that even as a minor trade partner of the several Bloc countries the U.S. would be better able to influence the course of events and the evolution of policies. The prospects for influencing Soviet policies, at least for the nearer term, would be modest at best; but they could be of very considerable significance in the case of the Satellites. We have good reason to believe that the forces now making for unrest and change in Eastern Europe will mount. The ability to use trade flexibly and actively in Eastern Europe would add greatly to the presently limited capacity of the U.S. to shape the course of these events. In any case, from the point of view of dealing with either the USSR or the Satellites, we would surely be in a stronger position if trade were active (and thus subject to change) than if it were virtually stagnant (and played in only one key). III. Policy Recommendations 1. The U.S. should be prepared to treat its trade control policy as a useful and uniquely appropriate negotiating instrument in discussions with the USSR directed toward resolving outstanding issues. We should view the policy as expendable in circumstances that promise a break in the cold war stalemate. Specifically, we should be willing to take all necessary steps to remove obstacles to trade except trade in items of direct strategic importance (COCOM items), if such action would contribute to constructive moves on the part of the USSR. 2. Pending such circumstances or negotiations, the U.S should not substantially modify its policies toward trade with the USSR. These policies permit considerable latitude in licensing decisions; we should use this latitude to serve our political purposes and in a manner appropriate to the prevailing state of relations with the USSR. We should, in particular, avoid individual licensing decisions that would in effect amount to a tightening or relaxation of licensing standards unrelated to concrete changes in Soviet conduct. We should also avoid pressing our allies to extend the scope of multilateral controls, except in response to a new Soviet-initiated crisis situation. 3. Apart from the question of trade policy toward the USSR, the US should use trade more actively as a means of influencing events in Eastern Europe, recognizing that such trade can symbolize for a Satellite country another avenue for achieving greater national identity and independence. Specifically, we should use the discretionary authority provided in export licensing and other legislation to respond effectively to overtures from any of the Satellite governments with which we have relations. We should also continue to press for new legislation to increase the existing discretionary authority. Should we reach a basic agreement on trade with the USSR, we should be prepared to negotiate at least as liberal an arrangement with the Satellite governments. 4. If we change our control policy, we should plan to conduct trade with individual Bloc countries on the basis of bilateral agreements. Through such agreements we should seek maximum political advantage from trade and the development of better safeguards for U.S. commercial interests. 5. Should it develop to our advantage to negotiate trade arrangements with the USSR, the Administration should be prepared to secure Congressional enactment of a new East-West Trade Act. Such legislation should be based on a full and frank examination with the Congress of all the relevant issues and would presuppose the existence of evidence that the USSR was in process of significant movement toward ending the dangers and strains of the cold war. Such legislation should provide the President with all the administrative authority he needs to use trade as an effective political instrument for dealing with the USSR and its Satellites. 6. The U.S. should in this circumstance also undertake, through advance consultation, to prepare the ground with our allies for a change in U.S. policy. In these consultations, we should discuss any implications that a change in U.S. policy would have on the multilateral system of controls and any changes that might be required to maintain collective surveillance and control of strategic commodities as multilaterally defined. In keeping with the objective of using trade more effectively for political purposes, we should seek a closer understanding with our Allies whereby we would collectively restrict or cut-off trade as a means of response to Soviet-initiated crises. [Here follows the remainder of the report.] * Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, Economic Policy, 1963. Secret. A July 29 covering memorandum from Walt Rostow to Rusk reads as follows: “Although you had a chance to read and hear discussion on an earlier draft of this paper, you may wish to have this latest version at hand which incorporates suggestions made at your planning session on July 18, 1963.” A July 29 cover letter from Rostow to Ambassador Kohler in Moscow states that the paper was prepared in the Policy Planning Council in response to a request by the President for a review of present U.S. policies. The paper was based on views developed in discussion of an informal group drawn from the interested geographic bureaus and the Bureaus of Economic Affairs and Intelligence and Research. “It has gone through a fairly extensive review process in the Department, including a session of the Secretary's Policy Planning meeting, and appears to have general support.” Kohler's comments and his endorsement of the recommendations in Part III of this paper are contained in telegram 474 from Moscow, August 7. (Ibid., Central Files, STR 7) A handwritten note on the title page of the report reads: “Basis for Draft Report to President—See WR memo to Secy. 8/9/63.” That memorandum has not been found. 1 See Document 322 . 2 Brackets in the source text. 325. Memorandum From David Klein of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 325. Memorandum From David Klein of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Source Washington, August 14, 1963. McGB— SUBJECT East-West Trade The Rostow paper on “U.S. Policy on Trade with the European Soviet Bloc” 1 is in the process of revision as a result of a series of talks last Thursday and a new and more forthcoming version is supposed to be in the offing. 2 The first draft talked in common-sensible terms about the character of our present trade policy toward the Soviets—emphasizing that its primary considerations were largely political rather than strategic or economic and recognizing that trade provided useful political leverage in dealing with the Soviets. But its recommendations, in effect, denied the use of trade as an instrument for political bargaining. It set as a pre-condition for a modification of our present policy “concrete evidence of Soviet interest in generating improved relations with the U.S. and of Soviet willingness to take, on the basis of mutual concessions, specific steps necessary to effect this improvement.” This perhaps is unchallengeable as a statement of abstract principle, but as an operating guideline its value is questionable because it leaves little or no maneuvering ground for useful political bargaining. It is not enough to say the trade question should be reconsidered after the Soviets have taken specific steps to bring about an improvement in the existing situation. Improvement will only be possible by some give and take on both sides, and it is unrealistic to suggest that the other side must first demonstrate its good intentions before we can consider meeting them part way. For it is in the give and take process that the intention of the other side can be ascertained. No one can seriously assert that our present relationship with Moscow can properly be characterized as “detente” or “rapprochement.” Whether either of these is in the cards remains to be seen. But the indisputable fact is that there is movement—the first in a long time—and there is an obligation on our part to attempt to ascertain its course and assess its significance. In this context, it makes little sense to assert that insofar as the possible use of trade in this bargaining exercise is concerned, the only real alternative is to wait and see what the other side does. Some waiting and seeing is called for. But carried on over a prolonged period, it will not produce much. If there is to be progress, there must be movement on both sides, and there is no convincing argument for excluding trade from the dialogue if it provides useful leverage. In this context, it is important to define the kinds of trade and trade restrictions we are talking about. There were the restrictions on crabmeat which were lifted early in this Administration. The impact of this action was largely psychological. Politically and economically it did little either for us or the Soviets except to clear away something which had only nuisance value. At the other end of the spectrum there are broad legal restrictions in the form of multilateral agreements (COCOM) and legislation—the Battle and Johnson Acts. And there is little that can be done about these limitations since this clearly is not the time to seek modification either of the multilateral agreements or legislation. But in between the crabmeat exercise and the treaty and legislative barriers, there is also a considerable area of potential activity that is controlled by administrative action—export licensing. Its character depends on the way the Secretary of Commerce's discretionary licensing authority is used. Historically, the restrictions have been severe and rigid because the political decision was taken to keep trade with the Communists at an absolute minimum. As a consequence, the United States has less trade today with the Soviet Union than any of its major Western European Allies. The Soviets, of course, are not interested in trade in general; they are interested in specific kinds of trade—selected heavy industrial goods and industrial plants. Khrushchev, in his conversations with the Secretary and Governor Harriman, talked about the possibilities of buying American chemical plant equipment. In other contexts, the Soviets have talked about buying tire plants and transportation equipment. All of these commodities, the experts have assured me, can actually be sold to the Soviets now, if a political decision were taken to do so. They are not COCOM items; nor do they appear on any other trade ban list. They merely require an export license which is within the Secretary of Commerce's discretion to issue. One “expert” has said that if the political climate is right and the political decision is taken to lift—to whatever degree is deemed desirable—East-West trade barriers, what needs to be done is “to liberalize export licensing, and let them (the Soviets) come and shop up to their ability to pay, by normal marketing of their commodities, gold sales, or settlement in foreign exchange earned elsewhere.” But the exercise is somewhat more complicated, for as pariahs in our market place, the Soviets have several additional problems to contend with: (1) The Soviets and their satellites are not entitled to MFN privileges (and are unlikely to get them) and therefore must face unequal competition. (2) In the sale of their goods here, the Soviets and their satellites have to contend with importer and consumer resistance, and, in some cases, boycott. (3) Moreover, the Soviets and their satellites do not have easy access to credits. The Battle and Johnson Acts cut off the most important sources, although by recent rulings on the Johnson Act, the Justice Department has in fact made it possible for the Communist states to apply for short-term commercial credits. And over and above these, there are several political factors which must also be taken into account. Assuming that the licensing and payment problems can be dealt with, the fact is if trade with the Bloc should reach substantial proportions before the necessary political groundwork is laid on Capitol Hill—even though legislative requirements are not directly involved—the entire operation could boomerang and complicate rather than help the situation. Moreover, at some point in any large-scale trade exercise with the Soviets, lend-lease is almost certain to rear its head and create political, if not legal, complications. Having said all this, the essential points are: (1) Even within the present restrictive parameters this government has substantial authority already at its disposal to expand trade with the Soviet Bloc, provided such trade makes political sense. (2) In our dialogue with the Soviets, the trade question is certain to arise again and at the very least we should be prepared to let the Soviet leadership know that we would consider liberalizing existing trade arrangements if the political developments were right—that we would be prepared to meet them part way if they met us in equal measure on significant ground. (3) Above all, timing is a factor of major importance. While we clearly should not move ahead precipitously (and there will be no end of advice to this effect), it is equally important that we remain alert to political developments and aware of the importance of not holding back so long that an opportunity for significant East-West movement might be missed. As I mentioned above, a revised Rostow paper is in the making which should be here later this week. This, I would hope, would provide the basis for further discussion and instructions. DK * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subject Series, Trade, East/West. Secret. 1 Document 324 . 2 The revised version of the Policy Planning Council paper has not been found. 326. Minutes of the Meeting of the Export Control Review Board 326. Minutes of the Meeting of the Export Control Review Board Source Washington, August 15, 1963. Secretary of State Rusk Secretary of Defense McNamara Secretary of Commerce Hodges Under Secretary of State Ball Assistant Secretary of Commerce Behrman Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Trezise Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce Wyman Mr. Mose L. Harvey, Policy Planning Staff, State Department Secretary Hodges opened the meeting by saying that he had drafted a letter to the President 1 to cover the paper responding to the President's memorandum addressed to the Export Control Review Board of May 16, 1963. 2 He asked Assistant Secretary Behrman to review the background of the proposals to the President and then asked for comment. Secretary Rusk indicated he had no adverse comments on the report itself but offered his views about the current state of Soviet policy and US-USSR relations and about the place of trade relations in our over-all relations with the Soviets. He cautioned, first of all, against being swept away by excessive optimism. Soviet foreign policy has appeared to change before. Each time, however, hostility toward the West has come to the surface again. Present comparatively friendly attitudes could change overnight. The break between Communist China and the Soviet Union seems to be genuine but we cannot be certain about its durability. There could be a reversal of Chinese or Soviet attitudes and a restoration of the Sino-Soviet common front against the West. On the other hand, Secretary Rusk said, Soviet policy probably is in a state of flux. It is often said that we must wait for a change in “the atmosphere” before we take steps in trade relations or in other matters to ease our relations with the Soviets. The trouble with that axiom is that the things that we say should not be changed without a change in the atmos-phere are the very elements that make up the atmosphere. In our trade relations with the Soviets and the European Soviet Bloc, he said, we should begin actively to probe and explore. There is plenty of room for scouting the terrain, he thought, as for example, by being ready to sell fertilizer plants and other items. Our willingness to sell certain kinds of advanced plant equipment for cash, even without pushing for relaxation of the existing ban on longer term credits, would be a signal to the Soviets of our willingness to move ahead on a fair basis. We need not rush too far or too fast. There is much exploration and scouting to be done before we will be ready to negotiate a bilateral trade agreement, although such an agreement may indeed be the end product of our explorations. Secretary Hodges pointed out that American businessmen frequently cannot understand the fact that, although Western Europe was trading with Russia in an increasing amount, we were still maintaining a very tight restriction on such trade. In reply Under Secretary Ball pointed out that differences exist between European attitudes toward trade with the Bloc in that there has been a closer historical connection and a heavier reliance on trade by the Europeans than by the United States. Secretary Rusk mentioned that Khrushchev had said to him, on the question of trade, that both sides should get an advantage. Secretary Rusk thought that we sometimes tend to forget this truism. In loosening our trade controls, we should be watchful, not only to see that we are making satisfactory trade exchanges but also to be sure that progress is being made in other areas. At the moment, Rumania seems to be ripe for a push toward better relations. We should be forthcoming promptly on a number of trade items in which Rumania is interested. If, then, the hoped-for improvement in our relations takes place, we should liberalize further. Returning to the question of the Soviet Union itself, Secretary Rusk expressed the view that it was almost inevitable that Ambassador Dobrynin will raise the trade issue when he begins his talks with him. Secretary Hodges agreed and referred to the invitation to Under Secretary of Commerce Roosevelt to visit the Soviet Union as indicating the USSR's interest in expanded trade. He went on to say that he is frequently asked by American businessmen why the Europeans can sell such large amounts to the Soviet Union while Americans are restricted in their access to the Soviet market. In effect, Secretary Hodges said, they are asking whether we are right and the Europeans wrong about proper trade policy toward the Soviet Bloc. He mentioned in this context Soviet statements that a U.S. export market of $1-1/2 billion per year could be developed in the Soviet Union. There was a general discussion of the possibilities of the Soviet market. Secretary Rusk and Under Secretary Ball both stressed the USSR's payment problem and the limits which this sets on the Soviet purchases. The Soviets seem to be unwilling to expand imports by gold sales and for the most part resist multilateral balancing of trade in favor of fairly strict bilateral equivalence. Furthermore, Under Secretary Ball noted, the Johnson Act prevents us from extending credits of up to five years which the European suppliers do provide. The Johnson Act thus sets the limits on exports to the Soviet Union at fairly low levels. Secretary Rusk asked about the recommendation that a U.S. Commercial Corporation be formed to conduct trade with the Soviet Union. He expressed his own misgivings about this idea. Mr. Wyman asked how otherwise we could get a quid pro quo for our sales to the Soviets. Under Secretary Ball observed that this could be achieved through a bilateral trade agreement, to the extent that private firms were not able to hold up their end in bargaining. He pointed out that the Europeans had not found it necessary to establish governmental agencies to conduct trade with the Soviets and he wondered if we needed to conform our economy to that of the Soviet Union in order to conduct trade. Returning to the problem of credits, Secretary Rusk said that he would be willing to consider the legislative action needed to liberalize our position if we could have credit liberalization accompanied by a Lend-Lease settlement. Secretary Hodges thought a Lend-Lease settlement well worth exploring. Secretary Rusk and Under Secretary Ball agreed. Secretary McNamara, in response to a question from Secretary Hodges, said that to him the question of trade relations with the Soviet Bloc was “purely a foreign policy matter.” He had thought for years that we have been misjudging and grossly overestimating the impact of our trade controls on Soviet military power. While the controls undoubtedly commend themselves to the body of American opinion and in political terms are probably necessary, the fact is that peaceful trade between the United States and the USSR would tend on the whole to mold the Soviet Union in the Western image. He felt that it should be U.S. policy to seek to alter Soviet attitudes and he thought that a positive attitude toward trade was an important aspect of such a policy. Secretary Rusk agreed noting that a recent U.S. Congressional delegation to Russia had come out in favor of a greater exploration of the possibilities of trade. Secretary Hodges noted that even two members of the Kitchin investigating committee indicated that they were willing to expand trade on a quid pro quo basis. In another brief exchange with Secretary Hodges, Secretary Rusk mentioned some of the small indicators for a change for the better in Soviet attitudes toward the West, such as the end of jamming of VOA and BBC broadcasts, and an apparent increase in Soviet receptivity to scientific exchanges. He thought that there may be basic reasons for a change in the Soviet viewpoint toward the West and in Soviet policy. One, of course, was the conflict with Communist China, but there was also, first the increasing awareness among the Soviet leaders of the awful hazards of atomic conflict and, second, a desire, at least on the part of Mr. Khru-shchev to make progress toward the solution of internal economic problems, foremost of which is a conflict between enormous expenditures on the military budget and the goal of higher living standards for the Russian people. A number of possible actions were then discussed: Secretary Rusk said that it was his impression that there was considerable interest in the Congress in the question of trade with the Soviets. The Senators who had accompanied him to Moscow had mentioned the matter and Senator Williams of Delaware had asked for an assurance that the test ban pact had not been accompanied by an understanding on a trade agreement. Secretary Rusk thought that he, Secretary Hodges, and Secretary McNamara should explore informally with the Hill leadership the whole area of trade with the Bloc, not in relation to any immediate legislative requests, but as a means of keeping the Congress informed of the possibilities for a changed U.S. position in trade matters. This suggestion was accepted by the other Secretaries. Secretary Rusk then suggested that after he had begun his talks with Dobrynin, Secretary Hodges join them some Saturday afternoon for discussions in a relaxed atmosphere, perhaps on a boat on the Potomac. This proposal was also agreed. Secretary Rusk asked that in addition to the studies proposed in the recommendations to the President, the agencies concerned take a close look at the possibilities for purchases from the Soviet Union and at the whole Soviet payments problem. Secretary McNamara said that it appeared that we could proceed promptly to liberalize trade with the satellites, whatever the decision about the Soviet Union itself. Secretary Rusk agreed and said that Rumania was the most immediate matter to be looked at. He thought, also, that Secretary Hodges should have “something in his pocket” for his forthcoming visit to Czechoslovakia. Secretary Rusk thought that the Czechoslovakians may be ready for expanded trade with the United States, since international trade represents a very large factor in the Czechoslovakian economy. At this point there was a brief discussion of press inquiries. It was agreed that the agencies concerned should not, at this stage, give backgrounders or otherwise talk to the press about an increased U.S. interest in Soviet trade possibilities. The three Secretaries agreed that the report drafted in response to the President should be forwarded and each signed the letter of transmittal. * Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, Economic Policy, 1963. 1 Secret. Document 327 . 2 Document 322 . 327. Memorandum From the Export Control Review Board to President Kennedy 327. Memorandum From the Export Control Review Board to President Kennedy Source Washington, August 15, 1963. CONCERNING East-West Trade Policy Attached for your consideration are actions which we recommend for your approval leading to an expansion of our trade with the Soviet Bloc. Some of the recommendations involve further research and analysis on the part of our Departments; one calls for discussions with our Allies to attempt to hold them in line. Recommendation No. 6 involves changes in existing legislation and, therefore, an approach to Congress relative to trade discrimination toward the Bloc, Most Favored Nation Treatment and repeal of the Johnson Act. Luther H. Hodges 1 Chairman Dean Rusk Secretary of State Robert S. McNamara Secretary of Defense Attachment 2 SUBJECT East-West Trade Your memorandum of May 16th directed us to examine two questions relating to U.S. trade with the USSR: "1. Do we now deal with the Soviet Union on the export of technically-advanced machinery and equipment in a manner which adequately protects U.S. interests? Where a national security issue is presented, we of course deny an export license. There are, however, many cases in which no clear security issue arises and yet we know that the Soviets are using American machinery and equipment as a basis for copying our technology. Are we being adequately compensated in these sales? "Is there any method of organizing these transactions which would secure a better quid pro quo than the present method of leaving it to the individual seller to secure the best price he can in the transaction, in light of the fact the Soviet Union does not ordinarily respect the patent and copyright arrangements on which we rely in our commercial transactions with other nations? "2. Should we reconsider the whole of our trade with the Soviet Union in the light of trade between Western Europe and the Soviet Union and its European satellites? Considering the character and volume of that trade, would a generally less restrictive policy be more in keeping with the interests of the United States? How much possibility is there for a significant broadening of trade that is consistent with our security interests? Would this possibility be such as to justify a general negotiation on trade and commercial matters with the Soviet Union?” On the basis of the analysis attached, we make the following recommendations. It should be particularly noted that the recommendations bearing on possible policy changes with respect to U.S.-Soviet trade should be negotiated and undertaken only in the context of an easing of East-West tensions over a broad front. 1. Given the fact that it is still unclear whether the U.S. Government could organize arrangements which would permit us higher compensation for technology sold to nations under Communist control without incurring greater costs than advantages from the effort, a study should be made to provide adequate information and analysis, especially in the following areas: The ability to obtain precise identification of advanced technology within industry and the status of its dissemination (published or unpublished). The ability to maintain a roster of changes in techniques and the manner in which they are transferable. The feasibility and effectiveness of unilateral controls over technology, especially when they may be frustrated merely by publication. Feasibility of obtaining sufficient information on the comparative standings of U.S. and European industry on specific techniques, since the relevant comparison of technologies, given a difference in treatment under control by the U.S and its Western Allies, is not between the U.S. and Russia but between the U.S. and the Allies which are making such technology available. The advantages and disadvantages of restricting exports of such technology to non-Communist countries to prevent frustration of U.S. controls and feasibility and desirability of restricting the sale of com- modities made with such technology, for the same reason. Determining pricing and quid pro quo arrangements which would assure adequate commercial and national returns from permissible trade with the bloc. Proposed Action : The Export Control Review Board should, as a matter of urgency, analyze the possibilities and problems inherent in an effort to organize the sale of technology to nations under Communist control and make policy recommendations. This study should develop clear criteria for “adequate compensation” in the field of technology; determine whether or not present prices meet those criteria; examine the feasibility of acquiring in the government the requisite information in particular fields; weigh the likelihood of cooperation from other nations; and assess the political and economic benefits and costs of such a program, both within the United States and in our relations with other nations. 3 2. Given a continuation of political and other tensions between the U.S. and the USSR similar to those which have existed in the recent past, no significant change should be made in our export control policy with the USSR—either over goods or technical data. Some rationalization of controls between the Departments of Commerce and the Treasury in the field of technology is in order. And we should avoid licensing decisions inconsistent with the present negotiating situation. There is, however, little to be gained from a serious extension of the controls or a serious relaxation of them on a unilateral basis. Proposed Action : The Department of Commerce should keep existing procedures under review through the ACEP structure to make sure that individual licensing decisions are not made in a manner so as to weaken a future negotiating posture for the U.S. and so as to reflect the prevailing state of relations with the USSR. 3. As an immediate response and when the political circumstances are judged appropriate, we should use the discretionary authority in existing export licensing and other legislation to respond effectively to overtures from any of the satellite governments with which we have relations including the possibility of bilateral agreements. In this context, we should seek some specific response in the areas of patent and copyright protection, tourism, etc., without the need for legislation. Proposed Action : In the light of the rapidly changing conditions in Eastern Europe, Export Control Review Board should prepare guidelines for a less restrictive, step-by-step expansion in trade with individual nations of Eastern Europe, within the present legal structure. 4. If a significant movement toward a relaxation of tensions with the USSR gets under way, the U.S. should be willing to take all necessary steps to remove obstacles to trade, except trade in items of direct strategic importance (COCOM items), if such action would gain equally constructive moves on the part of the USSR. We should be prepared to treat our trade control policy as a useful and uniquely appropriate negotiating instrument in discussions with the USSR directed toward resolving outstanding issues. We should view the present unilateral policy as amendable in circumstances that promise a break in the cold war stalemate, to be substituted for by a system of bilaterals. Proposed Action : The Export Control Review Board should prepare, on an urgent basis, a contingency plan for negotiating a bilateral trade agreement with the USSR. It should explore the coverage of such an agreement. It should also explore what is necessary for protection of industrial property and copyrights, and should consider whether any other means to secure better returns for the sale of technology are feasible. 5. In view of the possibility that the protection of the national interest in East-West trade may require a stronger institutional base than that now available, and that government purchasing may be necessary to keep a better balance in the accounts with bloc countries, consideration should be given to the desirability of establishing a form of U.S. Commercial Corporation, including its advantages in the event of need to exercise preclusive buying. Proposed Action : The Export Control Review Board should promptly study whether U.S. national interests in a period of expanded East-West trade could be adequately protected by either a step-by-step or bilateral agreements approach and whether it is necessary also to constitute a U.S. Commercial Corporation. 6. The Administration should be prepared as the situation justifies, to seek Congressional enactment of a new East-West Trade Act. Such legislation should be based on a full and frank examination with the Congress of all the relevant issues and would presuppose the existence of evidence that the USSR was in process of significant movement toward reducing the dangers and strains of the cold war. Such legislation should provide the President with all the administrative authority he needs to use trade as an effective political instrument for dealing with the USSR and its satellites. Proposed Action : The Departments of State and Commerce should establish a working group to determine the necessary content of such an Act and to develop data for use in possible 4 Congressional consideration of the Act. 7. We should make advance preparations for a discussion with our Allies of the implications that a change in U.S. policy would have on the multilateral system of controls and the possible need we may face to modify its overtly discriminatory form without damage to our ability to maintain collective surveillance and the control of strategic commodities as multilaterally defined. In keeping with the objective of using trade more effectively for political purposes, we should aim at a closer understanding with the allies, whereby we would collectively restrict or cut off trade as a response to Soviet-initiated crises. We would, of course, make clear that the proposed changes in U.S. arrangements involve no alteration in our policy towards Cuba and Communist China. In addition, we must assess the impact of any change in U.S. East-West trade policy on Latin America and other third countries and prepare to cushion reactions adverse to U.S. interests. Proposed Action : The Department of State should examine problems arising from relations with our Allies and third countries in this sphere. It should explore the feasibility of modifying the COCOM system but preserve the substance of mutual security protection. [Here follow 15 pages of analysis.] * Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Commerce, 1963. Secret. 1 Printed from a copy that indicates the original was signed by all three officers. 2 The source text, marked “FINAL DRAFT,” bears the date August 9. 3 All the proposed actions in this memorandum were anonymously approved with checkmarks on approval lines following each proposal. 4 The word “possible” was added by hand. 328. Memorandum From David Klein of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 328. Memorandum From David Klein of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Source Washington, September 7, 1963. McGB SUBJECT NSC Standing Group Meeting—Discussions of East-West Trade Policy The planners—the Export Control Review Board—have now come up with a set of propositions on East-West trade to be approved by the President (Tab A). 1 Their recommendations are in response to a Presidential request of May 16, 1963 (Tab B). 2 Their recommendations generally provide license for expanded East-West trade and more flexibility for managing this trade. The next step is to transfer the further responsibility in this exercise to the operators to put these recommendations into a meaningful political context. As I see it, this should result in giving Averell Harriman the mandate to come up with proposals for using trade as a lever for developing our relations with the Soviet Union and the Soviet satellites. As far as the Export Control Review Board's specific recommendations are concerned, the key passages are nos. 2 and 3. They call upon Commerce to tidy up its licensing practices to insure that these do not weaken the future negotiating posture of the U.S., and also recognize possible advantages in liberalizing existing practices to permit better exploitation of the changing situation in the Communist world. Recommendation #1 calls for a special study by the Export Control Review Board of the problem of “adequate compensation for U.S. technology.” This could be useful and I see no reason for discouraging it. Recommendation #5 proposes that the Review Board study the advisability of establishing a U.S. commercial corporation to provide a stronger institutional base for conducting East-West trade under the conditions of expanding trade. This, too, might produce something constructive and the Board should be instructed to go ahead. However, I am reluctant about recommendations 4, 6 and 7. Recommendation 4 suggests that the Review Board prepare “on an urgent basis a contingency plan for negotiating a bilateral trade agreement with the USSR.” I appreciate the possible advantages of such an enterprise, but I do not think we are quite ready for this step yet and I do not think it would be useful to have the departments become energetically engaged in such enterprise. It could not be kept under wraps long and would not only get in the way of domestic politics; it would get in the way of negotiations with the Soviets. For the same general reasons, I have even greater qualms about seeking Congressional action to eliminate present legislative restrictions on East-West trade (Recommendation 6) and going to our Allies to review COCOM (Recommendation 7). The experts in the field believe we already have sufficient leeway and authority to deal with the problem (via licensing) and even credit arrangements, limited as they are, are adequate to cope with the first anticipated increases in trade. If there is progress in East-West trade, these things will have to be dealt with in a more comprehensive fashion. But at this point our emphasis should be on utilizing the discretionary authority the Executive branch already has and the credit arrangements which already exist and which, in fact, have been liberalized by Justice Department's rulings. (Tab C) 3 In summary, recommendations 1, 2, 3 and 5 should go on to the President for approval and recommendations 4, 6 and 7 should be shelved for the present. With this action out of the way, it should be possible to go ahead with the more important part of the exercise—determining how trade leverage might be usefully exploited with the Communist Bloc. As I mentioned in two previous memoranda (Tab C and D), 4 trade with the satellites is a problem of different order and magnitude than trade with the Soviet Union. The two are not tied together; nor should one wait upon the other. In the case of the satellites, our purpose is to establish broader Western ties with them, giving them an alternative to the Soviets for their economic development and political relations. Go ahead signals have already been given in the case of Rumania because of developments there. But there are interesting opportunities in other Bloc states as well—including Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and even Albania. As far as the Soviet side of the picture is concerned, there is an important place for the trade item in moving along the dialogue—which already includes such items as security (non-aggression pacts, observation posts, etc.), Germany and Berlin. All this requires a hard look at the political problems at a high level, by someone with sufficient authority and prestige to direct the exercise, not only through the Department of State, but also through the other interested Government agencies—e.g., Harriman. The end product of Tuesday's meeting, 5 therefore, should be to give a mandate to Harriman to move ahead on both the Soviet and Satellite fronts and to produce recommendations for final consideration and decision by the President. DK * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subject Series, Trade, East/West. Secret. 1 Document 327 . 2 Document 322 . 3 Document 325 . 4 Tab D is a memorandum from Klein to Bundy, August 12, on relations with Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria; it is not printed. 5 Reference presumably is to the meeting of the NSC Standing Group on September 10, which discussed the Export Control Board's recommendations on East-West trade and “suggested that prompt action on the Board's recommendations be taken as soon as the Senate voted on the Test Ban Treaty.” (Kennedy Library, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meetings, 1963, September 10, 1963, East-West Trade, Record of Actions) 329. Memorandum From President Kennedy to the Export Control Review Board 329. Memorandum From President Kennedy to the Export Control Review Board Source Washington, September 19, 1963. 1. I have reviewed the report of the Export Control Review Board 1 and its recommendations for action in response to my request of the 16th of May. 2 In general, I approve these recommendations, but in giving this approval I should like to have it understood that I am strongly in favor of pressing forward more energetically than this report and its recommendations imply, in our trade with the Soviet and Eastern Bloc. The course of events of the last two months, including particularly the test ban agreement 3 and the evidence of greater trade by our allies with the Soviet and Eastern Bloc, persuade me that we must not be left behind. I believe also that one person within the Government should have central responsibility for setting this program into action, and after further consultation I expect to designate such a person. I should be glad to have prompt advice from each of you on this point. My more specific comments follow. 2. I agree that the Board should, through the appropriate agencies, go forward with the studies suggested in the first, fourth, fifth and sixth recommendations. Further, the studies and other staff work described in the seventh recommendation should be undertaken under the leadership of the Department of State, with the collaboration of the Department of Commerce and the Department of Defense. These preparations, which are essentially contingency activities, should remain on the staff level for the present. 3. I approve the second and third recommendations. In giving effect to these recommendations, the judgment of the Secretary of State on the political situation in the satellites and the state of bilateral relations with the Soviet Union should be given special weight by the Board. The spirit of the third recommendation with respect to satellites should apply not only to the preparation of guidelines but to the disposition of current licensing issues by the Board and the agencies under its direction. John F. Kennedy * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subject Series, Trade, East/West. Secret. 1 Document 327 . 2 Document 322 . 3 Reference is to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, done at Moscow on August 5, 1963, and entered into force on October 10, 1963; 14 UST 1313; 480 UNTS 43. 330. Editorial Note 330. Editorial Note At his news conference on October 9, 1963, President Kennedy stated that the U.S. Government would not prohibit sales of surplus wheat to the Soviet Union and various East European countries by American private grain dealers at the regular world price for dollars or gold, either cash on delivery or normal commercial terms. He said that he had decided this after consulting with the National Security Council and informing the appropriate leaders of Congress. He added that “the wheat we sell to the Soviet Union will be carried in available American ships, supplemented by ships of other countries as required.” President Kennedy also stated that “this particular decision does not represent a new Soviet-American trade policy,” but “it did represent one more hopeful sign that a more peaceful world is both possible and beneficial to us all.” He pointed out that “to the extent that their limited supplies of gold, dollars, and foreign exchange must be used for food, they cannot be used to purchase military or other equipment.” ( Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, pages 767-768 ) Because of Congressional interest and concern with the decision, President Kennedy reported the reasons not to prohibit wheat sales to the Soviet Union and other East European countries in a letter to President of the Senate Lyndon B. Johnson and Speaker of the House of Representatives John W. McCormack on October 10. (Ibid., pages 776-778) Released with the letter was the opinion of the Department of Justice that this decision neither required nor was prohibited by any act of Congress. (Letter from Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, October 9; Department of State Bulletin, October 28, 1963, pages 661-667) Attorney General Kennedy's letter referred to a letter from Under Secretary of State Ball, September 23, requesting the Attorney General's opinion concerning the applicability of certain laws to the prospective sales. That letter has not been found. Assuming that the President's announcement of U.S. willingness to sell wheat to the Soviet bloc might raise questions about U.S. East-West trade policy, the Department of State circularized to its posts abroad an expression of U.S. policy on East-West economic relationships as background for responses to official inquiries. It stated that the United States was exploring the possibility of modifying U.S. restrictions on non-strategic trade with the European Soviet bloc on a basis more comparable with other trading countries. Trade would be used to take advantage of current trends in East European states and to enhance the range of communication with the Soviet Union. The circular telegram stated that the approach on economic problems would be “considered within the context overall U.S. relationship with European Communist countries.” It pointed out that signature of the nuclear test ban treaty and other disarmament discussions had not ended the cold war. “Soviet leaders will hold uncompromising positions on such matters as Berlin and continue to make clear ultimate goal of world communism and advocate what they term ‘national liberation movements of oppressed peoples.'” The United States therefore adhered to its basic East-West economic policy, which the circular telegram then outlined. (Circular telegram 688 to 112 Embassies and Consulates, October 14; Department of State, Central Files, FT 1 US) During consideration of the foreign assistance authorization bill (H.R. 7885, 88th Cong.) on November 14, Senator Karl E. Mundt (R.-S.D.) offered an amendment to prohibit the Export-Import Bank from guaranteeing or extending credit to any Communist country for the purchase of U.S. grain. President Kennedy urged “in the strongest terms” that the Senate not approve this amendment. (Letter from President Kennedy to Senator Mike Mansfield (D.-Mont.), November 15; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Trade, East/West) On the same day, Senator Mundt withdrew his proposal after the Senate leadership agreed to consider it in a separate bill. That bill (S. 2310, 88th Cong.) would have banned Export-Import Bank credit and credit guarantees to Communist countries for purchase of any U.S. commodity, but it failed of adoption in the Senate on November 26. The House of Representatives approved a similar ban in the foreign aid appropriation bill for fiscal year 1964 (H.R. 9499, 88th Cong.), December 16, but the Senate rejected it on December 19. On December 24, the House of Representatives agreed to the foreign aid appropriation conference report (H. Rept. 1091, 88th Cong.) with a provision that left to the President's discretion authorization of Export-Import Bank credit or credit guarantees to Communist countries if he determined it was in the national interest and reported each determination to Congress within 30 days. The Senate approved the conference report on December 30. Presidential discretionary authority to approve Export-Import Bank credits to Communist countries thus became part of the Foreign Aid and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1964, approved by President Johnson on January 6, 1964. (P.L. 88-258; 77 Stat. 857) 331. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Export Control Review Board 331. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Export Control Review Board Source Washington, October 21, 1963. The President has now received recommendations and comments with respect to the internal organization of the Government for consideration of the problem of East-West trade, and has asked me to report the following decision. The President wishes to proceed as his memorandum of September 19 1 suggests—with a comprehensive review of our position in this field and with substantial efforts to improve it promptly. He accepts the recommendation of the Secretary of State that established channels of coordination and control be used for this purpose, and it is his understanding that under the direction of the Secretary of State, Under Secretary Ball will be responsible for this coordination, with due regard of course to the statutory responsibilities of the Secretary of the Treasury and Secretary of Commerce. The President further understands that under the general direction of the Secretary of Commerce, Under Secretary Roosevelt will take special responsibility for the work of his department in this field. Finally, the President accepts the recommendation of the Secretary of State that initial discussions with the Soviet Government shall be conducted by Ambassador Thompson under appropriate guidance. The President asked me to emphasize again his interest in prompt and energetic action in this field. McGeorge Bundy * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subject Series, Trade, East/West, 10/63-11/63. Secret. 1 Document 329 . 332. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Kennedy 332. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Kennedy Source Washington, October 25, 1963. SUBJECT Trade Relations with the Soviet Union The Soviet Ambassador 1 informed me today that the Soviet trade delegation headed by the Soviet First Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade, Borisov, will be prepared to discuss the general question of United States-Soviet trade relations as well as the specific problem of wheat sales. The Ambassador agreed that the first discussion on this subject might be held in the middle of next week, in an unpublicized manner, and, for the first meeting, would be held to two or three persons on each side. 2 I informed Dobrynin that Thompson 3 and I would represent the United States at this first meeting. My thought was that we should first ascertain what the Soviets have in mind as to the scope of the negotiations. The following appear to be the chief elements of the problem: 1. Large or Small Deal . We shall first have to decide our own policy and ascertain the Soviet views as to whether, in these discussions, we will seek a major settlement of trade problems or simply some modest expansion through liberalizing current restrictions without involving Congressional authorization. When Gromyko was recently in Washington, 4 I expressed to him the opinion that we probably could not reach a broad settlement of trade problems, including legislative action, until after our elections. I think this is probably recognized by the Soviet side. On the other hand, there have recently been indications that they would consider a lend-lease settlement which could conceivably open the way to a major deal. The Soviets have always stated they were seeking the end of any discrimination against them in the trade field. The only important fields of discrimination are the denial of Most-Favored-Nation treatment, the restrictions on credit by the Johnson Act, and controls on arms and strategic items. 2. Credits . The Johnson Act prohibits loans to countries in default in the payment of their obligations to the United States. In the past, we have generally interpreted this to prevent extension of credit terms beyond one hundred and eighty days. The Attorney General has ruled that the Johnson Act does not prohibit extensions of credit “within the range of those commonly encountered in commercial sales of a comparable character.” 5 We could presumably interpret this to allow the extension of credit by private firms to the Soviet Union for the sale of industrial plants for three and possibly even five years. Our Allies are now giving or guaranteeing credits up to five years for such equipment, and we are now engaged in an exercise in NATO to prevent the extension of even longer credit terms which the British, in particular, are inclined to give. If the Soviets thought they could get credit from us for as much as five years, they would probably have less interest in a lend-lease settlement, although they will still wish to obtain MFN treatment. To remove the prohibitions of the Johnson Act with respect to the Soviet Union, it would be necessary to arrive at a lend-lease settlement as well as the settlement of certain Government loans in default. These could, of course, be included in the lend-lease settlement. 3. Lend-lease Settlement . The last Soviet offer of a lend-lease settlement was for three hundred million dollars and our last offer was eight hundred million dollars, not including ships furnished to the Soviet Union. When we attempted to renew negotiations in January 1960, the Soviets attempted to make a condition of settlement, the simultaneous conclusion of a trade agreement giving MFN treatment to the Soviet Union and the granting by the United States Government of long-term credits. It is probable that the Soviets are now prepared to give up the latter condition. 4. Most-Favored-Nation Treatment . The extension of MFN treatment to the Soviet Union is now forbidden by law. In any lend-lease negotiations, the Soviets would certainly take the position that they could not be in a position to meet payments for interest and amortization unless they could have Most-Favored-Nation access to our markets. It seems questionable whether in the present political climate Congress would be willing to grant MFN treatment to the Soviet Union even to secure a substantial payment on lend-lease. Even with MFN treatment, it is doubtful whether the Soviets could sell substantial amounts of commodities in the United States. 5. Arms and Strategic Items . Neither we nor probably the Soviets expect any substantial change in current restrictions on the export of strategic items to the Soviet Union, although there is some leeway in our definition of what constitutes strategic materials. 6. Licensing Requirements . In practice, in carrying out licensing requirements for exports to the Soviet Union, we have frequently denied licenses for items such as agricultural machinery which could only be considered strategic under the widest interpretation of that term. It is in this field that it would be easiest for us to facilitate some expansion in trade with the Soviet Union. Mr. Khrushchev raised with Secretary Freeman 6 the question of Soviet purchase of a larger number of fertilizer plants in the United States and the Soviet Ambassador recently indicated to Thompson that he understood his Government was expecting an answer to this approach. 7. Conclusions . In our first talks with the Soviet delegation, I believe we should keep our sights low, since I believe it is unrealistic to think we could get legislation giving them Most-Favored-Nation treatment at this time and without this, I do not think we can expect them to settle their lend-lease accounts. It would seem to me that we might, however, reach an agreement somewhat along the following lines: a) Expression of our willingness to license the export of certain types of equipment, such as agricultural machinery, fertilizer plants, textile machinery, etc. (A United States firm has been asked to participate in an international consortium for the sale of a huge oil refinery to the Soviet Union. The United States participation would be chiefly the sale of technology. This is being investigated by Commerce, but we will probably have to reject it.) b) Interpret the Attorney General's ruling to allow the extension of private credits on large industrial plants up to three or (five ?) years. c) Let it be known that the foregoing is Government policy. Many firms are now unwilling to make bids or do business with the Soviet Union because of their belief that it will be impossible to obtain export licenses. d) We should probably sound out the Soviets on the possibility of their adhering to international copyright and patent conventions, although their agreement is unlikely and, in the belief of some, is neither very realistic nor necessary since most exporters protect themselves by refusing to sell small quantities for the Soviets to copy. George W. Ball * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subject Series, Trade, East/West. Secret. 1 Anatoly F. Dobrynin. 2 For documentation on the U.S.-Soviet talks on wheat, see vol. V, Documents 224 ff. 3 Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador at Large. 4 For documentation on meetings with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko in Washington on October 10, see vol. V, Documents 221 - 223 . 5 Reference is to the October 9 letter from Attorney General Kennedy to Under Secretary of State Ball; see Document 330 . 6 Secretary of Agriculture Orville L. Freeman visited East European countries, including the Soviet Union, in August 1963. 333. Report Prepared in the Department of State 333. Report Prepared in the Department of State Source Washington, December 6, 1963. STATUS REPORT ON EAST-WEST TRADE ACTION PROGRAM For convenient reference, each of the seven action recommendations approved by President Kennedy on September 19, 1963 1 is quoted below, followed by a summary of the progress thereon since that date. 1. Study of Sale of Technology "The Export Control Review Board should analyze the possibilities and problems inherent in an effort to organize the sale of technology to nations under Communist control and make policy recommendations. This study should develop clear criteria for “adequate compensation” in the field of technology; determine whether or not present prices meet those criteria; examine the feasibility of acquiring in the government the requisite information in particular fields; weigh the likelihood of cooperation from other nations; and assess the political and economic benefits and costs of such a program, both within the United States and in our relations with other nations.” This assignment involves the very complex question of whether some form of compensation other than the price set by the exporter would be both feasible and desirable in the case of sales of technology to the Soviet bloc. The Department of Commerce has prepared a preliminary draft study on this topic. 2 It also has in process the development of information from private business on their experience in dealing with the Soviet bloc on technology. Further analytical staff work will be necessary before significant progress on this assignment will be possible. 2. Review of Licensing Procedures "The Department of Commerce should keep existing procedures under review through the ACEP structure to make sure that individual licensing decisions are not made in a manner so as to weaken a future negotiating posture for the United States and so as to reflect the prevailing state of relations with the USSR.” As noted in Secretary Hodges' memorandum to the members of the Export Control Review Board on September 27, 3 no special action is required of the Board members beyond instructions to their respective “staff people working in the Committee structure of the Export Control Review Board to keep [Recommendation 2] 4 firmly in mind and to note the President's statement that ‘the judgment of the Secretary of State on the political situation in the satellites and the state of bilateral relations with the Soviet Union should be given special weight by the Board,' and that the spirit of the third recommendation concerning satellites should be implemented in our current licensing policy.” 3. Guidelines for Eastern Europe "In the light of the rapidly changing conditions in Eastern Europe, Export Control Review Board should prepare guidelines for a less restrictive, step-by-step expansion in trade with individual nations of Eastern Europe, within the present legal structure.” In the President's memorandum of September 19 he gave special emphasis to the approval of this recommendation and the second recommendation above, setting them, in terms of priority, ahead of the less urgent studies provided for in the first, fourth, fifth and sixth recommendations. A draft “Policy Guidelines on Trade with Eastern Europe”, 5 based on consultation by State, Defense and Commerce, is expected to go forward to the Board in the very near future. In a memorandum of September 26 to the Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Export Policy (ACEP Document No. 174, October 17, 1963)5 the Department of State Member set forth the reasons for the Department's judgment that the political situation and attitudes of Rumania had reached the stage where special trade arrangements would be helpful to the achievement of United States objectives. There has been favorable action by the Committee on recommendations in the State document, including: 1. Some liberalization for Rumania of export controls applied to items subject to individual licensing; 2. Procedural changes in the ACEP structure to secure quicker action on export license applications for Rumania; 3. Completion of a technical study, now under interdepartmental review, of technical data on polyisoprene and polybutadiene synthetic rubber plants because of interest on the highest levels in the Rumanian Government in such purchases in the United States and the likelihood that possible approval of those plants would be a key element in the development of a program for further constructive developments in United States-Rumanian relations. In addition, officials of the Departments of State and Commerce met with the Chairman of the Rumanian State Planning Committee on November 26 and 27 to discuss United States-Rumanian trade relations in general terms with a view to meeting for more detailed discussions at a later date. 4. Study of Possible Bilateral Trade Agreement with USSR "The Export Control Review Board should prepare a contingency plan for negotiating a bilateral trade agreement with the USSR. It should explore the coverage of such an agreement. It should also explore what is necessary for protection of industrial property and copyrights, and should consider whether any other means to secure better returns for the sale of technology are feasible.” The Department of State has developed the major elements of a bilateral agreement and has an up-to-date staff study on the status of the Lend-Lease problem. A special Working Group has also prepared a preliminary report on “The Protection of Industrial and Intellectual Property in U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade”6 as a basis for determining a United States position in any negotiations regarding industrial property and copyrights in United States-USSR trade. 5. Study of Possible United States Commercial Corporation "The Export Control Review Board should study whether United States national interests in a period of expanded East-West trade could be adequately protected by either a step-by-step or bilateral agreements approach and whether it is necessary also to constitute a United States Commercial Corporation.” A draft report 6 has been prepared and interdepartmental discussion on it will begin shortly. 6. Study of New East-West Trade Act "The Departments of State and Commerce should establish a working group to determine the necessary content of such an Act and to develop data for use in Congressional consideration of the Act.” Preliminary staff work is under way on such an Act. 7. Relationships with Other Free World Countries "The Department of State should examine problems arising from relations with our Allies and third countries in this sphere. It should explore the feasibility of modifying the COCOM system but preserve the substance of mutual security protection.” The Department of State has transmitted a circular instruction to all posts describing the nature of current East-West trade policy developments. 7 No proposal has been developed for changes in the COCOM system. It has thus far been premature and inappropriate to enter into discussions with our Allies and third countries about expanded trade with Eastern Europe. * Source: Department of State, Central Files, STR 5. Secret. No drafting information is on the source text. There are two covering memoranda to the source text: One memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Johnson to Under Secretary of State Ball, December 6, requests approval for transmittal of this report to McGeorge Bundy, and the approval line on the memorandum is signed. The second memorandum from Benjamin H. Read, Department of State Executive Secretary, December 18, transmits this report to Bundy. 1 Document 329 . 2 The draft study under reference has not been further identified, but a “Study of Special Aspects Pertaining to Export Controls of Technical Data, Plants, Prototypes, and Components, Parts and Materials” by the Bureau of International Commerce, Department of Commerce, July 30, is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies, Department of Commerce, Technical Export Controls Report, July 30, 1963. 3 Attached to the memorandum from Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Harriman to Secretary of Commerce Hodges, October 7, in Department of State, Central Files, STR 5. 4 Brackets in the source text. 5 Not found. 6 Not found. 7 See Document 330 . 334. Editorial Note 334. Editorial Note On December 16, 1963, President Johnson approved the Foreign Assistance Act of 1963 (P.L. 88-205; 77 Stat. 379), which, among other things, authorized the President to continue most-favored-nation tariffs on imports from Poland and Yugoslavia. Section 231 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (P.L. 87-794, approved on October 11, 1962; 76 Stat. 872) had required the denial of such tariffs to products of Communist countries, “as soon as practicable.” This had not yet been done. Strategic Materials and Commodities Policy Strategic Materials and Commodities Policy 335. National Security Action Memorandum No. 4 Washington, February 4, 1961. Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 4. Top Secret. 336. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, February 13, 1961. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 800.2553/2-1361. Confidential. Drafted by Dozier and cleared by E and NEA. 337. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, February 14, 1961. Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential. Drafted by E on February 25 and approved by S on March 5. 338. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, February 21, 1961. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series,NSAM 4, Uranium Purchase. Confidential. 339. Editorial Note 340. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, July 18, 1961. Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential. Drafted by Kupinsky. A handwritten note on a transmittal slip from Lucius D. Battle (S/S) to Emory C. Swank (S), July 26, attached to the source text, indicates Secretary Rusk approved the memorandum on August 3. 341. Editorial Note 342. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, August 7, 1961. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda, Staff Memoranda, Carl Kaysen, 6/61-8/61. Secret. 343. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Blumenthal) to the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for International Affairs (Burnstan) Washington, September 8, 1961. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 40, Under Secretary of Commerce Files: FRC 66 A 1971, Tin Agreement and Misc., 1961. Official Use Only. 344. White House Press Release Washington, December 2, 1961. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Economic Policy, Oil Policy. No classification marking. 345. Summary Minutes of Meeting of the Interdepartmental Committee of Under Secretaries on Foreign Economic Policy Washington, December 13, 1961. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 59, E Files: FRC 71 A 6682, ICFEP, December 13, 1961, World Oil Situation. Official Use Only. Presumably drafted by Ruth Donahue, who is identified on the list of participants as Recording Secretary. Regarding the origins of this interdepartmental committee, see Document 5. 346. Editorial Note 347. National Security Action Memorandum No. 126 Washington, February 7, 1962. Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 126. Official Use Only. 348. Letter From President Kennedy to President Prado Washington, February 26, 1962. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 800.235/1-2562. No classification marking. Drafted by Paul E. Callanan (OR/CSD) and Richard A. Poole (ARA/WST) on January 19 and cleared by Edwin M. Martin (E), Milton Barall (ARA), Jean H. Mulliken (REA), and Taylor G. Belcher (WST). A covering memorandum of January 25 from Battle (signed by Melvin M. Manfull) to McGeorge Bundy transmitted the letter of December 29, 1961, from Prado to President Kennedy and the suggested reply. 349. Report of the Executive Stockpile Committee to President Kennedy Washington, March 19, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Economic Policy, Stockpiling of Strategic Materials. For Official Use Only. For the dissent of the Department of State to this report, see Document 350. The dissent of the Department of the Interior, March 21, urged that the Departments of the Interior and State retain authority to approve or disapprove disposals of surpluses. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Economic Policy, Stockpiling of Strategic Materials) Regarding the CIA dissent, see footnote 8 below. 350. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Kennedy Washington, March 28, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Economic Policy, Stockpiling of Strategic Materials. Official Use Only. 351. Letter From Secretary of Commerce Hodges to President Kennedy Washington, April 6, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Economic Policy, Stockpiling of Strategic Materials. Administratively Restricted. 352. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) and the President's Assistant Special Counsel (White) to President Kennedy Washington, April 9, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Economic Policy, Stockpiling of Strategic Materials. Official Use Only. 353. National Security Action Memorandum No. 142 Washington, April 10, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 142, Stockpile Rpt. Official Use Only. Copies were sent to the Secretaries of State, Defense, Interior, Commerce, and Labor; the Director of Central Intelligence; and the Administrator of the General Services Administration. 354. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State Tehran, July 2, 1962, 4 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 800.2553/7-262. Confidential. Repeated to Baghdad, Benghazi, Caracas, Djakarta, Jidda, Kuwait, London, and Tripoli. The source text bears the handwritten notation: “File. No Action. 7/9/62” by William Van Dusen (FSD). 355. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, July 20, 1962. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 800.2553/7-2062. Confidential. Drafted by M. Hollis Kannenberg (E/OR/FSE). 356. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Brubeck) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, August 23, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Economic Policy, Stockpiling of Strategic Materials. Confidential. 357. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Petroleum Study Committee (McDermott) to President Kennedy Washington, September 4, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Economic Policy, Oil Policy. No classification marking. A September 5 covering memorandum from McDermott to Kaysen transmitted the report and noted with appreciation Kaysen's contribution to the study. 358. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy Washington, September 19, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 187. Official Use Only. 359. National Security Action Memorandum No. 187 Washington, September 20, 1962. Source: National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 187. Official Use Only. Copies were sent to the Secretaries of State, Defense, Interior, Commerce, Labor, and Treasury; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Director of the Bureau of the Budget; and the Administrator of the General Services Administration. 360. Editorial Note 361. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to the Mission to the European Communities Washington, November 14, 1962, 3:18 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 800.2553/11-1462. Limited Official Use. Drafted by George H. Alexander (OR/FSE) on November 8, cleared by Barbara Fagan (EUR/RPE) and Howard R. Cottam (NEA), and approved by Claus R. Ruser (FSE). Repeated to the EC Mission in Luxembourg and USRO in Paris. 362. Letter From President Kennedy to Secretary of the Interior Udall Washington, November 19, 1962. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Economic Policy, Oil Policy. No classification marking. A cover memorandum to Kaysen, et al., from Kenneth R. Hansen, Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget, November 16, states that this is a revised proposed letter to be sent to Udall on November 19 and that it will not be published. Hansen asked for comments by close of business, November 16. 363. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning (McDermott) to President Kennedy Washington, November 29, 1962. Source: Washington National Records Center,RG 40, Department of Commerce, Executive Secretariat Files: FRC 69 A 6828, Office of the Secretary, President's Committee on Stockpiling. No classification marking. McDermott was the Chairman of the Executive Stockpile Committee. 364. Report by the Executive Stockpile Committee to President Kennedy Washington, January 16, 1963. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Economic Policy, Stockpiling of Strategic Materials, SM 63. No classification marking. A January 16 transmittal letter from McDermott as Chairman of the Executive Stockpile Committee to President Kennedy, not printed, submitted the report for his review and consideration. An attached covering memorandum from McDermott to Kaysen, February 15, states that the President approved the public release of the report. 365. Memorandum From President Kennedy to the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning (McDermott) Washington, January 30, 1963. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 40, Department of Commerce, Executive Secretariat Files: FRC 69 A 6828, Office of the Secretary, President's Committee on Stockpiling. No classification marking. Transmitted with a February 6 covering letter from McDermott to Secretary of Commerce Luther H. Hodges. 335. National Security Action Memorandum No. 4 335. National Security Action Memorandum No. 4 Source Washington, February 4, 1961. TO The Secretary of Defense SUBJECT Purchases of Uranium from Foreign Countries In the light of discussion at the National Security Council on February 1, 1961, 1 the President requested the Secretary of Defense to consult with the Atomic Energy Commission about a review of the purchases of uranium from foreign countries. It is accordingly requested that this review be undertaken and that this office be informed whether, in fact, there is any hope of early savings of foreign exchange in this area. McGeorge Bundy 2 * Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 4. Top Secret. 1 NSC Action No. 2398-g, taken at the 475th meeting of the National Security Council on February 1, is scheduled for publication in volume VIII 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.12 336. Memorandum of Conversation 336. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, February 13, 1961. SUBJECT US-UK Bilateral Talks; Oil PARTICIPANTS UK—Lord Hood, Minister, British Embassy Mr. D.A. Greenhill, Counselor, British Embassy Mr. W.C.C. Ross, Petroleum Attache, British Embassy Mr. D.J. Speares, First Secretary, British Embassy Mr. C.D. Wiggin, First Secretary, British Embassy Mr. M.S. Weir, First Secretary, British Embassy US—Mr. Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Mr. William C. Burdett, Director, BNA Mr. Clarence W. Nichols, Special Assistant, E Mr. Armin H. Meyer, Director, NE Mr. S.B. Jacques, Director, OR Mr. Kennedy W. Cromwell, III, WE Mr. William B. Dozier, BNA Lord Hood said that he was not prepared to go into the details or the technicalities of oil, but rather wished to discuss the subject in general terms. Energy was, of course, vital to the UK economy, and of all the energy sources oil was the most important. Moreover, oil's share of the UK energy market was constantly increasing. Not only must the UK import this large amount of oil, but it has a further interest in that earnings from its oil companies were very important to the UK international payments position. A significant aspect of the oil situation was that production, refining, transportation and marketing were largely centralized in seven international oil companies—five US owned, one UK, and the other half UK and half Dutch. Oil was thus largely controlled by Anglo-American firms and is identified as such in the outside world. Lord Hood felt that it was very important for our two countries to keep in touch with respect to the oil situation, particularly since in their view our difficulties were likely to increase. He said that they thought it necessary for our two governments to provide political guidance to the oil companies and government backing when free world oil was threatened. The principal problem areas were as follows: 1. Oil producing countries demanding an even larger share of earnings and in some cases even ownership; 2. Increasing interference in consuming countries, particularly the trend toward nationalization of refining and distribution operations; 3. Indonesia; 4. Soviet oil exports. Mr. Kohler said that we could readily agree on problems 1 and 2, but he was not so sure about the question of political guidance to private companies. We have always had difficulty here because of our antitrust laws. The difficulty over the Iranian arrangement was mentioned as a case in point. He added that we probably could not expect any radical change in our policy on this point. Mr. Nichols said that there was a general appreciation in the US that the historical basis for the orderly distribution and marketing of oil was undergoing change. Our oil companies, however, have a history of doing a fairly good job in adjusting to and managing the changing situation themselves. He said that in Europe there was continuous discussion of energy policy by government bodies. The situation there was complicated by the rivalry between different energy sources, particularly oil and coal, and by the unusual degree of public ownership. We ourselves participated in the NATO oil study group which was now completing a comprehensive report on the problem of Soviet oil in relation to Western interests. It was anticipated that the report, which should prove to be a very useful document, will be turned over to the NATO economic advisers in about five weeks. 1 Mr. Kohler said that Ambassador Thompson, in recent talks here, stated that over the next ten years we should be prepared to face greatly increased Soviet capabilities in the economic field. Mr. Kohler added that the West may have to organize to meet the threat of increased economic warfare, perhaps along lines similar to the wartime effort. Mr. Kohler observed that while he agreed that bilateral discussions should be held, it seemed that much could also be done in the NATO forum. Lord Hood replied that he agreed with this, and pointed to the NATO study as being very useful in pulling all the threads together. Lord Hood asked if we agreed that our Governments may have to give backing to the oil companies. Mr. Kohler replied in the affirmative. Mr. Meyer asked if the British had anything specific in mind. Lord Hood said that Indonesia was a good example, and possibly even Venezuela and Japan. Mr. Nichols observed that in some areas there were policy questions which go beyond oil that may have to be settled. He said that, for example, large pipe had been taken off the COCOM list some time ago, and since then imported pipe had been of great use to the U.S.S.R. in building oil pipe lines to the West. This may be a matter for NATO consideration. Mr. Kohler asked if the UK had had any thoughts on how to bring the Italian concern Mattei back under control. This firm was very useful to the Soviets as a means of breaking into Western oil markets. Lord Hood replied in the negative. Mr. Meyer, referring to the question of guidance to oil companies, said that we do talk to our oil companies from time to time about their problems around the world, and they are usually cooperative since they consider themselves as being in the same boat. Perhaps the greatest problem is in educating the companies' home offices. * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 800.2553/2-1361. Confidential. Drafted by Dozier and cleared by E and NEA. 1 Not found. 337. Memorandum of Conversation 337. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, February 14, 1961. SUBJECT Sugar PARTICIPANTS House of Representatives Speaker Sam Rayburn Congressman Harold D. Cooley Congressman John W. McCormack Congressman W.R. Poage Congressman Charles B. Hoeven Department of State Secretary Dean Rusk Asst. Secy. for Econ. Affairs Edwin M. Martin Secretary Rusk opened the conversation by stating that the Administration accepted a 21-month extension of the sugar bill, wanted it enacted as soon as possible, but felt it of great importance that the bill, as submitted by Congressman Cooley, 1 be amended to give the President discretionary power with respect to that portion of the Cuban quota which might otherwise have to be allocated to the Dominican Republic. The Secretary based this letter request primarily on the serious potential threat to United States and hemisphere security which is presented by the present situation in Cuba. He indicated that it was essential to take vigorous action to prevent the Castro regime from continuing its efforts to upset peaceful and friendly regimes in Latin America and from becoming a more serious military threat to the United States. A number of steps were under consideration to this end. To be effective it was essential that we have at least understanding and in some cases active cooperation from the other members of the Organization of American States. It was also necessary to have their cooperation and sympathy if we were to succeed in other measures which we wish to take in Latin America in order to establish more firmly regimes in those countries which are friendly to the United States and able to resist Communist infiltration from whatever source it may come. To many of these Latin American countries, led by Venezuela, the Dominican Republic presents an equally serious threat to their stability. Failure of the United States to see the problem of Trujillo as a threat equally as serious as Castro will deprive us of the support and sympathy which we need. The attempt on the life of the President of Venezuela, which was organized in the Dominican Republic with Trujillo's help, stands out as an illustration to them of his threat. To these people it is incomprehensible that the United States should be willing to punish Castro by not buying sugar in Cuba and then turn to the Dominican Republic to replace much of it. It is a windfall and a reward when they think only punishment is justified. From a United States standpoint, we are also concerned about the current political activities of Trujillo. His propaganda machine, which is well financed, is extremely active and a cause of concern to our intelligence agencies. His publicity has become violently anti-American and sympathetic to many Soviet interests. There is evidence that his regime is in contact with Soviet bloc and Castro representatives. Congressman Cooley inquired whether it wasn't true that the Latin American countries had not supported us in the Organization of American States on action against Cuba and wasn't it desirable that they evidence this support before we take the action they want vis-a-vis the Dominican Republic. The Secretary agreed that we had not gotten all we had asked for, yet it had been a step ahead and had been helpful. We did not think we could go to them for support on the measures we now contemplated taking, much more radical in nature, without having given them in advance evidence of our good faith and intentions with respect to the Dominican Republic. He pointed out that, while the OAS had not adopted resolutions specifically embargoing purchases of goods such as sugar from the Dominican Republic, it had taken a number of concrete measures in the trade field, whose spirit they felt would be abrogated by United States windfall purchases in the Dominican Republic. Congressmen Cooley, McCormack and Poage pressed a number of questions with respect to what we expected to happen in the Dominican Republic if Trujillo was upset. Their great fear was that this prevented an opportunity for a Castro-sponsored regime to take over. The Secretary replied that our purpose was not to upset Trujillo, though failure to purchase sugar above and beyond the quota may well contribute to this end. If for this and other reasons, and there was evidence of extensive discontent, Trujillo were upset, our best guess was that a military regime would take over for a period. There were a substantial number of citizens who were anti-Trujillo and would cooperate, we thought, in any such regime. However, the brutality and repressions of the dictatorship had prevented these groups from effective organization. We felt there were military leaders who could continue a stable regime and put down any attempt of a Castro-type take-over, though, of course, we could give no guarantee as to the future course of events. Congressman Cooley indicated that he had been discussing the problem of Dominican Republic sugar with a number of people in recent days, including Messrs. Bowles, Berle, Governor Munos Marin of Puerto Rico and others. The three Congressmen had just returned from lunch at the Venezuelan Embassy during which the Venezuelan and Colombian Ambassadors had expressed strongly their views. Everyone he had talked to had agreed with the Secretary that our Latin American policy would be seriously prejudiced by continued United States purchases of former Cuban quota sugar from the Dominican Republic. He was, therefore, sympathetic to the idea of giving the President discretionary authority. However, he thought it would be desirable in order to secure an orderly transition and prevent a Castro-type take-over if Trujillo could be persuaded that now was a good time for him to retire to some quiet part of the world. He was known to have a substantial fortune abroad. If he stayed on and provoked violent revolution or if he started playing with the Communists, the first target for either group would be himself and his fortune. He could be told that he could not expect to sell sugar beyond the Dominican Republic quota to United States so there were not additional gains to be made in the near future. He should leave, call elections for 60 days hence, and thus provide an orderly transition. Congressman Cooley suggested that he knew some people who were close friends of Trujillo and could carry such a message to him. They would be persuasive and he thought he might listen to them. He thought this should be done before any action was taken on sugar legislation. The Secretary protested strongly that there was not time to undertake such a step, even if it were a wise thing to do, before enacting sugar legislation. In addition he felt that the persuasiveness of any such approach would be greatly increased if the President had already been given discretionary authority to cut off the Dominican Republic allotment before Trujillo was talked to. Otherwise, he could still hope that his friends in Washington could save the day for him as they had in the past. The Speaker strongly supported the Secretary on this point. The Secretary went on to say that a similar mission had, he thought, though of an unofficial character, talked to Trujillo not too long ago without success. He did not know if this was a useful or practical idea. He would wish to consult advisers who were better informed than he on the subject of Dominican Republic situations. He could agree to explore it, but that was all. Congressman Cooley then raised the question of the necessity of having an unallocated sugar quota available to give to a new regime, either in Cuba or the Dominican Republic, in order to provide it support. Such regimes might come into existence before the end of the calendar year and, therefore, he thought it would be desirable to have the sugar allocated on a quarterly basis so that we would always have plenty in reserve. He thought that this presented some problems to the Department of Agriculture. Mr. Martin indicated that he agreed it would pre-sent problems but that he thought if an arrangement, which was otherwise satisfactory, could be worked out, these problems could somehow be resolved. The Speaker asked Congressman Hoeven his views on the Secretary's request. Congressman Hoeven replied that he personally was glad to support the position presented by Secretary Rusk which seemed to him substantially identical to that which had been held by President Eisenhower previously. He felt the Republican members of the Committee would do the same and also the Republican Policy Committee. Congressman Cooley said that if the Secretary was prepared to explore the possibility of making contact with Trujillo and recommending that he depart now and with an understanding that an arrangement like a quarterly allocation could be worked out to preserve a sugar quota for a new regime, he was ready to support the Secretary's proposal for discretionary power to the President. Congressman Poage agreed. The Secretary then pointed out that he had said to them many things which he could not say in a public hearing. There were also things which it was awkward to even discuss in public hearings because what you did not say became significant. He, therefore, wondered if it would be possible for the Committee to report out the Bill without a hearing. Congressman Cooley said that this was the way he preferred to handle it. He had talked to several of the Democratic Congressmen and he thought they would go along with him without the necessity of hearings, especially if he could pass on what the Secretary said during their discussion. Congressman Hoeven was not so sure, feeling that it was desirable to provide information to some of the newer members of the Committee on the issues involved. It was left that Congressman Cooley would discuss the need for a hearing with the Committee when it organized but that in any case he would limit the hearing to an executive session, probably with the Secretary only appearing. He expressed the view that it would not be useful for anybody below the Secretary to talk to the Committee. The Secretary said this would be quite agreeable with him. Congressmen Cooley and Poage pointed out there were also problems on the Senate side and that it would be useful in their judgment if the Secretary could have a quiet talk, similar to the one they had, with two or three of the leading Senators, like Byrd and Ellender. The Secretary agreed to do this. Congressman McCormack then asked a number of questions about Trujillo's relations with the Soviets. He said if he were to reverse the position he took last year, he would have to have evidence that there had been a change in the situation and that the evidence which would interest him most would relate to the Trujillo relationships with the Soviets. The Secretary agreed to get further information on this point and present it to the Congressman. The Speaker in closing asked the Secretary to send him a letter with the text of the amendment the Department proposed in the bill. 2 He would then transmit it to Congressman Cooley as Chairman of the Committee. Congressman Cooley agreed to this procedure. * Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential. Drafted by E on February 25 and approved by S on March 5. 1 H.R. 3738, 87th Cong., introduced by Representative Harold D. Cooley (D.-N.C.) on February 2 2 A copy of Secretary Rusk's letter to Rayburn, February 21, is in Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 15. 338. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 338. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Source Washington, February 21, 1961. SUBJECT Purchases of Uranium from Foreign Countries Attached is a copy of a letter to the President from the Acting Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, dated 7 February 1961, which reviews projected U.S. uranium purchases from foreign governments through 1966. I believe the letter adequately covers the points which the President, at the 1 February 1961 NSC meeting, asked me to investigate with the AEC, as indicated in your National Security Action Memorandum No. 4. 1 You will note that most of the uranium purchases, involving a net dollar outlay of $700 million, will be made from Canada and the Union of South Africa, countries now having foreign exchange problems; that the contracts with these countries have recently been renegotiated to obtain the maximum benefit for the U.S.; and that there is no reasonable expectation that further deferment in purchases or payments can be negotiated, although the possibility of bartering surplus commodities for some South African uranium is being explored by the AEC. Robert S. McNamara Attachment 2 Washington, February 7, 1961. Letter From the Acting Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Graham) to President Kennedy Dear Mr. President : This is to inform you of the situation with respect to foreign uranium purchases. The Atomic Energy Commission is obligated to purchase approximately 36,000 tons of uranium oxide between July 1, 1961 and December 31, 1966, involving a net dollar outlay of $700 million. Most of these purchases will be made from Canada and the Union of South Africa, countries now having foreign exchange problems. Both contracts have recently been renegotiated to obtain the maximum benefit for the United States. There is no reasonable expectation that further deferment in purchases or payments could be negotiated. Barter of surplus commodities for some South African uranium is a possibility. As shown on the attached tabulation, 3 the net payments for Canadian uranium will total $370 million for deliveries under a contract with Eldorado Mining and Refining Limited, a Canadian Government corporation, and $325 million for uranium from the Union of South Africa under a contract with the South African Atomic Energy Board. In each case the Government agency with which AEC has its contract has underlying contracts with private uranium producers. The balance of the uranium (less than one percent, costing about $5 million) will come from small operations in Australia and Portugal. The Canadian contracts were recently revised to provide for a stretch-out in uranium production and deliveries. Delivery of approximately $140 million worth of uranium which would have been delivered in 1961 and 1962 has been deferred to later years. All deliveries are to be completed by the end of 1966. Had it not been for the stretch-out, Canadian deliveries to the U.S. would have been largely completed at the end of calendar 1962 with only minor deliveries coming in 1963. Prior to the time the stretch-out arrangement was agreed upon, the U.S. had notified the Canadian Government that it did not intend to exercise its options to purchase additional quantities of uranium and proposed that a stretch-out be considered which would involve no additional costs and no increase in the quantity of uranium being purchased. The Commission's decision not to exercise its options, as well as the stretch-out arrangement, posed major economic and political problems for the Canadian Government. Although operations will continue over a longer period, the stretch-out arrangement has cut the Canadian industry roughly in half with many of the mines being closed. Under the circumstances there is no reasonable prospect that further deferrals could be obtained. South African purchases were formerly made under a joint United States-United Kingdom contract with the South African Atomic Energy Board running through 1966. The U.S. bought two-thirds of the production and the U.K. one-third. This arrangement has also been recently revised to provide for separate AEC-South African and U.K. Atomic Energy Authority-South African contracts, the quantities remaining unchanged. The revised AEC-South African contract provides for a $20 million reduction in total cost and in a minor deferral of deliveries which would have been made in F.Y. 1961 and 1962 totalling $7 million. Under the new arrangement the U.K. will take most of its material after 1966 but, because South Africa also has a foreign exchange problem, will make substantial advances for each pound deferred. No advances are involved in the AEC-South African contract and all deliveries are to be completed by December 31, 1966. The Commission decided not to extend South African deliveries beyond 1966 because of possible problems with domestic producers. Our present domestic uranium program terminates December 31, 1966. It is unlikely that a further stretch-out of South African deliveries and payments can be negotiated. There is a possibility, however, that some portion of the South African uranium could be paid for with surplus commodities, provided the U.S. is willing, as an incentive, to purchase additional quantities of uranium which it does not need. In prior conversations, Commodity Credit Corporation indicated that the amount of surplus commodities which might be involved in a barter arrangement probably would not exceed $20 million annually. Part of this would go to pay for the additional quantity of uranium which might be involved. The problems in attempting barter relate, first, to displacement of U.S. cash sales of the commodities and, second, to displacement of sales by friendly governments which also export the commodities involved. The proposed barter program would undoubtedly cause resentment on the part of Canada, particularly if it involved additional uranium purchases—purchases which we refused to make from Canada. Canada has already raised objections to this country's agricultural barter program. Domestic producers also are likely to raise objections to additional foreign uranium purchases since the domestic program has been cut back. Notwithstanding the problems, we propose to explore the matter with Commodity Credit Corporation and possibly the South Africans to see what kind of arrangement might be worked out and to better define any problems which may be involved. Respectfully yours, John S. Graham 4 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series,NSAM 4, Uranium Purchase. Confidential. 1 Document 335 . 2 No classification marking 3 Not printed. 4 Printed from a copy that indicates Graham signed the original. 339. Editorial Note 339. Editorial Note On March 31, 1961, President Kennedy approved P.L. 87-15 (75 Stat. 40), which amended and extended the Sugar Act of 1948 (P.L. 80-388, approved on August 8, 1947; 61 Stat. 922), as amended, to June 30, 1962. The law continued the President's authority to exclude Cuban sugar exports from the U.S. market and authorized him to deny the Dominican Republic the share of the Cuban quota that it would otherwise gain. For a statement in support of this bill (H.R. 5463, 87th Congress) by Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Martin before the Senate Finance Committee on March 27, see Department of State Bulletin, April 17, 1961, page 562. 340. Memorandum of Conversation 340. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, July 18, 1961. SUBJECT The Secretary's Interview with the President of Standard Oil Company of New Jersey PARTICIPANTS The Secretary Mr. Rathbone, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey Mrs. Ruth H. Kupinsky, Office of European Regional Affairs Mr. Rathbone reported on his recent trip to the United Kingdom, Norway, Denmark and Sweden where he undertook an on-the-spot appraisal of Soviet exports of oil, both as it exists now and future trends. He said he was quite disturbed by his findings. There is considerable interest in, and pressure for, increased trade with the Soviets, with much of this pressure coming from business interests. In order to expand trade with the Soviets, Western European countries were being pressed to take increasing quantities of Soviet oil, which Mr. Rathbone thought the Soviets were using as a tool in the cold war. Soviet oil is priced to Western European countries considerably below oil from all other sources, making it attractive to many countries. Western oil companies could not compete with Soviet prices, since the latter did not have to be based on economic considerations. The Secretary said that the United States Government is concerned about the increase in Soviet exports and is consulting closely with our Allies on this problem. He asked for Mr. Rathbone's evaluation of Soviet oil reserves and supplies. Mr. Rathbone said there was no question but that the Soviets had very large reserves and could produce 5 million barrels of oil a day in the next three years. This compared with current United States production of 7 million barrels a day and a United States potential of 10 million barrels a day. He also felt that internal Soviet consumption would not absorb Russian oil supplies, particularly since the Soviets were developing the use of natural gas for industry and would thus have large supplies of oil available for export. Mr. Rathbone thought the Soviets were very well aware of the usefulness of oil in expanding their trade and the potential mischief this could create in the West. In Sweden, he said, approximately 50 percent of heavy industry depended on Soviet oil. Heavy reliance on Soviet oil was dangerous, since it could lead to an undesirable influence in government decisions affecting policy; it was an unreliable source which the Soviets could manipulate to their advantage; it could endanger the availability of oil from the Middle East, and have serious political and strategic implications for the Middle East. Mr. Rathbone considered it particularly undesirable that close allies of the United States become significantly dependent on the Soviets for their sources of oil. The Secretary asked Mr. Rathbone to expand on his discussions with the British, particularly his conversation with Selwyn Lloyd. Mr. Rathbone said that he had talked with Maudling, following the latter's return from Moscow, and with Mr. Wood, the Power Minister, who set up an appointment with him with Mr. Lloyd. Although the British have so far resisted taking any significant quantities of Soviet oil, they were under great pressure to import Soviet oil at their recent trade negotiations with the Russians. They were successful in holding off the Russians for another year on oil, telling them that they had a surplus of oil and would be happy to sell some to the Russians. According to both Maudling and Lloyd, however, it appeared unlikely that the British would be able to hold off taking Russian oil beyond this year, since they were under considerable pressure from their business people to expand UK-Soviet trade. The question now appeared to be not whether the British would take Soviet oil in the future, but how they would handle the oil administratively. Mr. Lloyd had asked Mr. Rathbone what he thought would be the best way to handle imports of Russian oil. Mr. Rathbone indicated he was not in favor of the idea in principle, and there was no really good way of handling it. He saw, however, three ways of distributing Russian oil in the U.K., if this oil were taken: (1) let the companies using the oil and the Soviets work it out directly; (2) have the Government take over the oil and make arrangements for its distribution; and (3) turn the oil over to the oil companies for their allocation to consumers. Of all three approaches, he thought the third one would be most difficult, if not impossible, for American companies due to United States anti-trust laws. He thought the first approach was also bad, since it might result in serious inequities. While the second approach also had difficulties, it would be the least troublesome of the three. Mr. Rathbone said that if the oil companies undertook to distribute Soviet crude, there would be a great out-cry from the Middle Eastern oil countries. The Secretary asked whether the Middle Eastern countries have made diplomatic approaches to the Western European countries who are taking substantial quantities of Soviet oil. According to Mr. Rathbone, practically nothing has been done by the Middle Eastern countries, since half refuse to recognize the Soviet danger and the others do not know what to do. He said some 25 million tons of Soviet oil were exported to Western Europe last year, the bulk of which came directly out of the Middle Eastern share. The Secretary then suggested that it might be useful to stir up the Middle Eastern countries to make approaches to the Western European countries and to make them aware of the dangers to their own interests in the Soviet oil export trade. Mr. Rathbone thought the United States ought to take the following three lines of action to counter the Soviet oil export drives: (1) instruct all our posts abroad on United States policy in this field; (2) hold high level conversations with our allies; and (3) exert “moderate pressure” on the less-developed countries taking Soviet oil, in connection with United States aid programs or loans. He understood the United States had taken action along the lines of his first proposal and that discussions were going forward in NATO and the OECD. Mr. Rathbone considered, however, that there was not sufficient high level attention being given to the discussions with our allies. The Secretary noted we were discussing this question on various levels and that it would probably come up for discussion at the December NATO Ministerial Meeting. Mr. Rathbone thought December might be too late and suggested a greater sense of urgency on this problem. The Secretary said that the question was being currently dealt with and that it would be involved in the Department's consultations on Berlin which were going forward on a current basis. The conversation turned to the subject of prices and the Secretary asked what the influence of Sahara oil would be. Mr. Rathbone said that the Soviets are pricing oil to Western Europe at about $1 a barrel below posted prices from Persian Gulf sources and about 75 cents below discount prices. The oil situation would be complicated by the additional supply from Sahara and, Mr. Rathbone estimated that in a year or so, three-fourths of the French requirements would be supplied by Saharan oil. The Secretary asked Mr. Rathbone if his company were contemplating a change in its price structure. Mr. Rathbone said the company had tried to reduce prices a year ago and that they had been faced with what he characterized “almost a revolution” in the Middle Eastern oil countries. Although the companies wanted to reduce prices, he felt it was not possible to do so. * Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential. Drafted by Kupinsky. A handwritten note on a transmittal slip from Lucius D. Battle (S/S) to Emory C. Swank (S), July 26, attached to the source text, indicates Secretary Rusk approved the memorandum on August 3. 341. Editorial Note 341. Editorial Note Executive Order 10952, August 9, 1961 (26 Federal Register 5918; 50 USC App. 2271), transferred major civil defense operating functions from the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization to the Department of Defense. In consequence, Public Law 87-296, approved on September 22, 1961 (75 Stat. 630), changed the name to Office of Emergency Planning. Executive Order 11051, September 27, 1962 (27 Federal Register 9683; 50 USC App. 2271), prescribed the responsibilities of that office within the Executive Office of the President. Among his activities, the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning determined the kinds and quantities of strategic and critical materials to be acquired and stockpiled under the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act of 1946. (P.L. 79-520, approved on July 23, 1946; 50 USC 98-98h) He investigated commodity imports to determine whether the rate or circumstances of such importation threatened to impair the national security within the terms of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. (P.L. 87-794, approved on October 11, 1962; 76 Stat. 872) He consulted with the heads of procuring agencies to determine whether procurement should be limited to domestic sources in the interest of national defense under the Buy America Act of 1933 (Title III of P.L. 72-428, approved March 3, 1933; 47 Stat. 1520; 41 USC 10a et seq.) 342. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 342. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Source Washington, August 7, 1961. SUBJECT Tin 1. I recommend that the President give Congress notice of his intention to dispose of 50,000 tons from the stockpile in the course of the next two years, and request a waiver of notice with respect to 10,000 tons. This should be done in such a way as to excite no public comment during the next ten days. Your signing the attached memorandum to Mr. Ellis 1 and sending a copy directly to Mr. Brewton will be enough to get the process in motion. I am sending him a copy of this memorandum. The only argument against this action is the adverse impact on our relations with Latin America, and Bolivia in particular. We cannot continue to base our good relations on the unrealistic policy of accumulating stockpiles in excess of any sensible need. This is to extend the vices of our domestic agricultural policy abroad, and we will find it simply intolerable, as well as politically impossible to do so. Indeed, to the extent that we are considering entering into commodity agreements, we must make it clear from the outset that we will not accept the task of simply financing other countries' surplus production ad infinitum. On the other side, the interest of American consumers, and the long-run interest of tin producers, both go in the same direction: for disposal. Further, this represents an important opportunity to reduce the costs of holding the stockpile and to make some profit on the sale. The gross profit on the disposal would run in the neighborhood of 8-10 million dollars over the average acquisition costs. We would reduce investment in the stockpile by some $150 million. 2. The price of tin has recently reached a new high and as a consequence there has been pressure on the government to dispose of some of our strategic stockpile. The pressure arises from two sources: First, the International Tin Cartel (of which the U.S. is not a member) has sold out its whole buffer stock as required by its statutes when the price reaches $1.10 per pound. It is now $1.16, and it has been as high as $1.20 this year. The second source of pressure is from the consuming industries in the U.S.: the steel industry, and the users of tinplate. In addition to this, there is the pressure of logic: this is an opportunity to diminish our investment in unnecessary stockpiles and to contribute even a small downward push to prices in a period of rising economic activity. 3. The rise in price has been consequent on a gradual decline in production in Bolivia and Indonesia, arising from political disorganization in both countries. This production seems unlikely to be made good in the immediate future, and Malaya, the major producer, is running about at capacity now and cannot readily increase its supply much in the short-run. 4. Present holdings in our strategic stockpile are about 345,000 tons, acquired at an average price of about $1.085 per pound. This compares with annual world production of something like 145,000 tons currently, and U.S. consumption of 55-60,000 tons of primary tin. The stockpile objective until May of 1960 was a basic figure of 192,000 tons, and a maximum of 198,000 tons. On June 14, 1960, the objectives were reduced to a basic objective of 150,000 tons and a maximum of 185,000 tons. Thus, we have an excess of at least 160,000 tons over our estimated emergency requirements. In fact, the emergency requirements are still set too high. They are calculated on the basis of three-year use. Given the likelihood that a war serious enough to cut off the sources of supply would become a general war, that would destroy much more of the capacity for using tin than it would the tin stockpile, and the possibility of a substitution of other products for tin, there would seem to be no doubt of the generosity of the three-year figure. 5. The OCDM is considering a recommendation that up to 50,000 tons be sold from the stockpile in the next two years. Any such action requires six months' notice to Congress and Congressional approval. The proposed OCDM recommendation suggests that the President request Congress for the waiver of the six-months' notice with respect to 10,000 tons, and that the President therefore have the authority to dispose of this much immediately. The best estimates that are available suggest that 10,000 tons could be disposed of with little if any effect on the price, and that therefore the stockpile would realize a significant profit (the GSA is now disposing of 4,000 tons which were under the control of the GSA in part of the strategic stockpile, and this is expected to go without any effect on the current price of $1.16). The 50,000 tons, if disposed of in the course of a year, might push the price down to $1.05. 6. Mr. Brewton, the Assistant Director for Resources and Production,OCDM, raises the question of whether the reduction of the stockpile objective made under the last administration is in accordance with the policy of this administration. He desires specific instruction on this point before he is willing to approve the staff recommendation on behalf of the Director. I attach a memorandum of instruction for him on this point. 2 7. Selling from the stockpile raises a problem of foreign policy. Bolivia, in particular, is very sensitive about the disposal of tin. Wymberley Coerr, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (ARA), is strongly of the opinion that nothing should be said that would produce any public indication of our intention to sell tin during the course of the Montevideo Conference. 3 He believes any discussion of the subject, even a rumor, will be extremely damaging to our position there. On the longer-run, Coerr says that the Bolivians are irrational about disposal of any sort. Past attempts to convince them that the very high price of tin hurts them in the long-run have not been too successful. Further, at the moment, there is a struggle between Communist and anti-Communist factions among the tin miners, and we will do ourselves no good there by any disposal. Coerr agreed that it might be worth thinking about more effective ways of making the Bolivians conscious of their long-run interests in the price of tin; namely, that generally high prices and short supply encourage substitutions away from tin, which once made, may well be permanent. 8. The Congressional situation on the request for waiver is as follows: The matter is within the jurisdiction of the Armed Services Committees, chaired in the Senate by Senator Russell, and in the House by Congressman Vinson. The subcommittees that have cognizance are chaired in the Senate by Senator Symington, and in the House by Congressman Philbin. So far as is known, none of these is expected to object to the request for the waiver of notice. It is the estimate of Messrs. Wilson and Manatos that, with no objection from the relevant chairmen, the waiver request would go through readily, and that nothing would be lost by waiting until the end of the Montevideo Conference to raise the issue. CK * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda, Staff Memoranda, Carl Kaysen, 6/61-8/61. Secret. 1 Not attached and not found. 2 Not attached and not found. 3 Reference possibly is to the special meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council at Punta del Este, Uruguay, August 5-17, 1961. 343. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Blumenthal) to the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for International Affairs (Burnstan) 343. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Blumenthal) to the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for International Affairs (Burnstan) Source Washington, September 8, 1961. Dear Burnie : I have received your memorandum of August 31st including Mr. Foley's memorandum to you of the 30th relating to the International Tin Agreement. 1 We had a meeting in Mr. Gudeman's office on September 1st at which we reached complete agreement on further procedure. 2 We all felt that it was most advisable to secure authority from the Congress at this session, if possible, to release a maximum of 50,000 tons from the strategic stockpile and to waive the six months waiting requirement for 10,000 tons of this amount. I understand that recommendations to this effect have now gone forward from General Services Administration to the Congress. 3 As a result, there has already been a break in the price and the upward trend may now have been reversed. We agreed that United States representatives should go to London during the week of September 13 to discuss on a confidential basis and without any commitment whatsoever the terms of possible U.S. accession to the Agreement. 4 After their return we will have a period of at least two to three months during which the Commerce Department will have further discussions with the tin consuming industry. The State Department is quite willing to be present at any such meetings and to assist in explaining the various factors involved in becoming full-fledged members of the Agreement. In any case, if matters proceed smoothly, we would not be in a position to recommend accession to the Congress, and to have this recommendation acted upon, until the second quarter of 1962. There was also general agreement that the present price of tin is too high and that this presents real threats to the long-run prospects of the tin producing industries throughout the world by stimulating research programs directed toward more economical use of tin and the development of substitute materials. For this and other reasons, we agreed that the U.S. should, at the present time, oppose increases in the price range for tin fixed by the Agreement. Best regards, Sincerely yours, Michael * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 40, Under Secretary of Commerce Files: FRC 66 A 1971, Tin Agreement and Misc., 1961. Official Use Only. 1 Reference is to Burnstan's memorandum to Blumenthal, August 31, enclosing a memorandum from Eugene P. Foley, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Domestic Affairs, to Burnstan, August 30. Both memoranda are attached to the source text but not printed. For text of the Second International Tin Agreement, which was signed in London on September 1, 1960, and entered into force provisionally on July 1, 1961, see 403 UNTS 3. 2 A report of the Gudeman-Blumenthal meeting on tin policy, September 1, is in Department of Commerce, Bureau of International Programs, BIP-848 Report, prepared by Donald Sham, September 2, filed with the source text. 3 For the General Services Administration announcement of the 50,000-ton disposal plan, September 6, see 26 Federal Register 8425. 4 In his speech to the special meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council at Punta del Este, Uruguay, on August 7, Secretary of the Treasury Dillon, chairman of the U.S. Delegation, intimated that the United States might be willing to join the International Tin Agreement. (Department of State Bulletin, August 28, 1961, pp. 356-360) Blumenthal asked Burnstan in a letter of August 23 (filed with the source text) whether the Department of Commerce objected to proceeding with this matter. At the September 1 meeting with Blumenthal, Gudeman said that he wanted to contact the industry before further discussions, and he wrote a letter to Roger M. Blough, Chairman of U.S. Steel Corporation, September 6 (filed with the source text), for his views. 344. White House Press Release 344. White House Press Release Source Washington, December 2, 1961. STUDY OF PETROLEUM SECURITY OBJECTIVES BY THE OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PLANNING Proposals of the Secretary of the Interior to amend Proclamation 3279 1 governing the allocation of oil import quotas have been under consideration for the past several weeks. The President announced today that a comprehensive study of petroleum requirements and supplies in relation to national security objectives will be undertaken under the leadership of the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning, to be completed by mid-1962. 2 The study will take into account not only the welfare of the domestic petroleum industries, but also the need to promote the Nation's economic growth in the face of rapid technological and world changes. The study group has been asked to make recommendations on alternative means of achieving our security objectives and providing a basis for increasing our strength to compete in the free world. Since the study will include a review of the mandatory oil import quota program, it will provide a basis for the consideration of any changes in the existing program that may be necessary. In the meantime, allocations of oil import quotas will continue to be made under the existing proclamation. * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Economic Policy, Oil Policy. No classification marking. 1 Proclamation 3279, “Adjusting Imports of Petroleum Products into the United States,” signed by President Eisenhower on March 10, 1959; 73 Stat. c25. 2 Frank B. Ellis, Director of the Office of Emergency Planning, subsequently announced the appointments to the Petroleum Study Committee, as follows: Edwin M. Martin (State), James A. Reed (Treasury), Paul H. Riley (Defense), Nicholas deB. Katzenbach (Justice), John M. Kelly (Interior), Eugene Foley (Commerce), and W. Willard Wirtz (Labor). (Office of Emergency Planning, Executive Office of the President, Press Release 17, December 21; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Economic Policy, 12/61-1/62) 345. Summary Minutes of Meeting of the Interdepartmental Committee of Under Secretaries on Foreign Economic Policy 345. Summary Minutes of Meeting of the Interdepartmental Committee of Under Secretaries on Foreign Economic Policy Source Washington, December 13, 1961. [Here follows a list of participants.] WORLD OIL SITUATION Opening remarks were made by Under Secretary of the Interior James K. Carr. This was followed by a detailed presentation of the strategic and foreign policy considerations of oil by Assistant Secretary of Interior John M. Kelly. Interior felt the subject so important that it put together a set of reference documents which were distributed to all members of the group and which Mr. Kelly used as the basis for his presentation. Interior believed these papers would be useful and could be widely distributed. 1 Mr. Martin, Assistant Secretary of State, who was presiding in Under Secretary Ball's absence, asked that the summary paper and the paper on Soviet oil not be made available to anyone outside of the Government until the State Department had checked with its Soviet experts as to the classification. The papers submitted by the Department of Interior were as follows: Strategic and Foreign Policy Considerations of Oil (summary paper) Illustrative Charts Statistical DataSupplemental Paper 1—Petroleum Refining Capacity of the Free World Supplemental Paper 2—World Tanker Situation Supplemental Paper 3—Oil Import Program Supplemental Paper 4—Petroleum Prices Supplemental Paper 5—Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Supplemental Paper 6—Soviet Oil Expansion Since these readily accessible papers cover the subject-matter so thoroughly and since Mr. Kelly's presentation followed the papers closely, this summary record covers only the discussion. Discussion Present import quota system questioned as a defense measure . One of the major points raised and around which a number of questions centered was whether the present oil import controls serve the national security interest as effectively and as cheaply as other arrangements would. If the national security interest requires a large quantity of readily available oil in this country, should not oil be stockpiled? One method would be for the Government to buy up some fields and keep them largely out of production until they were needed. Another method would be to import Middle East oil and store it in old oil wells in the United States, particularly in Pennsylvania. Mr. Kelly said that these measures were possible. He pointed out that only about two-thirds of the oil put into old wells would be recovered because of loss through “wetting.” Mr. Kelly thought that curtailment of U.S. production would be unwise, however, because of the changing fuel picture. He said that 50 years ago lots of people wanted the Government to take over the coal areas and hold them for future use, but that the emergence of oil and gas has shown that such a policy would have been unwise. Likewise, conservation measures for oil might turn out later to have been unnecessary. Mr. Rowen inquired whether Mr. Kelly meant by this that we need not worry about oil for defense? Mr. Kelly replied that he thought that enough U.S. oil would be forthcoming if the domestic industry, particularly because of its exploration activities, could be protected from large imports. The cost of the present import quota system to U.S. oil users was estimated by Mr. Gordon (CEA) at $3 billion per year. (This figure is based on U.S. consumption of 10,000,000 barrels per day at a price $1.25 per barrel above the price of Middle East oil delivered to East Coast refineries, reduced by one-third.) Mr. Kelly replied that this figure assumes that all oil consumed in the United States would be imported from the Middle East at a two-thirds saving of the $1.25 differential. Mr. Gordon questioned this inference stating that he assumed only that the United States domestic price would be governed by the world price. Questions were raised as to whether this cost served effectively to promote the discovery and development of new oil fields in the United States, and whether less costly means could not be found for assuring the availability of adequate oil for defense purposes. Profits from import controls . There were several questions about who should be allowed to profit from our import controls. Mr. Kelly noted that the import restrictions were a response to the difference in production costs in the U.S. and in the Middle East. Though the price difference was about $1.25 per barrel, not all this difference represented profit for domestic U.S. producers. Importers into the U.S. were able, however, to pocket the difference between the U.S. price and the import cost. Mr. Kelly, in reply to a question as to why we did not tax away this profit on imports, said that this would involve a tariff. He said that a sizable part of the industry would prefer a tariff to quotas, so that they could operate in a freer market, and Interior does not close the door to this approach. He said there would be problems in the use of a tariff, however, because of the different cost conditions between, for example, Venezuela and the Middle East. The Canadian problem . The U.S. consumer is subsidizing Canadian producers at the rate of about $250,000 per day, Mr. Kelly said, since oil from Canada enters the U.S. without any quota restrictions. Canada could meet its entire market by itself, but finds it more economic to export its oil to our Middle West rather than ship it to the Montreal area, and to supply the Montreal area from imports, largely Venezuelan. Others commented that it is in our national security interest to receive Canadian oil. Mr. Kelly replied that both countries have the same security interests and that we have protected our East Coast security interest by pipelines while Canada has not, though within five years Canada may start taking care of the Montreal complex by pipeline from its West. In the meantime, Canadian oil competes with U.S. oil in our Midwest. The broad international problem . Mr. Martin noted that not only does the Free World get two-thirds of its oil from the Middle East now but that 50 years from now it will probably be even more dependent on Middle East supplies. From the security standpoint of our longer-term interest in the broadest sense, we must consider what kind of arrangements we can work out to insure Free World access to Middle East oil. Already we have an irrational situation in the Middle East producing and distributing situation. It is irrational not only economically but politically. The international oil companies within the borders of these countries are in a position to dominate completely the political life of the countries because the companies are the source of the bulk of the Governments' revenues. The companies are earning enormous amounts of money and this is resented. This makes them a likely target for the worst kind of attack on political and economic grounds. On the other end of the spectrum, the companies themselves are faced with all kinds of problems. They are faced with the surpluses of stocks and capacity, with increasing competition of substitutes, with new oil discoveries which jeopardize their traditional markets, with competition from Soviet oil, with having to use their Middle East profits to cover costs of explorations elsewhere that prove sterile, with the constant demand of the Middle East Governments for a larger share of oil revenue, and with no flexibility on prices. These all add up to a serious state of tension. As a result our oil companies are handicapped in other less developed countries where the Soviets use cheap oil and oil exploration to penetrate the countries. Shall Western companies try to compete with the Soviets in price? (The French assumed that we put import controls on to get high profits for our international oil companies so that they could sell at cut prices in the less developed countries in order to compete with the Soviets.) The companies are in difficulty on exploratory concessions. They come in and spend lots of money and if they don't find oil, they are faced with the charge that they didn't really want to as it would have cut down on their Middle East profits. Then the less developed countries say they will ask the Soviets to come in. The companies are scared of OPEC because they don't think the people running it have a sufficient understanding of the economies of oil. They are frightened that the OPEC Governments will put international prorationing into effect. Then there is the problem of the European countries in connection with the Soviet oil offensive. The average person in Italy gets his oil cheaper because Italy is importing Soviet oil. Industrialists in Europe can produce at less cost because of Soviet oil. It is hard, under those circumstances, to work up resistance to imports of Soviet oil. Our argument has to be the danger of dependence on Soviet oil. We have made some headway on this, Mr. Martin said, as we have agreement (in NATO) that the whole question of Soviet dependence has to be watched very carefully and steps taken if necessary. We also think we have now made a little progress on the oil pipe question. Mr. Martin stressed the importance of the Administration address-ing itself to these international oil problems. Joseph D. Coppock 2 Executive Secretary * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 59, E Files: FRC 71 A 6682, ICFEP, December 13, 1961, World Oil Situation. Official Use Only. Presumably drafted by Ruth Donahue, who is identified on the list of participants as Recording Secretary. Regarding the origins of this interdepartmental committee, see Document 5 . 1 Not printed. 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 346. Editorial Note 346. Editorial Note At his news conference on January 31, 1962, President Kennedy made an announcement about the national stockpiling program. He said that the size of the stockpile, $7.7 billion worth of materials, exceeded emergency needs by nearly $3.4 billion and that his administration had taken steps to halt any new acquisitions. He deplored the secrecy surrounding the program, which he said was “only an invitation to mismanagement.” He stated that he had discussed the matter with Senator Stuart Symington (D.-Mo.), chairman of the Senate stockpiling subcommittee, who agreed on the need to explore the program completely. President Kennedy said that he assured Senator Symington that the “executive branch will cooperate fully with any investigation.” He noted that he was appointing a commission to review stockpiling policies, programs, and goals. He was “very much aware of the intricate and interrelated problems involved in this area, including the difficulties experienced by certain domestic mineral industries, the impact on world markets, and the heavy reliance of certain countries on producing one or more of these minerals.” In this regard he gave assurance that the United States “will take no action which will disrupt commodity prices.” ( Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962 , page 91) The Senate Subcommittee on the National Stockpile and Naval Petroleum Reserve held hearings intermittently, beginning March 28, 1962, and ending January 30, 1963. ( Inquiry into the Strategic and Critical Material Stockpiles of the United States: Hearings before the National Stockpile and Naval Petroleum Reserves Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Eighty-seventh Congress, Second Session , (Washington, 1962-1963)) On September 25, 1963, Senator Symington made public a draft report critical of waste and mismanagement, alleging improper assistance by certain officials in the Eisenhower administration to some suppliers of raw materials. ( Inquiry Into the Strategic and Critical Material Stockpiles of the United States: Draft Report of the National Stockpile and Naval Petroleum Reserves Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Under the Authority of S. Res. 295 As Amended (87th Cong., 1st Sess.) on the National Stockpile (Committee Print, Washington 1963)) The subcommittee failed to approve the report, but did vote to make it public. On October 31, 1963, Senator Symington introduced a bill (S.2272, 88th Cong.) in line with certain recommendations in the report, revising current stockpile legislation to establish new management and disposal procedures. The Subcommittee held hearings on S.2272, December 3-4, 1963, and the Senate Armed Services Committee reported the bill on May 26, 1964 (S. Rept. 1025, May 26, 1964), but the Congress took no further action on this bill. 347. National Security Action Memorandum No. 126 347. National Security Action Memorandum No. 126 Source Washington, February 7, 1962. TO Honorable Edward McDermott Acting Director, Office of Emergency Planning SUBJECT Review of Principles and Policies Guiding the Stockpiling of Strategic Materials To confirm our earlier discussions, 1 I am designating you to serve as the chairman of a group of department and agency heads to review the principles and policies which should guide our program for the stockpiling of strategic materials. Any stockpiling must obviously be related to our Nation's defense strategy, and must insure that materials necessary to our national defense and security will be available in the event of national emergency. I believe your committee should also give attention to specific goals as well as to basic principles, to the acquisition and maintenance of the materiel, and to the disposal of materials now on hand in excess of goals determined to be appropriate. This program is of vital importance to the Nation both in terms of our security and in terms of the Federal investment in these stockpiled goods. In addition, consideration should be given to the problems of our domestic minerals industry and to the international consequences of our programs of acquisition and disposal. In the past there may have been justification for classifying all or most of the information bearing on this program, but the changes in circumstances from the initiation of the program to the present call for a review of the secret classifications. I expect, therefore, that your committee composed of the heads of those departments and agencies whose responsibilities bear heavily on whether classification is warranted promptly review this question and that you will take the steps necessary to declassify as much information as possible consistent with national security. I am hopeful that your review will be completed by an early date and, in any event, no later than March 19. Those who will serve on the committee with you are the Secretaries of Defense, State, Interior, Commerce and Labor, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Administrator of the General Services Administration. 2 John F. Kennedy 3 * Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 126. Official Use Only. 1 Not further identified. 2 President Kennedy sent copies of NSAM No. 126 to the members of the committee listed in this paragraph, with a covering memorandum, February 7, noting the “importance of this review,” the “urgency of prompt action,” and the need “to present a strong case” to the Senate Stockpiling Subcommittee. (Washington National Records Center, RG 40, Department of Commerce, Executive Secretariat Files: FRC 69 A 6828, Office of the Secretary, President's Committee on Stockpiling) 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Kennedy signed the original. 348. Letter From President Kennedy to President Prado 348. Letter From President Kennedy to President Prado Source Washington, February 26, 1962. Dear Mr. President : I appreciate your letter of December 29, 1961, 1 in which you refer to studies now being made by certain United States Government agencies preparatory to the prospective revision of United States sugar legislation by the Congress. 2 Your Excellency reminds me of the great importance to the Peruvian economy and to the Peruvian Government's development programs of revenues resulting from the exportation of sugar. You therefore request that any decision reached by the United States take into account the serious repercussions for Peru that would result from any reduction in the price of imported sugar. I had delayed until now answering your letter in the expectation that the thinking of the Executive Branch on this subject would have reached a point where it might have been possible to explain more precisely the prospective recommendations to be made by the Administration to the Congress. The matter continues to be under active study within the Executive Branch, however, and the proposals of which your Ambassador has informed you thus do not yet represent the Administration's position. I have, meanwhile, asked the Department of State to keep your Ambassador in Washington informed of principal developments, and, consequently, the Under Secretary of State, Mr. George W. Ball, discussed these matters with your Ambassador on February 1, 1962. 3 I am confident that Your Excellency will appreciate the various considerations my Government must weigh in conducting this study and reaching a final position. Please be assured that we, for our part, are fully aware of the importance of this problem to Peru and to other friendly countries and that we sincerely trust the solution we achieve will in the long run prove beneficial. I should also emphasize, of course, that the final decision on United States sugar policies rests with the United States Congress. I very much appreciate your remark about the closely linked interests of our two countries, and should like to add that we in this country value most highly this close relationship with Peru. With cordial regards and renewed assurances of my highest esteem. Sincerely, John F. Kennedy 4 * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 800.235/1-2562. No classification marking. Drafted by Paul E. Callanan (OR/CSD) and Richard A. Poole (ARA/WST) on January 19 and cleared by Edwin M. Martin (E), Milton Barall (ARA), Jean H. Mulliken (REA), and Taylor G. Belcher (WST). A covering memorandum of January 25 from Battle (signed by Melvin M. Manfull) to McGeorge Bundy transmitted the letter of December 29, 1961, from Prado to President Kennedy and the suggested reply. 1 See the source note above. 2 The President's budget message of January 18 stated that the administration would recommend legislation to retain the difference between the domestic and world price of sugar currently received by foreign suppliers of sugar for an estimated increase of $180 million in 1963 budget receipts. The administration would recommend that a global quota replace individual country quotas. Regarding inquiries about this development, the Department of State instructed Embassies to point out to their respective governments that Latin American countries other than Cuba supplied only a small part of the U.S. market and that the total premium was only $12.8 million. Embassies could also state that the administration was considering asking Congress to make funds collected on sugar from Latin America available for Latin American economic development. (Circular telegram 1288 to posts in the American Republics except Chile and Venezuela, January 19; Department of State, Central Files, 800.235/1-1962) 3 No record of this conversation has been found. 4 Kennedy's signature appears in an unidentified hand, indicating Kennedy signed the original. 349. Report of the Executive Stockpile Committee to President Kennedy 349. Report of the Executive Stockpile Committee to President Kennedy Source Washington, March 19, 1962. The Executive Stockpile Committee, consisting of the Secretaries of State, Defense, Interior, Commerce, and Labor, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Administrator of the General Services Administration, and chaired by the Acting Director of the Office of Emergency Planning, was established by your memorandum of February 7, 1962, 1 to review the principles and policies which guide our national stockpile of strategic materials and its relationship to our national defense and security. The Committee has examined specifically the policies governing the program, the acquisition and maintenance of the inventories in the stockpile, the disposal of excess materials, and the classification of information bearing on this program. No examination could be made on the specific goals or objectives because of limited time and lack of new requirements information. This examination will be expedited in the coming months. On March 2, 1962, this Committee recommended to you that information pertaining to the current objectives and inventories of the Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpile should be declassified. 2 The other recommendations of the Committee are presented herewith for your approval. A substantial number of these recommendations can be put into effect by administrative actions. New legislation will be necessary to implement the others. The United States Government, as of December 31, 1961, held raw materials inventories with a market value of $7,723 million. Within this total, the inventory valuations are: National Stockpile, $5,729 million; Defense Production Act, $921 million; Commodity Credit Corporation Barter and Supplemental Stockpiles, $1,070 million; and Federal Facilities Corporation, $3 million. Current maximum objectives in the National Stockpile are valued at $4,332 million, and excess materials at $3,391 million. Net storage, rotation and disposal, and administrative expenses approximate $21-$22 million annually. PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES General policies for strategic and critical materials stockpiling set forth in Defense Mobilization Order V-7, dated December 10, 1959, 3 govern all executive operations of the stockpile. Scope of Stockpile Objectives In its examination of the scope of stockpile objectives, the Committee has considered the following points: 1. Current policy provides that the strategic stockpile objectives shall be adequate to cover material deficits for limited or general nuclear war (including reconstruction), whichever is greater. The planning assumptions now used by the Office of Emergency Planning and other Government departments and agencies engaged in defense mobilization activities are consonant with this policy. However, no definitive scope has been established for general nuclear war, nor has the extent of the reconstruction period been clearly defined. 2. No material is now included in the stockpile objectives for allocation to our allies other than normal wartime exports. 3. At present there is no reserve in strategic and critical materials stockpile objectives to guard against long term materials deficits in the United States projected a decade or more. The time and amounts of deficits would be almost impossible to determine. Discovery of new sources of supply, availability of substitute materials, and many other things could eliminate the need for inventories in the stockpile. It is believed that the initiative and ingenuity of a healthy and dynamic free economy will help make the necessary adjustments in supply and demand in the long run. 4. Defense Mobilization Order V-7 provides that stockpile objectives shall consist of (1) a “basic objective” which assumes reliance on sources of supply factored to reflect estimated supply risks, and (2) a “maximum objective” which includes an additional allowance to take into account the complete discounting of sources of supply beyond North America and comparably accessible areas. Since 1958 new cash procurement for the stockpile has been limited to minimum objectives. Maximum objectives were to be attained by barter and other methods. With the exception of five materials, inventories on hand now exceed or closely approximate the maximum objectives of all items in the stockpile. Current procurement is limited to three of these materials because of uncertainty of the future requirements for the other two. Establishment of a single objective would simplify the determination of objectives and would eliminate considerable paper work in the management functions of the stockpile. The Committee recommends the following: 1. The requirements of limited war shall continue to be the objectives of the stockpile, and a study shall be made of the proper scope of stockpile objectives for general nuclear war and the extent of stockpile necessary for the reconstruction period. 2. A study be made of the propriety of inclusion of a reserve for allied war production in the strategic and critical materials stockpile. 3. The strategic and critical materials stockpile shall not provide insurance for projected long-range deficits of raw materials in the United States. 4. A study should be made of the future necessity of establishing two stockpile objectives. New criteria should be established by this study. 5. Pending the calculation of new objectives under criteria established in 4. above, the present maximum objectives should be used for establishing excesses available for disposal. Supply Supply information for the establishment of stockpile objectives is currently received from the Departments of Commerce, Interior, State, and Agriculture, the General Services Administration, and the Tariff Commission. The Office of Emergency Planning receives data from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of State which enables it to discount supply sources as to military accessibility and internal Government dependability in wartime. In addition, the National Resources Evaluation Center provides data which permits an evaluation of the survival probability in nuclear war of production and consumption plants in the United States. The Committee believes that the supply information received by the Office of Emergency Planning is adequate, and its system of discounting is sound. Requirements The current stockpile objectives are limited to meeting the estimated shortages of materials for a three-year emergency. This planning period cannot be determined with mathematical accuracy. At best, it is an expert judgment based on considerations of a multitude of contingencies. Some of the points that should be considered are: 1. Military judgments regarding the length of a possible war. 2. Non-military judgments in relationship to non-military requirements which may be generated during the same war period or other emergency planning periods. 3. The possibility of multiple consecutive small-scale wars. 4. The possibility that in a mobilization situation short of war, sources of raw materials may be denied to us. Additional time will be required to consider all of these points and this matter will receive the further attention of the Committee. The planning period for nuclear war is indeterminate because of lack of supply-requirements estimates and criteria defining the extent of coverage. The studies suggested under Scope of Objectives should provide a sound basis for these studies. Present regulations require that the supply-requirements balance for any material that is now or may become important to defense shall be kept under surveillance and shall be given a full-scale review at any time that a change is believed to be taking place which would have a significant bearing on the United States wartime readiness position. All stockpile objectives are examined at least once a year to ascertain the need for a full-scale review. However, these examinations have shown no significant changes in the past three or four years, due principally to relative stability of military requirements in this period. The Committee recommends that: 1. The three-year planning period be retained until the completion of a thorough study of the various factors which would determine the length of the period. 2. The departments and agencies having responsibilities for supply-requirements studies begin immediately such studies for both limited and nuclear war (including reconstruction). Further, annual reviews of the supply-demand situation should be made. ACQUISITION, MAINTENANCE AND DISPOSAL OF STOCKPILE MATERIALS Effective management of the stockpile of the Office of Emergency Planning and the General Services Administration requires considerable flexibility in acquisition and disposal of materials. Sufficient flexibility has been available in the acquisition of materials, but this phase of stockpiling is largely completed. Disposal activity, however, is controlled by legislation and executive policies. One of the executive controls applicable to disposals is the provision written into Defense Mobilization Order V-7 in 1959 which states in part that “except when (surplus) materials are channeled to other agencies for their direct use, (the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning) must obtain the approval of the Departments of the Interior, Commerce, State, Agriculture, and Defense, and other Governmental agencies con- cerned. . . .” Legislation has been drafted by the Office of Emergency Planning and General Services Administration, but not yet cleared by the Executive Branch, which would modify considerably the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act of 1946. The proposed legislation would provide for changes in stockpile management by permitting the General Services Administration to consolidate materials inventories acquired under the provisions of the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act, the Defense Production Act, and transferred to the Supplemental Stockpile from barter or other programs into two inventories: (a) the national stockpile, composed of materials required to meet objectives, and (b) the materials reserve inventory, composed of all other materials. The proposed legislation would authorize transfer, without cost or reimbursement, of: (a) materials not required for objectives from the national stockpile to the materials reserve inventory, (b) materials required for objectives from the materials reserve inventory to the national stockpile, and (c) exchange of materials to improve the quality or change the location of materials in the national stockpile. The legislation would allow equivalent materials in the two inventories to be commingled, and also would permit materials in the materials reserve inventory to be used for payment for conversion costs and rotation costs (to prevent deterioration or to change the location) for similar materials. The consolidation of inventories would permit more economical and effective use of storage space, since like materials could be commingled, and it would avoid the necessity for physical segregation and identification in storage. It would provide for more economical dispersal of materials charged against the strategic and critical materials stockpile by permitting an exchange for materials in other inventories more safely located. It would further considerably simplify property accounting and reporting. The proposal would provide greater flexibility for disposal of excess stockpile materials by (a) reducing the waiting period from six months to sixty days, (b) eliminating the requirements for the express approval of the Congress, and (c) making the waiting period applicable only if the quantity to be sold during the first or last six months of the calendar year exceeds three percent of the estimated annual United States consumption of the material. The proposal would continue the present provisions that, in disposing of materials, due regard be given to the protection of the United States against avoidable loss and the protection of producers, processors, and consumers against avoidable disruption of their usual markets. A provision would be added to provide that due regard be given to the foreign relations of the United States in the disposal of materials, to the effect of disposals on employment or unemployment in the United States, and to provide for consultation with departments and agencies specified by the Director, Office of Emergency Planning. The proposal would subject disposals of materials acquired under the Defense Production Act 4 to the waiting period, when applicable. Disposals Stockpile materials significantly in excess of objectives should be disposed of on a long-term affirmative basis. Individual disposals should be considered in terms of the effect on commodity markets and international relations. To accomplish the above effectively, Section 14 of Defense Mobilization Order V-7 should be modified as follows (new language underlined, deletions in parenthesis): “ Disposals . The Director of the Office of Emergency Planning will authorize the disposal of excess materials whenever possible under the following conditions: (a) avoidance of serious disruption of the usual markets of producers, processors and consumers, (b) avoidance of adverse effects on the international interests of the United States, (c) due regard to the protection of the United States against avoidable loss, (d) avoidance of adverse effects upon domestic employment and labor disputes, and (e) except when materials are channeled to other agencies for their direct use, (approval) consultation with 5 the Departments of the Interior, Commerce, State, Agriculture, Defense, Labor and other governmental agencies concerned, and consultation as appropriate with the industries concerned. “In making such disposals preference shall be given to materials in the DPA inventories. “Disposals of materials that deteriorate, that are likely to become obsolete, that do not meet quality standards, or that do not have stockpile objectives, are to be expedited. “The Administrator of General Services shall be responsible for conducting negotiations for the sale of materials and will consult with and advise the agencies concerned.” Barter There was considerable discussion by the Committee of the implications of adopting a disposal program prior to a determination of the future course of the barter program of the Department of Agriculture. The Committee feels that a thorough examination of the relationship of these programs should be undertaken immediately. Upgrading of Inventories The policy of upgrading raw materials in the stockpile to higher use forms is an integral part of the overall stockpiling policy. It represents a stockpiling of time, labor, power and transportation, in addition to materials. Upgrading is not undertaken when the processing cost exceeds the amount for which the upgraded product can be obtained in the open market (DMO V-7). An upgrading program has been under way for some time, and a majority of the materials for which upgrading could be undertaken have been upgraded or are under contract. In many instances upgrading has resulted in an increased value of the stockpile. Proposals have been made to upgrade some of the inventories to finished products such as aluminum sheets and building materials, steel sheets, I-beams and rails. These finished products would be stockpiled for survival and continuity of industry in event of nuclear attack on this country. However, considerable study is necessary before recommendations can be made on this type of stockpiling. Rotation and Storage of Stockpile Materials Full responsibility for the rotation and storage of stockpile materials is lodged in the General Services Administration. Materials of a perishable nature are rotated under a rigidly enforced program, and losses in this program have been kept to a minimum. However, the decline in capacity of certain United States industries, such as the rope industry, which in the past have absorbed the quantities rotated out of the stockpile may necessitate changes in our rotation policies if we are to avoid heavy losses. A revision of Storage Policies for Stockpile Materials was issued in April 1961. 6 Included in those policies was a complete nuclear attack hazard evaluation of each storage site. As a result of this study, provision was made in the proposed FY 1963 budget for the General Services Administration for $465,000 to relocate miscellaneous materials. No further dispersal would appear to be necessary at this time. The Committee recommends that: 1. Legislation be processed for clearance by the Executive departments and sent to the Congress to amend the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act of 1946. 2. A group of interested agencies, including the Department of Agriculture, give immediate attention to the relationships of the Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpile and the Department of Agriculture barter program for strategic materials. 3. The Office of Emergency Planning and the General Services Administration, in consultation with other interested agencies, prepare a long-range disposal program for excess materials in the stockpile consistent with the previously stated criteria. 4. Congressional approval be sought and public announcement be made of disposal actions on a commodity basis in order to minimize disruptive effects on commodity markets. Respectfully submitted, George W. Ball 7 Department of State Roswell Gilpatric Department of Defense James K. Carr Department of the Interior Luther H. Hodges Department of Commerce Arthur J. Goldberg Department of Labor John A. McCone 8 Central Intelligence Agency Bernard L. Boutin General Services Administration Edward A. McDermott Office of Emergency Planning, Chairman * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Economic Policy, Stockpiling of Strategic Materials. For Official Use Only. For the dissent of the Department of State to this report, see Document 350 . The dissent of the Department of the Interior, March 21, urged that the Departments of the Interior and State retain authority to approve or disapprove disposals of surpluses. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Economic Policy, Stockpiling of Strategic Materials) Regarding the CIA dissent, see footnote 8 below. 1 Document 347 . 2 The Executive Stockpile Committee's recommendation of March 2 has not been found. 3 Not found. 4 P.L. 81-774, approved on September 8, 1950; 64 Stat. 798; 50 USC App. 2061, et seq.Disposals 5 Departments of State and Interior strongly dissent. [Footnote in the source text.] 6 Not found. 7 Printed from a copy that indicates that all the officials signed the original. 8 The following typed note appears in the margin to the left of McCone's signature block: “With respect to Section 14 of Defense Mobilization Order V-7, I believe that the restrictions on authorizations for disposal of excess material (p. 7) should apply with equal strength to expressions of intent to sell; such expressions of intent could have almost as serious effects as actual sales.” 350. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Kennedy 350. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Kennedy Source Washington, March 28, 1962. SUBJECT Stockpile Disposal Policy The report of the Executive Stockpile Committee, submitted to you on March 19, 1962, 1 noted agreement of all the agencies concerned except on one point. Under existing procedures the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning (formerly OCDM) is required to obtain the approval of the Department of State, among other agencies, before he authorizes the disposal of excess stockpile materials. The majority of the Committee has recommended that the Director be permitted to act after consultation with the State Department and other agencies; it has recommended the elimination of the requirement that the State Department approve stockpile reductions. I fully recognize the need for disposing of excess stockpile materials as rapidly as possible. However, it is essential that this be done without disrupting world commodity markets, which are in many cases extremely sensitive to any move on our part to reduce stockpiles. A fall in commodity prices can, of course, be disastrous to less developed countries dependent for their foreign exchange earnings on one or two commodities. The reactions with regard to recent programs for the disposal of rubber and tin have clearly shown that the business of reducing stockpiles can have serious foreign policy repercussions. I therefore feel that we should retain the requirement that the approval of the State Department be obtained prior to the disposal of surpluses. In view of the extreme sensitivity of many of these markets the mere act of eliminating this widely known requirement would be likely to create dismay and confusion. At the same time, I am sympathetic with the desirability of reducing the delay which has sometimes occurred in obtaining the necessary approval for disposal plans. The regulations might provide an appropriate time limit. For our part we would be willing to agree with the other agencies that if we do not object to a proposed disposal plan within thirty days of its receipt our approval could be assumed. 2 George W. Ball * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Economic Policy, Stockpiling of Strategic Materials. Official Use Only. 1 Document 349 . 2 A memorandum from Acting Secretary of the Interior John M. Kelly to President Kennedy, April 2, accepted Under Secretary Ball's suggestion for a 30-day limit on agency review as consistent with the Department of the Interior's position set forth in that Department's letter of March 21 to President Kennedy, urging that the Departments of State and Interior retain authority for approving or disapproving stockpile disposals affecting their programs and objectives. (Filed with the source text) 351. Letter From Secretary of Commerce Hodges to President Kennedy 351. Letter From Secretary of Commerce Hodges to President Kennedy Source Washington, April 6, 1962. Dear Mr. President : The report of the Executive Stockpile Committee sent to you on March 19, 1962, 1 recommended the establishment of a long-term affirmative disposal program for stockpile materials significantly in excess of objectives. At the same time it proposed a change in Defense Mobilization Order V-7 which would require consultation with instead of approval by the agencies concerned in regard to disposal plans. In effect, this would eliminate the right of individual agencies to veto any disposal program proposed by the Office of Emergency Planning and the General Services Administration. The Department of Interior and the Department of State strongly dissented from this proposed change. In the course of our participation in the preparation of Executive Stockpile Committee report we expressed strong views about the need for a continuing, effective disposal program and pointed out how the exercise of individual veto powers of the several agencies based on their special interests could interfere substantially with an overall sales program. Further, we believed that final responsibility for determining the national interest in the matter should rest with the Director of OEP. These views were reflected in the Report, but we consider them of such importance that we have prepared a more detailed position paper regarding them. We submit this paper herewith in the hope you will find it useful in making your determinations regarding the stockpile operation. 2 Respectfully yours, Luther H. Hodges * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Economic Policy, Stockpiling of Strategic Materials. Administratively Restricted. 1 Document 349 . 2 Not printed. This 5-page paper, dated March 19, expanded on the position taken in Hodges' letter. (Department of Commerce Executive Secretariat Abstract of Secretarial Correspondence, April 6; Washington National Records Center, RG 40, Department of Commerce, Executive Secretariat Files: FRC 69 A 6828, Office of the Secretary, President's Committee on Stockpiling) 352. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) and the President's Assistant Special Counsel (White) to President Kennedy 352. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) and the President's Assistant Special Counsel (White) to President Kennedy Source Washington, April 9, 1962. SUBJECT Report of the Executive Stockpile Committee 1 under NSAM 126 2 You now have in your hands the report of the Stockpile Committee dated 19 March. (Tab D) There are two kinds of major recommendations—for further studies and for immediate action. 1. The further studies recommended include re-examination of stockpile objectives and requirements, and also of the program of acquisitions through barter now undertaken in conjunction with the Department of Agriculture. 2. The major action recommendation is that the disposal process be simplified and speeded up by amendment of both defense mobilization orders and legislation. The purpose of these changes would be to reduce the period of notice to Congress from six months to sixty days, to eliminate it entirely for sales below certain levels, and to eliminate the need for express approval by Congress. These changes would be accomplished by legislation. The proposed amendment of the defense mobilization order would eliminate the requirement that OEP secure the approval of the Departments of the Interior, Commerce, Labor and Agriculture for proposed disposals, and substitute merely the requirement that it consult these and other interested agencies. State and Interior both dissent from this last proposal and each insists that it retain its power of approval or disapproval. Commerce, on the other hand, strongly urges the proposal and further urges that there be long-run disposal programs which involve a minimum annual sale of heavy surplus material with additional sale to be conditioned on circumstances. Letters to you from Under Secretary Ball, 3 Secretary Hodges, 4 Secretary Udall 5 and Assistant Secretary Kelly 6 are attached as Tab A. Tab B contains a memorandum from the Department of Commerce 7 arguing the desirability of a program which involves some minimum continuing level of disposal of every important item every year. After discussion with the Departments of State, Interior and Commerce and OEP, we would suggest that the points made by Ball, Udall, and Hodges can be met by adding language along the following lines to page 7 of the report under the heading of “Disposals.” “The Director of the OEP shall give notice to the above-mentioned departments of any proposed disposal and invite their views. If within thirty days either the Department of State or the Department of the Interior indicates an objection to the proposed plan which, after discussion, the Director does not support, he shall so notify the President and pre-sent the issue to him for decision. To the extent possible disposals should be made in accordance with long-run disposal plans which have been worked out in consultation with the interested departments and which take into account probable trends in supply and price both at home and abroad.” This change puts on the two departments the burden of justifying to you their disapproval of a proposed disposal plan. We recommend that you approve the report and its action recommendations with the modification proposed above. The attached letters to the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget will give effect to these recommendations. (Tab C) 8 Carl Kaysen Lee White 9 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Economic Policy, Stockpiling of Strategic Materials. Official Use Only. 1 Document 349 . 2 Document 347 . 3 Document 350 . 4 Document 351 . 5 Reference is to Secretary of the Interior Udall's March 21 letter; see the source note, Document 349 . 6 Reference is to Acting Secretary of the Interior Kelly's April 2 memorandum; see footnote 2, Document 350 . 7 Reference is to the March 19 Department of Commerce position paper; see footnote 2, Document 351 . 8 Not found 9 Printed from a copy that bears Kaysen's handwritten and White's typed signatures. 353. National Security Action Memorandum No. 142 353. National Security Action Memorandum No. 142 Source Washington, April 10, 1962. TO Honorable Edward McDermott Director, Office of Emergency Planning Honorable David E. Bell Director, Bureau of the Budget 1. I have received and read a report of your Stockpile Committee organized under NSAM 126. 1 I think it is a careful and thoughtful study, and I commend you and the Committee on it. I accept its recommendations with one modification. 2. In view of the dissents of the State 2 and Interior Departments 3 and the comments of the Department of Commerce, 4 I am directing that the amendment to Section 14 of Defense Mobilization Order V-7 5 which you recommended incorporate additional language as follows: “The Director of the OEP shall give notice to the above-mentioned departments of any proposed disposal and invite their views. If within thirty days either the Department of State or the Department of the Interior indicates an objection to the proposed plan which, after discussion, the Director does not support, he shall so notify the President and pre-sent the issue to him for decision. To the extent possible disposals should be made in accordance with long-run disposal plans which have been worked out in consultation with the interested departments and which take into account probable trends in supply and price both at home and abroad.” 3. The OEP is requested to prepare draft legislation required to embody the recommendations of the Committee, in consultation with the interested executive departments; to examine the problems of the barter program in consultation with the Department of Agriculture and other interested agencies; to continue its studies of stockpile objectives and requirements in accordance with the recommendations of the report; and to prepare in consultation with the General Services Administration and other interested agencies long-range disposal programs for excess materials in the stockpile. 4. I request the Bureau of the Budget to amend Defense Mobilization Order V-7 in accordance with the recommendations of the report and this memorandum. John F. Kennedy 6 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 142, Stockpile Rpt. Official Use Only. Copies were sent to the Secretaries of State, Defense, Interior, Commerce, and Labor; the Director of Central Intelligence; and the Administrator of the General Services Administration. 1 Document 349 . 2 Document 350 . 3 See the source note, Document 349, and footnote 2 , Document 351 . 4 See Document 351 . 5 Not found. 6 Printed from a copy that indicates Kennedy signed the original. 354. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 354. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State Source Tehran, July 2, 1962, 4 p.m. 8. Baghdad for Special Office. Prime Minister called me to his office July 1 to inform me of resolutions adopted by Fourth Conference of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) which being given to press today. 1 Amini stated he wished to reassure me that GOI's support resolutions in no way implied attack on oil consortium or suggestion oil agreement 2 should be modified. He said relations between GOI and consortium were very good and Iran in fact had exercised moderating influence in OPEC councils in preparation of resolutions. Prime Minister mentioned that Iran and Saudi Arabia had been designated to negotiate with oil companies to give effect to resolutions. He regarded this as favorable factor ensuring moderate approach. He pointed out this connection that negotiations need not be completed within specified time and that they would be conducted in unhurried and friendly spirit. Prime Minister also mentioned that Page 3 of Esso had been previously apprised of content of resolutions in New York. Essential points of resolutions call for (1) initiation “forthwith” of negotiations with oil companies to ensure that oil produced in member countries shall be paid for on basis of posted price no lower than that prior to August 1960; (2) development of formula whereunder oil royalty payments shall be fixed at “uniform rate” and shall not be treated as credit against income tax liability; (3) elimination by member countries of any contribution to the marketing expenses of the companies concerned. While Amini's statement sincere and is encouraging insofar as GOI relations with oil consortium are concerned, it is clear that fundamental and far-reaching character of resolutions will have sharp impact on member companies of oil consortium as well as other segments of international oil industry. Full text resolutions and press release follow by pouch. Holmes * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 800.2553/7-262. Confidential. Repeated to Baghdad, Benghazi, Caracas, Djakarta, Jidda, Kuwait, London, and Tripoli. The source text bears the handwritten notation: “File. No Action. 7/9/62” by William Van Dusen (FSD). 1 Reference is to the resolutions (IV-30-IV-36) adopted at the Fourth Conference of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries in Geneva, June 4, made public on July 2. The texts are in enclosure 1 to airgram A-10 from Caracas, July 3. (Ibid., 800.2553/7-362) 2 An agreement, effective October 29, 1954, between a consortium of eight U.S., Netherlands, British, and French international companies and the Government of Iran, which resolved the longstanding Iranian oil controversy, and signed by the Shah. See Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. X, p. 1049 , footnote 3, and p. 1053 , footnote 1. 3 Howard W. Page, Vice President of Standard Oil Company of New Jersey. 355. Memorandum of Conversation 355. Memorandum of Conversation Source Washington, July 20, 1962. SUBJECT OPEC Resolutions; U.S. Oil Imports PARTICIPANTS Mr. Leroy D. Stinebower, Treasurer, Standard Oil of New Jersey Mr. George Pearcy, Exec. Asst. to the Pres., SONJ Department of State: E—Mr. G. Griffith Johnson E—Mr. Nichols E/ES—Mr. Jospeh Coppock FSE—Mr. Kannenberg Following general remarks on the world oil situation, in particular worldwide surplus productive capacity, the conversation was steered to the recent OPEC resolutions. 1 At Mr. Johnson's request the visitors gave what they asked be clearly understood as preliminary impressions. Mr. Stinebower said two things occurred to him: first, it was understandable that the OPEC member countries should be seriously preoccupied with their own “take” and their related concern with the price question; second, that the companies obviously have no objection to higher prices but this is unrealistic in view of the world oil surplus. Mr. Pearcy said it was obvious that the August 1960 reduction in posted prices, in which his company took the lead, was the critical action leading to OPEC. Looking back, it was a questionable step politically, but seemed fully warranted at the time if posted prices were to bear any close relationship to the market. He added that the price cut was only a step in the direction of reality and reflected only a part of the discounts then prevailing. He then alluded to the inequities resulting from the present freeze in posted prices. Kuwait, with low gravity (low value) crude enjoys a better relative price as compared with Saudi Arabian higher gravity (higher value) crude which finds itself at a price disadvantage. On the restoration of prices to the pre-August 1960 level (the cut averages 8# per barrel throughout the OPEC countries), he said this was patently impossible from a commercial viewpoint; also the companies cannot talk price with OPEC because it is: 1) bad business, and 2) prohibited by anti-trust restraints. He cited the dissatisfaction of Western European governments that most of the oil profit is taken in the producing countries and leaves a narrow margin of profit (in some cases no margin) as a tax base for European refining and marketing operations. Between them, Messrs. Stinebower and Pearcy made the point that the OPEC resolutions on royalty are so vague that they preclude any judgment now. Perhaps preliminary talks between OPEC and company spokesmen will better define their real objectives. Mr. Pearcy thought the resolution on elimination of marketing expenses presents “no great problem”. In response to Mr. Johnson's question as to whether OPEC “had teeth in it”, Mr. Pearcy replied that it will certainly have to be taken seriously and speaking for himself (not for his directors) he felt some accommodation could be reached but it would take a lot of time, a lot of talking and a great deal of patience on the part of the companies and the OPEC negotiators. Hopefully, he said, these talks might lead to a durable, mutually tolerable regime. He added that we should not overlook the fact that Venezuela would stand to gain a great deal in relative competitiveness should either of the major resolutions be implemented. He suggested that this may be clearer to the Venezuelans than to the Persian Gulf countries. Mr. Johnson asked if the visitors thought we (the U.S. Government) should have plans to counter the OPEC thrust. Mr. Stinebower said he did not personally feel that the Middle East agreements were so sacrosanct that the companies should not be willing to discuss them. He revised the history of the Iranian nationalization and the extent of U.S. Government involvement which had led to a solution. He felt that any U.S. Government initiative, if it should in time prove necessary, would have to first await the developments resulting from company-OPEC talks. (As a historical footnote he referred to the December 1958 increase in the Venezuelan income tax, adding that while this step was unassailable legally and technically, it was now evident that this made Venezuelan oil less competitive and made Venezuela much less attractive for large scale investment. He hoped this point would not be lost on the OPEC members.) Mr. Pearcy, in speculating on what the companies might settle for, said it was his own view that the companies in general would like to reach a “peaceful plateau” if this were a durable and financially tolerable solution. The present system is so bound up in rigidities that something has to give in some direction. In response to Mr. Johnson's question as to the negotiating strength of the companies, Mr. Stinebower replied that it was great. The greatest danger, to the companies and to the Western world, in his mind was a suicidal wave of expropriation to which there is no rational counterforce. On the question of an international oil agreement, Mr. Nichols said this presented a dilemma. On the one hand, it is clear that we lack an overall coordinating mechanism; but on the other hand, could this be done by governments in a workable and generally beneficial form. He was inclined to think it probably could not. Mr. Stinebower said that the history of international commodity agreements was pretty sad; even those that had worked, had done so very lamely. Mr. Johnson added that where they had worked one important producer had had to be willing to accept a residual market position. The conversation turned to U.S. oil imports. Mr. Kannenberg mentioned that the issue of more or less imports (or perhaps the same level) was likely to be up for decision soon. Mr. Pearcy said Jersey of course thought residual fuel oil should be decontrolled. The crude oil question was more difficult because of Humble's leading position in the domestic market, but that Jersey would not publicly support any more restrictive program than now exists. At the conclusion of the meeting Mr. Johnson said the talks had been most helpful to him and he hoped we could continue them. He said we should follow the OPEC developments with much care. Mr. Stinebower agreed and said he (or his associates who are following this very closely) were available on a moment's notice and would keep the Department informed. * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 800.2553/7-2062. Confidential. Drafted by M. Hollis Kannenberg (E/OR/FSE). 1 See footnote 2, Document 354 . 356. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Brubeck) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 356. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Brubeck) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Source Washington, August 23, 1962. SUBJECT Tin In recent weeks Departmental officers have engaged in consultations regarding tin, first with the International Tin Council, 1 which failed to reach agreement (enclosures 2 and 3) 2 and second, on Malayan initiative, with a group of representatives of tin producing countries. The latter, however, declined to express satisfaction with a United States proposal that a maximum of 200 tons weekly be disposed of for an initial six months period (enclosure 4). An exchange of telegrams (enclosures 5 and 6) has resulted in acceptance by Malaya of a disposal program of 200 tons weekly for the remainder of 1962. Malaya earlier had made vigorous repeated representations seeking a limit of 100 tons and the accept-ance of the higher figure can be viewed as a real achievement in gaining opportunity to start with a test of the market's absorptive capacity in some reasonable relationship to the presently estimated shortfall. In both consultations an offer was made, with approval of the representatives of OEP, GSA, Commerce, and Interior that the United States would seek concurrence of interested U.S. agencies in limiting disposals of 200 tons weekly and it does not seem realistic to try to hold to the initially contemplated figure of 250 tons at this stage when Malaya has acquiesced in the ad referendum offer of 200, and may even try to induce a sympathetic reaction among other producers, aside from Bolivia. During the most recent interview with the Malayan Ambassador, when it was agreed to delay an announcement relative to tin disposals in order to see if any change could be made to meet producer interests, the Ambassador was assured that he would have 24 hours notice of the text of the U.S. government's release. Accordingly if the draft at enclosure 1 obtains concurrence it will require transmittal to U.S. Missions in tin producing countries and a day's notice to the Malayan Embassy prior to release. HF 3 Enclosure 1 DRAFT TEXT OF RELEASE REGARDING TIN 4 The United States Government, having had consultations with the International Tin Council, held further consultations with the Governments of the major tin producing countries—Malaya, Bolivia, Indonesia, Thailand, Nigeria, and the Republic of the Congo, Leopoldville—on the proposed disposal of surplus tin during the remainder of calendar year 1962. Desiring to take into account the problem of the producing countries, and to conform as nearly as feasible to the suggestions advanced by their Governments, the United States Government has decided to reduce the quantity of tin to be disposed of to a maximum of 200 tons per week. Of this, an average of approximately 30 tons per week is expected to be used in the foreign aid programs, and approximately 10 tons per week for direct use by United States Government agencies. The quantity actually sold in commercial markets will be reduced accordingly. 5 A separate statement being issued by the General Services Administration gives the detailed procedures of offerings and disposals. 6 The United States Government is interested in protecting the long-term stability and prosperity of the tin producing countries and therefore assumes the responsibility to observe the market situation closely, and to reduce or suspend sales below the maximum offering if necessary to avoid a significant adverse impact on the market. No bids will be accepted which are not reasonably consistent with prevailing market prices. The United States Government intends to consult with the Governments of the major producing countries if a significant adverse impact should at any time develop. In addition, it intends to consult with those Governments and with the International Tin Council before the end of 1962, concerning the rate and conditions of future disposals. The United States Government intends to make no substantial change in the rate and conditions of disposal without prior consultations with the substantially interested Governments and the International Tin Council. * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Economic Policy, Stockpiling of Strategic Materials. Confidential. 1 Regarding the U.S. consultations with the International Tin Council July 23-26, see Department of State Bulletin, August 13, 1962, pp. 255-256. 2 Enclosures 2-6 are not printed. 3 Deputy Executive Secretary Howard Furnas initialed for Brubeck above Brubeck's typed signature. 4 The Department of State issued a revised text of this statement on August 24. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, September 10, 1962, p. 386. 5 At this point in the statement released on August 24 is sentence: “The weekly limitation will not be cumulative as far as commercial sales are concerned.” (Ibid.) 6 At this point in the statement released on August 24 are the following sentences: “The General Services Administration will accept only those bids which are reasonably consistent with prevailing market prices. It will reduce or temporarily suspend the sales if it should appear that they are exerting substantial downward pressure on prices.” 357. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Petroleum Study Committee (McDermott) to President Kennedy 357. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Petroleum Study Committee (McDermott) to President Kennedy Source Washington, September 4, 1962. I am pleased to submit a Report based upon a comprehensive study of petroleum requirements and supplies in relation to national security objectives, undertaken in accordance with your directive issued December 2, 1961. 1 The Conclusions and Recommendations of the attached Report are the result of extensive study by the Committee and its Task Force group and the report has been signed on behalf of all participating departments. At the request of the Department of Interior, I have been asked to report to you their opinion that the conclusions relating to costs and benefits are potentially misleading. Interior contends that “while estimates purportedly covering costs to the economy are included in the report, the counter-balancing benefits which flow from the maintenance of the petroleum industry in its present state of health were not reduced to comparable terms.” The Interior member also states “that existing legislation and delegations vest the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning with adequate authority to deal with the security aspects of the petroleum problem and that, in consequence, the recommendation in the report dealing with coordination of interagency activities is unnecessary and could lead to future difficulty in assessing responsibility for development and coordination of petroleum policy within the Executive Branch.” Except for this comment by the Department of Interior, the attached Report has the unanimous support of all participating departmental members, the Committee's advisers and observers. Respectfully, Edward A. McDermott Attachment 2 Washington, September 4, 1962. Report by the Petroleum Study Committee to President Kennedy INTRODUCTION To the President: On December 2, 1961, in connection with proposals to amend Proclamation 3279, governing the allocation of oil import quotas, by press release (Tab A, attached) you announced ”. . . that a comprehensive study of petroleum requirements and supplies in relation to national security objectives will be undertaken under the leadership of the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning, to be completed by mid-1962.” This assignment was organized as an inter-agency study under the Chairmanship of the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning, with equal participation by the Departments of State, Treasury, Defense, Justice, Interior, Commerce, and Labor. Representatives of the Bureau of the Budget and the Council of Economic Advisers, and the Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs served as advisers, and Representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Power Commission participated as observers. In the course of this study, public hearings were not held. A press release, issued on February 16, 1962 (Tab B, attached) 3 advised industry and the public of the scope of the projected study, its objectives, and of the opportunity to submit written position papers. Further notification to this effect was published in the Federal Register on February 24, 1962. 4 In response to these public announcements, thirty-two (32) written submissions were received by the Office of Emergency Planning from various segments of the petroleum industry. Each of these documents received full and careful consideration by the Committee and its Task Force group, and a large volume of intra-Governmental information relating to the questions involved, and materials submitted in connection with other petroleum studies, were considered. This assigned study has now been completed and we submit the following conclusions and recommendations. 3 Respectfully, Edward A. McDermott Chairman Petroleum Study Committee Philip H. Trezise Department of State James A. Reed Department of the Treasury Paul H. Riley Department of Defense Nicholas deB. Katzenbach Department of Justice John A. Carver, Jr. Department of the Interior William B. Dale Department of Commerce W. Willard Wirtz Department of Labor * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Economic Policy, Oil Policy. No classification marking. A September 5 covering memorandum from McDermott to Kaysen transmitted the report and noted with appreciation Kaysen's contribution to the study. 1 Document 344 . 2 For Official Use Only. 3 Not printed. 4 27 Federal Register 1779 . 3 Not printed. 358. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy 358. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy Source Washington, September 19, 1962. 1. Attached is the report of the Executive Stockpile Committee on the Barter Program. The nine recommendations, pages 4 through 6, go to the objective of limiting the use of barter to those occasions where surplus agricultural commodities can be usefully exchanged for items that are clearly needed. Recommendation 6 provides for a list of exceptions to the general rule that barter should not be used to acquire strategic and critical materials in excess of national stockpile objectives. 2. These exceptions are appropriate and, aside from two, well-defined. These two (6 b. and 6 d.) raise some problems. Six d. provides for using barter instead of cash purchases when this can be done in such a way as to save dollar payments abroad. This is clearly a desirable objective. The recommendation would be improved, however, if it provided for consultation with the Treasury Department so that Treasury's judgment as to whether in fact there was a real saving in our balance of payments would be available. 3. Recommendation 6 b. raises more difficult questions. This provides for barter to acquire raw materials for processing in the U.S. which would help in maintaining the materials processing mobilization base and relieve areas of unemployment. Both these goals are extremely broad, and the recommendation provides no procedure for determining whether they will be achieved in any particular instance. We have alternative and usually more efficient methods for assisting areas of substantial unemployment. There is no defined standard for the materials processing mobilization base and in the absence of a defined standard, this paragraph could be used to justify almost any barter transaction. 4. The objections to these two provisions were shared by the Bureau of the Budget and the Council of Economic Advisers. Ed McDermott, the Director of Office of Emergency Planning, would be perfectly agreeable to your making the suggested change in Recommendation 6 d. and reserving approval on 6 b. until further study. It is his judgment that such a directive would be sufficient to lead to the withdrawal of 6 b. by the other members of the Committee. Accordingly, I suggest that you send the attached memorandum to Mr. McDermott and the other members of the Executive Stockpile Committee. 1 Carl Attachment 2 Washington, August 23, 1962. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning (McDermott) to President Kennedy I am pleased to submit a report on “The Barter Program” that has been prepared in response to your request made in NSAM No. 142 of April 10, 1962. 3 It reflects the general consensus of the Executive Stockpile Committee, and of the Department of Agriculture whose representative was added to the Committee for the purposes of this review. The diverse opinions of the different Federal agencies about the barter program have been carefully and exhaustively explored during the preparation of this Report. At the time this review was initiated early in May, the Department of Agriculture had almost completed proposals for a revised barter program which had been developed following consultations with a non-governmental task force and with other Federal agencies. Recommendation No. 9 of the attached Report proposes that: “The Basic Principles and Rules of Application of the proposed Revised Barter Program (Tab A) prepared by the Department of Agriculture should be revised to reflect the foregoing recommendations, and should be adopted as thus revised.” I believe it is important that the recommended revision be made and adopted by the Department of Agriculture as soon as possible, and without further detailed or prolonged consultations that may be merely a repetition of the process that has just been completed by the Executive Stockpile Committee. Although the attached Report has been approved by the signatory departments, there are individual views which I wish to call to your attention: Although the Department of the Treasury is not a member of the Executive Stockpile Committee and is not a signatory to this Report, its representatives participated fully in the staff and Committee discussions which resulted in the Report. The Department particularly feels that careful consideration must be given to the general effects of barter transactions on the balance-of-payments position of the United States and that, in this connection, appropriate attention should be given to the extent to which barter transactions might displace cash sales or are in addition to such cash sales, and to their competitive relation to other methods of procuring goods and services. The Department of Defense and other members share this view. The Department of Commerce limits its approval to the Recommendations of the attached Report and specifically opposes any barter transaction carried out while a disposal program involving the same materials is in operation, as well as any multilateral barter transaction. The Committee is continuing its study of other phases of the stockpile problem. Respectfully, Edward A. McDermott Attachment 4 Report on the Barter Program by the Executive Stockpile Committee to President Kennedy [Here follow 3 pages of comments and considerations on the barter program.] RECOMMENDATIONS In light of the foregoing comments and its considerations of the barter program, as briefly reviewed in the following pages, the Committee recommends that: 1. Due regard must be given to foreign policy considerations and balance-of-payment problems in carrying out the barter program. The Secretary of Agriculture should consult with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury, respectively, concerning the general impact which the barter program has on these considerations. 2. Greater emphasis than in the past should be given to the use of barter transactions for the procurement of non-strategic-materials items (including, but not limited to, offshore procurement) which meet approved program requirements of U.S. Government agencies within funds currently available or within procurement authority which extends over a period of years and for which dollars would normally be spent abroad. 3. The Department of Agriculture should review with appropriate Federal agencies the opportunities for the enlargement of the use of barter in support of currently budgeted programs or programs which have procurement authority extending over a period of years. The Department of Defense and the Agency for International Development should cooperate with the Department of Agriculture by effecting offshore procurement, using qualified barter arrangements to the greatest practicable extent when dollars would otherwise be spent abroad for the items being procured. In carrying out such procurement, the Department of Agriculture should absorb any increased cost incurred by the procuring agency above that which would have been incurred had dollar procurement been utilized. Off-shore military procurement by barter should not be effected in West Germany or any other country in which the United States has arrangements for payments to offset U.S. military expenditures in that country, except with the concurrence of the Secretary of the Treasury. 4. In addition to the foregoing, the Department of Defense and the Agency for International Development should continue to cooperate with the Department of Agriculture to convert to barter arrangements dollar contracts for foreign-produced items. 5. Barter should continue to be used to acquire strategic and critical materials within established maximum objectives. 6. With the exceptions indicated below, barter should not be used to acquire strategic and critical materials that are in excess of National Stockpile objectives. The exceptions are those cases where: a. In the judgment of the Secretary of Agriculture, after consultation with the Secretary of State, and after consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury regarding U.S. foreign currency holdings, and consistent with disposal policies, it would be more advantageous to the U.S. to take a useful material in a barter transaction than to acquire additional foreign currencies; b. The barter acquisition of foreign materials would involve in some cases domestic processing and thus help in either maintaining the domestic materials processing mobilization base or assisting areas of substantial unemployment; c. In the judgment of the Secretary of Agriculture and with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, the barter transaction would further the international economic or foreign policy interests of the United States, including help for weaker independent states to resist economic overtures and pressures from unfriendly powers; and d. An existing contract for a cash purchase can be converted to a barter arrangement on terms serving the best interests of the United States, thus relieving the United States of dollar payments. 7. Pending a decision on new legislation relating to the various inventories of strategic and critical materials, the materials acquired under Recommendation No. 6 should be transferred to the Supplemental Stockpile. 8. The Supplemental Stockpile Advisory Committee on Barter should continue to be used by the Secretary of Agriculture for advice and consultation regarding the barter program and the stockpile materials eligible for barter acquisition. 9. The Basic Principles and Rules of Application of the proposed “Revised Barter Program” (Tab A) 5 prepared by the Department of Agriculture should be revised to reflect the foregoing recommendations, and should be adopted as thus revised. [Here follow the final 10 pages of the report with sections on Disposal of Agricultural Surpluses Through the Barter Program, Uses of Barter, Future Bartering for Strategic Materials, and Barter's Effect on Cash Sales and Balance of Payments. Also omitted are the signatures of George Ball, Roswell Gilpatric (Department of Defense), John M. Kelly (Department of the Interior), Orville L. Freeman (Department of Agriculture), Luther H. Hodges (Department of Commerce), Arthur J. Goldberg (Department of Labor), Ray S. Cline (Central Intelligence Agency), Bernard L. Boutin (General Services Administration), and Edward A. McDermott, Chairman (Office of Emergency Planning).] * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 187. Official Use Only. 1 See Document 359 . 2 No classification marking. 3 Document 353 . 4 No classification marking. 5 Not printed. 359. National Security Action Memorandum No. 187 359. National Security Action Memorandum No. 187 Source Washington, September 20, 1962. TO Honorable Edward McDermott Director, Office of Emergency Planning SUBJECT The Barter Program 1. I have received the report and recommendations of the Executive Stockpile Committee on the Barter Program. 1 I approve the recommendations, numbers 1 through 9, with the exception of 6 b. and d. 2. Recommendation 6 b. seems to me to raise a question as to whether it provides a definite enough standard, both substantive and procedural, to guide the agencies involved. Accordingly, I request the committee to consider this recommendation further with a view to examining how important maintaining the materials processing mobilization base is, and how this method of assisting areas of unemployment compares with other methods available to the government. 2 3. Recommendation 6 d. should be clarified by adding a provision that any department proposing to substitute a barter arrangement for a cash purchase consult the Secretary of the Treasury to get his opinion as to whether the result would be a true improvement in our balance of payments. 3 * Source: National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 187. Official Use Only. Copies were sent to the Secretaries of State, Defense, Interior, Commerce, Labor, and Treasury; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Director of the Bureau of the Budget; and the Administrator of the General Services Administration. 1 Attachment to Document 358 . 2 A proposed revised text of recommendation 6b is contained in a letter from McDermott to Rusk, November 2, with a request for Rusk's comments. (Department of State, Central Files, 411.0041/11-262) No further revision of this text has been found in Department of State files. 3 Printed from an unsigned copy. Another copy filed with the source text, however, bears the handwritten initials of President Kennedy. On September 25, the White House announced President Kennedy's approval of the recommendations on the barter program submitted to him by the Executive Stockpile Committee with the exception of minor points to be studied further. (Department of State Bulletin, October 15, 1962, pp. 564-565) 360. Editorial Note 360. Editorial Note The U.N. Coffee Conference, consisting of representatives of 56 countries (including the United States), met in New York July-September 1962, and formulated the Coffee Agreement, 1962 (14 UST 1911). The objective of the agreement was to assure that coffee prices in general did not decline below the 1962 level. The agreement relied on an export quota system negotiated among coffee-exporting countries to achieve price stability with quarterly adjustments according to changes in consumption estimates. W. Michael Blumenthal signed for the United States. The agreement entered into force on December 27, 1963. The Department of State instructed Embassies in coffee-exporting countries to emphasize that the U.S. delegation “did not intercede in quota negotiations for any country.” Since U.S. Department of Agriculture figures were used as a basis for negotiation, the Department of State wanted to forestall the possibility that some countries might blame the United States for their failure to secure an adequate quota on grounds of an incorrect estimate. The agreement principally obliged coffee-importing countries like the United States to restrict imports from nonparticipants to the average quantity imported during the 3-year base period to prevent nonparticipants from sharing increases in consumption. Voting in the Council, situated in London, was based on quantity of exports and imports, giving the United States and Brazil a virtual veto on major Council decisions. (Circular telegram 342 to 29 Embassies and USUN, August 27; Department of State, Central Files, 398.2333/8-2762) 361. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to the Mission to the European Communities 361. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to the Mission to the European Communities Source Washington, November 14, 1962, 3:18 p.m. CA-5291. Subject: Contacts between EEC and OPEC. Ref: Mission's tel Ecbus 257 (rptd info Paris Ecbus 101, Luxembourg Luxco 80). 1 Dept prefers to avoid adding to OPEC's international prestige or position. Accordingly Dept wld prefer contacts between OPEC and other organizations, including EEC, be avoided or minimized. As a non-member of EEC, however, Dept is not prepared to push this position to extent of attempting officially to persuade EEC or its members to avoid contact with OPEC. Officers of the Mission, if called upon to express an opinion, may suggest that it wld be logical for members of EEC to adopt the same position on contacts between EEC and OPEC that they adopted when contacts between OECD and OPEC were discussed recently in a meeting of the OECD Special Oil Committee. (See Paris tel Cedto 411, Oct 23, 1962, pouched Brussels and Luxembourg.) 2 Rusk * Source: Department of State, Central Files, 800.2553/11-1462. Limited Official Use. Drafted by George H. Alexander (OR/FSE) on November 8, cleared by Barbara Fagan (EUR/RPE) and Howard R. Cottam (NEA), and approved by Claus R. Ruser (FSE). Repeated to the EC Mission in Luxembourg and USRO in Paris. 1 Dated September 7. (Ibid., 886.2553/9-762) 2 Not printed. (Ibid., 374.82553/10-2362) 362. Letter From President Kennedy to Secretary of the Interior Udall 362. Letter From President Kennedy to Secretary of the Interior Udall Source Washington, November 19, 1962. Dear Mr. Secretary : My review of the interagency study of petroleum supplies and requirements in relation to national security objectives has now been completed. 1 I request that you take the following actions: 1. Initiate discussions immediately with the Interstate Oil Compact Commission, looking toward the formation of a working group to consider objectively the problems involved in updating the state laws and regulations as they apply to the production of petroleum. It has become apparent that elements of state regulatory systems are seriously out of date, and have served to retard the progress of the petroleum industry. I am informed that the Commission has already begun discussions of some of the weaknesses of these systems. It is appropriate that the Federal Government join in these discussions which have a significant potential for improving the fundamental strength of our economy. 2. Provide assistance to the Secretary of State in discussing with the Government of Canada the coordination of United States and Canadian petroleum policy in relation to North American security objectives. 3. Develop and submit to me by no later than November 23, appropriate changes to Proclamation 3279 of March 10, 1959, 2 which would accomplish the following: Assure that the level of imports from all areas into Districts I-IV, of crude oil, unfinished oils, and products other than residual fuel oil to be used as fuel, will bear the same relationship to domestic production of liquid hydrocarbons as that which existed in 1961. This maximum level will include overland exempt imports. Continue the gradual phasing out of allocations based on historical imports of crude and unfinished oils in Districts I-IV and permit, as appropriate, the more rapid phasing out of historical allocations granted on the basis of imports now governed by the overland exemption. Provide that the sliding scale for determining allocations to refiners on the “input” basis include special provision for small business. The present method of establishing allocations for District V and Puerto Rico should remain unchanged but, in addition to your other responsibilities for petroleum policy within the Executive Branch, I request that you make a special effort to encourage the use of domestic production, including production from Districts I-IV, in District V. Sincerely yours, John F. Kennedy 3 * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Economic Policy, Oil Policy. No classification marking. A cover memorandum to Kaysen, et al., from Kenneth R. Hansen, Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget, November 16, states that this is a revised proposed letter to be sent to Udall on November 19 and that it will not be published. Hansen asked for comments by close of business, November 16. 1 The interagency study has not been further identified. 2 Reference is to the proclamation by President Eisenhower, “Adjusting Imports of Petroleum and Petroleum Products into the United States,” and through licenses issued by the Secretary of the Interior. (73 Stat. c26) 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 363. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning (McDermott) to President Kennedy 363. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning (McDermott) to President Kennedy Source Washington, November 29, 1962. I am pleased to reply to NSAM No. 187, dated September 20, 1962, 1 in which you suggested further consideration of recommendation 6b and clarification of recommendation 6d of the report of the Executive Stockpile Committee on the Barter Program. After reviewing a special task force report on recommendation 6b concerning the use of barter to maintain the processing mobilization base or relieve unemployment, 2 the weight of Committee opinion is that the recommendation should be withdrawn. The Committee feels, however, that no restraints should be placed on any department or agency's sponsoring a barter transaction which would accomplish one or both of the objectives described. Such recommendations should be presented to you through the Secretary of Agriculture for consideration on a case-by-case basis as an exception to the principle that barter shall not be used to acquire strategic and critical materials that would be excess to National Stockpile needs. The following amplification of recommendation 6d is submitted for your approval: 3 “Any existing contract for cash purchases may be converted to a barter arrangement on terms and conditions serving the best interests of the United States if the Secretary of the Treasury has found that such conversions would result in an improvement in our balance of payments”. Respectfully, Edward A. McDermott 4 * Source: Washington National Records Center,RG 40, Department of Commerce, Executive Secretariat Files: FRC 69 A 6828, Office of the Secretary, President's Committee on Stockpiling. No classification marking. McDermott was the Chairman of the Executive Stockpile Committee. 1 Document 359 . 2 A copy of the Report of the Special Task Force to Review Recommendation 6b of the Report to the President on the Barter Program is attached to a letter from McDermott to Rusk, November 2, requesting Rusk's comments on a rephrased Recommendation 6b. (Department of State, Central Files, 411.0041/11-262) 3 No record of President Kennedy's approval or disapproval of this recommendation has been found. 4 Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature. 364. Report by the Executive Stockpile Committee to President Kennedy 364. Report by the Executive Stockpile Committee to President Kennedy Source Washington, January 16, 1963. REPORT ON DISPOSING OF EXCESS STOCKPILE MATERIALS This report is in response to your request for the development of recommendations regarding long-range disposal programs for excess stockpile materials. 1 Scope of Disposal Problem As of September 30, 1962, the market value of Government inventories of strategic and critical materials in excess of present maximum objectives was $3,336,303,000. Of this total, $3,100,702,000 represented inventories of specification-grade materials. The balance, $235,601,000, represented materials which do not meet specifications or for which there are no stockpile objectives. About seventy-nine per cent of the excess of specification-grade materials, i.e., $2,438,000,000, is invested in inventories of only twelve materials. The remaining twenty-one per cent of such excess, i.e., $662,702,000, is contained in inventories of forty-nine materials. Net recurring storage costs applicable to surplus inventories amount to approximately $4 million annually. Some Issues Involved The Committee concluded that long-range stockpile disposal programs can best be developed after decisions are reached about several important matters. The issues involved are: (1) The need for a stockpile public information program. (2) The propriety of developing disposal plans for surplus materials before new and up-to-date stockpile objectives are calculated. (3) The need for retaining materials to meet some non-war requirements for strategic materials, e.g., cold war potential needs. (4) The preference to be given various methods of disposal. (5) The adoption and proclamation of criteria and procedures for developing disposal plans. (6) The need for additional legislation to promote efficient stockpile management and facilitate disposals of surplus materials. Recommendations As a result of its studies and discussions of these issues, the Committee makes the following recommendations: No. 1. A program should be developed to provide appropriate information to the general public, producers, processors, and consumers, both domestic and foreign, about the facts relative to stockpile surpluses, and the plans and programs which the Government may have or develop regarding them. No. 2. The Committee reaffirms the recommendation in its report of March 19, 1962, 2 that present maximum objectives should be used to determine the surplus of each material for which disposal plans should be developed. A careful review of present objectives should be undertaken and different interim objectives adopted where appropriate. No. 3. In formulating disposal plans, disposals of stockpile surpluses should be deferred in those instances where this may be considered necessary to meet contingencies short of war or national emergency arising because of the unanticipated consequences of economic or political activities in foreign countries which might result in a cut-off of critical supplies essential to day-to-day operations of the economy. Deferral of disposals on this basis should be confined to those cases where the United States is dependent for the bulk of its requirements on a limited number of foreign countries, where adequate substitute materials are unavailable, and where a cut-off of supplies would cause a serious disruption in a broad sector of commercial or industrial activity. No. 4. Preference should be given to disposal of surpluses by direct cash sales through regular commercial channels. No. 5. No legislation should be requested to provide price differentials to small businesses purchasing surpluses. Attention should be given, however, to the use of set-asides and the provision of terms and conditions which can be met by small businesses with regard to packaging, quantities, payments, and delivery. Full use should be made of the certification of competence procedure provided by section 8(b)(7) of the Small Business Act of 1958. 3 No. 6. Surplus disposals should be on a non-exclusive, non-discriminatory basis to all potential buyers, except where special circumstances might justify limiting disposals to a particular group, e.g., producers or sales agents. No. 7. Federal agencies should continue to purchase their direct needs for surplus stockpile materials from the General Services Administration. No. 8. Opportunities for disposals of surpluses through their use in the manufacture of articles being procured by the Government, i.e., indirect Government use, should be thoroughly investigated. This method of disposal should be used only when it is expected that disposals cannot otherwise be made. It should, however, be looked upon as an important tool for the implementation of surplus disposals. No. 9. Disposals which involve the use of surpluses to pay for all or part of the cost of Government procurement, i.e., barter, should be made only when it is expected that the disposal could not be satisfactorily made by other methods, and only when there are assurances that the materials will not be directly resold on the market. Such disposals, however, should be looked upon as an important tool for the implementation of surplus disposals. 4 No. 10. Permanent authority for the use of Defense Production Act 5 inventories to pay for the cost of upgrading materials needed for the National Stockpile should be provided by law. No. 11. Regardless of which of the methods discussed in recommendations Nos. 4 through 10 is used, the amount disposed of should be within the overall amount authorized by an approved long-term disposal program for the material involved. No. 12. (a) An interdepartmental committee chaired by the Office of Emergency Planning should be designated to conduct preliminary investigations of all aspects of the proposed disposal of any material, including selective consultation with industry. This committee should recommend relevant factors, policy decisions, and criteria for determining the ultimate maximum and minimum amounts of disposal and the average rate of disposal to be incorporated in each long-range disposal program to be approved by OEP. (b) Criteria for the development of disposal programs (Attachment A) 6 should be approved and published. No. 13. Necessary stockpile legislation should be provided to expedite and facilitate the disposal of stockpile surpluses. No. 14. Disposal programs should be developed for all surpluses under the Defense Production Act and the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act. Disposal programs for surpluses in the Supplemental Stockpile should also be developed if and when legislation is provided to facilitate disposals from that stockpile. [Here follow 20 pages of “Discussion of Recommendations.” Also omitted are the signatures of Edward A. McDermott (Chairman), G. Griffith Johnson (Department of State), Roswell Gilpatric (Department of Defense), John M. Kelly (Department of the Interior), Edward Gudeman (Department of Commerce), John F. Henning (Department of Labor), Huntington D. Sheldon (Central Intelligence Agency), and Bernard L. Boutin (General Services Administration).] * Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Economic Policy, Stockpiling of Strategic Materials, SM 63. No classification marking. A January 16 transmittal letter from McDermott as Chairman of the Executive Stockpile Committee to President Kennedy, not printed, submitted the report for his review and consideration. An attached covering memorandum from McDermott to Kaysen, February 15, states that the President approved the public release of the report. 1 Document 347 . 2 Document 349 . 3 Reference is to section 8(b)(7) of P.L. 85-536, approved July 18, 1958, under which small business government contractors could participate in procurement and disposal contracts without any other requirements with respect to capacity and credit. (72 Stat. 391; 15 USC 637(b)(7)) 4 In a letter of January 3 to McDermott, Acting Secretary of Commerce Edward Gudeman expressed reservations about recommendations 9 and 10 because “the Department of Commerce continues to be seriously concerned about the disruption of markets through noncommercial channels.” (Washington National Records Center, RG 40, Department of Commerce, Executive Secretariat Files:FRC 69 A 6828, Office of the Secretary, President's Committee on Stockpiling) 5 P.L. 81-774, approved September 8, 1950; 64 Stat. 798, 50 USC App. 2061, et seq. 6 Not printed. 365. Memorandum From President Kennedy to the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning (McDermott) 365. Memorandum From President Kennedy to the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning (McDermott) Source Washington, January 30, 1963. I have reviewed the report of the Executive Stockpile Committee on “Disposing of Excess Stockpile Materials,” 1 and I approve Recommendations Nos. 1 through 14. Although we should maintain an adequate stockpile of strategic materials, we should dispose of the materials that are in excess of our needs. Such disposals should be made in the light of our national interest and our desire to avoid any serious disruption of the markets. The development of long-range disposal policies and plans should proceed in anticipation of enabling legislation. John Kennedy * Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 40, Department of Commerce, Executive Secretariat Files: FRC 69 A 6828, Office of the Secretary, President's Committee on Stockpiling. No classification marking. Transmitted with a February 6 covering letter from McDermott to Secretary of Commerce Luther H. Hodges. 1 Document 364 . Index Index Acheson, Dean, 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 20 ] -47 [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 112 ] Acheson Advisory Group, 199 [ Pg. 199 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] -200 [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 211 [ Pg. 211 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] Achilles, Theodore C., 403 n [ Pg. 403 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] Adenauer, Konrad, 114 [ Pg. 114 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] -116 [ Pg. 116 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 72 ] -173 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 89 ] Advisory Committee on Export Policy, 661 [ Pg. 661 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] , 683 [ Pg. 683 is part of Doc. 309 ] , 748 [ Pg. 748 is part of Doc. 333 ] Afghanistan, 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 84 ] Africa, 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 348 [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 159 ] Agency for International Development(AID), 24 [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 17 ] -34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 18 ] -38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 62 [ Pg. 62 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 117 ] -270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 122 ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 134 ] -297 [ Pg. 297 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] , 324 [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 150 ] -325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 150 ] , 335 [ Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 154 ] -336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 154 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] -390 [ Pg. 390 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] -408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 185 ] loan policy, 286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 131 ] -292 [ Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 133 ] , 295 [ Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 135 ] -298 [ Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] , 327 [ Pg. 327 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] -328 [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 165 ] Agricultural Act of 1956 , 482 n [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 226 ] Agricultural commodities ( see also Foreign assistance policy; Trade policy), 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 24 ] -61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 126 ] -279 [ Pg. 279 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] , 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 151 ] -327 [ Pg. 327 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] , 354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 162 ] -355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 162 ] Agriculture, Department of, role, 238 [ Pg. 238 includes portions of Doc. 105 and Doc. 106 ] -240 [ Pg. 240 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] -247 [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] -264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 119 ] , 327 n [ Pg. 327 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] EEC Common Agricultural Policy, 507 [ Pg. 507 is part of Doc. 237 ] -508 [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 237 ] food assistance, 192 [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 85 ] -193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 238 [ Pg. 238 includes portions of Doc. 105 and Doc. 106 ] -240 [ Pg. 240 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] -247 [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] , 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 151 ] -327 [ Pg. 327 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] Food for Peace program, 192 [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 85 ] -193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 238 [ Pg. 238 includes portions of Doc. 105 and Doc. 106 ] -240 [ Pg. 240 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 119 ] , 354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 162 ] -355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 162 ] grain, 641 [ Pg. 641 is part of Doc. 294 ] -643 [ Pg. 643 includes portions of Doc. 294 and Doc. 295 ] , 646 [ Pg. 646 is part of Doc. 295 ] , 741 [ Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 330 ] -742 [ Pg. 742 is part of Doc. 330 ] poultry, 121 [ Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] , 559 [ Pg. 559 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] -560 [ Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 260 ] , 576 [ Pg. 576 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267 ] -577 [ Pg. 577 is part of Doc. 267 ] , 595 [ Pg. 595 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] , 597 [ Pg. 597 is part of Doc. 276 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 284 ] -614 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 285 ] , 635 [ Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 292 ] Soviet bloc, trade with, 656 [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 299 , Doc. 300 , and Doc. 301 ] -657 [ Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 301 ] , 689 [ Pg. 689 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312 ] , 741 [ Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 330 ] -742 [ Pg. 742 is part of Doc. 330 ] . U.S. agricultural package rejected by EEC, 462 [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 211 and Doc. 212 ] -463 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 212 ] wheat, 741 [ Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 330 ] -742 [ Pg. 742 is part of Doc. 330 ] Air Force redeployment, 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 28 ] -70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 28 ] Albright, Raymond J., 157 n [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 65 ] Alexander, George H., 808 n [ Pg. 808 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361 ] Alliance for Progress, 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 134 ] , 789 [ Pg. 789 includes portions of Doc. 351 and Doc. 352 ] -791 [ Pg. 791 includes portions of Doc. 352 and Doc. 353 ] Amini, Ali, 793 [ Pg. 793 is part of Doc. 354 ] -794 [ Pg. 794 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] Amory, Robert, 314 [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 144 ] Anderson, Robert, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 2 [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 87 n [ Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] Ansiaux, Hubert, 411 n [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 187 ] Asakai, Koichiro, 555 [ Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 258 ] -556 [ Pg. 556 is part of Doc. 258 ] Atomic Energy Agency, 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 194 ] Atomic Energy Commission, 751 [ Pg. 751 is part of Doc. 335 ] , 759 [ Pg. 759 is part of Doc. 338 ] -761 [ Pg. 761 includes portions of Doc. 338 and Doc. 339 ] Australia, 53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] Austria, 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 66 ] Bacon, Leonard L., 187 n [ Pg. 187 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] Balance-of-payments issue, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] -10 [ Pg. 10 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 25 [ Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 18 ] -36 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 39 ] -104 [ Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 42 ] -110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 178 [ Pg. 178 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] -184 [ Pg. 184 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 94 ] -209 [ Pg. 209 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] , 416 [ Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 190 ] -417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 190 ] , 605 [ Pg. 605 is part of Doc. 280 ] agricultural exports, 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 24 ] -61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 24 ] British position, 112 [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 43 ] -114 [ Pg. 114 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] Cabinet Committee on Balance of Payments, 27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 9 ] -34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 35 n [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 22 ] -64 [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 25 and Doc. 26 ] , 66 [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. 26 and Doc. 27 ] , 354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 548 [ Pg. 548 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] -553 [ Pg. 553 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257 ] , 554 n [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 257 ] Canada, 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 24 ] -53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 56 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 24 ] -57 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 62 [ Pg. 62 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 154 [ Pg. 154 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63 ] -155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 63 ] cost and price stabilization, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 3 ] domestic policy, 38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 18 ] -39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 19 ] export promotion, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 14 [ Pg. 14 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 93 [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] , 548 [ Pg. 548 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] -554 [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 257 ] foreign assistance policy, 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 18 ] -38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 18 ] -42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 86 [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 308 [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] -315 [ Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 144 ] foreign investment policy, 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 18 ] -41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 24 ] -53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 24 ] -62 [ Pg. 62 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 87 [ Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] -88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 33 ] France, 56 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 81 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 63 ] Galbraith letters, 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 30 ] -87 [ Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] Germany, Federal Republic of, 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 40 ] -108 [ Pg. 108 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] , 114 [ Pg. 114 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] -117 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 52 ] -133 [ Pg. 133 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] , 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 72 ] -172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 72 ] U.S. military expenses offsetpurchases, 36 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 42 ] -111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 45 ] -118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 121 [ Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 125 [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] -126 [ Pg. 126 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 52 ] -133 [ Pg. 133 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] , 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 64 ] -159 [ Pg. 159 includes portions of Doc. 65 and Doc. 66 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 75 ] -178 [ Pg. 178 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 184 [ Pg. 184 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] -185 [ Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] gold erosion problem, 2 [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 8 ] -17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 43 [ Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 20 ] -46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 54 [ Pg. 54 is part of Doc. 24 ] -60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 78 [ Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] -79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 102 [ Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 114 [ Pg. 114 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] -115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 135 [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] -138 [ Pg. 138 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 146 [ Pg. 146 is part of Doc. 59 ] -147 [ Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 153 [ Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 61 and Doc. 62 ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 includes portions of Doc. 65 and Doc. 66 ] -164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 174 [ Pg. 174 includes portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73 ] Group of Ten declaration, 144 [ Pg. 144 is part of Doc. 59 ] -153 [ Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 61 and Doc. 62 ] interagency coordination, 10 [ Pg. 10 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] -14 [ Pg. 14 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 10 ] -23 [ Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 11 ] interest equalization tax, 74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 104 [ Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 178 [ Pg. 178 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] -184 [ Pg. 184 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] -188 [ Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 83 ] International Monetary Fund drawingrights, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 56 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 24 ] -59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 25 and Doc. 26 ] , 102 [ Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 124 [ Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 48 ] -125 [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51 ] , 133 [ Pg. 133 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] -135 [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] Italy, 56 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 63 ] Japan, 518 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 241 ] military expenditures, 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 3 ] -10 [ Pg. 10 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 15 [ Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] -17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 25 [ Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] -32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 17 ] -37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 62 [ Pg. 62 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 28 ] -74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 84 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 32 ] -85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 93 [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] -100 [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 42 ] -111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 45 ] -119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 69 ] -168 [ Pg. 168 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] monetary policy ( see also gold erosion problem above ), 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 18 ] -44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 87 [ Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] -89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 43 ] -114 [ Pg. 114 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] , 125 [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 138 [ Pg. 138 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] -141 [ Pg. 141 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] -180 [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] oil, 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 97 [ Pg. 97 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] short-term demand, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 3 ] -5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 6 ] -14 [ Pg. 14 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 8 ] tourisim promotion, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 3 ] -7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 14 [ Pg. 14 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 80 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 72 ] trade deficits, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 30 [ Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] -31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 47 [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] -48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 21 ] trade policy, 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 3 ] -8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 32 ] -84 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 33 ] United Kingdom, 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 42 ] U.S. forces deployment, 64 [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 25 and Doc. 26 ] -68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 34 ] -93 [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] , 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 38 ] -100 [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 39 ] -104 [ Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 39 ] Venezuela, 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 63 ] Ball, George W., 10 [ Pg. 10 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] -11 [ Pg. 11 includes portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5 ] , 21 n [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 87 n [ Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] balance-of-payments issue, 12 [ Pg. 12 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 25 n [ Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] , 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 24 ] -55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 58 [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 24 ] -61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 125 n [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 52 ] -132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] -148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 328 [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 152 ] -334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 153 ] export defense policy, 667 [ Pg. 667 is part of Doc. 304 ] -668 [ Pg. 668 is part of Doc. 304 ] , 670 [ Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 306 ] -671 [ Pg. 671 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] , 697 [ Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 313 ] -698 [ Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 701 n [ Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 315 and Doc. 316 ] , 743 [ Pg. 743 is part of Doc. 331 ] , 744 [ Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 332 ] -746 [ Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 332 ] foreign assistance policy, 153 [ Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 61 and Doc. 62 ] -154 [ Pg. 154 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63 ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] , 195 [ Pg. 195 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] -198 [ Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 90 and Doc. 91 ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] -213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 214 n [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 98 ] , 220 [ Pg. 220 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] -222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. 101 and Doc. 102 ] -225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 235 [ Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 293 n [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 134 ] , 321 n [ Pg. 321 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] , 328 [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 152 ] -334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 341 [ Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] -391 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 175 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 177 ] -395 [ Pg. 395 is part of Doc. 177 ] , 492 n [ Pg. 492 is part of Doc. 229 ] , 493 [ Pg. 493 includes portions of Doc. 229 and Doc. 230 ] -495 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 230 ] , 501 n [ Pg. 501 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] , 502 [ Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] -503 [ Pg. 503 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 506 [ Pg. 506 includes portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] -512 [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240 ] , 557 n [ Pg. 557 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] , 786 [ Pg. 786 is part of Doc. 349 ] -788 [ Pg. 788 includes portions of Doc. 350 and Doc. 351 ] international investment and development policy, 403 n [ Pg. 403 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] , 409 [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 186 ] -410 [ Pg. 410 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 413 [ Pg. 413 includes portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] -414 [ Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 188 ] , 440 [ Pg. 440 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 453 [ Pg. 453 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] -454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 211 and Doc. 212 ] -463 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225 ] -484 [ Pg. 484 includes portions of Doc. 226 and Doc. 227 ] , 490 [ Pg. 490 includes portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228 ] -491 [ Pg. 491 is part of Doc. 228 ] , 492 n [ Pg. 492 is part of Doc. 229 ] , 493 [ Pg. 493 includes portions of Doc. 229 and Doc. 230 ] -495 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 230 ] , 501 n [ Pg. 501 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] , 502 [ Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] -503 [ Pg. 503 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 506 [ Pg. 506 includes portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] -509 [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] trade policy ( see also export defense policy above ), 520 [ Pg. 520 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] -521 [ Pg. 521 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] , 528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 541 [ Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] -548 [ Pg. 548 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] , 568 [ Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 263 ] -570 [ Pg. 570 includes portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265 ] , 576 [ Pg. 576 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267 ] -577 [ Pg. 577 is part of Doc. 267 ] , 582 [ Pg. 582 is part of Doc. 271 ] -584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 271 ] , 603 n [ Pg. 603 is part of Doc. 279 ] , 611 [ Pg. 611 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] -614 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 285 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 289 ] , 622 [ Pg. 622 is part of Doc. 290 ] -627 [ Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 290 ] , 641 [ Pg. 641 is part of Doc. 294 ] , 645 [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 295 ] textiles, 466 n [ Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 218 ] , 470 [ Pg. 470 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 510 [ Pg. 510 includes portions of Doc. 238 and Doc. 239 ] -512 [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240 ] , 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 241 ] -519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 249 ] -536 [ Pg. 536 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] , 546 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 255 ] -548 [ Pg. 548 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] , 555 [ Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 258 ] , 557 n [ Pg. 557 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] , 561 [ Pg. 561 includes portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262 ] -568 [ Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 263 ] , 570 [ Pg. 570 includes portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265 ] -576 [ Pg. 576 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267 ] , 578 [ Pg. 578 is part of Doc. 268 ] -581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 270 ] , 585 [ Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 272 ] -592 [ Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 619 n [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 288 ] Barall, Milton, 777 n [ Pg. 777 includes portions of Doc. 347 and Doc. 348 ] Barber (UK), 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 101 ] Barger, Herman H., 356 n [ Pg. 356 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 502 [ Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] , 538 n [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] Barnett, R.W., 337 n [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 155 ] Barter Program, 802 [ Pg. 802 is part of Doc. 358 ] -807 [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360 ] , 810 [ Pg. 810 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] -811 [ Pg. 811 includes portions of Doc. 363 and Doc. 364 ] Bator, Francis, 86 n [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. 32 ] Battle, Lucius D., 212 n , 271 n [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 123 ] , 291 n [ Pg. 291 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] , 293 n [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 134 ] , 326 n [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 151 ] , 411 n [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 187 ] , 479 n [ Pg. 479 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] , 510 n [ Pg. 510 includes portions of Doc. 238 and Doc. 239 ] , 762 n [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 340 ] Baumgartner, Leona, 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 155 ] Baumgartner, Wilfrid, 411 n [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 187 ] Beale, Wilson T.M., 649 n [ Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 297 ] Beaudry, Robert M., 529 n [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 606 n [ Pg. 606 is part of Doc. 281 ] Behrman, Jack N., 11 [ Pg. 11 includes portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5 ] -12 [ Pg. 12 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 654 [ Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 299 ] , 664 [ Pg. 664 is part of Doc. 304 ] -666 [ Pg. 666 is part of Doc. 304 ] , 705 n [ Pg. 705 includes portions of Doc. 318 and Doc. 319 ] . Belcher, Taylor G., 777 n [ Pg. 777 includes portions of Doc. 347 and Doc. 348 ] Belgium, 143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 205 ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 211 and Doc. 212 ] -463 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 226 ] -481 [ Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 226 ] carpet and glass trade, 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 246 ] -531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 248 ] International Monetary Fund, 411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 187 ] -413 [ Pg. 413 includes portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] Bell, David E., 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 86 n [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 87 n [ Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 176 n [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] -198 [ Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 90 and Doc. 91 ] , 202 [ Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] -213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 271 n [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 123 ] , 281 [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 128 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 134 ] , 301 n [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 321 n [ Pg. 321 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] , 335 [ Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 154 ] -336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 154 ] , 344 [ Pg. 344 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158 ] , 350 [ Pg. 350 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] -352 [ Pg. 352 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 164 ] -368 [ Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 370 [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 166 ] -377 [ Pg. 377 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] , 382 n [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] , 383 n [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 386 [ Pg. 386 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 177 ] , 403 n [ Pg. 403 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] , 409 n [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 653 n [ Pg. 653 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] Bell, John O., 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 409 n [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 186 ] Berger, Samuel D., 281 [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 128 ] Berlin, 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 708 [ Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 320 ] Big Lift military exercise, 96 [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 100 [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 38 ] Birth control, 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 155 ] Black, Eugene, 231 [ Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 190 ] -420 [ Pg. 420 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] , 441 [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 197 ] Blaser (Treasury), 187 n [ Pg. 187 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] Blessing, Karl, 411 n [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 187 ] Bloomfield, William, 659 [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 302 ] Blough, Roger M., 769 n [ Pg. 769 is part of Doc. 343 ] Blumenthal, W. Michael, 517 n [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 538 n [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] , 556 [ Pg. 556 is part of Doc. 258 ] -557 [ Pg. 557 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] , 565 [ Pg. 565 is part of Doc. 262 ] , 573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 266 ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 272 ] , 599 n [ Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] , 643 [ Pg. 643 includes portions of Doc. 294 and Doc. 295 ] -647 [ Pg. 647 is part of Doc. 295 ] , 768 [ Pg. 768 includes portions of Doc. 342 and Doc. 343 ] -769 [ Pg. 769 is part of Doc. 343 ] Bohlen, Charles E., 651 [ Pg. 651 is part of Doc. 298 ] -653 [ Pg. 653 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] Boland, Frederick H., 399 [ Pg. 399 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] Bolivia, 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 235 [ Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 766 [ Pg. 766 is part of Doc. 342 ] , 767 [ Pg. 767 is part of Doc. 342 ] Bolling, Richard, 209 [ Pg. 209 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] Boochever, Louis C., 176 n [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 74 ] Boutin, Bernard L., 786 [ Pg. 786 is part of Doc. 349 ] Bowles, Chester A., 75 n [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] -213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 236 [ Pg. 236 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] -239 [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. 106 and Doc. 107 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] -247 [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] , 403 [ Pg. 403 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] -406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] , 413 [ Pg. 413 includes portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] -414 [ Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 188 ] , 651 [ Pg. 651 is part of Doc. 298 ] -653 [ Pg. 653 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] Brandin, Robert M., 184 n [ Pg. 184 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] Brazil, 334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 164 ] Breaux, Clarence T., 656 n [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 299 , Doc. 300 , and Doc. 301 ] , 703 n [ Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 317 ] Brentano, Heinrich von, 233 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 104 ] -235 [ Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 104 ] Brown, Emerson M., 466 n [ Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] Brubeck, William H., 496 n [ Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 701 n [ Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 315 and Doc. 316 ] , 706 [ Pg. 706 includes portions of Doc. 319 and Doc. 320 ] -708 [ Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 320 ] , 797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 356 ] -799 [ Pg. 799 includes portions of Doc. 356 and Doc. 357 ] Bullitt, John C., 51 n [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 450 [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 204 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 205 ] -452 [ Pg. 452 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] Bundesbank, 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 24 ] Bundy, McGeorge: balance-of-payments issue, 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 43 [ Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] -44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 45 n [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 47 n [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 66 n [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. 26 and Doc. 27 ] , 87 n [ Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 97 n [ Pg. 97 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 167 n [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 70 ] , 382 n [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] , 383 n [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 171 ] economic defense policy, 659 n [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 706 [ Pg. 706 includes portions of Doc. 319 and Doc. 320 ] -708 [ Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 320 ] , 725 [ Pg. 725 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325 ] -728 [ Pg. 728 is part of Doc. 325 ] , 737 [ Pg. 737 includes portions of Doc. 327 and Doc. 328 ] -739 [ Pg. 739 is part of Doc. 328 ] , 743 [ Pg. 743 is part of Doc. 331 ] foreign assistance policy, 279 [ Pg. 279 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] , 292 n [ Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 133 ] , 326 n [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 151 ] , 344 n [ Pg. 344 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] -378 [ Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 392 [ Pg. 392 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 177 ] -395 [ Pg. 395 is part of Doc. 177 ] international investment and development policy, 415 [ Pg. 415 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 192 ] -423 [ Pg. 423 includes portions of Doc. 192 and Doc. 193 ] , 636 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 293 ] -639 [ Pg. 639 is part of Doc. 293 ] , 655 [ Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 299 ] -656 [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 299 , Doc. 300 , and Doc. 301 ] military expenditures, 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 271 n [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 123 ] , 301 n [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 139 ] strategic materials and commodities policy, 758 [ Pg. 758 includes portions of Doc. 337 and Doc. 338 ] -759 [ Pg. 759 is part of Doc. 338 ] , 765 [ Pg. 765 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] -768 [ Pg. 768 includes portions of Doc. 342 and Doc. 343 ] , 797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 356 ] -799 [ Pg. 799 includes portions of Doc. 356 and Doc. 357 ] Bundy, William, 281 [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 128 ] , 653 [ Pg. 653 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] Burdett, William C., 459 n [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 210 ] Burnstan, Rowland, 768 [ Pg. 768 includes portions of Doc. 342 and Doc. 343 ] -769 [ Pg. 769 is part of Doc. 343 ] Butler, Frank P., 457 n [ Pg. 457 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] Buy America Act, 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 17 ] Cabinet Committee on Balance of Payments, 27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 9 ] -34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 35 n [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 22 ] -64 [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 25 and Doc. 26 ] , 66 [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. 26 and Doc. 27 ] , 354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 548 [ Pg. 548 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] -553 [ Pg. 553 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257 ] , 554 n [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 257 ] Cabinet Textile Committee, 546 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 255 ] -547 [ Pg. 547 is part of Doc. 255 ] , 558 [ Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 259 ] , 562 [ Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 262 ] , 585 [ Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 272 ] Callanan, Paul E., 777 n [ Pg. 777 includes portions of Doc. 347 and Doc. 348 ] Canada, 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 759 [ Pg. 759 is part of Doc. 338 ] -760 [ Pg. 760 is part of Doc. 338 ] , 773 [ Pg. 773 is part of Doc. 345 ] balance-of-payments issue, 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 24 ] -53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 56 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 24 ] -57 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 62 [ Pg. 62 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 154 [ Pg. 154 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63 ] -155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 63 ] foreign assistance policy, 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 228 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 102 ] -229 [ Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 193 ] interest equalization tax, 180 [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] -181 [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] , 183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 79 ] Caplan, Benjamin, 178 n [ Pg. 178 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] Carpets, 479 [ Pg. 479 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] -484 [ Pg. 484 includes portions of Doc. 226 and Doc. 227 ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 528 n [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 246 ] -531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 248 ] Carr, James K., 771 [ Pg. 771 is part of Doc. 345 ] , 786 [ Pg. 786 is part of Doc. 349 ] Carver, John A., Jr., 801 [ Pg. 801 is part of Doc. 357 ] Cash, Frank E., Jr., 656 n [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 299 , Doc. 300 , and Doc. 301 ] Chenery, Hollis B., 24 n [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 282 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 128 ] , 283 n [ Pg. 283 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 293 n [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 134 ] Childs, Marquis, 611 [ Pg. 611 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] -614 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 285 ] Chile, 316 [ Pg. 316 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 164 ] China, People's Republic of, 280 n [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 128 ] , 668 [ Pg. 668 is part of Doc. 304 ] , 729 [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 326 ] Christopher, Warren M., 471 n [ Pg. 471 includes portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] Civil aviation policy, 709 [ Pg. 709 is part of Doc. 321 ] -711 [ Pg. 711 includes portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] Civil defense, 765 [ Pg. 765 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] Claxton, Philander P., 512 n [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240 ] Clay, Gen. Lucius D., 353 [ Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 161 ] Clay Committee. See Committee To Strengthen the Security of the Free World . Cleveland, Harlan, 326 n [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 151 ] , 327 n [ Pg. 327 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] , 399 n [ Pg. 399 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] , 403 [ Pg. 403 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] -404 [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 182 and Doc. 183 ] , 409 [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 186 ] -410 [ Pg. 410 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 426 [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 194 ] -433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 440 [ Pg. 440 is part of Doc. 197 ] -445 [ Pg. 445 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] Cleveland, Stanley M., 606 n [ Pg. 606 is part of Doc. 281 ] Clifford, Clark M., 1 n [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] Coal, 173 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 72 ] Cochran, H. Merle, 440 [ Pg. 440 is part of Doc. 197 ] Coerr, Wimberley, 767 [ Pg. 767 is part of Doc. 342 ] -768 [ Pg. 768 includes portions of Doc. 342 and Doc. 343 ] Coffee, 807 [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360 ] -808 [ Pg. 808 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361 ] Coffin, Frank M., 19 n [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 271 n [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 123 ] , 293 n [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 134 ] , 313 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 144 ] -315 [ Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 325 n [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 150 ] , 341 n [ Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] , 406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] -408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 185 ] Colbert, James L., 651 n [ Pg. 651 is part of Doc. 298 ] , 656 n [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 299 , Doc. 300 , and Doc. 301 ] , 701 n [ Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 315 and Doc. 316 ] Committee To Strengthen the Security of the Free World (Clay Committee), 344 [ Pg. 344 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158 ] -345 [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 350 [ Pg. 350 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] -353 [ Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 164 ] -359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 370 [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 166 ] -373 [ Pg. 373 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] Common Market. See European Economic Community . Congo, 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 226 ] Congress, U.S.: Agricultural Act of 1956 , 482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 510 [ Pg. 510 includes portions of Doc. 238 and Doc. 239 ] Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act (P.L. 480) ( see also Food for Peace), 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 239 [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. 106 and Doc. 107 ] , 240 [ Pg. 240 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 162 ] balance-of-payments issue, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 3 ] -6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 3 ] Buy America Act, 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 765 [ Pg. 765 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] Cooley Amendment loans, 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 162 ] Defense Production Act of 1950 , 784 [ Pg. 784 is part of Doc. 349 ] , 814 [ Pg. 814 is part of Doc. 364 ] Export Control Act, 658 [ Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 660 [ Pg. 660 is part of Doc. 302 ] -662 [ Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 670 n [ Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 679 [ Pg. 679 is part of Doc. 309 ] -680 [ Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 309 ] , 684 [ Pg. 684 includes portions of Doc. 309 and Doc. 310 ] -685 [ Pg. 685 is part of Doc. 310 ] , 688 [ Pg. 688 is part of Doc. 311 ] , 691 [ Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 312 ] -692 [ Pg. 692 is part of Doc. 312 ] , 707 [ Pg. 707 is part of Doc. 320 ] , 712 [ Pg. 712 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] -717 [ Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 323 ] , 765export controls, 658 [ Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 302 ] -661 [ Pg. 661 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 , 259 [ Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] -260 [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 265 [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 120 ] Foreign Assistance Act of 1963 , 391 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 175 ] , 750 [ Pg. 750 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] foreign assistance policy, 259 [ Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] -260 [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 116 ] House Select Committee on Export Control (Kitchin Committee), 658 [ Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 668 [ Pg. 668 is part of Doc. 304 ] Johnson Act ( 1934 ), 696 [ Pg. 696 is part of Doc. 313 ] -697 [ Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 733 [ Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 327 ] , 744 [ Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 332 ] -745 [ Pg. 745 is part of Doc. 332 ] Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (Battle Act), 648 [ Pg. 648 is part of Doc. 296 ] , 650 n [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 297 ] Senate Subcommittee on the National Stockpile and Naval Petroleum Reserve, 775 [ Pg. 775 is part of Doc. 346 ] Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act of 1946 , 765 [ Pg. 765 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] Sugar Act, 761 [ Pg. 761 includes portions of Doc. 338 and Doc. 339 ] textiles, 469 [ Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219 ] -472 [ Pg. 472 includes portions of Doc. 221 and Doc. 222 ] tin, 768 [ Pg. 768 includes portions of Doc. 342 and Doc. 343 ] Trade Agreements Act, 474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] Trade Expansion Act of 1962 , 512 [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240 ] -516 [ Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 240 ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 249 ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 includes portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] -538 [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 253 ] , 547 [ Pg. 547 is part of Doc. 255 ] , 568 [ Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 263 ] -570 [ Pg. 570 includes portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265 ] , 583 [ Pg. 583 is part of Doc. 271 ] , 633 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 291 ] -634 [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 750 [ Pg. 750 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] trade policy, 469 [ Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219 ] -470 [ Pg. 470 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 512 [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240 ] -516 [ Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 240 ] , 537 n [ Pg. 537 includes portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] , 732 [ Pg. 732 is part of Doc. 326 ] , 741 [ Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 330 ] Webb-Pomerene Act, 62 [ Pg. 62 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] Cooley, Harold D., 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] -758 [ Pg. 758 includes portions of Doc. 337 and Doc. 338 ] Cooley Amendment loans, 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 162 ] Coombs, Philip H., 236 [ Pg. 236 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] -237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 105 ] Cooperative for American Remittance Everywhere, Inc. (CARE), 192 n [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 85 ] Coordinating Committee of the Paris Consultative Group (COCOM), 649 [ Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 297 ] -650 [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 297 ] , 671 [ Pg. 671 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] -674 [ Pg. 674 is part of Doc. 307 ] , 700 [ Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 315 ] -701 [ Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 315 and Doc. 316 ] , 713 [ Pg. 713 is part of Doc. 323 ] -714 [ Pg. 714 is part of Doc. 323 ] Coppock, Joseph D., 11 [ Pg. 11 includes portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5 ] , 14 [ Pg. 14 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 431 [ Pg. 431 is part of Doc. 194 ] -432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 194 ] Cottam, Howard R., 808 n [ Pg. 808 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361 ] Cotton textiles. See textiles under Trade policy. Council of Economic Advisers, 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 30 ] -76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 80 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 56 ] Couve de Murville, Maurice, 168 [ Pg. 168 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] -169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 289 ] Crab meat trade restrictions, 726 [ Pg. 726 is part of Doc. 325 ] , 727 [ Pg. 727 is part of Doc. 325 ] Creel, Robert R., 170 n [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 176 n [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 179 n [ Pg. 179 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] Cuba, 658 [ Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 708 [ Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 320 ] , 755 [ Pg. 755 is part of Doc. 337 ] , 761 [ Pg. 761 includes portions of Doc. 338 and Doc. 339 ] sugar quotas, 755 [ Pg. 755 is part of Doc. 337 ] , 761 [ Pg. 761 includes portions of Doc. 338 and Doc. 339 ] trade embargo, 658 [ Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 708 [ Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 320 ] Cuban missile crisis, 705 [ Pg. 705 includes portions of Doc. 318 and Doc. 319 ] -706 [ Pg. 706 includes portions of Doc. 319 and Doc. 320 ] Current Economic Developments , 365 [ Pg. 365 includes portions of Doc. 164 and Doc. 165 ] -369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 384 [ Pg. 384 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] -389 [ Pg. 389 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] , 415 [ Pg. 415 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] -420 [ Pg. 420 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] , 423 [ Pg. 423 includes portions of Doc. 192 and Doc. 193 ] -425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 445 [ Pg. 445 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] -447 [ Pg. 447 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] , 671 [ Pg. 671 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] -674 [ Pg. 674 is part of Doc. 307 ] , 700 [ Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 315 ] -701 [ Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 315 and Doc. 316 ] Curtis, Donald W., 116 n [ Pg. 116 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] Dale, William B., 801 [ Pg. 801 is part of Doc. 357 ] Daniels, Draper, 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 18 ] Daufresne de la Chevallerie (Belgium), 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 101 ] Davis, Richard H., 176 n [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 74 ] De Gaulle, Charles, 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 64 ] De Lattre, Andre, 145 [ Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 146 [ Pg. 146 is part of Doc. 59 ] Defense Mobilization Order V-7, 780 [ Pg. 780 is part of Doc. 349 ] -781 [ Pg. 781 is part of Doc. 349 ] , 782 [ Pg. 782 is part of Doc. 349 ] , 785 [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 349 ] , 788 [ Pg. 788 includes portions of Doc. 350 and Doc. 351 ] , 792 [ Pg. 792 is part of Doc. 353 ] Denmark, 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 205 ] -452 [ Pg. 452 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] Dequae, Andre, 411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 187 ] -413 [ Pg. 413 includes portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] Development Assistance Committee. See under Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development . Development Assistance Group. See under Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development . Dillon, C. Douglas, 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] -390 [ Pg. 390 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] balance-of-payments issue, 3 [ Pg. 3 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] -10 [ Pg. 10 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 14 [ Pg. 14 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] -23 [ Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 18 ] -43 [ Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 50 [ Pg. 50 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23 ] -56 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 58 [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 24 ] -61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 68 n [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 87 n [ Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 40 ] -114 [ Pg. 114 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] -119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 122 [ Pg. 122 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] -125 [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 144 [ Pg. 144 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 154 [ Pg. 154 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63 ] -155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 65 ] -160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] -168 [ Pg. 168 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] international investment and development policy, 399 n [ Pg. 399 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] , 411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 187 ] -413 [ Pg. 413 includes portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] , 415 [ Pg. 415 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] -417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 190 ] trade policy, 553 [ Pg. 553 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257 ] -554 [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 257 ] , 696 [ Pg. 696 is part of Doc. 313 ] -697 [ Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 313 ] Dobrynin, Anatoly E, 744 [ Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 332 ] Dominican Republic, 755 [ Pg. 755 is part of Doc. 337 ] -758 [ Pg. 758 includes portions of Doc. 337 and Doc. 338 ] , 761 [ Pg. 761 includes portions of Doc. 338 and Doc. 339 ] Donahue, Ruth S., 276 n [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 358 n [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 426 [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 771 n [ Pg. 771 is part of Doc. 345 ] Dowling, Walter C., 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 52 ] Dozier, William B., 649 n [ Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 297 ] , 752 n [ Pg. 752 is part of Doc. 336 ] Drury (Canada), 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 28 ] Dulles, Allen W. 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 112 ] -255 [ Pg. 255 is part of Doc. 112 ] Duncan (Agriculture), 653 [ Pg. 653 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] Dungan, Ralph A., 258 n [ Pg. 258 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] , 271 n [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 123 ] , 291 n [ Pg. 291 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] , 293 n [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 134 ] , 297 [ Pg. 297 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] -298 [ Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] , 308 n [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] , 312 [ Pg. 312 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] -315 [ Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 344 [ Pg. 344 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158 ] -345 [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 158 ] East-west trade. See Economic defense policy; Trade policy. Easum, Donald, 271 n [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 123 ] , 283 n [ Pg. 283 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 293 n [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 134 ] , 370 n [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 166 ] Economic defense policy ( see also Trade policy), 680 [ Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 309 ] -689 [ Pg. 689 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312 ] , 695 [ Pg. 695 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] -699 [ Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 314 ] , 718 [ Pg. 718 is part of Doc. 324 ] -740 [ Pg. 740 is part of Doc. 329 ] , 747 [ Pg. 747 is part of Doc. 333 ] -750 [ Pg. 750 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] British position, 649 [ Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 297 ] -650 [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 297 ] , 671 [ Pg. 671 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] -674 [ Pg. 674 is part of Doc. 307 ] civil aviation, 709 [ Pg. 709 is part of Doc. 321 ] -711 [ Pg. 711 includes portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] “Code of Fair Practices in International Trade,” 707 [ Pg. 707 is part of Doc. 320 ] Congressional investigation, 658 [ Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 302 ] -661 [ Pg. 661 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] Coordinating Committee of the Paris Consultative Group (COCOM), 701 n [ Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 315 and Doc. 316 ] , 713 [ Pg. 713 is part of Doc. 323 ] -714 [ Pg. 714 is part of Doc. 323 ] Lists, review of, 649 [ Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 297 ] -650 [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 297 ] , 671 [ Pg. 671 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] -674 [ Pg. 674 is part of Doc. 307 ] , 700 [ Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 315 ] -701 [ Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 315 and Doc. 316 ] crab meat trade restrictions, 726 [ Pg. 726 is part of Doc. 325 ] , 727 [ Pg. 727 is part of Doc. 325 ] Cuban missile crisis and, 705 [ Pg. 705 includes portions of Doc. 318 and Doc. 319 ] -706 [ Pg. 706 includes portions of Doc. 319 and Doc. 320 ] embargo criteria, 671 [ Pg. 671 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] -674 [ Pg. 674 is part of Doc. 307 ] , 683 [ Pg. 683 is part of Doc. 309 ] -684 [ Pg. 684 includes portions of Doc. 309 and Doc. 310 ] , 688 [ Pg. 688 is part of Doc. 311 ] , 689 [ Pg. 689 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312 ] Executive Order 10945, 652 [ Pg. 652 is part of Doc. 298 ] , 653 [ Pg. 653 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] -654 [ Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 299 ] , 656 [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 299 , Doc. 300 , and Doc. 301 ] Export Control Act, 658 [ Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 660 [ Pg. 660 is part of Doc. 302 ] -662 [ Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 670 n [ Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 679 [ Pg. 679 is part of Doc. 309 ] -680 [ Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 309 ] , 684 [ Pg. 684 includes portions of Doc. 309 and Doc. 310 ] -685 [ Pg. 685 is part of Doc. 310 ] , 688 [ Pg. 688 is part of Doc. 311 ] , 691 [ Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 312 ] -692 [ Pg. 692 is part of Doc. 312 ] , 707 [ Pg. 707 is part of Doc. 320 ] , 712 [ Pg. 712 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] -717 [ Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 323 ] , 765 [ Pg. 765 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] Export Control Review Board, 653 [ Pg. 653 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] -654 [ Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 299 ] , 656 [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 299 , Doc. 300 , and Doc. 301 ] , 711 [ Pg. 711 includes portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] -712 [ Pg. 712 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] , 729 [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 326 ] -740 [ Pg. 740 is part of Doc. 329 ] , 743 [ Pg. 743 is part of Doc. 331 ] export controls, 658 [ Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 302 ] -668 [ Pg. 668 is part of Doc. 304 ] , 669 [ Pg. 669 is part of Doc. 305 ] -670 [ Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 683 [ Pg. 683 is part of Doc. 309 ] -689 [ Pg. 689 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312 ] , 694 [ Pg. 694 is part of Doc. 312 ] -695 [ Pg. 695 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] , 697 [ Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 699 [ Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 314 ] , 700 [ Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 315 ] -701 [ Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 315 and Doc. 316 ] , 703 n [ Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 317 ] 746 [ Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 332 ] , 747 [ Pg. 747 is part of Doc. 333 ] -748 [ Pg. 748 is part of Doc. 333 ] export licenses, 651 [ Pg. 651 is part of Doc. 298 ] -653 [ Pg. 653 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] , 654 [ Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 299 ] , 670 [ Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 306 ] -671 [ Pg. 671 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] , 683 [ Pg. 683 is part of Doc. 309 ] -684 [ Pg. 684 includes portions of Doc. 309 and Doc. 310 ] legislation, 658 [ Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 302 ] -661 [ Pg. 661 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] , 691 [ Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 312 ] -694 [ Pg. 694 is part of Doc. 312 ] , 712 [ Pg. 712 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] -713 [ Pg. 713 is part of Doc. 323 ] , 742 [ Pg. 742 is part of Doc. 330 ] multilateral controls, 691 [ Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 312 ] , 694 [ Pg. 694 is part of Doc. 312 ] -695 [ Pg. 695 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] , 701 [ Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 315 and Doc. 316 ] -708 [ Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 320 ] , 712 [ Pg. 712 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] -713 [ Pg. 713 is part of Doc. 323 ] , 715 [ Pg. 715 is part of Doc. 323 ] -717 [ Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 323 ] , 727 [ Pg. 727 is part of Doc. 325 ] , 750 [ Pg. 750 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] NSC discussion, 695 [ Pg. 695 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] -698 [ Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 313 ] oil pipe and equipment, 674 [ Pg. 674 is part of Doc. 307 ] Sino-Soviet relations and, 668 [ Pg. 668 is part of Doc. 304 ] , 729 [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 326 ] Soviet bloc, trade with, 663 [ Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 303 and Doc. 304 ] -668 [ Pg. 668 is part of Doc. 304 ] , 669 [ Pg. 669 is part of Doc. 305 ] , 718 [ Pg. 718 is part of Doc. 324 ] -728 [ Pg. 728 is part of Doc. 325 ] , 748 [ Pg. 748 is part of Doc. 333 ] -749 [ Pg. 749 is part of Doc. 333 ] agricultural commodities, 656 [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 299 , Doc. 300 , and Doc. 301 ] -657 [ Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 301 ] , 689 [ Pg. 689 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312 ] , 741 [ Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 330 ] -742 [ Pg. 742 is part of Doc. 330 ] Soviet Union, trade with, 711 [ Pg. 711 includes portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] -712 [ Pg. 712 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] , 718 [ Pg. 718 is part of Doc. 324 ] -725 [ Pg. 725 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325 ] , 741 [ Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 330 ] -742 [ Pg. 742 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 744 [ Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 332 ] -746 [ Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 332 ] , 749 [ Pg. 749 is part of Doc. 333 ] State-Commerce Departments differences, 675 [ Pg. 675 is part of Doc. 308 ] -680 [ Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 309 ] , 689 [ Pg. 689 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312 ] -694 [ Pg. 694 is part of Doc. 312 ] U.S. policy, 680 [ Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 309 ] -684 [ Pg. 684 includes portions of Doc. 309 and Doc. 310 ] , 699 [ Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 314 ] , 706 [ Pg. 706 includes portions of Doc. 319 and Doc. 320 ] -708 [ Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 320 ] , 718 [ Pg. 718 is part of Doc. 324 ] -725 [ Pg. 725 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325 ] wheat sales to Soviet Union, 741 [ Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 330 ] -742 [ Pg. 742 is part of Doc. 330 ] Egypt, 316 [ Pg. 316 is part of Doc. 145 ] Eisenhower, Dwight D., 592 [ Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 274 ] Eliot, Theodore L., 411 n [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 187 ] Ellis, Frank B., 770 n [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 344 ] Engle, Clair, 559 [ Pg. 559 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] -560 [ Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 260 ] , 576 [ Pg. 576 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267 ] -577 [ Pg. 577 is part of Doc. 267 ] Erhard, Ludwig, 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 72 ] -174 [ Pg. 174 includes portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73 ] , 411 n [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 187 ] , 640 [ Pg. 640 is part of Doc. 294 ] -643 [ Pg. 643 includes portions of Doc. 294 and Doc. 295 ] , 645 [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 295 ] Etzel, Franz, 411 n [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 187 ] Europe, 150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 60 ] -151 [ Pg. 151 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 165 ] U.S. military redeployment, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] -2 [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 15 ] -28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 25 and Doc. 26 ] -73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 34 ] -91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 82 ] -187 [ Pg. 187 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] European Economic Community, 84 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 211 and Doc. 212 ] -463 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225 ] -479 [ Pg. 479 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] , 487 [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 227 ] -487 [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 227 ] , 488 [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 227 ] , 492 [ Pg. 492 is part of Doc. 229 ] , 497 [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] , 506 [ Pg. 506 includes portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] -509 [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] , 512 [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240 ] , 520 [ Pg. 520 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] , 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 246 ] -560 [ Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 260 ] Executive Order 10945 , 652 [ Pg. 652 is part of Doc. 298 ] , 653 [ Pg. 653 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] -654 [ Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 299 ] , 656 [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 299 , Doc. 300 , and Doc. 301 ] Executive Order 10952 , 765 [ Pg. 765 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] Executive Order 11051 , 765 [ Pg. 765 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] Executive Stockpile Committee, 779 [ Pg. 779 is part of Doc. 349 ] -792 [ Pg. 792 is part of Doc. 353 ] , 802 [ Pg. 802 is part of Doc. 358 ] -807 [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360 ] , 810 [ Pg. 810 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] -815 [ Pg. 815 includes portions of Doc. 364 and Doc. 365 ] Export Control Act, 660 [ Pg. 660 is part of Doc. 302 ] -662 [ Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 670 n [ Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 679 [ Pg. 679 is part of Doc. 309 ] -680 [ Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 309 ] , 684 [ Pg. 684 includes portions of Doc. 309 and Doc. 310 ] -685 [ Pg. 685 is part of Doc. 310 ] , 691 [ Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 312 ] -692 [ Pg. 692 is part of Doc. 312 ] , 707 [ Pg. 707 is part of Doc. 320 ] , 712 [ Pg. 712 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] -717 [ Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 323 ] , 765 [ Pg. 765 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] Export Control Review Board, 653 [ Pg. 653 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] -654 [ Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 299 ] , 656 [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 299 , Doc. 300 , and Doc. 301 ] , 670 n [ Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 711 [ Pg. 711 includes portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] -712 [ Pg. 712 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] , 729 [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 326 ] -740 [ Pg. 740 is part of Doc. 329 ] , 743 [ Pg. 743 is part of Doc. 331 ] Export-Import Bank, 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 742 [ Pg. 742 is part of Doc. 330 ] Export licenses. See under Economic defense policy. Federal Reserve System, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 39 ] Feldman, Myer, 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] -484 [ Pg. 484 includes portions of Doc. 226 and Doc. 227 ] , 546 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 255 ] -548 [ Pg. 548 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] , 563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 262 ] , 565 [ Pg. 565 is part of Doc. 262 ] , 574 [ Pg. 574 is part of Doc. 266 ] -576 [ Pg. 576 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 270 ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 272 ] , 608 [ Pg. 608 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] -609 [ Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 283 ] , 654 [ Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 299 ] Ferrarri-Aggradi (Italy), 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 102 ] Fessenden, Russell H., 199 n [ Pg. 199 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] Finger, Seymour M., 434 n [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 195 ] Finletter, Thomas K., 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 45 ] Finn, Richard B., 186 n [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 640 n [ Pg. 640 is part of Doc. 294 ] Focke, Arthur B., 653 n [ Pg. 653 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] Fogarty, Edelen M., 457 n [ Pg. 457 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] Foley, Eugene P., 768 n [ Pg. 768 includes portions of Doc. 342 and Doc. 343 ] Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 192 ] -423 [ Pg. 423 includes portions of Doc. 192 and Doc. 193 ] , 425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 195 ] Food for Peace program, 192 [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 85 ] -193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 238 [ Pg. 238 includes portions of Doc. 105 and Doc. 106 ] -240 [ Pg. 240 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 119 ] , 354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 162 ] -355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 162 ] Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 , 259 [ Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] -260 [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 265 [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 120 ] Foreign Assistance Act of 1963 , 391 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 175 ] , 750 [ Pg. 750 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] Foreign assistance policy ( see also Balance-of-payments issue ), 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 151 [ Pg. 151 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 195 [ Pg. 195 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 204 [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] -211 [ Pg. 211 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] -220 [ Pg. 220 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] -232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 236 [ Pg. 236 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] -239 [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. 106 and Doc. 107 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 114 ] -259 [ Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 121 ] -270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 122 ] , 272 [ Pg. 272 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] -279 [ Pg. 279 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] , 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 134 ] -294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 134 ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 140 ] -308 [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] , 335 [ Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 154 ] -336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 154 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 159 ] -350 [ Pg. 350 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 164 ] -365 [ Pg. 365 includes portions of Doc. 164 and Doc. 165 ] Acheson Advisory Group, 199 [ Pg. 199 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] -200 [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 92 ] Agency for International Development (AID), 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 117 ] -270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 122 ] , 324 [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 150 ] -325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 150 ] , 335 [ Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 154 ] -336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 154 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] -390 [ Pg. 390 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] loan policy, 286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 131 ] -292 [ Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 133 ] , 295 [ Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 135 ] -298 [ Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] , 327 [ Pg. 327 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] -328 [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 165 ] agricultural commodities ( see also food assistance below ), 192 [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 85 ] -193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 126 ] -279 [ Pg. 279 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] , 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 151 ] -327 [ Pg. 327 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] , 354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 162 ] -355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 162 ] Agriculture, Department of, role, 238 [ Pg. 238 includes portions of Doc. 105 and Doc. 106 ] -240 [ Pg. 240 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] -247 [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] -264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 119 ] , 327 n [ Pg. 327 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] Asia, 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 235 balance-of-payments issue, 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 8 ] -21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 18 ] -38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 18 ] -42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 86 [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 87 [ Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] -88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 308 [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] -315 [ Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 146 ] -321 [ Pg. 321 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] Bell Report, 373 [ Pg. 373 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] -381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 169 ] burdensharing, see multilateral approach below Clay Committee, 344 [ Pg. 344 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158 ] -345 [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 350 [ Pg. 350 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] -353 [ Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 164 ] -359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 370 [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 166 ] -373 [ Pg. 373 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] Congressional interest, 259 [ Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] -260 [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 116 ] coordination between economic and military assistance, 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 140 ] -308 [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] , 373 [ Pg. 373 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] -378 [ Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] dollar procurement, 309 [ Pg. 309 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] -313 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 146 ] -319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 162 ] -355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 162 ] food assistance ( see also agricultural commodities above ), 238 [ Pg. 238 includes portions of Doc. 105 and Doc. 106 ] -240 [ Pg. 240 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] -247 [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] , 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 151 ] -327 [ Pg. 327 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] Food for Peace program, 192 [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 85 ] -193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 238 [ Pg. 238 includes portions of Doc. 105 and Doc. 106 ] -240 [ Pg. 240 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 119 ] , 354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 162 ] -355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 162 ] Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 , 259 [ Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] -260 [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 265 [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 120 ] Foreign Assistance Act of 1963 , 391 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 175 ] , 750 [ Pg. 750 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] Germany, Federal Republic of, 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 50 ] -129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 233 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 104 ] -235 [ Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 153 ] -334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 153 ] interagency coordination, 10 [ Pg. 10 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] -14 [ Pg. 14 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] International Cooperation Administration, 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 94 ] International Development Association, 153 [ Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 61 and Doc. 62 ] -154 [ Pg. 154 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63 ] international organizations, use of, 426 [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 194 ] -433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 194 ] Latin America, 232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 235 [ Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 134 ] legislation, 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 100 ] -220 [ Pg. 220 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] -260 [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 265 [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 120 ] -266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 164 ] -359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 370 [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 166 ] -373 [ Pg. 373 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] , 391 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 175 ] -392 [ Pg. 392 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] military assistance, 189 [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 84 ] -191 [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 93 ] -204 [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] , 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 211 [ Pg. 211 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] -212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] , 247 [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] -256 [ Pg. 256 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113 ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 123 ] -272 [ Pg. 272 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] , 280 [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 128 ] -287 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 140 ] -308 [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 148 ] , 373 [ Pg. 373 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] -384 [ Pg. 384 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] , 383 n [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 177 ] -394 [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 177 ] Marshall Study on the Military Assistance Program, 240 [ Pg. 240 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] -243 [ Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] , 247 [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] -248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 112 ] Military Assistance Steering Group, 280 [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 128 ] -285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 130 ] multilateral approach, 150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 60 ] -l51 [ Pg. 151 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 195 [ Pg. 195 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 200 [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 206 [ Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 209 [ Pg. 209 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] , 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 279 [ Pg. 279 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] , 317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 146 ] -318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 341 [ Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] -344 [ Pg. 344 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 159 ] -350 [ Pg. 350 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 362 [ Pg. 362 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 364 [ Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 164 ] -369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 384 [ Pg. 384 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] -390 [ Pg. 390 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 426 [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 194 ] -433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 194 ] Development Assistance Group (DAG), 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 97 ] -218 [ Pg. 218 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 220 [ Pg. 220 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] -231 [ Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] , 256 [ Pg. 256 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113 ] neutralism and, 262 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 118 ] -263 [ Pg. 263 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] North Atlantic Treaty Organization role, 196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 198 [ Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 90 and Doc. 91 ] oil, 327 [ Pg. 327 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] -328 [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 152 ] Peace Corps, 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 94 ] Philippines, 265 n [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 120 ] police training and equipment, 298 [ Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] -300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 323 [ Pg. 323 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] -325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 150 ] population issue, 337 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. 155 ] -340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 155 ] private property protection, 334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 153 ] private sector, 360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 164 ] -363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 172 ] -389 [ Pg. 389 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] reductions, 392 [ Pg. 392 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] Soviet bloc, 356 [ Pg. 356 is part of Doc. 163 ] -357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 163 ] Foreign Credit Insurance Association, 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 256 ] Forrestal, Michael V., 314 [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 144 ] Fowler, Henry H., 12 [ Pg. 12 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 6 ] -14 [ Pg. 14 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 653 [ Pg. 653 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] , 666 [ Pg. 666 is part of Doc. 304 ] , 668 [ Pg. 668 is part of Doc. 304 ] Fox, Ed, 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 162 ] France, 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 142 [ Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 168 [ Pg. 168 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 72 ] -173 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 774 [ Pg. 774 includes portions of Doc. 345 and Doc. 346 ] balance-of-payments issue, 56 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 63 ] foreign assistance policy, 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 386 [ Pg. 386 is part of Doc. 172 ] -388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 172 ] gold, 146 [ Pg. 146 is part of Doc. 59 ] -147 [ Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 168 [ Pg. 168 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] -169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 71 ] international monetary policy agreement, 141 [ Pg. 141 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] -143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 145 trade policy, 566 [ Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 262 ] , 583 [ Pg. 583 is part of Doc. 271 ] -584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 271 ] , 604 [ Pg. 604 includes portions of Doc. 279 and Doc. 280 ] -605 [ Pg. 605 is part of Doc. 280 ] , 607 [ Pg. 607 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 289 ] , 629 [ Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 640 [ Pg. 640 is part of Doc. 294 ] , 641 [ Pg. 641 is part of Doc. 294 ] U.S. military expenditures, 36 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 72 ] Frank, A. Eugene, 589 n [ Pg. 589 includes portions of Doc. 273 and Doc. 274 ] Frank, Isaiah, 214 n [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 98 ] Freeman, Orville L., 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 238 [ Pg. 238 includes portions of Doc. 105 and Doc. 106 ] -239 [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. 106 and Doc. 107 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] -247 [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] , 327 n [ Pg. 327 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] , 506 [ Pg. 506 includes portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] -509 [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] , 510 n [ Pg. 510 includes portions of Doc. 238 and Doc. 239 ] , 559 [ Pg. 559 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] , 659 n [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 302 ] Freshman, Arnold, 120 n [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 125 n [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] Fulbright, J. William, 356 [ Pg. 356 is part of Doc. 163 ] -357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 163 ] Funari, John, 312 [ Pg. 312 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] -315 [ Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 144 ] Furnas, Howard, 798 n [ Pg. 798 is part of Doc. 356 ] Galbraith, John Kenneth, 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 30 ] -87 [ Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 87 n [ Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 308 [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] -312 [ Pg. 312 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] , 317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 146 ] -321 [ Pg. 321 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] Gant, George, 231 [ Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] Gardner, Richard N., 403 n [ Pg. 403 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] , 440 [ Pg. 440 is part of Doc. 197 ] -442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 448 n [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 202 ] , 449 [ Pg. 449 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] Gaud, William S., 283 [ Pg. 283 is part of Doc. 129 ] -284 [ Pg. 284 includes portions of Doc. 129 and Doc. 130 ] General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) ( see also European Economic Community ; Trade policy), 426 [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 457 [ Pg. 457 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] -458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 209 ] , 558 [ Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 259 ] Contracting Parties meetings, 465 [ Pg. 465 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] -466 [ Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] , 501 [ Pg. 501 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] -503 [ Pg. 503 is part of Doc. 234 ] Ministerial meeting, May 1963 , 582 [ Pg. 582 is part of Doc. 271 ] -584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 271 ] , 594 [ Pg. 594 is part of Doc. 275 ] , 599 [ Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] -608 [ Pg. 608 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] Dillon Round negotiations, Geneva, 1961-1962, 462 [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 211 and Doc. 212 ] -463 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 466 [ Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] -467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 includes portions of Doc. 221 and Doc. 222 ] -478 [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] , 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 227 ] , 506 [ Pg. 506 includes portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] -509 [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] , 520 [ Pg. 520 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] -527 [ Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 244 ] Kennedy Round negotiations, Brussels, 1963, 621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 289 ] , 622 [ Pg. 622 is part of Doc. 290 ] -634 [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 640 [ Pg. 640 is part of Doc. 294 ] -647 [ Pg. 647 is part of Doc. 295 ] Germany, Federal Republic of, 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 142 [ Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 72 ] -178 [ Pg. 178 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 194 ] Africa, 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 153 ] aid to underdeveloped countries, 233 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 104 ] -235 [ Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 153 ] balance-of-payments issue, 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 46 ] -121 [ Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 52 ] -133 [ Pg. 133 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] , 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 64 ] -157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 72 ] -172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 72 ] British position, 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 42 ] -112 [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 43 ] debt payment, 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 40 ] -108 [ Pg. 108 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] , 121 [ Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 46 ] foreign assistance policy, 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 includes portions of Doc. 65 and Doc. 66 ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 102 ] -227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 233 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 104 ] -235 [ Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 153 ] -334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 172 ] interest equalization tax, 180 [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] -181 [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] military cooperation with U.S., 132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53 ] -133 [ Pg. 133 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 includes portions of Doc. 65 and Doc. 66 ] monetary policy, 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 42 ] -112 [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 121 [ Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 46 ] payments surplus, 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 42 ] -112 [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 44 ] -116 [ Pg. 116 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] Strauss-Gilpatric agreement, 132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53 ] -133 [ Pg. 133 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 includes portions of Doc. 65 and Doc. 66 ] trade policy, 173 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 72 ] -175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 73 ] , 629 [ Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 635 n [ Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 292 ] , 640 [ Pg. 640 is part of Doc. 294 ] -647 [ Pg. 647 is part of Doc. 295 ] U.S. forces deployment, 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 82 ] -187 [ Pg. 187 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] U.S. military expenditures, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 8 ] -18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 8 ] U.S. military expenses offset purchases, 36 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 42 ] -111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 45 ] -118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 125 [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] -126 [ Pg. 126 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 52 ] -133 [ Pg. 133 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 63 ] -159 [ Pg. 159 includes portions of Doc. 65 and Doc. 66 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 74 ] -178 [ Pg. 178 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 184 [ Pg. 184 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] -185 [ Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] vested interests, 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 40 ] -108 [ Pg. 108 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] Gilpatric, Roswell L., 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 98 [ Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53 ] -133 [ Pg. 133 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 112 ] -255 [ Pg. 255 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 786 [ Pg. 786 is part of Doc. 349 ] Giscard d'Estaing, Valery, 141 [ Pg. 141 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 144 [ Pg. 144 is part of Doc. 59 ] -146 [ Pg. 146 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 152 [ Pg. 152 is part of Doc. 61 ] Gold, Ruth S., 403 n [ Pg. 403 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] , 663 n [ Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 303 and Doc. 304 ] Goldberg, Arthur J., 786 [ Pg. 786 is part of Doc. 349 ] Goldstein, Mortimer D., 179 n [ Pg. 179 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] , 181 n [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] , 541 n [ Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] Goodwin, Richard, 404 [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 182 and Doc. 183 ] Gordon, Lester, 314 [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 144 ] Gordon, Walter, 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 87 n [ Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 162 ] -355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 772 [ Pg. 772 is part of Doc. 345 ] Graham, John S., 759 [ Pg. 759 is part of Doc. 338 ] -761 [ Pg. 761 includes portions of Doc. 338 and Doc. 339 ] Grant, James P., 176 n [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 74 ] Greece, 27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 280 n [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 128 ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 140 ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 379 [ Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 169 ] Green, Alan, 608 n [ Pg. 608 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] , 615 [ Pg. 615 is part of Doc. 286 ] Greenwald, Joseph A., 615 n [ Pg. 615 is part of Doc. 286 ] Griffin (Treasury), 214 n [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 98 ] Gromyko, Andrei A., 744 [ Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 332 ] Group of Ten declaration, 144 [ Pg. 144 is part of Doc. 59 ] -153 [ Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 61 and Doc. 62 ] Gudeman, Edward, 11 [ Pg. 11 includes portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5 ] , 14 [ Pg. 14 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 503 [ Pg. 503 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 663 [ Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 303 and Doc. 304 ] , 769 [ Pg. 769 is part of Doc. 343 ] Hadraba, Theodore, 541 n [ Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] Hague, Osborne, 291 n [ Pg. 291 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] Hamilton, Fowler, 24 [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 25 n [ Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] , 37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] -264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 119 ] , 271 n [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 123 ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 126 ] -277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 131 ] -294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 134 ] , 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 140 ] -307 [ Pg. 307 includes portions of Doc. 140 and Doc. 141 ] , 308 n [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] , 312 [ Pg. 312 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] -315 [ Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 321 n [ Pg. 321 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] , 341 [ Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] Hansen, Kenneth R., 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 14 [ Pg. 14 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 271 n [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 123 ] , 378 [ Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] -381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 169 ] , 429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 194 ] -433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 809 n [ Pg. 809 is part of Doc. 362 ] Hare, Raymond A., 189 n [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 84 ] Harriman, W. Averell, 358 [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 177 ] , 709 [ Pg. 709 is part of Doc. 321 ] -711 [ Pg. 711 includes portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] Hartman, Arthur A., 529 n [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 246 ] Hays, Brooks, 403 n [ Pg. 403 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] , 471 [ Pg. 471 includes portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] -472 [ Pg. 472 includes portions of Doc. 221 and Doc. 222 ] , 653 n [ Pg. 653 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] Heald (Ford Foundation), 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 155 ] Hefner, Frank K., 326 n [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 151 ] , 434 n [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 443 n [ Pg. 443 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] Heller, Walter W., l1 n [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 57 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 24 ] -59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 87 n [ Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 138 [ Pg. 138 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] -141 [ Pg. 141 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 is part of Doc. 181 ] -402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 181 ] Herter, Christian A., 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 24 ] -61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 253 ] -541 [ Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 546 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 255 ] , 565 [ Pg. 565 is part of Doc. 262 ] , 569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 264 ] , 573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 266 ] -575 [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. 266 ] , 593 [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 275 ] -595 [ Pg. 595 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] , 599 n [ Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] , 603 [ Pg. 603 is part of Doc. 279 ] -604 [ Pg. 604 includes portions of Doc. 279 and Doc. 280 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 284 ] -611 [ Pg. 611 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] , 628 [ Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 291 ] -637 [ Pg. 637 is part of Doc. 293 ] , 641 [ Pg. 641 is part of Doc. 294 ] , 643 [ Pg. 643 includes portions of Doc. 294 and Doc. 295 ] -647 [ Pg. 647 is part of Doc. 295 ] Hiley, A. Evans, 450 n [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 204 ] Hill, Charles M., 326 n [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 151 ] Hillenbrand, Martin J., 120 n [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 46 ] Hilliker, Grant G., 184 n [ Pg. 184 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] Hilsman, Roger, Jr., 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 112 ] Hirabayashi, Martin Y., 187 n [ Pg. 187 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] Hitch, Charles J., 27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 30 ] Hodges, Luther H., 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 24 ] -63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 520 n [ Pg. 520 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] , 521 n [ Pg. 521 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] , 565 [ Pg. 565 is part of Doc. 262 ] , 585 [ Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 272 ] , 616 [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] -618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 287 ] , 651 [ Pg. 651 is part of Doc. 298 ] -654 [ Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 299 ] , 658 [ Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 302 ] -663 [ Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 303 and Doc. 304 ] , 659 n [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 670 [ Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 306 ] -671 [ Pg. 671 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] , 684 [ Pg. 684 includes portions of Doc. 309 and Doc. 310 ] -687 [ Pg. 687 includes portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311 ] , 689 [ Pg. 689 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312 ] -694 [ Pg. 694 is part of Doc. 312 ] , 697 [ Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 313 ] -698 [ Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 701 [ Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 315 and Doc. 316 ] -705 [ Pg. 705 includes portions of Doc. 318 and Doc. 319 ] , 729 [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 326 ] -731 [ Pg. 731 is part of Doc. 326 ] , 733 [ Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 327 ] , 786 [ Pg. 786 is part of Doc. 349 ] , 788 [ Pg. 788 includes portions of Doc. 350 and Doc. 351 ] -789 [ Pg. 789 includes portions of Doc. 351 and Doc. 352 ] Hoeven, Charles B., 757 [ Pg. 757 is part of Doc. 337 ] Hoffman, Paul G., 403 [ Pg. 403 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] , 404 [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 182 and Doc. 183 ] -406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] -439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] -445 [ Pg. 445 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] , 449 [ Pg. 449 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] Holmes, Julius C., 281 [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 128 ] Holtrop, M., 411 n [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 187 ] Home, Lord Alexander Frederick Douglas, 536 [ Pg. 536 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] -537 [ Pg. 537 includes portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] Hong Kong, 460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 210 ] Hood, Viscount Samuel, 536 n [ Pg. 536 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] , 537 n [ Pg. 537 includes portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] , 752 [ Pg. 752 is part of Doc. 336 ] -753 [ Pg. 753 is part of Doc. 336 ] Hooker (Treasury), 214 n [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 98 ] Humphrey, George, 592 [ Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 274 ] Hutchinson, Edmond C., 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 134 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 144 ] Iceland, U.S. troop withdrawal, 27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 15 ] Ide, W. Carter, 176 n [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 74 ] Ikeda, Hayato, 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 218 ] -469 [ Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219 ] , 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 232 ] Imhof, Johannes V., 604 n [ Pg. 604 includes portions of Doc. 279 and Doc. 280 ] India, 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 235 [ Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 316 [ Pg. 316 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 320 [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 328 [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 209 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 210 ] Indonesia, 766 [ Pg. 766 is part of Doc. 342 ] Interdepartmental Committee of Under Secretaries on Foreign Economic Policy (ICFEP), 10 [ Pg. 10 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] -14 [ Pg. 14 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 10 ] -23 [ Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 126 ] -279 [ Pg. 279 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 164 ] -365 [ Pg. 365 includes portions of Doc. 164 and Doc. 165 ] , 426 [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 194 ] -433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 771 [ Pg. 771 is part of Doc. 345 ] -774 [ Pg. 774 includes portions of Doc. 345 and Doc. 346 ] Interdepartmental Committee on Trade Agreements (TAC), 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 520 [ Pg. 520 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] -527 [ Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 244 ] International Development Year, 413 [ Pg. 413 includes portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] -414 [ Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 188 ] Interest equalization tax ( see also Balance-of-payment issue ), 74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 104 [ Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 178 [ Pg. 178 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] -184 [ Pg. 184 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] -188 [ Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 83 ] International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (ICFEP), 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 190 ] -420 [ Pg. 420 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] , 440 [ Pg. 440 is part of Doc. 197 ] -442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] -454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 207 ] International Cooperation Administration (ICA), 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] International Development Association (IDA), 153 [ Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 61 and Doc. 62 ] -154 [ Pg. 154 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 190 ] , 441 [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 197 ] -442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] , 450 [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 204 ] -454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 207 ] International Finance Corporation (IFC), 420 [ Pg. 420 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] International investment and development policy, 401 [ Pg. 401 is part of Doc. 181 ] -403 [ Pg. 403 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] Agency for International Development, 406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] -408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 185 ] Development Loan Fund, 406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] -408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 185 ] Food and Agriculture Organization, 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 192 ] -423 [ Pg. 423 includes portions of Doc. 192 and Doc. 193 ] , 425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 195 ] General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 426 [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 194 ] International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 190 ] -420 [ Pg. 420 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] , 440 [ Pg. 440 is part of Doc. 197 ] -442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] -454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 207 ] International Development Association, 441 [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 197 ] -442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] , 450 [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 204 ] -454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 207 ] International Monetary Fund (IMF), 411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 187 ] -413 [ Pg. 413 includes portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] , 415 [ Pg. 415 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] -420 [ Pg. 420 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] , 426 [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 440 [ Pg. 440 is part of Doc. 197 ] -441 [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 197 ] international organizations, use of, 426 [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 194 ] -433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 194 ] U.N. Capital Development Fund, 409 [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 186 ] -410 [ Pg. 410 is part of Doc. 186 ] U.N. Decade of Development, 415 [ Pg. 415 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] , 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 191 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 192 ] -425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 441 [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 197 ] -442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 445 [ Pg. 445 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] -447 [ Pg. 447 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] U.N. Development Year, 413 [ Pg. 413 includes portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] -414 [ Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 188 ] U.N. Special Fund Project for Cuba, 397 [ Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] -399 [ Pg. 399 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] , 403 [ Pg. 403 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] -406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 195 ] -436 [ Pg. 436 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] -446 [ Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 200 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 202 ] -449 [ Pg. 449 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] United Nations, 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 194 ] -429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 431 [ Pg. 431 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 197 ] International Monetary Fund (IMF), 43 [ Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 138 [ Pg. 138 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] -153 [ Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 61 and Doc. 62 ] , 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 178 ] -397 [ Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] , 411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 187 ] -413 [ Pg. 413 includes portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] , 415 [ Pg. 415 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] -420 [ Pg. 420 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] , 426 [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 440 [ Pg. 440 is part of Doc. 197 ] -441 [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] drawing rights, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 56 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 24 ] -59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 25 and Doc. 26 ] , 102 [ Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 124 [ Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 48 ] -125 [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51 ] , 133 [ Pg. 133 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] -135 [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] , 368 n [ Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 369 n [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 165 ] Group of Ten declaration, 144 [ Pg. 144 is part of Doc. 59 ] -153 [ Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 61 and Doc. 62 ] Monetary Conference, Vienna, 1961, 128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51 ] International Tin Agreement, 768 [ Pg. 768 includes portions of Doc. 342 and Doc. 343 ] -769 [ Pg. 769 is part of Doc. 343 ] International Tin Council, 797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 356 ] -799 [ Pg. 799 includes portions of Doc. 356 and Doc. 357 ] Iran, 253 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 280 n [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 128 ] , 281 [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 128 ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 793 [ Pg. 793 is part of Doc. 354 ] -794 [ Pg. 794 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] Iraq, 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 193 ] Ireland, 316 [ Pg. 316 is part of Doc. 145 ] Israel, 53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 24 ] Italy, 36 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 142 [ Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 58 ] -143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] balance-of-payments issue, 56 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 63 ] foreign assistance policy, 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 172 ] Jackson, Henry M., 559 [ Pg. 559 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] -560 [ Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 260 ] Jacobsson, Per, 56 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 24 ] Jacques, Joseph E., 457 n [ Pg. 457 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] Jacques, Sidney B., 466 n [ Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] James, D.J., 356 n [ Pg. 356 is part of Doc. 163 ] Janow, Seymour J., 313 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 144 ] -314 [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 144 ] Japan, 2 [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 24 ] -61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 69 ] -166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 241 ] Economic Mission to Washington, 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 211 ] -462 [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 211 and Doc. 212 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] foreign assistance policy, 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 229 [ Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 172 ] interest equalization tax, 181 [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 79 ] -183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 79 ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] -188 [ Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 83 ] textiles, 464 [ Pg. 464 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] -465 [ Pg. 465 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 218 ] -469 [ Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219 ] , 482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 226 ] -483 [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 241 ] -519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 553 [ Pg. 553 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257 ] -557 [ Pg. 557 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] , 619 [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 288 ] -620 [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 288 ] cotton equalization fee, 504 [ Pg. 504 is part of Doc. 235 ] -506 [ Pg. 506 includes portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] , 509 [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] -512 [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240 ] trade, 484 [ Pg. 484 includes portions of Doc. 226 and Doc. 227 ] , 496 [ Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 231 ] -501 [ Pg. 501 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] U.S. forces redeployment, 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 28 ] -71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 34 ] -92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 34 ] U.S.-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs, Hakone, November 1961 , 483 [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 226 ] -484 [ Pg. 484 includes portions of Doc. 226 and Doc. 227 ] , 496 n [ Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 497 [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] -501 [ Pg. 501 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] Javits, Jacob K., 362 [ Pg. 362 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 712 [ Pg. 712 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] -713 [ Pg. 713 is part of Doc. 323 ] Johnson, Charles E., 291 n [ Pg. 291 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] Johnson, G. Griffith, 12 [ Pg. 12 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 25 n [ Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] , 27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 15 ] -28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 47 n [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 144 [ Pg. 144 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 299 [ Pg. 299 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] -300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 356 n [ Pg. 356 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 541 [ Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] -548 [ Pg. 548 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] , 615 n [ Pg. 615 is part of Doc. 286 ] , 701 n [ Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 315 and Doc. 316 ] , 795 [ Pg. 795 is part of Doc. 355 ] -796 [ Pg. 796 is part of Doc. 355 ] Johnson, Lyndon Baines: balance-of-payments issue, 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 39 ] -104 [ Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 39 ] economic defense policy, 648 [ Pg. 648 is part of Doc. 296 ] foreign assistance policy, 391 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 175 ] trade policy, 628 [ Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 291 ] -635 [ Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 292 ] , 640 [ Pg. 640 is part of Doc. 294 ] -643 [ Pg. 643 includes portions of Doc. 294 and Doc. 295 ] , 741 [ Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 750 [ Pg. 750 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] Johnson, U. Alexis, 299 n [ Pg. 299 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] , 347 n [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 382 n [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] , 383 n [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 177 ] , 651 n [ Pg. 651 is part of Doc. 298 ] Johnson Act (1934), 696 [ Pg. 696 is part of Doc. 313 ] -697 [ Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 733 [ Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 327 ] , 744 [ Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 332 ] -745 [ Pg. 745 is part of Doc. 332 ] Joint Chiefs of Staff, 281 [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 128 ] Jordan, 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 164 ] Kallis, Selma G., 512 n [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240 ] , 537 n [ Pg. 537 includes portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] , 599 n [ Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] Kannenberg, M. Hollis, 794 n [ Pg. 794 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] , 796 [ Pg. 796 is part of Doc. 355 ] Kaplan, Jacob J., 214 n [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 98 ] , 451 n [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 205 ] Katz, S. Stanley, 362 [ Pg. 362 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 656 n [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 299 , Doc. 300 , and Doc. 301 ] Katzenbach, Nicholas deB., 801 [ Pg. 801 is part of Doc. 357 ] Kaysen, Carl, 24 [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 43 [ Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] -44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 47 n [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 49 n [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 51 n [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 87 n [ Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 135 [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] -138 [ Pg. 138 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] , 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 60 ] -151 [ Pg. 151 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 297 [ Pg. 297 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] -298 [ Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] , 309 [ Pg. 309 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] -315 [ Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 335 [ Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 154 ] -336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 154 ] , 344 [ Pg. 344 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158 ] -345 [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 354 n [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 409 n [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 561 [ Pg. 561 includes portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262 ] , 570 [ Pg. 570 includes portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265 ] , 593 n [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 275 ] , 598 [ Pg. 598 is part of Doc. 277 ] -599 [ Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] , 678 n [ Pg. 678 is part of Doc. 309 ] , 689 n [ Pg. 689 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312 ] , 701 n [ Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 315 and Doc. 316 ] , 706 [ Pg. 706 includes portions of Doc. 319 and Doc. 320 ] , 765 [ Pg. 765 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] -768 [ Pg. 768 includes portions of Doc. 342 and Doc. 343 ] , 802 [ Pg. 802 is part of Doc. 358 ] Kelly, John M., 771 [ Pg. 771 is part of Doc. 345 ] , 772 [ Pg. 772 is part of Doc. 345 ] -773 [ Pg. 773 is part of Doc. 345 ] , 788 n [ Pg. 788 includes portions of Doc. 350 and Doc. 351 ] Kennedy, John Fitzgerald, 169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 71 ] balance-of-payments issue, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] -3 [ Pg. 3 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] , 14 [ Pg. 14 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] -24 [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 18 ] -43 [ Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 20 ] -66 [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. 26 and Doc. 27 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 30 ] -94 [ Pg. 94 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 46 ] -121 [ Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 133 [ Pg. 133 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] -134 [ Pg. 134 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55 ] , 138 [ Pg. 138 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] -153 [ Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 61 and Doc. 62 ] , 141 n [ Pg. 141 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 67 ] -162 [ Pg. 162 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 308 [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] -315 [ Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 548 [ Pg. 548 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] -554 [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 257 ] , 593 n [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 275 ] , 596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 276 ] -597 [ Pg. 597 is part of Doc. 276 ] gold erosion problem, 2 [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] -3 [ Pg. 3 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 54 [ Pg. 54 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 114 [ Pg. 114 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] -116 [ Pg. 116 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 122 [ Pg. 122 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] -125 [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 135 [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] -138 [ Pg. 138 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] , 153 [ Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 61 and Doc. 62 ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 includes portions of Doc. 65 and Doc. 66 ] -160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] -164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 174 [ Pg. 174 includes portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73 ] , 382 [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] Group of Ten meeting, 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 60 ] -154 [ Pg. 154 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63 ] military assistance, 202 [ Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 93 ] military expenditures, 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 28 ] -74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 94 [ Pg. 94 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] -100 [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 72 ] Bolivia, 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 235 [ Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 104 ] China, People's Republic of, 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 14 ] Cuba, 761 [ Pg. 761 includes portions of Doc. 338 and Doc. 339 ] Cuban missile crisis, 705 [ Pg. 705 includes portions of Doc. 318 and Doc. 319 ] -706 [ Pg. 706 includes portions of Doc. 319 and Doc. 320 ] Dominican Republic, 761export policy, 648 [ Pg. 648 is part of Doc. 296 ] Food for Peace program, 192 n [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 239 [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. 106 and Doc. 107 ] -240 [ Pg. 240 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] foreign assistance policy, 195 [ Pg. 195 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 198 [ Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 90 and Doc. 91 ] -199 [ Pg. 199 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] , 202 [ Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 204 [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] -211 [ Pg. 211 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 213 n [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] -220 [ Pg. 220 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] -236 [ Pg. 236 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] , 256 [ Pg. 256 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113 ] , 258 [ Pg. 258 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] -260 [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 262 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 118 ] -263 [ Pg. 263 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] , 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 140 ] -308 [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] , 316 [ Pg. 316 is part of Doc. 145 ] -317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 321 [ Pg. 321 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] , 350 [ Pg. 350 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] -353 [ Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 370 [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 166 ] -382 [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] , 391 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 175 ] -392 [ Pg. 392 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] Agency for International Development, 286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 131 ] -294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 134 ] police training and equipment, 298 [ Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] -299 [ Pg. 299 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] , 323 [ Pg. 323 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] -325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 150 ] France, 168 [ Pg. 168 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] -169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 71 ] General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 568 [ Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 263 ] -570 [ Pg. 570 includes portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265 ] German military expenses offset purchases, 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 74 ] Germany, Federal Republic of, 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] India, 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 235 [ Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 316 [ Pg. 316 is part of Doc. 145 ] Japan, 467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] -469 [ Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219 ] Korea, 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 14 ] Latin America, 194 [ Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] oil, 770 [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 344 ] , 799 [ Pg. 799 includes portions of Doc. 356 and Doc. 357 ] -801 [ Pg. 801 is part of Doc. 357 ] , 809 [ Pg. 809 is part of Doc. 362 ] -810 [ Pg. 810 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] Pakistan, 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 235 [ Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 104 ] Peru, 777 [ Pg. 777 includes portions of Doc. 347 and Doc. 348 ] -778 [ Pg. 778 is part of Doc. 348 ] Soviet Union, 698 [ Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 313 ] strategic materials and commodities policy, 774 [ Pg. 774 includes portions of Doc. 345 and Doc. 346 ] -777 [ Pg. 777 includes portions of Doc. 347 and Doc. 348 ] , 779 [ Pg. 779 is part of Doc. 349 ] -792 [ Pg. 792 is part of Doc. 353 ] , 802 [ Pg. 802 is part of Doc. 358 ] -806 [ Pg. 806 includes portions of Doc. 358 and Doc. 359 ] , 810 [ Pg. 810 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] -815 [ Pg. 815 includes portions of Doc. 364 and Doc. 365 ] sugar, 761 [ Pg. 761 includes portions of Doc. 338 and Doc. 339 ] , 777 [ Pg. 777 includes portions of Doc. 347 and Doc. 348 ] -778 [ Pg. 778 is part of Doc. 348 ] trade policy, 168 [ Pg. 168 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] -171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 72 ] -175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 73 ] , 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 208 ] -457 [ Pg. 457 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 493 [ Pg. 493 includes portions of Doc. 229 and Doc. 230 ] -495 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 230 ] , 519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 241 ] -528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 538 [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] -541 [ Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 554 n [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 257 ] , 559 [ Pg. 559 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] -560 [ Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 260 ] , 564 [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 262 ] , 570 [ Pg. 570 includes portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265 ] -577 [ Pg. 577 is part of Doc. 267 ] , 593 [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 275 ] -599 [ Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 284 ] -614 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 285 ] , 617 n [ Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 287 ] , 622 [ Pg. 622 is part of Doc. 290 ] -627 [ Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 290 ] , 660 n [ Pg. 660 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 670 n [ Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 678 n [ Pg. 678 is part of Doc. 309 ] , 684 [ Pg. 684 includes portions of Doc. 309 and Doc. 310 ] -687 [ Pg. 687 includes portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311 ] , 689 [ Pg. 689 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312 ] -699 [ Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 314 ] , 711 [ Pg. 711 includes portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] -712 [ Pg. 712 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] , 733 [ Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 327 ] , 740 [ Pg. 740 is part of Doc. 329 ] -746 [ Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 332 ] GATT negotiations, 172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] -484 [ Pg. 484 includes portions of Doc. 226 and Doc. 227 ] , 503 n [ Pg. 503 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 508 [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 237 ] -509 [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] , 582 [ Pg. 582 is part of Doc. 271 ] -584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 271 ] textiles, 458 n [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 209 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 210 ] -461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 464 [ Pg. 464 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] -465 [ Pg. 465 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] , 469 [ Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219 ] -470 [ Pg. 470 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 222 and Doc. 223 ] -474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] , 578 [ Pg. 578 is part of Doc. 268 ] -581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 270 ] , 584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 271 ] -592 [ Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 608 [ Pg. 608 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] -609 [ Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 283 ] , 615 [ Pg. 615 is part of Doc. 286 ] -616 [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] tourism promotion, 169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 72 ] Turkey, 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 235 [ Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 104 ] United Nations, 415 [ Pg. 415 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] , 420 [ Pg. 420 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] -422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 422 n [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 622 [ Pg. 622 is part of Doc. 290 ] -627 [ Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 290 ] uranium purchases, 759 [ Pg. 759 is part of Doc. 338 ] -761 [ Pg. 761 includes portions of Doc. 338 and Doc. 339 ] U.S. forces redeployment, 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 82 ] -187 [ Pg. 187 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] Vietnam, 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 14 ] Keynes, John Maynard, 138 [ Pg. 138 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] Kirlin, Florence K., 471 n [ Pg. 471 includes portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] Kitchen, Jeffrey C., 184 n [ Pg. 184 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 271 n [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 123 ] , 280 [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 128 ] -282 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 128 ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 177 ] Kitchin, A. Paul, 658 n [ Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 302 ] Klein, David, 184 n [ Pg. 184 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 725 [ Pg. 725 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325 ] -728 [ Pg. 728 is part of Doc. 325 ] Klutznik, Philip, 404 [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 182 and Doc. 183 ] , 434 n [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 195 ] Kohler, Foy D., 696 [ Pg. 696 is part of Doc. 313 ] -697 [ Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 718 n [ Pg. 718 is part of Doc. 324 ] , 753 [ Pg. 753 is part of Doc. 336 ] -754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] Komer, Robert W., 271 n [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 123 ] , 281 [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 128 ] , 282 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 128 ] , 307 n [ Pg. 307 includes portions of Doc. 140 and Doc. 141 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] -381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 169 ] Korea, 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 34 ] -92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 280 n [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 128 ] , 282 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 128 ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 140 ] , 360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 379 [ Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 169 ] Korn, David, 125 n [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] Kotschnig, Walter M., 399 n [ Pg. 399 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] , 705 n [ Pg. 705 includes portions of Doc. 318 and Doc. 319 ] Krannich, Robert H., 129 n [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 52 ] Kriebel, P.W., 347 n [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 159 ] Kristensen (OEEC), 229 [ Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 102 ] Kupinsky, Ruth H., 705 n [ Pg. 705 includes portions of Doc. 318 and Doc. 319 ] , 762 n [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 340 ] Kuss, Henry J., 125 n [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 184 n [ Pg. 184 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] Labouisse, Henry R., 194 [ Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] -213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 239 [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. 106 and Doc. 107 ] -240 [ Pg. 240 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 243 n [ Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] , 257 n [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 403 n [ Pg. 403 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] , 409 n [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 186 ] Labouisse Task Force, 231 [ Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] -232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 103 ] Laos, 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 164 ] Latin America, 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 362 [ Pg. 362 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 427 [ Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 194 ] Leatherman, E. D., 327 n [ Pg. 327 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] Leddy, John M., 341 [ Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] , 390 [ Pg. 390 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 440 [ Pg. 440 is part of Doc. 197 ] -442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 197 ] Lee, Frank, 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 42 ] -114 [ Pg. 114 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 104 ] Lejins, Nora M., 114 n [ Pg. 114 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] Lemnitzer, Gen. Lyman L., 202 [ Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 93 ] Lewis, James H., 599 n [ Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] Lincoln, Murray D., 192 n [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 85 ] Lindhorst-Homan, J., 607 [ Pg. 607 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] Lingle, Walter L., 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 134 ] -294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 134 ] Little, E.S., 448 n [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 202 ] Lloyd, Selwyn, 220 [ Pg. 220 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] , 763 [ Pg. 763 is part of Doc. 340 ] Lobenstine, James C., 214 n [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 98 ] London, Paul A., 462 n [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 211 and Doc. 212 ] Long-Range International Payments Committee, 64 [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 25 and Doc. 26 ] Long-Term Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles (LTA) ( 1962 ) ( see also textiles under Trade policy), 473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 222 and Doc. 223 ] -474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] , 520 [ Pg. 520 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] , 555 [ Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 258 ] -557 [ Pg. 557 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] , 558 [ Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 259 ] , 564 [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 262 ] , 565 [ Pg. 565 is part of Doc. 262 ] , 570 [ Pg. 570 includes portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265 ] -572 [ Pg. 572 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] , 573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 266 ] Louchheim, Walter, 135 [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 56 ] Lubkeman, Walter H., 176 n [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 74 ] Lyon, Robert P., 608 n [ Pg. 608 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] MacArthur, Douglas, II, 530 n [ Pg. 530 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] Magnuson, Warren G., 559 [ Pg. 559 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] -560 [ Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 260 ] Manning, Bayless A., 538 n [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] Mansholt, Sicco L., 607 [ Pg. 607 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] Mansholt Plan, 630 [ Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 291 ] -631 [ Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 641 [ Pg. 641 is part of Doc. 294 ] Marjolin, Robert E., 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 102 ] Marshall, Charles Burton, 240 [ Pg. 240 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] -245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 112 ] -253 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 is part of Doc. 112 ] Marshall Study on the Military Assistance Program, 240 [ Pg. 240 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] -243 [ Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] , 247 [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] -248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 112 ] Martin, Edwin M., 129 n [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 195 [ Pg. 195 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] -197 [ Pg. 197 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] , 214 n [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 98 ] , 268 [ Pg. 268 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] -270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 122 ] , 396 n [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 178 ] , 399 n [ Pg. 399 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] , 401 n [ Pg. 401 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 403 n [ Pg. 403 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] , 409 n [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 457 n [ Pg. 457 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 595 [ Pg. 595 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] -597 [ Pg. 597 is part of Doc. 276 ] , 649 [ Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 297 ] -650 [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 297 ] , 651 n [ Pg. 651 is part of Doc. 298 ] , 653 [ Pg. 653 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] , 666 [ Pg. 666 is part of Doc. 304 ] -668 [ Pg. 668 is part of Doc. 304 ] , 771 [ Pg. 771 is part of Doc. 345 ] , 777 n [ Pg. 777 includes portions of Doc. 347 and Doc. 348 ] Martin, William McChesney, Jr., 53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 57 ] Maudling, Reginald, 145 [ Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 59 ] May, Alice, 243 n [ Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] McCone, John A., 786 [ Pg. 786 is part of Doc. 349 ] McCormack, John W., 741 [ Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 756 [ Pg. 756 is part of Doc. 337 ] , 758 [ Pg. 758 includes portions of Doc. 337 and Doc. 338 ] McDermott, Edward A., 786 [ Pg. 786 is part of Doc. 349 ] , 799 [ Pg. 799 includes portions of Doc. 356 and Doc. 357 ] -800 [ Pg. 800 is part of Doc. 357 ] , 803 [ Pg. 803 is part of Doc. 358 ] -804 [ Pg. 804 is part of Doc. 358 ] , 806 [ Pg. 806 includes portions of Doc. 358 and Doc. 359 ] -807 [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360 ] , 810 [ Pg. 810 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] -811 [ Pg. 811 includes portions of Doc. 363 and Doc. 364 ] ,815 McGhee, George C., 12 [ Pg. 12 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 75 ] -178 [ Pg. 178 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 121 ] -268 [ Pg. 268 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] , 274 [ Pg. 274 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125 ] -275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 125 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 159 ] -350 [ Pg. 350 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] ,394 McGovern, George, 194 [ Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 192 ] McKitterick, Nathaniel, 326 n [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 151 ] , 448 n [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 202 ] , 705 n [ Pg. 705 includes portions of Doc. 318 and Doc. 319 ] McLaughlin, Charlotte M., 656 n [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 299 , Doc. 300 , and Doc. 301 ] McNamara, Robert S., 25 [ Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] , 36 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 25 and Doc. 26 ] -73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 87 n [ Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 94 [ Pg. 94 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] -97 [ Pg. 97 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 93 ] -203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 280 [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 128 ] -282 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 128 ] , 382 [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 171 ] -384 [ Pg. 384 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] , 658 [ Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 302 ] -661 [ Pg. 661 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] , 697 [ Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 313 ] -698 [ Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 731 [ Pg. 731 is part of Doc. 326 ] -733 [ Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 327 ] , 758 [ Pg. 758 includes portions of Doc. 337 and Doc. 338 ] -759 [ Pg. 759 is part of Doc. 338 ] McNutt, Louise, 326 n [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 151 ] Meade, Frazier, 621 n [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 289 ] Meyer, Armin H., 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] Military assistance policy ( see also Foreign assistance policy), 189 [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 84 ] -191 [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 93 ] -204 [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] , 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 211 [ Pg. 211 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] -212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] , 240 [ Pg. 240 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] -243 [ Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] , 247 [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] -256 [ Pg. 256 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113 ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 123 ] -272 [ Pg. 272 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] , 280 [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 128 ] -285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 140 ] -308 [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 148 ] , 373 [ Pg. 373 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] -384 [ Pg. 384 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] , 383 n [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 177 ] -394 [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 177 ] Military Assistance Steering Group, 280 [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 128 ] -285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 130 ] Monti, Vincent J., 179 n [ Pg. 179 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] Moor, Carol Carter, 283 n [ Pg. 283 is part of Doc. 129 ] Morgan, George A., 189 n [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 84 ] Moscoso, Teodoro, 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 134 ] Moynihan, Michael W., 635 n [ Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 292 ] Mulliken, Jean H., 777 n [ Pg. 777 includes portions of Doc. 347 and Doc. 348 ] Multer, Abraham J., 162 [ Pg. 162 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] Mundt, Karl E., 742 [ Pg. 742 is part of Doc. 330 ] Murrow, Edward R., 279 [ Pg. 279 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] Muskie, Edmund S., 471 [ Pg. 471 includes portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] -472 [ Pg. 472 includes portions of Doc. 221 and Doc. 222 ] National Security Council, 687 [ Pg. 687 includes portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311 ] -699 [ Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 314 ] action memoranda (NSAM): no. 4 , 751 [ Pg. 751 is part of Doc. 335 ] no. 6 , 195 [ Pg. 195 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] no. 22 , 198 [ Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 90 and Doc. 91 ] -199 [ Pg. 199 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] no. 81 , 122 [ Pg. 122 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] no. 101 , 415 [ Pg. 415 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] , 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 191 ] no. 124 , 299 n [ Pg. 299 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] , 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 150 ] no. 126 , 776 [ Pg. 776 is part of Doc. 347 ] -777 [ Pg. 777 includes portions of Doc. 347 and Doc. 348 ] no. 142 , 791 [ Pg. 791 includes portions of Doc. 352 and Doc. 353 ] -792 [ Pg. 792 is part of Doc. 353 ] no. 146 , 298 [ Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] -299 [ Pg. 299 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] no. 150 , 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 139 ] no. 159 , 307 [ Pg. 307 includes portions of Doc. 140 and Doc. 141 ] -308 [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] , 373 [ Pg. 373 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] , 392 [ Pg. 392 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] no. 171 , 25 [ Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] -26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 14 ] no. 177 , 323 [ Pg. 323 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] -325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 150 ] no. 187 , 806 [ Pg. 806 includes portions of Doc. 358 and Doc. 359 ] -807 [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360 ] , 810 [ Pg. 810 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] no. 224 , 569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 264 ] -570 [ Pg. 570 includes portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265 ] no. 225 , 47 [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] -48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 21 ] no. 228 , 379 [ Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 169 ] no. 242 , 382 [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 171 ] no. 270 , 98 [ Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] -100 [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 38 ] no. 276 , 392 [ Pg. 392 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] no. 2455 , 699 [ Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 314 ] , 704 [ Pg. 704 includes portions of Doc. 317 and Doc. 318 ] , 706 [ Pg. 706 includes portions of Doc. 319 and Doc. 320 ] actions: no. 1290 , 255 n [ Pg. 255 is part of Doc. 112 ] no. 2304 , 669 [ Pg. 669 is part of Doc. 305 ] no. 2399 , 195 [ Pg. 195 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] no. 2422 , 232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 103 ] no. 2447 , 284 [ Pg. 284 includes portions of Doc. 129 and Doc. 130 ] -285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 379 [ Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 169 ] , 392 [ Pg. 392 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] no. 2455 , 699 [ Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 314 ] , 704 [ Pg. 704 includes portions of Doc. 317 and Doc. 318 ] , 706 [ Pg. 706 includes portions of Doc. 319 and Doc. 320 ] documents: NSC 5704/3 , 669 [ Pg. 669 is part of Doc. 305 ] , 676 [ Pg. 676 is part of Doc. 308 ] , 679 [ Pg. 679 is part of Doc. 309 ] -680 [ Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 309 ] , 699 [ Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 314 ] , 706-708 [ Pg. 706 includes portions of Doc. 319 and Doc. 320 ] NSC 5726/1 , 709 [ Pg. 709 is part of Doc. 321 ] meeting, 503d, July 17 , 1962 , 695 [ Pg. 695 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] -698 [ Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 313 ] Standing Group, 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 15 ] -29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 669 [ Pg. 669 is part of Doc. 305 ] , 737 [ Pg. 737 includes portions of Doc. 327 and Doc. 328 ] -739 [ Pg. 739 is part of Doc. 328 ] Nauckhoff, Baron, 452 [ Pg. 452 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] Near East, 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 773 [ Pg. 773 is part of Doc. 345 ] Nehmer, Stanley, 557 n [ Pg. 557 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] , 589 n [ Pg. 589 includes portions of Doc. 273 and Doc. 274 ] Netherlands, 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 205 ] , 606 [ Pg. 606 is part of Doc. 281 ] -607 [ Pg. 607 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] New Zealand, 53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 24 ] Newman, George S., 27 n [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 29 n [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 16 ] Nichols, Clarence W., 753 [ Pg. 753 is part of Doc. 336 ] Nicholson, James T., 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 134 ] Nigeria, 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 18 ] Nitze, Paul H., 203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 253 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 112 ] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 117 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 702 [ Pg. 702 is part of Doc. 316 ] , 703 [ Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 317 ] , 708 [ Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 320 ] Norway, 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 205 ] -452 [ Pg. 452 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] Norwood, Bernard, 541 n [ Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 606 n [ Pg. 606 is part of Doc. 281 ] Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 740 [ Pg. 740 is part of Doc. 329 ] Nunley, William T., 496 n [ Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 231 ] O'Brien, Lawrence F, 370 n [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 166 ] , 587 [ Pg. 587 is part of Doc. 272 ] Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, 765 [ Pg. 765 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] Office of Emergency Planning, 765 [ Pg. 765 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] , 770 [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 344 ] , 790 [ Pg. 790 is part of Doc. 352 ] -791 [ Pg. 791 includes portions of Doc. 352 and Doc. 353 ] , 792 [ Pg. 792 is part of Doc. 353 ] , 803 [ Pg. 803 is part of Doc. 358 ] , 810 [ Pg. 810 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] Ohira, Masayoshi, 185 [ Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] Ohly, John H., 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 164 ] Oil, 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 97 [ Pg. 97 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 327 [ Pg. 327 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] -328 [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 752 [ Pg. 752 is part of Doc. 336 ] -754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] , 762 [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 340 ] -764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 340 ] , 770 [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 344 ] -775 [ Pg. 775 is part of Doc. 346 ] , 793 [ Pg. 793 is part of Doc. 354 ] -796 [ Pg. 796 is part of Doc. 355 ] , 799 [ Pg. 799 includes portions of Doc. 356 and Doc. 357 ] -801 [ Pg. 801 is part of Doc. 357 ] , 808 [ Pg. 808 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361 ] -810 [ Pg. 810 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] O'Mahony, Joseph E., 125 n [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 329 n [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 153 ] Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 3 ] -6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 200 [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 213 n [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 279 [ Pg. 279 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] , 341 [ Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] -344 [ Pg. 344 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158 ] , 390 [ Pg. 390 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] Development Assistance Committee (DAC), 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 18 ] -42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 323 [ Pg. 323 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] , 332 [ Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 153 ] -333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 159 ] -350 [ Pg. 350 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 365 [ Pg. 365 includes portions of Doc. 164 and Doc. 165 ] -369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 384 [ Pg. 384 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] -389 [ Pg. 389 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] , 431 [ Pg. 431 is part of Doc. 194 ] Development Assistance Group (DAG), 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 97 ] -218 [ Pg. 218 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 220 [ Pg. 220 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] -231 [ Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] , 256 [ Pg. 256 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113 ] Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 793 [ Pg. 793 is part of Doc. 354 ] -796 [ Pg. 796 is part of Doc. 355 ] , 808 [ Pg. 808 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361 ] Pakistan, 27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 235 [ Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 280 n [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 128 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 209 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 210 ] Palmer, R., 341 n [ Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] Paraguay, 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 162 ] Paris Club (IMF Group of Ten), 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 60 ] Parsons (UK), 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 43 ] -114 [ Pg. 114 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] Pastore, John O., 470 [ Pg. 470 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 564 n [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 262 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 270 ] Peace Corps, 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 94 ] Pearcy, George, 795 [ Pg. 795 is part of Doc. 355 ] -796 [ Pg. 796 is part of Doc. 355 ] Pearson, Lester, 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 28 ] Pelt, Adrian S., 606 [ Pg. 606 is part of Doc. 281 ] -607 [ Pg. 607 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] Pereira, Pedro T., 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. 101 and Doc. 102 ] , 229 [ Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 102 ] -230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 102 ] Perkins, Raymond S., 461 n [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 211 ] Persons, Gen. Wilton B., 1 n [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] Peru, 777 [ Pg. 777 includes portions of Doc. 347 and Doc. 348 ] -778 [ Pg. 778 is part of Doc. 348 ] Peterson, Avery F, 461 n [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 484 [ Pg. 484 includes portions of Doc. 226 and Doc. 227 ] -489 [ Pg. 489 is part of Doc. 227 ] , 492 [ Pg. 492 is part of Doc. 229 ] -493 [ Pg. 493 includes portions of Doc. 229 and Doc. 230 ] , 502 [ Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] -503 [ Pg. 503 is part of Doc. 234 ] Petroleum. See Oil . Petroleum Study Committee, 770 n [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 344 ] , 799 [ Pg. 799 includes portions of Doc. 356 and Doc. 357 ] -801 [ Pg. 801 is part of Doc. 357 ] Pezzullo, Lawrence, 501 n [ Pg. 501 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] Philippines, 265 n [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 120 ] Pius XII, Pope, 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 155 ] Plakias, John N., 397 n [ Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] , 399 n [ Pg. 399 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] Plumptre (Canada), 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 228 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 102 ] -229 [ Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 102 ] Poage, W.R., 756 [ Pg. 756 is part of Doc. 337 ] , 758 [ Pg. 758 includes portions of Doc. 337 and Doc. 338 ] Poland, 651 n [ Pg. 651 is part of Doc. 298 ] , 658 n [ Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 659 [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 660 n [ Pg. 660 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 661 n [ Pg. 661 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] Pollack, Gerald A., 541 n [ Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] Pollack, Herman, 541 n [ Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] Poole, Richard A., 777 n [ Pg. 777 includes portions of Doc. 347 and Doc. 348 ] Population issue, 337 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. 155 ] -340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 155 ] Portugal, 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. 101 and Doc. 102 ] , 229 [ Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 102 ] -230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 165 ] Poultry. See under Trade policy. Powell, Richard, 621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 289 ] Prado y Ugarteche, Manuel, 777 [ Pg. 777 includes portions of Doc. 347 and Doc. 348 ] -778 [ Pg. 778 is part of Doc. 348 ] Prebisch, Raul, 623 [ Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 290 ] Propps, Herbert, 457 n [ Pg. 457 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] Rashish, Meyer, 106 n [ Pg. 106 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41 ] , 214 n [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 98 ] , 512 n [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240 ] Rathbone, Monroe Jackson, 762 [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 340 ] -764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 340 ] Rayburn, Sam, 648 [ Pg. 648 is part of Doc. 296 ] Read, Benjamin H., 392 [ Pg. 392 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] , 450 n [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 204 ] , 603 n [ Pg. 603 is part of Doc. 279 ] Reed, James A., 801 [ Pg. 801 is part of Doc. 357 ] Rehm, John Bertram, 537 n [ Pg. 537 includes portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] Reilly, Patrick, 648 [ Pg. 648 is part of Doc. 296 ] Reischauer, Edwin O., 473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 222 and Doc. 223 ] , 505 [ Pg. 505 is part of Doc. 235 ] , 509 [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] -510 [ Pg. 510 includes portions of Doc. 238 and Doc. 239 ] Renner, John C., 125 n [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 403 [ Pg. 403 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] Reuter, Richard W., 354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 162 ] -355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 162 ] Rey, Jean, 595 [ Pg. 595 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] -597 [ Pg. 597 is part of Doc. 276 ] Rice, A.E., 265 n [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 120 ] Richardson, David, 326 n [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 151 ] Rickett, Denis, 227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 102 ] -228 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 102 ] -231 [ Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] Riddleberger, James W., 194 [ Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 256 [ Pg. 256 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113 ] , 440 [ Pg. 440 is part of Doc. 197 ] Riley, Paul H., 801 [ Pg. 801 is part of Doc. 357 ] Roberts, Richard H., 326 n [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 151 ] Rockefeller, John D., 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 337 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 155 ] Rogers, Paul G., 658 n [ Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 302 ] Romania, 748 [ Pg. 748 is part of Doc. 333 ] Rooney, John J., 553 [ Pg. 553 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257 ] Roosa, Robert V., 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 20 ] -47 [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 24 ] -59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 87 n [ Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 178 n [ Pg. 178 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 is part of Doc. 181 ] -402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 181 ] Rostow, Walt Whitman, 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 67 ] -164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 195 [ Pg. 195 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] -196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 204 [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] -209 [ Pg. 209 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 258 [ Pg. 258 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] -259 [ Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] , 262 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 118 ] -263 [ Pg. 263 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] , 271 n [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 123 ] , 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 718 n [ Pg. 718 is part of Doc. 324 ] Roth, William M., 635 n [ Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 292 ] , 636 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 293 ] -639 [ Pg. 639 is part of Doc. 293 ] Rubber, synthetic, 655 [ Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 299 ] Rubin, Seymour, 281 [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 128 ] Ruser, Claus R., 808 n [ Pg. 808 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361 ] Rusk, Dean, 66 [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. 26 and Doc. 27 ] -67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 68 n [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 28 ] ,-120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 46 ] -121 [ Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 69 ] -168 [ Pg. 168 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 171 ] -384 [ Pg. 384 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] balance-of-payments issue, 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 9 ] -22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 34 ] -93 [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 40 ] -108 [ Pg. 108 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] , 382 [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] , 605 [ Pg. 605 is part of Doc. 280 ] export control policy, 658 [ Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 302 ] -663 [ Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 303 and Doc. 304 ] , 675 [ Pg. 675 is part of Doc. 308 ] -680 [ Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 309 ] , 687 [ Pg. 687 includes portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311 ] -688 [ Pg. 688 is part of Doc. 311 ] , 695 [ Pg. 695 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] -698 [ Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 701 [ Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 315 and Doc. 316 ] -705 [ Pg. 705 includes portions of Doc. 318 and Doc. 319 ] , 712 [ Pg. 712 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] -713 [ Pg. 713 is part of Doc. 323 ] , 718 n [ Pg. 718 is part of Doc. 324 ] , 729 [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 326 ] -733 [ Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 327 ] foreign assistance policy, 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 9 ] -22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 209 [ Pg. 209 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] -213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 114 ] -258 [ Pg. 258 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] , 274 [ Pg. 274 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125 ] -275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 125 ] , 337 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. 155 ] -340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 159 ] -350 [ Pg. 350 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 356 [ Pg. 356 is part of Doc. 163 ] -357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 163 ] foreign economic policy, 10 [ Pg. 10 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] -11 [ Pg. 11 includes portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5 ] , 14 [ Pg. 14 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] -15 [ Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 79 ] -184 [ Pg. 184 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] Germany, Federal Republic of, 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 40 ] -108 [ Pg. 108 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 46 ] -121 [ Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 46 ] international investment and development policy, 420 [ Pg. 420 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] -421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 191 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] -439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 202 ] -449 [ Pg. 449 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 222 and Doc. 223 ] -478 [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225 ] , 493 n [ Pg. 493 includes portions of Doc. 229 and Doc. 230 ] Italy, 589 [ Pg. 589 includes portions of Doc. 273 and Doc. 274 ] military assistance, 202 [ Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 93 ] -204 [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] , 247 [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] -248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 253 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 112 ] -256 [ Pg. 256 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113 ] , 283 [ Pg. 283 is part of Doc. 129 ] -284 [ Pg. 284 includes portions of Doc. 129 and Doc. 130 ] military expenditures, 66 [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. 26 and Doc. 27 ] -67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 68 n [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 34 ] -93 [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 69 ] -168 [ Pg. 168 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] population problems, 337 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. 155 ] -350 [ Pg. 350 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] Soviet bloc, 356 [ Pg. 356 is part of Doc. 163 ] -357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 163 ] strategic materials and commodities policy, 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] -758 [ Pg. 758 includes portions of Doc. 337 and Doc. 338 ] , 762 [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 340 ] -764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 340 ] trade policy, 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 208 ] -457 [ Pg. 457 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 241 ] -519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 530 [ Pg. 530 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] -531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 248 ] , 536 [ Pg. 536 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] -539 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 561 [ Pg. 561 includes portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262 ] -568 [ Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 263 ] , 573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 266 ] -575 [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. 266 ] , 604 [ Pg. 604 includes portions of Doc. 279 and Doc. 280 ] -605 [ Pg. 605 is part of Doc. 280 ] , 616 [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] -618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 287 ] , 641 [ Pg. 641 is part of Doc. 294 ] Sadrin (France), 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 102 ] Sato (Japan), 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 211 ] -462 [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 211 and Doc. 212 ] Saunders, Harold, 301 n [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 139 ] Schaetzel, J. Robert, 496 n [ Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 289 ] Scheel, Walter, 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 153 ] -334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 153 ] Scheyven, Louis, 462 [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 211 and Doc. 212 ] -463 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 212 ] Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr., 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 192 ] -423 [ Pg. 423 includes portions of Doc. 192 and Doc. 193 ] Schmulker, Sidney, 125 n [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] Schroede,Gerhard, 157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 65 ] -159 [ Pg. 159 includes portions of Doc. 65 and Doc. 66 ] , 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 82 ] -187 [ Pg. 187 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] , 640 [ Pg. 640 is part of Doc. 294 ] -643 [ Pg. 643 includes portions of Doc. 294 and Doc. 295 ] , 645 [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 295 ] Schweitzer, Paul-Pierre, 452 [ Pg. 452 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] Senate, U.S. See Congress, U.S. Sheet glass, 518 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 528 n [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 246 ] -531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 248 ] Sheppard, David, 328 [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 152 ] Shimoda, Takeso, 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 229 [ Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 102 ] Simmons, Frederick, 86 n [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 176 n [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 74 ] Slater, Warren, 589 n [ Pg. 589 includes portions of Doc. 273 and Doc. 274 ] Smith, Bromley, 192 [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 85 ] -193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 292 n [ Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 133 ] , 378 n [ Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 695 n [ Pg. 695 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] Smith, Tim, 397 [ Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] -399 [ Pg. 399 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] Sneider, Richard L., 468 n [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 218 ] Sorensen, Theodore, 87 n [ Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 135 [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] -136 [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 152 [ Pg. 152 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 258 n [ Pg. 258 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] , 587 [ Pg. 587 is part of Doc. 272 ] South Africa, 452 [ Pg. 452 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] , 760 [ Pg. 760 is part of Doc. 338 ] -761 [ Pg. 761 includes portions of Doc. 338 and Doc. 339 ] Southard, Frank A., 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 178 ] -397 [ Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 is part of Doc. 181 ] Soviet bloc trade. See Economic defense policy. Soviet Union ( see also Economic defense policy), 447 [ Pg. 447 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] , 651 n [ Pg. 651 is part of Doc. 298 ] , 652 [ Pg. 652 is part of Doc. 298 ] lend-lease payment to the U.S., 696 [ Pg. 696 is part of Doc. 313 ] -697 [ Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 745 [ Pg. 745 is part of Doc. 332 ] most-favored-nation status, 745 [ Pg. 745 is part of Doc. 332 ] oil trade, 708 [ Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 320 ] , 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] , 762 [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 340 ] -764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 340 ] , 773 [ Pg. 773 is part of Doc. 345 ] -774 [ Pg. 774 includes portions of Doc. 345 and Doc. 346 ] pipeline, 674 [ Pg. 674 is part of Doc. 307 ] Sino-Soviet relations, 668 [ Pg. 668 is part of Doc. 304 ] , 729 [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 326 ] U.S. wheat sales, 741 [ Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 330 ] -742 [ Pg. 742 is part of Doc. 330 ] Spaak, Paul-Henri, 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 246 ] -531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 248 ] Spain, 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 66 ] Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 253 ] -541 [ Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 546 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 255 ] -547 [ Pg. 547 is part of Doc. 255 ] , 568 [ Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 263 ] , 634 [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 291 ] Springsteen, George, 178 n [ Pg. 178 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 450 n [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 204 ] Stalder, Andrew, 129 n [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 52 ] Stevens, Robert, 589 [ Pg. 589 includes portions of Doc. 273 and Doc. 274 ] Stevenson, Adlai E., III, 153 [ Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 61 and Doc. 62 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 445 [ Pg. 445 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] -447 [ Pg. 447 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] Stikker, Dirk, 117 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 70 ] , 168 [ Pg. 168 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] Stinebower, Leroy D., 794 [ Pg. 794 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] -796 [ Pg. 796 is part of Doc. 355 ] Stockpiles. See Strategic materials and commodities policy . Stoessel, Walter J., 214 n [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 98 ] Stone, Galen L., 589 n [ Pg. 589 includes portions of Doc. 273 and Doc. 274 ] Strategic materials and commodities policy ( see also Agricultural commodities ): Barter Program, 802 [ Pg. 802 is part of Doc. 358 ] -807 [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360 ] , 810 [ Pg. 810 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] -811 [ Pg. 811 includes portions of Doc. 363 and Doc. 364 ] Canada, 759 [ Pg. 759 is part of Doc. 338 ] -760 [ Pg. 760 is part of Doc. 338 ] , 773 [ Pg. 773 is part of Doc. 345 ] coffee, 807 [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360 ] -808 [ Pg. 808 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361 ] Defense Mobilization Order V-7, 780 [ Pg. 780 is part of Doc. 349 ] -781 [ Pg. 781 is part of Doc. 349 ] , 782 [ Pg. 782 is part of Doc. 349 ] , 785 [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 349 ] , 788 [ Pg. 788 includes portions of Doc. 350 and Doc. 351 ] , 792disposal of stockpiles, 811 [ Pg. 811 includes portions of Doc. 363 and Doc. 364 ] -815 [ Pg. 815 includes portions of Doc. 364 and Doc. 365 ] Executive Stockpile Committee, 779 [ Pg. 779 is part of Doc. 349 ] -792 [ Pg. 792 is part of Doc. 353 ] , 802 [ Pg. 802 is part of Doc. 358 ] -807 [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360 ] , 810 [ Pg. 810 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] -815 [ Pg. 815 includes portions of Doc. 364 and Doc. 365 ] national stockpiling program, 774 [ Pg. 774 includes portions of Doc. 345 and Doc. 346 ] -777 [ Pg. 777 includes portions of Doc. 347 and Doc. 348 ] , 779 [ Pg. 779 is part of Doc. 349 ] -792 [ Pg. 792 is part of Doc. 353 ] , 802 [ Pg. 802 is part of Doc. 358 ] -807 [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360 ] , 810 [ Pg. 810 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] -815 [ Pg. 815 includes portions of Doc. 364 and Doc. 365 ] Office of Emergency Planning, 765 [ Pg. 765 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] , 770 [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 344 ] , 790 [ Pg. 790 is part of Doc. 352 ] -791 [ Pg. 791 includes portions of Doc. 352 and Doc. 353 ] , 792 [ Pg. 792 is part of Doc. 353 ] , 803 [ Pg. 803 is part of Doc. 358 ] , 810 oil, 327 [ Pg. 327 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] -328 [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 752 [ Pg. 752 is part of Doc. 336 ] -754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] , 762 [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 340 ] -764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 340 ] , 770 [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 344 ] -775 [ Pg. 775 is part of Doc. 346 ] , 793 [ Pg. 793 is part of Doc. 354 ] -796 [ Pg. 796 is part of Doc. 355 ] , 799 [ Pg. 799 includes portions of Doc. 356 and Doc. 357 ] -801 [ Pg. 801 is part of Doc. 357 ] , 808 [ Pg. 808 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361 ] -810 [ Pg. 810 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, 793 [ Pg. 793 is part of Doc. 354 ] -796 [ Pg. 796 is part of Doc. 355 ] Petroleum Study Committee, 799 [ Pg. 799 includes portions of Doc. 356 and Doc. 357 ] -801 [ Pg. 801 is part of Doc. 357 ] sugar 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] -758 [ Pg. 758 includes portions of Doc. 337 and Doc. 338 ] , 761 [ Pg. 761 includes portions of Doc. 338 and Doc. 339 ] , 777 [ Pg. 777 includes portions of Doc. 347 and Doc. 348 ] -778 [ Pg. 778 is part of Doc. 348 ] tin, 765 [ Pg. 765 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] -769 [ Pg. 769 is part of Doc. 343 ] , 797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 356 ] -799 [ Pg. 799 includes portions of Doc. 356 and Doc. 357 ] uraniurn, 751 [ Pg. 751 is part of Doc. 335 ] , 758 [ Pg. 758 includes portions of Doc. 337 and Doc. 338 ] -761 [ Pg. 761 includes portions of Doc. 338 and Doc. 339 ] Venezuelan oil, 773 [ Pg. 773 is part of Doc. 345 ] Strauss, Franz Josef, 121 [ Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53 ] -133 [ Pg. 133 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] Strauss-Gilpatric agreement, 132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53 ] -133 [ Pg. 133 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 includes portions of Doc. 65 and Doc. 66 ] Sugar, 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] -758 [ Pg. 758 includes portions of Doc. 337 and Doc. 338 ] , 761 [ Pg. 761 includes portions of Doc. 338 and Doc. 339 ] , 777 [ Pg. 777 includes portions of Doc. 347 and Doc. 348 ] -778 [ Pg. 778 is part of Doc. 348 ] Sullivan Charles A., 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 45 ] -119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 125 n [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 184 n [ Pg. 184 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 291 n [ Pg. 291 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] Swank, Emory C., 589 n [ Pg. 589 includes portions of Doc. 273 and Doc. 274 ] , 762 n [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 340 ] Sweden, 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 24 ] -56 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 205 ] -452 [ Pg. 452 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] Sweeney, Joseph, 656 n [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 299 , Doc. 300 , and Doc. 301 ] Symington, Stuart, 263 [ Pg. 263 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] -264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 119 ] , 775 [ Pg. 775 is part of Doc. 346 ] Taiwan, 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 167 ] Takeuchi, Ryuji, 504 [ Pg. 504 is part of Doc. 235 ] -505 [ Pg. 505 is part of Doc. 235 ] , 509 [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] -510 [ Pg. 510 includes portions of Doc. 238 and Doc. 239 ] , 619 [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 288 ] -620 [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 288 ] Tannenwald, Theodore, 231 [ Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] Tariffs. See Trade policy. Tax depreciation reform, 38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 18 ] Taylor, Gen. Maxwell D., 298 n [ Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] , 299 [ Pg. 299 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] -300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 301 n [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 139 ] Textiles. See under Trade policy. Thailand, 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 112 ] Thompson, Kenneth, 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 155 ] Thompson, Llewellyn E., 658 n [ Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 679 [ Pg. 679 is part of Doc. 309 ] , 753 [ Pg. 753 is part of Doc. 336 ] , 744 [ Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 332 ] Thorp, Willard L., 366 [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 172 ] Tilson, David, 434 n [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 195 ] Tin, 765 [ Pg. 765 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] -769 [ Pg. 769 is part of Doc. 343 ] , 797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 356 ] -799 [ Pg. 799 includes portions of Doc. 356 and Doc. 357 ] Tobin, Irwin M., 58 [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 87 n [ Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 56 ] -137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 56 ] Toner,Joseph, 291 n [ Pg. 291 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] Trade Agreements Committee. See Interdepartmental Committee on Trade Agreements . Trade Expansion Act of 1962 , 512 [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240 ] -516 [ Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 240 ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 249 ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 includes portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] -538 [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 253 ] , 547 [ Pg. 547 is part of Doc. 255 ] , 568 [ Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 263 ] -570 [ Pg. 570 includes portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265 ] , 583 [ Pg. 583 is part of Doc. 271 ] , 633 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 291 ] -634 [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 750 [ Pg. 750 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] Trade policy ( see also European Economic Community ; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ; International investment and development policy ), 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 208 ] -457 [ Pg. 457 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 496 [ Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 231 ] -497 [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 253 ] -541 [ Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] agricultural commodities, 462 [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 211 and Doc. 212 ] -463 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 506 [ Pg. 506 includes portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] -509 [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] , 523 [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 244 ] , 595 [ Pg. 595 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 289 ] , 623 [ Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 290 ] -624 [ Pg. 624 is part of Doc. 290 ] , 630 [ Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 291 ] -631 [ Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 641 [ Pg. 641 is part of Doc. 294 ] -643 [ Pg. 643 includes portions of Doc. 294 and Doc. 295 ] , 646 [ Pg. 646 is part of Doc. 295 ] , 656 [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 299 , Doc. 300 , and Doc. 301 ] -657 [ Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 301 ] , 689 [ Pg. 689 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312 ] poultry, 121 [ Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] , 559 [ Pg. 559 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] -560 [ Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 260 ] , 576 [ Pg. 576 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267 ] -577 [ Pg. 577 is part of Doc. 267 ] , 595 [ Pg. 595 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] , 597 [ Pg. 597 is part of Doc. 276 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 284 ] -614 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 285 ] , 635 n [ Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 292 ] wheat, 741 [ Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 330 ] -742 [ Pg. 742 is part of Doc. 330 ] grain, 641 [ Pg. 641 is part of Doc. 294 ] -643 [ Pg. 643 includes portions of Doc. 294 and Doc. 295 ] , 646 [ Pg. 646 is part of Doc. 295 ] , 741 [ Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 330 ] -742 [ Pg. 742 is part of Doc. 330 ] Belgian carpets and glass, 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 226 ] -481 [ Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 226 ] bicycles, 536 [ Pg. 536 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] -539 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. 252 ] carpets, 479 [ Pg. 479 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] -484 [ Pg. 484 includes portions of Doc. 226 and Doc. 227 ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 528 n [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 246 ] -531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 248 ] escape clauses, 489 [ Pg. 489 is part of Doc. 227 ] , 515 [ Pg. 515 is part of Doc. 240 ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 241 ] -519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 633 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 291 ] Export Control Act, 658 [ Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 660 [ Pg. 660 is part of Doc. 302 ] -662 [ Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 670 n [ Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 679 [ Pg. 679 is part of Doc. 309 ] -680 [ Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 309 ] , 684 [ Pg. 684 includes portions of Doc. 309 and Doc. 310 ] -685 [ Pg. 685 is part of Doc. 310 ] , 688 [ Pg. 688 is part of Doc. 311 ] , 691 [ Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 312 ] -692 [ Pg. 692 is part of Doc. 312 ] , 707 [ Pg. 707 is part of Doc. 320 ] , 712 [ Pg. 712 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] -717 [ Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 323 ] , 765 [ Pg. 765 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] export expansion, see trade expansion below France, 566 [ Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 262 ] , 583 [ Pg. 583 is part of Doc. 271 ] -584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 271 ] , 604 [ Pg. 604 includes portions of Doc. 279 and Doc. 280 ] -605 [ Pg. 605 is part of Doc. 280 ] , 607 [ Pg. 607 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 289 ] , 629 [ Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 640 [ Pg. 640 is part of Doc. 294 ] -641 [ Pg. 641 is part of Doc. 294 ] glass, 528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 245 ] -531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 248 ] Hong Kong, 482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 226 ] -483 [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 226 ] House Select Committee on Export Control (Kitchin Committee), 658 [ Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 668 [ Pg. 668 is part of Doc. 304 ] Interdepartmental Committee on Trade Agreements (TAC), 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 520 [ Pg. 520 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] -527 [ Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 244 ] Italy, 589 [ Pg. 589 includes portions of Doc. 273 and Doc. 274 ] , 620 [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 288 ] Japan, 484 [ Pg. 484 includes portions of Doc. 226 and Doc. 227 ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 241 ] Economic Mission to Washington, 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 211 ] -462 [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 211 and Doc. 212 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] textiles ( see also below ), 464 [ Pg. 464 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] -465 [ Pg. 465 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 218 ] -469 [ Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219 ] , 482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 226 ] -483 [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 504 [ Pg. 504 is part of Doc. 235 ] -506 [ Pg. 506 includes portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] , 509 [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] -512 [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240 ] , 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 241 ] -519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 249 ] -534 [ Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 249 ] , 553 [ Pg. 553 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257 ] -557 [ Pg. 557 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] , 619 [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 288 ] -620 [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 288 ] U.S.-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs, Hakone, November 1961 , 483 [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 226 ] -484 [ Pg. 484 includes portions of Doc. 226 and Doc. 227 ] , 496 [ Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 231 ] -501 [ Pg. 501 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] MansholtPlan, 630 [ Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 291 ] -631 [ Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 641 [ Pg. 641 is part of Doc. 294 ] Netherlands, 606 [ Pg. 606 is part of Doc. 281 ] -607 [ Pg. 607 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] oil, 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 97 [ Pg. 97 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 327 [ Pg. 327 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] -328 [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 708 [ Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 320 ] , 762 [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 340 ] -764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 340 ] , 770 [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 344 ] -775 [ Pg. 775 is part of Doc. 346 ] preference issue, 625 [ Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 290 ] -627 [ Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 290 ] , 631 [ Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 291 ] -632 [ Pg. 632 is part of Doc. 291 ] sheet glass, 518 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 528 n [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 246 ] -531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 248 ] Soviet bloc and Soviet Union, see under Economic defense policy Soviet most-favored-nation trade status, 745 [ Pg. 745 is part of Doc. 332 ] Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 253 ] -541 [ Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 546 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 255 ] -547 [ Pg. 547 is part of Doc. 255 ] , 568 [ Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 263 ] , 634 [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 291 ] textiles, 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 24 ] -61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 457 [ Pg. 457 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] -460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 464 [ Pg. 464 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] -474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] -484 [ Pg. 484 includes portions of Doc. 226 and Doc. 227 ] , 504 [ Pg. 504 is part of Doc. 235 ] -506 [ Pg. 506 includes portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] , 509 [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] -512 [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240 ] , 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 241 ] -520 [ Pg. 520 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 249 ] -536 [ Pg. 536 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] , 589 [ Pg. 589 includes portions of Doc. 273 and Doc. 274 ] -592 [ Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 619 [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 288 ] -620 [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 288 ] Cabinet Textile Committee, 546 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 255 ] -547 [ Pg. 547 is part of Doc. 255 ] , 558 [ Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 259 ] , 562 [ Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 262 ] , 585 [ Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 272 ] cotton equalization fee, 504 [ Pg. 504 is part of Doc. 235 ] -506 [ Pg. 506 includes portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] , 509 [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] -512 [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240 ] , 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 249 ] -534 [ Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 249 ] Long-Term Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles (LTA) ( 1962 ), 473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 222 and Doc. 223 ] -474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] , 520 [ Pg. 520 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] , 555 [ Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 258 ] -557 [ Pg. 557 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] , 558 [ Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 259 ] , 564 [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 262 ] , 565 [ Pg. 565 is part of Doc. 262 ] , 570 [ Pg. 570 includes portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265 ] -572 [ Pg. 572 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] , 573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 266 ] President's Advisory Committee on Textiles, 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 209 ] U.S. 7-point program, 464 [ Pg. 464 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] -465 [ Pg. 465 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 222 and Doc. 223 ] wool, 535 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 249 ] -536 [ Pg. 536 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] , 546 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 255 ] -548 [ Pg. 548 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] , 555 [ Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 258 ] -559 [ Pg. 559 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] , 561 [ Pg. 561 includes portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262 ] -568 [ Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 263 ] , 570 [ Pg. 570 includes portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265 ] -576 [ Pg. 576 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267 ] , 578 [ Pg. 578 is part of Doc. 268 ] -581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 270 ] , 589 [ Pg. 589 includes portions of Doc. 273 and Doc. 274 ] , 608 [ Pg. 608 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] -609 [ Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 283 ] , 615 [ Pg. 615 is part of Doc. 286 ] -616 [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 619 [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 288 ] -620 [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 288 ] Trade Expansion Act of 1962 , 512 [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240 ] -516 [ Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 240 ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 249 ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 includes portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] -538 [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 253 ] , 547 [ Pg. 547 is part of Doc. 255 ] , 568 [ Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 263 ] -570 [ Pg. 570 includes portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265 ] , 583 [ Pg. 583 is part of Doc. 271 ] , 633 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 291 ] -634 [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 750 [ Pg. 750 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] trade expansion program, 541 [ Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] -545 [ Pg. 545 is part of Doc. 254 ] , 548 [ Pg. 548 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] -554 [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 257 ] , 568 [ Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 263 ] -570 [ Pg. 570 includes portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265 ] , 593 [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 275 ] -608 [ Pg. 608 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] , 616 [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] -618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 287 ] U.N. Trade and Development Conference, 622 [ Pg. 622 is part of Doc. 290 ] -627 [ Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 290 ] U.S.-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs, Hakone, November 1961 , 483 [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 226 ] -484 [ Pg. 484 includes portions of Doc. 226 and Doc. 227 ] , 496 [ Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 231 ] -501 [ Pg. 501 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] White House Conference on Export Expansion ( 1963 ), 616 [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] -618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 287 ] Treaty of Rome, 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 32 ] Trezise, Philip H., 490 [ Pg. 490 includes portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228 ] -491 [ Pg. 491 is part of Doc. 228 ] , 512 n [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240 ] , 529 n [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 675 [ Pg. 675 is part of Doc. 308 ] -677 [ Pg. 677 is part of Doc. 308 ] , 703 n [ Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 317 ] , 801 [ Pg. 801 is part of Doc. 357 ] Tunisia, 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 18 ] Turkey, 27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 235 [ Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 280 n [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 128 ] , 281 [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 128 ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 140 ] -304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 140 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 379 [ Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 169 ] Turner (BOB), 653 [ Pg. 653 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] Turpin, William N., 656 n [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 299 , Doc. 300 , and Doc. 301 ] Tuthill, John W., 279 [ Pg. 279 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] Tyler, William R., 120 n [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 52 ] -132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53 ] Udall, Stewart L., 809 [ Pg. 809 is part of Doc. 362 ] -810 [ Pg. 810 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] U.N. Capital Development Fund, 397 [ Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] -400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 409 [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 186 ] -410 [ Pg. 410 is part of Doc. 186 ] U.N. Coffee Conference, 807 [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360 ] -808 [ Pg. 808 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361 ] U.N. Decade of Development, 415 [ Pg. 415 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 192 ] -425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 441 [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 197 ] -442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 445 [ Pg. 445 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] -447 [ Pg. 447 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] U.N. Development Authority, 409 [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 186 ] -410 [ Pg. 410 is part of Doc. 186 ] U.N. Development Year, 413 [ Pg. 413 includes portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] -414 [ Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 188 ] U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 192 ] -423 [ Pg. 423 includes portions of Doc. 192 and Doc. 193 ] , 425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 195 ] U.N. Special Fund Project for Cuba, 397 [ Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] -399 [ Pg. 399 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] , 403 [ Pg. 403 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] -405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 195 ] -436 [ Pg. 436 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] -445 [ Pg. 445 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 202 ] -449 [ Pg. 449 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] U.N. Trade and Development Conference, 622 [ Pg. 622 is part of Doc. 290 ] -627 [ Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 290 ] United Arab Republic, 316 [ Pg. 316 is part of Doc. 145 ] United Kingdom ( see also European Economic Community ), 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 142 [ Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 145 [ Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 59 ] -146 [ Pg. 146 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 194 ] balance-of-payments issue, 2 [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 42 ] -110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 43 ] -114 [ Pg. 114 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 includes portions of Doc. 65 and Doc. 66 ] -160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 66 ] bicycle trade, 536 [ Pg. 536 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] -539 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. 252 ] COCOM List review, 649 [ Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 297 ] -650 [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 297 ] , 671 [ Pg. 671 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] -674 [ Pg. 674 is part of Doc. 307 ] foreign assistance policy, 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. 101 and Doc. 102 ] , 227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 102 ] -228 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 102 ] -231 [ Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] , 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 172 ] -387 [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 172 ] Japan, 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 43 ] oil trade, 752 [ Pg. 752 is part of Doc. 336 ] -754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] Soviet oil purchases, 763 [ Pg. 763 is part of Doc. 340 ] trade policy, 459 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 210 ] -460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 525 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 244 ] , 566 [ Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 262 ] , 608 n [ Pg. 608 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] , 615 [ Pg. 615 is part of Doc. 286 ] -616 [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 289 ] , 667 [ Pg. 667 is part of Doc. 304 ] -668 [ Pg. 668 is part of Doc. 304 ] , 671 [ Pg. 671 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] -674 [ Pg. 674 is part of Doc. 307 ] U.S. economic relations, 108 [ Pg. 108 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] -114 [ Pg. 114 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] United Nations ( see also U.N. headings ), 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 194 ] -429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 431 [ Pg. 431 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 197 ] Uranium, 751 [ Pg. 751 is part of Doc. 335 ] , 758 [ Pg. 758 includes portions of Doc. 337 and Doc. 338 ] -761 [ Pg. 761 includes portions of Doc. 338 and Doc. 339 ] Van Houten (Netherlands), 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 101 ] Vedeler, Harold C., 658 n [ Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 302 ] Veliotes, Nicholas A., 466 n [ Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] Venezuela, 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 316 [ Pg. 316 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 755 [ Pg. 755 is part of Doc. 337 ] , 773 [ Pg. 773 is part of Doc. 345 ] Vettel, Thelma E., 187 n [ Pg. 187 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] , 457 n [ Pg. 457 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 510 n [ Pg. 510 includes portions of Doc. 238 and Doc. 239 ] , 619 n [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 288 ] Vietnam, 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 280 n [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 128 ] , 36Vine, Richard D., 599 n [ Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] Vinson, Carl, 470 [ Pg. 470 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 564 n [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 262 ] Walker, Herman, 521 [ Pg. 521 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] -527 [ Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 244 ] Wallner, Woodruff, 448 n [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 202 ] Webb, William O., 189 n [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 84 ] Webb-Pomerene Act, 62 [ Pg. 62 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] Weiss, Leonard, 457 n [ Pg. 457 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 512 n [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240 ] , 529 n [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 537 n [ Pg. 537 includes portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] , 541 n [ Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 599 n [ Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] , 606 n [ Pg. 606 is part of Doc. 281 ] Weiss, Seymour, 201 n [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 211 n [ Pg. 211 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] Werner, Pierre, 411 n [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 187 ] Westfall, Virginia, 399 n [ Pg. 399 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] Westrick, Ludgar, 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 101 ] -223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 102 ] -227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 644 [ Pg. 644 is part of Doc. 295 ] White, Lee, 790 [ Pg. 790 is part of Doc. 352 ] -791 [ Pg. 791 includes portions of Doc. 352 and Doc. 353 ] White House Conference on Export Expansion (1963), 616 [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] -618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 287 ] Whitt, John S., 451 n [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 205 ] Widman, FL., 178 n [ Pg. 178 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 179 n [ Pg. 179 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] , 181 n [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] Wilkin, David, 399 n [ Pg. 399 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] Williams, Manning H., 192 [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 85 ] -193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 114 ] Wilson, George M., 453 [ Pg. 453 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] -454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 207 ] Wilson, James M., Jr., 201 n [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 93 ] Wilson, Leonard, 512 n [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240 ] Wirtz, W. Willard, 565 [ Pg. 565 is part of Doc. 262 ] , 801 [ Pg. 801 is part of Doc. 357 ] Woods, George, 452 [ Pg. 452 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] Woodward, Robert H, 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 114 ] Wool textiles. See under Trade policy. Wright, Robert H., 661 n [ Pg. 661 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] , 675 n [ Pg. 675 is part of Doc. 308 ] , 701 n [ Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 315 and Doc. 316 ] , 712 n [ Pg. 712 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] Wyndham White, Eric, 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 209 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 222 and Doc. 223 ] , 506 n [ Pg. 506 includes portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] , 556 [ Pg. 556 is part of Doc. 258 ] , 558 [ Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 259 ] , 559 [ Pg. 559 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] , 573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 266 ] Young, M.S., 656 n [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 299 , Doc. 300 , and Doc. 301 ] Yugoslavia, 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 658 n [ Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 660 n [ Pg. 660 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 750 [ Pg. 750 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] Zijlstra, J., 411 n [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 187 ]